Tuesday, January 21.
Naval Establishment.
The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill concerning the Naval Establishment.
Mr. Johnson said: I do not know, sir, why I should regret the discussion of any subject in this place, when I recollect that each member is under the same obligations of duty and responsibility. It has been said that no member would be thanked for his vote in favor of this bill—and, fearless of censure, I shall oppose this attempt to lay the foundation, and to pledge the property of the people for naval systems, as ruinous to the finances of the country, as it will be destructive to the peace of the nation. After every effort in my power, I could not suppress the sensation of sorrow, that Congress should be distracted with a subject that would justly excite alarm throughout the nation, even in the hours of profound tranquillity. I have looked to the Treasury reports, and I see a national debt of about fifty millions of dollars. I look to the aggressions of England, and I find we have been driven to the necessity of creating a great and expensive military force to avenge our wrongs and to expel the enemy from her North American colonies. I look to the arguments of the advocates of this pernicious system, and they acknowledge that we are driven to the brink of a war that will require loans and taxes, and end in a new debt of at least fifty millions of dollars—and under these circumstances, when we are upon the heels of a second revolution, when the people are likely to be most pressed for the ways and means to carry on the war with vigor and certain success, the ruinous system of a great navy is pressed upon us. Upon the return of a second peace, when the British possessions shall be incorporated into the Union, and our army disbanded—when commerce shall be restored, and a surplus of revenue in the Treasury—after meeting the demands of the Government, with more propriety might the question be presented for consideration. I believe, sir, since the political reformation in 1801, the question of building a navy had never been before presented directly to the consideration of Congress. When Mr. Jefferson, that illustrious character, presided over the destinies of the United States, why was not this navy-building proposed? Then we had a revenue of fifteen millions of dollars annually, and a surplus in the Treasury. No, sir, such a system had been put down too recently—the struggles against a navy in '98-9 were not forgotten. I deny the capacity of the United States to maintain a navy without oppression to the great mass of the community in the persons of tax-gatherers; and if a great navy could be maintained, it would be more than useless—it would be dangerous to the peace and tranquillity of this nation. I was in favor of repairing and putting into service the whole of our naval force, consisting of one hundred and sixty-two gunboats and upwards of fifteen frigates and smaller war vessels; because this naval force, united with our fortifications, would give security to our coasts and harbors, protect our coasting trade, and would be important in the present crisis to co-operate with privateers and individual enterprise against the commerce and plunder of Great Britain. But this is not the object of the bill. It contemplates and embraces a navy to protect our commerce in distant seas as well as at home, and which cannot cost less than twenty or thirty millions to accomplish; and, when built, would entail upon the Government of the United States the annual expense of fifteen millions of dollars,[25] equal to the amount of our whole revenue in the most prosperous years of commerce under the administration of Mr. Jefferson, and double the amount of our present financial income. It is the system, as well as the expense, that I object to; and while I am ready as any man to keep a small naval force, to be confined to the protection of our maritime frontiers, as well as I am to keep up a small land force, to protect our territorial frontiers, I will not vote one cent for a system of naval force which is destined to keep foreign nations in check in distant seas, and destined to entail upon this happy Government perpetual taxes and a perpetually-increasing national debt. The people will not support such a Naval Establishment—they have the corrective in their hands; and build this fleet of twenty seventy-fours and forty frigates, and the people will in their turn put them down. But, sir, we are told that we are a commercial people, and that you cannot restrain a spirit of enterprise in our citizens which is limited only by the polar snows to the North and the icy mountains to the South. No person has attempted to damp that gallant spirit, that mercantile enterprise—such adventurous voyages have been fostered and cherished by every means in the power of the Government. But, sir, has this unparalleled enterprise, this gallant spirit, been carried on by a navy? Such a thing has never been thought of, which proves that this question of a navy has no connection with this commercial enterprise; and the existence of one without the other, is positive proof of the fact. But it is also said, that agriculture and commerce are twin sisters, and the learned gentleman from New York (Mr. Mitchill) will not allow a more distant connection. I have no objection to such a union, and I did expect that it would have been demonstrated what was the real relationship between these twin sisters and a permanent navy; whether it is that of cousin-german, brother or husband. As these subjects have not been identified, I must be permitted to say that there is no connection—unless under the disguise of protection, the navy would be the destroyer both of commerce and agriculture—by taxes upon the one and constant war upon the theatre of the other. The advocates of a navy need not expect to cover the deformity and danger of the system by telling the people they are friends to the protection of commerce—and that those who oppose it are ready to relinquish our rights upon the ocean. No, sir, this will not do. They will ask if our commerce, as great as it has been, was ever protected by a navy. They will look at the expenditure of the public money—they will see twenty-nine millions of dollars expended upon our present Naval Establishment; and though they may not complain of that prodigal waste of public money upon so small a naval force, they will look to the effects produced by this power, and they will refuse to augment it, until, indeed, the Peace Establishment shall require augmentation. The people will look to the votes of this House, and they will see the opposers of a navy willing at this moment to avenge the depredation upon our commerce and neutral rights by actual hostility. I am not prepared to give up our rights, whether upon the ocean or upon land, whether commercial or personal; but I may differ in the means of avenging these wrongs, and vindicating those rights, and I shall ever differ from those who wish a navy to ride triumphant in distant seas, and, under a pretext of protection to commerce, doom the nation to galling burdens too intolerable to be borne. But we are told, sir, that this question partakes of the character of a self-evident proposition. Indeed, sir, and in what respect is it entitled to this definition of self-evident? Unless, indeed, from every consideration of history, experience and reason, it is evident that a navy is an engine of power and ambition, calculated to embroil a nation in quarrels and wars, and to fix permanent wretchedness upon the industrious class of the people. When we look to the delegation from each State, we find a difference in sentiment upon this subject, whether lying on the seaboard or distant from it.
