Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 4 (of 16)

by United States. Congress

Thursday, December 21.

Conduct of the British Minister.

The House again went into Committee of the Whole on the resolution from the Senate.

Mr. Emott concluded his speech against it, as given entire in preceding pages.

Mr. Gholson said, that notwithstanding much had already been said on the subject before the committee, he hoped he should be pardoned for occupying a small portion of their attention. The resolution before us seems to embrace several objects pre-eminently entitled to the dispassionate consideration of Congress; objects altogether unconnected with those factions and political dissensions which have unhappily too long prevailed among brethren of the same common family, and which may one day prove fatal to political liberty. The first question which presents itself in the investigation of this subject, involves on the one hand the veracity and dignity of the American Government, and, on the other, the character and reputation of a British Envoy, and, in some degree, of the British Ministry.

In my remarks on this subject, I consider it regular to commence with the origin of the mission from Great Britain to the United States; out of which has arisen the present unpropitious posture of the affairs between the two countries. What, sir, were the circumstances under which that mission was despatched here? In the month of May last, it was known to the British Ministry that a commercial arrangement had been made by their Envoy resident here, (Mr. Erskine,) with the American Government, but under the allegation that it was made contrary to instructions, it was no sooner known than it, and the Minister making it, were disavowed. Mr. Jackson was then appointed to substitute Mr. Erskine, the disavowed agent, and at the time he (Mr. Jackson) was sent to this country, it was well known by the British Ministry that the Government of the United States stood solemnly pledged to the American people to maintain, and that they had inviolably and steadily adhered, to certain points and principles in our differences with England, a surrender of, or departure from which, would be a sacrifice of the honor and best interests of this nation.

Yes, sir, when they well knew that, in the affair of the Chesapeake, our Executive would not, and the voice of almost the whole nation had pronounced that he ought not to make the first advance to a reconciliation, Mr. Jackson was charged, not only to require the first advance from us, to wit: that in the document which should contain the adjustment of that affair, the revocation of the President's proclamation of 1807, interdicting the British armed ships from our own water, should be recited as an indispensable preliminary; but to require from us also the violation of the principles of our naturalization laws, by insisting on the surrender of foreigners who had become naturalized. As to the Orders in Council, we know not what specific propositions he was charged with in relation to them. As far as we are able to deduce any thing from facts before us, it must be understood that the British Government had determined to accept of no conditions for the repeal of the Orders in Council except such as had been previously declared on the part of the American Government to be inadmissible. Notwithstanding what has been said by the gentleman from New York, (Mr. Emott,) I think it is easily to be demonstrated that the British Government did not intend to make any arrangement different from that contemplated by the celebrated instructions of the twenty-third of January, transmitted to Mr. Erskine. If the British Government, so recently as May last, disavowed an arrangement, and recalled its Minister, under an allegation that he violated his instructions, was it to be supposed that they would, in two or three months, so far change their policy as to authorize an arrangement on the same principles that they had just rejected? Certainly not, sir. It is evident that such an accommodation could not have been designed, because Mr. Canning says that such measures must be adopted as should secure the objects of the Orders in Council. That they did not by this mean the mere continuance of the non-intercourse law as to France, is manifest; for Mr. Canning says to Mr. Pinkney, that a repeal as to Great Britain, would be a repeal as to the whole world, unless the British Navy were to be permitted to enforce the law interdicting intercourse with France by the seizure of such vessels as should be found violating it.

