Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 4 (of 16)

by United States. Congress

Friday, February 15.

Bank of the United States.

The Senate resumed, as in Committee of the Whole, the bill to amend and continue in force an act, entitled "An act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States," passed on the 25th day of February, 1791.

Mr. Clay.—Mr. President: When the subject involved in the motion now under consideration was depending before the other branch of the Legislature, a disposition to acquiesce in their decision was evinced. For although the committee who reported this bill had been raised many weeks prior to the determination of that House on the proposition to recharter the bank, except the occasional reference to it of memorials and petitions, we scarcely ever heard of it. The rejection, it is true, of a measure brought before either branch of Congress, does not absolutely preclude the other from taking up the same proposition; but the economy of our time, and a just deference for the opinion of others, would seem to recommend a delicate and cautious exercise of this power. As this subject, at the memorable period when the charter was granted, called forth the best talents of the nation—as it has, on various occasions, undergone the most thorough investigation, and as we can hardly expect that it is susceptible of receiving any further elucidation, it was to have been hoped that we should have been spared a useless debate. This was the more desirable because there are, I conceive, much superior claims upon us for every hour of the small portion of the session yet remaining to us. Under the operation of these motives, I had resolved to give a silent vote, until I felt myself bound, by the defying manner of the arguments advanced in support of the renewal, to obey the paramount duties I owe my country and its constitution; to make one effort, however feeble, to avert the passage of what appears to me a most unjustifiable law. After my honorable friend from Virginia (Mr. Giles) had instructed and amused us with the very able and ingenious argument which he delivered on yesterday, I should have still forborne to trespass on the Senate, but for the extraordinary character of his speech. He discussed both sides of the question, with great ability and eloquence, and certainly demonstrated to the satisfaction of all who heard him, both that it was constitutional and unconstitutional, highly proper and improper to prolong the charter of the bank. The honorable gentleman appeared to me in the predicament in which the celebrated orator of Virginia, Patrick Henry, is said to have been once placed. Engaged in a most extensive and lucrative practice of the law, he mistook in one instance the side of the cause on which he was retained, and addressed the court and jury in a very splendid and convincing speech in behalf of his antagonist. His distracted client came up to him whilst he was progressing, and interrupting him, bitterly exclaimed, "you have undone me! you have ruined me!"—"Never mind, give yourself no concern," said the adroit advocate; and turning to the court and jury, continued his argument by observing, "May it please your honors, and you, gentlemen of the jury, I have been stating to you what I presume my adversary may urge on his side. I will now show you how fallacious his reasoning and groundless his pretensions are." The skilful orator proceeded, satisfactorily refuted every argument he had advanced, and gained his cause! A success with which I trust the exertion of my honorable friend will on this occasion be crowned.

It has been said by the honorable gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Crawford) that this has been made a party question, although the law incorporating the bank was passed prior to the formation of parties, and when Congress was not biased by party prejudices. [Mr. Crawford explained. He did not mean that it had been made a party question in the Senate. His allusion was elsewhere.] I do not think it altogether fair to refer to the discussions in the House of Representatives, as gentlemen belonging to that body have no opportunity of defending themselves here. It is true that this law was not the effect, but it is no less true that it was one of the causes of the political divisions of this country. And if, during the agitation of the present question, the renewal has, on one side, been opposed on party principles, let me ask if, on the other, it has not been advocated on similar principles? Where is the Macedonian phalanx, the opposition in Congress? I believe, sir, I shall not incur the charge of presumptuous prophecy, when I predict that we shall not pick up from its ranks one single straggler! And if, on this occasion, my worthy friend from Georgia has gone over into the camp of the enemy, is it kind in him to look back upon his former friends, and rebuke them for the fidelity with which they adhere to their old principles?

I shall not stop to examine how far a representative is bound by the instructions of his constituents. This is a question between the giver and receiver of the instructions. But I must be permitted to express my surprise at the pointed difference which has been made between the opinions and instructions of State Legislatures, and the opinions and details of the deputations with which we have been surrounded from Philadelphia. Whilst the resolutions of those Legislatures—known, legitimate, constitutional and deliberative bodies—have been thrown into the back ground, and their interference regarded as officious, these delegations from self-created societies, composed of whom nobody knows, have been received by the committee with the utmost complaisance. Their communications have been treasured up with the greatest diligence. Never did the Delphic priests collect with more holy care the frantic expressions of the agitated Pythia, or expound them with more solemnity to the astonished Grecians, than has the committee gathered the opinions and testimony of these deputies, and through the gentleman from Massachusetts, pompously detailed them to the Senate! Philadelphia has her immediate representatives, capable of expressing her wishes upon the floor of the other House. If it be improper for States to obtrude upon Congress their sentiments, it is much more highly so for the unauthorized deputies of fortuitous congregations.

The first singular feature that attracts attention in this bill is the new and unconstitutional veto which it establishes. The constitution has required only, that after bills have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, they shall be presented to the President for his approval or rejection, and his determination is to be made known in ten days. But this bill provides, that when all the constitutional sanctions are obtained, and when according to the usual routine of legislation it ought to be considered as a law, it is to be submitted to a new branch of the Legislature, consisting of the President and twenty-four Directors of the Bank of the United States, holding their sessions in Philadelphia, and if they please to approve it, why then it is to become a law! And three months (the term allowed by our law of May last, to one of the great belligerents for revoking his edicts, after the other shall have repealed his) are granted them to decide whether an act of Congress shall be the law of the land or not! An act which is said to be indispensably necessary to our salvation, and without the passage of which, universal distress and bankruptcy are to pervade the country. Remember, sir, that the honorable gentleman from Georgia has contended that this charter is no contract. Does it, then, become the representatives of the nation to leave the nation at the mercy of a corporation? Ought the impending calamities to be left to the hazard of a contingent remedy?

