CHAPTER V.
THE RELATIONS OF AMERICAN SLAVERY TO THE INDUSTRIAL INTERESTS OF OUR COUNTRY; TO THE DEMANDS OF COMMERCE; AND TO THE PRESENT POLITICAL CRISIS.
Present condition of Slavery—Not an isolated system—Its relations to other industrial interests—To manufactures, commerce, trade, human comfort—Its benevolent aspect—The reverse picture—Immense value of tropical possessions to Great Britain—England's attempted monopoly of Manufactures—Her dependence on American Planters—Cotton Planters attempt to monopolize Cotton markets—Fusion of these parties—Free Trade essential to their success—Influence on agriculture, mechanics—Exports of Cotton, Tobacco, etc.—Increased production of Provisions—Their extent—New markets needed.
The institution of slavery, at this moment, gives indications of a vitality that was never anticipated by its friends or foes. Its enemies often supposed it about ready to expire, from the wounds they had inflicted, when in truth it had taken two steps in advance, while they had taken twice the number in an opposite direction. In each successive conflict, its assailants have been weakened, while its dominion has been extended.
This has arisen from causes too generally overlooked. Slavery is not an isolated system, but is so mingled with the business of the world, that it derives facilities from the most innocent transactions. Capital and labor, in Europe and America, are largely employed in the manufacture of cotton. These goods, to a great extent, may be seen freighting every vessel, from Christian nations, that traverses the seas of the globe; and filling the warehouses and shelves of the merchants over two-thirds of the world. By the industry, skill, and enterprise employed in the manufacture of cotton, mankind are better clothed; their comfort better promoted; general industry more highly stimulated; commerce more widely extended; and civilization more rapidly advanced than in any preceding age.
To the superficial observer, all the agencies, based upon the sale and manufacture of cotton, seem to be legitimately engaged in promoting human happiness; and he, doubtless, feels like invoking Heaven's choicest blessings upon them. When he sees the stockholders in the cotton corporations receiving their dividends, the operatives their wages, the merchants their profits, and civilized people everywhere clothed comfortably in cottons, he can not refrain from exclaiming: The lines have fallen unto them in pleasant places; yea, they have a goodly heritage!
But turn a moment to the source whence the raw cotton, the basis of these operations, is obtained, and observe the aspect of things in that direction. When the statistics on the subject are examined, it appears that nine-tenths of the cotton consumed in the Christian world is the product of the slave labor of the United States.[14] It is this monopoly that has given to slavery its commercial value; and, while this monopoly is retained, the institution will continue to extend itself wherever it can find room to spread. He who looks for any other result, must expect that nations, which, for centuries, have waged war to extend their commerce, will now abandon that means of aggrandizement, and bankrupt themselves to force the abolition of American slavery!
This is not all. The economical value of slavery, as an agency for supplying the means of extending manufactures and commerce, has long been understood by statesmen.[15] The discovery of the power of steam, and the inventions in machinery, for preparing and manufacturing cotton, revealed the important fact, that a single island, having the monopoly secured to itself, could supply the world with clothing. Great Britain attempted to gain this monopoly; and, to prevent other countries from rivaling her, she long prohibited all emigration of skillful mechanics from the kingdom, as well as all exports of machinery. As country after country was opened to her commerce, the markets for her manufactures were extended, and the demand for the raw material increased. The benefits of this enlarged commerce of the world, were not confined to a single nation, but mutually enjoyed by all. As each had products to sell, peculiar to itself, the advantages often gained by one were no detriment to the others. The principal articles demanded by this increasing commerce have been coffee, sugar, and cotton, in the production of which slave labor has greatly predominated. Since the enlargement of manufactures, cotton has entered more extensively into commerce than coffee and sugar, though the demand for all three has advanced with the greatest rapidity. England could only become a great commercial nation, through the agency of her manufactures. She was the best supplied, of all the nations, with the necessary capital, skill, labor, and fuel, to extend her commerce by this means. But, for the raw material, to supply her manufactories, she was dependent upon other countries. The planters of the United States were the most favorably situated for the cultivation of cotton; and while Great Britain was aiming at monopolizing its manufacture, they attempted to monopolize the markets for that staple. This led to a fusion of interests between them and the British manufacturers; and to the adoption of principles in political economy, which, if rendered effective, would promote the interests of this coalition. With the advantages possessed by the English manufacturers, "Free Trade" would render all other nations subservient to their interests; and, so far as their operations should be increased, just so far would the demand for American cotton be extended. The details of the success of the parties to this combination, and the opposition they have had to encounter, are left to be noticed more fully hereafter. To the cotton planters, the co-partnership has been eminently advantageous.
How far the other agricultural interests of the United States are promoted, by extending the cultivation of cotton, may be inferred from the Census returns of 1850, and the Congressional Reports on Commerce and Navigation, for 1854.[16] Cotton and tobacco, only, are largely exported. The production of sugar does not yet equal our consumption of the article, and we import, chiefly from slave labor countries, 445,445,680 lbs. to make up the deficiency.[17] But of cotton and tobacco, we export more than two-thirds of the amount produced; while of other products of the agriculturists, less than the one forty-sixth part is exported. Foreign nations, generally, can grow their provisions, but can not grow their tobacco and cotton. Our surplus provisions, not exported, go to the villages, towns, and cities, to feed the mechanics, manufacturers, merchants, professional men, and others; or to the cotton and sugar districts of the South, to feed the planters and their slaves. The increase of mechanics and manufacturers at the North, and the expansion of slavery at the South, therefore, augment the markets for provisions, and promote the prosperity of the farmer. As the mechanical population increases, the implements of industry and articles of furniture are multiplied, so that both farmer and planter can be supplied with them on easier terms. As foreign nations open their markets to cotton fabrics, increased demands for the raw material are made. As new grazing and grain-growing States are developed, and teem with their surplus productions, the mechanic is benefited, and the planter, relieved from food-raising, can employ his slaves more extensively upon cotton. It is thus that our exports are increased; our foreign commerce advanced; the home markets of the mechanic and farmer extended, and the wealth of the nation promoted. It is thus, also, that the free labor of the country finds remunerating markets for its products—though at the expense of serving as an efficient auxiliary in the extension of slavery!
