III. AS AN ITALIAN SEES IT
In a typical form of primitive society, where institutions and ideals, collective representations and individual reactions, coincide, no distinction can be made between culture and civilization. Every element of the practical culture is a spiritual symbol, and there is no other logic or reason than that which is made manifest by the structure and habits of the social group. Life is a religion, in the two meanings of the word, that of a binding together of men, and the deeper one—of gathering the manifold activities of the individual in one compact spiritual mass. The mythical concepts, which limit and integrate the data of experience, in a sphere which is neither purely imaginative nor purely intellectual, present to the individual mind as irresistibly as to the mind of the group, a world of complementary objects which are of the same stuff as the apprehended data. Thought—practical, æsthetic, ethical—is still undifferentiated, unindividualized, as if a collective mind were an active reality, a gigantic, obscure, coherent personality, entering into definite relations with a world homogeneous with itself.
Such an abstract, ideal scheme of the life of the human spirit before it has any history, before it is even capable of history, affords, in its hypothetical indistinction (within the group, within the individual), a prefiguration of a certain higher relationship of culture with civilization, of a humana civilitas, in which the practical should be related to the spiritual, nature to the mind, in the full light of consciousness, with a perfect awareness of the processes of distinction and individualization. In the twilight and perspective of historical knowledge, if not in their actuality, Greece before Socrates, Rome before Christ, the Middle Ages before Saint Francis (each of them, before the apparition of the disrupting and illuminating element of growth), are successive attempts or étapes towards the creation of a civilization of such a kind—a human civilization.
Between these two limits—the primitive and the human—the ideal beginning and the ideal end—we can recognize, at any given moment in history, through the segmentation and aggregation of a multitude of cultures, different ages and strata of culture coexisting in the same social group; and the individual mind emerges at the confluence of the practical cultures, with science and philosophy and the ethical, non-tribal ideals, germs and initia, of the human civilization remaining above the given society as a soul that never entirely vivifies its own body. History begins where first the distinction between civilization and culture appears, or, to state the same fact from a different angle, where individual consciousness is born. It ends, ideally, where the same distinction fades away into Utopia, or death, or the Kingdom of Heaven; where the highest form of individual consciousness is at no point higher than the consciousness of the group from which it originally differentiated itself.
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The writer of these pages belongs, by birth, education, and election, to the civilization of Rome and to the culture, or cultures, of Italy. The civilization of Rome, the latina civilitas, is a complex mind, whose successive phases of growth are the abstract humanism of ancient Greece, the civic and legal humanism of Rome, the moral and spiritual humanism of the Latin church, the æsthetic and metaphysical humanism of the Renaissance. Each phase is an integration of the preceding one and the acquisition of a new universal principle, made independent of the particular social body in which it has partially realized itself before becoming a pure, intelligible ideal, an essential element of the human mind. The first three phases, Greece, Rome, and the Church, are still more or less closely associated, in relation to the forms of humanism which are peculiar to each of them, with particular cultures. But the last one, which, in its progress from the 13th century to our days, has been assimilating, purifying, and clarifying all the preceding ones, does not, at any given moment, directly connect itself with any definite social body. In its inception, as a purely Italian Renaissance, it may appear as the spiritual form of Italian society from the 13th to the 15th century; but its apparition coincides with the natural growth of the several, sharply defined European nationalities, and very soon (and apart from the evident insufficiency of any individual nation to fulfil its spiritual exigencies) it manifests its intrinsic character of universality by overflowing the frontiers of Italy and becoming the law of the whole Western European world.
The history of Europe during the last six centuries is the history of the gradual penetration of that idea within the circle of the passively or actively resistant, or inert, local, national cultures. The Reformation, of all active resistances, is the strongest and most important. The Germanic tribes rebel against the law of Rome, because a delay of from five to ten centuries in the experience of Christianity, and an experience of Christianity to be made not on a Græco-Roman, but on an Odinic background, create in them the spiritual need of an independent elaboration of the same universal principles. Germany is practically untouched by the spirit of the Renaissance until the 18th century, and Italy herself is for two centuries reduced to spiritual and political servitude by the superior material strength which accompanies and sustains the spiritual development of the nations of the North. Through the whole continent, within the single national units, as well as between nation and nation, the contrast and collaboration of the Romanic and Germanic elements, of Renaissance and Reformation, is the actual dialectic of the development of European civilization: of the successive approximations of the single cultures, or groups of cultures, in a multitude of more or less divergent directions, with alternating accelerations and involutions, towards the common form, the humana civilitas.
