Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 4 (of 16)

by United States. Congress

Thursday, January 14.

Additional Military Force.

The House then resumed the consideration of the bill to raise twenty additional regiments of infantry for one year.—The question being on the passage of the bill.

Mr. Stow, said: Mr. Speaker, I am aware of the delicacy and novelty of my situation, as well from the indulgence of the House, as from the neutral course which I mean to pursue. He must have been indeed an inattentive observer of mankind who proposes to himself such a course without being exposed to difficulties and dangers from every side. Our country has experienced them too long from the great belligerents of Europe, and an individual will quickly find them here. For even this House is not exempt from its great party belligerents who issue their conflicting decrees and Orders in Council; and, in imitation of the hostile Europeans, it is sometimes a sufficient cause of condemnation to have been spoken with by the adverse side. Yet, notwithstanding all these dangers, I mean to launch my neutral bark on this tempestuous ocean, conscious of the rectitude of my intentions, and humbly hoping for the approbation of my country and my God.

The proper extent of the discussion growing out of this bill seemed to be confined to these inquiries: Can the force contemplated be obtained? If obtained, will it accomplish the end proposed? And lastly, will the force be an economical one? If the discussion had been confined to these limits I would have listened, and not have spoken; but, sir, it has taken a wider range, and assumed a more important aspect. It has embraced the present, and past, and the future. The causes of the war, and the mode of conducting it, have been investigated, and even confident predictions have been made as to its end. The history and the state of our negotiations have been carefully examined—and the Presidential order of succession has been scrutinized by the light of experience as well as that of prophecy. We have sometimes been forced into the scenes of private life; and, at other times, we have been chained to the car of Napoleon. In short, sir, the discussion has ranged as wide as existence, and, not content with that, the speakers "have exhausted worlds, and then imagined new." I do not pretend to censure this—it may be well for the people to have their political concerns thus splendidly dressed and passed in review before them. But still I will attempt to call the attention of the House from the regions of fiction, of fancy, and of poetry, to the humble, but I trust no less profitable, sphere of reality and prose. Passing by many of those things which have amused by their ingenuity, or surprised by their novelty, but which do not deserve a serious answer, I will endeavor to state distinctly the grounds taken by the opponents of this bill, or rather the opponents of furnishing the means of prosecuting the war: Firstly. It is alleged "that the war was originally unjust." Secondly. "That if the war was originally just, it has become unjust to continue it in consequence of the revocation of the British Orders in Council." Thirdly. "That it is inexpedient to prosecute the war, because we have no means of coercing our enemy or enforcing our claims." Fourthly. "That we are unable to support the war." And fifthly. "That, in consideration of all these circumstances, the House ought to withhold the means of further prosecuting the war."

First, then, it was alleged that the war was originally unjust. Here let me call on the House to distinguish between unjust and inexpedient. Nothing can be more important than to have clear and distinct ideas about those words which lie at the bottom of a science, or inquiry. This is happily illustrated in mathematics—there every word, by the help of diagrams, is carefully defined; and the consequence is, that there are no disputes among mathematicians, while their labors have done honor to mankind. A thing may be just and yet inexpedient: the justice of an act relates to the conduct of another, the expediency of our own situation. It may be just for me to sue the man who withholds from me the smallest sum; and yet so inexpedient as to be even ridiculous. Thus a war may be perfectly just, and at the same time highly inexpedient. This, if I mistake not, was the ground generally taken the last year by the opponents of the war, particularly by the gentleman from Virginia before me, (Mr. Sheffey,) which pointed out the distinction which I have endeavored to do, though with more ability and success. I hope the House will bear this distinction in mind; because it is of the greatest importance in the investigation which I intend to make. Before I enter further on the argument, I ask the House to indulge me for a moment while I explain my views relative to the commencement of the war. I never saw any want of provocation on the part of Great Britain. I never for an instant doubted the justice of the war, while I urged its inexpediency with all my might. I considered man placed here by a beneficent Providence, on a fertile soil, and in a happy climate, enlightened by science, and protected by the wisest of laws. By our Revolution cut adrift, as I may say, from the old world, before the storm which was about to desolate Europe arose, I fondly hoped that this new world would furnish one fair experiment of what science, liberty and peace, might achieve, free from those corruptions which have eternally attended on war. I hoped to see the country improved, and bound together by roads and canals, to see it adorned by literary institutions, and by every establishment which reflects honor upon man. Nor do I yet believe that this was an Utopian vision, or an idle dream. I still believe it might all have been realized by a different course—but the nation has determined on war, and, though it was not my choice, I still maintain that it is not unjust.

I shall now examine the second proposition, "that if the war was originally just, its further prosecution is unjust." On what ground does this rest? It is this, that the Orders in Council were the cause of the war; those orders having ceased, the prosecution of the war becomes unjust. Here again justice and expediency are confounded. It was never maintained, that the Orders in Council rendered war more just than many other outrages, though they went farther to prove its expediency, and even necessity. It therefore follows, that their repeal does not affect the justice of the war; unless accompanied with compensation for the spoliations committed under them, and atonement made for other wrongs. Neither of these, is it pretended, has been done; except so far as relates to the affair of the Chesapeake, and which I purposely left out of the catalogue of grievances. An injury which was a just cause of war, remains a just cause for its continuance, till atonement is offered, or till it is settled by negotiation. But, sir, an ample justification of war remains in the impressment of our seamen. The claim on our part is not, as has been alleged, a claim to protect British seamen—it is a claim to protect American citizens. Nay, more, as respects the justice of the continuance of the war, it is a claim only, that they will cease from the practice during the truce, that it may be seen whether it is possible to arrange it by negotiation. Is it unjust to continue the war, till this demand is complied with? or does any American wish to see his country prostrated still lower?

Having thus far explained my ideas relative to the justice of the commencement and continuance of the war, I will now proceed to answer the third objection, namely: That it is inexpedient to carry it on, because we have no means of coercing our enemy—of compelling him—to what? barely to a just and honorable peace; for that is all we demand. And have we no means of doing this? Better, then, to surrender the charter of our independence, confess we are incapable of self-protection, and beg his most gracious Majesty to again take us under his paternal care. Such a doctrine, sir, is as unfounded, as it is degrading to the American character. We have ample means of compelling Great Britain to do us justice; they are to be found in the value of our commerce; in the enterprise of our privateers; in the gallantry of our ships of war, and the conquest of her provinces. Our custom (considering her in the light of a mechanic or merchant who supplies) is of vital importance to Great Britain. It is not to be measured by its amount, in pounds, shillings, and pence, but by the strength and support she derives from the intercourse. For, while I admit that Great Britain does not send half her exports to the United States, I do maintain, that the custom of this country is of more importance to her, than that of the whole world besides. It is with a nation as with an individual, if he exchange luxuries for luxuries, or superfluities, such as ribands for ribands, which he consumes, he adds nothing to his wealth; but if he exchange his luxuries, or his ribands, for bread, or for such materials as give scope to his industry, he is then benefited, and enriched by the interchange. Such is the situation of Great Britain with regard to America. She, and her dependencies, receive more of provision, and raw materials, from America, than from all other parts of the world together. Our trade exactly gives effect to her industry, her machinery, and her capital. And it is this which has, in a great degree, enabled her to make such gigantic efforts in the awful contest in which she is engaged. Our privateers; will they have no effect on Great Britain? Will she learn nothing from the loss of three or four hundred ships? And will she be insensible to the efforts of our little Navy? Can they touch no nerve in which Britons feel? Far different are my conclusions, from what I have seen in British papers—they show that she is tremblingly alive to that subject.