The chairman of the Naval Committee has attempted to make us believe that a navy is the anchor of our hopes, and I dare venture to say, his eloquent colleague (Mr. Williams) will in due time denounce it as the most abominable system—always employed in the fell purposes of outrage, plunder, war, and death. The same division of sentiment exists in Massachusetts as to this destructive and expensive establishment. And, sir, let me not omit to mention, the sentiments of the Republicans of '98-9 were not only entitled to the love and confidence of the people, but worthy of our imitation. Nor will I omit the resolutions of the Virginia Legislature in opposition to a navy, when they remonstrated against measures which they considered ruinous to the freedom of the United States—nor is my respect for those opinions lessened, although many Republicans in Congress at this time, and men of talents, have become great advocates for a navy, and I will put it to the people whose opinions are entitled to their approbation, whether a navy beyond the peace establishment is ruinous, or the rock of our safety.
Leaving the division of sentiment in our country, let us advert to ancient and modern history, and search for examples upon this important subject. And here, sir, I will take this position, and defy history for an example, that no great naval power ever confined their naval strength to the legitimate object of protecting commerce in distant seas. I will refer to Tyre and Sidon, Crete and Rhodes, to Athens and to Carthage. No sooner had these nations ceased to confine their naval strength to their maritime defence at home, to the protection of their seacoast, than they were engaged in plunder, piracy, depredations upon other nations, or involved in wars, which certainly accelerated, if it did not produce, the downfall and destruction of those governments. Peace and tranquillity is not the natural state of a great naval power. A disregard of public law, sacred treaties, and bloodshed, would suit it better; and it has been and ever will be, the consequences of such force. These nations furnish another example and instructive lesson to the present generation—that while their commerce and navy furnished a small part of the people with the luxuries of every country at that time known, the great mass of citizens at home were miserable and oppressed. Their rights neglected, their burdens increased, and their happiness destroyed, while their fleets and external grandeur carried astonishment and terror to distant nations. When a nation puts forth her strength upon the ocean, the interior of the country will be neglected and oppressed with contributions. Ancient history does not furnish a solitary instance of any permanent good, or long continuance of peace arising from a great naval supremacy; such overgrown power, such unnatural strength, must feed upon plunder, at home and abroad. When we come to modern nations we have proof before us of the positions I have taken. We have been told of Holland, as a people existing in a most flourishing state of prosperous commerce without a navy to protect it, and we have been told of Spain as a naval power without commerce to protect. But leaving these examples, let us look at France and Great Britain; we here have examples before our eyes; we need no history; the facts are before us.
Admit that Great Britain, with her thousand vessels, could protect her lawful commerce, let me ask, if her navy has ever been confined to that object; whether it is confined to that object at this time; whether her navy has not fattened upon the spoils of Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, and the commerce of neutral nations, making war equally upon friends and enemies. Her navy, triumphant in every sea, is employed in a system of plunder against the world, and, notwithstanding this supremacy, we see her citizens groaning under a national debt of eight hundred millions of pounds sterling, more than all the nations of the universe could pay. We see her upon the precipice of bankruptcy—we see her people, her numerous subjects, loaded with taxes, that would astonish any man who did not know the fact—notwithstanding this, the public debt is daily increasing, and it is now acknowledged by all the world that she is fighting for her existence—victorious at sea and safe at home from invasion, and still her very existence is at stake. Sir, I never wish to see the liberties of my country afloat upon the ocean and staked upon the strength of a navy. Look at France, separated from her enemy by a narrow channel, without vessels to meet the fleets of England on the water, and still she is unable to burn the seaport towns of France or invade the French territories, or in any way to make an impression upon her. Populous and powerful upon land, nothing but the imperial despotism that exists throughout that vast empire, prevents the country from being the most enviable residence upon the globe, except our own favored land. Let not the Congress of the United States therefore stake their existence upon navies, let us not withdraw the protecting hand of Government from the soil; let us not increase the burdens of the people, and weigh them down with a public debt to support external grandeur. Do not by this system destroy the affections and attachments of the solid and honest part of the community, who support the government of the country.
Sir, the report of the Naval Committee has assumed principles as erroneous as they are novel—that the protection of maritime commerce was, above all other objects, the first and the greatest consideration which laid the foundation for the present constitution. There is nothing to warrant such a position; and no reason does exist why our commercial rights should have been better secured than the other various rights and interests embraced by that charter of our independence. In the specific grants of powers, Congress has the authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations, with the several States, and with the Indian tribes; not giving preference in language to foreign over State and domestic commerce. I will admit, sir, that our commercial rights formed one of the primary considerations—not more primary than the rights of agriculture and manufactures, nor the rights of property, the rights of persons, protection from foreign invasion and aggression, or from internal foes. These rights were equally important, and not less the considerations which strengthened the bonds of the Union. And if any consideration had a preference, it arose from considerations of peace and war.