But more: So speedily are new grain-growing States springing up; so vast is the territory owned by the United States, ready for settlement; and so enormous will soon be the amount of products demanding profitable markets, that the national government has been seeking new outlets for them, upon our own continent, to which, alone, they can be advantageously transported. That such outlets, when our vast possessions Westward are brought under cultivation, will be an imperious necessity, is known to every statesman. The farmers of these new States, after the example of those of the older sections of the country, will demand a market for their products. This can be furnished, only, by the extension of slavery; by the acquisition of more tropical territory; by opening the ports of Brazil, and other South American countries, to the admission of our provisions; by their free importation into European countries; or by a vast enlargement of domestic manufactures, to the exclusion of foreign goods from the country. Look at this question as it now stands, and then judge of what it must be twenty years hence. The class of products under consideration, in the whole country, in 1853, were valued at $1,551,176,490; of which there were exported to foreign countries, to the value of only $33,809,126.[18] The planter will not assent to any check upon the foreign imports of the country, for the benefit of the farmer. This demands the adoption of vigorous measures to secure a market for his products by some of the other modes stated. Hence, the orders of our executive, in 1851, for the exploration of the valley of the Amazon; the efforts, in 1854, to obtain a treaty with Brazil, for the free navigation of that immense river; the negotiations for a military foothold in St. Domingo; and the determination to acquire Cuba. But we must not anticipate topics to be considered at a later period in our discussion.
CHAPTER VI.
Foresight of Great Britain—Hon. George Thompson's predictions—Their failure—England's dependence on Slave labor—Blackwood's Magazine—London Economist—McCullough—Her exports of cotton goods—Neglect to improve the proper moment for Emancipation—Admission of Gerrit Smith—Cotton, its exports, its value, extent of crop, and cost of our cotton fabrics—Provisions, their value, their export, their consumption—Groceries, source of their supplies, cost of amount consumed—Our total indebtedness to Slave labor—How far Free labor sustains Slave labor.
Antecedent to all the movements noticed in the preceding chapter, Great Britain had foreseen the coming increased demand for tropical products. Indeed, her West Indian policy, of a few years previous, had hastened the crisis; and, to repair her injuries, and meet the general outcry for cotton, she made the most vigorous efforts to promote its cultivation in her own tropical possessions. The motives prompting her to this policy, need not be referred to here, as they will be noticed hereafter. The Hon. George Thompson, it will be remembered, when urging the increase of cotton cultivation in the East Indies, declared that the scheme must succeed, and that, soon, all slave labor cotton would be repudiated by the British manufacturers. Mr Garrison indorsed the measure, and expressed his belief that, with its success, the American slave system must inevitably perish from starvation! But England's efforts signally failed, and the golden apple, fully ripened, dropped into the lap of our cotton planters.[19] The year that heard Thompson's pompous predictions,[20] witnessed the consumption of but 445,744,000 lbs. of cotton, by England; while, fourteen years later, she used 817,998,048 lbs., nearly 700,000,000 lbs. of which were obtained from America!
That we have not overstated her dependence upon our slave labor for cotton is a fact of world-wide notoriety. Blackwood's Magazine, January, 1853, in referring to the cultivation of the article, by the United States, says:
"With its increased growth has sprung up that mercantile navy, which now waves its stripes and stars over every sea, and that foreign influence, which has placed the internal peace—we may say the subsistence of millions in every manufacturing country in Europe—within the power of an oligarchy of planters."
In reference to the same subject, the London Economist quotes as follows:
"Let any great social or physical convulsion visit the United States, and England would feel the shock from Land's End to John O'Groats. The lives of nearly two millions of our countrymen are dependent upon the cotton crops of America; their destiny may be said, without any kind of hyperbole, to hang upon a thread. Should any dire calamity befall the land of cotton, a thousand of our merchant ships would rot idly in dock; ten thousand mills must stop their busy looms; two thousand thousand mouths would starve, for lack of food to feed them."
A more definite statement of England's indebtedness to cotton, is given by McCullough; who shows that as far back as 1832, her exports of cotton fabrics were equal in value to about two-thirds of all the woven fabrics exported from the empire. The same state of things, nearly, existed in 1849, when the cotton fabrics exported, according to the London Economist, were valued at about $140,000,000, while all the other woven fabrics exported did not quite reach to the value of $68,000,000. On consulting the same authority, of still later dates, it appears, that the last four years has produced no material change in the relations which the different classes of British fabrics, exported, bear to each other. The present condition of the demand and supplies of cotton, throughout Europe, and the extent to which the increasing consumption of that staple must stimulate the American planters to its increased production, will be noticed in the proper place.[21]
There was a time when American slave labor sustained no such relations to the manufactures and commerce of the world as it now so firmly holds; and when, by the adoption of proper measures, on the part of the free colored people and their friends, the emancipation of the slaves, in all the States, might, possibly, have been effected. But that period has passed forever away, and causes, unforeseen, have come into operation, which are too powerful to be overcome by any agencies that have since been employed.[22] What Divine Providence may have in store for the future, we know not; but, at present, the institution of slavery is sustained by numberless pillars, too massive for human power and wisdom to overthrow.
Take another view of this subject. To say nothing now of the tobacco, rice, and sugar, which are the products of our slave labor, we exported raw cotton to the value of $109,456,404 in 1853. Its destination was, to Great Britain, 768,596,498 lbs.; to the Continent of Europe, 335,271,434 lbs.; to countries on our own Continent, 7,702,438 lbs.; making the total exports, 1,111,570,370 lbs. The entire crop of that year being 1,305,152,800 lbs., gives, for home consumption, 268,403,600 lbs.[23] Of this, there was manufactured into cotton fabrics to the value of $61,869,274;[24] of which there was retained, for home markets, to the value of $53,100,290. Our imports of cotton fabrics from Europe, in 1853, for consumption, amounted in value to $26,477,950:[25] thus making our cottons, foreign and domestic, for that year, cost us $79,578,240.