Sir, I will now consider her provinces, about which so much has been said. I, too, will speak of that wonderful country, called Canada, which unites in itself all contrarieties! Which is so cold and sterile, as to be not worth possessing; and so fertile, that if, by any calamity it should become ours, it would seduce away our population; which is so unhappy under the British Government as not to lure our inhabitants; yet so happy, that it is criminal to disturb their felicity;—whose inhabitants, if united with ours, would destroy us, because they have none of the habits of freemen; and who, well knowing the privileges of their free Government, will defend them to the last. A country which is of no importance to Great Britain, and whose loss would not make her feel; a country which is so valuable to Great Britain that she will never give it up. A country so weak that it is inglorious to attack it; and a country so strong that we can never take it. But, sir, leaving these, and a thousand other contradictions, the work of fancy or of spleen, I will present to the House what I believe to be a true view of the subject, drawn from a near residence and much careful examination. Canada is of great importance both to Great Britain and the United States. It is important to Great Britain in the amount and kind of its exports. In the last year preceding war, its exports amounted to between seven and nine millions of dollars, an amount almost as great as the exports of the United States preceding the Revolutionary war. And had the most discerning statesman made out an order, he could not have selected articles better adapted to the essential wants of Great Britain. It has been said that Canada is of less value than one of the sugar islands of the West Indies. Sir, in the present state of the world, Canada is of more importance to Great Britain, in my opinion, than the whole West India Islands taken together. In danger, as she is, of being shut out from the Baltic, and fighting for her existence, she wants not the luxuries, the sugars, and the sweetmeats of the West Indies—she wants the provisions, the timber, the masts, and the spars of the North.

Canada is also of the greatest importance to the United States, in a commercial and political point of view. I have in a great measure explained its commercial importance, by stating its exports; a large portion of which were the products of the United States. Let an attentive observer cast his eye for one moment on the map of North America; let him bear in mind, that from the forty-fifth degree of latitude the waters of Canada bound for a vast extent one of the most fertile, and which will become, one of the most populous parts of the United States; and he will readily perceive that the river St. Lawrence must soon be the outlet for one-third of all the products of American labor. The same circumstances will enable it to lay an impost on one-third of our imported articles. Nor will the evil to our revenue end here. Great Britain will be enabled to smuggle her goods through this channel into all parts of the Union. It will be in vain that you attempt to counteract her by laws; from the great length and contiguity of her possessions, she will forever evade them, unless by your laws you can change the nature of man. But its greatest importance is in a political point of view: for, although not as happy in its government as the United States, it is sufficiently so to draw off multitudes of our new settlers, when the intermediate lands of the State of New York, which separate it from New England, shall be fully occupied. From this circumstance it will divide the American family, and, by the commercial relations which I have pointed out, it will exert a dangerous influence over a part of our country; for the transition from commercial dependence, to political allegiance, is too obvious to be insisted on. Having endeavored to show the importance of Canada to both of the contending nations, I I will only add that it is within our power.

The fourth objection is, that we cannot support the war—that we have not the ability to carry it on. Before I proceed to answer this objection, permit me, sir, to notice a single inconsistency of the gentlemen by whom it has been urged. It is this: in one part of their argument, they represent the people as too happy to enlist, and in another part as too poor to pay! Both of these propositions, I presume, cannot be true. Not to dwell longer, however, upon this contradiction, I do maintain, sir, that the nation is fully able to prosecute the war. On what does the ability of a nation depend? A person who will give himself the trouble of examining things rather than words, will find that it is proportioned to the number of laborers and the productiveness of their labor. Wherever, from soil, climate, or improvement, the labor of a country will produce more than a supply of the necessaries of life, it is evident that the surplus time may be devoted to idleness, to the production and consumption of luxuries, or to the carrying on of war. To illustrate this farther—suppose the labor of a person for five days will support him six, then it is clear, that the labor of five men will support the sixth man in idleness or in war. Now, sir, there is nowhere that the labor of seven millions of people will produce so much as in this country; consequently, nowhere have seven millions of people so great an ability to carry on a war. The quantity of circulating medium, whether made of paper or of silver dollars, has very little to do with the subject. If it is made of paper, and to a great extent, it only shows that the people are in their habits commercial; and that the faith of contracts is well supported. The real ability of a nation lies in what I have stated; and he must be a weak politician who cannot call it forth.

Mr. Speaker, I will now consider the last, and by far the most important objection of all; and one, without which, I certainly would not have spoken. It is, that in consideration of all the circumstances in which we are placed, it is the duty of this House to withhold the means of further prosecuting the war. It will not be denied, I trust, that this is a fair statement of the scope and object of most of the reasonings which have been employed; and that without this construction, they would be irreconcilable with common sense. This doctrine, in my opinion, goes not only to the overthrow of our constitution, but to the destruction of liberty itself. The principle of our Government is, not only that the majority shall rule, but that they shall rule in the manner prescribed by the constitution. So that if it could be proved that a majority of the people were in favor of certain measures, it would not be sufficient till they had pronounced that decision through the constitutional organs. In short, it must have been a principal object with the framers of our constitution to suspend, at least for a limited time, the effects of popular opinion. The constitution has committed the legislative power to three co-equal branches; and to the same hands has it entrusted the power of declaring war; while it has expressly confided the treaty-making power (and which alone can make peace) to two only of those branches. The claim now set up, goes to invest that branch which has no authority in the matter, not only with the treaty-making power, but also with a complete control over the other two branches. Thus one branch of the Government forcing the nation to desist from doing what three, including itself, had thought best to perform. Let us test the correctness of this principle by applying it to another co-equal branch of the Government. Let us suppose the President has made a treaty of peace, which is disapproved of by the Senate—and suppose upon this he should say, the war ought not to be further prosecuted, and refuse to employ the public force, would you not impeach him? Most unquestionably you would. I expressly admit that cases may be imagined, where such a course would be proper—where it would be not only the duty of this House to withhold supplies, but where it would be the duty of an individual to resist the laws; but such are extreme cases, not provided for by any organization of Government. What, sir, has been the practice of the British House of Commons? Have they ever refused supplies because a war was unpopular, since their revolution? Did not the same Parliament, which resolved that they would consider any man as an enemy to his country, who would advise his Majesty to the further prosecution of offensive war in America, still vote the means for carrying on the war? A similar case occurred when Mr. Fox came last into power—he disapproved of the commencement and conduct of the war, and yet he called for and received the necessary supplies.