When I look into the preamble of the constitution, which to be sure is no specific grant of power, but is an interpretation of the objects of that great charter of our Union, I find it was to establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence and general welfare, and to secure the blessings of liberty, that the constitution was adopted; and although maritime commerce has only a co-equal right with all others, still, the greatest means and resources of the Government have been directed to its protection. And still it would seem, if we do not ruin the nation by the establishment of a navy, we wish to make encroachments upon commerce, to damp the commercial spirit. And this we are told in the face of facts which appear upon record, and in the face of every expensive war measure now taken and adopted. Sir, in a colonial state, it was a duty upon tea that was the immediate cause of a war, which was bloody indeed, and continued upwards of seven years; a conflict which has no parallel in history as to its beginning and termination. And at this moment, violations of our neutral rights upon the ocean is a primary cause why we are about to wage a second war with Great Britain; and still we are gravely told that we are unwilling to protect commerce, and that we are ready to abandon it, because we will not vote away the substance of the people upon a system of policy which must ruin the nation if not crushed in its infancy. The constitution says, Congress shall have the power to provide and maintain a navy. And this has been read. So has it authorized Congress to raise and support armies, to lay and collect taxes, and declare war; but the constitution does not fix the limit of these powers, and all are liable to abuse. And the convention did not suppose that any Congress would so far abuse these powers as to keep either a standing army in time of peace, which must endanger the liberties of the people, or a permanent navy, that would involve us in continual wars with other nations, and permanent taxes upon the people. A reasonable peace establishment to protect our maritime and territorial frontier, consistent with strict economy, must have been contemplated; and this force, naval and military, we have maintained; and we are as secure as a nation can expect to be from savages or a maritime foe. There would be as much reason why we should keep in pay five hundred thousand regular troops in time of peace, as your twenty vessels of seventy-four guns and your forty frigates, in addition to our present naval force. In every point of view, therefore, a permanent navy is as injurious to the country as a standing army. One will endanger your liberties by conquest, and the other by wars with foreign nations.
But I am asked, how will you contend with a maritime nation, without a navy? Sir, that question is as easily answered as the first. I will ask, how we succeeded in the Revolutionary war? We were without any security upon our seacoast, and still we succeeded. But to be more specific—I would grant letters of marque and reprisal, and authorize privateering. Give scope to individual enterprise, to destroy the commerce of the enemy—which can be done effectually. I would fortify our seaport towns; station our gunboats and frigates along our coast, to protect us at home. And in this way I would in war avenge the infractions of our neutral rights.
Mr. Lowndes.—Mr. Speaker, in one opinion expressed by the honorable gentleman last up, (Mr. Johnson,) I can concur. The constitution was not formed for the exclusive protection of commerce, but for the defence of all the interests of the United States. These are to be protected by the whole force of the nation. If he had adhered throughout his speech to this opinion, the question would have been narrowed to the inquiry, by what means shall commerce be protected? He has asserted the adequacy to this purpose of the naval force which we now possess. This is, indeed, a different view of the subject from that which was taken by his honorable colleague. We were told but yesterday, that the undivided exertions of the United States could not give them a navy large enough to be useful. To-day the five frigates which we have in commission are thought sufficient if properly employed, to redress all our injuries. The death of Pierce might have been revenged, and the disgrace of the Chesapeake obliterated, if these five frigates had been sent a cruising. We did not want force, but spirit to employ it. Can it be necessary gravely to answer these assertions? May I not trust their confutation to that general knowledge of the subject which every member of the House possesses? Must we inquire what number of British vessels have been lately stationed near our coast, or what greater number it is in the power of England to station there?
But, although the honorable gentleman from Kentucky is determined to defend commerce by some method which he will not fully disclose, his arguments like those of my honorable friend from Pennsylvania, appeared designed to show that commerce was not worth defending. After the full discussion of this subject, produced by the report of the Committee of Foreign Relations, and the debates at every stage of the bill for raising an additional army, the House might have supposed that this question was at last dismissed. I hope, however, to be excused for remarking that both these gentlemen have considered the profits of commerce as confined to the merchant. They have forgotten that commerce implies a change of commodities, in which the merchant is only an intermediate agent. He derives, indeed, a profit from the transaction—but so must the seller and the buyer, the grower and the consumer, or they would not engage in it. So must all those who are supported by their own industry in commercial cities—the clerk, the artisan, the common laborer. But my honorable friend from Pennsylvania says that Mr. Pitt estimated the profits of commerce in England at only twelve millions for a year, in which the naval expense was fourteen or sixteen millions. I suppose this estimate to have been made in relation to the income tax, and it obviously must have referred only to the profits of merchants. The profits of merchants may be computed, but no sober financier would attempt to compute the entire profits of commerce. If it be desirable to form, not, indeed, an estimate, but some conception of its importance, let my honorable friend compute the value of New York, where a few square feet of land are an estate, and then compare it with the value of the same extent of ground for the purposes of the plough. But, is it in this nation, and at this time, that it can be supposed that the profits of commerce are confined to the merchant? Your trade was, a few years ago, unrestrained and flourishing—did it not enrich the most distant parts of your country? It has since been plundered and confined. Does not the industry of the country languish? Is not the income of every man impaired? If commerce were destroyed, the mercantile class, indeed, could exist no longer; but the merchant, the rich capitalist, at least, would individually suffer less than any other part of the community, because, while their property would become unproductive, the value of money would rise rather than fall.