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Of all the nations of Europe, Italy is the only one that, however contingently and imperfectly, has actually realized all of the four phases of humanism in a succession of historical cultures: Magna Græcia, the Roman Empire, the Catholic Church, the Renaissance. And as each of these successive cultures was trying to embody in itself a universal, not a particular, principle, nationality in Italy is not, as for other nations, the acceptance of certain spiritual limits elaborated from within the social body, but a reaction to the pressure of adjoining nationalities, which presented themselves as obstacles and impediments, even within the life of Italy herself, to the realization of a super-national principle. This is the process through which the humanism of the Renaissance, after having received its abstract political form at the hands of the thinkers and soldiers of the French Revolution, becomes active and militant in Mazzini’s principle of nationality, which is a heroic effort towards the utilization of the natural growth of European nations for the purposes of a universal civilization.
The distance between that civilization and the actual cultures of the nations of Europe can easily be measured by the observer of European events during the last seven years. To that civilization belong the ideals, to those cultures, the realities, of the Great War. And all of us who have thought and fought in it have souls which are irremediably divided between that civilization and those cultures. If we should limit ourselves to the consideration of present facts and conditions, we might well give way to despair: not for a good many years in the past have nationalities been so impervious to the voice of the common spirit as they are in Europe to-day. And the sharp contrast between ideals and realities which has been made visible even to the blind by the consequences of the war, has engendered a temper of violence and cynicism even among those rare men and parties who succeeded in keeping their ideals au dessus de la mêlée, and therefore did not put them to the destructive test of a promise which had to be broken.
The moral problem which every nation of Europe will have to labour at in the immediate future, is that of the relations of its historical culture or cultures with the exigencies of the humana civilitas. It is the problem that presents itself more or less dimly to the most earnest and thoughtful of Europeans, when they speak of the coming “death of our civilization,” or of the “salvaging of civilization.” To many of them, it is still a problem of institutions and technologies: its essentially spiritual quality does not seem to have been thoroughly grasped as yet. But it is also the problem that confronts, less tragically, with less urgency, but not less inevitably, this great European Commonwealth which has created its own life on the North American continent for the space of the last three centuries.
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This European Commonwealth of America owes its origin to a small number of adventurers and pilgrims, who brought the seeds of English culture to the new world. Let us very rapidly attempt a characterization of that original culture.
England holds as peculiar and distinctive a position among the nations of Europe as Italy. She is the meeting-point of the Romanic and Germanic elements in European history; and if her culture may appear as belonging to the family of mediterranean cultures (to what we have called the latina civilitas), to an English Catholic, like Cardinal Newman, there was a time, and not very remote, when the Protestant could be proud of its Teutonic associations. From a Catholic and Franco-Norman mediæval England, logically emerges, by a process similar to that exemplified by Italy and France and Spain, the England of Henry VIII and Elizabeth, of Shakespeare and the Cavaliers: Renaissance England. She flourishes between the suppression of the monasteries and the suppression of the theatres. She moulds, for all centuries to come, the æsthetic and political mind of the English people. But she carries the germs of a widely different culture in her womb: she borrows from them, already during the Elizabethan age, some traits that differentiate her from all other Renaissance cultures. And these germs, slowly gaining impetus through contrast and suppression, ultimately work her overthrow with the short-lived triumph of Cromwell and the Puritans.
After 1688, the law of English life is a compromise between Puritan and Cavalier, between Renaissance and Reformation, which sends the extreme representatives of each type out of the country, builders of an Empire of adventurers and pilgrims—while at home the moderate Cavalier, and the moderate Puritan, the Tory and the Whig, establish a Republic with a King, and a Parliamentary feudal régime. But the successive stages of English culture do not interest us at this point, except in so far as America has always remained closer to England than to any other European nation, and has again and again relived in her own life the social, political, spiritual experiences of the Mother Country.
It is from the two main directions of English spiritual life that America, through a double process of segmentation, Elizabethan or Cavalier in the South, Puritan in the North, draws the origins of her own life. It is in the Cavalier and the Puritan, still within the circle of English life, that the germs of American culture must be sought. The peculiar relations of the Cavalier and the Puritan to the general design of European civilization define the original attitude of this Commonwealth beyond the sea towards the other European cultures, and are the origins of the curves which, modified in their development by the addition of new elements and by the action of a new, distinctive environment, American culture has described and will describe in the future.
