ON THE UNITED STATES BANK QUESTION.
ADDRESS TO HIS CONSTITUENTS AT LEXINGTON, JUNE 3, 1816
[MR. CLAY here explains to the electors of the congressional district of Kentucky which he represented, the grounds of his change of opinion on the subject of a national bank. We have seen, by his speech delivered in the senate of the United States, in 1811, that he had opposed the renewal of the charter of the first bank of the United States, and now, in 1816, he had advocated the bill brought in by Mr. Calhoun, of South Carolina, for incorporating a similar institution,which bill passed both houses of congress, and received the signature of president Madison.[7] A perusal of the following address will, it is believed, satisfy all candid persons of the sincerity and patriotism of Mr. Clay, on both occasions. As one of his biographers remarks, ‘there is no other instance, in the whole history of his life, where he has changed his opinions, on an important subject. His ingenuousness is evinced by his having changed once, but his firmness by his having done so but once. And what was it that wrought this single revolution in his sentiments? A mighty event, whose consequences could be learned only from experience—the occurrence of a war with Great Britain, which changed, not only his views of the policy of a bank, but those of almost every other leading politician in the country.’]
ON one subject, that of the bank of the United States, to which at the late session of congress he gave his humble support, Mr. Clay felt particularly anxious to explain the grounds on which he had acted. This explanation, if not due to his own character, the state, and the district to which he belonged, had a right to demand. It would have been unnecessary, if his observations, addressed to the house of representatives, pending the measure, had been published; but they were not published, and why they were not published he was unadvised.
When he was a member of the senate of the United States, he was induced to oppose the renewal of the charter to the old bank of the United States by three general considerations. The first was, that he was instructed to oppose it by the legislature of the state. What were the reasons that operated with the legislature, in giving the instruction, he did not know. He has understood from members of that body, at the time it was given, that a clause, declaring that congress had no power to grant the charter, was stricken out; from which it might be inferred, either that the legislaturedid not believe a bank to be unconstitutional, or that it had formed no opinion on that point. This inference derives additional strength from the fact, that, although the two late senators from this state, as well as the present senators, voted for a national bank, the legislature, which must have been well apprized that such a measure was in contemplation, did not again interpose, either to protest against the measure itself, or to censure the conduct of those senators. From this silence on the part of a body which has ever fixed a watchful eye upon the proceedings of the general government, he had a right to believe, that the legislature of Kentucky saw, without dissatisfaction, the proposal to establish a national bank; and that its opposition to the former one was upon grounds of expediency, applicable to that corporation alone, or no longer existing. But when, at the last session, the question came up as to the establishment of a national bank, being a member of the house of representatives, the point of inquiry with him, was, not so much what was the opinion of the legislature, although undoubtedly the opinion of a body so respectable would have great weight with him under any circumstances, as, what were the sentiments of his immediate constituents. These he believed to be in favor of such an institution, from the following circumstances. In the first place, his predecessor (Mr. Hawkins) voted for a national bank, without the slightest murmur of discontent. Secondly, during the last fall, when he was in his district, he conversed freely with many of his constituents upon that subject, then the most common topic of conversation, and all, without a single exception, as far as he recollected, agreed that it was a desirable if not the only efficient remedy for the alarming evils in the currency of the country. And, lastly, during the session, he received many letters from his constituents, prior to the passage of the bill, all of which concurred, he believed without a solitary exception, in advising the measure. So far then from being instructed by his district to oppose the bank, he had what was perhaps tantamount to an instruction to support it—the acquiescence of his constituents in the vote of their former representative, and the communications, oral and written, of the opinions of many of them in favor of a bank.
The next consideration which induced him to oppose the renewal of the old charter, was, that he believed the corporation had, during a portion of the period of its existence, abused its powers, and had sought to subserve the views of a political party. Instances of its oppression, for that purpose, were asserted to have occurred at Philadelphia and at Charleston; and, although denied in congress by the friends of the institution, during the discussions on the application for the renewal of the charter, they were, in his judgment, satisfactorily made out. This oppression, indeed, was admitted in the house of representatives, in the debate on the present bank, by a distinguished member of that party which hadso warmly espoused the renewal of the old charter. It may be said, what security is there, that the new bank will not imitate this example of oppression? He answered, the fate of the old bank, warning all similar institutions to shun politics, with which they ought not to have any concern; the existence of abundant competition, arising from the great multiplication of banks; and the precautions which are to be found in the details of the present bill.
A third consideration upon which he acted in 1811, was, that as the power to create a corporation, such as was proposed to be continued, was not specifically granted in the constitution, and did not then appear to him to be necessary to carry into effect any of the powers which were specifically granted, congress was not authorized to continue the bank. The constitution, he said, contained powers delegated and prohibitory, powers expressed and constructive. It vests in congress all powers necessary to give effect to the enumerated powers—all that may be necessary to put into motion and activity the machine of government which it constructs. The powers that may be so necessary are deducible by construction. They are not defined in the constitution. They are, from their nature, indefinable. When the question is in relation to one of these powers, the point of inquiry should be, is its exertion necessary to carry into effect any of the enumerated powers and objects of the general government? With regard to the degree of necessity, various rules have been, at different times, laid down; but, perhaps, at last, there is no other than a sound and honest judgment exercised, under the checks and control which belong to the constitution and to the people.
The constructive powers being auxiliary to the specifically granted powers, and depending for their sanction and existence upon a necessity to give effect to the latter, which necessity is to be sought for and ascertained by a sound and honest discretion, it is manifest that this necessity may not be perceived, at one time, under one state of things, when it is perceived at another time, under a different state of things. The constitution, it is true, never changes; it is always the same; but the force of circumstances and the lights of experience may evolve to the fallible persons charged with its administration, the fitness and necessity of a particular exercise of constructive power to-day, which they did not see at a former period.
Mr. Clay proceeded to remark, that when the application was made to renew the old charter of the bank of the United States, such an institution did not appear to him to be so necessary to the fulfilment of any of the objects specifically enumerated in the constitution, as to justify congress in assuming, by construction, a power to establish it. It was supported mainly upon the ground that it was indispensable to the treasury operations. But the local institutions in the several states were at that time in prosperousexistence, confided in by the community, having a confidence in each other, and maintaining an intercourse and connection the most intimate. Many of them were actually employed by the treasury to aid that department, in a part of its fiscal arrangements; and they appeared to him to be fully capable of affording to it all the facility that it ought to desire in all of them. They superseded, in his judgment, the necessity of a national institution. But how stood the case in 1816, when he was called upon again to examine the power of the general government to incorporate a national bank? A total change of circumstances was presented; events of the utmost magnitude had intervened.