This vagrant power to erect a bank, after having wandered throughout the whole constitution in quest of some congenial spot whereupon to fasten, has been at length located by the gentleman from Georgia on that provision, which authorizes Congress to lay and collect taxes, &c. In 1791, the power is referred to one part of the instrument; in 1811, to another. Sometimes it is alleged to be deducible from the power to regulate commerce. Hard pressed here, it disappears, and shows itself under the grant to coin money. The sagacious Secretary of the Treasury in 1791 pursued the wisest course—he has taken shelter behind general, high-sounding, and imposing terms. He has declared in the preamble to the act establishing the bank, that it will be very conducive to the successful conducting of the national finances; will tend to give facility to the obtaining of loans, and will be productive of considerable advantage to trade and industry in general. No allusion is made to the collection of taxes. What is the nature of this Government? It is emphatically federal, vested with an aggregate of specified powers for general purposes, conceded by existing sovereignties, who have themselves retained what is not so conceded. It is said that there are cases in which it must act on implied powers. This is not controverted, but the implication must be necessary, and obviously flow from the enumerated power with which it is allied. The power to charter companies is not specified in the grant, and I contend is of a nature not transferable by mere implication. It is one of the most exalted attributes of sovereignty. In the exercise of this gigantic power we have seen an East India Company created, which has carried dismay, desolation, and death throughout one of the largest portions of the habitable world. A company which is, in itself, a sovereignty—which has subverted empires and set up new dynasties—and has not only made war, but war against its legitimate sovereign! Under the influence of this power, we have seen arise a South Sea Company, and a Mississippi Company, that distracted and convulsed all Europe, and menaced a total overthrow of all credit and confidence, and universal bankruptcy. Is it to be imagined that a power so vast would have been left by the wisdom of the constitution to doubtful inference? It has been alleged that there are many instances, in the constitution, where powers, in their nature incidental, and which would have necessarily vested along with the principal power, are nevertheless expressly enumerated; and the power "to make rules and regulations for the government of the land and naval forces," which, it is said, is incidental to the power to raise armies and provide a navy, is given as an example. What does this prove? How extremely cautious the convention were to leave as little as possible to implication. In all cases where incidental powers are acted upon, the principal and incidental ought to be congenial with each other, and partake of a common nature. The incidental power ought to be strictly subordinate and limited to the end proposed to be attained by the specified power. In other words, under the name of accomplishing one object which is specified, the power implied ought not to be made to embrace other objects which are not specified in the constitution. If then you could establish a bank to collect and distribute the revenue, it ought to be expressly restricted to the purpose of such collection and distribution. It is a mockery, worse than usurpation, to establish it for a lawful object, and then extend it to other objects which are not lawful. In deducing the power to create corporations, such as I have described it, from the power to collect taxes, the relation and condition of principal and incident are prostrated and destroyed. The accessory is exalted above the principal. As well might it be said that the great luminary of day is an accessory, a satellite to the humblest star that twinkles forth its feeble light in the firmament of heaven!

Suppose the constitution had been silent as to an individual department of this Government, could you, under the power to lay and collect taxes, establish a judiciary? I presume not; but if you could derive the power by mere implication, could you vest it with any other authority than to enforce the collection of the revenue? A bank is made for the ostensible purpose of aiding in the collection of the revenue, and while it is engaged in this, the most inferior and subordinate of all its functions, it is made to diffuse itself through society, and to influence all the great operations of credit, circulation, and commerce. Like the Virginia justice, you tell the man, whose turkey had been stolen, that your book of precedents furnishes no form for his case, but then you will grant him a precept to search for a cow, and when looking for that he may possibly find his turkey! You say to this corporation, we cannot authorize you to discount—to emit paper—to regulate commerce, &c. No! Our book has no precedents of that kind. But then we can authorize you to collect the revenue, and, while occupied with that, you may do whatever else you please!

What is a corporation such as the bill contemplates? It is a splendid association of favored individuals, taken from the mass of society, and invested with exemptions and surrounded by immunities and privileges. The honorable gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Lloyd) has said that the original law, establishing the bank, was justly liable to the objection of vesting in that institution an exclusive privilege, the faith of the Government being pledged that no other bank should be authorized during its existence. This objection he supposes is obviated by the bill under consideration; but all corporations enjoy exclusive privileges—that is, the corporators have privileges which no others possess; and if you create fifty corporations instead of one, you have only fifty privileged bodies instead of one.

I contend that the States have the exclusive power to regulate contracts, to declare the capacities and incapacities to contract, and to provide as to the extent of responsibility of debtors to their creditors. If Congress have the power to erect an artificial body and say it shall be endowed with the attributes of an individual—if you can bestow on this object of your own creation the ability to contract, may you not, in contravention of State rights, confer upon slaves, infants, and femes covert, the ability to contract? And if you have the power to say that an association of individuals shall be responsible for their debts only in a certain limited degree, what is to prevent an extension of a similar exemption to individuals? Where is the limitation upon this power to set up corporations? You establish one, in the heart of a State, the basis of whose capital is money. You may erect others whose capital shall consist of land, slaves, and personal estate, and thus the whole property within the jurisdiction of a State might be absorbed by these political bodies. The existing bank contends that it is beyond the power of a State to tax it, and if this pretension be well founded, it is in the power of Congress, by chartering companies, to dry up the whole of the sources of State revenue. Georgia has undertaken, it is true, to levy a tax on the branch within her jurisdiction, but this law, now under a course of litigation, is considered as invalid. The United States own a great deal of land in the State of Ohio; can this Government, for the purpose of creating an ability to purchase it, charter a company? Aliens are forbidden, I believe, in that State, to hold real estate—could you, in order to multiply purchasers, confer upon them the capacity to hold land, in derogation of the local law? I imagine this will hardly be insisted upon; and yet there exists a more obvious connection between the undoubted power, which is possessed by this Government, to sell its land, and the means of executing that power, by increasing the demand in the market, than there is between this bank and the collection of a tax. This Government has the power to levy taxes—to raise armies—provide a navy—make war—regulate commerce—coin money, &c. It would not be difficult to show as intimate a connection between a corporation, established for any purpose whatever, and some one or other of those great powers, as there is between the revenue and the bank of the United States.

Let us inquire into the actual participation of this bank in the collection of the revenue. Prior to the passage of the act of 1800, requiring the collectors of those ports of entry, at which the principal bank or any of its offices are situated, to deposit with them the custom-house bonds, it had not the smallest agency in the collection of the duties. During almost one moiety of the period to which the existence of this institution was limited, it was noways instrumental in the collection of that revenue, to which it is now become indispensable! The collection, previous to 1800, was made entirely by the collectors; and even at present, where there is one port of entry, at which this bank is employed, there are eight or ten at which the collection is made as it was before 1800. And, sir, what does this bank or its branches when resort is had to it? It does not adjust with the merchant the amount of the duty, nor take his bond; nor, if the bond is not paid, coerce the payment by distress or otherwise. In fact, it has no active agency whatever in the collection. Its operation is merely passive; that is, if the obligor, after his bond is placed in the bank, discharges it, all is very well. Such is the mighty aid afforded by this tax-gatherer, without which the Government cannot get along! Again, it is not pretended that the very limited assistance which this institution does in truth render, extends to any other than a single species of tax, that is, duties. In the collection of the excise, the direct and other internal taxes, no aid was derived from any bank. It is true, in the collection of those taxes, the farmer did not obtain the same indulgence which the merchant receives in paying duties. But what obliges Congress to give credit at all? Could it not demand prompt payment of the duties? And in fact does it not so demand in many instances? Whether credit is given or not, is a matter merely of discretion. If it be a facility to mercantile operations (as I presume it is) it ought to be granted. But I deny the right to ingraft upon it a bank, which you would not otherwise have the power to erect. You cannot create the necessity of a bank, and then plead that necessity for its establishment. In the administration of the finances, the bank acts simply as a payer and receiver. The Secretary of the Treasury has money in New York and wants it in Charleston; the bank will furnish him with a check, or bill, to make the remittance, which any merchant would do just as well.