The value of commerce, then, has been strangely misunderstood by these gentlemen, who suppose that they have calculated it so very accurately. But whatever may be its value, you have already determined to defend it. Considerations of expense are not, indeed, to be neglected. We must employ, in the prosecution of the war, the cheapest and most efficacious instruments of hostility which we can obtain. But the arguments of the honorable gentlemen on the other side, are almost all of them directed against the war rather than the navy. It would be absurd, say they, to protect commerce by a navy, which should cost more than that commerce is worth. It must yet be more absurd, then, to protect it by an army which costs much more than the navy. In the comparison of the expenses and of the efficiency of an army and navy, instituted by my colleague, there is nothing invidious. The army is acknowledged to be necessary. It has had our votes. But, from the acknowledged propriety of raising the army, was fairly inferred the propriety of employing a navy, if it should be proved to be less expensive in proportion to its probable efficacy. War, and all its operations and all its instruments, must be expensive. It is difficult to determine upon the expediency of employing any of these instruments, except by comparing it with some other. To compute the result of this comparison, the honorable gentlemen on the other side must show, not that it is more expensive to maintain a navy than to be without one—not that it is more expensive to go to war than to remain at peace, (these propositions they, perhaps, have proved,) but that the objects proposed to be attained by the navy may be better or more cheaply attained in some other way. My honorable friend from Pennsylvania, then, in determining not to follow my colleague in the investigation of the comparative expense of different kinds of force, must have determined to avoid the best, and, indeed, the only method of examination from which a just conclusion could be deduced.
The honorable gentleman from Kentucky, however, who spoke yesterday, offered objections to a navy, which, if they were well founded, would supersede all further reasoning and calculation. He opposes a navy now—he will oppose it for ever. It would produce no possible good and all possible evil. It would infallibly destroy the constitution. Will the honorable gentleman tell us why? how? He sees the danger clearly? Will he explain it? An ambitious General might corrupt his army, and seize the Capitol—but will an Admiral reduce us to subjection by bringing his ships up the Potomac? The strongest recommendation of a navy in free Governments has hitherto been supposed to be that it was capable of defending but not of enslaving its country. The honorable gentleman has discovered that this is a vulgar error. A navy is really much more dangerous than an army to public liberty. He voted for the army and expressed no fears for the constitution. But a navy would infallibly terminate in aristocracy and monarchy. All this may be very true. But are we unreasonable in expecting, before we give up the old opinion, to hear some argument in favor of the new one? The honorable gentleman has asserted his propositions very distinctly. We complain only that he has not proved them.
Yet there is a view in which this question of a navy is, indeed, closely connected with the constitution. That constitution was formed by the union of independent States, that the strength of the whole might be employed for the protection of every part. The States were not ignorant of the value of those rights which they surrendered to the General Government, but they expected a compensation for their relinquishment in the increased power which would be employed for their defence. Suppose this expectation disappointed—suppose the harbor of New York blockaded by two seventy-fours? The commerce of that city, which exists only by commerce, destroyed? The protection of the General Government claimed? Your whole navy could not drive these English seventy-fours from their station. Would the brave and enterprising people of New York consent to see their capital emptied of its inhabitants, and their whole country beggared by so contemptible a force? Their own exertions would raise a fleet which would drive off the enemy and restore their city to its owners. But, when a single State shall find herself able to raise a greater fleet than the General Government can or will employ for her defence, can it be expected that she shall consider that Government as essential to her safety—as entitled to her obedience? I repeat that the Federal Constitution was instituted by the States, that the strength of the whole might be combined for the protection of any part which should be attacked. But what is the nature of the defence which one of our large States may be supposed interested to obtain from the General Government? Is it a land force? We can scarcely expect an attack on land, to repel which the militia of New York or Massachusetts would be unequal. Were either of these States attacked, the General Government would protect her by ordering out her own militia. To render the Union permanent, you must render it the interest of all the States, the large as well as the small, to maintain it; you must show them that it will provide, not an army which they can have without it, but what without it they cannot have—an adequate navy.
The honorable gentleman who anticipates the destruction of the constitution, unless we shall neglect one of the great interests which it was intended to protect, considers the English Orders in Council as leaving our institutions firm and untouched. Regulations, the effect of which is to give to a foreign power the complete disposition of the property of a large class of our people, are it seems in their political result innocent. Although every citizen who has property on the ocean become dependent on the English Ministry, become their subject, our liberty and independence are (we are told) unimpaired. But let a navy be raised—let the Government which expects obedience provide protection, and the constitution perishes!
But we have been referred particularly by my honorable friend from Pennsylvania to the experience of the world, as having already decided the question which we are now discussing. It seems that Venice and Genoa, and every other naval power which can be named, have all furnished abundant proof of the ruinous effects which such a force is calculated to produce. Sir, the assertion is new. I do not pretend to an intimate acquaintance with the histories of those nations, but I have hitherto believed that the first great shock which the power of Venice received, was given by the League of Cambray—a league formed to repress her ambition, not of maritime, but of territorial aggrandizement. But, whilst Venice has lost her independence, after maintaining it for five or six centuries, may I ask my honorable friend whether the States of Italy, which were never oppressed by fleets, had enjoyed a longer term of prosperity and freedom? As to Genoa—her naval power, her independence and glory, rose and sunk with the same man—Doria. But Holland, says the gentleman from Kentucky, affords an example of a nation, whose commerce flourished greatly before it had a navy, and decayed while her navy continued powerful. If there ever were a people, whose naval power has been employed to protect and almost to create their commerce, it is the Dutch. They fought their way at the same time to trade in the East Indies and America, and to national independence in Europe. The decay of their trade is to be attributed to the development of the resources of other nations; to the navigation act of England; and the similar measures adopted by other powers. As to France—the period of her greatest financial prosperity probably coincided with that of her greatest naval power; both were due to the administration of Colbert. But the evils of a navy (gentlemen tell us) have been concentrated in the case of England. With all her fleets she is destined soon to lose her independence. The expense of those fleets has crushed the industry of her subjects, and must soon reduce her to national bankruptcy. Let us suppose that these gentlemen, who have been so much mistaken in regard to the past, may be more accurate in their narrative of the future. Still England will have owed to her fleets her redemption from invasion for ages past. While every other considerable nation of Europe has been bankrupt over and over again, she is not yet bankrupt. While nearly every other Government of Europe has been overset, hers yet rides out the storm. Should England fall to-morrow, it should seem impossible to deny that her navy will have prolonged her independence for at least two centuries.
