United States Policy on the China Trade
As mentioned before, the policy of the United States throughout the 6 months under review was to continue its total embargo on all exports—strategic or nonstrategic—to Communist China and North Korea, which were aggressors, and labeled as such by the United Nations. Rumors heard from time to time in various countries, to the effect that the United States had decided to relax its embargo or was under irresistible pressure to do so, and that American cars were reaching the Chinese mainland by way of Japan, were completely untrue.
The position of the United States throughout the review period was also that the free-world embargo on strategic goods to Communist China—an embargo much more sweeping than that applying to the European bloc—should be maintained. Other free governments took the same position, and the embargo continued in force. Such relaxations as took place in controls were changes that did not affect the multilateral embargo. One example was the change in the control of antibiotics and sulfonamides. The nations which carry on trade with Communist China had been controlling those drugs, while hostilities continued in Korea, by limiting the quantities shipped; the quotas assumed by the various nations were scheduled to expire on December 31, 1953, and were permitted to expire on schedule. Another example was the relaxation by Japan on certain items that had been under embargo by that country—but these were items that the other countries were not embargoing. The same was true of the United Kingdom’s decision to permit the shipment of light passenger automobiles.
Though the policies of other major free governments regarding trade with Communist China have not been identical with our own, the United States has not attempted—and will not attempt—to bring about conformity through coercion.
This is true of all of our relations with other countries, not merely our relations with them on the issue of Communist China.
Leaders of this Government forcefully reaffirmed that principle during the period we are reviewing.
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles said in a statement on December 1:
“The tide of events has made our Nation more powerful but I believe that it should not make us less loyal to our great American traditions; and that it should not blur our dedication to the truths, expressed in our Declaration of Independence, that we owe a respect to the opinions of others.
“Today it is to our interest to assist certain countries. But that does not give us the right to try to take them over, to dictate their trade policies and to make them our satellites.
“Indeed, we do not want weak or subservient allies. Our friends and allies are dependable just because they are unwilling to be anyone’s satellites. They will freely sacrifice much in a common effort. But they will no more be subservient to the United States than they will be subservient to Soviet Russia.
“Let us be thankful that they are that way, and that there still survives so much rugged determination to be free.”
On December 2, President Eisenhower endorsed the declaration of the Secretary of State and said this:
“The easiest thing to do with great power is to abuse it—to use it to excess. This most powerful of the free nations must not permit itself to grow weary of the processes of negotiation and adjustment that are fundamental to freedom. If it should turn impatiently to coercion of other free nations, our brand of coercion, so far as our friends are concerned, would be a mark of the imperialist rather than of the leader.
“What America is doing abroad in the way of military and economic assistance is as much a part of our own security program as our military efforts at home. We hope to be able to maintain these overseas elements of our security program as long as our enlightened self-interest requires, even though we may, and probably we always will, have various differences of opinion with the nations receiving our aid.”
On that same day, Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, speaking in general of America’s leadership role in the world, said in a speech at West Point:
“Relationships between members of coalitions are never simple, particularly in coalitions as large as ours of the free world. The smaller nations expect, and are entitled, to exercise their sovereignty and independence. Our leadership therefore involves self-restraint if our objectives are to be achieved by consent, rather than through the pressure techniques imposed by the Soviet on her satellites.”
There is one commodity that is not on any list but is more important than all others, and that is the cement that binds the free world together.
[CHAPTER VI]
The Battle Act and Economic Defense
The Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, usually known as the Battle Act after Representative Battle of Alabama, established a general framework of policy within which the executive branch takes actions that meet current conditions.
This law reinforced the system of international strategic trade controls that was in existence prior to its enactment. It maintains a close link between United States foreign aid and strategic trade controls. It also recognizes the necessity of international cooperation in the control effort, and it aims toward strengthening the free world as well as impeding the military ability of nations threatening our security.