Friday, January 8.
Mounted Rangers.
Mr. Jennings said that it must be recollected by the House, that the act which was passed at the last session of Congress, for the raising certain companies of rangers for the protection of the frontiers, had expired. Those rangers were raised under the apprehension of attacks from the savages; and these apprehensions have unfortunately been realized far beyond the general anticipation. When those companies were raised, Mr. Speaker, we expected long since to have taken possession of the British Province of Upper Canada, thereby to have intercepted the connection and communication between the British and the northwestern Indians. It will therefore readily be perceived, that in consequence of our disappointed expectations in that quarter, the northwestern frontier will be more exposed to the savage knife and tomahawk, at the opening of the approaching spring, than they have been heretofore. This description of force, if again organized, and stationed at suitable points without the frontier settlements, will render it more efficient, and in a better situation to range the woods and prevent the unapprised attack of the savage upon the helpless women and children. If we had to expect invasion from a civilized foe, our situation would not excite so much terror, but the savage character draws no distinction between the helpless infant and the prisoner of war. Under such circumstances, no calculation of expenditure ought to have any weight against a measure calculated to afford a necessary and proper protection to such an important and extensive frontier of the United States. The secrecy and facility with which the savages can assail that frontier, renders it improper that we should depend entirely for protection upon the volunteers and militia of an adjoining State. They carry with them their prejudices, and too often forget the sacred rights of private property. This fact has unfortunately been verified by a petition which I presented yesterday from the territory which I represent. But I cannot believe that such is the character of the citizens of Kentucky, although I do believe that the cause of that plundering, so far as it did take place in the western part of the territory of Indiana, by a portion of the Kentucky volunteers, may be found in the unhallowed exertions of local political purposes, to impress on the minds of at least some of those volunteers, that they were to defend British agents, British partisans, and persons having connection with the savages.
I shall now (said Mr. J.) present to the House the following resolutions which I have prepared, as well for the purpose of offering a bounty in lands to those who would volunteer their services as rangers for the protection of the northwestern frontier, as for the purpose of inquiring into the expediency of paying the militia and volunteers who have already rendered important services in shielding the helpless from savage cruelty:—
"Resolved, That the Committee on Military Affairs be, and they are hereby, directed to inquire into the expediency of authorizing the President of the United States to raise at least twelve companies of rangers, by the acceptance of volunteers or enlistment for one year, to be mounted or otherwise, as the service may require.
"Resolved, That the said committee inquire into the expediency of allowing a bounty in land to those who shall tender their services as rangers, and be accepted by the President of the United States.
"Resolved, That the said committee inquire likewise into the expediency of making provision for compensating the militia or volunteers, who may have been called out, or whose services may have been accepted by the Executives of either of the territories of the United States."
The resolutions were ordered to lie on the table.
Additional Military Force.
The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the bill from the Senate authorizing the raising of twenty thousand men, for one year, if in the opinion of the President of the United States the public service shall require it.
Mr. Wheaton said: Mr. Speaker, every intelligent man, whose age has given him an opportunity of combining experience with observation, must know that there are times when, on certain questions relating to the great interests of the nation, the sober remonstrances of truth and reason are of little or no avail against the misguided impetuosity of public prejudice. To such a crisis, if we have not already arrived, it is greatly to be feared that we are fast approaching. To float along the current of popular opinion requires very little exertion; but the man that is placed in a situation where the public safety demands that he should stem the torrent and buffet the storm, cannot but reflect, with peculiar sensibility, on the very unequal task he has to perform. The bill, now under consideration, has opened a field of discussion on the general policy of the war, in which its advocates and opponents seem to have given full range to their imaginations; and the arguments, on both sides, have apparently been attended with various success. There can, however, be little doubt on which side the victory will finally be declared. It is well known that the majority are determined, and the bill will pass. I had therefore resolved to take no part in the dispute, but to content myself with giving a simple vote. But, reflecting that I am called upon to act on a subject by me deemed important, not only for myself, but for the good of the people whom I have the honor to represent, who will be equally interested in the result, I have felt myself impelled, both by duty and inclination, to state some of the reasons on which that vote will be grounded.
