A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents. Volume 6, part 2: Andrew Johnson

by Unknown

SPECIAL MESSAGES.

WASHINGTON, December 3, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit, for consideration with a view to ratification, a treaty between the United States and His Majesty the King of Denmark, stipulating for the cession of the islands of St. Thomas and St. John, in the West Indies.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, December 3, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit, for consideration with a view to ratification, a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation between the United States and the Republic of Nicaragua, signed at the city of Managua on the 21st day of June last. This instrument has been framed pursuant to the amendments of the Senate of the United States to the previous treaty between the parties of the 16th of March, 1859.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, December 4, 1867.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith a final report from the Attorney-General, additional to the reports submitted by him December 31, 1866, March 2, 1867, and July 8, 1867, in reply to a resolution of the House of Representatives December 10, 1866, requesting "a list of the names of all persons engaged in the late rebellion against the United States Government who have been pardoned by the President from April 15, 1865, to this date; that said list shall also state the rank of each person who has been so pardoned, if he has been engaged in the military service of the so-called Confederate government, and the position if he shall have held any civil office under said so-called Confederate government; and shall also state whether such person has at anytime prior to April 14, 1861, held any office under the United States Government, and, if so, what office, together with the reason for granting such pardon, and also the names of the person or persons at whose solicitation such pardon was granted."

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, December 4, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, in answer to their resolution of the 26th ultimo, a report[30] from the Secretary of State, with accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, December 5, 1867.

To the House of Representatives:

In compliance with the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 17th July last, requesting me to communicate all information received at the several Departments of the Government touching the organization within or near the territory of the United States of armed bodies of men for the purpose of avenging the death of the Archduke Maximilian or of intervening in Mexican affairs, and what measures have been taken to prevent the organization or departure of such organized bodies for the purpose of carrying out such objects, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State and the papers accompanying it.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, December 5, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

I submit to the Senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, a commercial treaty between the United States of America and Her Majesty the Queen of Madagascar, signed at Antananarivo on the 14th of February last.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, December 10, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, in answer to their resolution of the 25th ultimo, a report[31] from the Secretary of State, with accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, December 10, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit a copy of a dispatch of the 17th of July last, addressed to the Secretary of State, and of the papers which accompanied it, from Anson Burlingame, esq., minister of the United States to China, relating to a proposed modification of the existing treaty between this Government and that of China.

The Senate is aware that the original treaty is chiefly ex parte in its character. The proposed modification, though not of sufficient importance to warrant all the usual forms, does not seem to be objectionable; but it can not be legally accepted by the executive government without the advice and consent of the Senate. If this should be given, it may be indicated by a resolution, upon the adoption of which the United States minister to China will be instructed to inform the Government of that country that the modification has been assented to.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, December 12, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

On the 12th of August last I suspended Mr. Stanton from the exercise of the office of Secretary of War, and on the same day designated General Grant to act as Secretary of War ad interim.

The following are copies of the Executive orders:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, August 12, 1867.

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

SIR: By virtue of the power and authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States, you are hereby suspended from office as Secretary of War, and will cease to exercise any and all functions pertaining to the same.

You will at once transfer to General Ulysses S. Grant, who has this day been authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War ad interim, all records, books, and other property now in your custody and charge.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, D.C., August 12, 1867.

General ULYSSES S. GRANT,
Washington, D.C.

SIR: The Hon. Edwin M. Stanton having been this day suspended as Secretary of War, you are hereby authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War ad interim, and will at once enter upon the discharge of the duties of the office.

The Secretary of War has been instructed to transfer to you all the records, books, papers, and other public property now in his custody and charge.

The following communication was received from Mr. Stanton:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, August 12, 1867.

The PRESIDENT.

SIR: Your note of this date has been received, informing me that by virtue of the powers and authority vested in you as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States I am suspended from office as Secretary of War, and will cease to exercise any and all functions pertaining to the same, and also directing me at once to transfer to General Ulysses S. Grant, who has this day been authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War ad interim, all records, books, papers, and other public property now in my custody and charge.

Under a sense of public duty I am compelled to deny your right under the Constitution and laws of the United States, without the advice and consent of the Senate and without any legal cause, to suspend me from office as Secretary of War or the exercise of any or all functions pertaining to the same, or without such advice and consent to compel me to transfer to any person the records, books, papers, and public property in my custody as Secretary.

But inasmuch as the General Commanding the armies of the United States has been appointed ad interim, and has notified me that he has accepted the appointment, I have no alternative but to submit, under protest, to superior force.

The suspension has not been revoked, and the business of the War Department is conducted by the Secretary ad interim.

Prior to the date of this suspension I had come to the conclusion that the time had arrived when it was proper Mr. Stanton should retire from my Cabinet. The mutual confidence and general accord which should exist in such a relation had ceased. I supposed that Mr. Stanton was well advised that his continuance in the Cabinet was contrary to my wishes, for I had repeatedly given him so to understand by every mode short of an express request that he should resign. Having waited full time for the voluntary action of Mr. Stanton, and seeing no manifestation on his part of an intention to resign, I addressed him the following note on the 5th of August:

SIR: Public considerations of a high character constrain me to say that your resignation as Secretary of War will be accepted.

To this note I received the following reply:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, August 5, 1867.

SIR: Your note of this day has been received, stating that public considerations of a high character constrain you to say that my resignation as Secretary of War will be accepted.

In reply I have the honor to say that public considerations of a high character, which alone have induced me to continue at the head of this Department, constrain me not to resign the office of Secretary of War before the next meeting of Congress.

This reply of Mr. Stanton was not merely a disinclination of compliance with the request for his resignation; it was a defiance, and something more. Mr. Stanton does not content himself with assuming that public considerations bearing upon his continuance in office form as fully a rule of action for himself as for the President, and that upon so delicate a question as the fitness of an officer for continuance in his office the officer is as competent and as impartial to decide as his superior, who is responsible for his conduct. But he goes further, and plainly intimates what he means by "public considerations of a high character," and this is nothing else than his loss of confidence in his superior. He says that these public considerations have "alone induced me to continue at the head of this Department," and that they "constrain me not to resign the office of Secretary of War before the next meeting of Congress."

This language is very significant. Mr. Stanton holds the position unwillingly. He continues in office only under a sense of high public duty. He is ready to leave when it is safe to leave, and as the danger he apprehends from his removal then will not exist when Congress is here, he is constrained to remain during the interim. What, then, is that danger which can only be averted by the presence of Mr. Stanton or of Congress? Mr. Stanton does not say that "public considerations of a high character" constrain him to hold on to the office indefinitely. He does not say that no one other than himself can at any time be found to take his place and perform its duties. On the contrary, he expresses a desire to leave the office at the earliest moment consistent with these high public considerations. He says, in effect, that while Congress is away he must remain, but that when Congress is here he can go. In other words, he has lost confidence in the President. He is unwilling to leave the War Department in his hands or in the hands of anyone the President may appoint or designate to perform its duties. If he resigns, the President may appoint a Secretary of War that Mr. Stanton does not approve; therefore he will not resign. But when Congress is in session the President can not appoint a Secretary of War which the Senate does not approve; consequently when Congress meets Mr. Stanton is ready to resign.

Whatever cogency these "considerations" may have had on Mr. Stanton, whatever right he may have had to entertain such considerations, whatever propriety there might be in the expression of them to others, one thing is certain, it was official misconduct, to say the least of it, to parade them before his superior officer.

Upon the receipt of this extraordinary note I only delayed the order of suspension long enough to make the necessary arrangements to fill the office. If this were the only cause for his suspension, it would be ample. Necessarily it must end our most important official relations, for I can not imagine a degree of effrontery which would embolden the head of a Department to take his seat at the council table in the Executive Mansion after such an act; nor can I imagine a President so forgetful of the proper respect and dignity which belong to his office as to submit to such intrusion. I will not do Mr. Stanton the wrong to suppose that he entertained any idea of offering to act as one of my constitutional advisers after that note was written. There was an interval of a week between that date and the order of suspension, during which two Cabinet meetings were held. Mr. Stanton did not present himself at either, nor was he expected.

On the 12th of August Mr. Stanton was notified of his suspension and that General Grant had been authorized to take charge of the Department. In his answer to this notification, of the same date, Mr. Stanton expresses himself as follows:

Under a sense of public duty I am compelled to deny your right under the Constitution and laws of the United States, without the advice and consent of the Senate and without any legal cause, to suspend me from office as Secretary of War or the exercise of any or all functions pertaining to the same, or without such advice and consent to compel me to transfer to any person the records, books, papers, and public property in my custody as Secretary.

But inasmuch as the General Commanding the armies of the United States has been appointed ad interim, and has notified me that he has accepted the appointment, I have no alternative but to submit, under protest, to superior force.

It will not escape attention that in his note of August 5 Mr. Stanton stated that he had been constrained to continue in the office, even before he was requested to resign, by considerations of a high public character. In this note of August 12 a new and different sense of public duty compels him to deny the President's right to suspend him from office without the consent of the Senate. This last is the public duty of resisting an act contrary to law, and he charges the President with violation of the law in ordering his suspension.

Mr. Stanton refers generally to the Constitution and laws of the "United States," and says that a sense of public duty "under" these compels him to deny the right of the President to suspend him from office. As to his sense of duty under the Constitution, that will be considered in the sequel. As to his sense of duty under "the laws of the United States," he certainly can not refer to the law which creates the War Department, for that expressly confers upon the President the unlimited right to remove the head of the Department. The only other law bearing upon the question is the tenure-of-office act, passed by Congress over the Presidential veto March 2, 1867. This is the law which, under a sense of public duty, Mr. Stanton volunteers to defend.

There is no provision in this law which compels any officer coming within its provisions to remain in office. It forbids removals—not resignations. Mr. Stanton was perfectly free to resign at any moment, either upon his own motion or in compliance with a request or an order. It was a matter of choice or of taste. There was nothing compulsory in the nature of legal obligation. Nor does he put his action upon that imperative ground. He says he acts under a "sense of public duty," not of legal obligation, compelling him to hold on and leaving him no choice. The public duty which is upon him arises from the respect which he owes to the Constitution and the laws, violated in his own case. He is therefore compelled by this sense of public duty to vindicate violated law and to stand as its champion.

This was not the first occasion in which Mr. Stanton, in discharge of a public duty, was called upon to consider the provisions of that law. That tenure-of-office law did not pass without notice. Like other acts, it was sent to the President for approval. As is my custom, I submitted its consideration to my Cabinet for their advice upon the question whether I should approve it or not. It was a grave question of constitutional law, in which I would, of course, rely most upon the opinion of the Attorney-General and of Mr. Stanton, who had once been Attorney-General.

Every member of my Cabinet advised me that the proposed law was unconstitutional. All spoke without doubt or reservation, but Mr. Stanton's condemnation of the law was the most elaborate and emphatic. He referred to the constitutional provisions, the debates in Congress, especially to the speech of Mr. Buchanan when a Senator, to the decisions of the Supreme Court, and to the usage from the beginning of the Government through every successive Administration, all concurring to establish the right of removal as vested by the Constitution in the President. To all these he added the weight of his own deliberate judgment, and advised me that it was my duty to defend the power of the President from usurpation and to veto the law.

I do not know when a sense of public duty is more imperative upon a head of Department than upon such an occasion as this. He acts then under the gravest obligations of law, for when he is called upon by the President for advice it is the Constitution which speaks to him. All his other duties are left by the Constitution to be regulated by statute, but this duty was deemed so momentous that it is imposed by the Constitution itself.

After all this I was not prepared for the ground taken by Mr. Stanton in his note of August 12. I was not prepared to find him compelled by a new and indefinite sense of public duty, under "the Constitution," to assume the vindication of a law which, under the solemn obligations of public duty imposed by the Constitution itself, he advised me was a violation of that Constitution. I make great allowance for a change of opinion, but such a change as this hardly falls within the limits of greatest indulgence.

Where our opinions take the shape of advice, and influence the action of others, the utmost stretch of charity will scarcely justify us in repudiating them when they come to be applied to ourselves.

But to proceed with the narrative. I was so much struck with the full mastery of the question manifested by Mr. Stanton, and was at the time so fully occupied with the preparation of another veto upon the pending reconstruction act, that I requested him to prepare the veto upon this tenure-of-office bill. This he declined, on the ground of physical disability to undergo at the time the labor of writing, but stated his readiness to furnish what aid might be required in the preparation of materials for the paper.

At the time this subject was before the Cabinet it seemed to be taken for granted that as to those members of the Cabinet who had been appointed by Mr. Lincoln their tenure of office was not fixed by the provisions of the act. I do not remember that the point was distinctly decided, but I well recollect that it was suggested by one member of the Cabinet who was appointed by Mr. Lincoln, and that no dissent was expressed.

Whether the point was well taken or not did not seem to me of any consequence, for the unanimous expression of opinion against the constitutionality and policy of the act was so decided that I felt no concern, so far as the act had reference to the gentlemen then present, that I would be embarrassed in the future. The bill had not then become a law. The limitation upon the power of removal was not yet imposed, and there was yet time to make any changes. If any one of these gentlemen had then said to me that he would avail himself of the provisions of that bill in case it became a law, I should not have hesitated a moment as to his removal. No pledge was then expressly given or required. But there are circumstances when to give an expressed pledge is not necessary, and when to require it is an imputation of possible bad faith. I felt that if these gentlemen came within the purview of the bill it was as to them a dead letter, and that none of them would ever take refuge under its provisions.

I now pass to another subject. When, on the 15th of April, 1865, the duties of the Presidential office devolved upon me, I found a full Cabinet of seven members, all of them selected by Mr. Lincoln. I made no change. On the contrary, I shortly afterwards ratified a change determined upon by Mr. Lincoln, but not perfected at his death, and admitted his appointee, Mr. Harlan, in the place of Mr. Usher, who was in office at the time.

The great duty of the time was to reestablish government, law, and order in the insurrectionary States. Congress was then in recess, and the sudden overthrow of the rebellion required speedy action. This grave subject had engaged the attention of Mr. Lincoln in the last days of his life, and the plan according to which it was to be managed had been prepared and was ready for adoption. A leading feature of that plan was that it should be carried out by the Executive authority, for, so far as I have been informed, neither Mr. Lincoln nor any member of his Cabinet doubted his authority to act or proposed to call an extra session of Congress to do the work. The first business transacted in Cabinet after I became President was this unfinished business of my predecessor. A plan or scheme of reconstruction was produced which had been prepared for Mr. Lincoln by Mr. Stanton, his Secretary of War. It was approved, and at the earliest moment practicable was applied in the form of a proclamation to the State of North Carolina, and afterwards became the basis of action in turn for the other States.

Upon the examination of Mr. Stanton before the Impeachment Committee he was asked the following question:

Did any one of the Cabinet express a doubt of the power of the executive branch of the Government to reorganize State governments which had been in rebellion without the aid of Congress?

He answered:

None whatever. I had myself entertained no doubt of the authority of the President to take measures for the organization of the rebel States on the plan proposed during the vacation of Congress and agreed in the plan specified in the proclamation in the case of North Carolina.

There is perhaps no act of my Administration for which I have been more denounced than this. It was not originated by me, but I shrink from no responsibility on that account, for the plan approved itself to my own judgment, and I did not hesitate to carry it into execution.