My honorable colleague has calculated the expense of building and maintaining a navy of 12 ships-of-the-line and 20 frigates, and has explained the principles on which his calculations have been founded. The estimate of the gentleman from Pennsylvania can hardly be considered, after the error which has been remarked, as impugning those calculations. I have not myself attempted to estimate the probable expense of maintaining 12 ships-of-the-line and 20 frigates with any precision, but I cannot doubt the fairness of the rule which deduces it from the expense of such a force to England. This is the rule which I understood my colleague to have employed. It has not been disputed in debate; it has been in conversation. Many gentlemen have objected to an estimate of the expenses of a navy during war, in which (as they suppose) no allowance is made for the peculiar expenses which war involves. To have all our ships safe at the end of the contest is observed to be rather a sanguine expectation. But if the rate of expense in the estimate of my colleague were deduced from the rate of English expense during war, these objections must be altogether groundless. Now, it was deduced from the expense which is found sufficient to maintain the English Navy in a state of unimpaired strength during war. The English expense, from which it was inferred, included the charge of docks and navy-yards, of the repair of old ships and of the building of new ones. It included pensions to their officers, and even the support of the prisoners taken from their enemies. I have on my table a detailed account of the English naval expenditure for a year of the last war. The whole amount was about twelve millions and a half, and of this sum fully four millions and a half were applied to what may be considered the contingent expenses of the navy. Now, is there any reason to suppose that the contingent expenses of our navy would be greater in proportion to its force than this? And if not greater, has not an allowance been made for the capture of some of our ships, or, in other words, for the building of new ones? It is true, that from the superiority of English sailors to their present enemies, England loses little by capture, and, it may be supposed, that from the greater frequency and severity of our conflicts when we shall be engaged in war against her, our contingent expenses may be greater in proportion to the number of our ships then hers. But there are many expenses to which she is necessarily subject, from which we shall be exempt. I will instance that resulting from blockading squadrons, and that from repairs in colonial and foreign ports. These can appear inconsiderable to no man who has given his attention in any degree to the subject. Naval men I believe would not contradict me, if I were to state the expense of a ship employed in a strict blockade, and particularly during the winter months, as fully double that of a ship engaged in ordinary service. In fact, England finds the expense too great for her finances, and has been obliged, in some measure, to give up the practice. The other article of expenditure to which I have referred, I shall not attempt to estimate with any precision. It must, however, be obvious to every man, that the ships of war of England must frequently be repaired and refitted in distant countries. In these the most scrupulous fidelity and economy on the part of her officers cannot prevent the expense from being frequently extravagant. The most salutary regulations and most provident instructions on the part of the Administration at home cannot prevent her officers from being sometimes careless and fraudulent. I recollect an instance of the enormous expense involved in the distant services required from the British Navy, which I cannot pretend to state with accuracy, but in which I hope not to be substantially wrong. Sir Home Popham (a distinguished officer in the English Navy) had under his command in the last war two or three frigates in the East Indies. They had left England in good condition, and their repairs for two or three years, and the supply of the different articles of equipment which they occasionally required, exceeded, I believe, the prime cost of the vessels themselves. These two items of expenditure, blockading squadrons, and repairs in distant countries, (to neither of which an American Navy would be liable,) will be acknowledged, I think, to justify the conclusion, that the contingent expenses of the English Navy must be as great in proportion to its force as ours would be in war—and therefore that the rule employed in the calculations of my colleague was correct.
But our resources for the equipment of a navy appear to the honorable gentlemen on the other side, as deficient in respect to men and money. Sailors in this country cannot be obtained in sufficient numbers without impressment. It is not necessary, sir, to inquire whether for the defence of their peculiar rights the services of a marine militia may not be required. There is no reason to doubt our being able to procure the voluntary services of our seamen. If we shall at any time be engaged in a war (like that with France in 1798) which shall leave the greater part of our trade unaffected, the wages of sailors will, indeed, be high, but the number required will be small and the Government can afford high wages. In a war of a different character—against a nation powerful at sea—your sailors will be thrown out of employment and their wages will be necessarily low. But gentlemen object to this reasoning on the supposition that in such a case our sailors would all engage in privateers. The notion that in any war there will be a demand in this country for more than thirty thousand sailors for privateers is surely an extravagant one. But it has been shown by my colleague that in a war which should diminish our trade by one-half, (and a war requiring any great naval exertion would necessarily do this,) thirty or forty thousand seamen may be employed in privateers, and a sufficient number would remain for your public ships. But are not your privateers as much a part of the naval force of the nation as your ships of war? It has been said, indeed, that they are the more useful part. Now, if the Government should believe (what neither sober reflection nor the experience of other nations can permit it to doubt) that this part of your force cannot be in any great degree serviceable unless supported by a fleet—then surely a limitation to its extent, which would be necessary even to the interest of its owners, cannot fairly be objected to. The law just passed for raising twenty-five thousand men, provides, I think, for only one regiment of cavalry. Now, it is very possible that a much larger proportion of the twenty-five thousand men that can be accommodated in this regiment, may choose to go to Canada on horseback. They must be disappointed, and either not go into the army at all, or go into the service which they least desire. No man has hitherto denounced the act as on this account tyrannical and oppressive. Yet this case seems to me a true parallel to the other. In the naval, as in the military service, the interest of the country requires the employment of different sorts of force; and the object may be attained with equal fairness in both services by limiting the amount of the favorite force.