These, sir, were the circumstances under which the mission commenced. What were those that characterized its progress and termination? I think it very easy to show that the conduct of the Minister himself, after he arrived, partook strictly of the same character as the conduct of the Ministry who sent him. I think I have shown that the disposition manifested by the Ministry in sending him here was insulting to this country. Let us next inquire into the character disclosed, and the conduct displayed by that Minister after his arrival. And, in this inquiry, without wading through all the documents, which gentlemen can as well understand by perusing them in their chambers as by hearing them read here, I will merely advert to the offensive expressions used by Mr. Jackson, and to the manner in which those expressions were met by the Secretary of State. By doing this, it will be very discernible, not only that the facts stated in the resolution are sustained by the correspondence, but that the resolution does not go so far as facts would warrant. In Mr. Jackson's letter of the 11th of October, he says, that the arrangement with Mr. Erskine was made under such circumstances as could only lead to a disavowal. If the circumstances were such as could only lead to a disavowal, they must have been dishonorable, and Mr. Jackson, by intimating that our Government had a knowledge of these circumstances, charges it with being particeps criminis. Can any thing be more palpable than this? He expresses this idea in still stronger terms when he intimates that Mr. Smith had a principal agency in the misconduct on this occasion. It certainly was not in Mr. Smith's power to substitute conditions for those which he declined accepting, but it must have been done by Mr. Erskine. But, notwithstanding this, he charges Mr. Smith, not only with conniving at a conduct improper in itself, because it could only lead to rejection of the arrangement growing out of it, but insinuates that he was the principal actor in the scene. In Mr. Smith's letter in answer to Mr. Jackson, the animadversions are too clear in their object to be mistaken. Mr. J. is informed of the displeasure of the American Government at such insinuations; and, in the very first letter which was written by the Secretary of State, he disclaims pointedly having had any knowledge whatever of the deficiency of Mr. Erskine's instructions at the time of making the arrangement. And what says Mr. Jackson in reply? He says again, that Mr. Erskine's instructions were known to Mr. Smith. Sir, I acknowledge very candidly, that on a superficial perusal of the correspondence, the charge of falsehood, from the art and adroitness with which it is wrapt up, does not appear so palpable as when it is more closely examined. Yet, sir, notwithstanding all knowledge of the instructions had been denied by Mr. Smith, Mr. Jackson reiterates the assertion that they were known. Do gentlemen say that there is no insult in this? That there is nothing wrong in the assertion of a knowledge on the part of the Secretary of State which he had before formally and solemnly disclaimed. In Mr. Smith's letter to Mr. Jackson, of the first of November, he intimates to Mr. Jackson that a language implying such a knowledge on the part of the American Government, was altogether inadmissible. What is Mr. Jackson's reply in his letter of the 4th of November, which is the last communication that a proper self-respect on the part of the American Government would permit it to receive from him? After again insinuating that our Government had a knowledge of Mr. Erskine's instructions, he says: "That any thing therein (in his former letter) contained may be irrelevant to the subject, it is of course competent to you to endeavor to show; and as far as you succeed in so doing, so far will my argument lose of its validity; but, as to the propriety of my allusions, you must allow me to acknowledge only the decision of my own Sovereign, whose commands I obey, and to whom alone I can consider myself responsible." In speaking of the propriety of his allusions, he acknowledges that he had made them, and does not deny that they are of the character ascribed to them. This insolent letter is concluded by expressions too plain for any misconception whatever. He says: "I have carefully avoided drawing conclusions which did not necessarily follow from the premises advanced by me, and least of all should I think of uttering an insinuation where I was unable to substantiate a fact." He here, in fact, recognizes the insinuation imputed to him, and says he would not have made it if he could not have substantiated it. Collecting all his insinuations, on the one hand, and the refutation of them, on the other, I draw the conclusion that Mr. Jackson not only insulted the Government, but charged it with one of the foulest crimes—with direct falsehood.

If the circumstances under which he was sent, and his conduct after he arrived here, were such as I have described, I ask if the occasion does not require that the American Government should take a firm and dignified stand? That we should repel insults and respect ourselves? Shall the authority to whom only is entrusted the most solemn act of government which can be performed, the act of deciding on the last appeal of nations, stand by and see the Executive insulted by an emissary, such as Mr. Jackson was? I hope not, sir.

Sir, I consider the present no time for the causeless crimination of our own Government, and much less is it a time to countenance any other. We should discard domestic differences and party spirit, which, at a juncture like this, may be disastrous to our country. If we differ among ourselves, in the name of God let us unite against foreign aggression and foreign insult. It is admitted by gentlemen on the other side, that both Great Britain and France have done us wrong. If so, why not unite against the one as well as against the other? A conduct like this must produce the happiest consequences. If any thing like union is discovered against insult and injury, I believe in God that it would not be long ere we met on reciprocal terms of amity. Sir, for my country, I only desire the rule of right; that we must obtain. If it is thought I wish any disaster to befall the British nation, I am misunderstood. I am willing that Great Britain should be great, happy, and prosperous. I should view her downfall as an inauspicious event; consequences might result from it which I will not undertake to estimate; but I hope that the expectation never will be encouraged from this Hall, that Great Britain can or will receive any terms from us other than such as are fair, honorable, and reciprocal.