I will now proceed to show by fact, actual experience, not theoretic reasoning, but by the records themselves of the Treasury, that the operations of that department may be as well conducted without as with this bank. The delusion has consisted in the use of certain high-sounding phrases, dexterously used on the occasion. "The collection of the revenue"—"The administration of the finance"—"The conducting the fiscal affairs of the Government," the usual language of the advocates of the bank, extort express assent, or awe into acquiescence, without inquiry or examination into its necessity. About the commencement of this year there appears, by the report of the Secretary of the Treasury of the 7th of January, to have been a little upwards of two millions four hundred thousand dollars in the Treasury of the United States; and more than one-third of this whole sum was in the vaults of local banks. In several instances, where an opportunity existed of selecting the bank, a preference has been given to the State bank, or at least a portion of the deposits has been made with it. In New York, for example, there was deposited with the Manhattan Bank $188,670, although a branch bank is in that city. In this District, $115,080 were deposited with the bank of Columbia, although here also is a branch bank, and yet the State banks are utterly unsafe to be trusted! If the money, after the bonds are collected, is thus placed with these banks, I presume there can be no difficulty in placing the bonds themselves there, if they must be deposited with some bank for collection, which I deny.

Again, one of the most important and complicated branches of the Treasury Department is the management of our landed system. The sales have some years amounted to upwards of half a million of dollars, are generally made upon credit, and yet no bank whatever is made use of to facilitate the collection. After it is made, the amount in some instances has been deposited with banks, and according to the Secretary's report, which I have before adverted to, the amount so deposited was in January upwards of three hundred thousand dollars, not one cent of which was in the vaults of the Bank of the United States, or in any of its branches, but in the Bank of Pennsylvania, its branch at Pittsburg, the Marietta Bank, and the Kentucky Bank. Upon the point of responsibility, I cannot subscribe to the opinion of the Secretary of the Treasury, if it is meant that the ability to pay the amount of any deposits which the Government may make under any exigency, is greater than that of the State banks; that the accountability of a ramified institution, whose affairs are managed by a single head, responsible for all its members, is more simple than that of a number of independent and unconnected establishments, I shall not deny; but, with regard to safety, I am strongly inclined to think it is on the side of the local banks. The corruption or misconduct of the parent, or any of its branches, may bankrupt or destroy the whole system, and the loss of the Government in that event will be of the deposits made with each; whereas in the failure of one State bank the loss will be confined to the deposit in the vaults of that bank. It is said to have been a part of Burr's plan to seize on the branch bank at New Orleans. At that period large sums, imported from La Vera Cruz, are alleged to have been deposited with it, and if the traitor had accomplished his design, the Bank of the United States, if not actually bankrupt, might have been constrained to stop payment.

It is urged by the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Lloyd,) that as this nation progresses in commerce, wealth, and population, new energies will be unfolded, new wants and exigencies will arise, and hence he infers that powers must be implied from the constitution. But, sir, the question is, shall we stretch the instrument to embrace cases not fairly within its scope, or shall we resort to that remedy, by amendment, which the constitution prescribes?

Gentlemen contend that the construction which they give to the constitution has been acquiesced in by all parties, and under all administrations; and they rely particularly on an act which passed in 1804, for extending a branch to New Orleans, and another act, of 1807, for punishing those who should forge or utter forged paper of the bank. With regard to the first law, passed no doubt upon the recommendation of the Treasury Department, I would remark, that it was the extension of a branch to a Territory, over which Congress possesses power of legislation almost uncontrolled, and where, without any constitutional impediment, charters of incorporation may be granted. As to the other act, it was passed no less for the benefit of the community than the bank—to protect the ignorant and unwary from counterfeit paper, purporting to have been emitted by the bank. When gentlemen are claiming the advantage supposed to be deducible from acquiescence, let me inquire what they would have had those to have done who believed the establishment of the bank an encroachment upon State rights? Were they to have resisted, and how? By force? Upon the change of parties, in 1800, it must be well recollected that the greatest calamities were predicted as consequences of that event. Intentions were ascribed to the new occupants of power of violating the public faith and prostrating national credit. Under such circumstances, that they should act with great circumspection was quite natural. They saw in full operation a bank, chartered by a Congress who had as much right to judge of their constitutional powers as their successors. Had they revoked the law which gave it existence, the institution would, in all probability, have continued to transact business notwithstanding. The Judiciary would have been appealed to; and, from the known opinions and predilections of the judges then composing it, they would have pronounced the act of incorporation, as in the nature of a contract, beyond the repealing power of any succeeding Legislature. And, sir, what a scene of confusion would such a state of things have presented—an act of Congress, which was law in the statute book, and a nullity on the judicial records! Was it not wisest to wait the natural dissolution of the corporation, rather than accelerate that event by a repealing law involving so many delicate considerations?

When gentlemen attempt to carry this measure, upon the ground of acquiescence or precedent, do they forget that we are not in Westminster Hall? In courts of justice, the utility of uniformity of decision exacts of the judge a conformity to the adjudication of his predecessor. In the interpretation and administration of the law, this practice is wise and proper; and without it, every thing depending upon the caprice of the judge, we should have no security for our dearest rights. It is far otherwise when applied to the source of legislation. Here no rule exists but the constitution; and to legislate upon the ground merely that our predecessors thought themselves authorized, under similar circumstances, to legislate, is to sanctify error and perpetuate usurpation. But if we are to be subjected to the trammels of precedents, I claim, on the other hand, the benefit of the restrictions under which the intelligent judge cautiously receives them. It is an established rule, that to give to a previous adjudication any effect, the mind of the judge who pronounced must have been awakened to the subject, and it must have been a deliberate opinion formed after full argument. In technical language, it must not have been sub silentio. Now, the acts of 1804 and 1807, relied upon as pledges for the re-chartering this company, passed not only without any discussions whatever, of the constitutional power of Congress to establish a bank, but I venture to say, without a single member having had his attention drawn to this question. I had the honor of a seat in the Senate when the latter law passed; probably voted for it; and I declare, with the utmost sincerity, that I never once thought of that point; and I appeal confidently to every honorable member who was then present to say if that was not his situation.

This doctrine of precedents, applied to the Legislature, appears to me to be fraught with the most mischievous consequences. The great advantage of our system of government over all others is, that we have a written constitution defining its limits and prescribing its authorities; and that, however for a time faction may convulse the nation, and passion and party prejudice sway its functionaries, the season of reflection will recur, when calmly retracing their deeds, and all aberrations from fundamental principle will be corrected. But once substitute practice for principle, the expositions of the constitution for the text of the constitution, and in vain shall we look for the instrument in the instrument itself. It will be as diffused and intangible as the pretended constitution of England; and it must be sought for in the statute book, in the fugitive journals of Congress, and in reports of the Secretary of the Treasury. What would be our condition if we were to take the interpretations given to that sacred book, which is or ought to be the criterion of our faith, for the book itself? We should find the Holy Bible buried beneath the interpretations, glosses, and comments of councils, synods, and learned divines, which have produced swarms of intolerant and furious sects, partaking less of the mildness and meekness of their origin than of a vindictive spirit of hostility towards each other. They ought to afford us a solemn warning to make that constitution, which we have sworn to support, our invariable guide.

