ON THE NORTHEASTERN BOUNDARY OF THE UNITED STATES.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, JULY 10, 1832.
[THE disputed question of the northeastern boundary of the United States, between the state of Maine and the British provinces, had been referred, in pursuance of an article of the treaty of Ghent, to the king of the Netherlands, for his opinion as to the true boundary line. That monarch having made his award, recommending the River St. John as the proper boundary line, (with some variations;) president Jackson communicated the decision to the senate, asking their advice thereon, as part of the treaty-making power. The subject being under discussion, (in secret session,) Mr. Clay made the following remarks, in which he shows that the advice asked of the senate was premature on the part of the president, with whom the responsibility should rest, until a treaty respecting the boundary should be concluded. This view of the matter was sustained by the subsequent course of the government, which resulted in the final settlement of this boundary question, concluded in 1842, by lord Ashburton and Mr. Webster, secretary of state, and afterwards confirmed by the senate.]
INTENDING to express, in a few words, my sentiments on this subject, I have thought I might as well embrace this occasion to do it. The president has called upon the senate for its advice, as to the award of the king of the Netherlands, respecting the northeastern boundary of the United States. This call upon the senate is made, not in its legislative character, but as a component part of the treaty-making power. If the senate, therefore, should give any advice on the matter, it must act in its executive capacity, and according to those rules which govern it when so acting. Among these, is that which requires the concurrence of two thirds of the senators present.
The language of the constitution, taken literally, would perhaps require a participation of the senate in the original formation of all treaties. The words are, ‘he, (the president,) shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to make treaties; provided two thirds of the senators present concur.’ In the early stages of his administration, general Washington endeavored to execute this part of the constitution according to its literal interpretation; but he soon found it impracticable, and abandoned it. Thedifficulty of consulting so large a body as to the instructions to be given to a foreign minister; the variety of propositions which may be interchanged in the progress of a negotiation, and the inconvenience of a perpetual recurrence to the senate for its opinion upon each of them, besides other considerations, rendered it altogether inexpedient to take the advice and consent of the senate previously to the conclusion of treaties. When concluded, president Washington thought the purport of the constitution would be satisfied by submitting them to the senate; as they could not be said to be made, in the language of the constitution, until the senate gave its constitutional concurrence to their becoming obligatory national compacts.
Accordingly, from an early period, in the first term of his administration, down to the present time, the settled and uniform practice of the executive government has been, to open negotiations with foreign powers, and to conclude such treaties as the president conceives the interests of this country demand. When so concluded, they are submitted to the senate for its constitutional advice and consent. And the extent of any agency which the senate exercises, in the formation of a treaty, is limited to proposing, as was done in the treaty of Mr. Jay, in 1794, amendments to the treaty. These become the subject of future negotiation.
To this established practice of the government, the present administration has hitherto, itself, conformed. And I presume it is not intended to change it, and to revive the impracticable course which general Washington was compelled to abandon, from experience.
What, then, are the circumstances of the case which the president has brought here for the consideration of the senate? In virtue of several treaties between the United States and Great Britain, on all of which treaties the senate had regularly acted and given its advice and consent, the disputed northeastern boundary was submitted to the decision of the king of the Netherlands, as the arbitrator between the two contracting parties, to decide the controversy. The king has pronounced his judgment, and communicated his award to each of the parties. Various questions have been started as to the validity of this instrument. Such as, whether it was intended as a decision binding the parties; whether it does not transcend the authority vested in the king, by the terms of the submission; whether it can be regarded as any thing more than the advice or recommendation of the king as to a suitable boundary, which either party is at liberty to adopt or not, at his discretion.
Whatever may be the real character of this royal act, no treaty, in consequence of it, has been concluded between the United States and Great Britain, as far as the senate is advised. It stands upon its own isolated ground. The president has asked the senate to advise him whether he shall sanction the award, and the reportof the committee of foreign relations, now before us, recommends that the government of Great Britain be notified of the acquiescence in it by the government of the United States.
Now, Mr. President, it seems to me, that, in the present state of the transaction, there is nothing brought by the president to our consideration, on which the senate, as a part of the treaty-making or executive power, can constitutionally act. There is no treaty presented to us for our advice and consent, not even a negotiation proposed, nor, in short, any basis whatever for the action of the senate. If the award of the king of the Netherlands be binding, it derives its validity from the consent of the parties referring the question to him, and from his having decided the case, in conformity with the terms of the submission. If he has not decided it, or if in deciding it he has transcended the terms of the submission, it is not binding and obligatory. The president being the only constitutional organ of the people of the United States, in all communications with foreign powers, and moreover charged with the execution of the laws and treaties of the United States, is bound to notify the British government what are the executive views in relation to the award. If he tells that government that this does not hold itself bound by the award, a negotiation would probably take place between the parties. If, on the contrary, the president notifies the British government that the United States are bound by the award, he would have to come to congress for its legislative aid in carrying into effect the award. And should he so come, the question of the validity of the award would be as open to the examination of congress as it had been to the president. So, if any negotiation which may be opened with Great Britain, in relation to the award, should terminate in the conclusion of a treaty, the president would be bound to submit that treaty to the senate for its constitutional advice and consent. The president not having applied to congress for any act of legislation, and having submitted no treaty or national compact, in any form, to this body, I think there is nothing before us on which we can constitutionally act; and that any advice which, under these circumstances, we might offer to the president, would have no warrant or authority in the constitution of the United States. I cannot, therefore, consent to vote for the resolution reported by the committee of foreign relations, or to concur in the adoption of any other resolution which would imply the right of the senate to express any opinion on the matter in its present state and condition.
