Saturday, June 13.
Declaration of War.
Mr. Gaillard was requested to take the Chair; and on motion, by Mr. Anderson, the consideration of the bill, entitled "An act declaring war between Great Britain and her Dependencies, and the United States and their Territories," was resumed, as in Committee of the Whole; and having agreed to sundry amendments, the President resumed the Chair; and Mr. Gaillard reported the bill with amendments, which were considered in Senate and agreed to.
A motion was made by Mr. German, to postpone the further consideration of the bill to the first Monday in November next.
Mr. German addressed the Chair as follows:
Mr. President: I made the motion to postpone the consideration of the bill now before us, from a conviction that it will be extremely injurious to the country to pass it at this time. I feel, sir, that the State I have the honor to represent has a peculiar interest in the event of this question; and I also feel the weight of the interest which the nation at large has at stake, in the event of the passage of this bill. I therefore consider it a duty I owe my constituents, to use every reasonable exertion in my power to prevent the object of that bill, until the country is better prepared to carry it into effect.
As I presume the war, if declared, is intended to be an offensive one, I will, to establish the propriety of my motion, take a general view of the situation of this country; of its means to carry on offensive operations, as well as to defend itself, and of the situation and relative strength also of the country we are required to make war upon.
I am ready to allow, Mr. President, that both Great Britain and France have given us abundant cause for war; on this occasion, therefore, I shall dispense with using any argument which might serve to show, that if we were even in a state of preparation, and possessed the means of insuring a favorable issue, it would be bad policy for this country, at the present time, to enter into war with Great Britain, although perhaps many weighty reasons might be adduced in support of such argument.
I will first call the attention of the Senate to the ability and strength of the nation we are about, by this bill, to declare war against. Gentlemen ought to recollect, that Great Britain has been almost constantly engaged in war for twenty years past against one of the most powerful nations that ever existed; and for a considerable part of that time, the energies of her enemy have been directed by war's favorite genius—Napoleon, who has succeeded in uniting nearly the whole force of the Continent of Europe against her: against that very nation which we are about to assail; and what has been the effect? Is Great Britain less powerful now, than she was twenty years ago? No, sir, this constant warfare has increased her powers instead of diminishing them. At the commencement of the war, France was nearly her equal on the ocean, and several other nations of Europe maintained a powerful naval force. But what is their situation at present? Has not Great Britain driven them all from the ocean? And does she not remain sole mistress? I ask gentlemen, if her ability to carry on a distant war by land or sea, has diminished? The answer must be that it has increased with her navy, and extended with her dominion. Great Britain now commands the strength and resources of most of the West India Islands, and many of the islands in the Indian Ocean. She controls the destinies of more than thirty millions of people on the Continent of Asia. And she has, at this time, or will have, if we engage in a war with her, the exclusive benefit of the trade of the world; and under these circumstances possesses the ability to carry on a war in distant countries across the ocean, beyond any nation ever heard of.