I conceive, then, sir, that we are not empowered by the constitution nor bound by any practice under it, to renew the charter of this bank and I might here rest the argument. But, as there are strong objections to the renewal upon the score of expediency, and as the distresses which will attend the dissolution of the bank have been greatly exaggerated, I will ask your indulgence for a few moments longer. That some temporary inconvenience will arise, I shall not deny; but most groundlessly have the recent failures in New York been attributed to the discontinuance of this bank. As well might you ascribe to that cause the failures of Amsterdam and Hamburg, of London and Liverpool. The embarrassments of commerce, the sequestration in France, the Danish captures—in fine, the belligerent edicts, are the obvious sources of these failures. Their immediate cause is the return of bills upon London, drawn upon the faith of unproductive or unprofitable shipments. Yes, sir, the protests of the notaries of London, not those of New York, have occasioned these bankruptcies.

The power of a nation is said to consist in the sword and the purse. Perhaps, at last, all power is resolvable into that of the purse, for with it you may command almost every thing else. The specie circulation of the United States is estimated by some calculators at ten millions of dollars; and if it be no more, one moiety is in the vaults of this bank. May not the time arrive when the concentration of such a vast portion of the circulating medium of the country in the hands of any corporation will be dangerous to our liberties? By whom is this immense power wielded? By a body who, in derogation of the great principle of all our institutions, responsibility to the people, is amenable only to a few stockholders, and they chiefly foreigners. Suppose an attempt to subvert this Government, would not the traitor first aim, by force or corruption, to acquire the treasure of this company? Look at it in another aspect. Seven-tenths of its capital are in the hands of foreigners, and these foreigners chiefly English subjects. We are possibly upon the eve of a rupture with that nation. Should such an event occur, do you apprehend that the English Premier would experience any difficulty in obtaining the entire control of this institution? Republics, above all other nations, ought most studiously to guard against foreign influence. All history proves that the internal dissensions excited by foreign intrigue have produced the downfall of almost every free Government that has hitherto existed; and yet gentlemen contend that we are benefited by the possession of this foreign capital. If we could have its use, without its attending abuse, I should be gratified also. But it is in vain to expect the one without the other. Wealth is power, and under whatsoever form it exists, its proprietor, whether he lives on this or the other side of the Atlantic, will have a proportionate influence. It is argued, that our possession of this English capital gives us a certain influence over the British Government. If this reasoning be sound, we had better revoke the interdiction as to aliens holding land, and invite foreigners to engross the whole property, real and personal, of the country. We had better at once exchange the condition of independent proprietors for that of stewards. We should then be able to govern foreign nations, according to the arguments of gentlemen on the other side. But let us put aside this theory, and appeal to the decisions of experience. Go to the other side of the Atlantic, and see what has been achieved for us there by Englishmen holding seven-tenths of the capital of this bank. Has it released from galling and ignominious bondage one solitary American seaman, bleeding under British oppression? Did it prevent the unmanly attack upon the Chesapeake? Did it arrest the promulgation, or has it abrogated the Orders in Council—those orders which have given birth to a new era in commerce? In spite of all its boasted effects, are not the two nations brought to the very brink of war? Are we quite sure that, on this side of the water, it has had no effect favorable to British interests. It has often been stated, and, although I do not know that it is susceptible of strict proof, I believe it to be a fact, that this bank exercised its influence in support of Jay's treaty; and may it not have contributed to blunt the public sentiment, or paralyze the efforts of this nation against British aggression?

The Duke of Northumberland is said to be the most considerable stockholder in the Bank of the United States. A late Lord Chancellor of England, besides other noblemen, was a large stockholder. Suppose the Prince of Essling, the Duke of Cadore, and other French dignitaries owned seven-eighths of the capital of this bank, should we witness the same exertions (I allude not to any made in the Senate) to recharter it? So far from it, would not the danger of French influence be resounded throughout the nation?

I shall give my most hearty assent to the motion for striking out the first section of the bill.

Mr. Pope.—Mr. President, in rising on this occasion, I never more entirely obeyed both my feelings and my judgment. The principle involved in the decision about to be given, is in my view of more magnitude than any which has been presented for our consideration since I had the honor of a seat here. It is no less than whether we shall surrender to the State Governments the power of collecting our revenue and rely upon the old system of requisitions. We are called upon to return to that state of imbecility and chaos from which this political fabric was reared by the wisdom and patriotism of the first statesmen of which any age or nation can boast. For twenty years we have collected our revenue, borrowed money, paid our debts, and managed our fiscal concerns through the agency of a national bank. That it has answered the most sanguine expectations of its authors; that it has been well managed, is admitted by the most decided opponents to the renewal of the charter. Although in public debate, in newspapers, court-yards, muster-fields, &c., we have heard much of dangerous powers, violations of the constitution, British influence, and poisonous vipers, &c., &c., which were to sting to death the liberties of the people, yet we find ourselves as free almost as the air we breathe, and hardly subservient to the mildest code of laws by which any nation was ever governed. In the city of Philadelphia, and the State of Pennsylvania generally, where these animals called banks have grown to the most enormous size, we find as sound morals, and as much real practical republicanism, as in those parts of the Union where the rattling of this viper's tail has never been heard, and in point of solid wealth and internal improvements, mark the contrast. We are required to disregard the lessons of that best teacher, experience, and to try some new scheme. However captivating new theories and abstract propositions were a few years since, I believe the thinking men of all parties in the nation are perfectly convinced that one ounce of experience and common matter-of-fact sense is worth more for the purposes of legislation than a ship-load of theory and speculation. We are told that we must force into the vaults of the bank a large portion of the circulating medium, and thereby depress the price of every thing in the market; we must give a shock to credit of every kind, check and embarrass every branch of agricultural, commercial, and manufacturing industry; give up the young mechanics, manufacturers, and merchants with small capitals a prey to the cupidity of moneyed men, who will be tempted to withdraw their funds from trade to speculate on the wrecks of the unfortunate. This is not mere matter of calculation. I only state facts proved to us by the most unquestionable evidence. We are not only, sir, to ruin many innocent and unoffending individuals, but to derange the national finances; and for what is all this to be done? To promote the public good or advance the national prosperity? No, sir, it is not pretended. We are gravely told, that we, the Representatives of the people, must sacrifice the people to save the constitution of the people, whose happiness and welfare it was intended to secure. If this be true, it is indeed a strange Government under which we live. I advance the opinion with confidence, that no principle which, in its practical effects, outrages the common sense and feelings of mankind, can be a sound one, and we ought to examine it well, and hesitate much before we give our assent. To bring distress on the country, not to prevent a violation of any positive provision of the constitution; but to correct what we suppose to have been an erroneous construction of it by our predecessors, of which neither the States nor the people have ever complained, appears to be more nice than wise.

