FOOTNOTES:
[148] Which was so constituted as to represent wealth rather than men, cf. American History and Government, § 154 and note.
[149] Otto was the French minister to the United States; Vergennes was the French minister in charge of foreign affairs at Paris.
[XXVII. MAKING THE CONSTITUTION]
153. Call issued by the Annapolis Convention
Documentary History of the Constitution, I, 1-6. For a narrative of the circumstances, cf. American History and Government, § 199.
Sundry of the States having in Consequence of a Resolution and Circular Letter from the State of Virginia appointed Commissioners to meet at such time and Place as should be agreed upon by them the said Commissioners, to take into Consideration the Trade and Commerce of the United States etc:—the Commissioners of Virginia, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and New York, met at the City of Annapolis on the 11th of September 1786, but did not think it advisable to proceed on the Business of their Mission. They therefore broke up after making a Report to the States by which they had been appointed and transmitting to Congress a Copy thereof which is as follows.
To the Honorable the Legislatures of Virginia, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and New York.
The Commissioners from the said States respectively Assembled at the City of Annapolis, humbly beg leave to Report:
That, pursuant to their several Appointments, they met at Annapolis in the State of Maryland, on the eleventh day of September Instant, and, having proceeded to a communication of their Powers, they found that the States of New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia had, in substance, and nearly in the same terms, authorized their respective Commissioners "to meet such Commissioners as were or might be appointed by the other States in the Union, at such time and Place as should be agreed upon by the said Commissioners, to take into Consideration the trade and Commerce of the United States, to consider how far an uniform System in their commercial intercourse and regulations might be necessary to their common interest and permanent harmony, and to report, to the several States, such an Act relative to this great Object, as when unanimously ratified by them, would enable the United States in Congress Assembled effectually to provide for the same."
That the State of Delaware had given similar Powers to their Commissioners, with this difference only, that the Act to be framed in virtue of those Powers, is required to be reported "to the United States in Congress Assembled to be agreed to by them and Confirmed by the Legislatures of every State."
That the State of New Jersey has enlarged the Object of their Appointment, empowering their Commissioners, "to consider how far an uniform System in their Commercial Regulations, and other important matters, might be necessary to the common interest and permanent harmony of the several States;" and to "report such an Act on the Subject, as when ratified by them" would "enable the United States in Congress Assembled effectually to provide for the exigencies of the Union."
That appointments of Commissioners have also been made by the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and North Carolina, none of whom have however attended, but that no information has been received by your Commissioners of any Appointment having been made by the States of Connecticut, Maryland, South-Carolina or Georgia.
That the express terms of the Powers to your Commissioners supposing a Deputation from all the States, and having for Object the trade and Commerce of the United States, your Commissioners did not conceive it advisable to proceed on the business of their Mission, under the Circumstance of so partial and defective a Representation.
Deeply impressed however with the magnitude and importance of the Object confided to them on this Occasion, your Commissioners cannot forbear to indulge an expression of their earnest and unanimous wish that speedy measures may be taken to effect a general meeting of the States in a future Convention, for the same, and such other Purposes, as the situation of Public Affairs may be found to require.
If in expressing this wish, or in intimating any other Sentiment, your Commissioners should seem to exceed the strict bounds of their Appointment, they entertain a full Confidence that a Conduct dictated by an anxiety for the welfare of the United States, will not fail to receive an indulgent Construction.
In this persuasion, your Commissioners submit an Opinion, that the Idea of extending the Powers of their Deputies to other Objects than those of Commerce, which has been adopted by the State of New Jersey, was an improvement on the original Plan, and will deserve to be incorporated into that of a future Convention. They are the more naturally led to which Conclusion, as in the course of the Reflections on the Subject, they have been induced to think, that the Power of regulating Trade, is of such comprehensive extent, and will enter so far into the General System of the Fœderal Government, that to give it efficacy, and to obviate questions and doubts concerning its precise nature and limits, may require a corresponding adjustment of other Parts of the Fœderal System.
That there are important defects in the System of the Fœderal Government, is acknowledged by the Acts of those States which have concurred in the present Meeting. That the defects, upon a closer examination may be found greater and more numerous than even these Acts imply, is at least so far probable from the embarrassments which characterize the present state of our National Affairs, foreign and domestic, as may reasonably be supposed to merit a deliberate and candid discussion, in some mode, which will unite the Sentiments and Councils of all the States. In the choice of the mode, your Commissioners are of Opinion that a Convention of Deputies from the different States, for the special and sole purpose of entering into this investigation and digesting a Plan for supplying such defects as may be discovered to exist, will be entitled to a preference, from Considerations which will occur without being particularized.
Your Commissioners decline an enumeration of those National Circumstances on which their Opinion respecting the Propriety of a future Convention with more enlarged Powers is founded; as it would be an useless intrusion of facts and Observations, most of which have been frequently the Subject of Public Discussion, and none of which can have escaped the penetration of those to whom they would in this instance be addressed. They are however of a nature so serious as, in the View of your Commissioners, to render the situation of the United States delicate and critical, calling for an exertion of the united Virtue and Wisdom of all the Members of the Confederacy.
Under this Impression Your Commissioners, with the most respectful deference, beg leave to suggest their unanimous conviction that it may essentially tend to advance the interests of the Union, if the States by whom they have been respectively delegated would themselves concur, and use their endeavours to procure the concurrence of the other States, in the Appointment of Commissioners to meet at Philadelphia on the second Monday in May next, to take into Consideration the situation of the United States, to devise such further Provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the Constitution of the Fœderal Government adequate to the exigencies of the Union; and to report such an Act for that purpose to the United States in Congress Assembled, as when "agreed to by them and afterwards confirmed by the Legislatures of every State" will effectually provide for the same.
Though your Commissioners could not with propriety address these Observations and Sentiments to any but the States they have the honor to Represent, they have nevertheless concluded, from motives of respect, to transmit Copies of this Report, to the United States in Congress Assembled, and to the Executives of the other States.
By Order of the Commissioners
John Dickinson, Chairman
Dated at Annapolis
September 14th 1786.
154. Appointment of Delegates: Credentials (Georgia)
Records of the Federal Convention (Farrand), III, 576-577.
Georgia is here selected for illustration, because of the emphasis upon the sovereignty of the State in the forms used.
GEORGIA
By the Honorable George Mathews Esquire, Captain General, Governor and Commander in Chief, in and over the said State aforesaid.
To all to whom these Presents shall come Greeting.
Know Ye that John Milton Esquire, who hath certified the annexed Copy of an Ordinance intituled "An Ordinance for the appointment of Deputies from this State for the purpose of revising the Fœderal Constitution"—is Secretary of the said State in whose Office the Archives of the same are deposited. Therefore all due faith, Credit and Authority are and ought to be had and given the same.
In Testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Great Seal of the said State to be put and affixed at Augusta, this Twenty fourth day of April in the Year of our Lord One thousand seven hundred and eighty seven and of our Sovereignty and Independence the Eleventh.