A general suspension of specie payments had taken place, and this had led to a train of consequences of the most alarming nature. He beheld, dispersed over the immense extent of the United States, about three hundred banking institutions, enjoying in different degrees the confidence of the public, shaken as to them all, under no direct control of the general government, and subject to no actual responsibility to the state authorities. These institutions were emitting the actual currency of the United States; a currency consisting of a paper, on which they neither paid interest nor principal, whilst it was exchanged for the paper of the community, on which both were paid. He saw these institutions in fact exercising what had been considered, at all times and in all countries, one of the highest attributes of sovereignty, the regulation of the current medium of the country. They were no longer competent to assist the treasury in either of the great operations of collection, deposit, or distribution, of the public revenues. In fact, the paper which they emitted, and which the treasury, from the force of events, found itself constrained to receive, was constantly obstructing the operations of that department. For it would accumulate where it was not wanted, and could not be used where it was wanted for the purposes of government, without a ruinous and arbitrary brokerage. Every man who paid or received from the government, paid or received as much less than he ought to have done as was the difference between the medium in which the payment was effected and specie. Taxes were no longer uniform. In New England, where specie payments have not been suspended, the people were called upon to pay larger contributions than where they were suspended. In Kentucky as much more was paid by the people in their taxes than was paid, for example, in the state of Ohio, as Kentucky paper was worth more than Ohio paper.
It appeared to Mr. Clay, that, in this condition of things, the general government could depend no longer upon these local institutions, multiplied and multiplying daily; coming into existence by the breath of eighteen state sovereignties, some of which by a single act of volition had created twenty or thirty at a time. Even if the resumption of specie payments could have beenanticipated, the general government remaining passive, it did not seem to him that the general government ought longer to depend upon these local institutions exclusively for aid in its operations. But he did not believe it could be justly so anticipated. It was not the interest of all of them that the renewal of specie payments should take place, and yet, without concert between all or most of them it could not be effected. With regard to those disposed to return to a regular state of things, great difficulties might arise, as to the time of its commencement.
Considering, then, that the state of the currency was such that no thinking man could contemplate it without the most serious alarm; that it threatened general distress, if it did not ultimately lead to convulsion and subversion of the government; it appeared to him to be the duty of congress to apply a remedy, if a remedy could be devised. A national bank, with other auxiliary measures, was proposed as that remedy. Mr. Clay said, he determined to examine the question with as little prejudice as possible arising from his former opinion. He knew that the safest course to him, if he pursued a cold, calculating prudence, was to adhere to that opinion, right or wrong. He was perfectly aware, that if he changed, or seemed to change it, he should expose himself to some censure. But, looking at the subject with the light shed upon it by events happening since the commencement of the war, he could no longer doubt. A bank appeared to him not only necessary, but indispensably necessary, in connection with another measure, to remedy the evils of which all were but too sensible. He preferred to the suggestions of the pride of consistency, the evident interests of the community, and determined to throw himself upon their candor and justice. That which appeared to him in 1811, under the state of things then existing, not to be necessary to the general government, seemed now to be necessary, under the present state of things. Had he then foreseen what now exists, and no objection had lain against the renewal of the charter other than that derived from the constitution, he should have voted for the renewal.
Other provisions of the constitution, but little noticed, if noticed at all, on the discussions in congress in 1811, would seem to urge that body to exert all its powers to restore to a sound state the money of the country. That instrument confers upon congress the power to coin money, and to regulate the value of foreign coins; and the states are prohibited to coin money, to emit bills of credit, or to make any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts. The plain inference is, that the subject of the general currency was intended to be submitted exclusively to the general government. In point of fact, however, the regulation of the general currency is in the hands of the state governments, or, which is the same thing, of the banks created by them. Their paper has every quality of money, except that of being made atender, and even this is imparted to it by some states, in the law by which a creditor must receive it, or submit to a ruinous suspension of the payment of his debt. It was incumbent upon congress to recover the control which it had lost over the general currency. The remedy called for, was one of caution and moderation, but of firmness. Whether a remedy directly acting upon the banks and their paper thrown into circulation, was in the power of the general government or not, neither congress nor the community were prepared for the application of such a remedy. An indirect remedy, of a milder character, seemed to be furnished by a national bank. Going into operation, with the powerful aid of the treasury of the United States, he believed it would be highly instrumental in the renewal of specie payments. Coupled with the other measure adopted by congress for that object, he believed the remedy effectual. The local banks must follow the example which the national bank would set them, of redeeming their notes by the payment of specie, or their notes will be discredited and put down.
If the constitution, then, warranted the establishment of a bank, other considerations, besides those already mentioned, strongly urged it. The want of a general medium is every where felt. Exchange varies continually, not only between different parts of the union, but between different parts of the same city. If the paper of a national bank were not redeemed in specie, it would be much better than the current paper, since, although its value in comparison with specie might fluctuate, it would afford an uniform standard.
If political power be incidental to banking corporations, there ought, perhaps, to be in the general government some counterpoise to that which is exerted by the states. Such a counterpoise might not indeed be so necessary, if the states exercised the power to incorporate banks equally, or in proportion to their respective populations. But that is not the case. A single state has a banking capital equivalent, or nearly so, to one-fifth of the whole banking capital of the United States. Four states combined, have the major part of the banking capital of the United States. In the event of any convulsion, in which the distribution of banking institutions might be important, it may be urged, that the mischief would not be alleviated by the creation of a national bank, since its location must be within one of the states. But in this respect the location of the bank is extremely favorable, being in one of the middle states, not likely from its position, as well as its loyalty, to concur in any scheme for subverting the government. And a sufficient security against such contingency is to be found in the distribution of branches in different states, acting and reacting upon the parent institution, and upon each other.
ON THE DIRECT TAX,
AND THE STATE OF THE NATION AFTER THE CLOSE OF THE WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY, 1816.
[IN this speech, which was made in committee of the whole, on a proposition to lay a direct tax for the purpose of providing for the interest on the public debt, and for other objects, as expressed in the report of the committee of ways and means, Mr. Clay enters into a general view of the state of public affairs, as they existed at the conclusion of the war with Great Britain. His defence of the policy of the war, and of the treaty of peace concluded by himself and the other commissioners at Ghent, will be found interesting and valuable, as a portion of our national history. On the present occasion, it will be observed, Mr. Clay first boldly avows his sympathies for the cause of the patriots of South America; thus shadowing forth, at this early period, the feelings which prompted him, in 1818, to propose, in a definite form, the recognition of their independence. This speech concludes with a masterly, although rapid, sketch of the true policy of the country, in which are seen the outlines of the American system, a subject always prominent in the thoughts of this statesman.]