Mr. Law said: Being in favor of the bill now under consideration, I beg leave to express my sentiments, and state the reasons in support of my opinion; and the only pledge I shall offer to the House, for their attention, is, that I shall not occupy much of their time.
This bill, sir, embraces two objects—one relates to the repairs and equipment of the ships of the United States now out of service—the other contemplates the building of ten additional frigates, and laying the foundation of a new Naval Establishment. The view which I entertain of this subject, does not arise from its connection with that system which grows out of what is called the present crisis, or putting the nation in armor for war, as reported by the Committee of Foreign Relations; but from a conviction, that, as an abstract question or matter of general policy, I deem it for the interest and security of the United States, to begin the establishment of a Navy, to be perpetuated and extended hereafter—and, because I believe it may be accomplished, to the extent at present proposed, from the ordinary means we ought to possess, without adding any new burdens on the citizens. In order to decide whether it is for the interest of the United States we must examine and see how it is connected with the great and essential interest of the country. The basis of our national wealth is agriculture; the real substance of the nation is drawn from the earth. This arises from the great and extensive territory which we possess, thinly settled, low in price, of an excellent soil, capable, from its fertility and variety of climes, of affording produce of every kind, in the greatest abundance. The surplus of all is wanted in other countries, where nature has been less bountiful; and it must be a great while before the labor of our citizens can be diverted extensively into other channels—I mean manufactures. This is a condition in which we ought to rejoice for the causes, which bind us in this necessity, are those which tend to preserve the morals, the happiness, and the independence of the nation. And until our lands are taken up, and population becomes redundant, the basis of our national wealth must be the farming interest. But, sir, in a country so blessed by nature; where the inhabitants have the greatest stimulus to industry, the fruits of their labor secured by just and equal laws; where the property cannot be taken from the owner without his consent, there will be a vast surplus, beyond what the consumption of the country requires. Hence, commerce springs up as the daughter and handmaid of agriculture. Without commerce, agriculture would languish. With it, wealth is consolidated, and industry promoted. It diffuses its benign influence, discoverable in the splendid and delightful improvements, which rejoice the eye of the traveller, throughout the country. And it is as unnatural for the farming interest to oppress the commercial, as it is for the parent to abandon its offspring. They mutually cherish and support each other; and, by natural sympathy, must be affected by the checks and disorders which each may receive. But commerce must be protected. It cannot protect itself against force. Being carried on abroad on the ocean, (for I am speaking of foreign commerce,) it is subject to annoyance, interruption, and hazard. We must pass the common highway of nations to get to a market; and in this route, the weak and defenceless must, and always will be the sport and prey of the strong and violent, whom they meet in the way. From the wretched state of those nations with whom we have intercourse, we, from weakness, must fall victims to their violence. This is an evil which we shall always experience as a neutral, coming in collision with belligerents. Shall we then abandon commerce, or shall we strive to support it? It will be for the interest of the country to support it, if possible; for if we abandon it, the evil will recoil on the agricultural part, who, no longer than foreign commerce is supported, can find a vent for their surplus; and without a vent for the surplus, a bare competency might be endangered. Internal commerce would always fail, for that, being but a stream from foreign commerce, must dry when the fountain from whence it issues fails. Enterprise ceases, and languor and poverty ensue. It is then for the interest of the nation to cherish commerce. But how can this be done? Will a navy have this effect? I think it will. Indeed, if the little navy which was commenced some years ago, had been supported and increased as it might have been without any difficulty, we might, and in all probability should, have avoided our present calamities. We are now the defenceless prey of both France and England; deprived of the common rights of nations and citizens of the world. Will it then be asked, shall we not go to war and fight our way? I have already recorded my negative on the several questions preparatory to that step, and I am decidedly against going to war. We have not the means necessary, and unsuccessful resistance will only make our condition worse. I verily believe, if this nation had fostered our infant navy, from the time it was commenced, and had not, by a strange infatuation, abandoned and neglected it, it would now have been too important to be despised, by either France or England. Our prosperity would have continued. Our strength would have been dreaded, and our friendship courted by both nations. While they have been contending for the mastery, we, with such naval force as we ought to have had, and a strict course of neutrality, might have pursued a lawful and gainful trade. We might have had a perpetual revenue of sixteen millions, instead of the pittance now received at the Treasury. I believe, that with the navy we might have had, and a correct strict neutral course, there would have been neither Berlin and Milan Decrees, nor Orders in Council, to annoy our lawful commerce.