The bill proposes giving authority to the President of the United States to raise twenty thousand regular troops, in addition to the thirty-five thousand already authorized by law. This may be right or wrong, proper or improper, according to times and circumstances, and the objects which the measure is contemplated to effect. Were the country invaded by a foreign foe, and a foe so powerful as to make this additional number of troops necessary for its defence, I should say it were right and proper to raise them, whatever expense it might be to the nation. But if, as the advocates of the bill profess, these men are to be enlisted, and, together with those heretofore authorized, are to form a powerful army for the purpose of foreign conquest, I have no hesitation in giving it, as my opinion, that it is improper and wrong, or, at least, as the President has told us respecting the French decree repealing those of Berlin and Milan, that "the proceeding is rendered, by the time and manner of it, liable to many objections." Objections, it is apprehended, may arise from want of powers given to Congress by the constitution, either expressed or implied, to do this thing, with its professed object in view—that is, foreign conquest. And if these are unavailing, common reason and common sense furnish objections, sufficiently strong, to the expediency of our undertaking such enterprises. Objections, for want of sufficient powers given by the constitution, may be considered as novel; but, if sound, they should nevertheless prevail. The war itself is novel, this being the first of the kind that ever we have undertaken since that instrument was formed, or since we became an independent nation. If the constitution gives Congress any power to carry on foreign wars, those powers must be collected from expressions it contains, or from some clear and necessary implication from something that is therein expressed. It will be very readily admitted, that our national Government is a Government of a very simple construction, and that it possesses very limited powers; being established by compact, not by conquest, it has not all the powers incident to the sovereignties of other countries; not produced by conquest, it was not made for conquest. "The enumeration of certain rights in the constitution shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people; and the powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people." The framers of this constitution took particular care, not only to define the powers they intended to give, but the objects to which that power should be applied, and therefore, but for those defined objects, Congress have no powers at all. The objects are first pointed out clearly and plainly, and then the powers necessary to their attainment. The people of this country, after having effected the Revolution and established their independence, considering their great transmarine distance from the nations of the Old World, and all their jarring and rival interests, flattered themselves with the expectation of long peace. Unapprehensive of being attacked at home, they had no idea of making war for the purpose of conquest abroad. "Peace and friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none," was their motto, and the same sentiment has been sanctioned by a man, whom the advocates of this war have never ceased to admire. An aversion to standing armies was among the causes that induced the Declaration of Independence; without standing armies, it was then believed, and we now know full well, foreign wars cannot be carried on. Foreign wars did not, therefore, come within the scope of that policy that dictated the constitution. I am not insensible, that, by the constitution, a power is given to Congress to declare war, (not to make it,) but their power is not to be exercised but in the spirit of that instrument, and for the attainment of some or all of the objects for which it was framed. And what are those objects? Why, and for what was the constitution made? Its authors have told us. It was for "the forming of a more perfect union, establishing justice, insuring domestic tranquillity, providing for the common defence, promoting the general welfare, and securing the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity," and all these benefits for the people that then did, or who thereafter should, belong to, or reside in the territory then embraced by the United States, and none other. The constitution was not made for any other, nor can it give jurisdiction over any other. If all or any of these objects are endangered, and it can be made to appear that raising the additional army proposed by this bill be necessary to the preservation and security of them, and can afford a rational prospect of producing such an effect, then my objections to the measure, so far as they arise from the apprehension of the want of constitutional authority, will be obviated. But here, permit me to ask, whether adding twenty thousand new troops to our present regular army, will be likely to have the effect of forming a more perfect union among the people of these States, or whether the little progress already made in the war has not produced fearful apprehensions of a sad reverse? If justice be not already established in our country, can there be any probability that a more formidable army will effect an object so desirable? No; for it is a well-known maxim, as true now as in those ancient times when it was written, that "Inter arma leges silent." So romantic an idea, as being able to establish justice through the world, could not have entered the heads of those that framed the constitution. Much has been said respecting the laws of nations; but they are now nowhere to be found, but in those books that treat on that subject; they were formed by the nations of the civilized world, and evidenced by the treaties, compacts, and agreements, entered into by them; but the Governments of Europe, in their struggle for power and dominion, seem to have disregarded or broken them down; and they being the majority in number, and superior in strength, it is not at present in our power to build up and enforce them. The unavoidable state of the world must be submitted to, until human nature shall, by its Great Author, be corrected. Nor can we, from what we have experienced, promise ourselves, from foreign war, an increase of tranquillity at home. But we are authorized, and are bound to provide for our common defence, and to raise armies, as well of regulars as militia, for that purpose, whenever the unfortunate situation of our country may render such a measure necessary; and our raising of a regular army could never have been contemplated by the framers of the constitution for any other purpose, and therefore give no authority so to do, and, as if conscious that this were the case, the committee that penned the act passed by Congress in June last, declaring war, made use of a form altogether unusual in other countries on similar occasions. The act declares that "war exists between the United Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland, and the United States;" going upon the idea, that hostilities had then been actually commenced against us by that Government, and our country invaded by a British armed force. Such a doctrine would have been very proper, and it might have been proper to raise armies in pursuance of it, had it been true. But such was not the fact. No hostile invasion of the country, by the British Government, had then been made, attempted or threatened. But some may say, and do say, that, if it were not a point then, it is now, and that, therefore, if we had no right to raise regular armies then, it being a time of peace, we may feel ourselves fully authorized now, since war has been declared, to raise new ones, or make additions to the old. This, indeed, would be contrary to a principle universally received and adopted, that no one should be permitted to take the advantage of his own wrong.