MR. CLAY (speaker) said, the course had been pursued, ever since he had had the honor of a seat on this floor, to select some subject during the early part of the session, on which, by a general understanding, gentlemen were allowed to indulge themselves in remarks on the existing state of public affairs. The practice was a very good one, he said, and there could be no occasion more proper than that of a proposition to lay a direct tax.
Those who have for fifteen years past administered the affairs of this government, have conducted this nation to an honorable point of elevation, at which they may justly pause, challenge a retrospect, and invite attention to the bright field of prosperity which lies before us.
The great objects of the committee of finance, in the report under consideration, are, in the first place, to provide for the payment of the public debts, and in the second, to provide for the support of the government, and the payment of such expenses as should be authorized by congress. The greater part of the debt, Mr. Clay admitted, had grown out of the late war; yet a considerable portion of it consisted of that contracted in the former war forindependence, and a portion of it, perhaps, of that which arose out of the wars with Tripoli and Algiers. Gentlemen had, on this occasion, therefore, fairly a right to examine into the course of administration heretofore, to demonstrate the impolicy of those wars, and the injudiciousness of the public expenditures generally. In the cursory view which he should take of this subject, he must be allowed to say, he should pay no particular attention to what had passed before, in debate. An honorable colleague (Mr. Hardin) who spoke the other day, like another gentleman who preceded him in debate, had taken occasion to refer to his (Mr. Clay’s) late absence from this country on public business; but, Mr. Clay said, he trusted, among the fruits of that absence were a greater respect for the institutions which distinguish this happy country, a greater confidence in them, and an increased disposition to cling to them. Yes, sir; I was in the neighborhood of the battle of Waterloo, and some lessons I did derive from it; but they were lessons which satisfied me, that national independence was only to be maintained by national resistance against foreign encroachments; by cherishing the interests of the people, and giving to the whole physical power of the country an interest in the preservation of the nation. I have been taught that lesson; that we should never lose sight of the possibility, that a combination of despots, of men unfriendly to liberty, propagating what in their opinion constitutes the principle of legitimacy, might reach our happy land, and subject us to that tyranny and degradation which seems to be one of their objects in another country. The result of my reflections is, the determination to aid with my vote in providing my country with all the means to protect its liberties, and guard them even from serious menace. Motives of delicacy, which the committee would be able to understand and appreciate, prevented him from noticing some of his colleague’s (Mr. Hardin’s) remarks; but he would take the occasion to give him one admonition—that, when he next favored the house with an exhibition of his talent for wit—with a display of those elegant implements, for his possession of which, the gentleman from Virginia had so handsomely complimented him—that he would recollect that it is bought, and not borrowed wit, which the adage recommends as best. With regard to the late war with Great Britain, history, in deciding upon the justice and policy of that war, will determine the question according to the state of things which existed when that war was declared. I gave a vote for the declaration of war. I exerted all the little influence and talents I could command to make the war. The war was made; it is terminated; and I declare with perfect sincerity, if it had been permitted me to lift the veil of futurity, and to have foreseen the precise series of events which has occurred, my vote would have been unchanged. The policy of the war, as it regarded our state of preparation, must be determined with reference to the state ofthings at the time that war was declared. He need not take up the time of the house, in demonstrating that we had cause sufficient for war. We had been insulted and outraged, and spoilated upon by almost all Europe—by Great Britain, by France, Spain, Denmark, Naples, and, to cap the climax, by the little, contemptible power of Algiers. We had submitted too long and too much. We had become the scorn of foreign powers, and the contempt of our own citizens. The question of the policy of declaring war at the particular time when it was commenced, is best determined by applying to the enemy himself; and what said he!—that of all the circumstances attending its declaration, none was so aggravating as that we should have selected the moment which of all others was most inconvenient to him; when he was struggling for self-existence in a last effort against the gigantic power of France. The question of the state of preparation for war at any time is a relative question—relative to our own means, the condition of the other power, and the state of the world at the time of declaring it. We could not expect, for instance, that a war against Algiers would require the same means or extent of preparation, as a war against Great Britain; and if it was to be waged against one of the primary powers of Europe, at peace with all the rest of the world, and therefore all her force at command, it could not be commenced with so little preparation, as if her whole force were employed in another quarter. It is not necessary again to repel the stale, ridiculous, false story of French influence, originating in Great Britain, and echoed here. I now contend, as I have always done, that we had a right to take advantage of the condition of the world, at the time war was declared. If Great Britain were engaged in war, we had a right to act on the knowledge of the fact, that her means of annoyance, as to us, were diminished; and we had a right to obtain all the collateral aid we could, from the operations of other powers against her, without entering into those connections which are forbidden by the genius of our government. But it was rather like disturbing the ashes of the dead, now to discuss the questions of the justice or expediency of the war. They were questions long since settled, and on which the public opinion was decisively made up, in favor of the administration.
He proceeded to examine the conditions of the peace and the fruits of the war—questions of more recent date, and more immediately applicable to the present discussion. The terms of the peace must be determined by the same rule that was applicable to the declaration of war—that rule which was furnished by the state of the world at the time the peace was made; and, even if it were true, that all the sanguine expectations which might have been formed at the time of the declaration of war, were not realized by the terms of the subsequent peace, it did not follow that the war was improperly declared, or the peace dishonorable, unless thecondition of the parties, in relation to other powers, remained substantially the same, throughout the struggle, and at the time of the termination of the war, as it was at the commencement of it. At the termination of the war, France was annihilated—blotted out of the map of Europe; the vast power wielded by Bonaparte existed no longer. Let it be admitted, that statesmen, in laying their course, are to look at probable events; that their conduct is to be examined, with reference to the course of events, which in all human probability might have been anticipated; and is there a man in this house, in existence, who can say, that on the eighteenth day of June, 1812, when the war was declared, it would have been anticipated, that Great Britain, by the circumstance of a general peace, resulting from the overthrow of a power whose basements were supposed to be deeper laid, more ramified, and more extended, than those of any power ever were before, would be placed in the attitude in which she stood in December, 1814? Would any one say, that this government could have anticipated such a state of things, and ought to have been governed in its conduct accordingly? Great Britain, Russia, Germany, did not expect—not a power in Europe believed—as late even as January, 1814, that, in the ensuing March, Bonaparte would abdicate, and the restoration of the Bourbons would follow. What, then, was the actual condition of Europe, when peace was concluded? A perfect tranquillity reigned throughout; for, as late as the first of March, the idea of Napoleon’s reappearing in France, was as little entertained as that of a man’s coming from the moon to take upon himself the government of the country. In December, 1814, a profound and apparently a permanent peace existed; Great Britain was left to dispose of the vast force, the accumulation of twenty-five years, the work of an immense system of finance and protracted war; she was at liberty to employ that undivided force against this country. Under such circumstances, it did not follow, according to the rules laid down, either that the war ought not to have been made, or that peace on such terms ought not to have been concluded.