In bringing down the results to 1858, it will be seen that the imports of foreign cotton goods has fluctuated at higher and lower amounts than those of 1853; and that an actual decrease of our exports of cotton manufactures has taken place since that date.[26] But in the exports of raw cotton there has been an increase of nearly a hundred millions of pounds over that of 1853—the total exports of 1859 being 1,208,561,200 lbs. The total crop of 1859, in the United States, was 1,606,800,000 lbs., and the amount taken for consumption 371,060,800 lbs.[27]
Thus, while our consumption of foreign cotton goods is not on the increase, the foreign demand for our raw cotton is rapidly augmenting; and thus the American planter is becoming more and more important to the manufactures and commerce of the world.
This, now, is what becomes of our cotton; this is the way in which it so largely constitutes the basis of commerce and trade; and this is the nature of the relations existing between the slavery of the United States and the economical interests of the world.
But have the United States no other great leading interests, except those which are involved in the production of cotton? Certainly, they have. Here is a great field for the growth of provisions. In ordinary years, exclusive of tobacco and cotton, our agricultural property, when added to the domestic animals and their products, amounts in value $1,551,176,490. Of this, there is exported only to the value of $33,809,126; which leaves for home consumption and use, a remainder to the value of $1,517,367,364.[28] The portions of the property represented by this immense sum of money, which pass from the hands of the agriculturists, are distributed throughout the Union, for the support of the day laborers, sailors, mechanics, manufacturers, traders, merchants, professional men, planters, and the slave population. This is what becomes of our provisions.
Besides this annual consumption of provisions, most of which is the product of free labor, the people of the United States use a vast amount of groceries, which are mainly of slave labor origin. Boundless as is the influence of cotton, in stimulating slavery extension, that of the cultivation of groceries falls but little short of it; the chief difference being, that they do not receive such an increased value under the hand of manufacturers. The cultivation of coffee, in Brazil, employs as great a number of slaves as that of cotton in the United States.
But, to comprehend fully our indebtedness to slave labor for groceries, we must descend to particulars. Our imports of coffee, tobacco, sugar, and molasses, for 1853, amounted in value to $38,479,000; of which the hand of the slave, in Brazil and Cuba, mainly, supplied to the value of $34,451,000.[29] This shows the extent to which we are sustaining foreign slavery, by the consumption of these four products. But this is not our whole indebtedness to slavery for groceries. Of the domestic grown tobacco, valued at $19,975,000, of which we retain nearly one-half, the Slave States produce to the value of $16,787,000; of domestic rice, the product of the South, we consume to the value of $7,092,000; of domestic slave grown sugar and molasses, we take, for home consumption, to the value of $34,779,000; making our grocery account, with domestic slavery, foot up to the sum of $50,449,000. Our whole indebtedness, then, to slavery, foreign and domestic, for these four commodities, after deducting two millions of re-exports amounts to $82,607,000.
The exports of tobacco are on the increase, as appears from [Table VIII] of [Appendix], showing an extension of its cultivation; but the exports of rice are not on the increase, from which it would appear that its production remains stationary.
By adding the value of the foreign and domestic cotton fabrics, consumed annually in the United States, to the yearly cost of the groceries which the country uses, our total indebtedness, for articles of slave labor origin, will be found swelling up to the enormous sum of $162,185,240.[30]
We have now seen the channels through which our cotton passes off into the great sea of commerce, to furnish the world its clothing. We have seen the origin and value of our provisions, and to whom they are sold. We have seen the sources whence our groceries are derived, and the millions of money they cost. To ascertain how far these several interests are sustained by one another, will be to determine how far any one of them becomes an element of expansion to the others. To decide a question of this nature with precision is impracticable. The statistics are not attainable. It may be illustrated, however, in various ways, so as to obtain a conclusion proximately accurate. Suppose, for example, that the supplies of food from the North were cut off, the manufactories left in their present condition, and the planters forced to raise their provisions and draught animals: in such circumstances, the export of cotton must cease, as the lands of these States could not be made to yield more than would subsist their own population, and supply the cotton demanded by the Northern States. Now, if this be true of the agricultural resources of the cotton States—and it is believed to be nearly the full extent of their capacity—then the surplus of cotton, to the value of more than a hundred millions of dollars, now annually sent abroad, stands as the representative of the yearly supplies which the cotton planters receive from the farmers north of the cotton line. This, therefore, as will afterward more fully appear, may be taken as the probable extent to which the supplies from the North serve as an element of slavery expansion in the article of cotton alone.
CHAPTER VII.
Economical relations of Slavery further considered—System unprofitable in grain growing, but profitable in culture of Cotton—Antagonism of Farmer and Planter—"Protection," and, "Free Trade" controversy—Congressional Debates on the subject—Mr. Clay—Position of the South—"Free Trade," considered indispensable to its prosperity.
But the subject of the relations of American slavery to the economical interests of the world, demands a still closer scrutiny, in order that the causes of the failure of abolitionism to arrest its progress, as well as the present relations of the institution to the politics of the country, may fully appear.
Slave labor has seldom been made profitable where it has been wholly employed in grazing and grain growing; but it becomes remunerative in proportion as the planters can devote their attention to cotton, sugar, rice, or tobacco. To render Southern slavery profitable in the highest degree, therefore, the slaves must be employed upon some one of these articles, and be sustained by a supply of food and draught animals from Northern agriculturists; and before the planter's supplies are complete, to these must be added cotton gins, implements of husbandry, furniture, and tools, from Northern mechanics. This is a point of the utmost moment, and must be considered more at length.
It has long been a vital question to the success of the slaveholder, to know how he could render the labor of his slaves the most profitable. The grain growing States had to emancipate their slaves, to rid themselves of a profitless system. The cotton-growing States, ever after the invention of the cotton gin, had found the production of that staple highly remunerative. The logical conclusion, from these different results, was, that the less provisions, and the more cotton grown by the planter, the greater would be his profits. This must be noted with special care. Markets for the surplus products of the farmer of the North, were equally as important to him as the supply of Provisions was to the planter. But the planter, to be eminently successful, must purchase his supplies at the lowest possible prices; while the farmer, to secure his prosperity, must sell his products at the highest possible rates. Few, indeed, can be so ill informed, as not to know, that these two topics, for many years, were involved in the "Free Trade" and "Protective Tariff" doctrines, and afforded the materiel of the political contests between the North and the South—between free labor and slave labor. A very brief notice of the history of that controversy, will demonstrate the truth of this assertion.