Mr. Calhoun observed, that he could offer nothing more acceptable, he presumed, to the House, than a promise not to discuss the Orders in Council, French decrees, blockades, or embargoes. He was induced to avoid these topics for several reasons. In the first place, they were too stale to furnish any interest to this House or country. Gentlemen who had attempted it, with whatever abilities, had failed to command attention; and it would argue very little sagacity on his part not to be admonished by their want of success. Indeed, whatever interest had been at one time attached to these subjects, they had now lost. They have passed away; and will not soon, he hoped, return into the circle of politics. Yes, sir, as reviled as has been our country's efforts to curb belligerent injustice, as weak and contemptible as she has been represented to be in the grade of nations, she has triumphed in breaking down the most dangerous monopoly ever attempted by one nation against the commerce of another. He would not stop to inquire whether it was the non-importation act, or the menace of war, or, what was the most probable, the last operating on the pressure produced by the former. The fact is certain, that the Orders in Council of 1807 and 1809, which our opponents have often said that England would not yield, as they made a part of her commercial system, are now no more. The same firmness, if persevered in, which has carried us thus far with success, will, as our cause is just and moderate, end in final victory. A further reason which he had, not to follow our opponents into the region of documents and records, was, that he was afraid of a decoy; as he was induced to believe from appearances that their object was to draw our attention from the merits of the question. Gentlemen had literally buried their arguments under a huge pile of quotations; and had wandered so far into this realm of paper, that neither the vision of this House has been, nor that of the country will be, able to follow them. There the best and worst reasons share an equal fate. The truth of the one and error of the other, are covered with like obscurity.

Mr. C. said he would not multiply proof on a course of conduct the bad effect of which was too sensibly felt to be easily forgot, and the continuation of which was but too apparent in the present discussion. For what was the object of the opposition in this debate? To defeat the passage of this bill? It has been scarcely mentioned; and contains nothing to raise that storm which has been excited against it. The bill proposes to raise twenty thousand men only, and that for one year; and surely there is nothing in that calculated to lay such strong hold of the jealousy or fear of the community. What then is the object of the opposition? Gentlemen certainly do not act without an intention; and wide as has been the range of debate, it cannot be so lawless as to be without an object. It was not, he repeated, to defeat the passage of this bill; no, but what was much more to be dreaded, to thwart that, which the bill proposes to contribute to, the final success of the war; and for this purpose he must do the opposition the credit to say, they have resorted to means the best calculated to produce the effect. In a free Government, in the government of laws, two things are necessary for the effectual prosecution of any great measure; the law by which the executive officer is charged with the execution and vested with suitable powers; and the co-operating zeal and union of the people, who are always indispensable agents. Opposition to be successful must direct its efforts against the passage of the law; or, what was more common and generally more effectual, to destroy the union and the zeal of the people. Either, if successful, is effectual. The former would in most cases be seen and reprobated; the latter, much the most dangerous, has, to the great misfortunes of Republics, presented at all times a ready means of defeating the most salutary measures. To this point the whole arguments of opposition have converged. This gives a meaning to every reason and assertion, which have been advanced, however wild and inconsistent. No topic has been left untouched, no passion unessayed. The war has been represented as unjust in its origin, disastrous in its progress, and desperate in its farther prosecution. As if to prevent the possibility of doubt, a determination has been boldly asserted not to support it. Such is the opposition to the war, which was admitted on all sides to be just; and which in a manner received the votes even of those who now appear to be willing to ruin the country in order to defeat its success.

But, say our opponents, as they were opposed to the war, they are not bound to support it; and so far has this opposition been carried, that we have been accused almost of violating the right of conscience, in denying the right set up by gentlemen. The right to oppose the efforts of our country, while in war, ought to be established beyond the possibility of doubt, before it can be justly adopted as the basis of conduct. How conscience can be claimed in this case cannot be very easily imagined. We oppose not by laws or penalties; we only assert that the opposition experienced cannot be dictated by love of country, and is inconsistent with the duty which every citizen is under to promote the prosperity of the Republic. Its necessary tendency is to prostrate the country at the feet of the enemy, and to elevate a party on the ruins of the public. Till our opponents can prove that they have a right which is paramount to the public interest, we must persist in denying the right to thwart the success of the war. War has been declared by a law of the land; and what would be thought of similar attempts to defeat any other law, however inconsiderable its object? Who would dare to avow an intention to defeat its operation? Can that, then, be true in relation to war which would be reprobated in every other case? Can that be true which, when the whole physical force of the country is needed, withdraws half of that force? Can that be true which gives the greatest violence to party animosity? What would have been thought of such conduct in the war of the Revolution? Many good citizens friendly to the liberty of our country were opposed to the declaration at the time; could they have been justified in such opposition as we now experience? To terminate the war through discord and weakness is a hazardous experiment. But, in the most unjust and inexpedient war, it can scarcely be possible, that disunion and defeats can have a salutary operation. In the numerous examples which history furnishes, let an instance be pointed out, in any war, where the public interest has been promoted by divisions, or injured by concord. Hundreds of instances may be cited of the reverse. Why, then, will gentlemen persist in that course where danger is almost unavoidable, and shun that where safety is almost certain?

But, sir, we are told that peace is in our power without a farther promotion of the war. Appeal not, say our opponents, to the fear, but to the generosity of our enemy. England yields nothing to her fears; stop, therefore, your preparation, and throw yourself on her mercy, and peace will be the result. We might, indeed, have pardon, but not peace on such terms. Those who think the war a sacrilege or a crime, might consistently adopt such a course; but we, who know it to be for the maintenance of the just rights of the community, never can. We are farther told that impressment of seamen was not considered a sufficient cause of war; and are asked why should it be continued on that account? Mr. C. observed that he individually did not feel the force of the argument; for it had been his opinion, that the nation was bound to resist so deep an injury even at the hazard of war; but, admitting its full force, the difference is striking between the commencement and the continuance of hostilities. War ought to be continued until its rational object, a permanent and secure peace, could be obtained. Even the friends of England ought not to desire the termination of the war, without a satisfactory adjustment of the subject of impressment. It would leave the root that must necessarily shoot up in future animosity and hostilities. America can never quietly submit to the deepest of injury. Necessity might compel her to yield for a moment; but it would be to watch the growth of national strength, and to seize the first favorable opportunity to seek redress. The worst enemy to the peace of the two countries could not desire a more effectual means to propagate eternal enmity.