Thus far and upon this vital policy there was perfect accord between the Cabinet and myself, and I saw no necessity for a change. As time passed on there was developed an unfortunate difference of opinion and of policy between Congress and the President upon this same subject and upon the ultimate basis upon which the reconstruction of these States should proceed, especially upon the question of negro suffrage. Upon this point three members of the Cabinet found themselves to be in sympathy with Congress. They remained only long enough to see that the difference of policy could not be reconciled. They felt that they should remain no longer, and a high sense of duty and propriety constrained them to resign their positions. We parted with mutual respect for the sincerity of each other in opposite opinions, and mutual regret that the difference was on points so vital as to require a severance of official relations. This was in the summer of 1866. The subsequent sessions of Congress developed new complications, when the suffrage bill for the District of Columbia and the reconstruction acts of March 2 and March 23, 1867, all passed over the veto. It was in Cabinet consultations upon these bills that a difference of opinion upon the most vital points was developed. Upon these questions there was perfect accord between all the members of the Cabinet and myself, except Mr. Stanton. He stood alone, and the difference of opinion could not be reconciled. That unity of opinion which, upon great questions of public policy or administration, is so essential to the Executive was gone.

I do not claim that a head of Department should have no other opinions than those of the President. He has the same right, in the conscientious discharge of duty, to entertain and express his own opinions as has the President. What I do claim is that the President is the responsible head of the Administration, and when the opinions of a head of Department are irreconcilably opposed to those of the President in grave matters of policy and administration there is but one result which can solve the difficulty, and that is a severance of the official relation. This in the past history of the Government has always been the rule, and it is a wise one, for such differences of opinion among its members must impair the efficiency of any Administration.

I have now referred to the general grounds upon which the withdrawal or Mr. Stanton from my Administration seemed to me to be proper and necessary, but I can not omit to state a special ground, which, if it stood alone, would vindicate my action.

The sanguinary riot which occurred in the city of New Orleans on the 30th of August, 1866, justly aroused public indignation and public inquiry, not only as to those who were engaged in it, but as to those who, more or less remotely, might be held to responsibility for its occurrence. I need not remind the Senate of the effort made to fix that responsibility on the President. The charge was openly made, and again and again reiterated all through the land, that the President was warned in time, but refused to interfere.

By telegrams from the lieutenant-governor and attorney-general of Louisiana, dated the 27th and 28th of August, I was advised that a body of delegates claiming to be a constitutional convention were about to assemble in New Orleans; that the matter was before the grand jury, but that it would be impossible to execute civil process without a riot; and this question was asked:

Is the military to interfere to prevent process of court?

This question was asked at a time when the civil courts were in the full exercise of their authority, and the answer sent by telegraph on the same 28th of August was this:

The military will be expected to sustain, and not to interfere with, the proceedings of the courts.

On the same 28th of August the following telegram was sent to Mr. Stanton by Major-General Baird, then (owing to the absence of General Sheridan) in command of the military at New Orleans:

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War:

A convention has been called, with the sanction of Governor Wells, to meet here on Monday. The lieutenant-governor and city authorities think it unlawful, and propose to break it up by arresting the delegates. I have given no orders on the subject, but have warned the parties that I could not countenance or permit such action without instructions to that effect from the President. Please instruct me at once by telegraph.

The 28th of August was on Saturday. The next morning, the 29th, this dispatch was received by Mr. Stanton at his residence in this city. He took no action upon it, and neither sent instructions to General Baird himself nor presented it to me for such instructions. On the next day (Monday) the riot occurred. I never saw this dispatch from General Baird until some ten days or two weeks after the riot, when, upon my call for all the dispatches, with a view to their publication, Mr. Stanton sent it to me.

These facts all appear in the testimony of Mr. Stanton before the Judiciary Committee in the impeachment investigation.

On the 30th, the day of the riot, and after it was suppressed, General Baird wrote to Mr. Stanton a long letter, from which I make the following extract:

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that a very serious riot has occurred here to-day. I had not been applied to by the convention for protection, but the lieutenant-governor and the mayor had freely consulted with me, and I was so fully convinced that it was so strongly the intent of the city authorities to preserve the peace, in order to prevent military interference, that I did not regard an outbreak as a thing to be apprehended. The lieutenant-governor had assured me that even if a writ of arrest was issued by the court the sheriff would not attempt to serve it without my permission, and for to-day they designed to suspend it. I inclose herewith copies of my correspondence with the mayor and of a dispatch which the lieutenant-governor claims to have received from the President. I regret that no reply to my dispatch to you of Saturday has yet reached me. General Sheridan is still absent in Texas.

The dispatch of General Baird of the 28th asks for immediate instructions, and his letter of the 30th, after detailing the terrible riot which had just happened, ends with the expression of regret that the instructions which he asked for were not sent. It is not the fault or the error or the omission of the President that this military commander was left without instructions; but for all omissions, for all errors, for all failures to instruct when instruction might have averted this calamity, the President was openly and persistently held responsible. Instantly, without waiting for proof, the delinquency of the President was heralded in every form of utterance. Mr. Stanton knew then that the President was not responsible for this delinquency. The exculpation was in his power, but it was not given by him to the public, and only to the President in obedience to a requisition for all the dispatches.

No one regrets more than myself that General Baird's request was not brought to my notice. It is clear from his dispatch and letter that if the Secretary of War had given him proper instructions the riot which arose on the assembling of the convention would have been averted.

There may be those ready to say that I would have given no instructions even if the dispatch had reached me in time, but all must admit that I ought to have had the opportunity.

The following is the testimony given by Mr. Stanton before the impeachment investigation committee as to this dispatch:

Q. Referring to the dispatch of the 28th of July by General Baird, I ask you whether that dispatch on its receipt was communicated?

A. I received that dispatch on Sunday forenoon. I examined it carefully, and considered the question presented. I did not see that I could give any instructions different from the line of action which General Baird proposed, and made no answer to the dispatch.

Q. I see it stated that this was received at 10.20 p.m. Was that the hour at which it was received by you?

A. That is the date of its reception in the telegraph office Saturday night. I received it on Sunday forenoon at my residence. A copy of the dispatch was furnished to the President several days afterwards, along with all the other dispatches and communications on that subject, but it was not furnished by me before that time. I suppose it may have been ten or fifteen days afterwards.

Q. The President himself being in correspondence with those parties upon the same subject, would it not have been proper to have advised him of the reception of that dispatch?

A. I know nothing about his correspondence, and know nothing about any correspondence except this one dispatch. We had intelligence of the riot on Thursday morning. The riot had taken place on Monday.

It is a difficult matter to define all the relations which exist between the heads of Departments and the President. The legal relations are well enough defined. The Constitution places these officers in the relation of his advisers when he calls upon them for advice. The acts of Congress go further. Take, for example, the act of 1789 creating the War Department. It provides that—

There shall be a principal officer therein to be called the Secretary for the Department of War, who shall perform and execute such duties as shall from time to time be enjoined on or intrusted to him by the President of the United States; and, furthermore, the said principal officer shall conduct the business of the said Department in such manner as the President of the United States shall from time to time order and instruct.

Provision is also made for the appointment of an inferior officer by the head of the Department, to be called the chief clerk, "who, whenever said principal officer shall be removed from office by the President of the United States," shall have the charge and custody of the books, records, and papers of the Department.

The legal relation is analogous to that of principal and agent. It is the President upon whom the Constitution devolves, as head of the executive department, the duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed; but as he can not execute them in person, he is allowed to select his agents, and is made responsible for their acts within just limits. So complete is this presumed delegation of authority in the relation of a head of Department to the President that the Supreme Court of the United States have decided that an order made by a head of Department is presumed to be made by the President himself.

The principal, upon whom such responsibility is placed for the acts of a subordinate, ought to be left as free as possible in the matter of selection and of dismissal. To hold him to responsibility for an officer beyond his control; to leave the question of the fitness of such an agent to be decided for him and not by him; to allow such a subordinate, when the President, moved by "public considerations of a high character," requests his resignation, to assume for himself an equal right to act upon his own views of "public considerations" and to make his own conclusions paramount to those of the President—to allow all this is to reverse the just order of administration and to place the subordinate above the superior.

There are, however, other relations between the President and a head of Department beyond these defined legal relations, which necessarily attend them, though not expressed. Chief among these is mutual confidence. This relation is so delicate that it is sometimes hard to say when or how it ceases. A single flagrant act may end it at once, and then there is no difficulty. But confidence may be just as effectually destroyed by a series of causes too subtle for demonstration. As it is a plant of slow growth, so, too, it may be slow in decay. Such has been the process here. I will not pretend to say what acts or omissions have broken up this relation. They are hardly susceptible of statement, and still less of formal proof. Nevertheless, no one can read the correspondence of the 5th of August without being convinced that this relation was effectually gone on both sides, and that while the President was unwilling to allow Mr. Stanton to remain in his Administration, Mr. Stanton was equally unwilling to allow the President to carry on his Administration without his presence.

In the great debate which took place in the House of Representatives in 1789, in the first organization of the principal Departments, Mr. Madison spoke as follows:

It is evidently the intention of the Constitution that the first magistrate should be responsible for the executive department. So far, therefore, as we do not make the officers who are to aid him in the duties of that department responsible to him, he is not responsible to the country. Again: Is there no danger that an officer, when he is appointed by the concurrence of the Senate and has friends in that body, may choose rather to risk his establishment on the favor of that branch than rest it upon the discharge of his duties to the satisfaction of the executive branch, which is constitutionally authorized to inspect and control his conduct? And if it should happen that the officers connect themselves with the Senate, they may mutually support each other, and for want of efficacy reduce the power of the President to a mere vapor, in which case his responsibility would be annihilated, and the expectation of it is unjust. The high executive officers, joined in cabal with the Senate, would lay the foundation of discord, and end in an assumption of the executive power only to be removed by a revolution in the Government.

Mr. Sedgwick, in the same debate, referring to the proposition that a head of Department should only be removed or suspended by the concurrence of the Senate, used this language:

But if proof be necessary, what is then the consequence? Why, in nine cases out of ten, where the case is very clear to the mind of the President that the man ought to be removed, the effect can not be produced, because it is absolutely impossible to produce the necessary evidence. Are the Senate to proceed without evidence? Some gentlemen contend not. Then the object will be lost. Shall a man under these circumstances be saddled upon the President who has been appointed for no other purpose but to aid the President in performing certain duties? Shall he be continued, I ask again, against the will of the President? If he is, where is the responsibility? Are you to look for it in the President, who has no control over the officer, no power to remove him if he acts unfeelingly or unfaithfully? Without you make him responsible you weaken and destroy the strength and beauty of your system. What is to be done in cases which can only be known from a long acquaintance with the conduct of an officer?

I had indulged the hope that upon the assembling of Congress Mr. Stanton would have ended this unpleasant complication according to his intimation given in his note of August 12. The duty which I have felt myself called upon to perform was by no means agreeable, but I feel that I am not responsible for the controversy or for the consequences.

Unpleasant as this necessary change in my Cabinet has been to me upon personal considerations, I have the consolation to be assured that so far as the public interests are involved there is no cause for regret.

Salutary reforms have been introduced by the Secretary ad interim, and great reductions of expenses have been effected under his administration of the War Department, to the saving of millions to the Treasury.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, December 14, 1867.

To the House of Representatives:

In compliance with the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 9th instant, I transmit herewith a copy of the papers relating to the trial by a military commission of Albert M.D.C. Lusk, of Louisiana. No action in the case has yet been taken by the President.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, December 17, 1867.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit for the information of the House of Representatives a report from the Secretary of State, with an accompanying paper.[32]

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, December 17, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

In answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 6th instant, concerning the International Monetary Conference held at Paris in June last, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State, which is accompanied by the papers called for by the resolution.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, December 17, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit, for the consideration of the Senate, an agreement between the diplomatic representatives of certain foreign powers in Japan, including the minister of the United States, on the one part, and plenipotentiaries on the part of the Japanese Government, relative to the settlement of Yokohama.

This instrument can not be legally binding upon the United States unless sanctioned by the Senate. There appears to be no objection to its approval.

A copy of General Van Valkenburgh's dispatch to the Secretary of State, by which the agreement was accompanied, and of the map to which it refers, are also herewith transmitted.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., December 18, 1867.

Gentlemen of the Senate and of the House of Representatives:

An official copy of the order issued by Major-General Winfield S. Hancock, commander of the Fifth Military District, dated headquarters in New Orleans, La., on the 29th day of November, has reached me through the regular channels of the War Department, and I herewith communicate it to Congress for such action as may seem to be proper in view of all the circumstances.

It will be perceived that General Hancock announces that he will make the law the rule of his conduct; that he will uphold the courts and other civil authorities in the performance of their proper duties, and that he will use his military power only to preserve the peace and enforce the law. He declares very explicitly that the sacred right of the trial by jury and the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be crushed out or trodden under foot. He goes further, and in one comprehensive sentence asserts that the principles of American liberty are still the inheritance of this people and ever should be.

When a great soldier, with unrestricted power in his hands to oppress his fellow-men, voluntarily foregoes the chance of gratifying his selfish ambition and devotes himself to the duty of building up the liberties and strengthening the laws of his country, he presents an example of the highest public virtue that human nature is capable of practicing. The strongest claim of Washington to be "first in war, first in peace, and first in the hearts of his countrymen" is founded on the great fact that in all his illustrious career he scrupulously abstained from violating the legal and constitutional rights of his fellow-citizens. When he surrendered his commission to Congress, the President of that body spoke his highest praise in saying that he had "always regarded the rights of the civil authorities through all dangers and disasters." Whenever power above the law courted his acceptance, he calmly put the temptation aside. By such magnanimous acts of forbearance he won the universal admiration of mankind and left a name which has no rival in the history of the world.

I am far from saying that General Hancock is the only officer of the American Army who is influenced by the example of Washington. Doubtless thousands of them are faithfully devoted to the principles for which the men of the Revolution laid down their lives. But the distinguished honor belongs to him of being the first officer in high command south of the Potomac, since the close of the civil war, who has given utterance to these noble sentiments in the form of a military order.

I respectfully suggest to Congress that some public recognition of General Hancock's patriotic conduct is due, if not to him, to the friends of law and justice throughout the country. Of such an act as his at such a time it is but fit that the dignity should be vindicated and the virtue proclaimed, so that its value as an example may not be lost to the nation.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, December 19, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, in answer to a resolution of that body of the 16th instant, a report[33] from the Secretary of State, with accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1867.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I herewith transmit to Congress a report, dated the 20th instant, with the accompanying papers, received from the Secretary of State in compliance with the requirements of the eighteenth section of the act entitled "An act to regulate the diplomatic and consular systems of the United States," approved August 18, 1856.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, December 31, 1867.

To the House of Representatives:

In answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 18th instant, requesting information concerning alleged interference by Russian naval vessels with whaling vessels of the United States, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State and the papers referred to therein.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, January 6, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith transmit to the Senate a report from the Secretary of the Treasury, containing the information requested in their resolution of the 16th ultimo, relative to the amount of United States bonds issued to the Union Pacific Railroad Company and each of its branches, including the Central Pacific Railroad Company of California.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, January 7, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit a report from the Secretary of State, in answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of yesterday, making inquiry how many and what State legislatures have ratified the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States known as the fourteenth article.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, January 7, 1868.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

A Spanish steamer named Nuestra Señora being in the harbor of Port Royal, S.C., on the 1st of December, 1861, Brigadier General T.W. Sherman, who was in command of the United States forces there, received information which he supposed justified him in seizing her, as she was on her way from Charleston to Havana with insurgent correspondence on board. The seizure was made accordingly, and during the ensuing spring the vessel was sent to New York, in order that the legality of the seizure might be tried.