These considerations, Mr. President, lead me to the view of our situation and means of defence, and of our ability to carry immediate war into the colonies of Upper and Lower Canada. I will first consider the situation of our maritime frontier, beginning at New Orleans, and examine the situation of that place. We learn from the War Office that there is little rising of one hundred regular troops stationed near the city for its defence. Now I will ask any gentleman if that paltry force is sufficient for that object; and if it will not be in the power of the British to take possession of that city within sixty days after your declaration of war against them? If gentlemen calculate on the goodness and forbearance of the enemy, I think they will be deceived. Great Britain is a wily, active nation. She has been trained to war. She will not measure her steps and movements by ours; if we are not prepared to defend our seaports, she will not wait until we are; and should she get possession of New Orleans, it will cost much blood and treasure to dislodge her. Passing northerly along our coast, let us see what is the situation of our most valuable cities. Charleston and Norfolk, as well as many other places of less consequence, are found exposed to maritime attacks. And when we reach the city of New York (the nation's great emporium of trade) do we, on viewing its situation, and strength of the public works for its defence, find it in a perfect state of security? No, sir, unless the greatest part of your frigates are stationed there, to aid your fortifications, and gunboats, it will fall a prey to the enemy. It can be assailed by a small fleet, with every prospect of success. The only resistance they would meet with would be in passing the fortifications on Staten Island, and perhaps a few shots from Bedlow's and Ellis's Islands. They might soon place themselves abreast the works at the upper end of the city, the weakest of them all. And I have no doubt two seventy-fours might silence this work in twenty or thirty minutes. They would then meet with no other resistance than from travelling guns on the shore and from the docks. The result would probably be, that the city would be set on fire, or a contribution extorted from its inhabitants. I will now pass on to Rhode Island. Does the prospect of security there flatter us? No, sir. I am told by competent judges that nothing short of a force of from three to five thousand men can defend that island. Boston, it is said, can be defended, and is, perhaps, the only secure place of considerable consequence on the seaboard. In viewing the situation along the province of Maine, and our northern frontier up the river St. Lawrence, and the Lakes to Fort Malden, and from thence to the Mississippi, do we not find almost every point and place where there are inhabitants, subject to the incursions of the enemy? Have they not more troops on and near the line than we have? Yes, sir, they have ten to our one, and a militia which the Government of Canada have been fully vigilant in training. I understand that ever since the prospect of war began to thicken in the political horizon, they have trained their militia three or four times a month, and have paid them daily wages for their services. Not so, sir, with our militia—they have, it is true, been called into the public service to do the duty of regular troops; and what is now their situation? Sixteen hundred of the militia of the State of New York have been ordered into public service, on the frontiers of that State, and have, as I am informed, marched to their place of destination. There we find exhibiting a spectacle that would wound the feelings of the most callous man—without hats, without blankets to cover them, without camp-kettles to cook the miserable provisions furnished them by the Government contractors or any one necessary for camp equipage. Their officers with the utmost difficulty preventing their marching home for self-preservation. Here, Mr. President, I wish to call the attention of the Senate to the propriety and constitutionality of calling out this detachment of militia at a time when no enemy menaced an invasion. The constitution only authorizes the General Government to call out the militia to suppress insurrection, enforce the laws, and repel invasion. And I would ask whether either of these events had happened when this corps of militia were ordered out? No. It is well known that no such emergency existed. But they have this miserable consolation, that they are to receive six dollars and two-thirds a month for their services, finding their own clothes, arms and accoutrements. I do not mention these things with a wish to discourage the militia from serving their country when necessary, nor do I believe defending them in their constitutional rights will have that effect, for I am fully aware that there is no class of citizens more patriotic or willing to defend their country than they are, and will be so found when the safety of it shall really demand their services.
I will now resume the consideration of our situation upon the Lakes to Detroit and Fort Malden. Here it must be remembered that the British command the Lakes. We are told that Governor Hull is marching to the defence of Detroit with twelve hundred militia from the State of Ohio, together with four hundred regular troops, formed and disciplined for action by the brave Colonel Boyd. These troops, I hope, will be better supplied and provided for than those on the frontier of New York. It is whispered by some of the favorites who are suffered to know the projects of our Government, that the British have sent a part of their regular troops, together with a number of Indians, from Fort Malden to Fort Erie, near the Falls of Niagara; and this is taken as certain evidence of the weakness of the garrison at Fort Malden, and that that fort may consequently be surprised and taken by Governor Hull with little difficulty. Now, I draw the exact contrary conclusion from this circumstance; for the British must have known that Governor Hull was on his march to Detroit; and if they had been weak at Fort Malden they never would have detached part of their force and sent it to the aid of Fort Erie. But presuming they had not heard of Governor Hull's march, and that they had left that fort comparatively defenceless, they will assuredly learn it soon enough to have the detachment return by water before Governor Hull can reach Malden. And if in the attempt to take Fort Malden, Governor Hull should meet with a defeat, the consequences will be alarming; for no reinforcement can be sent him, nor any assistance afforded soon enough to prevent a disastrous termination of the expedition. In that case the British, with a partial aid from the Indians, might cross the river and take possession of Detroit; and if they should then obtain the assistance of the Indians generally, it will be in their power to drive in all the frontier settlements of Ohio; and there can be little doubt when this war is once commenced that nearly all the Indians will flock to the British standard.