Mr. Roberts observed, that there appeared to be a disposition in the committee to take the question on the filling the blank in the first section without further debate. As he could not vote for appropriating $480,000 for the repair of the vessels of war unfit for service, it would perhaps be the most proper time to submit his opinions. I have not, Mr. Chairman, said he been a listless hearer of the very ingenious arguments advanced by gentlemen in favor of the report. He had, however, been so unfortunate as to be more confirmed in his inclination to vote against the bill, from attentively weighing these arguments. The select committee in their report (for they had reported specially as well as by bill) have said, with oracular confidence, that this country is inevitably destined to become a naval power. He had not, with them, become a fatalist. Though he was disposed to claim a high destiny for his country, he did not believe that destiny was yet immutably fixed. He, however, believed the question now to be decided must have an influence on that destiny, that might at an early day, if decided affirmatively, obliterate our happy civil institutions; if negatively, preserve them long the best blessings of posterity. Gentlemen who have advocated a naval establishment, have chosen to consider this bill and report as the furtherance of a system already in existence, and that, however short of their wishes the committee may be disposed to go, they stand prepared to view whatever might be done to augment the naval force as an evidence of assent to their system. Mr. R. said at one time he had inclined to vote for the appropriation of a sum to equip such of the vessels now out of service as might be found worthy of refittal. But on discovering it would be considered as an acknowledgment that a navy was proper in the sense it had been brought into view by the committee, and doubting, on better consideration, whether there was not great likelihood the money would be worse applied in repairing old, than in building new vessels, and feeling a conviction that if these vessels should be deemed worthy of repair, they could not be brought into action in that exigence of war when they could be useful, as in that case land defence must be resorted to, and the consequent expense incurred, he should feel it his duty to vote against this appropriation.
It has been observed that the constitution has invested Congress with power to regulate commerce, to provide and maintain a navy, &c. There is nothing, said Mr. R., imperative in this. It was necessary in a general grant of powers to insert many items to be left to the sound discretion of Congress, to use or not to use. Soon after the Government came into operation, it became a favorite object with one set of politicians to form a navy. On the occasion of our commerce being depredated upon by the Barbary corsairs, the question first came up. It became a matter of deliberation whether a peace should be purchased of them with money and presents; whether some European power should be subsidized to keep a few frigates on that station, or whether a naval force should be equipped for the purpose (as alleged) of enabling the President to negotiate to better effect. The party with whom I have always found it my duty to act, said Mr. R., opposed, on that occasion, the commencement of a navy system, when it was invited under circumstances so specious. They were, however, in the minority. The ships of war were voted—with what effect on the Algerines, he did not stop to inquire. If this opposition to the commencement of a Naval Establishment was wrong in the minority, their successors ought not to follow them; but if it should be found that they were right, the ground ought never to be quitted. The question of increasing the navy was again discussed in the celebrated times of '98-9. The collisions with France had raised the war fever very high. A navy was vociferously contended for as the most efficient means of defence. It was when things were in this state, that the President, in his reply to the Marine Society of Boston, who had with much fervor tendered him their approbation of his measures, hoped to see the wooden walls of America considered as her best defence. Because Athens, when she was invaded by the hosts of Xerxes, had chosen to interpret the oracle that promised her safety in wooden walls, rationally, America must take the same course, however dissimilarly situated. The people of Attica, inhabiting a circumscribed territory, found safety in their fleet, and they could have found it nowhere else. But such cannot be the case with America. Even the hosts of Xerxes could not make it necessary for the American people to quit their territory—the figure would not hold. On this occasion, too, the Republican party consistently opposed a navy; strange blindness and obstinacy, if they were not sustained by reason as well as principle. On this occasion, the supporters of a navy system were a majority in council. For a moment they succeeded with their measures. But the public councils were soon filled by the people with men of other minds, and the question was put to rest.
Gentlemen have considered this subject on its general principles and remote consequences. In this point of view, said Mr. R., it presents a wide field for reflection. The Chairman (Mr. Cheves) has complained he has had to meet this subject encumbered with much error and many prejudices; among which is the idea that a naval system is prejudicial to civil liberty. The opposers of a navy, with an air of no small triumph, are called upon to show how a system of maritime power would endanger the freedom of our country. It has been said, a military chieftain, by an easy transition, may become a civil ruler, and that the commander of an army has often become a despot, while no such event could happen from a naval commander, as such an office gave no power on terra firma. If we look a little deeper into the subject, we shall find we have as much to fear, and even more, from a naval than a military power. The latter can only be kept in time of war, and for comparatively but short periods; at a time too, when the public spirit is awakened and ready to oppose encroachment. The chair of rule may possibly be gained by a military chief; but an attempt on the public liberty has a much greater chance to fail. Evils of this sort can only take place on very rare contingency; but the ruin of the public liberty can hardly fail to be a consequence of the establishment of a naval power. History proves to us that maritime power has always excited national ambition to a spirit of conquest and plunder. A naval power will seek colonies and ports in distant places. The chance, nay, the certainty, of collisions with other nations, is multiplied, and a corruption of morals is produced, that cannot fail to make the first Government on earth a tyranny, by a course of events that the patriot can neither prevent nor divert to other consequences. A short time after Athens had found safety in her wooden walls, one of her statesmen proposed she should burn the fleets of her neighbors, that she might thereby be rendered mistress of Greece. This project the virtue of the people resisted; but that virtue soon gave way in the expedition to the Cyclades, where her navy committed acts of violence that must indelibly fix the stain of the blackest perfidy and cruelty on the Athenian character. What could be a more unprovoked act of aggression than her crusade against Syracuse, a crime that visited her with a declension of power from which she never recovered? For a