Disguise this question as you will, sir, and still it will clearly appear to be a contest between a few importing States and the people of the United States. Resolutions have been already laid on our table by gentlemen from the two large States; from which instructions have been received in substance, requiring Congress to give up to the State banks the collection of the national revenue. I am, Mr. President, on the side of the people of the United States. This is indeed a question of party, but of a very different character from that which will be attempted to be palmed on the people. It is a contest between the friends and enemies of the Federal Constitution revived; for, if I am not mistaken, the power of laying and collecting imposts and duties was strongly objected to by some of the large States having advantageous seaports, before the constitution was adopted. I am for preserving both the States and the Union. I consider the safety and independence of the several States, and the liberties of the people, inseparably connected with and dependent on the efficiency of the National Government, and it is to me unaccountable that gentlemen in favor of strong measures against foreign nations should be so solicitous to strip the General Government of this very essential part of its power. We were told, a few days since, that our army was so insignificant and contemptible, that it would require a constable, with a search warrant, to find it. I have heard another gentleman of very high standing suggest the propriety of retroceding the ten miles square to the States of Virginia and Maryland. Our gunboats are almost rotten. We have not more frigates and other armed vessels than sufficient to carry our Ministers and diplomatic despatches to foreign courts, and if we yield to the States the collection of our revenue, what will remain of the Federal Government with which the people can identify their feelings or affections? In what will this Government consist? It will be a mere creature of the imagination—a political fiction. And, analogous to the fiction in the action of ejectment, we shall have to suppose its existence, and then bottom our proceedings upon that supposition. If I was hostile to our Federal Union, or wanted to prepare the public mind for a surrender of this happy system of Government, I would join in the hue and cry against this institution; I would support every measure calculated to destroy all confidence in and respect for this Government, both at home and abroad; I would endeavor to produce throughout the country, confusion and disorder, and a state of glorious uncertainty; then persuade the people to seek security and tranquillity under some other form of Government. The transition from a wild, factious democracy, to despotism, is often easy, and generally sudden. The extremes are very nearly allied. A Republican Government, guided by the virtue and intelligence of a nation, is the first of human blessings, but when directed by the angry, vindictive passions of party, the worst of which the imagination can conceive. A republic, to be durable, must inspire confidence and respect. Such instability, such variable, unsettled policy as now appears to be the order of the day, could not have been anticipated by any man blessed with a tolerable degree of faith in the success of this great republican experiment. Mr. President, I have ever been opposed to yielding to the commercial interest an undue influence in this Government, but I am unwilling to make an unnecessary and wanton attack upon them. Coming from an agricultural State, I am not disposed to increase the jealousies which unfortunately exist, and thereby weaken the ties by which these States are held together. I am sensible, too, how much the prosperity of the State I represent depends on a prosperous state of trade, and although the shock from the dissolution of this bank will be first felt in the commercial cities, it must immediately react to the extremes of the empire. I know many are under an impression that Federalists and British agents are to be the victims; but very different will be the result. I refer to the evidence detailed by the honorable gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Lloyd.) But is it possible that an intolerant spirit of party has prepared us for this? Are gentlemen ready to injure their country, weaken our Federal Union, the sheet-anchor of our political safety, to reach their political opponents? I will not believe it. When I see around me some of the soldiers of the Revolution, actuated I am sure by nobler views; when I see the professors of a religion which teaches us to love our neighbors as ourselves, I cannot persuade myself that Christian charity, and all the noble, generous feelings of the human heart, are extinguished by this demon, party spirit. If there be a man in the nation who can witness with unfeeling apathy the distresses of his fellow-citizens, he would have figured in Smithfield in the bloody reign of Queen Mary of England, in binding heretics to the stake; or in the sanguinary time of Robespierre, in adding victims to the guillotine; but he is unworthy the blessings of a free Government.

Sir, I address the Senate under circumstances discouraging indeed. I have been told, and on this floor, that debate is useless; that no man's opinion is to be changed; that I shall find verified in the decision of this question the sentiment contained in two lines of Hudibras—"He that is convinced against his will, is of the same opinion still." I cannot admit this. I know there are gentlemen fully sensible of the evils about to befall their country, without any obstinate pride to conquer, who would rejoice at being convinced it is in their power to avert them. Let me entreat them to pause and reflect, before they inflict a wound on their country's interest, under the influence of constitutional doubt; and if they err, I would ask them, would it not be more safe and patriotic to err in favor of the people? Permit me now, sir, to redeem this subject from the constitutional difficulties with which it has been encumbered.

To form a correct opinion, we must retrospect the defects of the old Government, and ascertain the remedy which was anticipated in the present constitution. I believe it will be conceded that the great cause of the inefficiency of the former, was not because their principal field of legislation was too limited, but was owing to its dependence on the States for the means to carry their powers into effect. For the truth of this position, I appeal to the history of that day—to the candor of gentlemen who hear me. The present constitution was framed for national purposes, with ample authority to pass all laws necessary and proper for the attainment of its objects, independent of State authority, except so far as expressly made dependent by the constitution. The erroneous impressions with regard to this bank have arisen from ignorance of facts, relative to the practical fiscal operations of the Government, and from confounding an original, independent power, to establish banks and corporations, with a necessary auxiliary to the execution of the powers given. By the constitution it is expressly declared, that Congress shall have power to pass all laws necessary and proper to carry into effect the powers previously enumerated, and all other powers vested in the Government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof. Our power to create a bank is not derived by implication. No, sir. If this express delegation of power had not been inserted, we must have implied the authority to provide the means necessary and proper, &c.

But the Convention, with a full knowledge of the defects of the old Confederation, and deeply impressed with the necessity of an efficient national Government, determined to exclude all doubt by granting to the new Government, in express and unequivocal language, ample authority to use all means necessary and proper for the attainment of the ends for which it was instituted. If a man was requested to look at the constitution and decide whether power is given to Congress to create a bank, or corporations generally, he would answer in the negative. This would very naturally be the answer of most men upon the first blush of the constitution. It is not pretended that Congress have power to create corporations as an independent proposition. The authority to establish a bank or corporations is only contended for so far as it can be fairly considered as a necessary and proper auxiliary to the execution of the powers granted by the constitution. The question of constitutionality depends upon facts, dehors the instrument, of which we must be informed before we decide, and which could not be ascertained before the attempt was made to give motion and energy to this political machinery. If the fact be ascertained, by the best evidence the nature of the subject affords, that a bank is necessary and proper to effectuate the legitimate powers of Government, then our power is express, and we need not resort to implication. To prove to the satisfaction of the Senate and the world, this material fact, will be my business before I request their assent to the position assumed, that Congress have an express power to incorporate a bank. To do this it is indispensable that we should understand the practical financial concerns of the Government, or have the information of those who do. We appropriate money for fortifications on the report of our engineer, Colonel Williams, and for the Capitol, &c., upon the report of Mr. Latrobe. To know how much timber or other materials are necessary for a ship or a house, you must understand the subject yourself, or have the information of those who do. For myself, I am ready to admit that I rely much upon the information and experience of others. To ignorant men, and those who do not profess to be fully acquainted with the nature and management of the national finances, the following evidence is presented. The first, and with many, perhaps the best, not heretofore particularly noticed, which I shall offer, is the Congress of 1781, which established a national bank, called the Bank of North America, during our revolutionary struggle, the utility and necessity of which were ascertained by the experience of that day.