But it is said that we ought to offer to England suitable regulations on this subject to secure to her the use of her own seamen; and because we have not, we are aggressors. He denied that we were bound to tender any regulations, or that we had not. England was the party injuring. She ought to confine her seamen to her own service; or, if that was impracticable, propose such arrangements that she might exercise her right without injury to us. This is the rule that governs all analogous cases in private life. But we have made our offer; it is, that the ship should protect the sailor. It is the most simple and only safe rule; but, to secure so desirable a point, the most liberal and effectual provisions ought and have been proposed to be made on our part to guard the British Government against the evil they apprehended, the loss of her seamen. The whole doctrine of protection heretofore relied on, and still recommended by the gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. P.,) is false and derogatory to our honor; and under no possible modification can effect the desirable objects of affording safety to our sailors, and securing the future harmony of the two countries. Nor can it be doubted, if governed by justice, she will yield to the offer of our Government, particularly if what the gentleman from New York (Mr. Bleecker) says be true, that there are ten thousand of her seamen in our service. She would be greatly the gainer by the arrangement. Experience, it is to be feared, however, will teach that gentleman that the evil lies much deeper. The use of her seamen is a mere pretence. The blow is aimed at our commercial greatness. It is this which has animated and directed all of her injurious councils towards this country. England is at the same time a trading and fighting nation; two occupations naturally at variance, and most difficult to be united. War limits the number and extent of the markets of a belligerent, makes a variety of regulations necessary; and produces heavy taxes, which are inimical to the prosperity of manufactories and consequently commerce. These causes combined give to trade new channels, which direct it naturally to neutral nations. To counteract this tendency, England, under various but flimsy pretences, has endeavored to support her commercial superiority by monopoly. It has been our fortune to resist with no inconsiderable success this spirit of monopoly. Her principal object in contending for the right of impressment is to have, in a great measure, the monopoly of the sailors of the world. A fixed resistance will compel her to yield this point as she has already done her Orders in Council. Success will amply reward our exertions. Our future commerce will feel its invigorating effects. But, say gentlemen, England will never yield this point, and every effort on our part to secure it is hopeless. To confirm this prediction and secure our reverence, the prophecies of the last session are relied on. Mr. C. felt no disposition to disparage our opponents' talents in that line; but he very much doubted whether the whole chapter of woes had been fulfilled. He would, for instance, ask whether so much as related to sacked towns, bombarded cities, ruined commerce, and revolting blacks, had been realized?

Such, then, is the cause of the war and its continuation; and such the nature of the opposition experienced, and its justification. It remains to be seen whether the intended effect will be produced. Whether animosity and discord will be fomented, and the zeal and union of the people to maintain the rights and indispensable duties of the community will abate; or, describing it under another aspect, whether it is the destiny of our country to sink under that of our enemy or not. Mr. C. said he was not without his fears and his hopes.

On the one hand our opponents had manifestly the advantage. The love of present ease and enjoyment, the love of gain, and party zeal, were on their side. These constitute part of the weakness of our nature. We naturally lead that way without the arts of persuasion. Far more difficult is the task of the majority. It is theirs to support the distant but lasting interest of our country; it is theirs to elevate the minds of the people, and to call up all of those qualities by which present sacrifices are made to secure a future good. On the other hand, our cause is not without its hope. The interest of the people and that of the leaders of a party are, as observed by a gentleman from New York, (Mr. Stow,) often at variance. The people are always ready, unless led astray by ignorance or delusion, to participate in the success of the country, or to sympathize in its adversity. Very different are the feelings of the leaders; on every great measure they stand pledged against its success, and almost invariably consider that their political consequence depends on its defeat. The heat of debate, the spirit of settled opposition, and the confident prediction of disaster, are among the causes of this opposition between the interest of a party and their country; and in no instance under our own Government have they existed in a greater degree than in relation to the present war. The evil is deeply rooted in the constitution of all free Governments, and is the principal cause of their weakness and destruction. It has but one remedy, the virtue and intelligence of the people—it behooves them, as they value the blessings of their freedom, not to permit themselves to be drawn into the vortex of party rage. For if by such opposition the firmest Government should prove incompetent to maintain the rights of the nation against foreign aggression, they will find realized the truth of the assertion that government is protection, and that it cannot exist where it fails of this great and primary object. The authors of the weakness are commonly the first to take the advantage of it, and to turn it to the destruction of liberty.

Mr. Desha.—Mr. Speaker, it is not my intention to detain you long; my principal object in rising is to conjure gentlemen to bring this debate to a close. Sir, what can gentlemen flatter themselves by suffering this discussion to be protracted to so unwarrantable a length? It cannot be supposed that the substantial part of this House (I mean those who think much and speak little) will, by theoretical or sophisticated remarks, be driven from their course. Then, sir, those long-winded speeches must be either intended for the gallery, or for gentlemen's constituents. It would certainly be unjustifiable to sport away the public money; to exhaust the public patience in making long speeches, merely for the purpose of amusing the ear of the gallery. And, sir, your constituents would much rather you would act with decision, with promptitude, in adopting measures calculated for a vigorous prosecution of the war, that it might be brought to a speedy and honorable termination, than to take up weeks in detailing the causes of the war. The people are fully apprised of the causes of the war, from the documents that have been promulgated; they are satisfied that it is a just and necessary war: that it has been forced upon us by the injustice and oppression of our enemy, occasioned in a great measure by the violent opposition of a party to the Administration. Sir, act so as to give a vigorous prosecution to the war, and act promptly, and the people will support you with manly firmness, independent of the consideration of expense.

Mr. Speaker, this bill contemplates raising twenty thousand men for one year. Although I shall vote for the bill under consideration, I do not altogether approve of it. Sir, the time of service is too short to answer a valuable purpose. I am not so sanguine as to suppose that we will overrun the British provinces in one season. I should like it much better if the time of service, as has been proposed, was extended to eighteen months, and the bounty raised in proportion. You would then have the advantage of two campaigns; in the last of which, you might calculate on a certainty of being able to do something of a decisive character, as you would have the advantage of disciplined troops; and really, sir, if this bill is to answer any valuable purpose, it ought to have been passed some time since. Gentlemen certainly must see that the object of the opposition is procrastination; they have predicted that the bill under consideration, if adopted, will not only run the country to extraordinary expenses, swell the national debt to an enormous size, but that it will ultimately bring disgrace on the Government. And, sir, they are determined that their predictions shall be realized, by putting off the passage of the bill until late in the season thereby preventing you from obtaining the men in time to do any thing of a decisive character next summer. This, in my mind, is unquestionably their object; and I believe the ambition of some of them is such, that, rather than be found false prophets, they would endanger the only republic in the world. Sir, I do not wish to be understood to include the whole Federal party; far from it. I believe there are some, and I hope a considerable portion, who are American in principle, and would, perhaps, go as far as any American in defending their country's rights. Sir, it is not my intention to arraign motives; but, speaking of party, what has been the conduct of the Federalists for twelve years past, ever since the termination of the Reign of Terror? A uniform opposition to every thing of a prominent character proposed by the different republican Administrations. Now, sir, if Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison had been the weakest of men, as well as the wickedest, (which no man in his senses, who had any respect for his character, or standing in society, would assert,) they must have accidentally happened on something right in the course of twelve years.