I know it is a doctrine, that the ruling party in this country, both in and out of this House, are every day zealously endeavoring to inculcate, that even admitting the war to have been wrong, at its commencement, it has now become the constitutional duty of its original opponents to afford every aid and encouragement to its prosecution. But this is a doctrine that I think no one can yield his assent to, till he is made to believe that two lines, constantly diverging, may finally meet in the same point. If our country has been in any degree invaded, and such invasion be in consequence of our having first invaded the territories of the invaders, it is proper for us, by withdrawing the cause, to put an end to the effect. The last, and not the least object of the powers given by the constitution, is "to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." Many arguments cannot be necessary to show the tendency of foreign wars to destroy liberty. I believe history does not furnish an instance of any people long free, after engaging in the mad projects of foreign conquest. While Rome was content with her ancient boundaries, her inhabitants were blessed with freedom; but, afterwards, jealousies, tumults, insurrections, and seditions, and those two great plagues and scourges of mankind—anarchy and tyranny—following in the train, destroyed every vestige of liberty among that people. Is there any liberty left among the people of France, or of those countries that France has conquered? Fortunate for them, if they are less enlightened than we are; for, in such case, though slaves, they may not be quite so miserable ones. "The very age and body of our constitution, its form and pressure," indicative of the genius and temper of the people that adopted it, are all opposed to the prosecution of wars for conquest. Such enterprises must not be undertaken, or the constitution must be destroyed. Gentlemen seem already inclined to attribute the disgrace and defeats that have hitherto marked our progress in this war, rather to the form and constitution of our Government, than to the weakness and folly of its Administration. The French Emperor has been extolled, and his mode of conducting wars has been more than intimated as being worth our imitation. If, in making foreign conquests, we would have his success, we must make use of his means, and then we may bid adieu to our former happy institutions, our laws, and our liberty. On this ground, therefore, I am opposed to the progress of this war. But if I had not a scruple left, as to the authority given to Congress by the constitution to make this war for conquest, (and perhaps I ought not to have,) my sense of its inexpediency, while I shall have any regard for the welfare and prosperity of my country, will forever forbid my giving it the smallest aid.
Mr. H. Clay (Speaker) said he was gratified yesterday by the recommitment of this bill to a Committee of the whole House, from two considerations: one, since it afforded to him a slight relaxation from a most fatiguing situation; and the other, because it furnished him with an opportunity of presenting to the committee his sentiments upon the important topics which had been mingled in the debate. He regretted, however, the necessity under which the Chairman had been placed of putting the question,[32] precluded him from an opportunity he had wished to have enjoyed of rendering more acceptable to the committee any thing he might have to offer on the interesting points it was his duty to touch. Unprepared, however, as he was to speak on this day, of which he was more sensible from the ill state of his health, he would solicit the attention of the committee for a few moments.
I was a little astonished, I confess, said Mr. C., when I found this bill permitted to pass silently through the Committee of the Whole, and that, not until the moment when the question was about to be put for its third reading, was it selected as that subject on which gentlemen in the opposition chose to lay before the House their views of the interesting attitude in which the nation stands. It did appear to me that the loan bill, which will soon come before us, would have afforded a much more proper occasion, it being more essential, as providing the ways and means for the prosecution of the war. But the gentlemen had the right of selection, and having exercised it, no matter how improperly, I am gratified, whatever I may think of the character of some part of the debate, at the latitude in which for once they have indulged. I claim only, in return, of gentlemen on the other side of the House, and of the committee, a like indulgence in expressing, with the same unrestrained freedom, my sentiments. Perhaps in the course of the remarks which I may feel myself called upon to make, said he, gentlemen may apprehend that they assume too harsh an aspect; I have only now to say that I shall speak of parties, measures, and things, as they strike my moral sense, protesting against the imputation of any intention on my part to wound the feelings of any gentleman.
Considering the situation in which this country is now placed, in a state of actual war with one of the most powerful nations on the earth, it may not be useless to take a view of the past, of various parties which have at different times appeared in this country, and to attend to the manner by which we have been driven from a peaceful posture. Such an inquiry may assist in guiding us to that result—an honorable peace—which must be the sincere desire of every friend to America. The course of that opposition, by which the administration of the Government had been unremittingly impeded for the last twelve years, was singular, and, I believe, unexampled in the history of any country. It has been alike the duty and the interest of the Administration to preserve peace. Their duty, because it is necessary to the growth of an infant people, their genius and their habits. Their interest, because a change of the condition of the nation brings along with it a danger of the loss of the affections of the people. The Administration has not been forgetful of these solemn obligations. No art has been left unessayed; no experiment, promising a favorable result, left untried to maintain the peaceful relations of the country. When, some six or seven years ago, the affairs of the nation assumed a threatening aspect, a partial non-importation was adopted. As they grew more alarming, an embargo was imposed. It would have attained its purpose, but it was sacrificed upon the altar of conciliation. Vain and fruitless attempt to propitiate! Then came a law of non-intercourse, and a general non-importation followed in the train. In the mean time, any indications of a return to the public law and the path of justice, on the part of either belligerent, are seized with avidity by the Administration—the arrangement with Mr. Erskine is concluded. It is first applauded, and then censured by the opposition. No matter with what sincerity the Administration cultivates peace, the opposition will insist that it alone is culpable for any breach between the two countries. Because the President thought proper, in accepting the proffered reparation for the attack on a national vessel, to intimate that it would have better comported with the justice of the King (and who does not think so?) to punish the offending officer, the opposition, entering into the royal feelings, sees in that imaginary insult abundant cause for rejecting Mr. Erskine's arrangement. On another occasion, you cannot have forgotten the hypercritical ingenuity which they displayed to divest Mr. Jackson's correspondence of a premeditated insult to this country. If gentlemen would only reserve for their own Government half the sensibility which is indulged for that of Great Britain, they would find much less to condemn. Restriction after restriction has been tried; negotiation has been resorted to, until longer to have negotiated would have been disgraceful. Whilst these peaceful experiments are undergoing a trial, what is the conduct of the opposition? They are the champions of war; the proud, the spirited, the sole repository of the nation's honor; the exclusive men of vigor and energy. The Administration, on the contrary, is weak, feeble, and pusillanimous—"incapable of being kicked into a war." The maxim, "not a cent for tribute, millions for defence," is loudly proclaimed. Is the Administration for negotiation? The opposition is tired, sick, disgusted with negotiation. They want to draw the sword and avenge the nation's wrongs. When, at length, foreign nations, perhaps, emboldened by the very opposition here made, refused to listen to the amicable appeals made, and repeated and reiterated by the Administration, to their justice and to their interests; when, in fact, war with one of them became identified with our independence and our sovereignty, and it was no longer possible to abstain from it, behold the opposition become the friends of peace and of commerce. They tell you of the calamities of war; its tragical events; the squandering away of your resources; the waste of the public treasure, and the spilling of innocent blood. They tell you that honor is an illusion! Now we see them exhibiting the terrific forms of the roaring king of the forest. Now the meekness and humility of the lamb! They are for war, and no restrictions, when the Administration is for peace; they are for peace and restrictions, when the Administration is for war. You find them, sir, tacking with every gale, displaying the colors of every party, and of all nations, steady only in one unalterable purpose: to steer, if possible, into the haven of power.