It is worthy of remark, that they created a bank under powers much more limited than ours. That act was not passed precipitately, but was the result of the most mature and deliberate consideration. I beg leave to read the preamble of the law which contains the opinions of that Congress with regard to the utility and necessity of a National Bank. "Whereas Congress, on the 26th day of May last, did, from a conviction of the support which the finances of the United States would receive from the establishment of a National Bank, approve a plan for such an institution, submitted to their consideration by Robert Morris, Esq., and now lodged among the archives of Congress, and did engage to promote the same by the most effectual means; and whereas the subscription thereto is now filled, from an expectation of a charter of incorporation from Congress, the directors and president are appointed, and application has been made to Congress by the said president and directors, for an act of incorporation: and whereas the exigencies of the United States render it indispensably necessary that such an act be immediately passed—Be it therefore ordained," &c. This act passed on the 31st day of December, 1781. And here permit me to observe, that this National Bank, styled the Bank of North America, was not produced by British influence or party spirit. No, sir, the little, slandering, intriguing partyism of the present moment was unknown to the patriots of that awful period. They had no party but their country—liberty and independence were their objects. Their souls were fired with a noble, a generous enthusiasm, on which Heaven looked down with pleasure. It appears from the journals of the Congress of 1781, that the members from every State were unanimous in favor of a National Bank, except Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia—the two members from Massachusetts voted against it, the two members from Pennsylvania were divided—of the four from Virginia, Mr. Madison alone voted against it. Here it is evident that, in the very infancy of our Republic, before indeed it could with propriety be said to be born, when every bosom glowed with enthusiasm for liberty and a pure disinterested patriotism, a National Bank was not thought that dangerous, dreadful monster, which the very wise and exclusive patriots of 1811 are endeavoring to represent it to the American people. And the construction given to the grant of powers in the Articles of Confederation by the Congress of 1781, is strong evidence of our right to establish a bank under a grant of powers much more ample, and with money concerns vastly more extensive and complicated.

The next evidence I shall adduce for the consideration of the Senate, is the opinion of the late General Hamilton, appointed by President Washington, the first Secretary of the Treasury; whose province and duty it was to superintend the national finances. His attention was therefore particularly directed to the subject, and, in a very able report to the first Congress, assembled under the new constitution, he recommended a National Bank. Although opinions have been imputed to this gentleman very foreign to my feelings and notions about Government, yet he has ever been acknowledged, by the candid and liberal of all parties, one of the first American statesmen. For reasons, which it is unnecessary for me to assign, I will not press his opinion upon the attention of the Senate, but will introduce other and perhaps less exceptionable testimony. The Congress of 1791, which incorporated the present bank, merits the highest regard. It was composed of the most enlightened and distinguished men in America, many of whom had been members of the convention, and were fully apprised of the defects of the old and the objects of the new Government. A large majority of both branches voted in favor of the bank. They were not divided on the question by party. Many who have continued with the Republican party under every Administration voted in favor of this bank. Although different speculative or abstract political opinions were then entertained, yet the spirit and passion of party had not diffused itself so generally through the nation as at a subsequent period. The next authority in favor of this bank, and one which must at all times and on all occasions command the highest respect, is no less than our immortal Washington. He was President of the United States in 1791, when this bank law passed. After it had received the sanction of both branches of the Legislature, with that circumspection and prudence which regulated his conduct through life, he consulted the able men who composed his Cabinet Council on the constitutional question; they differed in opinion; he heard their arguments for and against the measure; and, after full consideration, approved the law. I cannot yet, sir, take leave of this very important testimony in favor of the bank. The opinion of our Washington has the strongest claim to our confidence. Let us pause before we disregard his solemn advice. This is the hero who led our armies to victory; this is the Washington, who, at the close of our Revolutionary war, disbanded a disciplined army in the bosom of the Republic, and voluntarily exchanged the splendid robes and ensigns of military power for the plain, humble garb of a private citizen. This Washington, who continued an American, a Republican in heart and in sentiment, until summoned to the mansions of bliss; yes, sir, this illustrious departed hero, this practical statesman, has solemnly declared to the American people that a National Bank is a necessary and proper auxiliary to the execution of the national powers. The last authority I shall particularly notice in support of this institution, is the opinion of the present Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Gallatin. If this gentleman cannot boast of the military laurels which have adorned the brows of the patriots I have mentioned; as a statesman and faithful public servant, he stands inferior to none. Mr. Gallatin, from his first appearance on the theatre of public life, has been considered by all parties an able financier. At a very early period the finances of the United States became the subject of his particular attention and inquiry; the result of which was a treatise, published in 1796, called "Gallatin, on the finances of the United States," in which he gives a decided opinion in favor of this bank. I rely much on his opinion at that period, because it must have been the result of conviction, and not of any party feeling or consideration, as he was then in the minority, and continued in it until the Administration changed. His report to the Senate during the last session of Mr. Jefferson's Administration, and his letter to the committee, show, that time and experience, so far from changing, have confirmed him in the opinion he first formed on the subject; to which I might add every Administration and almost every man practically acquainted with our money concerns. Is not this mass of evidence sufficient to substantiate the facts upon the existence or non-existence of which the constitutionality of this measure depends? I put the question to the candor and good sense of gentlemen, whether they are not satisfied, in the language of the constitution, that a National Bank is necessary and proper to effectuate the legitimate powers of the National Government? If they answer in the negative, I can only say, he who will neither regard the suggestions of experience, nor believe the report of the great political disciples who have gone before us, would not believe though one were to rise from the dead. And what is the answer to all this out of doors? Why, that we are not to be governed by the information or opinion of others, however well acquainted with the subject; we are so self-sufficient as to disregard the best lights which can be presented to us. The cry is up to the hub, down with the bank, huzza for the party! So long, Mr. President, as I shall be honored with a seat in the Senate of the Union, I am determined to respect my station and my own feelings and character too much to be driven along by any such idle, ridiculous clamor.