Geo. (Seal) Mathews.
By his Honor's Command
J. Milton Secy
An Ordinance for the appointment of Deputies from this State for the purpose of revising the Fœderal Constitution.
Be It Ordained by the Representatives of the Freemen of the State of Georgia in General Assembly met and by the Authority of the same, that William Few, Abraham Baldwin, William Pierce, George Walton, William Houstoun and Nathaniel Pendleton Esquires, Be, and they are hereby appointed Commissioners, who, or any two or more of them are hereby authorized as Deputies from this State to meet such deputies as maybe appointed and authorized by other States to assemble in Convention at Philadelphia and to join with them in devising and discussing all such Alterations and farther Provisions as may be necessary to render the Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of the Union, and in reporting such an Act for that purpose to the United States in Congress Assembled as when agreed to by them, and duly confirmed by the several States will effectually provide for the same. In case of the death of any of the said Deputies, or of their declining their appointments, the Executive are hereby authorized to supply such Vacancies.
By Order of the House
(signed) WM GIBBONS Speaker.
Augusta the 10th February 1787.
Georgia.
Secretary's Office
The above is a true Copy from the Original Ordinance deposited in my Office.
Augusta 24 April 1787.
J. Milton, Secretary.
The State of Georgia by the grace of God free, Sovereign and Independent
To the Honorable William Pierce, Esquire.
Whereas you, the said William Pierce, are in and by an Ordinance of the General Assembly of our said State Nominated and Appointed a Deputy to represent the same in a Convention of the United States to be assembled at Philadelphia, for the Purposes of devising and discussing such Alterations and farther Provisions as may be necessary to render the Fœderal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of the Union.
You are therefore hereby Commissioned to proceed on the duties required of you in virtue of the said Ordinance
Witness our trusty and well beloved George Mathews Esquire, our[150] Captain General, Governor, and Commander in Chief, under his hand and our Great Seal at Augusta this Seventeenth day of April in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty seven and of our Sovereignty and Independence the Eleventh.[151]
Geo: Mathews (Seal)
By His Honor's Command.
J. Milton. Secy.
[Like commissions for the other delegates.]
155. George Mason on the Preliminaries at Philadelphia
George Mason to George Mason, Jr.
Records of the Federal Convention (Farrand), III, 22-24.
Philadelphia, May 20th, 1787.
... Upon our arrival here on Thursday evening, seventeenth May, I found only the States of Virginia and Pennsylvania fully represented; and there are at this time only five—New York, the two Carolinas, and the two before mentioned. All the States, Rhode Island excepted, have made their appointments; but the members drop in slowly; some of the deputies from the Eastern States are here, but none of them have yet a sufficient representation, and it will probably be several days before the Convention will be authorized to proceed to business. The expectations and hopes of all the Union centre in this Convention. God grant that we may be able to concert effectual means of preserving our country from the evils which threaten us.
The Virginia deputies (who are all here) meet and confer together two or three hours every day, in order to form a proper correspondence of sentiments; and for form's sake, to see what new deputies are arrived, and to grow into some acquaintance with each other, we regularly meet every day at three o'clock. These and some occasional conversations with the deputies of different States and with some of the general officers of the late army (who are here upon a general meeting of the Cincinnati), are the only opportunities I have hitherto had of forming any opinion upon the great subject of our mission, and, consequently, a very imperfect and indecisive one. Yet, upon the great principles of it, I have reason to hope there will be greater unanimity and less opposition, except from the little States, than was at first apprehended. The most prevalent idea in the principal States seems to be a total alteration of the present federal system, and substituting a great national council or parliament, consisting of two branches of the legislature, founded upon the principles of equal proportionate representation, with full legislative powers upon all the subjects of the Union; and an executive: and to make the several State legislatures subordinate to the national, by giving the latter the power of a negative upon all such laws as they shall judge contrary to the interest of the federal Union ... and what is a very extraordinary phenomenon, we are likely to find the republicans, on this occasion, issue from the Southern and Middle States, and the anti-republicans from the Eastern; however extraordinary this may at first seem, it may, I think be accounted for from a very common and natural impulse of the human mind. Men disappointed in expectations too hastily and sanguinely formed, tired and disgusted with the unexpected evils they have experienced, and anxious to remove them as far as possible, are very apt to run into the opposite extreme; and the people of the Eastern States, setting out with more republican principles, have consequently been more disappointed than we have been....
156. The Virginia Plan
Records of the Federal Convention (Farrand), I, 20-22, for May 29. For history of the plan, cf. American History and Government, § 202. On the opening day of the Philadelphia Convention for business Mr. Randolph, after a brilliant speech, introduced the following resolutions in behalf of the Virginia delegation.
1. Resolved that the articles of Confederation ought to be so corrected and enlarged as to accomplish the objects proposed by their institution; namely, "common defence, security of liberty and general welfare."
2. Resd. therefore that the rights of suffrage in the National Legislature ought to be proportioned to the Quotas of contribution, or to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem best in different cases.
3. Resd. that the National Legislature ought to consist of two branches.
4. Resd. that the members of the first branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several States every —— for the term of ——; to be of the age of —— years at least; to receive liberal stipends by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to public service; to be ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or under the authority of the United States, except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the first branch, during the term of service, and for the space of —— after its expiration; to be incapable of re-election for the space of —— after the expiration of their term of service, and to be subject to recall.
5. Resd. that the members of the second branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by those of the first, out of a proper number of persons nominated by the individual Legislatures, to be of the age of —— years at least; to hold their offices for a term sufficient to ensure their independency; to receive liberal stipends, by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to public service; and to be ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or under the authority of the United States, except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the second branch, during the term of service, and for the space of —— after the expiration thereof.
6. Resolved that each branch ought to possess the right of originating Acts; that the National Legislature ought to be impowered to enjoy the Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation and moreover to legislate in all cases to which the separate states are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation; to negative all laws passed by the several States, contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of Union; and to call forth the force of the Union against any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the articles thereof.
7. Resd. that a National Executive be instituted; to be chosen by the National Legislature for the term of —— years, to receive punctually at stated times, a fixed compensation for the services rendered, in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the Magistracy existing at the time of increase or diminution, and to be ineligible a second time; and that besides a general authority to execute the National laws, it ought to enjoy the Executive rights vested in Congress by the Confederation.
8. Resd. that the Executive and a convenient number of the National Judiciary, ought to compose a council of revision with authority to examine every act of the National Legislature before it shall operate, and every act of a particular Legislature before a Negative thereon shall be final; and that the dissent of the said Council shall amount to a rejection, unless the Act of the National Legislature be again passed, or that of a particular Legislature be again negatived by —— of the members of each branch.