By a decree of June 20, 1863, Judge Betts ordered the vessel to be restored, and by a subsequent decree, of October 15, 1863, he referred the adjustment of damages to amicable negotiations between the two Governments.

While the proceeding in admiralty was pending, the vessel was appraised and taken by the Navy Department at the valuation of $28,000, which sum that Department paid into the Treasury.

As the amount of this valuation can not legally be drawn from the Treasury without authority from Congress, I recommend an appropriation for that purpose.

It is proposed to appoint a commissioner on the part of this Government to adjust, informally in this case, with a similar commissioner on the part of Spain, the question of damages, the commissioners to name an arbiter for points upon which they may disagree. When the amount of the damages shall thus have been ascertained, application will be made to Congress for a further appropriation toward paying them.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., January 14, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith a communication from the Secretary of War ad interim, with the accompanying papers, prepared in compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives of March 15, 1867, requesting information in reference to contracts for ordnance projectiles and small arms.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., January 14, 1868.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith the report made by the commissioners appointed under the act of Congress approved on the 20th day of July, 1867, entitled "An act to establish peace with certain hostile Indian tribes," together with the accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, January 14, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

In answer to the resolution of the Senate of yesterday, calling for information relating to the appointment of the American minister at Pekin to a diplomatic or other mission on behalf of the Chinese Government by the Emperor of China, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State upon the subject, together with the accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON CITY, January 14, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith lay before the Senate, for its constitutional action thereon, the following treaties, concluded at "Medicine Lodge Creek," Kansas, between the Indian tribes therein named and the United States, by their commissioners appointed by the act of Congress approved July 20, 1867, entitled "An act to establish peace with certain hostile Indian tribes," viz:

A treaty with the Kiowa and Comanche tribes, concluded October 21, 1867.

A treaty with the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache tribes, concluded October 28, 1867.

A treaty with the Arapahoe and Cheyenne tribes, dated October 28, 1867.

A letter of this date from the Secretary of the Interior, transmitting said treaties, is herewith inclosed.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, January 17, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

With reference to the convention between the United States and Denmark for the cession of the islands of St. Thomas and St. John, in the West Indies, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State on the subject of the vote of St. Thomas on the question of accepting the cession.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., January 23, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

In compliance with the request of the Senate of yesterday, I return herewith their resolution of the 21st instant, calling for information in reference to James A. Seddon, late Secretary of War of the so-called Confederate States.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, January 23, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I have received the following preamble and resolution, adopted by the Senate on the 8th instant:

Whereas Senate bill No. 141, and entitled "An act for the further security of equal rights in the District of Columbia," having at this present session passed both Houses of Congress, was afterwards, on the 11th day of December, 1867, duly presented to the President of the United States for his approval and signature; and

Whereas more than ten days, exclusive of Sundays, have since elapsed in this session without said bill having been returned, either approved or disapproved: Therefore,

Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to inform the Senate whether said bill has been delivered to and received by the Secretary of State, as provided by the second section of the act of the 27th day of July, 1789.

As the act which the resolution mentions has no relevancy to the subject under inquiry, it is presumed that it was the intention of the Senate to refer to the law of the 15th September, 1789, the second section of which prescribes—

That whenever a bill, order, resolution, or vote of the Senate and House of Representatives, having been approved and signed by the President of the United States, or not having been returned by him with his objections, shall become a law or take effect, it shall forthwith thereafter be received by the said Secretary from the President; and whenever a bill, order, resolution, or vote shall be returned by the President with his objections, and shall, on being reconsidered, be agreed to be passed, and be approved by two-thirds of both Houses of Congress, and thereby become a law or take effect, it shall in such case be received by the said Secretary from the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, in whichsoever House it shall last have been so approved.

Inasmuch as the bill "for the further security of equal rights in the District of Columbia" has not become a law in either of the modes designated in the section above quoted, it has not been delivered to the Secretary of State for record and promulgation. The Constitution expressly declares that—

If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law.

As stated in the preamble to the resolution, the bill to which it refers was presented for my approval on the 11th day of December, 1867. On the 20th of same month, and before the expiration of the ten days after the presentation of the bill to the President, the two Houses, in accordance with a concurrent resolution adopted on the 3d [13th] of December, adjourned until the 6th of January, 1868. Congress by their adjournment thus prevented the return of the bill within the time prescribed by the Constitution, and it was therefore left in the precise condition in which that instrument positively declares a bill "shall not be a law."

If the adjournment in December did not cause the failure of this bill, because not such an adjournment as is contemplated by the Constitution in the clause which I have cited, it must follow that such was the nature of the adjournments during the past year, on the 30th day of March until the first Wednesday of July and from the 20th of July until the 21st of November. Other bills will therefore be affected by the decision which may be rendered in this case, among them one having the same title as that named in the resolution, and containing similar provisions, which, passed by both Houses in the month of July last, failed to become a law by reason of the adjournment of Congress before ten days for its consideration had been allowed the Executive.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, January 27, 1868.

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

In answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 22d instant, calling for a copy of the report of Abram S. Hewitt, commissioner of the United States to the Paris Universal Exhibition of 1867, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State and the papers which accompany it.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, January 27, 1868.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit a report from the Secretary of State and the documents to which it refers, in relation to the formal transfer of territory from Russia to the United States in accordance with the treaty of the 30th of March last.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, January 28, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit, for the consideration of the Senate with a view to its ratification, an additional article to the treaty of navigation and commerce with Russia of the 18th of December, 1832, which additional article was concluded and signed between the plenipotentiaries of the two Governments at Washington on the 27th instant.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, February 3, 1868.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit to Congress a report from the Secretary of State, suggesting the necessity for a further appropriation toward defraying the expense of employing copying clerks, with a view to enable his Department seasonably to answer certain calls for information.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, February 3, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

In answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 27th ultimo, directing the Secretary of State to furnish information in regard to the trial of John H. Surratt, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, February 3, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith a report[34] from the Secretary of State, in answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 28th of January.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, February 10, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith a communication from the Secretary of the Navy, relative to depredations upon and the future care of the reservations of lands for the "purpose of supplying timber for the Navy of the United States."

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., February 10, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

In reply to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 1st instant, I transmit herewith a report from the Postmaster-General, in reference to the appointment of a special agent to take charge of the post-office at Penn Yan, in the State of New York.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, February 10, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit a report from the Secretary of State, with the accompanying papers, on the subject of a transfer of the Peninsula and Bay of Samana to the United States. The advice and consent of the Senate to the transfer, upon the terms proposed in the draft of a convention with the Dominican Republic, are requested.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, February 10, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I submit to the Senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, the accompanying consular convention between the United States and the Government of His Majesty the King of Italy.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., February 10, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith a report from the Attorney-General, prepared in compliance with the resolution of the Senate of the 30th ultimo, requesting information as to the number of justices of the peace now in commission in each ward, respectively, of the city of Washington.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, February 10, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

In answer to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 25th of November, 1867, calling for information in relation to the trial and conviction of American citizens in Great Britain and Ireland for the two years last past, I transmit a partial report from the Secretary of State, which is accompanied by a portion of the papers called for by the resolution.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., February 11, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

In compliance with the resolution adopted yesterday by the House of Representatives, requesting any further correspondence the President "may have had with General U.S. Grant, in addition to that heretofore submitted, on the subject of the recent vacation by the latter of the War Office," I transmit herewith a copy of a communication addressed to General Grant on the 10th instant, together with a copy of the accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, February 10, 1868.

General U.S. GRANT,
Commanding Armies of the United States, Washington, D.C.

GENERAL: The extraordinary character of your letter of the 3d instant[35] would seem to preclude any reply on my part; but the manner in which publicity has been given to the correspondence of which that letter forms a part and the grave questions which are involved induce me to take this mode of giving, as a proper sequel to the communications which have passed between us, the statements of the five members of the Cabinet who were present on the occasion of our conversation on the 14th ultimo. Copies of the letters which they have addressed to me upon the subject are accordingly herewith inclosed.

You speak of my letter of the 31st ultimo[36] as a reiteration of the "many and gross misrepresentations" contained in certain newspaper articles, and reassert the correctness of the statements contained in your communication of the 28th ultimo,[37] adding—and here I give your own words—"anything in yours in reply to it to the contrary notwithstanding."

When a controversy upon matters of fact reaches the point to which this has been brought, further assertion or denial between the immediate parties should cease, especially where upon either side it loses the character of the respectful discussion which is required by the relations in which the parties stand to each other and degenerates in tone and temper. In such a case, if there is nothing to rely upon but the opposing statements, conclusions must be drawn from those statements alone and from whatever intrinsic probabilities they afford in favor of or against either of the parties. I should not shrink from this test in this controversy; but, fortunately, it is not left to this test alone. There were five Cabinet officers present at the conversation the detail of which in my letter of the 28th [31st[37] ultimo you allow yourself to say contains "many and gross misrepresentations." These gentlemen heard that conversation and have read my statement. They speak for themselves, and I leave the proof without a word of comment.

I deem it proper before concluding this communication to notice some of the statements contained in your letter.

You say that a performance of the promises alleged to have been made by you to the President "would have involved a resistance to law and an inconsistency with the whole history of my connection with the suspension of Mr. Stanton." You then state that you had fears the President would, on the removal of Mr. Stanton, appoint someone in his place who would embarrass the Army in carrying out the reconstruction acts, and add:

"It was to prevent such an appointment that I accepted the office of Secretary of War ad interim, and not for the purpose of enabling you to get rid of Mr. Stanton by withholding it from him in opposition to law, or, not doing so myself, surrendering it to one who would, as the statements and assumptions in your communication plainly indicate was sought."

First of all, you here admit that from the very beginning of what you term "the whole history" of your connection with Mr. Stanton's suspension you intended to circumvent the President. It was to carry out that intent that you accepted the appointment. This was in your mind at the time of your acceptance. It was not, then, in obedience to the order of your superior, as has heretofore been supposed, that you assumed the duties of the office. You knew it was the President's purpose to prevent Mr. Stanton from resuming the office of Secretary of War, and you intended to defeat that purpose. You accepted the office, not in the interest of the President but of Mr. Stanton. If this purpose, so entertained by you, had been confined to yourself; if when accepting the office you had done so with a mental reservation to frustrate the President, it would have been a tacit deception. In the ethics of some persons such a course is allowable. But you can not stand even upon that questionable ground. The "history" of your connection with this transaction, as written by yourself, places you in a different predicament, and shows that you not only concealed your design from the President, but induced him to suppose that you would carry out his purpose to keep Mr. Stanton out of office by retaining it yourself after an attempted restoration by the Senate, so as to require Mr. Stanton to establish his right by judicial decision.

I now give that part of this "history" as written by yourself in your letter of the 28th ultimo:[38]

"Some time after I assumed the duties of Secretary of War ad interim the President asked me my views as to the course Mr. Stanton would have to pursue, in case the Senate should not concur in his suspension, to obtain possession of his office. My reply was, in substance, that Mr. Stanton would have to appeal to the courts to reinstate him, illustrating my position by citing the ground I had taken in the case of the Baltimore police commissioners."

Now, at that time, as you admit in your letter of the 3d instant,[39] you held the office for the very object of defeating an appeal to the courts. In that letter you say that in accepting the office one motive was to prevent the President from appointing some other person who would retain possession, and thus make judicial proceedings necessary. You knew the President was unwilling to trust the office with anyone who would not by holding it compel Mr. Stanton to resort to the courts. You perfectly understood that in this interview, "some time" after you accepted the office, the President, not content with your silence, desired an expression of your views, and you answered him that Mr. Stanton "would have to appeal to the courts." If the President reposed confidence before he knew your views, and that confidence had been violated, it might have been said he made a mistake; but a violation of confidence reposed after that conversation was no mistake of his nor of yours. It is the fact only that needs be stated, that at the date of this conversation you did not intend to hold the office with the purpose of forcing Mr. Stanton into court, but did hold it then and had accepted it to prevent that course from being carried out. In other words, you said to the President, "That is the proper course," and you said to yourself, "I have accepted this office, and now hold it to defeat that course." The excuse you make in a subsequent paragraph of that letter of the 28th ultimo,[38] that afterwards you changed your views as to what would be a proper course, has nothing to do with the point now under consideration. The point is that before you changed your views you had secretly determined to do the very thing which at last you did—surrender the office to Mr. Stanton. You may have changed your views as to the law, but you certainly did not change your views as to the course you had marked out for yourself from the beginning.

I will only notice one more statement in your letter of the 3d instant[39]—that the performance of the promises which it is alleged were made by you would have involved you in the resistance of law. I know of no statute that would have been violated had you, carrying out your promises in good faith, tendered your resignation when you concluded not to be made a party in any legal proceedings. You add:

"I am in a measure confirmed in this conclusion by your recent orders directing me to disobey orders from the Secretary of War, my superior and your subordinate, without having countermanded his authority to issue the orders I am to disobey."

On the 24th[39] ultimo you addressed a note to the President requesting in writing an order given to you verbally five days before to disregard orders from Mr. Stanton as Secretary of War until you "knew from the President himself that they were his orders."

On the 29th,[40] in compliance with your request, I did give you instructions in writing "not to obey any order from the War Department assumed to be issued by the direction of the President unless such order is known by the General Commanding the armies of the United States to have been authorized by the Executive."

There are some orders which a Secretary of War may issue without the authority of the President; there are others which he issues simply as the agent of the President, and which purport to be "by direction" of the President. For such orders the President is responsible, and he should therefore know and understand what they are before giving such "direction." Mr. Stanton states in his letter of the 4th instant,[41] which accompanies the published correspondence, that he "has had no correspondence with the President since the 12th of August last;" and he further says that since he resumed the duties of the office he has continued to discharge them "without any personal or written communication with the President;" and he adds, "No orders have been issued from this Department in the name of the President with my knowledge, and I have received no orders from him."

It thus seems that Mr. Stanton now discharges the duties of the War Department without any reference to the President and without using his name.

My order to you had only reference to orders "assumed to be issued by the direction of the President." It would appear from Mr. Stanton's letter that you have received no such orders from him. However, in your note to the President of the 30th ultimo,[42] in which you acknowledge the receipt of the written order of the 29th,[43] you say that you have been informed by Mr. Stanton that he has not received any order limiting his authority to issue orders to the Army, according to the practice of the Department, and state that "while this authority to the War Department is not countermanded it will be satisfactory evidence to me that any orders issued from the War Department by direction of the President are authorized by the Executive."

The President issues an order to you to obey no order from the War Department purporting to be made "by the direction of the President" until you have referred it to him for his approval. You reply that you have received the President's order and will not obey it, but will obey an order purporting to be given by his direction if it comes from the War Department. You will not obey the direct order of the President, but will obey his indirect order. If, as you say, there has been a practice in the War Department to issue orders in the name of the President without his direction, does not the precise order you have requested and have received change the practice as to the General of the Army? Could not the President countermand any such order issued to you from the War Department? If you should receive an order from that Department, issued in the name of the President, to do a special act, and an order directly from the President himself not to do the act, is there a doubt which you are to obey? You answer the question when you say to the President, in your letter of the 3d instant,[44] the Secretary of War is "my superior and your subordinate," and yet you refuse obedience to the superior out of a deference to the subordinate.

Without further comment upon the insubordinate attitude which you have assumed, I am at a loss to know how you can relieve yourself from obedience to the orders of the President, who is made by the Constitution the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and is therefore the official superior as well of the General of the Army as of the Secretary of War.