What, then, were the terms of the peace? The regular opposition in this country, the gentlemen on the other side of the house, had not come out to challenge an investigation of the terms of the peace, although they had several times given a sidewipe at the treaty, on occasions with which it had no necessary connection. It had been sometimes said, that we had gained nothing by the war, that the fisheries were lost, &c. How, he asked, did this question of the fisheries really stand? By the first part of the third article of the treaty of 1783, the right was recognized in the people of the United States to take fish of every kind on the Grand Bank, and on all the other banks of Newfoundland; also in the gulf of St. Lawrence, and at all other places in the sea, where the inhabitantsof both countries used at any time to fish. This right was a necessary incident to our sovereignty, although it is denied to some of the powers of Europe. It was not contested at Ghent; it has never been drawn in question by Great Britain. But by the same third article it was further stipulated, that the inhabitants of the United States shall have ‘liberty to take fish of every kind on such part of the coast of Newfoundland as British fishermen shall use (but not to dry or cure the same on that island), and also on the coasts, bays, and creeks, of all other of his Britannic majesty’s dominions in America; and that the American fishermen shall have liberty to dry and cure fish in any of the unsettled bays, harbors, and creeks of Nova Scotia, Magdalen islands, and Labrador, so long as the same shall remain unsettled; but so soon as the same or either of them shall be settled, it shall not be lawful for the said fishermen to dry or cure fish at such settlement, without a previous agreement for that purpose with the inhabitants, proprietors, or possessors of the ground.’ The British commissioners, assuming that these liberties had expired by the war between the two countries, at an early period of the negotiation, declared that they would not be revived without an equivalent. Whether the treaty of 1783 does not form an exception to the general rule, according to which treaties are vacated by a war breaking out between the parties, is a question on which he did not mean to express an opinion. The first article of that treaty, by which the king of Great Britain acknowledges the sovereignty of the United States, certainly was not abrogated by the war; that all the other parts of the same instrument, which define the limits, privileges, and liberties attaching to that sovereignty, were equally unaffected by the war, might be contended for with at least much plausibility. If we determined to offer them the equivalent required, the question was, what should it be? When the British commissioners demanded, in their projet, a renewal to Great Britain of the right to the navigation of the Mississippi, secured by the treaty of 1783, a bare majority of the American commissioners offered to renew it, upon the condition that the liberties in question were renewed to us. He was not one of that majority. He would not trouble the committee with his reasons for being opposed to the offer. A majority of his colleagues, actuated he believed by the best motives, made, however, the offer, and it was refused by the British commissioners.
If the British interpretation of the treaty of 1783 be correct, we have lost the liberties in question. What the value of them really is, he had not been able to meet with any two gentlemen who agreed. The great value of the whole mass of our fishery interests, as connected with our navigation and trade, was sufficiently demonstrated by the tonnage employed; but of what was the relative importance of these liberties, there was great contrariety ofstatements. They were liberties to be exercised within a foreign jurisdiction, and some of them were liable to be destroyed by the contingency of settlement. He did not believe, that much importance attached to such liberties. And, supposing them to be lost, we are, perhaps, sufficiently indemnified by the redemption of the British mortgage upon the navigation of the Mississippi. This great stream, on that supposition, is placed where it ought to be, in the same independent condition with the Hudson, or any other river in the United States.
If, on the contrary, the opposite construction of the treaty of 1783 be the true one, these liberties remain to us, and the right to the navigation of the Mississippi, as secured to Great Britain by that instrument, continues with her.
But he was surprised to hear a gentleman from the western country (Mr. Hardin) exclaim, that we had gained nothing by the war. Great Britain acquired, by the treaty negotiated by Mr. Jay, the right to trade with the Indians within our territories. It was a right upon which she placed great value, and from the pursuit of which she did not desist without great reluctance. It had been exercised by her agents in a manner to excite the greatest sensibility in the western country. This right was clearly lost by the war; for, whatever may be the true opinion as to the treaty of 1783, there can be no doubt that the stipulations of that of 1794 no longer exist.
It had been said, that the great object, in the continuation of the war, had been to secure our mariners against impressment, and that peace was made without accomplishing it. With regard to the opposition, he presumed that they would not urge any such argument. For, if their opinion was to be inferred (though he hoped in this case it was not) from that of an influential and distinguished member of the opposition, we had reason to believe that they did not think the British doctrines wrong on this subject. He alluded to a letter said to be written by a gentleman of great consideration, residing in an adjoining state, to a member of this house, in which the writer states, that he conceives the British claim to be right, and expresses his hope that the president, however he might kick at it, would be compelled to swallow the bitter pill. If the peace had really given up the American doctrine, it would have been, according to that opinion, merely yielding to the force of the British right. In that view of the subject, the error of the administration would have been in contending for too much in behalf of this country; for he presumed there was no doubt, that, whether right or wrong, it would be an important principle gained to secure our seamen against British impressment. And he trusted in God that all future administrations would rather err on the side of contending for too much than too little for America.
But he was willing to admit, that the conduct of the administrationought to be tried by their own opinions, and not those of the opposition. One of the great causes of the war, and of its continuance, was the practice of impressment exercised by Great Britain, and if this claim has been admitted, by necessary implication or express stipulation, the administration has abandoned the rights of our seamen. It was with utter astonishment that he heard, that it had been contended in this country, that because our right of exemption from the practice had not been expressly secured in the treaty, it was therefore given up! It was impossible that such an argument could be advanced on the floor. No member who regarded his reputation would have dared advance such an argument here.