9. Resd. that a National Judiciary be established to consist of one or more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National Legislature, to hold their offices during good behaviour; and to receive punctually at stated times fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution that the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to hear and determine in the first instance, and of the supreme tribunal to hear and determine in the dernier resort, all piracies and felonies of the high seas, captures from an enemy; cases in which foreigners or citizens of other States applying to such jurisdiction may be interested, or which respect the collection of the National revenue; impeachments of any National officers, and questions which may involve the national peace and harmony.
10. Resd. that provision ought to be made for the admission of States lawfully arising within the limits of the United States, whether from a voluntary junction of Government and Territory or otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the National legislature less than the whole.
11. Resd. that a Republican Government and the territory of each State, except in the instance of a voluntary junction of Government and territory, ought to be guaranteed by the United States to each State.
12. Resd. that provision ought to be made for the continuance of Congress and their authorities and privileges, until a given day after the reform of the articles of Union shall be adopted, and for the completion of all their engagements.
13. Resd. that provision ought to be made for the amendment of the Articles of Union whensoever it shall seem necessary; and that the assent of the National Legislature ought not to be required thereto.
14. Resd. that the Legislative Executive and Judiciary powers within the several States ought to be bound by oath to support the articles of Union.
15. Resd. that the amendments which shall be offered to the Confederation by the Convention, ought at a proper time, or times, after the approbation of Congress to be submitted to an assembly or assemblies of Representatives, recommended by the several Legislatures to be expressly chosen by the people to consider and decide thereon.
157. George Mason on the Convention and its Aristocratic Tendencies (June, 1787)
George Mason to George Mason, Jr.
Records of the Federal Convention (Farrand), III, 32-33
Philadelphia, June 1, 1787.
... Virginia has had the honor of presenting the outlines of the plan upon which the convention is proceeding; but so slowly that it is impossible to judge when the business will be finished, most probably not before August—festina lente may very well be called our motto. When I first came here, judging from casual conversations with gentlemen from the different States, I was very apprehensive that, soured and disgusted with the unexpected evils we had experienced from the democratic principles of our governments, we should be apt to run into the opposite extreme and in endeavoring to steer too far from Scylla, we might be drawn into the vortex of Charybdis, of which I still think there is some danger,[152] though I have the pleasure to find in the convention, many men of fine republican principles. America has certainly, upon this occasion, drawn forth her first characters; there are upon this Convention many gentlemen of the most respectable abilities, and so far as I can discover, of the purest intentions. The eyes of the United States are turned upon this assembly, and their expectations raised to a very anxious degree....
All communications of the proceedings are forbidden during the sitting of the Convention; this I think was a necessary precaution to prevent misrepresentations or mistakes; there being a material difference between the appearance of a subject in its first crude and undigested shape, and after it shall have been properly matured and arranged.
158. The New Jersey Plan
Records of the Federal Convention (Farrand), I, 242-245 (for June 15). The Convention, in committee of the whole, in two weeks of debate, had adopted nineteen resolutions based upon the fifteen in the Virginia Plan above. Action upon this report of the committee of the whole was then interrupted by the presentation of the following plan on which the "Small States" had now agreed.
Mr. Patterson [New Jersey] laid before the Convention the plan which he said several of the deputations wished to be substituted in place of that proposed by Mr. Randolph. After some little discussion of the most proper mode of giving it a fair deliberation it was agreed that it should be referred to a Committee of the Whole, and that in order to place the two plans in due comparison, the other should be recommitted. At the earnest desire of Mr. Lansing [New Jersey], and some other gentlemen, it was also agreed that the Convention should not go into Committee of the Whole on the subject till tomorrow, by which delay the friends of the plan proposed by Mr. Patterson wd. be better prepared to explain and support it, and all would have an opportunity of taking copies.—
The propositions from N. Jersey moved by Mr. Patterson were in the words following.
1. Resd. that the articles of Confederation ought to be so revised, corrected and enlarged as to render the federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government, and the preservation of the Union.
2. Resd. that in addition to the powers vested in the U. States in Congress, by the present existing articles of Confederation, they be authorized to pass acts for raising a revenue, by levying a duty or duties on all goods and merchandizes of foreign growth or manufacture, imported into any part of the U. States, by Stamps on paper, vellum or parchment, and by a postage on all letters or packages passing through the general post-Office, to be applied to such federal purposes as they shall deem proper and expedient; to make rules and regulations for the collection thereof; and the same from time to time to alter and amend in such manner as they shall think proper: to pass Acts for the regulation of trade and commerce as well with foreign nations as with each other: provided that all punishments, fines, forfeitures and penalties, to be incurred for contravening such acts rules and regulations shall be adjudged by the Common law judiciaries of the State in which any offence contrary to the true intent and meaning of such Acts rules and regulations shall have been committed or perpetrated, with liberty of commencing in the first instance all suits and prosecutions for that purpose in the superior Common law Judiciary in such State, subject nevertheless, for the correction of all errors, both in law and fact in rendering judgment, to an appeal to the Judiciary to the U. States.
3. Resd. that whenever requisitions shall be necessary, instead of the rule for making requisitions mentioned in the articles of Confederation, the United States in Congs. be authorized to make such requisitions in proportion to the whole number of white and other free citizens and inhabitants of every age sex and condition including those bound to servitude for a term of years and three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians not paying taxes; that if such requisitions be not complied with, in the time specified therein, to direct the collection thereof in the non complying States and for that purpose to devise and pass acts directing and authorizing the same; provided that none of the powers hereby vested in the U. States in Congs. shall be exercised without the consent of at least —— States, and in that proportion, if the number of Confederated States should hereafter be increased or diminished.
4. Resd. that the U. States in Congs. be authorized to elect a federal Executive to consist of —— persons, to continue in office for the term of —— years, to receive punctually at stated times a fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution, shall be made so as to affect the persons composing the Executive at the time of such increase or diminution, to be paid out of the federal treasury; to be incapable of holding any other office or appointment during their time of service and for —— years thereafter; to be ineligible a second time, and removeable by Congs. on application by a majority of the Executives of the several States; that the Executives besides their general authority to execute the federal acts ought to appoint all federal officers not otherwise provided for, and to direct all military operations; provided that none of the persons composing the federal Executive shall on any occasion take command of any troops, so as personally to conduct any enterprise as General, or in other capacity.
5. Resd. that a federal judiciary be established to consist of a supreme Tribunal the Judges of which to be appointed by the Executive, and to hold their offices during good behaviour, to receive punctually at stated times a fixed compensation for their services in which no increase or diminution shall be made, so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution; that the Judiciary so established shall have authority to hear and determine in the first instance on all impeachments of federal officers, and by way of appeal, in the dernier resort, in all cases touching the rights of Ambassadors, in all cases of captures from an enemy, in all cases of piracies and felonies on the high seas, in all cases in which foreigners may be interested, in the construction of any treaty or treaties, or which may arise on any of the Acts for regulation of trade, or the collection of the federal Revenue: that none of the Judiciary shall during the time they remain in Office be capable of receiving or holding any other office or appointment during their time of service, or for —— thereafter.