Whilst this is my deliberate judgment, I have no hesitation to offer to the president, if he would attach any consequence to them, my views and opinions, as a private citizen, on the whole matter of the northeastern boundary. At Ghent, Great Britain did not assert any right to the territory to which she subsequently set up aclaim. She sought there to obtain by negotiation, and exchange of territory with the United States, a passage within her own jurisdiction from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick to Quebec. The British commissioners were told by the American, on that occasion, that they had no power to cede away or exchange any part of the territory of Massachusetts, which then included Maine. As there were many parts of the long line of boundary between the United States and Great Britain unsettled and unmarked, it became necessary to have it correctly ascertained and defined. For this purpose several boards of commissioners were provided for by the treaty of Ghent, in the same manner as a similar board had been created by a previous treaty. Most of these boards have amicably and satisfactorily settled the questions respectively submitted to them. That to which was referred the boundary now in dispute could not agree. Before this board, Great Britain brought forward and claimed as her right, that which she had sought to obtain by negotiation only, at the conferences of Ghent. And the perseverance with which she has prosecuted her pretensions, and the apparent success with which they have been so far finally crowned, demonstrate that there never need be despair in any cause, however bad.
During my service in an executive department, it became my duty to examine into this claim asserted by Great Britain; and the result was a firm persuasion and a strong conviction that it was unfounded, and that the right to the disputed territory was in the state of Maine. It is true that, in the treaty of peace of 1783, owing to the imperfect knowledge possessed of the country through which the boundary runs, there is some defective description, but the intention of the parties I think is clear, and according to that intention the right is with Maine, and not in Great Britain. It is altogether unnecessary, upon this occasion, to proceed to state all the grounds and considerations which brought my mind to that conclusion. By doing so, I should be trespassing upon the senate too much.
The commissioners not having been able to settle the question, the casus fæderis, provided for in former treaties, arose, and it became necessary to submit the question to an arbiter. The king of the Netherlands was selected for that purpose, and we all know the subsequent events. The statements, arguments, and papers of the parties, were all prepared within the two countries respectively, and transmitted to Holland, where they were submitted to the king. In consenting to refer the question, the late administration was impelled by the duty of respecting the national faith, as pledged in solemn treaties. And although the king of the Netherlands, was not the first choice of either party, high confidence was reposed in his independence, and in his ability, and integrity, by the late president of the United States.
With respect to the conduct of the arbitration, on the part of our government, there are some circumstances I think deeply to be regretted. The plan adopted by the late administration was to have retained Mr. Hughes at the Hague, elevated him to the rank of minister plenipotentiary, and send out Mr. Preble as a public agent to be associated with him. I scarcely know any man so well qualified for such a service as Mr. Hughes. He had the benefit of much diplomatic experience, and he had been very successful in various negotiations which he had conducted. Commencing his career as secretary of the commission at Ghent, he subsequently had creditably represented his government at Stockholm, and at St. Petersburg, and at Copenhagen, on temporary missions; and he had been some time at the court of the Netherlands. Wherever he had been, he uniformly made good impressions, and conciliated the esteem and friendship of all whose acquaintance he formed. He was well versed in the language of the court of the Hague, and well acquainted with all the persons having access to, or surrounding the king. Of pleasing and winning manners, a general favorite, he was exactly such a person as was well fitted for the service. The rank of minister plenipotentiary was necessary to entitle him to approach the person of the king, according to established usage. It was a point of more importance that this government should have had such a representative at Holland, as the British government was there represented by an accomplished ambassador, (sir Charles Bagot,) well known here. Mr. Hughes, intimately acquainted with the corps diplomatique, with all the avenues of access to the king, and with all persons likely to influence the mind or judgment of the monarch or his ministers, would have been able to discover and avert the exercise of any undue influence, if any should be brought to bear upon the government of the Netherlands, in this delicate transaction.
It was among the early acts of this administration, to overturn the plan which had been thus resolved on by its predecessors, and, in place of Mr. Hughes, to send out Mr. Preble, in the sole charge of conducting a difficult arbitration. I have had only a limited acquaintance with this gentleman; but he was destitute of all diplomatic experience, had never been in the councils of the general government, and I understand could not either speak or write the language of the court to which he was sent, and where he was a total stranger. He was indeed a respectable lawyer in his own state, but of what avail would professional eminence be, where tact, insinuating manners, and thorough acquaintance with the persons of the court, were indispensable?