Had the war terminated, the practice continuing, he admitted that such might be a fair inference; and on some former occasion he had laid down the principle, which he thought correct, that if the United States did not make peace with Great Britain, the war in Europe continuing, and therefore she continuing the exercise of the practice, without any stipulation to secure us against its effects, the plain inference would be, that we had surrendered the right. But what is the fact? At the time of the conclusion of the treaty of peace, Great Britain had ceased the practice of impressment; she was not only at peace with all the powers of Europe, but there was every prospect of a permanent and durable peace. The treaty being silent on the subject of impressment, the only plain rational result was, that neither party had conceded its rights, but they were left totally unaffected by it. He recollected to have heard, in the British house of commons, whilst he was in Europe, the very reverse of the doctrine advanced here on this subject. The British ministry were charged by a member of the opposition with having surrendered their right of impressment, and the same course of reasoning was employed to prove it, as he understood was employed in this country to prove our acquiescence in that practice. The argument was this: the war was made on the professed ground of resistance of the practice of impressment; the peace having been made without a recognition of the right of America, the treaty being silent on the subject, the inference was, that the British authorities had surrendered the right—that they had failed to secure it, and, having done so, had in effect yielded it. The member of the opposition in England was just as wrong as any member of the house would be, who should contend that the right of impressment is surrendered to the British government. The fact, was, neither party had surrendered its rights; things remain as though the war had never been made—both parties are in possession of all the rights they had anterior to the war. Lest it might be deduced that his sentiments on the subject of impressment had undergone a change, he took the opportunity to say, that, although he desired to preserve peace between Great Britain and the UnitedStates, and to maintain between them that good understanding calculated to promote the interest of each, yet, whenever Great Britain should give satisfactory evidence of her design to apply her doctrine of impressment as heretofore, he was, for one, ready to take up arms again to oppose her. The fact was, that the two nations had been placed in a state of hostility as to a practice growing out of the war in Europe. The war ceasing between Great Britain and the rest of Europe, left England and America engaged in a contest on an aggression which had also practically ceased. The question had then presented itself, whether the United States should be kept in war, to gain an abandonment of what had become a mere abstract principle; or, looking at the results, and relying on the good sense and sound discretion of both countries, we should not recommend the termination of the war. When no practical evil could result from the suspension of hostilities, and there was no more than a possibility of the removal of the practice of impressment, I, as one of the mission, consented with sincere pleasure to the peace, satisfied that we gave up no right, sacrificed no honor, compromited no important principle. He said, then, applying the rule of the actual state of things, as that by which to judge of the peace, there was nothing in the conditions or terms of the peace that was dishonorable, nothing for reproach, nothing for regret.
Gentlemen have complained, that we had lost the islands in the bay of Passamaquoddy. Have they examined into that question, and do they know the grounds on which it stands? Prior to the war we occupied Moose Island, the British Grand Menan. Each party claimed both islands; America, because they are within the limits of the United States, as defined by the treaty of 1783; and Great Britain, because, as she alleges, they were in the exception contained in the second article of that treaty as to islands within the limits of the province of Nova Scotia. All the information which he had received concurred in representing Grand Menan as the most valuable island. Does the treaty, in stipulating for an amicable and equitable mode of settling this controversy, yield one foot of the territory of the United States? If our title to Moose Island is drawn in question, that of Great Britain to Grand Menan is equally so. If we may lose the one, she may the other. The treaty, it was true, contained a provision that the party in possession, at the time of its ratification, may hold on until the question of right is decided. The committee would observe, that this stipulation, as to possession, was not limited to the moment of the signature, but looked to the period of the ratification of the treaty. The American commissioners had thought they might safely rely on the valor of Massachusetts, or the arms of the United States, to drive the invader from our soil; and had also hoped that we might obtain possession of Grand Menan. Itis true, they have been disappointed in the successful application of the force of that state and of that of the union. But it is not true that we have parted with the right. It is fair to presume that Great Britain will, with good faith, coöperate in carrying the stipulations into effect; and she has, in fact, already promptly proceeded to the appointment of commissioners under the treaty.
What have we gained by the war? He had shown we had lost nothing in rights, territory, or honor; nothing for which we ought to have contended, according to the principles of the gentlemen on the other side, or according to our own. Have we gained nothing by the war? Let any man look at the degraded condition of this country before the war—the scorn of the universe, the contempt of ourselves—and tell me, if we have gained nothing by the war? What is our present situation? Respectability and character abroad; security and confidence at home. If we have not obtained, in the opinion of some, the full measure of retribution, our character and constitution are placed on a solid basis, never to be shaken. The glory acquired by our gallant tars, by our Jacksons and our Browns on the land, is that nothing? True, we have had our vicissitudes—that there were humiliating events which the patriot could not review without deep regret. But the great account, when it came to be balanced, thank God, would be found vastly in our favor. Is there a man, he asked, who would have obliterated from the proud pages of our history the brilliant achievements of Jackson, Brown, Scott, and the host of heroes on land and sea whom he would not enumerate? Is there a man who could not desire a participation in the national glory acquired by the war?—yes, national glory; which, however the expression may be condemned by some, must be cherished by every genuine patriot. What do I mean by national glory? Glory such as Hull, of the Constitution, Jackson, Lawrence, Perry, have acquired. And are gentlemen insensible to their deeds? to the value of them, in animating the country in the hour of peril hereafter? Did the battle of Thermopylæ preserve Greece but once? Whilst the Mississippi continues to bear the tributes of the Iron mountains and the Alleghany to her Delta and to the Gulf of Mexico, the eighth of January shall be remembered, and the glory of that day shall stimulate future patriots, and nerve the arms of unborn freemen, in driving the presumptuous invader from our country’s soil! Gentlemen may boast of their insensibility to feelings inspired by the contemplation of such events. But he would ask, does the recollection of Bunker’s hill, of Saratoga, of York-town, afford them no pleasure? Every act of noble sacrifice to the country—every instance of patriotic devotion to her cause—has its beneficial influence. A nation’s character is the sum of its splendid deeds. They constitute one common patrimony—the nation’s inheritance. They awe foreign powers. They arouse and animate our ownpeople. Do gentlemen derive no pleasure from the recent transactions in the Mediterranean? Can they regard unmoved the honorable issue of a war, in support of our national rights, declared, prosecuted, and terminated by a treaty in which the enemy submitted to a carte blanche, in the short period of forty days? The days of chivalry are not gone. They have been revived in the person of commodore Decatur, who, in releasing from infidel bondage Christian captives—the subjects of a foreign power—and restoring them to their country and their friends, has placed himself beside the most renowned knights of former times. I love true glory. It is this sentiment which ought to be cherished; and in spite of cavils and sneers and attempts to put it down, it will finally conduct this nation to that height to which God and nature have destined it. Three wars, those who at present administer this government may say, and say with proud satisfaction, they have safely conducted us through. Two with powers, which, though otherwise contemptible, have laid almost all Europe under tribute—a tribute from which we are exonerated. The third, with one of the most gigantic powers that the world ever saw. These struggles have not been without their sacrifices, nor without their lessons. They have created, or rather greatly increased, the public debt. They have taught, that, to preserve the character we have established, preparation for war is necessary.