Mr. Speaker, it is mortifying to see gentlemen who call themselves Americans, rise up in the face of the nation to palliate and vindicate the conduct of an enemy, and at the same time reprobate, in the strongest language of ridicule, every step proposed by the Administration calculated to counteract the iniquitous and destructive policy of our enemy. Can such conduct be called American? Sir, when it ought to be the duty and pride of every man having any pretensions to American principles, to rally under the governmental standard, in order to assist in expelling our tyrannical oppressors from the continent, by which extricating the Government from its present difficulties, you see the Federal party making every exertion in their power to make the war a dishonorable one.

I know, Mr. Speaker, that it is in the nature of tyrannical or despotical Governments to take arbitrary strides; yet, sir, I do believe that the impositions and oppressions heaped upon the American Government; the evils under which we at this time labor, are measurably, if not entirely, attributable to the party hostility arrayed against the Administration. Sir, they have, by their uniform opposition, led the British to believe that they had a powerful party in this country; that parties were nearly equally balanced; that it would be impossible for a Republican Administration to adhere to any decided stand taken against England, and that finally the English party would prevail. Thus, sir, have Government been beset by party. They have been baffled in every peaceable step calculated to vindicate our rights, or redress our grievances, until, by the injustice of our foreign enemy, bottomed on the aid they calculated on receiving from our domestic foes, the Government have been forced into war. And now you are told to put a stop to the war, and try once more if Briton will not do us justice. Degrading thought! Sir, we have already humbled ourselves in making proposals, and all efforts on the part of the Administration failed. The world has seen and understood that the failure was attributable to her own wickedness, and not to our pertinacity. Sir, the American Administration has exhibited an example of moderation unparalleled in the annals of the world; our forbearance has astonished the universe, and we have the consolation to see that neither the guilt of aggression, nor the folly of ambition, can be fairly attributed to it. Negotiation, as well as patience, has been exhausted. Instead of appealing again to the justice of a Government that makes principle bend to power, we have been necessarily compelled (though reluctantly) to appeal to arms, and I trust in God that they will never be laid down short of justice.

Mr. Cheves rose.—It was for some time during this debate, said he, my intention to have mingled my unimportant opinions and sentiments with those of other gentlemen in this discussion; but I gave way from time to time before the eagerness of others who were desirous of presenting themselves to your attention, and I had entirely abandoned the idea of taking any part in the argument; but the sudden and unexpected indisposition at this moment of my worthy friend and honorable colleague, (Mr. Williams,) the chairman of the committee with whom this bill originated, who was expected to close the debate, has left a vacuum in the argument which I propose to fill. Could he have addressed you, as he was prepared and anxious, in the faithful discharge of his duty to do, it would have rendered the feeble attempt which I shall make as unnecessary as it would have been impertinent and obtrusive. I propose, then, to speak, as my honorable friend would probably have done, generally, but briefly, on the several heads of discussion which have been introduced into the debate, which has not been on the bill before you, but on the general merits of the war; the origin, progress, and continuance of it. I mean not to censure the wide range which this discussion has taken. It is fair and right in gentlemen of the opposition to select some occasion during each session on which to discuss the great questions of state which the public events of the passing times present; and the one furnished by the bill before you was perhaps as proper as any other.

Almost all the gentlemen who have addressed you, have very gravely told you, by way of exordium, of their unquestionable right to do so, and of the firmness with which they mean to assert and exercise it, as if there had been, at any time, really an opposition to this freedom of discussion. These introductions must be a little amusing to the members of this House and to the attendants in your galleries, who have been in the habit of listening to the gentlemen. But if there ever could have been a doubt on this subject, and surely there never was any, the debate, which I hope is about to be closed, affords an ample refutation of it. There are parts of this debate which will descend to distant posterity as a monument of the freedom of discussion in this Hall. I trust, sir, we shall furnish few such testimonials—I hope never to see another exhibition on this floor. They must be looked upon with apprehension by all those who consider the restraints of personal politeness and the urbanity of social esteem as affording a better security to those who love peace and good manners, for the preservation of these valuable objects, than can be lent by the strongest arm or the severest sanctions which positive institutions have established; restraints under which even "vice itself loses half its evil, by losing all its grossness." I shall imitate the example of gentlemen who followed in the debate—I shall pour oil upon the waves, and endeavor to still the raging of the storm.

Gentlemen, fruitful in epithets, yet rather fruitful in their abundance than in their variety, have called this an unjust, wanton, wicked, and unnecessary war. I, on the contrary, assert it to be a just and necessary war. One characteristic difficulty here presents itself, which has occurred in all the discussion in and out of this House on this subject. What is a just and necessary war? By the advocates of war it is asserted that the injuries and insults of the enemy demanded war, and rendered this war just and necessary. The opponents of war admit the magnitude of the insults and injuries, but deny the inference. They assert that the war is unnecessary and not justifiable, because the pecuniary expenditure and loss will exceed in value the commercial objects for which we are contending. The advocates of war deny both the premises and the conclusion. The objects of the war are not merely commercial, but, if they were, the inference is denied. They admit that the pecuniary expenditure and loss will exceed the pecuniary value of the commercial objects for which they contend, but they deny that a war for commercial objects is therefore unnecessary or indefensible. To an intelligible argument it seems, therefore, under these circumstances, necessary that we should begin by some definition of a just and necessary war; and yet it seems to be a melancholy labor in a great and free State, where public sentiment should be unequivocal on such subjects, to proceed by rules of logic to establish great first principles of public sentiment; but I fear that, as all good things are purchased by concomitant sacrifices, we have not obtained the innumerable blessings and advantages of the freedom of speech and of the press for nothing. I fear they have sometimes substituted an erring reason for a better guide—the great uncontaminated current of public feeling—the moral sense of the nation, of which the honorable gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Quincy) so often tells so much.