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Puritanism is essentially a culture and not a civilization. The Puritan mind, in its quest for an original Christian experience, falls upon the Old Testament and the Ancient Law. The God of the tribes of Israel becomes its God, a God finding a complete expression in the law that rules his chosen people. A compact, immovable spiritual logic, a set of fixed standards, a rhetoric of the virtues, the identification of any element of growth and change with the power of evil, a dualistic morality, and the consequent negation of a spiritually free will, these are the characteristics of Puritanism, constituting at the same time, and with the same elements, a system of truth and a system of conduct. In both the meanings in which we have used the word religion at the beginning of this essay, Puritanism is a perfect, final religion. Transplanted to America when Europe was slowly becoming conscious of the metaphysical implications of the destruction of the old Cosmology—when the discovery of an infinite universe was depriving a purely transcendent divinity of the place it had been given beyond the limits of a finite universe—the infinite universe itself being manifest, in the words of Bruno, as lo specchio della infinita deità,—it gave birth to an intrinsically static culture, standing out against a background of transcendental thought.
The principles of growth in Puritanism were not specifically Puritan: they were those universal values that Puritan discipline succeeded in rediscovering because every moral discipline, however fettered by its premises, will inevitably be led towards them. Quite recently, a sincere and ardent apologist of Puritanism recognized in a document which he considers as the highest expression of that culture in America, a paraphrase of the Roman dulce et decorum. The irrationality which breaks through the most hermetically closed system of logic, in the process of life, asserts itself by extracting from a narrowly institutional religion values which are not dependent upon a particular set of institutions, nor are valid for one people only. But we might detect the germs of that irrationality already in the very beginnings of the system, when Milton adds the whole weight of the Roman tradition to the Puritan conception of democracy—or in the divine words of the Gospels, through which in all times and places every anima naturaliter christiana will hear the cry of Love rebelling against the letter of the Ancient Law.
What the Cavalier brought to America, we should have to investigate only if we were tracing the history of divergent directions, of local cultures: because the original soul of America is undoubtedly the Puritanic soul of New England, and the South, even before the War of Secession, in relation to the main direction, to the general culture, has a merely episodical significance. Yet, though the founders of New England were only Puritans, certain traits of the Cavalier spirit, the adventurer in the pilgrim, will inevitably reappear in their descendants, repeating the original dichotomy in the generations issuing from an apparently pure stock: partly, because a difference in beliefs is not always the mark of a fundamental difference in temperaments, and partly because those traits correspond to some of the generally human impulses suppressed by the choice of the Puritan.
There is one element which is common to Puritan and Cavalier in America, and which cannot be said to belong in precisely the same fashion to their ancestors in England. It is, in England and the rest of Europe, a mythology formed by similar hopes and desires, by a similar necessity of giving an imaginary body to certain thoughts and aspirations, on the part of the spirit of the Renaissance as well as of the spirit of the Reformation: a mythology which, in the mind of the European during the centuries between the discovery of America and the French Revolution, inhabits such regions as the island of Utopia, the city of the Sun, and the continent of America. In that mythology, Utopism and American exoticism coincide. But the adventurer and the pilgrim were actually and firmly setting their feet on one of the lands mapped in that purely ideal geography, and thoughts and aspirations confined by the European to the continent of dreams, became the moral exigencies of the new Commonwealth. Thus America set herself against Europe as the ideal against the real, the land of the free, and the refuge of the oppressed; and was confirmed in such a position by her natural opportunities, by the conditions of pioneer life, by contrast to European despotism—finally, by the Revolution and the Constitution, in which she felt that the initial moral exigencies were ultimately fulfilled. It is to this myth of a Promised Land, which is neither strictly Puritan nor strictly Cavalier, and yet at times seems to coincide with the less static aspects of Puritanism, that a peculiarly American idealism, unconquerable by defeat and even by the evidence of facts, abstract, self-confident, energetic, youthful and optimistic, owes its strength and its courage: an idealism which is hardly conscious of what Europe has been taught by centuries of dire experience—the irreparable contingency and imperfection of history; and which believes, as firmly as the Puritan legislator believes it, that such institutions have been devised, or can be devised, through which the ideal law, when thought out and written, will not fail to become the law of reality for all times to come.