The public debt exists. However contracted, the faith of the nation is pledged for its redemption. It can only be paid by providing an excess of revenue beyond expenditure, or by retrenchment. Did gentlemen contend that the results of the report were inaccurate—that the proceeds of the revenue would be greater, or the public expenses less, than the estimate? On these subjects, he believed it would be presumption in him, when the defence of the report was in such able hands (Mr. Lowndes’s), to attempt its vindication. Leaving the task to that gentleman, he should assume, for the present, its accuracy. He would lay down a general rule, from which there ought never to be a departure, without absolute necessity—that the expenses of the year ought to be met by the revenue of the year. If in time of war it were impossible to observe this rule, we ought, in time of peace, to provide for as speedy a discharge of the debt contracted in the preceding war as possible. This can only be done by an effective sinking fund, based upon an excess of revenue beyond expenditure, and a protraction of the period of peace. If in England the sinking fund had not fulfilled what was promised, it was because of a failure to provide such a revenue, and because the interests of peace in that country had been too few and too short. From the revolution to 1812, a period of one hundred and twenty-four years, there had been sixty-three years of war, and only sixty-one of peace; and there had been contracted £638,129,577 of debt, anddischarged only £39,594,305. The national debt at the peace of Utrecht amounted to £52,681,076, and during the peace which followed, being twenty-seven years, from 1714 to 1740, there was discharged only £7,231,503. When the operations of our sinking fund were contrasted with those of Great Britain, they would be found to present the most gratifying results. Our public debt, existing on the first day of January, 1802, amounted to $78,754,568 70; and on the first of January, 1815, we had extinguished $33,873,463 98. Thus in thirteen years, one half the period of peace that followed the treaty of Utrecht, we had discharged more public debt than Great Britain did during that period. In twenty-six years she did not pay much more than a seventh of her debt. In thirteen years we paid more than a third of ours. If, then, a public debt, contracted in a manner, he trusted, satisfactory to the country, imposed upon us a duty to provide for its payment; if we were encouraged, by past experience, to persevere in the application of an effective sinking fund, he would again repeat, that the only alternatives were the adoption of a system of taxation producing the revenue estimated by the committee of ways and means, or by great retrenchment of the public expenses.
In what respect can a reduction of the public expenses be effected? Gentlemen who assailed the report on this ground have, by the indefinite nature of the attack, great advantage on their side. Instead of contenting themselves with crying out retrenchment! retrenchment! a theme always plausible, an object always proper, when the public interest will admit of it, let them point the attention of the house to some specified subject. If they really think a reduction of the army and navy, or either of them, be proper, let them lay a resolution upon the table to that effect. They had generally, it was true, singled out, in discussing this report, (and he had no objection to meet them in this way, though he thought the other the fairest course,) the military establishment. He was glad that the navy had fought itself into favor, and that no one appeared disposed to move its reduction or to oppose its gradual augmentation. But the ‘standing army’ is the great object of gentlemen’s apprehensions. And those who can bravely set at defiance hobgoblins, the creatures of their own fertile imaginations, are trembling for the liberties of the people, endangered by a standing army of ten thousand men. Those who can courageously vote against taxes, are alarmed for the safety of the constitution and the country, at such a force scattered over our extensive territory! This could not have been expected, at least in the honorable gentleman (Mr. Ross), who, if he had been storming a fort, could not have displayed more cool, collected courage than he did, when he declared, that he would show to Pennsylvania, that she had one faithful representative, bold and independent enough to vote against a tax!
He had happened, very incidentally, the other day, and in a manner which he had supposed could not attract particular attention, to state, that the general condition of the world admonished us to shape our measures with a view to the possible conflicts into which we might be drawn; and he said, he did not know when he should cease to witness the attacks made upon him in consequence of that general remark; when he should cease to hear the cry of ‘standing army,’ ‘national glory,’ &c. &c. From the tenor of gentlemen’s observations, it would seem as if, for the first time in the history of this government, it was now proposed, that a certain regular force should constitute a portion of the public defence. But from the administration of general Washington, down to this time, a regular force, a standing army (if gentlemen please), had existed, and the only question about it, at any time, had been, what should be the amount. Gentlemen themselves, who most loudly decry this establishment, did not propose an entire disbandment of it; and the question, ever with them, is, not whether a regular force be necessary, but whether a regular force of this or that amount be called for by the actual state of our affairs.