The attempt of the agricultural States, thirty years since, to establish the protective policy, and promote "Domestic Manufactures," was a struggle to create such a division of labor as would afford a "Home Market" for their products, no longer in demand abroad. The first decisive action on the question, by Congress, was in 1824; when the distress in these States, and the measures proposed for their relief, by national legislation, were discussed on the passage of the "Tariff Bill" of that year. The ablest men in the nation were engaged in the controversy. As provisions are the most important item on the one hand, and cotton on the other, we shall use these two terms as the representatives of the two classes of products, belonging, respectively, to free labor and to slave labor.
Mr. Clay, in the course of the debate, said: "What, again, I would ask, is the cause of the unhappy condition of our country, which I have fairly depicted? It is to be found in the fact that, during almost the whole existence of this government, we have shaped our industry, our navigation, and our commerce, in reference to an extraordinary war in Europe, and to foreign markets which no longer exist; in the fact that we have depended too much on foreign sources of supply, and excited too little the native; in the fact that, while we have cultivated, with assiduous care, our foreign resources, we have suffered those at home to wither, in a state of neglect and abandonment. The consequence of the termination of the war of Europe, has been the resumption of European commerce, European navigation, and the extension of European agriculture, in all its branches. Europe, therefore, has no longer occasion for any thing like the same extent as that which she had during her wars, for American commerce, American navigation, the produce of American industry. Europe in commotion, and convulsed throughout all her members, is to America no longer the same Europe as she is now, tranquil, and watching with the most vigilant attention, all her own peculiar interests, without regard to their operation on us. The effect of this altered state of Europe upon us, has been to circumscribe the employment of our marine, and greatly to reduce the value of the produce of our territorial labor. . . . . The greatest want of civilized society is a market for the sale and exchange of the surplus of the products of the labor of its members. This market may exist at home or abroad, or both, but it must exist somewhere, if society prospers; and, wherever it does exist, it should be competent to the absorption of the entire surplus production. It is most desirable that there should be both a home and a foreign market. But with respect to their relative superiority, I can not entertain a doubt. The home market is first in order, and paramount in importance. The object of the bill under consideration, is to create this home market, and to lay the foundation of a genuine American policy. It is opposed; and it is incumbent on the partisans of the foreign policy (terms which I shall use without any invidious intent) to demonstrate that the foreign market is an adequate vent for the surplus produce of our labor. But is it so? 1. Foreign nations can not, if they would, take our surplus produce. . . . . 2. If they could, they would not. . . . . We have seen, I think, the causes of the distress of the country. We have seen that an exclusive dependence upon the foreign market must lead to a still severer distress, to impoverishment, to ruin. We must, then, change somewhat our course. We must give a new direction to some portion of our industry. We must speedily adopt a genuine American policy. Still cherishing a foreign market, let us create also a home market, to give further scope to the consumption of the produce of American industry. Let us counteract the policy of foreigners, and withdraw the support which we now give to their industry, and stimulate that of our own country. . . . . The creation of a home market is not only necessary to procure for our agriculture a just reward of its labors, but it is indispensable to obtain a supply of our necessary wants. If we can not sell, we can not buy. That portion of our population (and we have seen that it is not less than four-fifths) which makes comparatively nothing that foreigners will buy, has nothing to make purchases with from foreigners. It is in vain that we are told of the amount of our exports, supplied by the planting interest. They may enable the planting interest to supply all its wants; but they bring no ability to the interests not planting, unless, which can not be pretended, the planting interest was an adequate vent for the surplus produce of all the labor of all other interests. . . . . But this home market, highly desirable as it is, can only be created and cherished by the protection of our own legislation against the inevitable prostration of our industry, which must ensue from the action of foreign policy and legislation. . . . . The sole object of the tariff is to tax the produce of foreign industry, with the view of promoting American industry. . . . . But it is said by the honorable gentleman from Virginia, that the South, owing to the character of a certain portion of its population, can not engage in the business of manufacturing. . . . . The circumstances of its degradation unfits it for manufacturing arts. The well-being of the other, and the larger part of our population, requires the introduction of those arts.
"What is to be done in this conflict? The gentleman would have us abstain from adopting a policy called for by the interests of the greater and freer part of the population. But is that reasonable? Can it be expected that the interests of the greater part should be made to bend to the condition of the servile part of our population? That, in effect, would be to make us the slaves of slaves. . . . . I am sure that the patriotism of the South may be exclusively relied upon to reject a policy which should be dictated by considerations altogether connected with that degraded class, to the prejudice of the residue of our population. But does not a perseverance in the foreign policy, as it now exists, in fact, make all parts of the Union, not planting, tributary to the planting parts? What is the argument? It is, that we must continue freely to receive the produce of foreign industry, without regard to the protection of American industry, that a market may be retained for the sale abroad of the produce of the planting portion of the country; and that, if we lessen the consumption, in all parts of America, those which are not planting, as well as the planting sections, of foreign manufactures, we diminish to that extent the foreign market for the planting produce. The existing state of things, indeed, presents a sort of tacit compact between the cotton-grower and the British manufacturer, the stipulations of which are, on the part of the cotton-grower, that the whole of the United States, the other portions as well as the cotton-growing, shall remain open and unrestricted in the consumption of British manufactures; and, on the part of the British manufacturer, that, in consideration thereof, he will continue to purchase the cotton of the South. Thus, then, we perceive that the proposed measure, instead of sacrificing the South to the other parts of the Union, seeks only to preserve them from being actually sacrificed under the operation of the tacit compact which I have described."