But we must inquire, what is a just and necessary war? A war is just and necessary when waged to protect and defend the violated pecuniary interests of the country; or to defend and secure the sovereign rights and independence of a country; or, lastly and principally, to support and maintain the national honor. The last, indeed, embraces all the others; and, if I have distinguished, it is rather in conformity with custom, or for the purpose of elucidation than from any practical separation which I admit between the last and the former. But I am likely to incur the derision of the honorable gentlemen in the opposition by speaking of national honor. They seem not to have admitted the term into their vocabulary; they treat it as a new language; they remind me of the character of Goldfinch in one of Holcroft's plays, who, when he hears the Romans mentioned, exclaims, "Romans! Romans! who are they?" So the gentlemen, "national honor! what's that? what's that?" Yet, sir, strange as it may seem to the honorable gentlemen over the way, the maintenance of the principle of national honor, by which I mean that principle which animates and sustains an elevated fitness of character and conduct, is the only justifiable cause of war; and, if necessary, the principle ought to be maintained by all the sacrifices of war in its worst shape. No war is justifiable or necessary which is waged merely for pecuniary objects, if we can suppose such a war, for all wars involve expense and loss greater than the amount of any pecuniary objects for which they can be waged. On the ground of interest merely they would not, therefore, be justifiable; and there is to be superadded, what cannot be valued in money, the value of human life. But the value of every thing is founded on the security with which it is enjoyed. One unpunished violation of right provokes another and another, until all security is destroyed; and, therefore, it is necessary to resist given infractions of pecuniary right by sacrifices beyond the value of the right itself, because resistance is necessary to the security of all other pecuniary rights—nay, to the security of all other rights. Security of rights is a political thing; it is the protection of Government; it derives its value, and a great portion of its power, too, from a faithful and unrelaxed application of it to all the rights and interests of a nation; and is diminished in its value, and in its power also, by any failure to afford the protection which is due by Government to the subjects and the interests under its control. To abandon any interest is to abandon all, and to protect one is to protect all; war, therefore, waged to protect one political right is waged to protect all political rights; no war is, in consequence, made for any given right merely as such, but for all the rights and interests which are bound together in a nation under the social and civil compacts. To compare the expenditure and losses of war with the value of commercial objects, which may be the immediate cause of war, is to talk idly, and to forget the true end of all war and the first great purpose of Government—security. A great man (Sir James Mackintosh) has said, "the paramount interest of every State, that which comprehends all others, is security." Will you, then, it may be inquired, go to war to avenge the infraction of the smallest right under the protection of Government, and for this object jeopardize every other, and spill the blood of your fellow-citizens? Certainly not. There is a fitness which cannot be defined in anticipation, but which is easily discoverable when the occasion occurs, which determines when a war is necessary. It may depend upon the nature of the injury; on the character which the nation has acquired; on its ability to avenge the injury; on the character of the nation which has inflicted the injury, and a thousand other circumstances. The question ought always to be, What becomes the nation? What is due to the national honor? What is necessary to sustain an elevated fitness of character and conduct in the nation? If the injury sustained be one which cannot or will not probably be repeated, it is less necessary to avenge it. If the nation be poor and feeble, it may be obliged to submit to the violation of a great right. If it be great and powerful, it must sometimes resent a smaller injury; it may sometimes disdain to notice a considerable aggression upon its rights; in short, in no instance is the expense of the war a rule which will prove it just and necessary, or otherwise; in every instance is national honor, that is, a fitness of character and conduct, the rule by which its necessity and justifiable character are determinable. Generally when a nation is able to resist with effect the infraction of important pecuniary rights, it seems indubitable that an elevated fitness of character and conduct requires resistance. But this obligation is increased, and is less doubtful when any of the sovereign rights of a nation are infringed, as in gross and reiterated insults to the national flag, habitual violations of the personal liberty of its subjects, invasion of its territories, and the like; these are assaults upon its independence, and there is no room left for an inquiry into the fitness of resistance; it may indeed be supposed to change from a question of expediency to an act of necessity; it is a struggle for self-preservation; the nation acts upon a principle which is inherent in the meanest insect, and of which inanimate matter is not divested; the worm, when trodden on, writhes in resistance as well as anguish, and the reaction of inanimate matter seems to be the repulsive act of self-preservation.

What, then, did an elevated fitness of character and conduct require of the American Government, in relation to Great Britain, at the moment war was declared? What does it still require? I repeat, the war is a just and necessary war. This will be proved by adverting to the causes of the war. What, then, were the causes of the war? They were principally new and before unheard-of blockades—the Orders in Council, which have been generally so called, by way of pre-eminence; the spoliations of our commerce under various unfounded and insulting pretexts, and the impressment of our seamen. I am not permitted by the circumstances under which I address you to go at length into any of these subjects. But I may ask, what on the ocean did we enjoy but by the sufferance of Great Britain? What insults, what injuries had we not suffered? When did they begin; when, though they may have been varied in character, were they relaxed in degree, and when were they probably to cease?

Great Britain has been properly selected as the first object of our hostility. When a proposition was made to include France as well as Great Britain in the declaration of war, gentlemen on neither side of the House did support it. The opposition prints throughout the Union laughed it to scorn. Few men thought of resisting both at once. The voice of both parties appeared to be against it. The Government, obliged to resist, was obliged to select its enemy. Should France have been selected? With the blood of our citizens insultingly slaughtered without the slightest provocation, on the shores of our own territory, unatoned for till the moment of the declaration of war, with the habitual impressment of our seamen in every sea, with the continual and reiterated violation of your right to seek where you choose a market for your native produce, all before your eyes, and with no hope of a discontinuance of these injuries, we are told that we ought to have diverted our enmity from Great Britain, and directed it against France. Where, sir, could we attack France? Where are her colonies into which we could carry our arms? Where could we subjugate her provinces? Where are her ships?—where her commerce? Where could we have carried on against her any of the operations of war? Would the chivalry of gentlemen on the other side of the House have suggested an invasion of France? An honorable gentleman from New York, (Mr. Gold) said it would not have required another man nor another ship, to have resisted France. But, why, I pray you? Because such a resistance would have been confined to the idle and nugatory act of declaring it. Effectual resistance would have been impracticable. Gentlemen would resist France, would declare war against France, merely to show their indignation at her perfidy and injustice; and here I confess my feelings go with the gentlemen—I would do so too, had we no other enemy to contend with. But if we had abandoned or deferred our resistance to the injuries of England and as a pretext for it assailed France, would not the act have been idle and weak? Would it not have been wicked, to borrow one of the epithets which gentlemen have applied to the war with England, so to have sported with the public feelings and the national resentment as to have declared war against France, the minor aggressor, whom we could not touch, and to have suppressed our resentment against Great Britain, whose injuries were unlimited and unceasing, and whom alone we could reach? But why, sir, are the injuries these nations have done contrasted, and those of the one made an apology for those of the other? Why are we partisans of either? Have we no country of our own? Is there a land upon the globe so fair, so happy, and so free? And, beholding and enjoying these blessings,

"Breathes there a man with soul so dead
Who never to himself hath said,
This is my own, my native land!"

Sir, I feel neither as a Frenchman nor Briton, but as an American. As a citizen of the United States, I bear no affection to any other country. If I have any feeling of partiality for either of the great belligerents, it is for the country, and the people of Great Britain. From them I draw my blood in a very short descent. But that nation is the injurer of my country, and I can see her in no other light than that of an enemy, nor can I find any apology for her in the injuries France has done us. Sir, the Government did right in discriminating between Britain and France, and selecting the former. It was the only mode of real practical resistance. The world would have laughed at us had we declared war against France, who was no longer able to injure us, whom we could not assail with effect, and have left the unceasing injuries of Great Britain to go on unresisted and unresented. The world would have considered it as a mere cover for our pusillanimity. I say, then, that the Government was not tricked into a war with Great Britain. It was commenced in the prosecution of the best and most deliberate policy. It was the only honorable and practicable course. If there has been an error, and I think there has, it was in not having long since resisted England. War against England should have followed the first embargo; that was a wise measure, but it could not endure forever; it carried the policy of commercial restriction upon the enemy as far as such a policy should ever be carried, which from its nature can only be temporary. It at the same time prepared the nation for war; it brought home your wealth and seamen; it brought home your vessels, and placed you in the attitude in which the nation ought to have been previous to war, and its termination ought to have been followed by immediate and vigorous war. The pulse of the nation was high, and the confidence of the people in their rulers and resources great. Distrust has grown out of the hesitation and timidity then manifested. If the embargo had been followed up by war, some of the greatest injuries we have since suffered would not have occurred. France would not have ventured to have seized and sequestered our vessels and property as she subsequently did. She was tempted to do it because she saw we would suffer and submit to any injury.