6. Resd. that all Acts of the U. States in Congs. made by virtue and in pursuance of the powers hereby and by the articles of confederation vested in them, and all Treaties made and ratified under the authority of the U. States shall be the supreme law of the respective States so far forth as those Acts or Treaties shall relate to the said States or their Citizens, and that the Judiciary of the several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the individual States to the contrary notwithstanding; and that if any State or any body of men in any State shall oppose or prevent the carrying into execution such acts or treaties, the federal Executive shall be authorized to call forth the power of the Confederated States, or so much thereof as may be necessary to enforce and compel an obedience to such Acts or an Observance of such Treaties.
7. Resd. that provision be made for the admission of new States into the Union.
8. Resd. the rule for naturalization ought to be the same in every State.
9. Resd. that a Citizen of one State committing an offence in another State of the Union, shall be deemed guilty of the sane offence as if it had been committed by a Citizen of the State in which the Offence was committed.
Adjourned
159. Hamilton's Plan
On June 18, Hamilton occupied nearly the whole session with an argument for a government stronger and more centralized even than the Virginia Plan—to meet the advocates of the New Jersey Plan by taking high ground. During this address he presented his own Plan (not what he thought attainable, but desirable). The paper given below (from Hamilton's Works, Federalist edition, I, 401 ff.) seems to have been prepared to assist the delivery of this address, as a sort of brief. The address itself is reported by Madison (Journal, for June 18) much more at length, but with many of the same phrases. The student would do well to compare the two. Copious extracts from that speech, and from other words of Hamilton in the Convention, are quoted in American History and Government, § 200.
All communities divide themselves into the few and the many. The first are the rich and well-born; the other, the mass of the people. ... The people are turbulent and changing; they seldom judge or determine right. Give therefore to the first class [the few] a distinct permanent share in the government. They will check the unsteadiness of the second; and, as they cannot receive any advantage by a change, they therefore will ever maintain good government. ... Nothing but a permanent body can check the imprudence of democracy. Their turbulent and uncontrollable disposition requires checks....
It is admitted that you cannot have a good Executive upon a democratic plan. See the excellency of the British Executive. He is placed above temptation. He can have no distinct interests from the public welfare. Nothing short of such an executive can be efficient. ... Let one body of the Legislature be constituted during good behavior or life. Let one Executive be appointed who dares execute his powers. It may be asked: Is this a republican system? It is strictly so, as long as they remain elective. And let me observe that an Executive is less dangerous to the liberties of the people when in office during life, than for seven years. ... Let electors be appointed in each of the States to elect the Legislature, to consist of two branches; and I would give them [the national legislature] the unlimited power of passing all laws, without exception. The Assembly to be elected for three years by the people in districts. The Senate to be elected by electors to be chosen for that purpose by the people, and to remain in office during life. The Executive to have the power of negativing all laws; to make war and peace, with their [Senate's] advice, but to have sole direction of all military operations, and to send ambassadors, and appoint all military officers; and to pardon all offenders, treason excepted, unless by advice of the Senate ... Supreme judicial officers to be appointed by the Executive and the Senate.
The Legislature to appoint courts in each State, so as to make the State governments unnecessary to it. All state laws which contravene the general laws to be absolutely void. An officer to be appointed in each State to have a negative on all State laws. ...
160. Character Sketches of Delegates by William Pierce
Records of the Federal Convention, III, 87 ff.
Pierce was a delegate from Georgia. It is not known just when he composed these sketches.
From New Hampshire.
Mr. Langdon is a man of considerable fortune....
From Massachusetts.
Rufus King, Natl. Gorham, Gerry and Jno. [Caleb] Strong Esquires.
Mr. King is a Man much distinguished for his eloquence and great parliamentary talents. He was educated in Massachusetts and is said to have good classical as well as legal knowledge. He has served for three years in the Congress of the United States with great and deserved applause, and is at this time high in the confidence and approbation of his Countrymen. This Gentleman is about thirty three years of age, about five feet ten Inches high, well formed, an handsome face, with a strong expressive Eye, and a sweet high toned voice. In his public speaking there is something peculiarly strong and rich in his expression, clear, and convincing in his arguments, rapid and irresistible at times in his eloquence but he is not always equal. His action is natural, swimming and graceful, but there is a rudeness of manner sometimes accompanying it. But take him tout en semble, he may with propriety be ranked among the Luminaries of the present Age.
Mr. Gorham is a Merchant in Boston....
Mr. Gerry's character is marked for integrity and perseverance. He is a hesitating and laborious speaker;—possesses a great degree of confidence and goes extensively into all subjects that he speaks on, without respect to elegance or flower of diction. He is connected and sometimes clear in his arguments, conceives well, and cherishes as his virtue, a love for his Country. Mr. Gerry is very much of a Gentleman in his principles and manners;—he has been engaged in the mercantile line and is a Man of property. He is about 37 years of age.
From Connecticut.
Saml. Johnson, Roger Sherman, and W. [Oliver] Elsworth Esquires.
Mr. Sherman exhibits the oddest shaped character I ever remember to have met with. He is awkward, un-winning, and unaccountably strange in his manner. But in his train of thinking there is something regular, deep and comprehensive; yet the oddity of his address, the vulgarisms that accompany his public speaking, and that strange New England cant that runs through his public as well as his private speaking make everything that is connected with him grotesque and laughable;—and yet he deserves infinite praise,—no Man has a better Heart or a clearer Head. If he cannot embellish he can furnish thoughts that are wise and useful. He is an able politician and extremely artful in accomplishing any particular object;—and it is remarked that he seldom fails. I am told he sits on the bench in Connecticut, and is very correct in the discharge of his Judicial functions. In the early part of his life he was a Shoe-maker;—but despising the lowness of his condition, he turned Almanack maker, and so progressed upwards to a Judge. He has been several years a Member of Congress, and discharged the duties of his Office with honor and credit to himself, and advantage to the State he represented. He is about 60.
Mr. Elsworth is a Judge of the Supreme Court in Connecticut;—he is a Gentleman of a clear, deep, and copious understanding; eloquent, and connected in public debate; and always attentive to his duty. He is very happy in a reply, and choice in selecting such parts of his adversary's arguments as he finds make the strongest impressions,—in order to take off the force of them, so as to admit the power of his own. Mr. Elsworth is about 37 years of age, a Man much respected for his integrity, and venerated for his abilities.
From New York.
Alexander Hamilton, [Robert] Yates, and W. [John] Lansing Esquires.