The question is not, on any side of the house, as to the nature, but the quantum of the force. He maintained the position, that, if there was the most profound peace that ever existed; if we had no fears from any quarter whatever; if all the world was in a state of the most profound and absolute repose; a regular force of ten thousand men was not too great for the purposes of this government. We knew too much, he said, of the vicissitudes of human affairs, and the uncertainty of all our calculations, not to know, that, even in the most profound tranquillity, some tempest may suddenly arise, and bring us into a state requiring the exertion of military force, which cannot be created in a moment, but requires time for its collection, organization, and discipline. When gentlemen talked of the force which was deemed sufficient some twenty years ago, what did they mean? That this force was not to be progressive? That the full grown man ought to wear the clothes and habits of his infancy? That the establishment maintained by this government, when its population amounted to four or five millions only, should be the standard by which our measures should be regulated, in all subsequent states of the country? If gentlemen meant this, as it seemed to him they did, he and they should not agree. He contended, that establishments ought to be commensurate with the actual state of the country, should grow with its growth, and keep pace with its progress. Look at that map (said he, pointing to the large map of the United States, which hangs in the hall of representatives)—at the vast extent of that country which stretches from the Lake of the Woods, in the northwest, to the Bay of Fundy, in the east. Look at the vast extent of our maritime coast; recollect we have Indians and powerful nations conterminouson the whole frontier; and that we know not at what moment the savage enemy, or Great Britain herself, may seek to make war with us. Ought the force of the country to be graduated by the scale of our exposure, or are we to be uninfluenced by the increase of our liability to war? Have we forgotten that the power of France, as a counterpoise to that of Great Britain, is annihilated—gone, never to rise again, I believe, under the weak, unhappy, and imbecile race who now sway her destinies? Any individual must, I think, come to the same conclusion with myself, who takes these considerations into view, and reflects on our growth, the state of our defence, the situation of the nations of the world, and above all, of that nation with whom we are most likely to come into collision—for it is in vain to conceal it; this country must have many a hard and desperate tug with Great Britain, let the two governments be administered how and by whom they may. That man must be blind to the indications of the future, who cannot see that we are destined to have war after war with Great Britain, until, if one of the two nations be not crushed, all grounds of collision shall have ceased between us. I repeat, if the condition of France were that of perfect repose, instead of that of a volcano, ready to burst out again with a desolating eruption; if with Spain our differences were settled; if the dreadful war raging in South America were terminated; if the marines of all the powers of Europe were resuscitated as they stood prior to the revolution of France; if there was universal repose, and profound tranquillity among all the nations of the earth; considering the actual growth of our country, in my judgment, the force of ten thousand men would not be too great for its exigences. Do gentlemen ask, if I rely on the regular force entirely for the defence of the country? I answer, it is for garrisoning and keeping in order our fortifications, for the preservation of the national arms, for something like a safe depository of military science and skill, to which we may recur in time of danger, that I desire to maintain an adequate regular force. I know, that in the hour of peril, our great reliance must be on the whole physical force of the country, and that no detachment of it can be exclusively depended on. History proves that no nation, not destitute of the military art, whose people were united in its defence, ever was conquered. It is true, that in countries where standing armies have been entirely relied on, the armies have been subdued, and the subjugation of the nation has been the consequence of it; but no example is to be found of a united people being conquered, who possessed an adequate degree of military knowledge. Look at the Grecian republics, struggling successfully against the overwhelming force of Persia; look more recently at Spain. I have great confidence in the militia, and I would go with my honorable colleague (Mr. M’Kee), whose views I know are honest, hand in hand, in arming, disciplining, andrendering effective, the militia; I am for providing the nation with every possible means of resistance. I ask my honorable colleague, after I have gone thus far with him, to go a step further with me, and let us retain the force we now have for the purposes I have already described. I ask gentlemen who propose to reduce the army, if they have examined in detail the number and extent of the posts and garrisons on our maritime and interior frontier? If they have not gone through this process of reasoning, how shall we arrive at the result that we can reduce the army with safety? There is not one of our forts adequately garrisoned at this moment; and there is nearly one fourth of them that have not one solitary man. I said the other day, that I would rather vote for the augmentation than the reduction of the army. When returning to my country from its foreign service, and looking at this question, it appeared to me that the maximum was twenty thousand, the minimum ten thousand of the force we ought to retain. And I again say, that rather than reduce I would vote to increase the present force.
A standing army had been deemed necessary, from the commencement of the government to the present time. The question was only as to the quantum of force; and not whether it should exist. No man who regards his political reputation, would place himself before the people, on a proposition for its absolute disbandment. He admitted a question as to quantum might be carried so far as to rise into a question of principle. If we were to propose to retain an army of thirty, or forty, or fifty thousand men, then truly the question would present itself, whether our rights were not in some danger from such a standing army; whether reliance was to be placed altogether on a standing army, or on that natural safe defence which, according to the habits of the country and the principles of our government, is considered the bulwark of our liberties. But, between five and ten thousand men, or any number under ten thousand, it could not be a question of principle; for, unless gentlemen were afraid of spectres, it was utterly impossible that any danger could be apprehended from ten thousand men, dispersed on a frontier of many thousand miles; here twenty or thirty, there an hundred; and the largest amount, at Detroit, not exceeding a thin regiment. And yet, brave gentlemen—gentlemen who are not alarmed at hobgoblins—who can intrepidly vote even against taxes—are alarmed by a force of this extent! What, he asked, was the amount of the army in the time of Mr. Jefferson—a time, the orthodoxy of which had been so ostentatiously proclaimed? It was true, when that gentleman came into power, it was with a determination to retrench, as far as practicable. Under the full influence of these notions, in 1802, the bold step of wholly disbanding the army, never was thought of. The military peace establishment was then fixed at about four thousand men.But, before Mr. Jefferson went out of power, what was done—that is, in April, 1808? In addition to the then existing peace establishment, eight regiments, amounting to between five and six thousand men, were authorized, making a total force precisely equal to the present peace establishment. It was true, that all this force had never been actually enlisted and embodied; that the recruiting service had been suspended; and that at the commencement of the war we had far from this number; and we have not now actually ten thousand men—being at least two thousand deficient of that number. He adverted to what had been said, on this and other occasions, of Mr. Jefferson’s not having seized the favorable moment for war, which was afforded by the attack on the Chesapeake. He had always entertained the opinion, he said, that Mr. Jefferson on that occasion took the correct, manly, and frank course, in saying to the British government, your officers have done this; it is an enormous aggression; do you approve the act; do you make it your cause, or not? That government did not sanction the act; it disclaimed it, and promptly too; and although they for a long time withheld the due redress, it was ultimately tendered. If Mr. Jefferson had used his power to carry the country into a war at that period, it might have been supported by public opinion, during the moment of fever, but it would soon abate, and the people would begin to ask, why this war had been made without understanding whether the British government avowed the conduct of its officers, and so forth. If the threatening aspect of our relations with England had entered into the consideration which had caused the increase of the army at that time, there were considerations equally strong at this time, with our augmented population, for retaining our present force. If, however, there were no threatenings from any quarter; if the relative force of European nations, and the general balance of power existing before the French revolution were restored; if South America had not made the attempt, in which he trusted in God she would succeed, to achieve her independence; if our affairs with Spain were settled, he would repeat, that ten thousand men would not be too great a force for the necessities of the country, and with a view to future emergences.