The opposition to the Protective Tariff, by the South, arose from two causes: the first openly avowed at the time, and the second clearly deducible from the policy it pursued: the one to secure the foreign market for its cotton, the other to obtain a bountiful supply of provisions at cheap rates. Cotton was admitted free of duty into foreign countries, and Southern statesmen feared its exclusion, if our government increased the duties on foreign fabrics. The South exported about twice as much of that staple as was supplied to Europe by all other countries, and there were indications favoring the desire it entertained of monopolizing the foreign markets. The West India planters could not import food, but at such high rates as to make it impracticable to grow cotton at prices low enough to suit the English manufacturer. To purchase cotton cheaply, was essential to the success of his scheme of monopolizing its manufacture, and supplying the world with clothing. The close proximity of the provision and cotton-growing districts in the United States, gave its planters advantages over all other portions of the world. But they could not monopolize the markets, unless they could obtain a cheap supply of food and clothing for their negroes, and raise their cotton at such reduced prices as to undersell their rivals. A manufacturing population, with its mechanical coadjutors, in the midst of the provision-growers, on a scale such as the protective policy contemplated, it was conceived, would create a permanent market for their products, and enhance the price; whereas, if this manufacturing could be prevented, and a system of free trade adopted, the South would constitute the principal provision market of the country, and the fertile lands of the North supply the cheap food demanded for its slaves. As the tariff policy, in the outset, contemplated the encouragement of the production of iron, hemp, whisky, and the establishment of woolen manufactories, principally, the South found its interests but slightly identified with the system—the coarser qualities of cottons, only, being manufactured in the country, and, even these, on a diminished scale, as compared with the cotton crops of the South. Cotton, up to the date when this controversy had been fairly commenced, had been worth, in the English market, an average price of from 297/10 to 484/10 cents per lb.[31] But at this period, a wide spread and ruinous depression both in the culture and manufacture of the article, occurred—cotton, in 1826, having fallen, in England, as low as 119/10 to 189/10 cents per lb. The home market, then, was too inconsiderable to be of much importance, and there existed little hope of its enlargement to the extent demanded by its increasing cultivation. The planters, therefore, looked abroad to the existing markets, rather than to wait for tardily creating one at home. For success in the foreign markets, they relied, mainly, upon preparing themselves to produce cotton at the reduced prices then prevailing in Europe. All agricultural products, except cotton, being excluded from foreign markets, the planters found themselves almost the sole exporters of the country; and it was to them a source of chagrin, that the North did not, at once, co-operate with them in augmenting the commerce of the nation.
At this point in the history of the controversy, politicians found it an easy matter to produce feelings of the deepest hostility between the opposing parties. The planters were led to believe that the millions of revenue collected off the goods imported, was so much deducted from the value of the cotton that paid for them, either in the diminished price they received abroad, or in the increased price which they paid for the imported articles. To enhance the duties, for the protection of our manufacturers, they were persuaded, would be so much of an additional tax upon themselves, for the benefit of the North; and, beside, to give the manufacturer such a monopoly of the home market for his fabrics, would enable him to charge purchasers an excess over the true value of his stuffs, to the whole amount of the duty. By the protective policy, the planters expected to have the cost of both provisions and clothing increased, and their ability to monopolize the foreign markets diminished in a corresponding degree. If they could establish free trade, it would insure the American market to foreign manufacturers; secure the foreign markets for their leading staple; repress home manufactures; force a large number of the Northern men into agriculture; multiply the growth, and diminish the price of provisions; feed and clothe their slaves at lower rates; produce their cotton for a third or fourth of former prices; rival all other countries in its cultivation; monopolize the trade in the article throughout the whole of Europe; and build up a commerce and a navy that would make us ruler of the seas.
CHAPTER VIII.
Tariff controversy continued—Mr. Hayne—Mr. Carter—Mr. Govan—Mr. Martindale—Mr. Buchanan—Sugar Planters invoked to aid Free Trade—The West also invoked—Its pecuniary embarrassments for want of markets—Henry Baldwin—Remarks on the views of the parties—State of the world—Dread of the Protective policy by the Planters—Their schemes to avert its consequences, and promote Free Trade.
To understand the sentiments of the South, on the Protective Policy, as expressed by its statesmen, we must again quote from the Congressional Debates of 1824:
Mr. Hayne, of South Carolina, said: "But how, I would seriously ask, is it possible for the home market to supply the place of the foreign market, for our cotton? We supply Great Britain with the raw material, out of which she furnishes the Continent of Europe, nay, the whole world, with cotton goods. Now, suppose our manufactories could make every yard of cloth we consume, that would furnish a home market for no more than 20,000,000 lbs. out of the 180,000,000 lbs. of cotton now shipped to Great Britain; leaving on our hands 160,000,000 lbs., equal to two-thirds of our whole produce. . . . . Considering this scheme of promoting certain employments, at the expense of others, as unequal, oppressive, and unjust—viewing prohibition as the means, and the destruction of all foreign commerce as the end of this policy—I take this occasion to declare, that we shall feel ourselves, justified in embracing the very first opportunity of repealing all such laws as may be passed for the promotion of these objects."
Mr. Carter, of South Carolina, said: "Another danger to which the present measure would expose this country, and one in which the Southern States have a deep and vital interest, would be the risk we incur, by this system of exclusion, of driving Great Britain to countervailing measures, and inducing all other countries, with whom the United States have any considerable trading connections, to resort to measures of retaliation. There are countries possessing vast capacities for the production of rice, of cotton, and of tobacco, to which England might resort to supply herself. She might apply herself to Brazil, Bengal, and Egypt, for her cotton; to South America, as well as to her colonies, for her tobacco; and to China and Turkey for her rice."
Mr. Govan, of South Carolina, said: "The effect of this measure on the cotton, rice, and tobacco-growing States, will be pernicious in the extreme:—it will exclude them from those markets where they depended almost entirely for a sale of those articles, and force Great Britain to encourage the cottons, (Brazil, Rio Janeiro, and Buenos Ayres,) which, in a short time, can be brought in competition with us. Nothing but the consumption of British goods in this country, received in exchange, can support a command of the cotton market to the Southern planter. It is one thing very certain, she will not come here with her gold and silver to trade with us. And should Great Britain, pursuing the principles of her reciprocal duty act, of last June, lay three or four cents on our cotton, where would, I ask, be our surplus of cotton? It is well known that the United States can not manufacture one-fourth of the cotton that is in it; and should we, by our imprudent legislative enactments, in pursuing to such an extent this restrictive system, force Great Britain to shut her ports against us, it will paralyze the whole trade of the Southern country. This export trade, which composes five-sixths of the export trade of the United States, will be swept entirely from the ocean, and leave but a melancholy wreck behind."