Colo. Hamilton is deservedly celebrated for his talents. He is a practitioner of the Law, and reputed to be a finished Scholar. To a clear and strong judgment he unites the ornaments of fancy, and whilst he is able, convincing, and engaging in his eloquence the Heart and Head sympathize in approving him. Yet there is something too feeble in his voice to be equal to the strains of oratory;—it is my opinion that he is rather a convincing Speaker, that [than] a blazing Orator. Colo. Hamilton requires time to think,—he enquires into every part of his subject with the searchings of philosophy, and when he comes forward he comes highly charged with interesting matter. There is no skimming over the surface of a subject with him, he must sink to the bottom to see what foundation it rests on.—His language is not always equal, sometimes didactic like Bolingbroke's at others light and tripping like Stern's. His eloquence is not so diffusive as to trifle with the senses, but he rambles just enough to strike and keep up the attention. He is about 33 years old, of small stature, and lean. His manners are tinctured with stiffness, and sometimes with a degree of vanity that is highly disagreeable.
Mr. Yates is said to be an able Judge. He is a Man of great legal abilities, but not distinguished as an Orator. Some of his Enemies say he is an anti-federal Man, but I discovered no such disposition in him. He is about 45 years old, and enjoys a great share of health.
Mr. Lansing is a practicing Attorney at Albany, and Mayor of that Corporation. He has a hesitation in his speech, that will prevent his being an Orator of any eminence;—his legal knowledge I am told is not extensive, nor his education a good one. He is however a Man of good sense, plain in his manners, and sincere in his friendships. He is about 32 years of age.
From New Jersey.
Wm. Livingston, David Brearly, Wm. Patterson, and Jonn. Dayton, Esquires.
Governor Livingston is confessedly a Man of the first rate talents, but he appears to me rather to indulge a sportiveness of wit, than a strength of thinking. He is however equal to anything, from the extensiveness of his education and genius. His writings teem with satyr and a neatness of style. But he is no Orator, and seems little acquainted with the guiles of policy. He is about 60 years old, and remarkably healthy.
Mr. Brearly is a man of good, rather than of brilliant parts. He is a Judge of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, and is very much in the esteem of the people. As an Orator he has little to boast of, but as a Man he has every virtue to recommend him. Mr. Brearly is about 40 years of age.
M. Patterson is one of those kind of Men whose powers break in upon you, and create wonder and astonishment. He is a Man of great modesty, with looks that bespeak talents of no great extent,—but he is a Classic, a Lawyer, and an Orator;—and of a disposition so favorable to his advancement that every one seemed ready to exalt him with their praises. He is very happy in the choice of time and manner of engaging in a debate, and never speaks but when he understands his subject well. This Gentleman is about 34 years of age, of a very low stature.
Capt. Dayton is a young Gentleman of talents, with ambition to exert them. He possesses a good education, and some reading; he speaks well, and seems desirous of improving himself in Oratory. There is an impetuosity in his temper that is injurious to him; but there is an honest rectitude about him that makes him a valuable Member of Society, and secures to him the esteem of all good Men. He is about 30 years old, served with me as a Brother Aid to General Sullivan in the Western expedition of '79.
From Pennsylvania.
Benja. Franklin, Thos. Mifflin, Robt. Morris, Geo. Clymer, Thomas Fitzsimmons, Jared Ingersol, James Wilson, Governeur Morris.
Dr. Franklin is well known to be the greatest philosopher of the present age;—all the operations of nature he seems to understand,—the very heavens obey him, and the Clouds yield up their Lightning to be imprisoned in his rod. But what claim he has to the politician posterity must determine. It is certain that he does not shine much in public Council,—he is no Speaker, nor does he seem to let politics engage his attention. He is, however, a most extraordinary Man, and tells a story in a style more engaging that anything I ever heard. Let his Biographer finish his character. He is 82 years old, and possesses an activity of mind equal to a youth of 25 years of age.
Robert Morris is a merchant of great eminence and wealth; an able Financier, and a worthy Patriot. He has an understanding equal to any public object, and possesses an energy of mind that few Men can boast of. Although he is not learned, yet he is as great as those who are. I am told that when he speaks in the Assembly of Pennsylvania, that he bears down all before him. What could have been his reason for not Speaking in the Convention I know not,—but he never spoke on any point. This Gentleman is about 50 years of age....
Mr. Fitzsimmons is a Merchant of considerable talents....
Mr. Ingersol is a very able Attorney, and possesses a clear legal understanding. He is well educated in the Classics and is a Man of very extensive reading. Mr. Ingersol speaks well, and comprehends his subject fully. There is a modesty in his character that keeps him back. He is about 36 years old.
Mr. Wilson ranks among the foremost in legal and political knowledge. He has joined to a fine genius all that can set him off and show him to advantage. He is well acquainted with Man, and understands all the passions that influence him.
Government seems to have been his peculiar Study, all the political institutions of the World he knows in detail, and can trace the causes and effects of every revolution from the earliest stages of the Grecian commonwealth down to the present time. No man is more clear, copious, and comprehensive than Mr. Wilson, yet he is no great Orator. He draws the attention not by the charm of his eloquence, but by the force of his reasoning. He is about 45 years old.
Mr. Governeur Morris is one of those Genius's in whom every species of talents combine to render him conspicuous and flourishing in public debate:—He winds through all the mazes of rhetoric, and throws around him such a glare that he charms, captivates, and leads away the senses of all who hear him. With an infinite stretch of fancy he brings to view things when he is engaged in deep argument, that render all the labor of reasoning easy and pleasing. But with all these powers he is fickle and inconstant,—never pursuing one train of thinking,—nor ever regular. He has gone through a very extensive course of reading, and is acquainted with all the sciences. No Man has more wit,—nor can any one engage the attention more than Mr. Morris. He was bred to the Law, but I am told he disliked the profession, and turned merchant. He is engaged in some great mercantile matters with his namesake Mr. Robt Morris. This Gentleman is about 38 years old, he has been unfortunate in losing one of his Legs, and getting all the flesh taken off his right arm by a scald, when a youth.
From Delaware.
John Dickinson, Gunning Bedford, Geo: Richd. Bassett, and Jacob Broom Esquires.
Mr. Dickinson has been famed through all America, for his Farmers Letters; he is a Scholar, and said to be a Man of very extensive information. When I saw him in the Convention I was induced to pay the greatest attention to him whenever he spoke. I had often heard that he was a great Orator, but I found him an indifferent Speaker. With an affected air of wisdom he labors to produce a trifle,—his language is irregular and incorrect,—his flourishes (for he sometimes attempts them), are like expiring flames, they just shew themselves and go out;—no traces of them are left on the mind to chear or animate it. He is, however, a good writer and will ever be considered one of the most important characters in the United States. He is about 55 years old, and was bred a Quaker.
Mr. Bedford was educated for the Bar, and in his profession I am told has merit. He is a bold and nervous Speaker, and has a very commanding and striking manner;—but he is warm and inpetuous in his temper, and precipitate in his judgment. [Cf. No. 161.] Mr. Bedford is about 32 years old, and very corpulent.
From Maryland.
Luther Martin, Jas. McHenry, Daniel of St. Thomas, Jenifer, and Daniel Carrol Esquires.