Respectfully, yours,

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Letter addressed to each of the members of the Cabinet present at the conversation between the President and General Grant on the 14th of January, 1868, and answers thereto.]

EXECUTIVE MANSION, Washington, D.C., February 5, 1868.

SIR: The Chronicle of this morning contains a correspondence between the President and General Grant reported from the War Department in answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives.

I beg to call your attention to that correspondence, and especially to that part of it which refers to the conversation between the President and General Grant at the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the 14th of January, and to request you to state what was said in that conversation.

Very respectfully, yours,

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., February 5, 1868.

The PRESIDENT.

SIR: Your note of this date was handed to me this evening. My recollection of the conversation at the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the 14th of January, corresponds with your statement of it in the letter of the 31st ultimo[45] in the published correspondence.

The three points specified in that letter, giving your recollection of the conversation, are correctly stated.

Very respectfully,

GIDEON WELLES.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, February 6, 1868.

The PRESIDENT.

SIR: I have received your note of the 5th instant, calling my attention to the correspondence between yourself and General Grant as published in the Chronicle of yesterday, especially to that part of it which relates to what occurred at the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the 14th ultimo, and requesting me to state what was said in the conversation referred to.

I can not undertake to state the precise language used, but I have no hesitation in saying that your account of that conversation as given in your letter to General Grant under date of the 31st ultimo[45] substantially and in all important particulars accords with my recollection of it.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

HUGH McCULLOCH.

POST-OFFICE DEPARTMENT,
Washington, February 6, 1868.

The PRESIDENT.

SIR: I am in receipt of your letter of the 5th of February, calling my attention to the correspondence published in the Chronicle between the President and General Grant, and especially to that part of it which refers to the conversation between the President and General Grant at the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the 14th of January, with a request that I state what was said in that conversation.

In reply I have the honor to state that I have read carefully the correspondence in question, and particularly the letter of the President to General Grant dated January 31, 1868.[45] The following extract from your letter of the 31st January to General Grant is, according to my recollection, a correct statement of the conversation that took place between the President and General Grant at the Cabinet meeting on the 14th of January last. In the presence of the Cabinet the President asked General Grant whether, "in conversation which took place after his appointment as Secretary of War ad interim, he did not agree either to remain at the head of the War Department and abide any judicial proceedings that might follow the nonconcurrence by the Senate in Mr. Stanton's suspension, or, should he wish not to become involved in such a controversy, to put the President in the same position with respect to the office as he occupied previous to General Grant's appointment, by returning it to the President in time to anticipate such action by the Senate." This General Grant admitted.

The President then asked General Grant if at the conference on the preceding Saturday he had not, to avoid misunderstanding, requested General Grant to state what he intended to do, and, further, if in reply to that inquiry he (General Grant) had not referred to their former conversations, saying that from them the President understood his position, and that his (General Grant's) action would be consistent with the understanding which had been reached.

To these questions General Grant replied in the affirmative.

The President asked General Grant if at the conclusion of their interview on Saturday it was not understood that they were to have another conference on Monday before final action by the Senate in the case of Mr. Stanton.

General Grant replied that such was the understanding, but that he did not suppose the Senate would act so soon; that on Monday he had been engaged in a conference with General Sherman, and was occupied with "many little matters," and asked if General Sherman had not called on that day.

I take this mode of complying with the request contained in the President's letter to me, because my attention had been called to the subject before, when the conversation between the President and General Grant was under consideration.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ALEX W. RANDALL,
Postmaster-General.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Washington, D.C., February 6, 1868.

The PRESIDENT.

SIR: I am in receipt of yours of yesterday, calling my attention to a correspondance between yourself and General Grant published in the Chronicle newspaper, and especially to that part of said correspondence "which refers to the conversation between the President and General Grant at the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the 14th of January," and requesting me "to state what was said in that conversation."

In reply I submit the following statement: At the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the 14th of January, 1868, General Grant appeared and took his accustomed seat at the board. When he had been reached in the order of business, the President asked him, as usual, if he had anything to present.

In reply the General, after referring to a note which he had that morning addressed to the President, inclosing a copy of the resolution of the Senate refusing to concur in the reasons for the suspension of Mr. Stanton, proceeded to say that he regarded his duties as Secretary of War ad interim terminated by that resolution, and that he could not lawfully exercise such duties for a moment after the adoption of the resolution by the Senate; that the resolution reached him last night, and that this morning he had gone to the War Department, entered the Secretary's room, bolted one door on the inside, locked the other on the outside, delivered the key to the Adjutant-General, and proceeded to the Headquarters of the Army and addressed the note above mentioned to the President, informing him that he (General Grant) was no longer Secretary of War ad interim.

The President expressed great surprise at the course which General Grant had thought proper to pursue, and, addressing himself to the General, proceeded to say, in substance, that he had anticipated such action on the part of the Senate, and, being very desirous to have the constitutionality of the tenure-of-office bill tested and his right to suspend or remove a member of the Cabinet decided by the judicial tribunals of the country, he had some time ago, and shortly after General Grant's appointment as Secretary of War ad interim, asked the General what his action would be in the event that the Senate should refuse to concur in the suspension of Mr. Stanton, and that the General had then agreed either to remain at the head of the War Department till a decision could be obtained from the court or resign the office into the hands of the President before the case was acted upon by the Senate, so as to place the President in the same situation he occupied at the time of his (Grant's) appointment.

The President further said that the conversation was renewed on the preceding Saturday, at which time he asked the General what he intended to do if the Senate should undertake to reinstate Mr. Stanton, in reply to which the General referred to their former conversation upon the same subject and said: "You understand my position, and my conduct will be conformable to that understanding;" that he (the General) then expressed a repugnance to being made a party to a judicial proceeding, saying that he would expose himself to fine and imprisonment by doing so, as his continuing to discharge the duties of Secretary of War ad interim after the Senate should have refused to concur in the suspension of Mr. Stanton would be a violation of the tenure-of-office bill; that in reply to this he (the President) informed General Grant he had not suspended Mr. Stanton under the tenure-of-office bill, but by virtue of the powers conferred on him by the Constitution; and that, as to the fine and imprisonment, he (the President) would pay whatever fine was imposed and submit to whatever imprisonment might be adjudged against him (the General); that they continued the conversation for some time, discussing the law at length, and that they finally separated without having reached a definite conclusion, and with the understanding that the General would see the President again on Monday.

In reply General Grant admitted that the conversations had occurred, and said that at the first conversation he had given it as his opinion to the President that in the event of nonconcurrence by the Senate in the action of the President in respect to the Secretary of War the question would have to be decided by the court—that Mr. Stanton would have to appeal to the court to reinstate him in office; that the ins would remain in till they could be displaced and the outs put in by legal proceedings; and that he then thought so, and had agreed that if he should change his mind he would notify the President in time to enable him to make another appointment, but that at the time of the first conversation he had not looked very closely into the law; that it had recently been discussed by the newspapers, and that this had induced him to examine it more carefully, and that he had come to the conclusion that if the Senate should refuse to concur in the suspension Mr. Stanton would thereby be reinstated, and that he (Grant) could not continue thereafter to act as Secretary of War ad interim without subjecting himself to fine and imprisonment, and that he came over on Saturday to inform the President of this change in his views, and did so inform him; that the President replied that he had not suspended Mr. Stanton under the tenure-of-office bill, but under the Constitution, and had appointed him (Grant) by virtue of the authority derived from the Constitution, etc.; that they continued to discuss the matter some time, and finally he left, without any conclusion having been reached, expecting to see the President again on Monday.

He then proceeded to explain why he had not called on the President on Monday, saying that he had had a long interview with General Sherman, that various little matters had occupied his time till it was late, and that he did not think the Senate would act so soon, and asked: "Did not General Sherman call on you on Monday?"

I do not know what passed between the President and General Grant on Saturday, except as I learned it from the conversation between them at the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, and the foregoing is substantially what then occurred. The precise words used on the occasion are not, of course, given exactly in the order in which they were spoken, but the ideas expressed and the facts stated are faithfully preserved and presented.

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

O.H. BROWNING.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 6, 1868.

The PRESIDENT.

SIR: The meeting to which you refer in your letter was a regular Cabinet meeting. While the members were assembling, and before the President had entered the council chamber, General Grant on coming in said to me that he was in attendance there, not as a member of the Cabinet, but upon invitation, and I replied by the inquiry whether there was a change in the War Department. After the President had taken his seat, business went on in the usual way of hearing matters submitted by the several Secretaries. When the time came for the Secretary of War, General Grant said that he was now there, not as Secretary of War, but upon the President's invitation; that he had retired from the War Department. A slight difference then appeared about the supposed invitation, General Grant saying that the officer who had borne his letter to the President that morning announcing his retirement from the War Department had told him that the President desired to see him at the Cabinet, to which the President answered that when General Grant's communication was delivered to him the President simply replied that he supposed General Grant would be very soon at the Cabinet meeting. I regarded the conversation thus begun as an incidental one. It went on quite informally, and consisted of a statement on your part of your views in regard to the understanding of the tenure upon which General Grant had assented to hold the War Department ad interim and of his replies by way of answer and explanation. It was respectful and courteous on both sides. Being in this conversational form, its details could only have been preserved by verbatim report. So far as I know, no such report was made at the time. I can give only the general effect of the conversation. Certainly you stated that, although you had reported the reasons for Mr. Stanton's suspension to the Senate, you nevertheless held that he would not be entitled to resume the office of Secretary of War even if the Senate should disapprove of his suspension, and that you had proposed to have the question tested by judicial process, to be applied to the person who should be the incumbent of the Department under your designation of Secretary of War ad interim in the place of Mr. Stanton. You contended that this was well understood between yourself and General Grant; that when he entered the War Department as Secretary ad interim he expressed his concurrence in a belief that the question of Mr. Stanton's restoration would be a question for the courts; that in a subsequent conversation with General Grant you had adverted to the understanding thus had, and that General Grant expressed his concurrence in it; that at some conversation which had been previously held General Grant said he still adhered to the same construction of the law, but said if he should change his opinion he would give you seasonable notice of it, so that you should in any case be placed in the same position in regard to the War Department that you were while General Grant held it ad interim. I did not understand General Grant as denying nor as explicitly admitting these statements in the form and full extent to which you made them. His admission of them was rather indirect and circumstantial, though I did not understand it to be an evasive one. He said that, reasoning from what occurred in the case of the police in Maryland, which he regarded as a parallel one, he was of opinion, and so assured you, that it would be his right and duty under your instructions to hold the War Office after the Senate should disapprove of Mr. Stanton's suspension until the question should be decided upon by the courts; that he remained until very recently of that opinion, and that on the Saturday before the Cabinet meeting a conversation was held between yourself and him in which the subject was generally discussed.

General Grant's statement was that in that conversation he had stated to you the legal difficulties which might arise, involving fine and imprisonment, under the civil-tenure bill, and that he did not care to subject himself to those penalties; that you replied to this remark that you regarded the civil-tenure bill as unconstitutional and did not think its penalties were to be feared, or that you would voluntarily assume them; and you insisted that General Grant should either retain the office until relieved by yourself, according to what you claimed was the original understanding between yourself and him, or, by seasonable notice of change of purpose on his part, put you in the same situation which you would be if he adhered. You claimed that General Grant finally said in that Saturday's conversation that you understood his views, and his proceedings thereafter would be consistent with what had been so understood. General Grant did not controvert, nor can I say that he admitted, this last statement. Certainly General Grant did not at any time in the Cabinet meeting insist that he had in the Saturday's conversation, either distinctly or finally, advised you of his determination to retire from the charge of the War Department otherwise than under your own subsequent direction. He acquiesced in your statement that the Saturday's conversation ended with an expectation that there would be a subsequent conference on the subject, which he, as well as yourself, supposed could seasonably take place on Monday. You then alluded to the fact that General Grant did not call upon you on Monday, as you had expected from that conversation. General Grant admitted that it was his expectation or purpose to call upon you on Monday. General Grant assigned reasons for the omission. He said he was in conference with General Sherman; that there were many little matters to be attended to; he had conversed upon the matter of the incumbency of the War Department with General Sherman, and he expected that General Sherman would call upon you on Monday. My own mind suggested a further explanation, but I do not remember whether it was mentioned or not, namely, that it was not supposed by General Grant on Monday that the Senate would decide the question so promptly as to anticipate further explanation between yourself and him if delayed beyond that day. General Grant made another explanation—that he was engaged on Sunday with General Sherman, and I think, also, on Monday, in regard to the War Department matter, with a hope, though he did not say in an effort, to procure an amicable settlement of the affair of Mr. Stanton, and he still hoped that it would be brought about.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

WASHINGTON, D.C., February 11, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

The accompanying letter from General Grant, received since the transmission to the House of Representatives of my communication of this date, is submitted to the House as a part of the correspondence referred to in the resolution of the 10th instant.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.
Washington, D.C., February 11, 1868.

His Excellency A. JOHNSON,
President of the United States.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 10th instant,[46] accompanied by statements of five Cabinet ministers of their recollection of what occurred in Cabinet meeting on the 14th of January. Without admitting anything in these statements where they differ from anything heretofore stated by me, I propose to notice only that portion of your communication wherein I am charged with insubordination. I think it will be plain to the reader of my letter of the 30th of January[47] that I did not propose to disobey any legal order of the President distinctly given, but only gave an interpretation of what would be regarded as satisfactory evidence of the President's sanction to orders communicated by the Secretary of War. I will say here that your letter of the 10th instant[48] contains the first intimation I have had that you did not accept that interpretation.

Now for reasons for giving that interpretation. It was clear to me before my letter of January 30[47] was written that I, the person having more public business to transact with the Secretary of War than any other of the President's subordinates, was the only one who had been instructed to disregard the authority of Mr. Stanton where his authority was derived as agent of the President.

On the 27th of January I received a letter from the Secretary of War (copy herewith) directing me to furnish escort to public treasure from the Rio Grande to New Orleans, etc., at the request of the Secretary of the Treasury to him. I also send two other inclosures, showing recognition of Mr. Stanton as Secretary of War by both the Secretary of the Treasury and the Postmaster-General, in all of which cases the Secretary of War had to call upon me to make the orders requested or give the information desired, and where his authority to do so is derived, in my view, as agent of the President.

With an order so clearly ambiguous as that of the President here referred to, it was my duty to inform the President of my interpretation of it and to abide by that interpretation until I received other orders.

Disclaiming any intention, now or heretofore, of disobeying any legal order of the President distinctly communicated,

I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U.S. GRANT, General.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, January 27, 1868.

General U.S. GRANT,
Commanding Army United States.

GENERAL: The Secretary of the Treasury has requested this Department to afford A.F. Randall, special agent of the Treasury Department, such military aid as may be necessary to secure and forward for deposit from Brownsville, Tex., to New Orleans public moneys in possession of custom-house officers at Brownsville, and which are deemed insecure at that place.

You will please give such directions as you may deem proper to the officer commanding at Brownsville to carry into effect the request of the Treasury Department, the instructions to be sent by telegraph to Galveston, to the care of A.F. Randall, special agent, who is at Galveston waiting telegraphic orders, there being no telegraphic communication with Brownsville, and the necessity for military protection to the public moneys represented as urgent.

Please favor me with a copy of such instructions as you may give, in order that they may be communicated to the Secretary of the Treasury.

Yours, truly,

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

POST-OFFICE DEPARTMENT, CONTRACT OFFICE,
Washington, February 3, 1868.

The Honorable the SECRETARY OF WAR.