During all this time the parasites of opposition do not fail by cunning sarcasm or sly inuendo to throw out the idea of French influence, which is known to be false; which ought to be met in one manner only, and that is, by the lie direct. The Administration of this country devoted to foreign influence! The Administration of this country subservient to France! Great God! how is it so influenced? By what ligament, on what basis, on what possible foundation, does it rest? Is it on similarity of language? No! we speak different tongues; we speak the English language. On the resemblance of our laws! No! the sources of our jurisprudence spring from another and a different country. On commercial intercourse? No! we have comparatively none with France. Is it from the correspondence in the genius of the two governments? No! here alone is the liberty of man secure from the inexorable despotism which everywhere else tramples it under foot. Where, then, is the ground of such an influence? But, sir, I am insulting you by arguing on such a subject. Yet, preposterous and ridiculous as the insinuation is, it is propagated with so much industry, that there are persons found foolish and credulous enough to believe it. You will, no doubt, think it incredible (but I have nevertheless been told the fact) that an honorable member of this House, now in my eye, recently lost his election by the circulation of a story in his district, that he was the first cousin of the Emperor Napoleon. The proof of the charge was rested on a statement of facts which was undoubtedly true. The gentleman in question it was alleged had married a connection of the lady of the President of the United States, who was the intimate friend of Thomas Jefferson, late President of the United States, who some years ago was in the habit of wearing red French breeches. Now, taking these premises as established, you, Mr. Chairman, are too good a logician not to see that the conclusion necessarily followed!
Throughout the period he had been speaking of, the opposition had been distinguished, amidst all its veerings and changes, by another inflexible feature—the application of every vile epithet, which our rich language affords, to Bonaparte. He has been compared to every hideous monster and beast, from that of the Revelations to the most insignificant quadruped. He has been called the scourge of mankind, the destroyer of Europe, the great robber, the infidel, and—Heaven knows by what other names. Really, gentlemen remind me of an obscure lady in a city, not very far off, who also took it into her head, in conversation with an accomplished French gentleman, to talk of the affairs of Europe. She, too, spoke of the destruction of the balance of power, stormed and raged about the insatiable ambition of the Emperor; called him the curse of mankind—the destroyer of Europe. The Frenchman listened to her with perfect patience, and when she had ceased, said to her, with ineffable politeness: "Madam, it would give my master, the Emperor, infinite pain, if he knew how hardly you thought of him."
Sir, gentlemen appear to me to forget that they stand on American soil; that they are not in the British House of Commons, but in the Chamber of the House of Representatives of the United States; that we have nothing to do with the affairs of Europe—the partition of territory and sovereignty there—except in so far as these things affect the interests of our own country. Gentlemen transform themselves into the Burkes, Chathams, and Pitts, of another country, and forgetting, from honest zeal, the interests of America, engage, with European sensibility, in the discussion of European interests. If gentlemen ask me, if I do not view with regret and sorrow the concentration of such vast power in the hands of Bonaparte, I reply that I do. I regret to see the Emperor of China holding such immense sway over the fortunes of millions of our species. I regret to see Great Britain possessing so uncontrolled a command over all the waters of our globe. And if I had the ability to distribute among the nations of Europe their several portions of power and of sovereignty, I would say that Holland should be resuscitated, and given the weight she enjoyed in the days of her De Witts. I would confine France within her natural boundaries—the Alps, the Pyrenees, and the Rhine—and make her a secondary naval power only. I would abridge the British maritime power, raise Prussia and Austria to first-rate powers, and preserve the integrity of the Empire of Russia. But these are speculations. I look at the political transactions of Europe, with the single exception of their possible bearing upon us, as I do at the history of other countries or other times. I do not survey them with half the interest that I do the movements in South America. Our political relation is much less important than it is supposed to be. I have no fears of French or English subjugation. If we are united, we are too powerful for the mightiest nation in Europe, or all Europe combined. If we are separated, and torn asunder, we shall become an easy prey to the weakest of them. In the latter dreadful contingency, our country will not be worth preserving.