Mr. Martin was educated for the Bar, and is Attorney general for the State of Maryland. This Gentleman possesses a good deal of information, but he has a very bad delivery, and so extremely prolix, that he never speaks without tiring the patience of all who hear him. He is about 34 years of age.
Mr. Jenifer is a Gentleman of fortune....
Mr. Carroll is a Man of large fortune....
From Virginia.
Genl. Geo. Washington, Geo. Wythe, Geo. Mason, Jas. Maddison Jr. Jno. Blair, Edmd. Randolph, and James McLurg.
Mr. Mason is a Gentleman of a remarkable strong powers, and possesses a clear and copious understanding. He is able and convincing in debate, steady and firm in his principles, and undoubtedly one of the best politicians in America. Mr. Mason is about 60 years old, with a fine strong constitution.
Mr. Maddison is a character who has long been in public life; and what is very remarkable every Person seems to acknowledge his greatness. He blends together the profound politician, with the Scholar. In the management of every great question he evidently took the lead in the Convention, and tho' he cannot be called an Orator, he is a most agreable, eloquent, and convincing Speaker. From a spirit of industry and application which he possesses in a most eminent degree, he always comes forward the best informed Man of any point in debate. The affairs of the United States, he perhaps, has the most correct knowledge of, of any Man in the Union. He has been twice a Member of Congress, and was always thought one of the ablest Members that ever sat in that Council. Mr. Maddison is about 37 years of age, a Gentleman of great modesty,—with a remarkable sweet temper. He is easy and unreserved among his acquaintances, and has a most agreable style of conversation.
Mr. Blair is one of the most respectable Men in Virginia both on account of his Family as well as his fortune....
Mr. Randolph is Governor of Virginia,—a young Gentleman in whom unite all the accomplishments of the Scholar, and the States-man. He came forward with the postulata or first principles, on which the Convention acted, and he supported them with a force of eloquence and reasoning that did him great honor. He has a most harmonious voice, a fine person and striking manners. Mr. Randolph is about 32 years of age.
North Carolina.
Wm. Blount, Richd. Dobbs Spaight, Hugh Williamson, Wm. Davey, and Jno. [Alexander] Martin Esquires.
Mr. Blount is a character strongly marked for integrity and honor. He has been twice a Member of Congress, and in that office discharged his duty with ability and faithfulness. He is no Speaker, nor does he possess any of those talents that make Men shine;—he is plain, honest, and sincere. Mr. Blount is about 36 years of age.
Mr. Spaight is a worthy Man, of some abilities, and fortune. Without possessing a Genius to render him brilliant, he is able to discharge any public trust that his Country may repose in him. He is about 31 years of age....
South Carolina.
Jno. Rutledge, Chs. Cotesworth Pinckney, Charles Pinckney, and Pierce Butler Esquires.
Mr. Rutledge is one of those characters who was highly mounted at the commencement of the late revolution; his reputation in the first Congress gave him a distinguished rank among the American Worthies. He was bred to the Law, and now acts as one of the Chancellors of South Carolina. This Gentleman is much famed in his own State as an Orator, but in my opinion he is too rapid in his public speaking to be denominated an agreeable Orator. He is undoubtedly a man of abilities, and a Gentleman of distinction and fortune. Mr. Rutledge was once Governor of South Carolina. He is about 48 years of age.
Mr. Chas. Cotesworth Pinckney is a Gentleman of Family and fortune....
Mr. Charles Pinckney is a young Gentleman of most promising talents. He is, altho only 24 years of age, in possession of a very great variety of knowledge. Government, Law, History, and Philosophy are his favorite studies, but he is intimately acquainted with many species of polite learning....
For Georgia.
Wm. Few, Abraham Baldwin, Wm. Pierce, and Wm. Houstoun Esqrs.
Mr. Few possesses a strong natural Genius, and from application has acquired some knowledge of legal matters; and he practices at the bar of Georgia, and speaks tolerably well in the Legislature. He has been twice a Member of Congress, and served in that capacity with fidelity to his State, and honor to himself. Mr. Few is about 35 years of age.
Mr. Baldwin is a Gentleman of superior abilities, and joins in a public debate with great art and eloquence. Having laid the foundation of a compleat classical education at Harvard College, he pursues every other study with ease. He is well acquainted with Books and Characters, and has an accommodating turn of mind, which enables him to gain the confidence of Men, and to understand them. He is a practicing Attorney in Georgia, and has been twice a Member of Congress. Mr. Baldwin is about 38 years of age.
Mr. Houstoun is an Attorney at Law. ... He is a Gentleman of Family, and was educated in England. As to his legal or political knowledge, he has very little to boast of. Nature seems to have done more for his corporeal than mental powers. His person is striking....
161. One Day in the Philadelphia Convention
Madison's Journal. The day chosen was the closing day of debate on the "Connecticut Compromise" proposition, when the Convention came near disruption. For the narrative, cf. American History and Government, § 203.
Saturday, June 30th
In Convention,—Mr. Brearly [New Jersey][153] moved that the President write to the Executive of New Hampshire, informing it that the business depending before the Convention was of such a nature as to require the immediate attendance of the Deputies of that State. In support of his motion, he observed that the difficulties of the subject, and the diversity of opinions called for all the assistance we could possibly obtain. (It was well understood that the object was to add New Hampshire to the number of States opposed to the doctrine of proportional representation, which it was presumed, from her relative size, she must be adverse to.)
Mr. Patterson [New Jersey] seconded the motion.
Mr. Rutledge [South Carolina] could see neither the necessity nor propriety of such a measure. They are not unapprised of the meeting, and can attend if they choose.
Rhode Island might as well be urged to appoint and send deputies. Are we to suspend the business until the Deputies arrive? If we proceed, he hoped all the great points would be adjusted before the letter could produce its effect.
Mr. King [Massachusetts] said he had written more than once as a private correspondent, and the answer gave him every reason to expect that State would be represented very shortly, if it should be so at all. Circumstances of a personal nature had hitherto prevented it. A letter could have no effect.
Mr. Wilson [Pennsylvania] wished to know, whether it would be consistent with rule or reason of secrecy, to communicate to New Hampshire that the business was of such a nature as the motion described. It would spread a great alarm. Besides he doubted the propriety of soliciting any State on the subject, the meeting being merely voluntary.
On motion of Mr. Brearly.
New York, New Jersey, aye—2; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, no—5; Maryland divided; Pennsylvania, Delaware, Georgia, not on the floor.