SIR: It has been represented to this Department that in October last a military commission was appointed to settle upon some general plan of defense for the Texas frontiers, and that the said commission has made a report recommending a line of posts from the Rio Grande to the Red River.

An application is now pending in this Department for a change in the course of the San Antonio and El Paso mail, so as to send it by way of Forts Mason, Griffin, and Stockton instead of Camps Hudson and Lancaster. This application requires immediate decision, but before final action can be had thereon it is desired to have some official information as to the report of the commission above referred to.

Accordingly, I have the honor to request that you will cause this Department to be furnished as early as possible with the information desired in the premises, and also with a copy of the report, if any has been made by the commission.

Very respectfully, etc.,

GEO. W. McCLELLAN,
Second Assistant Postmaster-General.

FEBRUARY 3, 1868.

Referred to the General of the Army for report.

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, January 29, 1868.

The Honorable SECRETARY OF WAR.

SIR: It is represented to this Department that a band of robbers has obtained such a foothold in the section of country between Humboldt and Lawrence, Kans., committing depredations upon travelers, both by public and private conveyance, that the safety of the public money collected by the receiver of the land office at Humboldt requires that it should be guarded during its transit from Humboldt to Lawrence. I have therefore the honor to request that the proper commanding officer of the district may be instructed by the War Department, if in the opinion of the honorable Secretary of War it can be done without prejudice to the public interests, to furnish a sufficient military guard to protect such moneys as may be in transitu from the above office for the purpose of being deposited to the credit of the Treasurer of the United States. As far as we are now advised, such service will not be necessary oftener than once a month. Will you please advise me of the action taken, that I may instruct the receiver and the Commissioner of the General Land Office in the matter?

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. McCULLOCH,
Secretary of the Treasury.

Respectfully referred to the General of the Army to give the necessary orders in this case and to furnish this Department a copy for the information of the Secretary of the Treasury.

By order of the Secretary of War:

ED. SCHRIVER,
Inspector-General.

[The following are inserted because they have direct bearing on the two messages from the President of February 11, 1868, and their inclosures.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, February 4, 1868.

Hon. SCHUYLER COLFAX,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

SIR: In answer to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 3d instant, I transmit herewith copies furnished me by General Grant of correspondence between him and the President relating to the Secretary of War, and which he reports to be all the correspondence he has had with the President on the subject.

I have had no correspondence with the President since the 12th of August last. After the action of the Senate on his alleged reason for my suspension from the office of Secretary of War, I resumed the duties of that office, as required by the act of Congress, and have continued to discharge them without any personal or written communication with the President. No orders have been issued from this Department in the name of the President with my knowledge, and I have received no orders from him.

The correspondence sent herewith embraces all the correspondence known to me on the subject referred to in the resolution of the House of Representatives.

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

General Grant to the President.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, January 24, 1868.

His Excellency A. JOHNSON,
President of the United States.

SIR: I have the honor very respectfully to request to have in writing the order which the President gave me verbally on Sunday, the 19th instant, to disregard the orders of the Hon. E.M. Stanton as Secretary of War until I knew from the President himself that they were his orders.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U.S. GRANT, General.

General Grant to the President.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, D.C., January 28, 1868.

His Excellency A. JOHNSON,
President of the United States.

SIR: On the 24th instant I requested you to give me in writing the instructions which you had previously given me verbally not to obey any order from Hon. E.M. Stanton, Secretary of War, unless I knew that it came from yourself. To this written request I received a message that has left doubt in my mind of your intentions. To prevent any possible misunderstanding, therefore, I renew the request that you will give me written instructions, and till they are received will suspend action on your verbal ones.

I am compelled to ask these instructions in writing in consequence of the many and gross misrepresentations affecting my personal honor circulated through the press for the last fortnight, purporting to come from the President, of conversations which occurred either with the President privately in his office or in Cabinet meeting. What is written admits of no misunderstanding.

In view of the misrepresentations referred to, it will be well to state the facts in the case.

Some time after I assumed the duties of Secretary of War ad interim the President asked me my views as to the course Mr. Stanton would have to pursue, in case the Senate should not concur in his suspension, to obtain possession of his office. My reply was, in substance, that Mr. Stanton would have to appeal to the courts to reinstate him, illustrating my position by citing the ground I had taken in the case of the Baltimore police commissioners.

In that case I did not doubt the technical right of Governor Swann to remove the old commissioners and to appoint their successors. As the old commissioners refused to give up, however, I contended that no resource was left but to appeal to the courts.

Finding that the President was desirous of keeping Mr. Stanton out of office, whether sustained in the suspension or not, I stated that I had not looked particularly into the tenure-of-office bill, but that what I had stated was a general principle, and if I should change my mind in this particular case I would inform him of the fact.

Subsequently, on reading the tenure-of-office bill closely, I found that I could not, without violation of the law, refuse to vacate the office of Secretary of War the moment Mr. Stanton was reinstated by the Senate, even though the President should order me to retain it, which he never did.

Taking this view of the subject, and learning on Saturday, the 11th instant, that the Senate had taken up the subject of Mr. Stanton's suspension, after some conversation with Lieutenant General Sherman and some members of my staff, in which I stated that the law left me no discretion as to my action should Mr. Stanton be reinstated, and that I intended to inform the President, I went to the President for the sole purpose of making this decision known, and did so make it known.

In doing this I fulfilled the promise made in our last preceding conversation on the subject.

The President, however, instead of accepting my view of the requirements of the tenure-of-office bill, contended that he had suspended Mr. Stanton under the authority given by the Constitution, and that the same authority did not preclude him from reporting, as an act of courtesy, his reasons for the suspension to the Senate; that, having appointed me under the authority given by the Constitution, and not under any act of Congress, I could not be governed by the act. I stated that the law was binding on me, constitutional or not, until set aside by the proper tribunal. An hour or more was consumed, each reiterating his views on this subject, until, getting late, the President said he would see me again.

I did not agree to call again on Monday, nor at any other definite time, nor was I sent for by the President until the following Tuesday.

From the 11th to the Cabinet meeting on the 14th instant a doubt never entered my mind about the President's fully understanding my position, namely, that if the Senate refused to concur in the suspension of Mr. Stanton my powers as Secretary of War ad interim would cease and Mr. Stanton's right to resume at once the functions of his office would under the law be indisputable, and I acted accordingly. With Mr. Stanton I had no communication, direct nor indirect, on the subject of his reinstatement during his suspension.

I knew it had been recommended to the President to send in the name of Governor Cox, of Ohio, for Secretary of War, and thus save all embarrassment—a proposition that I sincerely hoped he would entertain favorably; General Sherman seeing the President at my particular request to urge this on the 13th instant.

On Tuesday (the day Mr. Stanton reentered the office of the Secretary of War) General Comstock, who had carried my official letter announcing that with Mr. Stanton's reinstatement by the Senate I had ceased to be Secretary of War ad interim, and who saw the President open and read the communication, brought back to me from the President a message that he wanted to see me that day at the Cabinet meeting, after I had made known the fact that I was no longer Secretary of War ad interim.

At this meeting, after opening it as though I were a member of the Cabinet, when reminded of the notification already given him that I was no longer Secretary of War ad interim, the President gave a version of the conversations alluded to already. In this statement it was asserted that in both conversations I had agreed to hold on to the office of Secretary of War until displaced by the courts, or resign, so as to place the President where he would have been had I never accepted the office. After hearing the President through, I stated our conversations substantially as given in this letter. I will add that my conversation before the Cabinet embraced other matter not pertinent here, and is therefore left out.

I in no wise admitted the correctness of the President's statement of our conversations, though, to soften the evident contradiction my statement gave, I said (alluding to our first conversation on the subject) the President might have understood me the way he said, namely, that I had promised to resign if I did not resist the reinstatement. I made no such promise.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U.S. GRANT, General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES,
January 30, 1868.

Respectfully forwarded to the Secretary of War for his information.

U.S. GRANT, General.

[Indorsement of the President on General Grant's note of January 24, 1868.[49]]

JANUARY 29, 1868.

As requested in this communication, General Grant is instructed in writing not to obey any order from the War Department assumed to be issued by the direction of the President unless such order is known by the General Commanding the armies of the United States to have been authorized by the Executive.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

General Grant to the President.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, January 30, 1868.

His Excellency A. JOHNSON,
President of the United States.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the return of my note of the 24th instant,[49] with your indorsement thereon, that I am not to obey any order from the War Department assumed to be issued by the direction of the President unless such order is known by me to have been authorized by the Executive, and in reply thereto to say that I am informed by the Secretary of War that he has not received from the Executive any order or instructions limiting or impairing his authority to issue orders to the Army, as has heretofore been his practice under the law and the customs of the Department. While this authority to the War Department is not countermanded it will be satisfactory evidence to me that any orders issued from the War Department by direction of the President are authorized by the Executive.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U.S. GRANT, General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY UNITED STATES,
January 30, 1868.

Respectfully forwarded to the Secretary of War for his information.

U.S. GRANT, General.

The President to General Grant.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, January 31, 1868.

General U.S. GRANT,
Commanding United States Armies.

GENERAL: I have received your communication of the 28th instant,[50] renewing your request of the 24th,[49] that I should repeat in a written form my verbal instructions of the 19th instant, viz, that you obey no order from the Hon. Edwin M. Stanton as Secretary of War unless you have information that it was issued by the President's directions.

In submitting this request (with which I complied on the 29th instant[51]) you take occasion to allude to recent publications in reference to the circumstances connected with the vacation by yourself of the office of Secretary of War ad interim, and with the view of correcting statements which you term "gross misrepresentations" give at length your own recollection of the facts under which, without the sanction of the President, from whom you had received and accepted the appointment, you yielded the Department of War to the present incumbent.

As stated in your communication, some time after you had assumed the duties of Secretary of War ad interim we interchanged views respecting the course that should be pursued in the event of nonconcurrence by the Senate in the suspension from office of Mr. Stanton. I sought that interview, calling myself at the War Department. My sole object in then bringing the subject to your attention was to ascertain definitely what would be your own action should such an attempt be made for his restoration to the War Department. That object was accomplished, for the interview terminated with the distinct understanding that if upon reflection you should prefer not to become a party to the controversy or should conclude that it would be your duty to surrender the Department to Mr. Stanton upon action in his favor by the Senate you were to return the office to me prior to a decision by the Senate, in order that if I desired to do so I might designate someone to succeed you. It must have been apparent to you that had not this understanding been reached it was my purpose to relieve you from the further discharge of the duties of Secretary of War ad interim and to appoint some other person in that capacity.

Other conversations upon this subject ensued, all of them having on my part the same object and leading to the same conclusion as the first. It is not necessary, however, to refer to any of them excepting that of Saturday, the 11th instant, mentioned in your communication. As it was then known that the Senate had proceeded to consider the case of Mr. Stanton, I was anxious to learn your determination. After a protracted interview, during which the provisions of the tenure-of-office bill were freely discussed, you said that, as had been agreed upon in our first conference, you would either return the office to my possession in time to enable me to appoint a successor before final action by the Senate upon Mr. Stanton's suspension, or would remain as its head, awaiting a decision of the question by judicial proceedings. It was then understood that there would be a further conference on Monday, by which time I supposed you would be prepared to inform me of your final decision. You failed, however, to fulfill the engagement, and on Tuesday notified me in writing of the receipt by you of official notification of the action of the Senate in the case of Mr. Stanton, and at the same time informed me that according to the act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices your functions as Secretary of War ad interim ceased from the moment of the receipt of the notice. You thus, in disregard of the understanding between us, vacated the office without having given me notice of your intention to do so. It is but just, however, to say that in your communication you claim that you did inform me of your purpose, and thus "fulfilled the promise made in our last preceding conversation on this subject." The fact that such a promise existed is evidence of an arrangement of the kind I have mentioned. You had found in our first conference "that the President was desirous of keeping Mr. Stanton out of office whether sustained in the suspension or not." You knew what reasons had induced the President to ask from you a promise; you also knew that in case your views of duty did not accord with his own convictions it was his purpose to fill your place by another appointment. Even ignoring the existence of a positive understanding between us, these conclusions were plainly deducible from our various conversations. It is certain, however, that even under these circumstances you did not offer to return the place to my possession, but, according to your own statement, placed yourself in a position where, could I have anticipated your action, I would have been compelled to ask of you, as I was compelled to ask of your predecessor in the War Department, a letter of resignation, or else to resort to the more disagreeable expedient of suspending you by a successor.

As stated in your letter, the nomination of Governor Cox, of Ohio, for the office of Secretary of War was suggested to me. His appointment as Mr. Stanton's successor was urged in your name, and it was said that his selection would save further embarrassment. I did not think that in the selection of a Cabinet officer I should be trammeled by such considerations. I was prepared to take the responsibility of deciding the question in accordance with my ideas of constitutional duty, and, having determined upon a course which I deemed right and proper, was anxious to learn the steps you would take should the possession of the War Department be demanded by Mr. Stanton. Had your action been in conformity to the understanding between us, I do not believe that the embarrassment would have attained its present proportions or that the probability of its repetition would have been so great.

I know that, with a view to an early termination of a state of affairs so detrimental to the public interests, you voluntarily offered, both on Wednesday, the 15th instant, and on the succeeding Sunday, to call upon Mr. Stanton and urge upon him that the good of the service required his resignation. I confess that I considered your proposal as a sort of reparation for the failure on your part to act in accordance with an understanding more than once repeated, which I thought had received your full assent, and under which you could have returned to me the office which I had conferred upon you, thus saving yourself from embarrassment and leaving the responsibility where it properly belonged—with the President, who is accountable for the faithful execution of the laws.

I have not yet been informed by you whether, as twice proposed by yourself, you have called upon Mr. Stanton and made an effort to induce him voluntarily to retire from the War Department.

You conclude your communication with a reference to our conversation at the meeting of the Cabinet held on Tuesday, the 14th instant. In your account of what then occurred you say that after the President had given his version of our previous conversations you stated them substantially as given in your letter; that you in no wise admitted the correctness of his statement of them, "though, to soften the evident contradiction my statement gave, I said (alluding to our first conversation on the subject) the President might have understood me the way he said, namely, that I had promised to resign if I did not resist the reinstatement. I made no such promise."

My recollection of what then transpired is diametrically the reverse of your narration. In the presence of the Cabinet I asked you—

First. If, in a conversation which took place shortly after your appointment as Secretary of War ad interim, you did not agree either to remain at the head of the War Department and abide any judicial proceedings that might follow nonconcurrence by the Senate in Mr. Stanton's suspension, or, should you wish not to become involved in such a controversy, to put me in the same position with respect to the office as I occupied previous to your appointment, by returning it to me in time to anticipate such action by the Senate. This you admitted.

Second. I then asked you if, at our conference on the preceding Saturday, I had not, to avoid misunderstanding, requested you to state what you intended to do, and, further, if in reply to that inquiry you had not referred to our former conversations, saying that from them I understood your position, and that your action would be consistent with the understanding which had been reached. To these questions you also replied in the affirmative.

Third. I next asked if at the conclusion of our interview on Saturday it was not understood that we were to have another conference on Monday before final action by the Senate in the case of Mr. Stanton. You replied that such was the understanding, but that you did not suppose the Senate would act so soon; that on Monday you had been engaged in a conference with General Sherman and were occupied with "many little matters," and asked if General Sherman had not called on that day. What relevancy General Sherman's visit to me on Monday had with the purpose for which you were then to have called I am at a loss to perceive, as he certainly did not inform me whether you had determined to retain possession of the office or to afford me an opportunity to appoint a successor in advance of any attempted reinstatement of Mr. Stanton.

