Conclusion
Many factors were undoubtedly involved in Oswald’s motivation for the assassination, and the Commission does not believe that it can ascribe to him any one motive or group of motives. It is apparent, however, that Oswald was moved by an overriding hostility to his environment. He does not appear to have been able to establish meaningful relationships with other people. He was perpetually discontented with the world around him. Long before the assassination he expressed his hatred for American society and acted in protest against it. Oswald’s search for what he conceived to be the perfect society was doomed from the start. He sought for himself a place in history—a role as the “great man” who would be recognized as having been in advance of his times. His commitment to Marxism and communism appears to have been another important factor in his motivation. He also had demonstrated a capacity to act decisively and without regard to the consequences when such action would further his aims of the moment. Out of these and the many other factors which may have molded the character of Lee Harvey Oswald there emerged a man capable of assassinating President Kennedy.
CHAPTER VIII
The Protection of the President
In the 100 years since 1865 four Presidents of the United States have been assassinated—Abraham Lincoln, James A. Garfield, William McKinley, and John F. Kennedy. During this same period there were three other attacks on the life of a President, a President-elect, and a candidate for the Presidency, which narrowly failed: on Theodore Roosevelt while campaigning in October of 1912; on President-elect Franklin Delano Roosevelt, when visiting Miami on February 15, 1933; and on President Harry S. Truman on November 1, 1950, when his temporary residence, Blair House, was attacked by Puerto Rican Nationalists.[C8-1] One out of every five Presidents since 1865 has been assassinated; there have been attempts on the lives of one out of every three.
Prompted by these dismaying statistics, the Commission has inquired into the problems and methods of Presidential protection in effect at the time of President Kennedy’s assassination. This study has led the Commission to conclude that the public interest might be served by any contribution it can make to the improvement of protective arrangements. The Commission has not undertaken a comprehensive examination of all facets of this subject; rather, it has devoted its time and resources to those broader aspects of Presidential protection to which the events of last November called attention.
In this part of its inquiry the Commission has had full access to a major study of all phases of protective activities prepared by the Secret Service for the Secretary of the Treasury following the assassination. As a result of this study, the Secretary of the Treasury has prepared a planning document dated August 27, 1964, which recommends additional personnel and facilities to enable the Secret Service to expand its protection capabilities. The Secretary of the Treasury submitted this planning document on August 31, 1964, to the Bureau of the Budget for review and approval. This planning document has been made a part of the Commission’s published record; the underlying staff and consultants’ reports reviewed by the Commission have not, since a disclosure of such detailed information relating to protective measures might undermine present methods of protecting the President. However, all information considered by the Commission which pertains to the protective function as it was carried out in Dallas has been published as part of this report.
The protection of the President of the United States is an immensely difficult and complex task. It is unlikely that measures can be devised to eliminate entirely the multitude of diverse dangers that may arise, particularly when the President is traveling in this country or abroad. The protective task is further complicated by the reluctance of Presidents to take security precautions which might interfere with the performance of their duties, or their desire to have frequent and easy access to the people. The adequacy of existing procedures can fairly be assessed only after full consideration of the difficulty of the protective assignment, with particular attention to the diverse roles which the President is expected to fill. After reviewing this aspect of the matter this chapter will set forth the Commission’s conclusions regarding certain protective measures in force at the time of the Dallas trip and propose recommendations for improvements.