The motion of Mr. Ellsworth being resumed, for allowing each State an equal vote in the second branch,—[154]
Mr. Wilson did not expect such a motion after the establishment of the contrary principle in the first branch; and considering the reasons which would oppose it, even if an equal vote had been allowed in the first branch. The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Ellsworth) had pronounced, that if the motion should not be acceded to, of all the States north of Pennsylvania one only would agree to any General Government. He entertained more favourable hopes of Connecticut and of the other Northern States. He hoped the alarms exceeded their cause, and that they would not abandon a country to which they were bound by so many strong and endearing ties. But should the deplored event happen, it would neither stagger his sentiments nor his duty. If the minority of the people of America refuse to coalesce with the majority on just and proper principles; if a separation must take place, it could never happen on better grounds. The votes of yesterday against the just principle of representation were as twenty-two to ninety of the people of America. Taking the opinions to be the same on this point, and he was sure, if there was any room for change, it could not be on the side of the majority, the question will be, shall less than one-fourth of the United States withdraw themselves from the Union, or shall more than three-fourths renounce the inherent, indisputable and unalienable rights of men, in favor of the artificial system of States? If issue must be joined, it was on this point he would choose to join it. The gentleman from Connecticut, in supposing that the preponderance secured to the majority in the first branch had removed the objections to an equality of votes in the second branch for the security of the minority, narrowed the case extremely. Such an equality will enable the minority to control, in all cases whatsoever, the sentiments and interests of the majority. Seven States will control six: seven States, according to the estimates that had been used, composed twenty-four ninetieths of the whole people. It would be in the power, then, of less than one-third to overrule two-thirds, whenever a question should happen to divide the States in that manner....
Mr. Ellsworth. The capital objection of Mr. Wilson, "that the minority will rule the majority," is not true. The power is given to the few to save them from being destroyed by the many. If an equality of votes had been given to them in both branches, the objection might have weight. Is it a novel thing that the few should have a check on the many? Is it not the case in the British Constitution, the wisdom of which so many gentlemen have united in applauding? Have not the House of Lords, who form so small a proportion of the nation, a negative on the laws, as a necessary defence of their peculiar rights against the encroachments of the Commons? No instance of a confederacy has existed in which an equality of voices has not been exercised by the members of it. We are running from one extreme to another. We are razing the foundations of the building, when we need only repair the roof. No salutary measure has been lost for want of a majority of the States to favor it. If security be all that the great States wish for, the first branch secures them. The danger of combinations among them is not imaginary. Although no particular abuses could be foreseen by him the possibility of them would be sufficient to alarm him. But he could easily conceive cases in which they might result from such combinations. Suppose, that, in pursuance of some commercial treaty or arrangement, three or four free ports and no more were to be established, would not combinations be formed in favor of Boston, Philadelphia, and some port of the Chesapeake? A like concert might be formed in the appointment of the great offices. He appealed again to the obligations of the Federal compact [Articles of Confederation] in force, and which had been entered into with so much solemnity; persuading himself that some regard would still be paid to the plighted faith under which each State, small as well as great, held an equal right of suffrage in the general councils. His remarks were not the result of partial or local views. The State he represented (Connecticut) held a middle rank.
Mr. Madison did justice to the able and close reasoning of Mr. Ellsworth, but must observe that it did not always accord with itself. On another occasion, the large States were described by him as the aristocratic States, ready to oppress the small. Now the small are the House of Lords, requiring a negative to defend them against the more numerous Commons. Mr. Ellsworth had also erred in saying that no instance had existed in which confederated states had not retained to themselves a perfect equality of suffrage. Passing over the German system, in which the King of Prussia has nine voices, he reminded Mr. Ellsworth of the Lycian confederacy, in which the component members had votes proportioned to their importance, and which Montesquieu recommends as the fittest model for that form of government. Had the fact been as stated by Mr. Ellsworth, it would have been of little avail to him, or rather would have strengthened the arguments against him; the history and fate of the several confederacies, modern as well as ancient, demonstrating some radical vice in their structure. In reply to the appeal of Mr. Ellsworth to the faith plighted in the existing federal compact, he remarked, that the party claiming from others an adherence to a common engagement, ought at least to be guiltless itself of a violation. Of all the States, however, Connecticut was perhaps least able to urge this plea. Besides the various omissions to perform the stipulated acts, from which no State was free, the Legislature of that State had, by a pretty recent vote, positively refused to pass a law for complying with the requisitions of Congress, and transmitted a copy of the vote to Congress.[155] It was urged, he said, continually, that an equality of votes in the second branch was not only necessary to secure the small, but would be perfectly safe to the large ones; whose majority in the first branch was an effectual bulwark. But notwithstanding this apparent defence, the majority of States might still injure the majority of the people. ... He admitted that every peculiar interest, whether in any class of citizens or any description of States, ought to be secured as far as possible. Wherever there is danger of attack, there ought to be given a constitutional power of defence. But he contended that the States were divided into different interests, not by their difference of size, but other circumstances; the most material of which resulted partly from climate, but principally from the effects of their having or not having slaves. These two causes concurred in forming the great division of interests in the United States. It did not lie between the large and small States. It lay between the Northern and Southern. ...
Mr. Ellsworth assured the House, that, whatever might be thought of the Representatives of Connecticut, the State was entirely Federal in her disposition. He appealed to her great exertions during the war, in supplying both men and money. The muster-rolls would show she had more troops in the field than Virginia.[156] If she had been delinquent, it had been from inability, and not more so than other States.
Mr. Sherman. Mr. Madison animadverted on the delinquency of the States, when his object required him to prove that the constitution of Congress was faulty. Congress is not to blame for the faults of the States. Their measures have been right, and the only thing wanting has been a further power in Congress to render them effectual.
Mr. Davie [North Carolina] was much embarrassed, and wished for explanations. The Report of the Committee [of the Whole], allowing the Legislatures to choose the Senate, and establishing a proportional representation in it, seemed to be impracticable. There will, according to this rule, be ninety members in the outset, and the number will increase as new States are added. It was impossible that so numerous a body could possess the activity and other qualities required in it. Were he to vote on the comparative merits of the Report, as it stood, and the amendment, he should be constrained to prefer the latter. ... Under this view of the subject, he could not vote for any plan for the Senate yet proposed. He thought that, in general, there were extremes on both sides. We were partly federal, partly national, in our union; and he did not see why the Government might not in some respects operate on the States, in others on the people.
Mr. Wilson admitted the question concerning the number of Senators to be embarrassing. If the smallest States be allowed one, and the others in proportion, the Senate will certainly be too numerous. He looked forward to the time when the smallest States will contain a hundred thousand souls at least. Let there be then one Senator in each, for every hundred thousand souls, and let the States not having that number of inhabitants be allowed one. He was willing himself to submit to this temporary concession to the small States; and threw out the idea as a ground of compromise....
Doctor Franklin. The diversity of opinions turns on two points. If a proportional representation takes place, the small States contend that their liberties will be in danger. If an equality of votes is to be put in its place, the large States say their money will be in danger. When a broad table is to be made, and the edges of planks do not fit, the artist takes a little from both, and makes a good joint. In like manner, here, both sides must part from some of their demands, in order that they may join in some accommodating proposition. He had prepared one which he would read, that it might lie on the table for consideration. The proposition was in the words following:
"That the Legislatures of the several States shall choose and send an equal number of delegates, namely ..., who are to compose the second branch of the General Legislature.