From two contrasting elements, a firm belief in a Law which was at the beginning, and a romantic mythology, a third characteristic of the American mind is thus engendered: a full confidence in the power of intellect conceived as a mechanism apt to contrive practical schemes for the accomplishment of ideal ends. This intellectual faith is similar in its static nature to the moral faith of the Puritan: it is the material weapon of Puritanism. Perfectibility is within its reach, but not the actual processes of evolution. The intellect that does not conceive itself as a process or function, but as a mechanism, can tend towards, and theoretically possess, a state of perfection, but will resent and condemn the gropings and failings of actual, imperfect growth and change. Not without reason, the greatest individual tragedy of the war, in a typically American mind confronted with the sins and misery of Europe, was a tragedy of intellectual pride: of the inability of a static intellect to become charitably active in the tragic flux of European life; a tragedy which a little moral and intellectual humility might well have spared to the generous hopes of America, and the childish, messianic faith which irradiated for only too short a time the bleeding soul of Europe.
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If we have called Puritanism a culture, what name shall we reserve for that vast and complicated collection of mechanical contrivances which constitute the material body of American society to-day? We are in the presence of a technology, a more highly developed one, perhaps (with the possible exception of Germany before the war), than any that has ever existed in the world. Technologies have a logic of their own, and that logic is apt to take the place of higher spiritual constructions; either when conditions of life lend a miraculous character to the means of sustaining life itself and invest the practical actions of hunting or agriculture with a religious significance; or when the complexity of their organization is such that the workings of that practical logic inevitably transcend the power of observation of the individual agent, however highly placed in the machinery itself, and moral or intellectual myths are born of an imperfect knowledge. This is the case of America, and in America this technological or industrial mythology has crushed out of existence the rival myths of the farms and the prairie, allowing them a purely romantic value and decorative function, through the industrially controlled power of the press. Even pioneering, and the conquest of the West, a process in which Americans of another age found an energetic, if partly vicarious, satisfaction for certain moral and ideal yearnings, has receded, in the mind of Americans of to-day, into the shades of a fabulous and solemn background.
The industrial revolution followed in America the lines of development of its early English model. This commonwealth beyond the sea, agricultural and democratic, found in itself the same elements which gave birth in the original country to an industrial feudalism, grafting itself, without any solution of continuity, on a feudalism of the land. The ineradicable optimism of the American invested the whole process with the same halo of moral romance which had coloured the age of pioneering, and accepted as a useful substitute (or rather, as a new content) for Puritanic moralism the philosophy of opportunity and of success constantly commensurate with true merit. The conception of intellect as a mechanism to be used for moral and ideal ends, gave way to a similar though more complex conception, modelled not on the methods of pure science, from whose early conquests the revolution itself had been started, but on those of applied science or of practical machinery.
When, in the natural course of events, the bonds which kept together the purely economic elements of the country became more powerful and real than any system of political institutions, when, in fact, a financial syndicalism became the structure underlying the apparent organs of government, all the original ideals of America had already gathered to the defence of the new order. Hence the extraordinary solidity of the prevailing economic system in this country, when compared with any European country. Economic, as well as political systems, ultimately rest on convictions rather than on sheer force, and the radical in America, in all spheres of thought, is constantly in the necessity of fighting not mere institutions, as in Europe, but institutionalized ideals, organisms and personalities which establish their right on the same assumptions which prompt him in his rebellion. There is less difference in fundamentals between a Carnegie and a Debs than between any two individuals placed in similar positions in Europe.
An interesting by-product of this particular development is the myth of the captain of industry, possessed, in the popular imagination, of all the virtues. And a consequence of this myth is an unavoidable revision of the catalogue of virtues, from which some were expunged that do not lead to industrial success, and others were admitted because industrial success is thought to be impossible without them. This myth is not believed in by the aspiring multitudes only, but by a good many among the captains of industry themselves, who accept their wealth as a social trust, and conceive of their function in a manner not dissimilar from that of the old sovereign by the grace of God.