He had taken the liberty, the other day, to make some observations which he might now repeat as furnishing auxiliary considerations for adopting a course of prudence and precaution. He had then said, that our affairs with Spain were not settled; that the Spanish minister was reported to have made some inadmissible demands of our government. The fact turned out as he had presented it. It appeared that what was then rumor, was now fact; and Spain had taken the ground, not only that there must be a discussion of our title to that part of Louisiana, formerly called West Florida, (which it might be doubted whether it ought to take place,) but had required that we must surrender the territory first,and discuss the right to it afterwards. Besides this unsettled state of our relations with Spain, he said, there were other rumors, and he wished to God we had the same means of ascertaining their correctness, as we had found of ascertaining the truth of the rumor just noticed; it was rumored that the Spanish province of Florida had been ceded, with all her pretensions, to Great Britain. Would gentlemen tell him, then, that this was a time when any statesman would pursue the hazardous policy of disarming entirely, of quietly smoking our pipes by our firesides, regardless of impending danger? It might be a palatable doctrine to some, but he was persuaded was condemned by the rules of conduct in private life, by those maxims of sound precaution by which individuals would regulate their private affairs. He did not here mean to take up the question in relation to South America. Still, it was impossible not to see, that, in the progress of things, we might be called on to decide the question, whether we would or would not lend them our aid. This opinion he boldly declared, and he entertained it, not in any pursuit of vain glory, but from a deliberate conviction of its being conformable to the best interests of the country; that, having a proper understanding with foreign powers—that understanding which prudence and a just precaution recommended—it would undoubtedly be good policy to take part with the patriots of South America. He believed it could be shown, that, on the strictest principles of public law, we have a right to take part with them, that it is our interest to take part with them, and that our interposition in their favor would be effectual. But he confessed, with infinite regret, that he saw a supineness on this interesting subject, throughout our country, which left him almost without hope, that what he believed the correct policy of the country would be pursued. He considered the release of any part of America from the dominions of the old world, as adding to the general security of the new. He could not contemplate the exertions of the people of South America, without wishing that they might triumph, and nobly triumph. He believed the cause of humanity would be promoted by the interposition of any foreign power which should terminate the contest between the friends and enemies of independence in that quarter, for a more bloody and cruel war never had been carried on since the days of Adam, than that which is now raging in South America; in which not the least regard is paid to the laws of war, to the rights of capitulation, to the rights of prisoners, nor even to the rights of kindred. I do not offer these views, expecting to influence the opinions of others; they are opinions, of my own. But, on the question of general policy, whether or not we shall interfere in the war in South America, it may turn out that, whether we will or will not choose to interfere in their behalf, we shall be drawn into the contest in the course of its progress. Among other demands by the minister of Spain, isthe exclusion of the flag of Buenos Ayres, and other parts of South America, from our ports. Our government has taken a ground on this subject, of which I think no gentleman can disapprove—that all parties shall be admitted and hospitably treated in our ports, provided they conform to our laws whilst among us. What course Spain may take on this subject, it was impossible now to say. Although I would not urge this as an argument for increasing our force, I would place it among those considerations which ought to have weight with every enlightened mind, in determining upon the propriety of its reduction. It is asserted that Great Britain has strengthened, and is strengthening herself in the provinces adjoining us. Is this a moment when in prudence we ought to disarm? No, sir. Preserve your existing force. It would be extreme indiscretion to lessen it.
Mr. Clay here made some observations, to show that a reduction of the army to from four to five thousand men, as had been suggested, would not occasion such a diminution of expense as to authorize the rejection of the report, or any essential alteration in the amount of revenue, which the system proposes to raise from internal taxes, and his colleague (Mr. M’Kee) appeared equally hostile to all of them. Having, however, shown that we cannot in safety reduce the army, he would leave the details of the report in the abler hands of the honorable chairman (Mr. Lowndes), who, he had no doubt, could demonstrate, that with all the retrenchments which had been recommended, the government would be bankrupt in less than three years, if most of these taxes were not continued. He would now hasten to that conclusion, at which the committee could not regret more than he did, that he had not long since arrived.
As to the attitude in which this country should be placed, the duty of congress could not be mistaken. My policy is to preserve the present force, naval and military; to provide for the augmentation of the navy; and, if the danger of war should increase, to increase the army also. Arm the militia, and give it the most effective character of which it is susceptible. Provide in the most ample manner, and place in proper depots, all the munitions and instruments of war. Fortify and strengthen the weak and vulnerable points indicated by experience. Construct military roads and canals, particularly from the Miami of the Ohio to the Miami of Erie; from the Sciota to the bay of Sandusky; from the Hudson to Ontario; that the facilities of transportation may exist, of the men and means of the country, to points where they may be wanted. I would employ on this subject a part of the army, which should also be employed on our line of frontier, territorial and maritime, in strengthening the works of defence. I would provide steam batteries for the Mississippi, for Borgne and Ponchartrain, and for the Chesapeake, and for any part of the north or east, where they might bebeneficially employed. In short, I would act seriously, effectively act, on the principle, that in peace we ought to prepare for war; for I repeat, again and again, that, in spite of all the prudence exerted by the government, and the forbearance of others, the hour of trial will come. These halcyon days of peace, this calm will yield to the storm of war, and when that comes, I am for being prepared to breast it. Has not the government been reproached for the want of preparation at the commencement of the late war? And yet the same gentlemen who utter these reproaches, instead of taking counsel from experience, would leave the country in an unprepared condition.
He would as earnestly commence the great work, too long delayed, of internal improvement. He desired to see a chain of turnpike roads and canals, from Passamaquoddy to New Orleans; and other similar roads intersecting the mountains, to facilitate intercourse between all parts of the country, and to bind and connect us together. He would also effectually protect our manufactories. We had given, at least, an implied pledge to do so, by the course of administration. He would afford them protection, not so much for the sake of the manufacturers themselves, as for the general interest. We should thus have our wants supplied, when foreign resources are cut off, and we should also lay the basis of a system of taxation, to be resorted to when the revenue from imports is stopped by war. Such, Mr. Chairman, is a rapid sketch of the policy which it seems to me it becomes us to pursue. It is for you now to decide, whether we shall draw wisdom from the past, or, neglecting the lessons of recent experience, we shall go on headlong without foresight, meriting and receiving the reproaches of the community. I trust, sir, notwithstanding the unpromising appearances sometimes presenting themselves, during the present session, we shall yet do our duty. I appeal to the friends around me, with whom I have been associated for years in public life; who nobly, manfully vindicated the national character by a war, waged by a young people, unskilled in arms, single-handed, against a veteran power—a war which the nation has emerged from, covered with laurels; let us now do something to ameliorate the internal condition of the country; let us show that objects of domestic, no less than those of foreign policy, receive our attention; let us fulfil the just expectations of the public, whose eyes are anxiously directed towards this session of congress; let us, by a liberal and enlightened policy, entitle ourselves, upon our return home, to that best of all rewards, the grateful exclamation, ‘well done, thou good and faithful servant.’