nation to believe her destinies fixed, is in a great measure to fix them. Nothing, perhaps, contributed more to make Rome the mistress of the world, than the oracles that promised it. Her heroes and statesmen were stimulated thereby to fulfil her destiny. The maritime supremacy of Britain is, perhaps, owing as much to the belief that she is the destined Queen of the waters, as to any other cause. Though such operations be calculated to bring about astonishing effects, how unfortunate is it when a nation's eyes are thus directed to improper attainments—it becomes a source of incalculable evil. Athens and Rome were the victims of such a policy, as Britain is at this time. I fervently hope, said Mr. R., for a better destiny for our beloved country. Rome and Carthage were both great maritime powers; it was not in Lybia and Italy they began to contend for superiority, but in Sicily and Iberia. The conflicts thence arising brought terror to the gates of Rome, and laid Carthage in ashes. The abuse of maritime power in both those States changed the free features of the government, and left a dreary despotism in their stead. A naval victory secured to the second Cæsar the rule of the mistress of the world. In later times, we have been told, said Mr. R., the declension of maritime States has been due to other causes than their Naval Establishments. In some instances it may have been so. When the strength and power of a State has arisen entirely from the profits of commerce, when that commerce has taken another course, the transitory splendor it has built up has vanished. Venice was an example of this. The commerce of the East caused her to rise out of the circumscribed and marshy Islands at the bottom of the Adriatic, the proud Mistress of the Waves. When the Cape of Good Hope had been doubled by the Portuguese, her commercial advantages failed. She sunk from the conqueror of the Eastern Empire, to a mere city of Italy and Portugal; a narrow territory, by the same commerce, assumed the first rank among the nations of the world. A naval power may serve sometimes to extend commerce to wider limits; but it can by no means control it with certainty to channels through which nature, and often the policy of other nations, bid it to flow. What is the state of British commerce at this time? The rupture of the peace of Amiens did not arise from Britain having received injuries from France after the cessation of hostilities. The new war was a commercial one. The British Cabinet saw, in a state of peace, France would not be unmindful of her commercial interests. The intelligence, the enterprise, and population, and the resources of France, all indicated that she would at least divide successfully the profits of commerce with her rival. The naval power of Britain giving her the command of the sea, she could oppose only with effect the growing commerce of her neighbor in a state of war. This step of British policy imposed on the ruler of France the necessity of changing the channels of commerce. In this way he has aimed a blow at the vitals of her strength, which her tremendous naval power neither enables her to avert nor lessen its force. Her marine puts the trident into her hands, but she can no longer shake the earth. Her monopolizing spirit has sealed the Continent of Europe against her, and interdicted her commerce with America. She has reduced the ocean almost to a desert; and she seems hastening to that destiny which has generally attended her predecessors in naval power through her ambition to rule the waves.
Gentlemen propose to protect commerce on this side the Gulf Stream, yet admit if our vessels are despoiled on the Indian Ocean, we must apply retaliation in the West Indies. The Gulf Stream limitation is at once given up; a new expedition to the Cyclades is in that case to take place. Begin your conquest in the West Indies, and you must increase your navy to acquire and defend them. It is at once an admission that naval power must be used more for ambition than the protection of commerce and our territorial waters. But, what is worse, as you acquire colonies and ships you must create armies. The hands of the Executive, restricted and elective as it is, in the United States, became thence armed with a sceptre formidable indeed, and the more so as it acquires this strength without producing the shock to public feeling which the seizure of power by a military leader will always excite. It has been said, (said Mr. R.,) that the existence of Great Britain hung upon her navy in the contest in which she is now engaged. If her fate hangs suspended by her naval power, she owes her peril to that source. Without her maritime strength, would she have aspired to balance the scales of power on the Continent? Would she have become a party to the infamous conspiracy of Pilnitz? Would she have wantonly plotted the dismemberment of France? Would she have broken the peace of Amiens whence her present dangers arise? Certainly not.
On the article of cost, said Mr. R., it is of little importance whether the army or navy of Great Britain is most burdensome on her finances, though it has been dwelt upon with particular emphasis, nor whether an army be more expensive in every case, than a navy. Armies are a necessary consequence of navies. Has not the British army increased with equal pace with her navy?
The humane mind, said Mr. R., cannot contemplate without pain, that from naval power have flown the most copious streams of human misery. The plunder of half the world, with immense advantages in addition, has not sustained the British navy. A debt has been accumulated that almost baffles the power of figures to estimate. But debt, and a prospect of Government insolvency at home, are of much less account than the wrongs this navy has wrought on the society of nations. And yet it is this Government that is held up to Republican America as a model for imitation.
Need I remind you, said Mr. R., of the millions of victims sacrificed to commercial cupidity on the plains of Hindostan, by means of this navy? A population, thrice as great as that of the British Isles, has been exterminated in this devoted region, within comparatively but a few years, by mercantile rapacity. Colonel Dowe informs us, that the wealth of one of the cities of this wretched country had whetted the avarice of Clive and his associates, and that an offer was made to the Government to pay the public debt for permission to sack it. It was too gross an act of infamy to assent to, and the adventurers obtained their end by other means. A famine and pestilence was substituted for the bayonet, and the spoils of the devoted city glutted the hands of rapine. In this exploit, a shoe-black divided his £200,000. Need I remind you, said Mr. R., that the population of Africa has been drained, to groan out a wretched existence in the West India colonies, to prop up this naval and commercial power, or that the remotest corners of every sea have been visited with the scourge of blood and desolation for the same purpose? On general principles, does not past experience afford sufficient warning to these States to avoid those shoals on which so many nations have been wrecked?
Mr. Chairman, under no view which I have been able to take of this subject, considering it either as the furtherance of a system of naval power, to be expanded with the growing strength of the Union to gigantic size, or that it is a proper time for providing a temporary increase of naval force, can I agree, said Mr. R., to the bill on your table.
When Mr. Roberts had concluded, the committee rose, and had leave to sit again.