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This transposition of ideals from the religious and moral field to the practical and economic, leaves only a very thin ground for personal piety and the religion of the Churches. Yet there is no country in the world (again, with the only possible exception of Northern Africa during the first centuries of the Christian Era) which has produced such a wealth and such a variety of religious movements as America. The substance of that very thin ground is diluted Puritanism, Puritanism which, in a vast majority of the population, converts itself, strangely enough, as we have seen, into social optimism, a belief sufficient to the great active masses, but not to the needs of “the heart,” when the heart is given enough leisure to consider itself, through either too much wealth or too little hope: through the discovery of its emptiness, when the possession of the means makes manifest the absence of an end, or through the spasms of its hunger, when means are beyond reach, in the hands of the supposed inferior and unworthy. In this second case, even a purely sensual craving dignifies itself with the name of the Spirit. The more or less official Churches, in an attempt to retain the allegiance of their vast congregations, have followed the masses in their evolution: they pride themselves essentially on their social achievements, a little doubtfully, perhaps, knowing that their particular God has no more reason to inhabit a church than a factory, and that the highest possible embodiment of their doctrine is an orderly and paternally governed industrial organization.
To the needs of “the heart” minister the innumerable sects (and here again, the American religious history repeats, in magnified proportions, the characteristics of English religious life). But because of the gradual impoverishment of the central religious tradition of the country, because of the scanty cultural background of both apostles and neophytes, it is hard to recognize in the whole movement an intimate spiritual dialectic which might lend strength and significance to the individual sects. A vague mysticism appropriates to itself, in a haphazard and capricious fashion, shadows and ghosts of religious experiences and opinions, whose germs of truth lie in other ages and other climates. The only common feature seems to be a distrust of intellect, derived from the original divorce of the intellectual from the spiritual in the Puritan, a distrust which at times becomes active in the denunciation of the supposed crimes of science. It is this fundamental common feature which will for ever prevent any of them from becoming what all sects fail to be, a religion.
The two states of mind which are nearer to-day to being true religions are, on one side, Americanism (a religion as a common bond), and on the other, Radicalism (a religion as a personal experience). Americanism is the more or less perfect expression of the common belief that American ideals realize themselves in American society. Radicalism is the more or less spasmodic protest against such a belief, sometimes coupled with an individual attempt at realizing those ideals in one’s life and actions. The sharpest contrast between the two attitudes is to be found in their ideas of political and spiritual freedom; which to one is a condition actually existing by the mere fact of the existence of American society such as it is, and to the other a dynamic principle which can never be permanently associated with any particular set of institutions.
The original spirit of Puritanism can hardly be said to be alive to-day in America. In a few intellectuals, it confuses itself with other high forms of moral discipline in the past, and reappears with a strange fidelity to form rather than substance, as Platonism, Classicism, Mediævalism, Catholicism, or any other set of fixed standards that can be accepted as a whole, and can give the soul that sense of security which is inherent in the illusion of possessing the final truth. The consequence of such a deviation is that these truly religious souls, after having satisfied themselves with a sufficiently vast and beautiful interpretation of their creed, resent any cruder and more dangerous form of intellectual experience much more keenly than they resent crudities and dangers actually present in the nature of things. They are intellectuals, but again, with no faith in intellect; they are truly isolated among their fellow-countrymen, and yet they believe in conformity, and assume the conformity of American society to be the conformity of their dreams.
Such a static apprehension of truth, such an identification of universal spiritual values with one or another particular tradition, is in fact as much an obstacle to the new life of the human spirit as the external conformity enforced by social optimism. But the polemic against the older intellectuals is carried on by younger men, many of them of recent immigrant blood, but all of them reared in the atmosphere of American culture, and who differ from them more in the objects of their preference than in the vastness or depth of their outlook. There is a way of clinging to the latest fashion in philosophy or in art which is not a progress in any sense in relation to older faiths; of combating a manifest logical fallacy by the use of the same sophism; of embracing sin with the same moral enthusiasm that in less enlightened times was kept in reserve for the highest virtues only.
More important, for their influence on certain phases of American life, than these intellectual echoes, are the moralistic remnants of Puritanism. It is always possible, for small groups of people, strongly endowed with the sense of other people’s duties, to intimidate large sections of public opinion into accepting the logical consequences of certain undisputed moral assumptions, however widely they may differ from the realities of American life. It is under such circumstances that the kind-hearted, easy-going American pays the penalty for his identification of realities with ideals, by being deprived of some very dear reality in the name of an ideal which had long since ceased to have any meaning for him.