This account of what passed between us at the Cabinet meeting on the 14th instant widely differs from that contained in your communication, for it shows that instead of having "stated our conversations as given in the letter" which has made this reply necessary you admitted that my recital of them was entirely accurate. Sincerely anxious, however, to be correct in my statements, I have to-day read this narration of what occurred on the 14th instant to the members of the Cabinet who were then present. They, without exception, agree in its accuracy.

It is only necessary to add that on Wednesday morning, the 15th instant, you called on me, in company with Lieutenant-General Sherman. After some preliminary conversation, you remarked that an article in the National Intelligencer of that date did you much injustice. I replied that I had not read the Intelligencer of that morning. You then first told me that it was your intention to urge Mr. Stanton to resign his office.

After you had withdrawn I carefully read the article of which you had spoken, and found that its statements of the understanding between us were substantially correct. On the 17th I caused it to be read to four of the five members of the Cabinet who were present at our conference on the 14th, and they concurred in the general accuracy of its statements respecting our conversation upon that occasion.

In reply to your communication, I have deemed it proper, in order to prevent further misunderstanding, to make this simple recital of facts.

Very respectfully, yours,

ANDREW JOHNSON.

General Grant to the President.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, D.C., February 3, 1868.

His Excellency A. JOHNSON,
President of the United States.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 31st ultimo,[52] in answer to mine of the 28th ultimo[53]. After a careful reading and comparison of it with the article in the National Intelligencer of the 15th ultimo and the article over the initials J.B.S. in the New York World of the 27th ultimo, purporting to be based upon your statement and that of the members of your Cabinet therein named, I find it to be but a reiteration, only somewhat more in detail, of the "many and gross misrepresentations" contained in these articles, and which my statement of the facts set forth in my letter of the 28th ultimo[53] was intended to correct; and I here reassert the correctness of my statements in that letter, anything in yours in reply to it to the contrary notwithstanding.

I confess my surprise that the Cabinet officers referred to should so greatly misapprehend the facts in the matter of admissions alleged to have been made by me at the Cabinet meeting of the 14th ultimo as to suffer their names to be made the basis of the charges in the newspaper article referred to, or agree in the accuracy, as you affirm they do, of your account of what occurred at that meeting.

You know that we parted on Saturday, the 11th ultimo, without any promise on my part, either express or implied, to the effect that I would hold on to the office of Secretary of War ad interim against the action of the Senate, or, declining to do so myself, would surrender it to you before such action was had, or that I would see you again at any fixed time on the subject.

The performance of the promises alleged by you to have been made by me would have involved a resistance to law and an inconsistency with the whole history of my connection with the suspension of Mr. Stanton.

From our conversations and my written protest of August 1, 1867, against the removal of Mr. Stanton, you must have known that my greatest objection to his removal or suspension was the fear that someone would be appointed in his stead who would, by opposition to the laws relating to the restoration of the Southern States to their proper relations to the Government, embarrass the Army in the performance of duties especially imposed upon it by these laws; and it was to prevent such an appointment that I accepted the office of Secretary of War ad interim, and not for the purpose of enabling you to get rid of Mr. Stanton by my withholding it from him in opposition to law, or, not doing so myself, surrendering it to one who would, as the statement and assumptions in your communication plainly indicate was sought. And it was to avoid this same danger, as well as to relieve you from the personal embarrassment in which Mr. Stanton's reinstatement would place you, that I urged the appointment of Governor Cox, believing that it would be agreeable to you and also to Mr. Stanton, satisfied as I was that it was the good of the country, and not the office, the latter desired.

On the 15th ultimo, in presence of General Sherman, I stated to you that I thought Mr. Stanton would resign, but did not say that I would advise him to do so. On the 18th I did agree with General Sherman to go and advise him to that course, and on the 19th I had an interview alone with Mr. Stanton, which led me to the conclusion that any advice to him of the kind would be useless, and I so informed General Sherman.

Before I consented to advise Mr. Stanton to resign, I understood from him, in a conversation on the subject immediately after his reinstatement, that it was his opinion that the act of Congress entitled "An act temporarily to supply vacancies in the Executive Departments in certain cases," approved February 20, 1863, was repealed by subsequent legislation, which materially influenced my action. Previous to this time I had had no doubt that the law of 1863 was still in force, and, notwithstanding my action, a fuller examination of the law leaves a question in my mind whether it is or is not repealed. This being the case, I could not now advise his resignation, lest the same danger I apprehended on his first removal might follow.

The course you would have it understood I agreed to pursue was in violation of law and without orders from you, while the course I did pursue, and which I never doubted you fully understood, was in accordance with law and not in disobedience of any orders of my superior.

And now, Mr. President, when my honor as a soldier and integrity as a man have been so violently assailed, pardon me for saying that I can but regard this whole matter, from the beginning to the end, as an attempt to involve me in the resistance of law, for which you hesitated to assume the responsibility in orders, and thus to destroy my character before the country. I am in a measure confirmed in this conclusion by your recent orders directing me to disobey orders from the Secretary of War, my superior and your subordinate, without having countermanded his authority to issue the orders I am to disobey.

With the assurance, Mr. President, that nothing less than a vindication of my personal honor and character could have induced this correspondence on my part,

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U.S. GRANT, General.

Respectfully forwarded to the Secretary of War for his information, and to be made a part of correspondence previously furnished on same subject.

U.S. GRANT, General.

WASHINGTON, February 17, 1868.

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

In reply to the resolution adopted by the House of Representatives on the 19th of December last, calling for correspondence and information in relation to Russian America, I transmit reports and accompanying documents from the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, respectively.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, February 18, 1868.

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

In answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 17th of January last, calling for information in regard to the execution of the treaty of 1858 with China, for the settlement of claims, I transmit a report of the Secretary of State and the papers which accompany it.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., February 19, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith a report from the Attorney-General, prepared in compliance with the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 26th November, 1867, requesting a list of all pardons "granted since the 14th day of April, 1865, to any person or persons charged with or convicted of making or passing counterfeit money, or having counterfeit money or tools or instruments for making the same in his or their possession, or charged with or convicted of the crime of forgery or criminal alteration of papers, accounts, or other documents, or of the crime of perjury, and that such list be accompanied by a particular statement in each case of the reasons or grounds of the pardon, with a disclosure of the names of persons, if any, who recommended or advised the same."

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., February 19, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith a report from the Attorney-General, prepared in compliance with a resolution adopted by the Senate on the 2d day of December last, requesting "a full list of the names of all persons pardoned by the President since May 1, 1865, who have been convicted of counterfeiting United States bonds, greenbacks, national-bank currency, fractional currency, or the coin of the United States, with the date of issuing each pardon, reasons for issuing it, and by whom recommended."

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, February 20, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

In answer to a resolution of the Senate of the 18th of December last, requesting information in regard to the island of San Juan, on Puget Sound, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State and the papers which accompanied it.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, February 20, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

With reference to the convention between Denmark and the United States concluded on the 24th of October last, I transmit to the Senate a copy in translation of a note of the 19th instant addressed to the Secretary of State by His Danish Majesty's chargé d'affaires, announcing the ratification of the convention by the Government of Denmark and stating his readiness to proceed with the customary exchange of ratifications.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, February 21, 1868.

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

I transmit herewith a communication from the Chief of the Engineer Corps of the Army, accompanied by a report, in reference to ship canals around the Falls of the Ohio River, called for by the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 18th instant.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., February 21, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

On the 12th day of August, 1867, by virtue of the power and authority vested in the President by the Constitution and laws of the United States, I suspended Edwin M. Stanton from the office of Secretary of War.

In further exercise of the power and authority so vested in the President, I have this day removed Mr. Stanton from office and designated the Adjutant-General of the Army to act as Secretary of War ad interim.

Copies of the communications upon this subject addressed to Mr. Stanton and the Adjutant-General are herewith transmitted for the information of the Senate.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., February 22, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I have received a copy of the resolution adopted by the Senate on the 21st instant, as follows:

Whereas the Senate have received and considered the communication of the President stating that he had removed Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, and had designated the Adjutant-General of the Army to act as Secretary of War ad interim: Therefore,

Resolved by the Senate of the United States, That under the Constitution and laws of the United States the President has no power to remove the Secretary of War and designate any other officer to perform the duties of that office ad interim.

This resolution is confined to the power of the President to remove the Secretary of War and to designate another officer to perform the duties of the office ad interim, and by its preamble is made expressly applicable to the removal of Mr. Stanton and the designation to act ad interim of the Adjutant-General of the Army. Without, therefore, attempting to discuss the general power of removal as to all officers, upon which subject no expression of opinion is contained in the resolution, I shall confine myself to the question as thus limited—the power to remove the Secretary of War.

It is declared in the resolution—

That under the Constitution and laws of the United States the President has no power to remove the Secretary of War and designate any other officer to perform the duties of that office ad interim.

As to the question of power under the Constitution, I do not propose at present to enter upon its discussion.

The uniform practice from the beginning of the Government, as established by every President who has exercised the office, and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States have settled the question in favor of the power of the President to remove all officers excepting a class holding appointments of a judicial character. No practice nor any decision has ever excepted a Secretary of War from this general power of the President to make removals from office.

It is only necessary, then, that I should refer to the power of the Executive, under the laws of the United States, to remove from office a Secretary of War. The resolution denies that under these laws this power has any existence. In other words, it affirms that no such authority is recognized or given by the statutes of the country.

What, then, are the laws of the United States which deny the President the power to remove that officer? I know but two laws which bear upon this question. The first in order of time is the act of August 7, 1789, creating the Department of War, which, after providing for a Secretary as its principal officer, proceeds as follows:

SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That there shall be in the said Department an inferior officer, to be appointed by the said principal officer, to be employed therein as he shall deem proper, and to be called the chief clerk in the Department of War, and who, whenever the said principal officer shall be removed from office by the President of the United States, or in any other case of vacancy, shall during such vacancy have the charge and custody of all records, books, and papers appertaining to the said Department.

It is clear that this act, passed by a Congress many of whose members participated in the formation of the Constitution, so far from denying the power of the President to remove the Secretary of War, recognizes it as existing in the Executive alone, without the concurrence of the Senate or of any other department of the Government. Furthermore, this act does not purport to confer the power by legislative authority, nor in fact was there any other existing legislation through which it was bestowed upon the Executive. The recognition of the power by this act is therefore complete as a recognition under the Constitution itself, for there was no other source or authority from which it could be derived.

The other act which refers to this question is that regulating the tenure of certain civil offices, passed by Congress on the 2d day of March, 1867. The first section of that act is in the following words:

That every person holding any civil office to which he has been appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and every person who shall hereafter be appointed to any such office, and shall become duly qualified to act therein, is and shall be entitled to hold such office until a successor shall have been in like manner appointed and duly qualified, except as herein otherwise provided: Provided, That the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, of the Navy, and of the Interior, the Postmaster-General, and the Attorney-General shall hold their offices, respectively, for and during the term of the President by whom they may have been appointed and for one month thereafter, subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

The fourth section of the same act restricts the term of offices to the limit prescribed by the law creating them.

That part of the first section which precedes the proviso declares that every person holding a civil office to which he has been or may be appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall hold such office until a successor shall have been in like manner appointed. It purports to take from the Executive, during the fixed time established for the tenure of the office, the independent power of removal, and to require for such removal the concurrent action of the President and the Senate.

The proviso that follows proceeds to fix the term of office of the seven heads of Departments, whose tenure never had been defined before, by prescribing that they "shall hold their offices, respectively, for and during the term of the President by whom they may have been appointed and for one month thereafter, subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate."

Thus, as to these enumerated officers, the proviso takes from the President the power of removal except with the advice and consent of the Senate. By its terms, however, before he can be deprived of the power to displace them it must appear that he himself has appointed them. It is only in that case that they have any tenure of office or any independent right to hold during the term of the President and for one month after the cessation of his official functions. The proviso, therefore, gives no tenure of office to any one of these officers who has been appointed by a former President beyond one month after the accession of his successor.

In the case of Mr. Stanton, the only appointment under which he held the office of Secretary of War was that conferred upon him by my immediate predecessor, with the advice and consent of the Senate. He has never held from me any appointment as the head of the War Department. Whatever right he had to hold the office was derived from that original appointment and my own sufferance. The law was not intended to protect such an incumbent of the War Department by taking from the President the power to remove him. This, in my judgment, is perfectly clear, and the law itself admits of no other just construction. We find in all that portion of the first section which precedes the proviso that as to civil officers generally the President is deprived of the power of removal, and it is plain that if there had been no proviso that power would just as clearly have been taken from him so far as it applies to the seven heads of Departments. But for reasons which were no doubt satisfactory to Congress these principal officers were specially provided for, and as to them the express and only requirement is that the President who has appointed them shall not without the advice and consent of the Senate remove them from office. The consequence is that as to my Cabinet, embracing the seven officers designated in the first section, the act takes from me the power, without the concurrence of the Senate, to remove any one of them that I have appointed, but it does not protect such of them as I did not appoint, nor give to them any tenure of office beyond my pleasure.

An examination of this act, then, shows that while in one part of the section provision is made for officers generally, in another clause there is a class of officers, designated by their official titles, who are excepted from the general terms of the law, and in reference to whom a clear distinction is made as to the general power of removal limited in the first clause of the section.

This distinction is that as to such of these enumerated officers as hold under the appointment of the President the power of removal can only be exercised by him with the consent of the Senate, while as to those who have not been appointed by him there is no like denial of his power to displace them. It would be a violation of the plain meaning of this enactment to place Mr. Stanton upon the same footing as those heads of Departments who have been appointed by myself. As to him, this law gives him no tenure of office. The members of my Cabinet who have been appointed by me are by this act entitled to hold for one month after the term of my office shall cease; but Mr. Stanton could not, against the wishes of my successor, hold a moment thereafter. If he were permitted by that successor to hold for the first two weeks, would that successor have no power to remove him? But the power of my successor over him could be no greater than my own. If my successor would have the power to remove Mr. Stanton after permitting him to remain a period of two weeks, because he was not appointed by him, but by his predecessor, I, who have tolerated Mr. Stanton for more than two years, certainly have the same right to remove him, and upon the same ground, namely, that he was not appointed by me, but by my predecessor.

Under this construction of the tenure-of-office act, I have never doubted my power to remove Mr. Stanton.

Whether the act were constitutional or not, it was always my opinion that it did not secure him from removal. I was, however, aware that there were doubts as to the construction of the law, and from the first I deemed it desirable that at the earliest possible moment those doubts should be settled and the true construction of the act fixed by decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. My order of suspension in August last was intended to place the case in such a position as would make a resort to a judicial decision both necessary and proper. My understanding and wishes, however, under that order of suspension were frustrated, and the late order for Mr. Stanton's removal was a further step toward the accomplishment of that purpose.

I repeat that my own convictions as to the true construction of the law and as to its constitutionality were well settled and were sustained by every member of my Cabinet, including Mr. Stanton himself. Upon the question of constitutionality, each one in turn deliberately advised me that the tenure-of-office act was unconstitutional. Upon the question whether, as to those members who were appointed by my predecessor, that act took from me the power to remove them, one of those members emphatically stated in the presence of the others sitting in Cabinet that they did not come within the provisions of the act, and it was no protection to them. No one dissented from this construction, and I understood them all to acquiesce in its correctness. In a matter of such grave consequence I was not disposed to rest upon my own opinions, though fortified by my constitutional advisers. I have therefore sought to bring the question at as early a day as possible before the Supreme Court of the United States for final and authoritative decision.