The terms which have been offered to us are not of that kind. I submit it to gentlemen's own decision. We have long experienced injustice, and if we are only capable of being firm to our purpose, and adhering to the principles of neutrality which have hitherto guided the councils of our country, and especially the enlightened policy of the Executive department, we shall no doubt obtain justice.

In every view, therefore, it appears to me that the resolution from the Senate not only is supported by the correspondence laid before us, but is rendered peculiarly important by the occasion. The appeal made by Mr. Jackson from the Executive, from the organ with which alone a foreign Minister can have communication, to the people, to a tribunal with which he cannot communicate, adds great force to the arguments in favor of a firm stand on our part. I hope it will be made, and that it never will be abandoned till we receive that justice which has been but too long delayed.

Mr. Ross observed: I, for one, am an Administration man, if that Administration act correctly, whether it shall, in a time of great difficulty and doubt, insure a prospect of peace with Great Britain, or whether it may find it necessary in asserting the rights and independence of the Government to involve the nation in war. I think the importance of the one course is as great as the other, and I will, under such circumstances, equally support them when they are likely to make war as to make peace, however other gentlemen may differ from me on this head.

Before I proceed to state, sir, what I conceive necessary to be understood, in order to come to a correct judgment on these resolutions, permit me to premise that there is more than a presumption that Mr. Erskine had a power to enter into the arrangement which he made. 1st. Because he himself declared he had such power. 2dly. Because he acted in conformity to that declaration; and, 3dly. Because Mr. Jackson does not deny he had such power. Mr. Jackson does not pretend to say that Mr. Erskine had not other despatches and other instructions than those of the 23d of January, and that, in them, there were not other conditions of a different grade and character from those contained in that despatch. Hence, I think it is fairly to be concluded, that Mr. Erskine had the power to enter into the agreement. It has, however, been said by the gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Dana,) that this is not so much a question of what our Government was ignorant of, as of what they knew, or what they ought to have known; and he has entered into a long examination of the mode of commissioning diplomatic characters, whether by letters of credence or by full powers, and has drawn a distinction between the two. In the first place, I apprehend it is in nowise material, to enable the House to decide on the resolution, whether the President did or did not know the nature of Mr. Erskine's powers. But it is necessary to rescue him from the imputation which those are disposed to cast on him who are desirous to pull down the Administration. What was the amount of the gentleman's showing on this occasion? That in all cases, in order to complete a treaty, it is necessary there should be a commission or full power. But has he shown that it is necessary in order to make a preliminary arrangement similar to that entered into? I apprehend he has not. On referring to the letter quoted by him from Mr. Jefferson, then Secretary of State, to Mr. Hammond, we find the former calling upon the latter to exhibit his powers to enter into a negotiation; but Mr. Jefferson afterwards recedes from that demand, and receives the word of Mr. Hammond that he is possessed of power to negotiate as sufficient evidence of his being clothed with the proper power without the exhibition thereof. But the ratification was not withheld, as has been justly said, because there was an absence of a full power on this occasion. Mr. Jackson himself states that this was not the ground on which the ratification was withheld. It must first be proved that it was obligatory on the Executive to call for Mr. Erskine's full power, and it must then be proved that he did not, before his observations can be brought to bear on the question. Where is the proof that the Executive did not call for those powers? It is not pretended that Mr. Erskine had not a power to make an arrangement, but that it was not concluded in pursuance of his instructions. Therefore, if he had produced ten thousand powers, unless his instructions had authorized him to do what he did, the British Ministry would have rejected the terms stipulated for them, as they have done. But why is it necessary to know, on this occasion, whether the President did call for these powers or not? The inquiry composes no part of the resolution; it is neither expressly mentioned nor glanced at; and why this inquiry is raised, I confess I am utterly at a loss to know, unless it was to prove that the President of the United States had a knowledge of the instructions, and that they restricted Mr. Erskine's powers. The gentleman has not ventured to infer that the President of the United States had this knowledge, but the course of his argument goes to show that, in his opinion, he did possess this knowledge. He lays down the position, that it was the duty of the President to have seen those powers, and, I presume, supposes that the conclusion will be drawn that the President performed his duty; and, of course, taking it for granted that there were no other instructions than those of the 23d of January, that the President must have seen those instructions, and consequently have known that Mr. Erskine had not power to conclude the arrangement. All his argument went to raise a structure to induce a belief in this House, and in the public at large, that this knowledge must have been in possession of the President. The gentleman, at the same time, professes the utmost regard and respect for Mr. Madison. This, I confess, is following the direction of the poet, who says:

"Damn with faint praise, assent with civil leer;
And, without sneering, teach the rest to sneer."

But let us inquire if the President had any knowledge that Mr. Erskine had no full power; for if I show, beyond all doubt, that the President did not know it, all this insidious fabric, which is designed to produce so many delusions, will vanish at once. I think it is to be presumed that the President had no knowledge that Mr. Erskine had not full powers, because he entered into the arrangement. What object could he have in view which should induce him to conclude an arrangement, except with full confidence of its being carried into effect? Not to get rid of the embargo—that had long before been interred by its fathers with a truly Christian spirit. Not to get rid of the non-intercourse—because the moment the arrangement was disavowed, the President breathed life and spirit into that act, and gave it renewed existence. It was not from any hostile disposition to England, because he could have no reason to wish for a war. And because, if he had desired a war with that country, he had no occasion to seek a pretext therefor, inasmuch as long antecedents, and up to the very time of making the arrangement, the causes for war against Great Britain were great and numerous, as has been agreed by all parties. If not to get rid of the embargo, nor of the non-intercourse, nor for war, what object could he have, with such knowledge as has been imputed to him, not expressly, but by inference, in making the arrangement of April? Will gentlemen be good enough to condescend so far as to assign some object that the Executive could have had in view from such conduct? For it is not to be presumed that men, in or out of office, act without motive and without object. Therefore, hearing no reason assigned why the President should act thus preposterously, as it is attempted to be insinuated he did, by those in opposition, it would be reasonable to conclude that he had no such knowledge. But, in opposition to this insinuation, also, you have the solemn declaration of the President of the United States, through the Secretary of State. Humiliating in the extreme must it be to hear this solemn asseveration questioned, even in a side-way, in order to support the insolence of a British Minister! Was it not enough that the country has been enabled to endure, in order to secure the great object of remaining in peace, insult after insult, outrage after outrage, and even that the Government should be insulted by foreign diplomatic characters, without doubts and suspicions being insinuated by members of this House? Pray, sir, let me ask this House, or the whole of the United States, what the President of the United States has ever done in any official character, among the many which he has filled with honor to himself and reputation to his country, that the correctness of his declarations, made through his Minister of State, should be disputed? But I might suffer the humiliation of going still further into the subject. We have the word of the recalled Minister, if that be considered more conclusive by gentlemen than that of the President of the United States, that he did not communicate his instructions to Mr. Smith. We have, 1st. The presumption that the Executive had no knowledge of Mr. Erskine's instructions, because he could have no object in view in concluding an arrangement with that knowledge; 2d. We have his declaration to that effect through the Secretary of State; 3d. We have the declaration of the Minister, whose act was disavowed, to the same effect. What have we to destroy this proof? The deceptive, poisonous insinuations of Mr. Jackson. Mr. Erskine repeatedly declared that he had ample powers. On the news being received during the last session of the issuing of the order of the 26th April, he declared that he had no doubt his arrangement would be carried into effect. He, to the last moment, declared that he acted in the spirit, if not in the letter, of his several letters of instructions. How, therefore, was it possible for the President to receive information from Mr. Erskine that he was not invested with competent power, when Mr. Erskine himself declared and believed he was, and acted accordingly.

From these considerations I apprehend it most clearly appears that the President of the United States had not a knowledge, neither was it his duty to have had a knowledge that Mr. Erskine did not possess powers to make the arrangement which he did.