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From whatever side we look at American culture, we are constantly brought face to face with a disregard or distrust, or a narrow conception, of purely intellectual values, which seems to be the common characteristic of widely divergent spiritual attitudes. The American does not, as the Englishman, glory in his capacity for muddling through: he is proud of certain logical achievements, and has a fondness for abstract schemes, an earnest belief in their validity and efficiency; but no more than the English does he believe that intellect is an integral part of the human personality. He recognizes the identity of goodness and truth, provided that truth can be found out by other means than purely intellectual: by common sense, by revelation, by instinct, by imagination, but not by intellect. It is here that even the defenders, among Americans, of the classical tradition miss the true meaning of the message of Socrates and Plato, the foundation of humanism.
What is peculiarly American in the opinions of American philosophers is a clear and distinct expression of the common attitude. The official philosophy of America has repeated for a century the views of English empiricists and of German idealists, sometimes with very interesting and illuminating personal variations. It has even, and it is an original achievement, brought them to lose their peculiar accents and to coincide in new theories of knowledge. But the heart of American philosophy is not there: it is in pragmatism, in instrumentalism, in whatever other theory clearly establishes the purely functional character of truth, the mechanical aspect of intellect. Having put the criterion of truth outside the intellect, and considered intellect as the mere mechanism of belief, these doctrines try to re-establish the dignity of intellect by making of it a machine for the reproduction of morally or socially useful beliefs. The operation is similar to that of an anatomist who, having extracted the heart from a living body, would presume to reconstruct the body by artificially promoting the movements of the heart. The doctrine of the purely pragmatic or instrumental nature of intellect, which is the logical clarification of the popular conception, is a doctrine of radical scepticism, whatever the particular declarations of faith of the philosophers themselves might say to the contrary: it destroys not the objects of knowledge only, but the instrument itself.
American philosophers came to this doctrine through the psychological and sociological approach to the problems of the mind. Such an approach is in keeping with the general tendency towards assuming the form of natural and mathematical sciences, which moral sciences in American universities have been obeying during the last thirty or forty years, partly under the influence of a certain kind of European positivism, and partly because of the prestige that natural and mathematical sciences gained from their practical applications. Even now it is easier to find a truly humanistic mind, a sound conception of intellectual values, among the great American scientists than among the philosophers and philologists: but pure science has become the most solitary of occupations, and the scientist the most remote of men, since his place in society has been taken by the inventor and by the popularizer. Psychology and sociology, those half-literary, half-scientific disciplines, gave as a basis to philosophy not the individual effort to understand and to think, but the positive observation of the more or less involuntary processes of thought in the multitude. Intellect was sacrificed to a democratic idea of the equality of minds: how could the philosopher presume to think, I do not say better or more efficiently than, but differently from the multitude? To European philosophy the reproach has been made again and again, and with some justice, of imposing laws upon reality which are only the laws of individual philosophic thought; and yet what else does the scientist ultimately do? But both scientist and philosopher find their justification in their faith in the validity of their instruments: in a spirit of devotion and humility, not in a gratuitous presumption. The typical American philosopher has sold his birthright, not for a pottage of lentils, but for mere love.
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I am painfully aware of the fact that, through the meshes of this necessarily abstract and sketchy analysis, a good deal of the beauty and vastness, the vigour and good-humour of American life inevitably escapes. The traveller from the old countries experiences here a sense of great spaces and of practically unbounded possibilities, which reflects itself in an unparalleled gaiety and openness of heart, and freedom of social intercourse. The true meaning of the doctrine of opportunity lies much more in these individual attitudes than in any difference between the structures of American and European societies. And I do not believe that the only explanation for them is in the prosperity of America when compared to the misery of Europe, because this generosity stands in no direct relation with individual wealth. The lumberman and the longshoreman are as good as, if not better than, the millionaire.
These individual attitudes find their collective expression in the idea of, and readiness for, service, which is universal in this country. Churches, political parties, movements for social reform, fraternal orders, industrial and business organizations, meet on this common ground. There is no material interest or spiritual prejudice that will not yield to an appeal for service: and whenever the object of service is clearly defined, action follows the impulse, intolerant of any delay. But Service is a means and not an end: you can serve a God, or a man, or a group of men, and in that man or group of men what you conceive to be his or their need, but you cannot serve Service. And the common end can only be given by a clear intellectual vision of the relations between a set of ideals and the realities of life.