It is necessary, also, to add a few additional extracts, from the speeches of Northern statesmen, during this discussion.
Mr. Martindale, of New York, said: "Does not the agriculture of the country languish, and the laborer stand still, because, beyond the supply of food for his own family, his produce perishes on his hands, or his fields lie waste and fallow; and this because his accustomed market is closed against him? It does, sir. . . . . A twenty years' war in Europe, which drew into its vortex all its various nations, made our merchants the carriers of a large portion of the world, and our farmers the feeders of immense belligerent armies. An unexampled activity and increase in our commerce followed—our agriculture extended itself, grew and nourished. An unprecedented demand gave the farmer an extraordinary price for his produce. . . . . Imports kept pace with exports, and consumption with both. . . . . Peace came into Europe, and shut out our exports, and found us in war with England, which almost cut off our imports. . . . . Now we felt how comfortable it was to have plenty of food, but no clothing. . . . . Now we felt the imperfect organization of our system. Now we saw the imperfect distribution and classification of labor. . . . . Here is the explanation of our opposite views. It is employment, after all, that we are all in search of. It is a market for our labor and our produce, which we all want, and all contend for. 'Buy foreign goods, that we may import,' say the merchants: it will make a market for importations, and find employment for our ships. Buy English manufactures, say the cotton planters; England will take our cotton in exchange. Thus the merchant and the cotton planter fully appreciate the value of a market when they find their own encroached upon. The farmer and manufacturer claim to participate in the benefits of a market for their labor and produce; and hence this protracted debate and struggle of contending interests. It is a contest for a market between the cotton-grower and the merchant on the one side, and the farmer and the manufacturer on the other. That the manufacturer would furnish this market to the farmer, admits no doubt. The farmer should reciprocate the favor; and government is now called upon to render this market accessible to foreign fabrics for the mutual benefit of both. . . . . This, then, is the remedy we propose, sir, for the evils which we suffer. Place the mechanic by the side of the farmer, that the manufacturer who makes our cloth, should make it from our farmers' wool, flax, hemp, etc., and be fed by our farmers' provisions. Draw forth our iron from our own mountains, and we shall not drain our country in the purchase of the foreign. . . . . We propose, sir, to supply our own wants from our own resources, by the means which God and Nature have placed in our hands. . . . . But here is a question of sectional interest, which elicits unfriendly feelings and determined hostility to the bill. . . . . The cotton, rice, tobacco, and indigo-growers of the Southern States, claim to be deeply affected and injured by this system. . . . . Let us inquire if the Southern planter does not demand what, in fact, he denies to others. And now, what does he request? That the North and West should buy—what? Not their cotton, tobacco, etc., for that we do already, to the utmost of our ability to consume, or pay, or vend to others; and that is to an immense amount, greatly exceeding what they purchase of us. But they insist that we should buy English wool, wrought into cloth, that they may pay for it with their cotton; that we should buy Russia iron, that they may sell their cotton; that we should buy Holland gin and linen, that they may sell their tobacco. In fine, that we should not grow wool, and dig and smelt the iron of the country; for, if we did, they could not sell their cotton." (On another occasion, he said:) "Gentlemen say they will oppose every part of the bill. They will, therefore, move to strike out every part of it. And, on every such motion, we shall hear repeated, as we have done already, the same objections: that it will ruin trade and commerce; that it will destroy the revenue, and prostrate the navy; that it will enhance the prices of articles of the first necessity, and thus be taxing the poor; and that it will destroy the cotton market, and stop the future growth of cotton."
Mr. Buchanan, of Pennsylvania, said: "No nation can be perfectly independent which depends upon foreign countries for its supply of iron. It is an article equally necessary in peace and in war. Without a plentiful supply of it, we cannot provide for the common defense. Can we so soon have forgotten the lesson which experience taught us during the late war with Great Britain? Our foreign supply was then cut off, and we could not manufacture in sufficient quantities for the increased domestic demand. The price of the article became extravagant, and both the Government and the agriculturist were compelled to pay double the sum for which they might have purchased it, had its manufacture, before that period, been encouraged by proper protecting duties."
Sugar cane, at that period, had become an article of culture in Louisiana, and efforts were made to persuade her planters into the adoption of the Free Trade system. It was urged that they could more effectually resist foreign competition, and extend their business, by a cheap supply of food, than by protective duties. But the Louisianians were too wise not to know, that though they would certainly obtain cheap provisions by the destruction of Northern manufactures, still, this would not enable them to compete with the cheaper labor supplied by the slave trade to the Cubans.
The West, for many years, gave its undivided support to the manufacturing interests, thereby obtaining a heavy duty on hemp, wool, and foreign distilled spirits: thus securing encouragement to its hemp and wool-growers, and the monopoly of the home market for its whisky. The distiller and the manufacturer, under this system, were equally ranked as public benefactors, as each increased the consumption of the surplus products of the farmer. The grain of the West could find no remunerative market, except as fed to domestic animals for droving East and South, or distilled into whisky which would bear transportation. Take a fact in proof of this assertion. Hon. Henry Baldwin, of Pittsburgh, at a public dinner given him by the friends of General Jackson, in Cincinnati, May, 1828, in referring to the want of markets, for the farmers of the West, said, "He was certain, the aggregate of their agricultural produce, finding a market in Europe, would not pay for the pins and needles they imported."
The markets in the Southwest, now so important, were then quite limited. As the protective system, coupled with the contemplated internal improvements, if successfully accomplished, would inevitably tend to enhance the price of agricultural products; while the free trade and anti-internal improvement policy, would as certainly reduce their value; the two systems were long considered so antagonistic, that the success of the one must sound the knell of the other. Indeed, so fully was Ohio impressed with the necessity of promoting manufactures, that all capital thus employed, was for many years entirely exempt from taxation.