In one respect there is a remarkable difference between Administration and the Opposition—it is in a sacred regard for personal liberty. When out of power, my political friends condemned the surrender of Jonathan Robbins; they opposed the violation of the freedom of the press, in the sedition law; they opposed the more insidious attack upon the freedom of the person, under the imposing garb of an alien law. The party now in opposition, then in power, advocated the sacrifice of the unhappy Robbins, and passed those two laws. True to our principles, we are now struggling for the liberty of our seamen against foreign oppression. True to theirs, they oppose the war for this object. They have indeed lately affected tender solicitude for the liberties of the people, and talk of the danger of standing armies, and the burden of taxes. But it is evident to you, Mr. Chairman, that they speak in a foreign idiom. Their brogue betrays that it is not their vernacular tongue. What! the opposition, who in 1798 and 1799, could raise an useless army to fight an enemy three thousand miles distant from us, alarmed at the existence of one raised for a known specified object—the attack of the adjoining provinces of the enemy? The gentleman from Massachusetts, who assisted by his vote to raise the army of twenty-five thousand, alarmed at the danger of our liberties from this very army!
I mean to speak of another subject, which I never think of but with the most awful considerations. The gentleman from Massachusetts, in imitation of his predecessors of 1799, has entertained us with Cabinet plots, Presidential plots, which are conjured up in the gentleman's own perturbed imagination. I wish, sir, that another plot of a much more serious kind—a plot that aims at the dismemberment of our Union—had only the same imaginary existence. But no man, who had paid any attention to the tone of certain prints, and to transactions in a particular quarter of the Union for several years past, can doubt the existence of such a plot. It was far, very far from my intention to charge the opposition with such a design. No, he believed them generally incapable of it. He could not say as much for some who were unworthily associated with them in that quarter of the Union to which he referred. The gentleman cannot have forgotten his own sentiment, uttered even on the floor of this House, "peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must;" in and about the same time Henry's mission to Boston was undertaken. The flagitiousness of that embassy had been attempted to be concealed by directing the public attention to the price which the gentleman says was given for the disclosure. As if any price could change the atrociousness of the attempt on the part of Great Britain, or could extenuate in the slightest degree the offence of those citizens who entertained and deliberated upon the infamous proposition! There was a most remarkable coincidence between some of the things which that man states, and certain events in the quarter alluded to. In the contingency of war with Great Britain, it will be recollected that the neutrality and eventual separation of that section of the Union was to be brought about. How, sir, has it happened, since the declaration of war, that British officers in Canada have asserted to American officers that this very neutrality would take place? That they have so asserted can be established beyond controversy. The project is not brought forward openly, with a direct avowal of the intention. No, the stock of good sense and patriotism in that portion of the country is too great to be undisguisedly encountered. It is assailed from the masked batteries of friendship to peace and commerce on the one side, and by the groundless imputation of opposite propensities on the other. The affections of the people are to be gradually undermined. The project is suggested or withdrawn; the diabolical parties, in this criminal tragedy, make their appearance or exit, as the audience to whom they address themselves are silent, applaud or hiss. I was astonished, sir, to have lately read a letter, or pretended letter, published in a prominent print in that quarter, written not in the fervor of party zeal, but coolly and deliberately, in which the writer affects to reason about a separation, and attempts to demonstrate its advantages to different sections of the Union, deploring the existence now of what he terms prejudices against it, but hoping for the arrival of the period when they shall be eradicated.
The war was declared because Great Britain arrogated to herself the pretension of regulating foreign trade, under the delusive name of retaliatory Orders in Council—a pretension by which she undertook to proclaim to American enterprise, "Thus far shalt thou go, and no farther." Orders which she refused to revoke after the alleged cause of their enactment had ceased; because she persisted in the act of impressing American seamen; because she had instigated the Indians to commit hostilities against us; and because she refused indemnity for her past injuries upon our commerce. I throw out of the question other wrongs. The war in fact was announced, on our part, to meet the war which she was waging on her part. So undeniable were the causes of the war; so powerfully did they address themselves to the feelings of the whole American people, that when the bill was pending before this House, gentlemen in the opposition, although provoked to debate, would not, or could not, utter one syllable against it. It is true they wrapped themselves up in sullen silence, pretending that they did not choose to debate such a question in secret session. Whilst speaking of the proceedings on that occasion, I beg to be permitted to advert to another fact that transpired—an important fact material for the nation to know, and which I have often regretted had not been spread upon our journals. My honorable colleague (Mr. McKee) moved, in Committee of the Whole, to comprehend France in the war; and when the question was taken upon the proposition, there appeared but ten votes in support of it, of whom seven belonged to this side of the House, and three only to the other.