This intrinsic generosity of the American people is the motive of the song, and the substance of the ideal, of the one great poet that America has added to the small family of European poets: Walt Whitman. In him that feeling and that impulse became a vision and a prophecy. There is a habit on the part of American intellectuals to look with a slight contempt on the admiration of Europeans for the poetry of Walt Whitman, as just another symptom of their ignorance of American things. But I, for one, will confess that what I have loved passionately, as little more than a boy, in that poetry, is that same quality whose presence I have now recognized as the human flower of American culture, and which makes me love this country as passionately as I loved that poetry.
It is one of the many paradoxes of American intellectual life that even the cultural preparation of a Walt Whitman should have been deeper and more substantial, if not more systematic, than that of any professor or writer of his times. These were minds which had as fully imbibed European thought and imagination as any professor or writer in Europe: but that thought, that imagination, transplanted to the new country, stood in no real relation with the new practical and moral surroundings, and were therefore thin and sterile. Walt Whitman knew and understood the great traditions of European civilization, and tried to express them in the original idiom, moral and literary, of his America.
But nemo propheta, and it takes centuries to understand a poet. Walt Whitman still waits for his own generation. The modern schools of American poetry, curious of all winds of fashion, working for the day rather than for the times, have not yet fully grasped, I do not say the spirit of his message, but even, for all their free-versifying, the mystery of his magnificent rhythms. His successors are rather among some of the younger novelists, and in a few men, spiritually related to them, who approach the study of American conditions from a combined economic and psychological point of view. The novelists are busy in discovering the actual traits of the American physiognomy, with sufficient faith in the future to describe the shades with as much care as the lights, and with a deeper passion; the economists are making way for the highest and purest American ideals by revealing the contingent and merely psychological basis of the supposedly scientific axioms of classical economics.
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My own experience of American life, between the autumn of 1919 and the summer of 1921, has brought me in contact with all sorts and manners of people from one end to the other of the country, from the Atlantic to the Pacific. It is from this direct intercourse with Americans, rather than from my readings of American literature, continued for a much longer time, that I have formed the opinions expressed in this paper. But as my work has brought me in closer communion with colleges and universities than with any other kind of institutions, I feel a little more assured in writing of the educational aspect of the American problem.
A university is in any case more a universitas studentium than a corporation of professors. I have enjoyed my life in American faculties, and I have gained a good deal from the many noble souls and intellects that I have met among them; but, whenever it has been possible to me, I have escaped from the faculties to the students and tried to understand the tendencies of the coming generations.
The students of the American college or university, from the comparatively ancient institutions of the East, to the young co-educational schools of the Middle and Far West, form a fairly homogeneous, though very widely representative, cross-section of the American community. They are, in a very precise and inclusive meaning, young America, the America of to-morrow. A good many of their intellectual and spiritual characteristics are the common traits of American culture which we have studied in the preceding paragraphs; and yet, because of the social separation of individuals according to ages, which is carried in this country much farther than in any European country, they develop also a number of independent traits, which are peculiar to each one of the “younger generations” in their turn. The life of the American boy or girl, up to the time of their entrance into college, is mainly the life of a beautiful and healthy young organism, not subject to any too strict intellectual or spiritual discipline. The High Schools seem to understand their function in a spirit which is substantially different from that of the European secondary schools, owing especially to certain prevailing educational doctrines founded on a fiction which is used also in many other fields of American life, but which in the field of education has wrought more harm than in any other one, the fiction of the public demand—in this particular case of one or another type of education. A fiction undoubtedly it is, and used to give prestige and authority to the theories of individual educationalists, since in no country and in no time there have existed educational opinions outside the circle of the educators themselves. But this fiction has unfortunately had practical consequences because American educators, subject to big business in the private institutions, and to the politicians in the State schools and universities, have not found in themselves the energy, except in a few isolated instances, to resist what came to them strengthened by such auspices. And the public itself was easily convinced that it wanted what it was told that it wanted. The students, more sinned against than sinning, enjoy the easy atmosphere of the school, and it is only when they reach college that they become aware of their absolute unpreparedness for the higher studies.