It was in vain that the friends of protection appealed to the fact, that the duties levied on foreign goods did not necessarily enhance their cost to the consumer; that the competition among home manufacturers, and between them and foreigners, had greatly reduced the price of nearly every article properly protected; that foreign manufacturers always had, and always would advance their prices according to our dependence upon them; that domestic competition was the only safety the country had against foreign imposition; that it was necessary we should become our own manufacturers, in a fair degree, to render ourselves independent of other nations in times of war, as well as to guard against the vacillations in foreign legislation; that the South would be vastly the gainer by having the market for its products at its own doors, to avoid the cost of their transit across the Atlantic; that, in the event of the repression or want of proper extension of our manufactures, by the adoption of the free trade system, the imports of foreign goods, to meet the public wants, would soon exceed the ability of the people to pay, and, inevitably, involve the country in bankruptcy.
Southern politicians remained inflexible, and refused to accept any policy except free trade, to the utter abandonment of the principle of protection. Whether they were jealous of the greater prosperity of the North, and desirous to cripple its energies, or whether they were truly fearful of bankrupting the South, we shall not wait to inquire. Justice demands, however, that we should state that the South was suffering from the stagnation in the cotton trade existing throughout Europe. The planters had been unused to the low prices, for that staple, they were compelled to accept. They had no prospect of an adequate home market for many years to come, and there were indications that they might lose the one they already possessed. The West Indies was still slave territory, and attempting to recover its early position in the English market. This it had to do, or be forced into emancipation. The powerful Viceroy of Egypt, Mehemet Ali, was endeavoring to compel his subjects to grow cotton on an enlarged scale. The newly organized South American republics were assuming an aspect of commercial consequence, and might commence its cultivation. The East Indies and Brazil were supplying to Great Britain from one-third to one-half of the cotton she was annually manufacturing. The other half, or two-thirds, she might obtain from other sources, and repudiate all traffic with our planters. Southern men, therefore, could not conceive of any thing but ruin to themselves, by any considerable advance in duties on foreign imports. They understood the protective policy as contemplating the supply of our country with home manufactured articles to the exclusion of those of foreign countries. This would confine the planters, in the sale of their cotton, to the American market mainly, and leave them in the power of moneyed corporations; which, possessing the ability, might control the prices of their staple, to the irreparable injury of the South. With slave labor they could not become manufacturers, and must, therefore, remain at the mercy of the North, both as to food and clothing, unless the European markets should be retained. Out of this conviction grew the war upon Corporations; the hostility to the employment of foreign capital in developing the mineral, agricultural, and manufacturing resources of the country; the efforts to destroy the banks and the credit system; the attempts to reduce the currency to gold and silver; the system of collecting the public revenues in coin; the withdrawal of the public moneys from all the banks as a basis of paper circulation; and the sleepless vigilance of the South in resisting all systems of internal improvements by the General Government. Its statesmen foresaw that a paper currency would keep up the price of Northern products one or two hundred per cent. above the specie standard; that combinations of capitalists, whether engaged in manufacturing wool, cotton, or iron, would draw off labor from the cultivation of the soil, and cause large bodies of the producers to become consumers; and that roads and canals, connecting the West with the East, were effectual means of bringing the agricultural and manufacturing classes into closer proximity, to the serious limitation of the foreign commerce of the country, the checking of the growth of the navy, and the manifest, injury of the planters.
CHAPTER IX.
Character of the Tariff controversy—Peculiar condition of the people—Efforts to enlist the West in the interest of the South—Mr. McDuffie—Mr. Hamilton—Mr. Rankin—Mr. Garnett—Mr. Cuthbert—the West still shut out from market—Mr. Wickliffe—Mr. Benton—Tariff of 1828 obnoxious to the South—Georgia Resolutions—Mr. Hamilton—Argument to Sugar Planters.
The Protective Tariff and Free Trade controversy, at its origin, and during its progress, was very different in its character from what many now imagine it to have been. People, on both sides, were often in great straits to know how to obtain a livelihood, much less to amass fortunes. The word ruin was no unmeaning phrase at that day. The news, now, that a bank has failed, carries with it, to the depositors and holders of its notes, no stronger feelings of consternation, than did the report of the passage or repeal of tariff laws, then, affect the minds of the opposing parties. We have spoken of the peculiar condition of the South in this respect. In the West, for many years, the farmers often received no more than twenty-five cents, and rarely over forty cents, per bushel for their wheat, after conveying it, on horseback, or in wagons, not unfrequently, a distance of fifty miles, to find a market. Other products were proportionally low in price; and such was the difficulty in obtaining money, that people could not pay their taxes but with the greatest sacrifices. So deeply were the people interested in these questions of national policy, that they became the basis of political action during several Presidential elections. This led to much vacillation in legislation on the subject, and gave alternately, to one and then to the other section of the Union, the benefits of its favorite policy.
The vote of the West, during this struggle, was of the first importance, as it possessed the balance of power, and could turn the scale at will. It was not left without inducements to co-operate with the South, in its measures for extending slavery, that it might create a market among the planters for its products. This appears from the particular efforts made by the Southern members of Congress, during the debate of 1824, to win over the West to the doctrines of free trade.