It is said that we were inveigled into the war by the perfidy of France; and that had she furnished the document in time, which was first published in England, in May last, it would have been prevented. I will concede to gentlemen every thing they ask about the injustice of France towards this country. I wish to God that our ability was equal to our disposition to make her feel the sense of that injustice. The manner of the publication of the paper in question, was undoubtedly extremely exceptionable. But I maintain that, had it made its appearance earlier, it would not have had the effect supposed; and the proof lies in the unequivocal declarations of the British Government. I will trouble you, sir, with going no further back than to the letters of the British Minister, addressed to the Secretary of State, just before the expiration of his diplomatic functions. It will be recollected by the committee that he exhibited to this Government a despatch from Lord Castlereagh, in which the principle was distinctly avowed, that to produce the effect of the repeal of the Orders in Council, the French decrees must be absolutely and entirely revoked as to all the world, and not as to America alone. A copy of that despatch was demanded of him, and he very awkwardly evaded it. But, on the 10th of June, after the bill declaring war had actually passed this House, and was pending before the Senate, (and which, I have no doubt, was known to him,) in a letter to Mr. Monroe, he says: "I have no hesitation, sir, in stating that Great Britain, as the case has hitherto stood, never did, nor ever could engage, without the greatest injustice to herself and her allies, as well as to other neutral nations, to repeal her orders as affecting America alone, leaving them in force against other States, upon condition that France would except singly and specially America from the operation of her decrees." On the 14th of the same month, the bill still pending before the Senate, he repeats: "I will now say, that I feel entirely authorized to assure you, that if you can at any time produce a full and unconditional repeal of the French decrees, as you have a right to demand it in your character of a neutral nation, and that it be disengaged from any question concerning our maritime rights, we shall be ready to meet you with a revocation of the Orders in Council. Previously to your producing such an instrument, which I am sorry to see you regard as unnecessary, you cannot expect of us to give up our Orders in Council." Thus, sir, you see that the British Government would not be content with a repeal of the French decrees as to us only. But the French paper in question was such a repeal. It could not, therefore, satisfy the British Government. It could not, therefore, have induced that Government, had it been earlier promulgated, to repeal the Orders in Council. It could not, therefore, have averted the war. The withholding of it did not occasion the war, and the promulgation of it would not have prevented the war. But gentlemen have contended that, in point of fact, it did produce a repeal of the Orders in Council. This I deny. After it made its appearance in England, it was declared by one of the British Ministry, in Parliament, not to be satisfactory. And all the world knows, that the repeal of the Orders in Council resulted from the inquiry, reluctantly acceded to by the Ministry, into the effect upon their manufacturing establishments, of our non-importation law, or to the warlike attitude assumed by this Government, or to both. But it is said that the Orders in Council are done away, no matter from what cause; and that having been the sole motive for declaring the war, the relations of peace ought to be restored. This brings me into an examination of the grounds for continuing the war.
I am far from acknowledging that had the Orders in Council been repealed, as they have been, before the war was declared, the declaration would have been prevented. In a body so numerous as this, from which the declaration emanated, it is impossible to say with any degree of certainty what would have been the effect of such a repeal. Each member must answer for himself. I have no hesitation then, in saying, that I have always considered the impressment of American seamen as much the most serious aggression. But, sir, how have those orders at last been repealed? Great Britain, it is true, has intimated a willingness to suspend their practical operation, but she still arrogates to herself the right to revive them upon certain contingencies, of which she constitutes herself the sole judge. She waives the temporary use of the rod, but she suspends it in terrorem over our heads. Supposing it was conceded to gentlemen that such a repeal of the Orders in Council, as took place on the 23d of June last, exceptionable as it is, being known before the war, would have prevented the war, does it follow that it ought to induce us to lay down our arms without the redress of any other injury? Does it follow, in all cases, that that which would have prevented the war in the first instance should terminate the war? By no means. It requires a great struggle for a nation prone to peace as this is, to burst through its habits and encounter the difficulties of war. Such a nation ought but seldom to go to war. When it does, it should be for clear and essential rights alone, and it should firmly resolve to extort, at all hazards, their recognition. The war of the Revolution is an example of a war began for one object and prosecuted for another. It was waged in its commencement against the right asserted by the parent country to tax the colonies. Then no one thought of absolute independence. The idea of independence was repelled. But the British Government would have relinquished the principle of taxation. The founders of our liberties saw, however, that there was no security short of independence, and they achieved our independence. When nations are engaged in war, those rights in controversy, which are acknowledged by the Treaty of Peace, are abandoned. And who is prepared to say that American seamen shall be surrendered the victims to the British principle of impressment? And, sir, what is this principle? She contends that she has a right to the services of her own subjects: that, in the exercise of this right, she may lawfully impress them, even although she finds them in our vessels, upon the high seas, without her jurisdiction. Now, I deny that she has any right, without her jurisdiction, to come on board our vessels on the high seas, for any other purpose but in pursuit of enemies, or their goods, or goods contraband of war. But she further contends that her subjects cannot renounce their allegiance to her and contract a new obligation to other Sovereigns. I do not mean to go into the general question of the right of expatriation. If, as is contended, all nations deny it, all nations at the same time admit and practice the right of naturalization. Great Britain, in the very case of foreign seamen, imposes perhaps fewer restraints upon naturalization than any other