As I heard much said about absolute, indispensable necessity, I may be pardoned for giving what I consider the sound interpretation of the words "necessary and proper" in the constitution. This idea of absolute, indispensable, &c., must have originated in an excessive jealousy of power or a decided hostility to the Federal Union. This instrument was framed by and for the people of the United States, and, in the language used, was certainly intended to be understood in that sense in which it is used and understood by them generally. If you ask a plain man what are the necessaries of life, he will answer, something below luxury and extravagance, what is calculated to afford him reasonable comfort. Neither a house nor a bed is absolutely or indispensably necessary to a man's existence; he could live in a camp and sleep on boards, or on the ground, yet, the common sense of mankind would respond, they are necessary and proper. If a man had a journey to make, either to Richmond, in Virginia, or Lexington, in Kentucky, although every person would pronounce a coach and six superfluous and unnecessary, all reasonable men would say, he ought to have a horse or a hack, but it will not be pretended that either are indispensable, because he could perform it on foot. If a gentleman from Baltimore gives his agent instructions to provide every thing necessary for an East India voyage, what would he expect? Certainly that he should avoid unnecessary expense, but would consider him acting within the pale of his authority if he procured only what was reasonably necessary and proper, or, in other words, what was fairly suited to the master and crew, and well calculated to enable the vessel to reach her port of destination. That interpretation is correct which best accords with the common sense and understanding of mankind. It must, therefore, be evident that the only question as regards the constitutionality of the measure to be decided is a question of fact, and that is, whether a National Bank is reasonably necessary and proper, or fairly suited to, and calculated for, the collection of our revenue and the management of our money concerns. And this fact appears to be admitted by the gentlemen opposed to the bill, for their arguments are predicated upon the probability that the State banks will answer the national purposes. This is a complete surrender of the constitutional objection; for, if banks be necessary and proper, it follows that we have a constitutional power to create them, and it will be a mere question of expediency whether we will use State banks or a National Bank. My colleague (Mr. Clay) has asked for the congeniality between a bank and the collection of our revenue? The argument in favor of using State banks shows it, but let the use hitherto made of the bank answer the question. Is not a bank a proper place for the deposit and safe-keeping of money—more so than the custom-house? Is it not a convenient agent for paying and receiving money? Through the agency of this bank our revenue, or the greater part of it, has been collected, our financial transactions done, and public money transmitted to such places as the necessities of the Government required. The revenue collected at Boston, Baltimore, or any other port, is paid, if required, at New Orleans, Natchez, St. Louis, or any other place without risk or expense. The money in the bank and its branches is payable at such of them as the convenience of the Government may require, and, by this arrangement, we can command the whole of the public money in any quarter of the Union without risk or expense. The operations of this institution have been confined to the seaboard. The principal bank is at Philadelphia, with a branch at New York, Boston, Baltimore, Washington, Norfolk, Charleston, Savannah, and New Orleans. At all which places, the Government has considerable revenue to collect. No branches have been extended into the interior. It has been connected with our fiscal arrangements at all the places to which it has been extended, and may be fairly deemed a convenient, necessary, and appropriate auxiliary to the management of the national concerns. It is said that the revenue is collected at many ports where none of these branches are placed. This is true; the bank and branches are fixed only at the principal seaports, where a large amount of revenue is collected. Every one draws into its vaults, subject to the demands of Government, the revenue collected at the less important ports in the same quarter of the country. Boston being the commercial emporium of New England, the Government, by the agency of the branch bank there, is enabled to draw to that point most of the revenue received at the numerous ports in that quarter of the Union. The repeated sanctions this bank has received from the different Administrations, and especially from Mr. Jefferson and the Republican party, by authorizing the extension of a branch to New Orleans, and selling one million of the stock, the property of the United States, to British subjects, for four hundred thousand dollars more than the nominal amount, is indeed strangely accounted for; gentlemen say the Government were bound to fulfil their engagements, and that the charter, being in the nature of a contract, was sacred. I had thought the fashionable doctrine was, that an unconstitutional law was wholly null and void. It has been held by some of the States. However plausible the answer to the argument of acquiescence, it furnishes no apology for a positive confirmation. Permit me to assimilate a common case between individuals to the case before us: a man in Washington executes a joint power to five trustees in Kentucky to collect his debts, settle his land business, &c., and authorizes them to take all steps necessary and proper to effectuate the trust or power; in the progress of the business a measure is suggested as necessary, about which there is a diversity of opinion among the trustees. A majority, however, decide that it is within their authority; the principal is informed of it, does not complain or disavow, but positively and by the strongest implication assents to the construction given by his agents. In such a case there would be but one opinion. In 1791 a National Bank is proposed to Congress; they differ as to the constitutionality, a large majority decide in favor of it, the people and the States are informed of the measure, the States do not protest, nor do the people complain; many of the States pass laws to protect the institution, it receives the confirmation of three or four different Administrations, and particularly of the one composed of men originally opposed to it; it violates no positive provision of the constitution; no mischiefs have been produced, but great convenience and advantage have been experienced by the Government and community. I ask whether, under such circumstances, the question ought not to be considered settled? Is no respect due to the opinions of our predecessors? Is a question of construction never to be at rest? Why is a judge, sworn to support the laws and constitution of the country, bound by a train of decisions contrary to his own opinions? Because the good, the peace, the tranquillity of society require it. The conduct of a court, as well as every department of Government, must be regulated in its course in some measure by a regard for the public weal. It is worthy of remark that, notwithstanding all the fuss about implied and incidental powers—if you except the sedition law, which was supposed to violate a positive provision of the constitution—the same practical construction has been given to this instrument by every Administration of the Government. Indeed, the sphere of national legislation has been more enlarged under Mr. Jefferson's than any other Administration. All parties have found that the national vessel could not be navigated without sails, rigging, and every thing necessary and proper. Whence was derived a power to pass a law laying an embargo without limitation? There is nothing in the constitution about embargoes. Whence did we derive a power to purchase Louisiana, and incorporate it with the good old United States? There is no express delegation of power to purchase new territory. On these subjects the constitution is silent. I have approved both. No State can lay an embargo, or acquire new territory. Our power to perform these acts results from the nature of the national sovereignty created by this constitution. The Republican Administrations have no pretensions to the approbation of the people on the ground of having restrained any latitude or liberality of construction. Their claim to the public confidence is founded on very different considerations. They have repealed the internal taxes, paid a large part of the public debt, purchased Louisiana, and preserved to the nation the blessings of peace. For these acts, they have, I believe, the thanks of the nation. They have mine, most sincerely.

Great stress is placed on the twelfth article of the amendments to the constitution, which declares the powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. I must confess that I cannot discover what influence this can have on the bill under consideration, or any other measure which may be proposed. It appears to me to have been adopted rather to quiet State jealousies and popular fears than with a view to produce any positive effect, for the inquiry must ever be, Is the power given? And if granted, it is not retained. The supporters of this bill do not pretend to usurp any power retained by the States or the people, but contend that the power to pass the bill is expressly delegated, if the facts assumed are true.