Gentlemen say, that popular opinion was against the war. I deny it, sir. It was called for by popular opinion; and this will not be disproved, however soon popular opinion shall incline to peace, and gentlemen on the other side of the House regain the reins of power, as they are not unlikely to do, however just and necessary the war. Any man who thought with half the ability with which the gentlemen do, must have believed that in voting for war, he was probably surrendering himself politically a victim on the altar of his country; yet it is frequently declared, that the majority have declared this war to preserve their seats. They declared it against popular opinion, too, to preserve their seats, which they hold by the tenure of popular opinion! Are gentlemen serious? Look at the history of nations, and see if the war-makers have been generally the peacemakers.

But war was prematurely declared, it is said, because we had not a regular disciplined army at the time. Preparation for operations on land must have been relative to the defence of our own territory, or the invasion of the enemy's territory. The militia are the proper and the adequate defenders of the soil on which they live; for this purpose we did not want any other army. They might have been made more extensively useful. I join not with their revilers—I wish that their usefulness had not been circumscribed by a doctrine subversive of the true principles of the constitution which was maintained on this floor. I rejoice that I combated that doctrine; yet I do not mean to consider them as a fit army of invasion. I acknowledge that we were not prepared with a regularly-disciplined army, qualified for the invasion and conquest of the enemy's country. But should we have been prepared by winter, the time to which gentlemen wished to have deferred the declaration of war? It is a truth that a Government like ours never will, and never can, be prepared for war in peace. The great and effective preparation for war must grow out of the progress and events of the war. Notwithstanding our disasters on land, I believe our preparation is greater, and our situation better, than it would have been had the war been deferred. We were to expect, in the commencement of the war, to suffer such misfortunes. Except in the affair of Detroit, nothing has happened which should cause us to blush: that disgrace, like the disgrace of the Chesapeake, will be the harbinger of glory—I take it as an omen of victory. I pledge myself, if the war continue it will be so in the event. As the war stands at this moment, we have suffered little, and we have humbled the pride of the enemy where it was most insulting. We have insured the confidence of the nation, from the seashore to the mountains beyond them, as far as our population reaches, in our naval ability. I ask the gentlemen on the other side of the House, whether we have not gained something in this respect by the war? In one word, who would now commence the war and take the chance of better success in preference to the actual fortune of the war since it has been declared. It was not prematurely declared. I now contend the war ought to be continued. Some gentlemen have thought fit to say in debate, that the only alleged cause of war was formed by the Orders in Council. But from their own act, their celebrated protest, I will prove the contrary. Impressment is there enumerated as among the causes of war, as it was in all the public acts of the time relative to the causes of war. Without more words, I am authorized in asserting that impressment was one of the principal causes of the war; and although had the Orders in Council been revoked, and their revocation known to us before war was declared, we would no doubt have temporized longer; yet this cause itself must in the end have produced war.

It appears that very soon after the General Government went into operation, this practice was the subject of remonstrance; this was under the Administration of General Washington. It has been the subject of negotiation and remonstrance under every succeeding Administration. But it is alleged, because it was not settled in the Treaty of 1794, that it was not considered by General Washington as justifiable cause of war, and it is inferred that it ought not now to be considered as sufficient cause for the continuance of the war. What, sir, shall constitute cause of war? The spoliation of your property? Not so, say gentlemen, because the expenditure for redress will be greater than the injury sustained. The violation of the personal liberty of your citizens and the degradation of the ensign of your sovereignty? No, say gentlemen, General Washington did not consider these as sufficient cause of war. Will, then, any injury, or any combination of injuries, authorize or require national resentment? The reasoning of the gentlemen would lead us to a negative conclusion. But in their estimate of the actual causes of the present war, they appear to consider the business of impressment as trivial, and the Orders in Council as every thing. What, sir, will you go to war for property, the value of which is only relative, and which, compared with personal liberty, is worthless, and refuse to go to war for the personal liberty of the citizen? for that which is alike

"Given to the fool, the vain, the evil—
To Ward, to Waters, Chartres, and the Devil!"

You will wage war, and not to rescue your fellow-citizens from imprisonment and stripes? But however this subject was to be viewed before we were actually involved in war, it must now be put on a footing of certainty; if our claim be not secured it will be surrendered; to make peace without obtaining any security against the abuse of which we complain, would be to acquiesce in it, and to acquiesce in it would be to surrender the rights of the country. This was the reasoning of Mr. King, who in one of his communications to Government on this subject says, he has abandoned negotiation, because to acquiesce in the views of the British Government would be to surrender our rights. And shall I be obliged, sir, to come here with volumes of documents to prove the rights of the citizen; to demonstrate that the naval officers of Britain have not a right to incarcerate him; to drag him to the gangway and flog him? Shall I be obliged by a laborious process of reasoning to prove the obligation of Government to rescue him from such suffering? No, gentlemen generally have abandoned this ground, and say, that the impressment of our citizens is, under proper circumstances, justifiable cause of war; and the gentleman from North Carolina, (Mr. Pearson,) who opened the debate on this subject says, that if a fit proposition, accompanied by means calculated to give it a fair chance of success, were tendered and did not procure a cessation of the practice of impressment, he would support the war. What is the proposition which he submits? That we shall prohibit from serving in our ships the seamen of Great Britain and other foreign seamen, and confine our crews to our own citizens. This being done he will support the war. I challenge gentlemen on the other side of the House to say distinctly to the people, for whom an honorable gentleman (Mr. Quincy) has said this debate was intended, that this war should not be continued for the protection of our seamen; they will not, they dare not. But if they are against the continuance of the war, it is on that ground and no other. The honorable gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Randolph) says, Great Britain has a right to insist on the services of her own subjects, and that England would not be England if she could not command them. I say that America will cease to be America if she suffers her to command them at the price of the liberty of her citizens and the honor of her flag. The same gentleman says, England will nail the flag to the mast and go to the bottom with it, rather than surrender the right of taking her seamen from on board our merchant vessels. I hope, sir, we shall imitate the noble example she sets us, and make every sacrifice rather than give up our citizens to bondage and stripes.