nation. Then, if subjects cannot break their original allegiance, they may, according to universal usage, contract a new allegiance. What is the effect of this double obligation? Undoubtedly, that the Sovereign having possession of the subject would have a right to the services of the subject. If he return within the jurisdiction of his primitive Sovereign, he may resume his right to his services, of which the subject by his own act could not divest himself. But his primitive Sovereign can have no right to go in quest of him, out of his own jurisdiction into the jurisdiction of another Sovereign, or upon the high seas, where there exists either no jurisdiction, or it belongs to the nation owning the ship navigating them. But, sir, this discussion is altogether useless. It is not to the British principle, objectionable as it is, that we are alone to look; it is to her practice—no matter what guise she puts on. It is in vain to assert the inviolability of the obligation of allegiance. It is in vain to set up the plea of necessity, and to allege that she cannot exist without the impressment of her seamen. The truth is, she comes, by her press gangs, on board of our vessels, seizes our native seamen, as well as naturalized, and drags them into her service. It is the case, then, of the assertion of an erroneous principle, and a practice not conformable to the principle—a principle which, if it were theoretically right, must be forever practically wrong. We are told by gentlemen in the opposition that Government has not done all that was incumbent on it to do to avoid just cause of complaint on the part of Great Britain; that, in particular, the certificates of protection, authorized by the act of 1796, are fraudulently used. Sir, Government has done too much in granting those paper protections. I can never think of them without being shocked. They resemble the passes which the master grants to his negro slave: "Let the bearer, Mungo, pass and repass without molestation." What do they imply? That Great Britain has a right to take all who are not provided with them. From their very nature they must be liable to abuse on both sides. If Great Britain desires a mark by which she can know her own subjects, let her give them an ear mark. The colors that float from the mast head should be the credentials of our seamen. There is no safety to us, and the gentlemen have shown it, but in the rule that all who sail under the flag (not being enemies) are protected by the flag. It is impossible that this country should ever abandon the gallant tars who have won for us such splendid trophies. Let me suppose that the Genius of Columbia should visit one of them in his oppressor's prison and attempt to reconcile him to his wretched condition. She would say to him, in the. language of the gentlemen on the other side, "Great Britain intends you no harm; she did not mean to impress you, but one of her own subjects; having taken you by mistake, I will remonstrate, and try to prevail upon her by peaceable means to release you, but I cannot, my son, fight for you." If he did not consider this mockery, he would address her judgment, and say, "You owe me, my country, protection; I owe you in return obedience. I am no British subject, I am a native of old Massachusetts, where live my aged father, my wife and my children. I have faithfully discharged my duty. Will you refuse to do yours?" Appealing to her passions, he would continue, "I lost this eye in fighting under Truxton with the Insurgent; I got this scar before Tripoli; I broke this leg on board the Constitution when the Guerriere struck." If she remained still unmoved, he would break out, in the accents of mingled distress and despair,
"Hard, hard, is my fate! once I freedom enjoyed,
Was as happy as happy could be!
Oh! how hard is my fate, how galling these chains!"
I will not imagine the dreadful catastrophe to which he would be driven by an abandonment of him to his oppressor. It will not be, it cannot be, that his country will refuse him protection!
It is said that Great Britain has been always willing to make a satisfactory arrangement of the subject of impressment; and that Mr. King had nearly concluded one prior to his departure from that country. Let us hear what that Minister says upon his return to America. In his letter dated at New York, in July, 1803, after giving an account of his attempt to form an arrangement for the protection of our seamen, and his interviews to this end with Lords Hawkesbury and St. Vincent; and stating that, when he had supposed the terms of a convention were agreed upon, a new pretension was set up (the mare clausum,) he concludes: "I regret not to have been able to put this business on a satisfactory footing, knowing as I do its very great importance to both parties; but I flatter myself that I have not misjudged the interests of our own country, in refusing to sanction a principle that might be productive of more extensive evils than those it was our aim to prevent." The sequel of his negotiation, on this affair, is more fully given in the recent conversation between Mr. Russell and Lord Castlereagh, communicated to Congress during its present session. Lord Castlereagh says to Mr. Russell:
"Indeed there has evidently been much misapprehension on this subject, and an erroneous belief entertained that an arrangement in regard to it has been nearer an accomplishment than the facts will warrant. Even our friends in Congress—I mean those who were opposed to going to war with us—have been so confident in this mistake, that they have ascribed the failure of such an arrangement solely to the misconduct of the American Government. This error probably originated with Mr. King; for, being much esteemed here, and always well received by the persons in power, he seems to have misconstrued their readiness to listen to his representations, and their warm professions of a disposition to remove the complaints of America in relation to impressment, into a supposed conviction on their part of the propriety of adopting the plan which he had proposed. But Lord St. Vincent, whom he might have thought he had brought over to his opinions, appears never for a moment to have ceased to regard all arrangement on the subject to be attended with formidable, if not insurmountable obstacles. This is obvious from a letter which his Lordship addressed to Sir William Scott at the time."
Here Lord Castlereagh read a letter, contained in the records before him, in which Lord St. Vincent states to Sir William Scott the zeal with which Mr. King had assailed him on the subject of impressment, confesses his own perplexity, and total incompetency to discover any practical project for the safe discontinuance of that practice, and asks for counsel and advice. "Thus you see," proceeded Lord Castlereagh, "that the confidence of Mr. King on this subject was entirely unfounded."
Thus, continued Mr. Clay, it is apparent, that, at no time, has the enemy been willing to place this subject on a satisfactory footing. I will speak hereafter of the overtures made by the Administration since the war.