In respect to so much of the resolution as relates to the designation of an officer to act as Secretary of War ad interim, I have only to say that I have exercised this power under the provisions of the first section of the act of February 13, 1795, which, so far as they are applicable to vacancies caused by removals, I understand to be still in force.

The legislation upon the subject of ad interim appointments in the Executive Departments stands, as to the War Office, as follows:

The second section of the act of the 7th of August, 1789, makes provision for a vacancy in the very case of a removal of the head of the War Department, and upon such a vacancy gives the charge and custody of the records, books, and papers to the chief clerk. Next, by the act of the 8th of May, 1792, section 8, it is provided that in case of a vacancy occasioned by death, absence from the seat of Government, or sickness of the head of the War Department the President may authorize a person to perform the duties of the office until a successor is appointed or the disability removed. The act, it will be observed, does not provide for the case of a vacancy caused by removal. Then, by the first section of the act of February 13, 1795, it is provided that in case of any vacancy the President may appoint a person to perform the duties while the vacancy exists.

These acts are followed by that of the 20th of February, 1863, by the first section of which provision is again made for a vacancy caused by death, resignation, absence from the seat of Government, or sickness of the head of any Executive Department of the Government, and upon the occurrence of such a vacancy power is given to the President—

to authorize the head of any other Executive Department, or other officer in either of said Departments whose appointment is vested in the President, at his discretion, to perform the duties of the said respective offices until a successor be appointed or until such absence or inability by sickness shall cease: Provided, That no one vacancy shall be supplied in manner aforesaid for a longer term than six months.

This law, with some modifications, reenacts the act of 1792, and provides, as did that act, for the sort of vacancies so to be filled; but, like the act of 1792, it makes no provision for a vacancy occasioned by removal. It has reference altogether to vacancies arising from other causes.

According to my construction of the act of 1863, while it impliedly repeals the act of 1792 regulating the vacancies therein described, it has no bearing whatever upon so much of the act of 1795 as applies to a vacancy caused by removal. The act of 1795 therefore furnishes the rule for a vacancy occasioned by removal—one of the vacancies expressly referred to in the act of the 7th of August, 1789, creating the Department of War. Certainly there is no express repeal by the act of 1863 of the act of 1795. The repeal, if there is any, is by implication, and can only be admitted so far as there is a clear inconsistency between the two acts. The act of 1795 is inconsistent with that of 1863 as to a vacancy occasioned by death, resignation, absence, or sickness, but not at all inconsistent as to a vacancy caused by removal.

It is assuredly proper that the President should have the same power to fill temporarily a vacancy occasioned by removal as he has to supply a place made vacant by death or the expiration of a term. If, for instance, the incumbent of an office should be found to be wholly unfit to exercise its functions, and the public service should require his immediate expulsion, a remedy should exist and be at once applied, and time be allowed the President to select and appoint a successor, as is permitted him in case of a vacancy caused by death or the termination of an official term.

The necessity, therefore, for an ad interim appointment is just as great, and, indeed, may be greater in cases of removal than in any others. Before it be held, therefore, that the power given by the act of 1795 in cases of removal is abrogated by succeeding legislation an express repeal ought to appear. So wholesome a power should certainly not be taken away by loose implication.

It may be, however, that in this, as in other cases of implied repeal, doubts may arise. It is confessedly one of the most subtle and debatable questions which arise in the construction of statutes. If upon such a question I have fallen into an erroneous construction, I submit whether it should be characterized as a violation of official duty and of law.

I have deemed it proper, in vindication of the course which I have considered it my duty to take, to place before the Senate the reasons upon which I have based my action. Although I have been advised by every member of my Cabinet that the entire tenure-of-office act is unconstitutional, and therefore void, and although I have expressly concurred in that opinion in the veto message which I had the honor to submit to Congress when I returned the bill for reconsideration, I have refrained from making a removal of any officer contrary to the provisions of the law, and have only exercised that power in the case of Mr. Stanton, which, in my judgment, did not come within its provisions. I have endeavored to proceed with the greatest circumspection, and have acted only in an extreme and exceptional case, carefully following the course which I have marked out for myself as a general rule, faithfully to execute all laws, though passed over my objections on the score of constitutionality. In the present instance I have appealed, or sought to appeal, to that final arbiter fixed by the Constitution for the determination of all such questions. To this course I have been impelled by the solemn obligations which rest upon me to sustain inviolate the powers of the high office committed to my hands.

Whatever may be the consequences merely personal to myself, I could not allow them to prevail against a public duty so clear to my own mind, and so imperative. If what was possible had been certain, if I had been fully advised when I removed Mr. Stanton that in thus defending the trust committed to my hands my own removal was sure to follow, I could not have hesitated. Actuated by public considerations of the highest character, I earnestly protest against the resolution of the Senate which charges me in what I have done with a violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, February 25, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

In further answer of the resolution of the Senate of the 13th of January last, relative to the appointment of the Hon. Anson Burlingame to a diplomatic or other mission by the Emperor of China, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State and the communication which accompanied it.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., February 26, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith a report from the General Commanding the Army of the United States, prepared in compliance with the resolution of the Senate of the 4th instant, requesting copies of all instructions relating to the Third Military District issued to General Pope and General Meade.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, March 4, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

In answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 17th February ultimo, concerning the alleged interference of the United States consul at Rome in the late difficulty in Italy, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State, containing the information called for by the resolution.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit a report of this date from the Secretary of State, and the accompanying papers, in regard to the revolution in the Dominican Republic.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

In answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 21st of February last, in relation to the abduction of one Allan Macdonald from Canada, I transmit a communication from the Secretary of State, accompanied by the papers relating to that subject.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1868.

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

In answer to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 7th of January last, in relation to the claim of the late Benjamin W. Perkins against the Russian Government, I transmit a communication from the Secretary of State, which is accompanied by the papers called for by the resolution.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, March 6, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate the accompanying report[54] of the Secretary of State, in answer to their resolution of the 13th January,

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, March 10, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit, for the consideration of the Senate with a view to ratification, a treaty between the United States and His Majesty the King of Prussia, in the name of the North German Confederation, for the purpose of regulating the citizenship of those persons who emigrate from the Confederation to this country and from the United States to the North German Confederation.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, March 11, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

In further answer to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 25th of November, 1867, calling for information in relation to the trial and conviction of American citizens in Great Britain and Ireland for the last two years, I transmit a continuation of the report from the Secretary of State upon the subject.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, March 14, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

In answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 27th of January last, in relation to the arrest and trial of the Rev. John McMahon, Robert B. Lynch, and John Warren by the Government of Great Britain, and requesting to be informed what action has been taken by this Government in maintaining the rights of American citizens abroad, I transmit a report of the Secretary of State, which is accompanied by a copy of the papers called for by that resolution.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., March 18, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith lay before the Senate, for its constitutional action thereon, a treaty made on the 2d day of March, 1868, by and between Nathaniel G. Taylor, Commissioner of Indian Affairs; Alexander C. Hunt, governor and ex officio superintendent of Indian affairs of Colorado Territory, and Kit Carson, on the part of the United States, and the representatives of the Tabeguache, Muache, Capote, Weeminuche, Yampa, Grand River, and Uintah bands of Ute Indians.

A letter of the Secretary of the Interior of the 17th instant and the papers therein referred to are also herewith transmitted.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, a convention, signed on the 23d instant, for the surrender of criminals, between the United States and the Government of Italy.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith a report[55] and accompanying documents, in answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 18th ultimo.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, March 25, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit to the House of Representatives, in answer to a resolution of the 9th instant, the accompanying report[56] from the Secretary of State.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, March 25, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith a report and accompanying document,[57] in answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 18th ultimo.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, March 25, 1868.

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

In answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 18th ultimo, relating to the report of Mr. Cowdin, I transmit a report of the Secretary of State and the document[58] to which it refers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, April 2, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit to the House of Representatives, in further answer to their resolution of the 9th ultimo, the accompanying report[59] from the Secretary of State.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, April 2, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

In further reply to the resolution adopted by the House of Representatives on the 19th of December, 1867, calling for correspondence and information in relation to Russian America, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State and the papers which accompanied it.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, April 3, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit a report from the Secretary of State and the papers accompanying it, in answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 10th of February last, requesting information relative to the imprisonment and destruction of the property of Antonio Pelletier by the people and authorities of Hayti.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, April 13, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

In answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 5th of February last, calling for the correspondence upon the subject of the murder by the inhabitants of the island of Formosa of the ship's company of the American bark Rover, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State and a report from the Secretary of the Navy, with accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, April 18, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

In answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 14th of April instant, calling for information relative to any application by any party for exclusive privileges in connection with hunting, trading, and the fisheries in Alaska, I transmit herewith the report of the Secretary of State on the subject, with its accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., April 22, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

In compliance with the resolution of the Senate of the 28th ultimo, requesting information as to the number and designations of military departments formed since the 1st day of August, 1867, and as to the statute or other authority under which they have been established, I transmit a report from the Adjutant-General's Office showing the organization since that date of the Department of Alaska and the Military Division of the Atlantic.

The orders issued by me upon this subject are in accordance with long-established usage and hitherto unquestioned authority. This will be readily seen from the accompanying report, which shows that, employing the authority vested by the Constitution in the President as Commander in Chief of the Army, it has been customary for my predecessors to create such military divisions and departments as from time to time they deemed advisable.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, April 27, 1868.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I submit a report of the Secretary of State, concerning the naturalization treaty recently negotiated between the United States and North Germany.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., May 5, 1868.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit to Congress the accompanying documents, which I deem it proper to state are all the papers[60] that have been submitted to the President relating to the proceedings to which they refer in the States of South Carolina and Arkansas.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, May 6, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, in further answer to their resolution of the 14th of April last, the accompanying report[61] from the Secretary of State.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., May 8, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith reports from the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of the Navy, prepared in compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 12th of December last, requesting information respecting the sale of public vessels since the close of the rebellion. No report upon the subject has yet been received from the Department of War.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, May 9, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit to the House of Representatives, in answer to their resolution of the 14th ultimo, a report from the Secretary of State, with accompanying papers.[62]

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, May 9, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith reports from the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney-General, prepared in compliance with the resolution of the Senate of the 17th December last, requesting information in reference to the seizure and confiscation of property. No report upon this subject has yet been received by me from the War Department.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., May 11, 1868.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit to Congress the accompanying documents,[63] which embrace all the papers that have been submitted to me relating to the proceedings to which they refer in the States of North Carolina and Louisiana.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, May 15, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit to the House of Representatives, in answer to their resolution of the 8th instant, a report[64] from the Secretary of State, with accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., May 18, 1868.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit to Congress the accompanying document,[65] which is the only paper which has been submitted to me relating to the proceedings to which it refers in the State of Georgia.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, May 23, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate a report from the Secretary of State, with accompaniments, in relation to recent events in the Empire of Japan.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., May 27, 1868.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit to Congress the accompanying documents,[66] which are the only papers which have been submitted to me relating to the proceedings to which they refer in the State of Florida.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith a letter from the Secretary of the Navy, in reply to the resolution of the House of Representatives adopted on the 26th instant, making inquiries relative to a naval force at Hayti.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, June 2, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I communicate, for the information of the Senate, in confidence, a report of the Secretary of State, accompanied by a copy of a dispatch recently received from the acting consul of the United States at San Jose, Costa Rica.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, June 2, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I communicate, for the consideration of the Senate, a report from the Secretary of State, accompanied by a copy of a dispatch recently received from the acting United States consul in charge of the legation at San Jose, Costa Rica.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

In further answer to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 25th of November, 1867, calling for information in relation to the trial and conviction of American citizens in Great Britain and Ireland for the last two years, I transmit the accompanying report from the Secretary of State upon the subject.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, June 8, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

In compliance with the resolution of the Senate of the 28th ultimo, I transmit herewith a communication from the Postmaster-General, with a copy of the correspondence recently had with the authorities of Great Britain in relation to a new postal treaty.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C. June 10, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

In reply to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 1st instant, I transmit herewith a report from the Secretary of the Interior, in reference to a treaty now being negotiated between the Great and Little Osage Indians and the special Indian commissioners acting on the part of the United States.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C. June 13, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith submit to the Senate, for its constitutional action thereon, a treaty concluded on the 27th ultimo between commissioners on the part of the United States and the Great and Little Osage tribe of Indians of Kansas, together with a communication from the Secretary of the Interior suggesting an amendment to the fourteenth article, and a copy of the report of the commissioners.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., June 15, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith a report from the Secretary of the Interior, made in reply to the resolution adopted by the House of Representatives on the 13th instant.

The treaty recently concluded with the Great and Little Osage Indians, to which the accompanying report refers, was submitted to the Senate prior to the receipt of the resolution of the House upon the subject.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, June, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, for its consideration with a view to its ratification, a treaty between the United States and His Majesty the King of Bavaria, signed at Munich on the 26th ultimo, concerning the citizenship of persons emigrating from Bavaria to the United States and from the United States to the Kingdom of Bavaria. I transmit also a copy of the letter of the United States minister communicating the treaty, of the protocol which accompanied it, and a translation of the Bavarian military law referred to in the latter paper.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., June 20, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith transmit to the Senate, for its constitutional action thereon, a treaty concluded at Fort Sumner, N. Mex., on the 1st instant, between Lieutenant-General W. T. Sherman and Colonel Samuel F. Tappan, on the part of the United States, and the chiefs and headmen of the Navajo Indians, on the part of the latter. I also transmit a communication upon the subject from the Secretary of the Interior, with the accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, June 22, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, in answer to their resolution of the 28th ultimo, a report from the Secretary of State, with accompanying papers.[67]

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, June 23, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit a report from the Secretary of State, in answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 15th instant, upon the subject of Messrs. Warren and Costello, who have been convicted and sentenced to penal imprisonment in Great Britain.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, June 23, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate a copy of a dispatch addressed to the Department of State by the consul of the United States at Bangkok, Siam, dated December 31, 1867, with a view to its consideration and the ratification thereof, of the modification proposed by the royal counselors of the Kingdom of Siam in Article I of the general regulations which form a part of the treaty between the United States and that Kingdom concluded May 29, 1856, of which a printed copy is also herewith transmitted.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, June 29, 1868.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit to Congress a copy of a dispatch from the United States consul at Elsinore, and of an instruction from the Secretary of State to the United States minister at Copenhagen, relative to an alleged practice of the Danish authorities to banish convicts to this country. The expediency of making it a penal offense to bring such persons to the United States is submitted to your consideration.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, July 2, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith a report from the Secretary of State of the 2d instant, together with accompanying papers.[68]

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., July 7, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith lay before the Senate, for its constitutional action thereon, a treaty concluded at Fort Laramie, Dakota Territory, on the 7th of May, 1868, between the United States and the chiefs and headmen of the Crow Indians of Montana, and a treaty concluded at Fort Lyaramie, Dakota Territory, on the 10th of May, 1868, between the United States and the chiefs and headmen of the Northern Cheyenne and Northern Arapahoe tribes of Indians.

A letter from the Secretary of the Interior suggesting amendments to said treaties, and the papers to which he refers in his communication, are also herewith transmitted.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., July 7, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith lay before the Senate, for its constitutional action thereon, a treaty made and concluded at Ottawa, Kans., on the 1st day of June, 1868, between the United States and the Swan Creek and Black River Chippewas and the Munsee or Christian Indians of the State of Kansas.