This consciousness of their inferiority manifests itself in an attitude of “low-browism,” which is not contempt of that which they think is beyond them, but rather an unwillingness to pretend that they are what they know they are not. It is practically impossible for them to acquire any standards in matters of scholarship, and they are thus forcibly thrown back on that which they know very well, the sports, and social life among themselves. A Chinese friend of mine once quaintly defined an American university as an athletic association in which certain opportunities for study were provided for the feeble-bodied. Now, in athletics and social life, the student finds something that is real, and therefore is an education: there is no pretence or fraud about football, and in their institutions within the college and the university the students obey certain standards and rules which are not as clearly justified as those of athletics, but still are made by themselves, and therefore readily understood. They are standards and rules that sometimes strangely resemble those of primitive society, as it is only too natural when the ground on which they grow is a community of the very young only, and yet undoubtedly they are a preparation for a life after college in which similar features are very far from being the exception. And besides, that social life has a freedom and beauty of its own, evident in one at least of its most hallowed institutions, the dance. American dances, with those captivating and vital rhythms which American music has appropriated for itself from the Negro, are a perfect expression of the mere joy of life. The older generations are shocked and mystified by these dances, and also by many other ways and by the implicit opinions of the young; but so they have been in all ages and countries. To a curious and passionate observer, the youth of America seems to be obscurely labouring at a liberation of the sexual life from pretences and unjustified inhibitions, and, through an original experience of the elements of love, at a creation of new values, perhaps of a new morality.
But the student is an object of perplexity and wonder to the professor, who generally ends by taking very seriously, very literally, as something that cannot be changed, his attitude towards athletics and the social life of the college. Starting from such an assumption, the professor becomes shy of teaching; that is, he keeps for himself whatever true intellectual and spiritual interests he may have, and deals out to the students in the classroom rations of knowledge, which go up to form a complicated system of units and credits symbolizing the process of education. There is, to my mind, no more tragic misunderstanding in American life.
My own experience (and I give it for what it is worth) tells me that athletics and the social life are vicarious satisfactions for much deeper spiritual and intellectual needs. The student receives from the common American tradition a desire for spiritual values; from his individual reaction to that tradition, a craving for intellectual clarity. But he is handicapped by his scholastic unpreparedness, and disillusioned by the aloofness of the professor, by the intricacies and aridity of the curriculum: by the fact, only too evident to him, that what he is given is not science or thought, but their scholastic version. Whenever a man stands before him, and without trying to “put himself at his level,” talks to him as one talks to a man, thinking for him as one thinks for oneself, there is no more ready and enthusiastic response to be had than from the American student. He is not afraid of the difficulties or dangers, but he must trust his guide, and know that his guide trusts him. There is evidence for this in the cases which are too frequent to be called mere exceptions, of those American professors who are truly popular in the colleges and universities. But until many more of them realize what splendid material is in their hands, what big thirst there is for them to quench, and go back to their work with this new faith, the gulf will not be bridged, and young America will have to attempt to solve her own problems without the help of the spiritual experience of the centuries.
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This condition in the institutions of higher learning is a symbol and a mirror of the condition of the country. With an impoverished religious tradition, with an imperfect knowledge of the power of intellect, America is starving for religious and intellectual truth. No other country in the world has, as the phrase goes, a heart more full of service: a heart that is constantly quaerens quem amet. With the war, and after the war, America has wished to dedicate herself to the world, and has only withdrawn from action when she has felt that she could not trust her leaders, what was supposed to be her mind.
In a few years, the children of the recent millions of immigrants from all regions of Europe will come forward in American life and ask for their share in the common inheritance of American tradition, in the common work of American civilization. They will not have much to contribute directly from their original cultures, but they will add an unexampled variety of bloods, of intellectual and moral temperaments, to the population of America. Their Americanization, in habits and language and manners, is a natural process which, left to itself, invariably takes place in the second generation. America must clarify and intensify her tradition, the moral discipline of the Puritan, the moral enthusiasm of the Discoverers and Pioneers, for them, and they will gladly embrace her heritage; but this clarification and intensification is only possible through the revision of the original values in the light of the central humanistic tradition of European thought.
The dreams of the European founders of this Commonwealth of Utopia may yet come true, in the way in which human dreams come true, by becoming the active, all-pervading motive of spiritual effort, the substance of life. Exiles, voluntary or forced, from England and Ireland, from Russia and Italy, from Germany and Israel, children of one mother, unified in America as they will not be unified for centuries to come in Europe, will thus have a chance to anticipate, in the civilitas americana, the future developments of the humana civilitas.
And if this generation needs a motto, I would suggest one line of Dante:
luce intellettual piena d’amore:
the light of intellect, in the fulness of love.
Raffaello Piccoli