The disasters of the war admonish us, we are told, of the necessity of terminating the contest. If our achievements upon the land have been less splendid than those of our intrepid seamen, it is not because the American soldier is less brave. On the one element, organization, discipline, and a thorough knowledge of their duties, exist on the part of the officers and their men. On the other, almost every thing is yet to be acquired. We have, however, the consolation that our country abounds with the richest materials, and that, in no instance, when engaged in action, have our arms been tarnished. At Brownstown, and at Queenstown, the valor of veterans was displayed, and acts of the noblest heroism were performed. It is true, that the disgrace of Detroit remains to be wiped off. That is a subject on which I cannot trust my feelings, it is not fitting I should speak. But this much I will say, it was an event which no human foresight could have anticipated, and for which the Administration cannot be justly censured. It was the parent of all the misfortunes we have experienced on land. But for it the Indian war would have been in a great measure prevented or terminated, the ascendency on Lake Erie acquired, and the war pushed perhaps to Montreal. With the exception of that event, the war, even upon the land, had been attended by a series of the most brilliant exploits, which, whatever interest they may inspire on this side of the mountains, have given the greatest pleasure on the other. The expedition under the command of Governor Edwards and Colonel Russell, to Lake Peoria, on the Illinois, was completely successful. So was that of Captain Craig, who, it is said, ascended that river still higher. General Hopkins destroyed the Prophet's town. We have just received intelligence of the gallant enterprise of Colonel Campbell. In short, sir, the Indian towns have been swept from the mouth to the source of the Wabash, and a hostile country has been penetrated far beyond the most daring incursions of any campaign during the former Indian war. Never was more cool, deliberate bravery displayed than that by Newnan's party from Georgia. And the capture of the Detroit, and the destruction of the Caledonia, (whether placed to our maritime or land account,) for judgment, skill, and courage, on the part of Lieutenant Elliott, has never been surpassed.
What cause, Mr. Chairman, which existed for declaring the war has been removed? We sought indemnity for the past and security for the future. The Orders in Council are suspended, not revoked; no compensation for spoliations; Indian hostilities, which were before secretly instigated, now openly encouraged; and the practice of impressment unremittingly persevered in and insisted upon. Yet Administration has given the strongest demonstrations of its love of peace. On the 29th June, less than ten days after the declaration of war, the Secretary of State writes to Mr. Russell, authorizing him to agree to an armistice, upon two conditions only; and what are they? That the Orders in Council should be repealed, and the practice of impressing American seamen cease, those already impressed being released. The proposition was for nothing more than a real truce; that the war should in fact cease on both sides. Again, on the 27th July, one month later, anticipating a possible objection to these terms, reasonable as they are, Mr. Monroe empowers Mr. Russell to stipulate in general terms for an armistice, having only an informal understanding on these points. In return, the enemy is offered a prohibition of the employment of his seamen in our service, thus removing entirely all pretext for the practice of impressment. The very proposition which the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Pitkin) contends ought to be made, has been made. How are these pacific advances met by the other party? Rejected as absolutely inadmissible; cavils are indulged about the inadequacy of Mr. Russell's powers, and the want of an act of Congress is intimated. And yet the constant usage of nations I believe is, where the legislation of one party is necessary to carry into effect a given stipulation, to leave it to the contracting party to provide the requisite laws. If he fails to do so, it is a breach of good faith, and a subject of subsequent remonstrance by the injured party. When Mr. Russell renews the overture, in what was intended as a more agreeable form to the British Government, Lord Castlereagh is not content with a simple rejection, but clothes it in the language of insult. Afterwards, in conversation with Mr. Russell, the moderation of our Government is misinterpreted and made the occasion of a sneer, that we are tired of the war. The proposition of Admiral Warren is submitted in a spirit not more pacific. He is instructed, he tells us, to propose that the Government of the United States shall instantly recall their letters of marque and reprisal against British ships, together with all orders and instructions for any acts of hostility whatever against the territories of His Majesty or the persons or property of his subjects. That small affair being settled, he is further authorized to arrange as to the revocation of the laws which interdict the commerce and ships of war of His Majesty from the harbors and waters of the United States. This messenger of peace comes with one qualified concession in his pocket, not made to the justice of our demands, and is fully empowered to receive our homage, the contrite retraction of all our measures adopted against his master! And in default, he does not fail to assure us, the Orders in Council are to be forthwith revived. Administration, still anxious to terminate the war, suppresses the indignation which such a proposal ought to have created, and in its answer concludes by informing Admiral Warren, "that if there be no objection to an accommodation of the difference relating to impressment, in the mode proposed, other than the suspension of the British claim to impressment during the armistice, there can be none to proceeding, without the armistice, to an immediate discussion and arrangement of an article on that subject." Thus it has left the door of negotiation unclosed, and it remains to be seen if the enemy will accept the invitation tendered to him. The honorable gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Pearson) supposes, that if Congress would pass a law, prohibiting the employment of British seamen in our service, upon condition of a like prohibition on their part, and repeal the act of non-importation, peace would immediately follow. Sir, I have no doubt if such a law were passed, with all the requisite solemnities, and the repeal to take place, Lord Castlereagh would laugh at our simplicity. No, sir, Administration has erred in the steps which it has taken to restore peace, but its error has been not in doing too little, but in betraying too great a solicitude for that event. An honorable peace is attainable only by an efficient war. My plan would be to call out the ample resources of the country, give them a judicious direction, prosecute the war with the utmost vigor, strike wherever we can reach the enemy, at sea or on land, and negotiate the terms of a peace at Quebec or Halifax. We are told that England is a proud and lofty nation that, disdaining to wait for danger, meets it half way. Haughty as she is, we once triumphed over her, and if we do not listen to the counsels of timidity and despair we shall again prevail. In such a cause, with the aid of Providence, we must come out crowned with success; but if we fail, let us fail like men—lash ourselves to our gallant tars, and expire together in one common struggle, fighting for "seamen's rights and free trade."
Mr. McKee moved an amendment to the bill, going to place the appointment of the other field officers of each regiment, as well as the Colonels, in the President and Senate. The motion was agreed to.