Accompanying the treaty is a letter from the Secretary of the Interior, dated the 30th ultimo, together with the papers therein designated.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, July 9, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, for consideration with a view to ratification, additional articles to the treaty between the United States and His Majesty the Emperor of China of the 18th June, 1858, signed in this city on the 4th instant by the plenipotentiaries of the parties.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, for consideration with a view to ratification, a convention between the United States and the Mexican Republic, signed in this city by the plenipotentiaries of the parties on the 4th instant, providing for an adjustment of claims of citizens of the United States on the Mexican Government and of Mexican citizens on the Government of the United States.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

Referring to my message to the Senate of the 23d of May last, I herewith transmit a further report from the Secretary of State, with an accompanying document, relative to late occurrences in Japan.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, July 14, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate a report from the Secretary of State, inclosing a list of the States of the Union whose legislatures have ratified the proposed fourteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and also a copy of the resolutions of ratification, as called for in the Senate's resolution of the 9th instant, together with a copy of the respective resolutions of the legislatures of Ohio and New Jersey purporting to rescind the resolutions of ratification of said amendment which had previously been adopted by the legislatures of these two States, respectively, or to withdraw their consent to the same.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, July 15, 1868.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I hereby transmit to Congress a report, with the accompanying papers, received from the Secretary of State, in compliance with the requirements of the eighteenth section of the act entitled "An act to regulate the diplomatic and consular systems of the United States," approved August 18, 1856.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, July 15, 1868.

To the Congress of the United States:

I submit herewith a correspondence between the Secretary of State and Mr. Robert B. Van Valkenburgh, minister resident of the United States in Japan. It seems to show the importance of an amendment of the law of the United States prohibiting the cooly trade.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, July 17, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, in compliance with its resolution of the 9th instant, a report from the Secretary of State, communicating a copy of a paper received by him to-day, purporting to be a resolution ratifying on the part of the State of Louisiana the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States known as Article XIV.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, July 18, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, in compliance with its resolution of the 9th instant, a report from the Secretary of State, communicating a copy of a paper received by me on the 18th instant, purporting to be a resolution of the senate and house of representatives of the State of South Carolina, ratifying the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States known as Article XIV.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., July 18, 1868.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

Experience has fully demonstrated the wisdom of the framers of the Federal Constitution. Under all circumstances the result of their labors was as near an approximation to perfection as was compatible with the fallibility of man. Such being the estimation in which the Constitution is and has ever been held by our countrymen, it is not surprising that any proposition for its alteration or amendment should be received with reluctance and distrust. While this sentiment deserves commendation and encouragement as a useful preventive of unnecessary attempt to change its provisions, it must be conceded that time has developed imperfections and omissions in the Constitution, the reformation of which has been demanded by the best interests of the country. Some of these have been remedied in the manner provided in the Constitution itself. There are others which, although heretofore brought to the attention of the people, have never been so presented as to enable the popular judgment to determine whether they should be corrected by means of additional amendments. My object in this communication is to suggest certain defects in the Constitution which seem to me to require correction, and to recommend that the judgment of the people be taken on the amendments proposed.

The first of the defects to which I desire to direct attention is in that clause of the Constitution which provides for the election of President and Vice-President through the intervention of electors, and not by an immediate vote of the people. The importance of so amending this clause as to secure to the people the election of President and Vice-President by their direct votes was urged with great earnestness and ability by President Jackson in his first annual message, and the recommendation was repeated in five of his subsequent communications to Congress, extending through the eight years of his Administration. In his message of 1829 he said:

To the people belongs the right of electing their Chief Magistrate; it was never designed that their choice should in any case be defeated, either by the intervention of electoral colleges or by the agency confided, under certain contingencies, to the House of Representatives.

He then proceeded to state the objections to an election of President by the House of Representatives, the most important of which was that the choice of a clear majority of the people might be easily defeated. He then closed the argument with the following communication:

I would therefore recommend such an amendment of the Constitution as may remove all intermediate agency in the election of the President and Vice-President. The mode may be so regulated as to preserve to each State its present relative weight in the election, and a failure in the first attempt may be provided for by confining the second to a choice between the two highest candidates. In connection with such an amendment it would seem advisable to limit the service of the Chief Magistrate to a single term of either four or six years. If, however, it should not be adopted, it is worthy of consideration whether a provision disqualifying for office the Representatives in Congress on whom such an election may have devolved would not be proper.

Although this recommendation was repeated with undiminished earnestness in several of his succeeding messages, yet the proposed amendment was never adopted and submitted to the people by Congress. The danger of a defeat of the people's choice in an election by the House of Representatives remains unprovided for in the Constitution, and would be greatly increased if the House of Representatives should assume the power arbitrarily to reject the votes of a State which might not be cast in conformity with the wishes of the majority in that body.

But if President Jackson failed to secure the amendment to the Constitution which he urged so persistently, his arguments contributed largely to the formation of party organizations, which have effectually avoided the contingency of an election by the House of Representatives. These organizations, first by a resort to the caucus system of nominating candidates, and afterwards to State and national conventions, have been successful in so limiting the number of candidates as to escape the danger of an election by the House of Representatives.

It is clear, however, that in thus limiting the number of candidates the true object and spirit of the Constitution have been evaded and defeated. It is an essential feature in our republican system of government that every citizen possessing the constitutional qualifications has a right to become a candidate for the office of President and Vice-President, and that every qualified elector has a right to cast his vote for any citizen whom he may regard as worthy of these offices. But under the party organizations which have prevailed for years these asserted rights of the people have been as effectually cut off and destroyed as if the Constitution itself had inhibited their exercise.

The danger of a defeat of the popular choice in an election by the House of Representatives is no greater than in an election made nominally by the people themselves, when by the laws of party organizations and by the constitutional provisions requiring the people to vote for electors instead of for the President or Vice-President it is made impracticable for any citizen to be a candidate except through the process of a party nomination, and for any voter to cast his suffrage for any other person than one thus brought forward through the manipulations of a nominating convention. It is thus apparent that by means of party organizations that provision of the Constitution which requires the election of President and Vice-President to be made through the electoral colleges has been made instrumental and potential in defeating the great object of conferring the choice of these officers upon the people. It may be conceded that party organizations are inseparable from republican government, and that when formed and managed in subordination to the Constitution they may be valuable safeguards of popular liberty; but when they are perverted to purposes of bad ambition they are liable to become the dangerous instruments of overthrowing the Constitution itself. Strongly impressed with the truth of these views, I feel called upon by an imperative sense of duty to revive substantially the recommendation so often and so earnestly made by President Jackson, and to urge that the amendment to the Constitution herewith presented, or some similar proposition, may be submitted to the people for their ratification or rejection.

Recent events have shown the necessity of an amendment to the Constitution distinctly defining the persons who shall discharge the duties of President of the United States in the event of a vacancy in that office by the death, resignation, or removal of both the President and Vice-President. It is clear that this should be fixed by the Constitution, and not be left to repealable enactments of doubtful constitutionality. It occurs to me that in the event of a vacancy in the office of President by the death, resignation, disability, or removal of both the President and Vice-President the duties of the office should devolve upon an officer of the executive department of the Government, rather than one connected with the legislative or judicial departments. The objections to designating either the President pro tempore of the Senate or the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, especially in the event of a vacancy produced by removal, are so obvious and so unanswerable that they need not be stated in detail. It is enough to state that they are both interested in producing a vacancy, and, according to the provisions of the Constitution, are members of the tribunal by whose decree a vacancy may be produced.

Under such circumstances the impropriety of designating either of these officers to succeed the President so removed is palpable. The framers of the Constitution, when they referred to Congress the settlement of the succession to the office of President in the event of a vacancy in the offices of both President and Vice-President, did not, in my opinion, contemplate the designation of any other than an officer of the executive department, on whom, in such a contingency, the powers and duties of the President should devolve. Until recently the contingency has been remote, and serious attention has not been called to the manifest incongruity between the provisions of the Constitution on this subject and the act of Congress of 1792. Having, however, been brought almost face to face with this important question, it seems an eminently proper time for us to make the legislation conform to the language, intent, and theory of the Constitution, and thus place the executive department beyond the reach of usurpation, and remove from the legislative and judicial departments every temptation to combine for the absorption of all the powers of government.

It has occurred to me that in the event of such a vacancy the duties of President would devolve most appropriately upon some one of the heads of the several Executive Departments, and under this conviction I present for your consideration an amendment to the Constitution on this subject, with the recommendation that it be submitted to the people for their action.

Experience seems to have established the necessity of an amendment of that clause of the Constitution which provides for the election of Senators to Congress by the legislatures of the several States. It would be more consistent with the genius of our form of government if the Senators were chosen directly by the people of the several States. The objections to the election of Senators by the legislatures are so palpable that I deem it unnecessary to do more than submit the proposition for such an amendment, with the recommendation that it be opened to the people for their judgment.

It is strongly impressed on my mind that the tenure of office by the judiciary of the United States during good behavior for life is incompatible with the spirit of republican government, and in this opinion I am fully sustained by the evidence of popular judgment upon this subject in the different States of the Union.

I therefore deem it my duty to recommend an amendment to the Constitution by which the terms of the judicial officers would be limited to a period of years, and I herewith present it in the hope that Congress will submit it to the people for their decision.

The foregoing views have long been entertained by me. In 1845, in the House of Representatives, and afterwards, in 1860, in the Senate of the United States, I submitted substantially the same propositions as those to which the attention of Congress is herein invited. Time, observation, and experience have confirmed these convictions; and, as a matter of public duty and a deep sense of my constitutional obligation "to recommend to the consideration of Congress such measures as I deem necessary and expedient," I submit the accompanying propositions, and urge their adoption and submission to the judgment of the people.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

JOINT RESOLUTION proposing amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

Whereas the fifth article of the Constitution of the United States provides for amendments thereto in the manner following, viz:

"The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which in either case shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of this Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States or by conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress: Provided, That no amendment which may be made prior to the year 1808 shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article, and that no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate:"

Therefore,

Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of both Houses concurring), That the following amendments to the Constitution of the United States be proposed to the legislatures of the several States, which, when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the States, shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution:

"That hereafter the President and Vice-President of the United States shall be chosen for the term of six years, by the people of the respective States, in the manner following: Each State shall be divided by the legislature thereof in districts, equal in number to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which such State may be entitled in the Congress of the United States; the said districts to be composed of contiguous territory, and to contain, as nearly as may be, an equal number of persons entitled to be represented under the Constitution, and to be laid off for the first time immediately after the ratification of this amendment; that on the first Thursday in August in the year 18—, and on the same day every sixth year thereafter, the citizens of each State who possess the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures shall meet within their respective districts and vote for a President and Vice-President of the United States; and the person receiving the greatest number of votes for President and the one receiving the greatest number of votes for Vice-President in each district shall be holden to have received one vote, which fact shall be immediately certified by the governor of the State to each of the Senators in Congress from such State and to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The Congress of the United States shall be in session on the second Monday in October in the year 18—, and on the same day in every sixth year thereafter; and the President of the Senate, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, shall open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted. The person having the greatest number of votes for President shall be President, if such number be equal to a majority of the whole number of votes given; but if no person have such majority, then a second election shall be held on the first Thursday in the month of December then next ensuing between the persons having the two highest numbers for the office of President, which second election shall be conducted, the result certified, and the votes counted in the same manner as in the first, and the person having the greatest number of votes for President shall be President. But if two or more persons shall have received the greatest and an equal number of votes at the second election, then the person who shall have received the greatest number of votes in the greatest number of States shall be President. The person having the greatest number of votes for Vice-President at the first election shall be Vice-President, if such number be equal to a majority of the whole number of votes given; and if no person have such majority, then a second election shall take place between the persons having the two highest numbers on the same day that the second election is held for President, and the person having the highest number of the votes for Vice-President shall be Vice-President. But if there should happen to be an equality of votes between the persons so voted for at the second election, then the person having the greatest number of votes in the greatest number of States shall be Vice-President. But when a second election shall be necessary in the case of Vice-President and not necessary in the case of President, then the Senate shall choose a Vice-President from the persons having the two highest numbers in the first election, as now prescribed in the Constitution: Provided, That after the ratification of this amendment to the Constitution the President and Vice-President shall hold their offices, respectively, for the term of six years, and that no President or Vice-President shall be eligible for reelection to a second term."

Sec. 2. And be it further resolved, That Article II, section I, paragraph 6, of the Constitution of the United States shall be amended so as to read as follows:

"In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice-President; and in the case of the removal, death, resignation, or inability both of the President and Vice-President, the powers and duties of said office shall devolve on the Secretary of State for the time being, and after this officer, in case of vacancy in that or other Department, and in the order in which they are named, on the Secretary of the Treasury, on the Secretary of War, on the Secretary of the Navy, on the Secretary of the Interior, on the Postmaster-General, and on the Attorney-General; and such officer, on whom the powers and duties of President shall devolve in accordance with the foregoing provisions, shall then act as President until the disability shall be removed or a President shall be elected, as is or may be provided for by law."

Sec. 3. And be it further resolved, That Article I, section 3, be amended by striking out the word "legislature," and inserting in lieu thereof the following words, viz: "Persons qualified to vote for members of the most numerous branch of the legislature," so as to make the third section of said article, when ratified by three-fourths of the States, read as follows, to wit:

"The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the persons qualified to vote for the members of the most numerous branch of the legislature thereof, for six years, and each Senator shall have one vote."

Sec. 4. And be it further resolved, That Article III, section I, be amended by striking out the words "good behavior," and inserting the following words, viz: "the term of twelve years." And further, that said article and section be amended by adding the following thereto, viz: "And it shall be the duty of the President of the United States, within twelve months after the ratification of this amendment by three-fourths of all the States, as provided by the Constitution of the United States, to divide the whole number of judges, as near as may be practicable, into three classes. The seats of the judges of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the fourth year from such classification, of the second class at the expiration of the eighth year, and of the third class at the expiration of the twelfth year, so that one-third may be chosen every fourth year thereafter."

The article as amended will read as follows:

Article III.

Sec. I. The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as the Congress from time to time may ordain and establish. The judges, both of the Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during the term of twelve years, and shall at stated times receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office; and it shall be the duty of the President of the United States, within twelve months after the ratification of this amendment by three-fourths of all the States, as provided by the Constitution of the United States, to divide the whole number of judges, as near as may be practicable, into three classes. The seats of the judges of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the fourth year from such classification; of the second class, at the expiration of the eighth year; and of the third class, at the expiration of the twelfth year, so that one-third may be chosen every fourth year thereafter.

WASHINGTON, D.C., July 18, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

In compliance with the resolution adopted by the House of Representatives on the 13th instant, requesting "copies of all instructions, records, and correspondence connected with the commission authorized to negotiate the late treaty with the Great and Little Osage Indians, and copies of all propositions made to said commission from railroad corporations or by individuals," I transmit the accompanying communications from the Secretary of the Interior, together with the papers to which they have reference.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, July 20, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, in compliance with its resolution of the 9th instant, a report from the Secretary of State, communicating a copy of a paper received by me this day, purporting to be a resolution of the senate and house of representatives of the State of Alabama ratifying the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States known as Article XIV.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, July 24, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith a letter from the Secretary of the Navy, inclosing a report of a board of naval officers appointed in pursuance of an act of Congress approved May 19, 1868, to select suitable locations for powder magazines.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, July 27, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit to the House of Representatives, in answer to their resolution of the 24th instant, the accompanying report[69] from the Secretary of State.

ANDREW JOHNSON.