"That in all cases or questions wherein the sovereignty of individual States may be affected, or whereby their authority over their own citizens may be diminished, or the authority of the General Government within the several States augmented, each State shall have equal suffrage.
"That in the appointment of all civil officers of the General Government, in the election of whom the second branch may by the constitution have part, each State shall have equal suffrage.
"That in fixing the salaries of such officers, and in all allowances for public services, and generally in all appropriations and disposition of money to be drawn out of the general Treasury; and in all laws for supplying that Treasury, the Delegates of the several States shall have suffrage in proportion to the sums which their respective States do actually contribute to the Treasury."
Where a ship had many owners, this was the rule of deciding on her expedition. He had been one of the ministers from this country to France during the joint war, and would have been very glad if allowed to vote in distributing the money to carry it on.
Mr. King observed, that the simple question was, whether each State should have an equal vote in the second branch; that it must be apparent to those gentlemen who liked neither the motion for this quality, nor the Report as it stood, that the Report was as susceptible of melioration as the motion; that a reform would be nugatory and nominal only, if we should make another Congress of the proposed Senate; that if the adherence to an equality of votes was fixed and unalterable, there could not be less obstinacy on the other side; and that we were in fact cut asunder already, and it was in vain to shut our eyes against it. That he was, however, filled with astonishment, that, if we were convinced that every man in America was secured in all his rights, we should be ready to sacrifice this substantial good to the phantom of State sovereignty. That his feelings were more harrowed and his fears more agitated for his country than he could express; that he conceived this to be the last opportunity of providing for its liberty and happiness: that he could not, therefore, but repeat his amazement, that when a just government, founded on a fair representation of the People of America, was within our reach, we should renounce the blessing, from an attachment to the ideal freedom and importance of States. That should this wonderful illusion continue to prevail, his mind was prepared for any event, rather than sit down under a Government founded on a vicious principle of representation, and which must be as short-lived as it would be unjust. He might prevail on himself to accede to some such expedient as had been hinted by Mr. Wilson; but he never could listen to an equality of votes, as proposed in the motion.
Mr. Dayton. When assertion is given for proof, and terror substituted for argument, he presumed they would have no effect, however eloquently spoken. It should have been shown that the evils we have experienced have proceeded from the equality now objected to; and that the seeds of dissolution for the State Governments are not sown in the General Government. He considered the system on the table [Virginia Plan] as a novelty, an amphibious monster; and was persuaded that it never would be received by the people.
Mr. Martin [Maryland] would never confederate, if it could not be done on just principles [i.e., giving small States equal voice in at least one House].
Mr. Madison would acquiesce in the concession hinted by Mr. Wilson, on condition that a due independence should be given to the Senate. The plan in its present shape makes the Senate absolutely dependent on the States. The Senate, therefore, is only another edition of Congress. He knew the faults of that body, and had used a bold language against it. Still he would preserve the State rights as carefully as the trial by jury.
Mr. Bedford [Delaware] contended, that there was no middle way between a perfect consolidation, and a mere confederacy of the States. The first is out of the question; and in the latter they must continue, if not perfectly, yet equally, sovereign. If political societies possess ambition, avarice, and all the other passions which render them formidable to each other, ought we not to view them in this light here? Will not the same motives operate in America as elsewhere? If any gentleman doubts it, let him look at the votes. Have they not been dictated by interest, by ambition? Are not the large States evidently seeking to aggrandize themselves at the expense of the small? They think, no doubt, that they have right on their side, but interest has blinded their eyes. Look at Georgia. Though a small State at present, she is actuated by the prospect of soon being a great one. South Carolina is actuated both by present interest, and future prospects. She hopes, too, to see the other States cut down to her own dimensions. North Carolina has the same motives of present and future interest. Virginia follows. Maryland is not on that side of the question. Pennsylvania has a direct and future interest. Massachusetts has a decided and palpable interest in the part she takes. ... The three large States have a common interest to bind them together in commerce. But whether a combination, as we supposed, shall take place among them, in either case the small States must be ruined. We must, like Solon, make such a government as the people will approve. Will the smaller States ever agree to the proposed degradation of them? It is not true that the people will not agree to enlarge the powers of the present Congress. The language of the people has been, that Congress ought to have the power of collecting an impost, and of coercing the States where it may be necessary. On the first point they have been explicit, and, in a manner, unanimous in their declarations. And must they not agree to this, and similar measures, if they ever mean to discharge their engagements? The little States are willing to observe their engagements, but will meet the large ones on no ground but that of the Confederation. We have been told, with dictatorial air, this is the last moment for a fair trial in favor of a good government. It will be the last, indeed, if the propositions reported from the Committee go forth to the people. He was under no apprehensions. The large States dare not dissolve the Confederation. If they do, the small ones will find some foreign ally, of more honour and good faith, who will take them by the hand, and do them justice. He did not mean, by this, to intimidate or alarm. It was a natural consequence, which ought to be avoided by enlarging the Federal powers, not annihilating the Federal system. This is what the people expect. All agree in the necessity of a more efficient government, and why not make such an one as they desire?
Mr. Ellsworth. Under a National Government, he should participate in the national security, as remarked by Mr. King; but that was all. What he wanted was domestic happiness. The National Government could not descend to the local objects on which this depended. It could only embrace objects of a general nature. He turned his eyes, therefore, for the preservation of his rights, to the State Governments. From these alone he could derive the greatest happiness he expects in this life. His happiness depends on their existence, as much as a new-born infant on its mother for nourishment. If this reasoning was not satisfactory, he had nothing to add that could be so.
Mr. King was for preserving the States in a subordinate degree, and as far as they could be necessary for the purposes stated by Mr. Ellsworth. He did not think a full answer had been given to those who apprehended a dangerous encroachment on their jurisdictions. ... He could not sit down without taking some notice of the language of the honorable gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Bedford). It was not he [King] that had uttered a dictatorial language. This intemperance had marked the honorable gentleman himself. It was not he [King] who, with a vehemence unprecedented in that House, had declared himself ready to turn his hopes from our common country, and court the protection of some foreign hand. This, too, was the language of the honorable member himself. He was grieved that such an expression had dropped from his lips. The gentleman could only excuse it to himself on the score of passion. For himself, whatever might be his distress, he would never court relief from a foreign power.
Adjourned.
[The vote, taken on the opening of the next session, is recorded as follows:
"In Convention,—On the question for allowing each State one vote in the second branch, as moved by Mr. Ellsworth, it was lost, by an equal division of votes,—Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, aye—5; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, no—5; Georgia, divided (Mr. Baldwin aye, Mr. Houston, no)."
This was a tie, intentionally made so by the Georgia delegate who voted last. For this and for the final victory of the "Compromise," cf. American History and Government, § 203.]