The result of an arbitration conducted under such auspices was to be feared. During its progress, and before the king’s decision, he was stripped, by the revolution in Belgium, of the better half of his dominions. Had he been monarch of Holland alone, I thinkI hazard nothing in saying, that, notwithstanding the confidence which Mr. Adams reposed in his personal character, he would not have been selected, with the concurrence of the late administration, as the sovereign arbiter. It was to an independent sovereign, one the extent of whose power and dominions placed him at the head of the second-rate states of the continent of Europe, that the controversy was submitted. It was not to the king of Holland, but to the king of Holland and Belgium, that the question was referred. It was to a monarch supposed to be unbiased, powerful, and independent, that the question was referred, and not to a sovereign, who, whilst he was arbitrating between Great Britain and the United States as to the territory of Maine, by the uncontrollable force of events found one half of his own dominions the subject of British arbitration or decision, in conjunction with the other allied powers.
By the loss of Belgium, the political character of the king was entirely changed, his identity altered, and he ceased to be that monarch, whose friendly arbitration had been solicited. Mr. Preble saw the matter in its true light, and expected to have been notified by the minister of foreign affairs of the king’s declining to proceed in the arbitration. But he said nothing, and did nothing, to produce that result. Had Mr. Hughes been there, he would, by a suggestion or a hint, not at all offensive, (such as, whether the critical condition of his own domestic affairs did not afford sufficient occupation for his majesty, without troubling himself with the concerns of foreign governments, in which his own subjects had no interest,) have prevailed on the king to give up the papers; or, at least, to suspend proceeding in the arbitration until he could receive fresh instructions from his own government, adapted to the great event which had happened.
But nothing was done at the Hague or at Washington to arrest or suspend the progress of the arbitration. We have neither seen nor heard of any instructions from our secretary of state, founded on the event just mentioned. A senator (now in my eye) informed me, that he had conversed with the late secretary of state about the revolt of Belgium, and asked him, if it would not put a stop to the arbitration. To which the secretary answered, that he supposed of course it would; and yet, as far as we know, he gave no instruction whatever in relation to that event!
Under all these circumstances, our surprise at the issue of the arbitration ought to be less than it otherwise would have been. If the king of the Netherlands had definitively decided the questions actually submitted to him, in consequence of the silent acquiescence of our government in the progress of the arbitration, the honor and faith of the nation might have bound us to submit to the decision, however unjust we deem it. But, Mr. President, I cannot concur with the committee of foreign relations, in considering the papercommunicated by the king of Holland to the two governments as containing a decision. It seems to me to express only the opinion of that monarch, as to what he thinks might be a suitable boundary, and to operate as a recommendation to the parties to adopt it; but leaving them, at the same time, at full liberty to adopt it or not, at their discretion. So far from being a decision, the king professes his inability to decide the question submitted to him, for reasons which he states, and he does not decide it, according to the terms of the submission.
Nor can I concur with that committee in believing, that we shall be in danger of incurring the reproaches of the world for not submitting to such an award, if award it can be called. I am quite sure, that the chairman of the committee of foreign affairs, or the present secretary of state, would be fully competent to make out an argument in behalf of the rights of Maine, that would fully vindicate them, and vindicate the course of government, from all reproaches, founded on noncompliance with the advice and recommendation of the sovereign arbiter.
Entertaining these sentiments, as a private citizen, I have no hesitation in expressing my opinion that the American government, disregarding, and declining to be bound by, the award, ought to open a negotiation with Great Britain on the subject of this disputed boundary. I have no apprehensions that such a step would, necessarily, bring on war. Great Britain might have adopted one of two courses; either to proceed to occupy the territory which the sovereign arbiter thinks it would be suitable for her to possess, and signified her determination to do so; or, to communicate to our government her willingness to be governed by the advice of the arbiter, and inquired as to the intentions, on that subject, of this government. The former course would have been harsh, and might have involved the two countries in war. The latter was more respectful, and, having been adopted by Great Britain, it will be natural and easy to return an answer to the diplomatic note which has been received, stating the grounds and arguments which induce the American government to believe itself not bound by what has been done by the king of Holland. Such an answer would be preliminary to a negotiation, which would necessarily follow. It is desirable, undoubtedly, to have all controversies between nations settled, and amicably, if possible. But this is not the only question remaining to be decided between the two powers, and if that mutual respect and friendly disposition which, it is to be hoped, may predominate in the official intercourse between the two countries, should prevail, although the dispute, by the intervention of the Dutch king, has been somewhat complicated, we need not, I think, despair finally of some satisfactory arrangement.
These are my private views, Mr. President. But I think the president has come to the senate too soon, or come to it in a wrongcharacter. As a part of the executive government, I think the senate has nothing to do with the question, in the present state of it. Holding this opinion, I shall vote against the resolution reported by the committee of foreign affairs, and I shall vote against any other resolution or proposition which may imply or assume a power in the senate of the United States to act in the case. The president, it seems to me, is invested, exclusively, with the power of deciding, in the first instance, whether any and what obligations, if any, have been created upon the American government, in consequence of the act of the king of the Netherlands; and whether it be expedient or not to open a negotiation with Great Britain. And I think he should be left to his constitutional responsibility, to pursue such a course as a sense of duty may prompt.