THE WORLD'S SUPPLY OF WHEAT
France, always an agricultural nation, was the most nearly self-sustaining of the western Allies. Now one-third of her wheat-fields are barren. Thousands of her acres have been taken by the enemy, or are in No Man's Land. Much of the land that has been fought over these past four years is now hopeless for farming, and will be for years to come. Even the territory still under cultivation cannot be expected to yield large returns, for laborers, tools, and fertilizers are lacking.
The men who have left the fields to fight have been replaced chiefly by women, children, and old men, while furloughed soldiers at times help to bring in the crops. To get adequate return from the soil which has been tilled for centuries, tons of fertilizer are necessary. Fertilizers are an absolute necessity, and nitrates, one of the most important of them, can no longer be imported from Chile. The work-animals have been driven off by the enemy or slaughtered for want of food, and mechanics are lacking to repair and replace the worn-out farm-machinery. As a result of this, in 1917 France raised only enough wheat to supply 40 per cent of her need, instead of 90 per cent, as in pre-war years.
In England the situation is not much better. Unlike France, England has always imported far more wheat than she raised. But now through vigorous effort she alone of all the European countries has increased her cereal production so that it has actually been doubled. Being free from the devastation of war at home, she has been able to convert the great lawns of her parks and country estates into grain-fields. English women of all classes, an army of half a million, are working on the land. At the same time the consumption of wheat has been reduced. Even yet, however, the home-grown supply in England is only one-fourth of the wheat required.
In Belgium the devastation is so complete that the women, children, and old people left there would die of famine if food were not sent to them. Two and a half million Belgians daily stand in line waiting for food to be doled out to them. The United States must supply three-fourths of the wheat contained in their meagre bread ration. In Italy, too, the condition is serious, for she produces far less than she needs, despite every effort of her Government to stimulate production.
Germany and Austria-Hungary have not escaped universal suffering from lack of wheat. Germany before the war was a wheat-importing country, and Austria-Hungary was able to supply herself with wheat, but had none to export. Their war crops have been below normal, and even the wheat taken from conquered territory has not been sufficient to prevent severe shortage, resulting in bread riots in industrial centres.
The imports of wheat into both the Allied and enemy European countries to supplement the wheat of their own raising came in peace-times from seven countries—Russia, Roumania, Australia, the United States, Canada, Argentina, and India. Most of these have now failed as a source of supply.
Russia and Roumania were the great wheat-bins of Europe. They produced as much wheat as the United States, and sometimes more, and they were always able to make up or nearly make up the deficiencies of western Europe. Russia and Roumania are now themselves on the verge of famine. Even before their own situation became so desperate, they could get little wheat to the western Allies, because the enemy territory and the battle-lines made a great wall of separation.
Australia and India both continue to grow large crops of wheat, and have a surplus in storage, but it cannot be sent to Europe because of lack of ships. Australia has wheat stored from her last three crops. The Argentine had very poor crops in 1916 and 1917, and although the 1918 crop is good, it is scarcely more available to Europe than Australia's wheat.
So the wheat scarcity is not a question only of the amount of wheat in the world. It is a problem of getting it where it is needed—wheat plus ships. Not a single ship must go farther than is absolutely necessary. A glance at the map shows why wheat for Europe should come from North America rather than from Australia or India, or even the Argentine. The trip from Australia is three times as long as from North America, so it takes only one-third as many ships to carry food to Europe from the United States as from Australia. The Argentine is twice as far from Europe as the United States, and therefore twice as many ships are needed to carry an equal amount of Argentine food to Europe. If this continent could produce and save enough next year to provide the whole of the Allied food necessities, we could save 1,500,000 tons of world shipping to be used for other purposes. Every ship saved is a ship built to carry more men and more ammunition to France.