It is not pretended that our fiscal concerns can be managed with gold and silver. If our territory was of no greater extent than Rhode Island, Delaware, or the city of Philadelphia, gold and silver would answer the purposes of the Government, but it would require a number of pack horses and wagons to transport the public money in gold and silver, over this immense country, to the different places where it is wanting. Our extensive commerce, and the great extent of this empire, renders a paper medium necessary. Is the power to create this paper medium, or national currency, an attribute of State or national sovereignty? I put the question to the candor of gentlemen, and solicit a serious answer! The argument of my honorable friend from Georgia against the power of the States to authorize the emission of bank paper, founded on that part of the constitution which declares that "No State shall emit bills of credit," acquires great additional force, when these bills of credit are made to assume the character of money, for national purposes. In the same article the power to coin money is expressly prohibited to the States, and in the catalogue of cardinal powers granted to this Government, is that to coin money. It will, perhaps, be contended that this only applies to gold and silver, but if that be admitted to be the literal meaning of the words, still it is evident that what shall be the national currency, whether specie or paper, is a proper subject of national legislation. No gentleman will be so absurd as to insist that any State or States ought to coin the current money of the United States. That the power of the States to establish banks may be questioned with at least great plausibility, is perfectly clear, but as this banking power has been so long exercised, as the National and State banks have conducted their operations very harmoniously, as no serious evils call for national interference, I am not for disturbing the existing state of things; it is better, perhaps, that the banking power should be divided between the States and the United States. That bank paper, if good, is in fact money, although not made a legal tender, cannot be denied. The currency of this bank paper of the United States, although made by law receivable in payment of revenue, rests upon a much better foundation than an act of Congress. Its national character, the extended operations of this bank from Boston to New Orleans, have given it credit with the people of every part of the empire, more than the bank paper of any particular State can be expected to have; so that, by common consent, this money coined by the national bank has become the current money of the United States. I hope we shall never be driven to the necessity of compelling our citizens by law to receive our paper. We should so guard and regulate our banking operations as to make the national paper at least equal to gold and silver, in every quarter of the Union.

If this bank is removed, the Secretary of the Treasury must nationalize the bank paper of the great importing States; for, I presume, Congress will never decide what State paper shall be used by the officers of the General Government. Most of the public money is now collected and deposited in the Bank of the United States; if that is destroyed, the Secretary of the Treasury is to deposit in the State banks, and with him is the power of selection—a power and patronage greater than any ever exercised by any officer in this nation. The deposits of the public money are sought after with great avidity, by all the State institutions. He can deposit the whole in one, or divide it between two, or three, or all the banks in any one place. He can change them at pleasure. He may, with great apparent fairness and propriety, make it a condition with every bank where deposits are made that they shall appoint a certain portion of the directors of his nomination, and through them he can reach the credit of any man who may have accommodations in it. It is true we have now a man at the head of the Treasury who may not be disposed to abuse this power, but we may not always have such an officer. This immense power and influence may be exercised in an invisible manner, and, of course, without responsibility. Is this republican? It was not a few years ago. I have always understood that one of the strongest and most popular objections to the Federal Administration was their disposition to increase Executive patronage.

Although this subject has received much false coloring through the country, by charges of British influence, &c., I did not expect to hear it from an honorable senator of the United States—it has not indeed been positively asserted, but hinted in such a manner as to make an impression on the community. Some stale circumstances connected with the British treaty have been very unnecessarily lugged in to increase the prejudices against this bill. It has been insinuated, that British influence, operating through this institution, has prevented the Government from taking strong measures against Great Britain; but in what manner this has been effected, gentlemen have not been good enough to explain. Did it prevent Mr. Jefferson from taking a war course? For I believe it is generally understood that he was opposed to a war. Has it operated upon the present Executive? Such a suggestion will not be made. I have, during my service here, given a fair and faithful support to the Administration, and I have certainly voted for stronger measures than they were willing to accept. It is due to the 10th and 11th Congresses, who have been so much abused, to state that their course, as regards the question of peace or war, has been in perfect unison with the views of the late and present Presidents. Let it not be inferred that I am disposed to find fault; I believe when we consider the very extraordinary state of the foreign world, and retrospect the embarrassing circumstances which have surrounded us, the course pursued by them ought to be deemed substantially correct, certainly so as respects their leading object, which has been to avoid making this country a party in the present war. If I was disposed to censure, it would be for not making an effort to chastise some of the British armed vessels which lay in our waters after the affair of the Chesapeake, in open contempt of the President's proclamation; if a single vessel had been driven out or compelled to strike her colors, it would have healed the wound inflicted on the national pride and feeling, committed by the Leopard.

That this Government should have an influence with foreign Governments proportioned to the interest their subjects have in our funds, is probable, but how this interest gives them an influence here I am at a loss to perceive: foreigners cannot even vote in the appointment of directors. If there is any reality in this idea of foreign influence through this institution, why did gentlemen permit the present stockholders to be incorporated into the bill introduced last year? And why was not a provision inserted to prevent foreigners from purchasing additional stock?

Gentlemen say the embarrassments in Philadelphia could not have been occasioned by the Bank of the United States, because they continue to discount as usual. If I recollect the evidence—and I hope to be corrected if I mistake it—it was this: that the calling in of ten per cent. on their debts occasioned such a pressure, that they were prevailed upon to extend their discounts until the ultimate decision of Congress should be known. I have heard it seriously urged that the evils and inconveniences to be experienced from its dissolution, prove it to be a dangerous institution; the same argument would prove that the Government ought to be destroyed. Nothing, indeed, seems too absurd for the human mind to seize upon, when under the influence of passion or misguided zeal.

My honorable friend from Georgia has been reminded of the Macedonian phalanx. I trust, sir, we shall ever be found associated with a phalanx American, Republican, in heart and sentiment. I will not sacrifice the interest of my constituents for fear of being called hard names. The epithets of quidism, quadroonism, or any other ism which malice or policy may suggest, shall not drive me from the course called for by the public good. I am proud that I represent a people just, generous, and independent, not to be carried away by unmeaning clamor. Before they discard a public servant, they will view him both on a political theatre, and in the walks of private life. They know, too well, that those are not always the best Christians who sing hallelujahs on the house top, nor have they forgotten the celebrated Sempronius, who, on the approach of Cæsar, thundered war in the Roman Senate, and at the same time was secretly co-operating with the traitor to overthrow the liberties of the Roman people.

Deeply impressed, Mr. President, with the opinion, that the rejection of this bill will give at least a temporary check to the prosperity of the rising State from which I come, I shall give my negative to the motion to strike out the first section. Yes, sir, not only the interest, but importance of that State in the Union is about to be sacrificed. When I look beyond the mountains, and remember that Kentucky has nurtured me almost from my cradle, that she has bestowed on me her choicest honors, my bosom is filled with emotions of gratitude, which impel me to say on this, as on all other occasions, Kentucky I am only thine!