But, say gentlemen, the public law of all nations on earth, ancient and modern, has denied the right of expatriation. Admit that they are correct, and for the purpose of the argument, I do admit that such is the general law. But what is this law as modified by the practice of nations? Every nation which has thus forbidden expatriation has at the same time granted naturalization, and the general practice of nations is undoubtedly the law of nations. Does not England naturalize foreigners? Does she not naturalize your citizens? If she does not do it as generally as you do, it is because it is not her policy to do so; it is enough that she naturalizes your seamen; it is enough that all nations have, at the same moment, forbidden expatriation and granted naturalization. The law must be the result of neither exclusively, but of both these practices. Mr. Burke, (the great Edmund,) who was certainly no innovator, denominates Charles XII. the murderer of Patkul. Patkul was born a Swedish subject and had repeatedly taken up arms against his Sovereign; he was adopted by Russia and had been her Minister at the Court of Poland. Charles XII., the Sovereign to whom his natural allegiance was due, obtained possession of his person and put him to death—this act Mr. Burke denominates murder!

Governments which have naturalized foreigners have protected their naturalized subjects, and the Government to whom the native allegiance of such subjects was due, though they have denied the right of expatriation, have not impugned the protecting interposition of the adopted sovereign. If they have, it has been considered as an act of unprincipled violence, and in the instance of Patkul has merited and received the denomination of murder. On this subject I will quote a single sentence from one of Mr. King's letters; he says, "it behooves the British Government to adhere to the principle of natural allegiance wholly, or renounce it wholly." Contending themselves for the right of naturalization, can the British Government deny it to others? On the part of this Government sufficient evidence of its pacific and accommodating disposition appears in its offer to surrender every thing it can, consistently with national faith. On the part of Britain a protraction of the war, by refusing to meet us on the terms proposed, can proceed from no other motive than a determination to continue that abuse of power which she has inflicted and we have suffered so long. The ground taken by this country is what we must insist upon keeping, and I doubt not we will succeed if we contend for it as we ought. The informality of the negotiation between our Chargé d'Affaires and the British Government has been mentioned as a cause of its failure. If there had been an amicable disposition on the part of the British Government, the authority would have been considered ample. If there be not an amicable disposition we will negotiate in vain. We must fight, or we shall never succeed in obtaining a recognition of our rights. I will advert to one argument of the gentleman from New York, (Mr. Emott,) who has examined this subject with ability. It is that one which appeared to me to make the greatest impression on the House. He said he had examined the voluminous document on the subject of impressment, which was printed during the last session by order of the House, and that it did not appear from that document that more than ninety-three American seamen had been impressed in the year 1809; from which I believe every one who heard him inferred that it was proved affirmatively by that document, that no more than ninety-three American seamen, who were named therein, were impressed in that year. Now, what is the fact? The document does not state in one case, perhaps of eight or ten, when the impressment took place, and there are one thousand five hundred and fifty-eight persons named in that document. Of course the gentleman could not be authorized to say that but ninety-three, or any other precise number, were impressed in 1809. All those, the date of whose detention is not stated, may have been impressed in 1809. It is probable much the greatest portion was. A more particular examination of this point of inquiry will prove the magnitude of the evil. From the 1st of April, 1809, to the 30th of September, 1810, a period of eighteen months only, a single agent of this Government, in London, received one thousand five hundred and fifty-eight applications from impressed seamen. How many were unable to apply? Men imprisoned on board ships of war, scattered over the ocean and on distant stations, how could they apply to Mr. Lyman in London and give in their names? The number impressed must have been great, indeed, when a single agent in the short space of eighteen months, registered the names of one thousand five hundred and fifty-eight applicants. Of this number a part was discharged, acknowledged to be Americans beyond the possibility of denial; a small number is detained as being born in England, and the remainder are detained under various pretexts—such as supposed to be born in England, being on distant stations, having consular certificates proving them Danes, Swedes, &c.; as if they had any better right to take from on board an American vessel a Swede or a Dane than an American citizen. Even their own doctrine goes to assert a right to seize none but their own subjects. I ask, now, whether the impression made by the gentleman from New York was a just one? Whether it does not appear probable that at least one thousand of those contained in this list were impressed without even a plausible pretext? But if in a single statement I make out a result so variant from the statement of the gentleman, I beg you and the public to test the other statements of the gentleman in the same way. Not, sir, that the gentleman made the statement with any unfair intention, for no man is more honorable or correct—he has my highest esteem—but, it will show how liable we are to err—nay, how prone we are to err when our feelings and habit of thinking run with our argument. So much for impressment. It is an abuse such as cannot be tolerated by an independent nation. It is one which ought to be resisted by war.

The question was then taken on the passage of the bill, and decided in the affirmative—For the bill 77, against it 42, as follows:

Yeas.—Willis Alston, jun., William Anderson, Stevenson Archer, Daniel Avery, Ezekiel Bacon, David Bard, Josiah Bartlett, Burwell Bassett, William W. Bibb, William Blackledge, Robert Brown, William A. Burwell, William Butler, John C. Calhoun, Francis Carr, Langdon Cheves, James Cochran, John Clopton, Lewis Condict, William Crawford, Richard Cutts, Roger Davis, John Dawson, Joseph Desha, Samuel Dinsmoor, Elias Earle, William Findlay, James Fisk, Meshack Franklin, Thomas Gholson, Isaiah L. Green, Felix Grundy, Bolling Hall, Obed Hall, John A. Harper, Aylett Hawes, John M. Hyneman, Richard M. Johnson, Joseph Kent, William R. King, Abner Lacock, Peter Little, Aaron Lyle, Thomas Moore, William McCoy, Samuel McKee, Alexander McKim, Arunah Metcalf, Samuel L. Mitchill, Jeremiah Morrow, Hugh Nelson, Anthony New, Thomas Newton, Stephen Ormsby, Israel Pickens, James Pleasants, jun., Benjamin Pond, William M. Richardson, Samuel Ringgold, Thomas B. Robertson, John Rhea, John Roane, Jonathan Roberts, Ebenezer Sage, Lemuel Sawyer, Ebenezer Seaver, John Sevier, Adam Seybert, Samuel Shaw, George Smith, John Smith, William Strong, John Taliaferro, George M. Troup, Charles Turner, jr., William Widgery, and Richard Wynn.

Nays.—John Baker, Abijah Bigelow, Hermanus Bleecker, James Breckenridge, Elijah Brigham, Epaphroditus Champion, Martin Chittenden, Matthew Clay, Thomas B. Cooke, John Davenport, jr., William Ely, James Emott, Asa Fitch, Thomas R. Gold, Charles Goldsborough, Edwin Gray, Jacob Hufty, Richard Jackson, jun., Philip B. Key, Lyman Law, Joseph Lewis, jr., William Lowndes, Archibald McBryde, James Milnor, Jonathan O. Mosely, Joseph Pearson, Timothy Pitkin, jun., Elisha R. Potter, Josiah Quincy, John Randolph, William Reed, Henry M. Ridgely, William Rodman, Daniel Sheffey, Richard Stanford, Lewis B. Sturges, Samuel Taggart, Benjamin Tallmadge, Uri Tracy, Laban Wheaton, Leonard White, and Thomas Wilson.

Ordered, That the title be, "An act in addition to the act, entitled 'An act to raise an additional military force, and for other purposes.'"