Mr. McDuffie, of South Carolina, said: "I admit that the Western people are embarrassed, but I deny that they are distressed, in any other sense of the word. . . . . I am well assured that the permanent prosperity of the West depends more upon the improvement of the means of transporting their produce to market, and of receiving the returns, than upon every other subject to which the legislation of this government can be directed. . . . . Gentlemen (from the West) are aware that a very profitable trade is carried on by their constituents with the Southern country, in live stock of all descriptions, which they drive over the mountains and sell for cash. This extensive trade, which, from its peculiar character, more easily overcomes the difficulties of transportation than any that can be substituted in its place, is about to be put in jeopardy for the conjectural benefits of this measure. When I say this trade is about to be put in jeopardy, I do not speak unadvisedly. I am perfectly convinced that, if this bill passes, it will have the effect of inducing the people of the South, partly from the feeling and partly from the necessity growing out of it, to raise within themselves, the live stock which they now purchase from the West. . . . . If we cease to take the manufactures of Great Britain, she will assuredly cease to take our cotton to the same extent. It is a settled principle of her policy—a principle not only wise, but essential to her existence—to purchase from those nations that receive her manufactures, in preference to those who do not. We have, heretofore, been her best customers, and, therefore, it has been her policy to purchase our cotton to the full extent of our demand for her manufactures. But, say gentlemen, Great Britain does not purchase your cotton from affection, but from interest. I grant it, sir; and that is the very reason of my decided hostility to a system which will make it her interest to purchase from other countries in preference to our own. It is her interest to purchase cotton, even at a higher price, from those countries which receive her manufactures in exchange. It is better for her to give a little more for cotton, than to obtain nothing for her manufactures. It will be remarked that the situation of Great Britain is, in this respect, widely different from that of the United States. The powers of her soil have been already pushed very nearly to the maximum of their productiveness. The productiveness of her manufactures on the contrary, is as unlimited as the demand of the whole world. . . . . In fact, sir, the policy of Great Britain is not, as gentlemen seem to suppose, to secure the home, but the foreign market for her manufactures. The former she has without an effort. It is to attain the latter that all her policy and enterprise are brought into requisition. The manufactures of that country are the basis of her commerce; our manufactures, on the contrary are to be the destruction of our commerce. . . . . It can not be doubted that, in pursuance of the policy of forcing her manufactures into foreign markets, she will, if deprived of a large portion of our custom, direct all her efforts to South America. That country abounds in a soil admirably adapted to the production of cotton, and will, for a century to come, import her manufactures from foreign countries."
Mr. Hamilton, of South Carolina, said: "That the planters in his section shared in that depression which is common in every department of the industry of the Union, excepting those from which we have heard the most clamor for relief. This would be understood when it was known that sea-island cotton had fallen from 50 or 60 cents, to 25 cents—a fall even greater than that which has attended wheat, of which we had heard so much—as if the grain-growing section was the only agricultural interest which had suffered. . . . . While the planters of this region do not dread competition in the foreign markets on equal terms, from the superiority of their cotton, they entertain a well-founded apprehension, that the restrictions contemplated will lead to retaliatory duties on the part of Great Britain, which must end in ruin. . . . . In relation to our upland cottons, Great Britain may, without difficulty, in the course of a very short period, supply her wants from Brazil. . . . . How long the exclusive production, even of the sea-island cotton, will remain to our country, is yet a doubtful and interesting problem. The experiments that are making on the Delta of the Nile, if pushed to the Ocean, may result in the production of this beautiful staple, in an abundance which, in reference to other productions, has long blest and consecrated Egyptian fertility. . . . . We are told by the honorable Speaker (Mr. Clay,) that our manufacturing establishments will, in a very short period, supply the place of the foreign demand. The futility, I will not say mockery of this hope, may be measured by one or two facts. First, the present consumption of cotton, by our manufactories, is about equal to one-sixth of our whole production. . . . . How long it will take to increase these manufactories to a scale equal to the consumption of this production, he could not venture to determine; but that it will be some years after the epitaph will have been written on the fortunes of the South, there can be but little doubt.". . . . [After speaking of the tendency of increased manufactures in the East, to check emigration to the West, and thus to diminish the value of the public lands and prevent the growth of the Western States, Mr. H. proceeded thus:] "That portion of the Union could participate in no part of the bill, except in its burdens, in spite of the fallacious hopes that were cherished, in reference to cotton bagging for Kentucky, and the woolen duty for Steubenville, Ohio. He feared that to the entire region of the West, no 'cordial drops of comfort' would come, even in the duty on foreign spirits. To a large portion of our people, who are in the habit of solacing themselves with Hollands, Antigua, and Cogniac, whisky would still have 'a most villainous twang.' The cup, he feared, would be refused, though tendered by the hand of patriotism as well as conviviality. No, the West has but one interest, and that is, that its best customer, the South, should be prosperous."
Mr. Rankin, of Mississippi, said: "With the West, it appears to me like a rebellion of the members against the body. It is true, we export, but the amount received from those exports is only apparently, largely in our favor, inasmuch as we are the consumers of your produce, dependent on you for our implements of husbandry, the means of sustaining life, and almost every thing except our lands and negroes; all of which draws much from the apparent profits and advantages. In proportion as you diminish our exportations, you diminish our means of purchasing from you, and destroy your own market. You will compel us to use those advantages of soil and of climate which God and Nature have placed within our reach, and to live, as to you, as you desire us to live as to foreign nations—dependent on our own resources."
Mr. Garnett, of Virginia, said: "The Western States can not manufacture. The want of capital (of which they, as well as the Southern States, have been drained by the policy of government,) and other causes render it impossible. The Southern States are destined to suffer more by this policy than any other—the Western next; but it will not benefit the aggregate population of any State. It is for the benefit of capitalists only. If persisted in, it will drive the South to ruin and resistance."
Mr. Cuthbert, of Georgia, said: "He hoped the market for the cotton of the South was not about to be contracted within a little miserable sphere, (the home market,) instead of being spread throughout the world. If they should drive the cotton-growers from the only source from whence their means were derived, (the foreign market,) they would be unable any longer to take their supplies from the West—they must contract their concerns within their own spheres, and begin to raise flesh and grain for their own consumption. The South was already under a severe pressure—if this measure went into effect, its distress would be consummated."
In 1828, the West found still very limited means of communication with the East. The opening of the New York canal, in 1825, created a means of traffic with the seaboard, to the people of the Lake region; but all of the remaining territory, west of the Alleghanies, had gained no advantages over those it had enjoyed in 1824, except so far as steamboat navigation had progressed on the Western rivers. In the debate preceding the passage of the tariff in 1828, usually termed the "Woolens' Bill," allusion is made to the condition of the West, from which we quote as follows:
Mr. Wickliffe, of Kentucky, said: "My constituents may be said to be a grain-growing people. They raise stock, and their surplus grain is converted into spirits. Where, I ask, is our market?. . . . Our market is where our sympathies should be, in the South. Our course of trade, for all heavy articles, is down the Mississippi. What breadstuffs we find a market for, are principally consumed in the States of Mississippi, Louisiana, South Alabama, and Florida. Indeed, I may say, these States are the consumers, at miserable and ruinous prices to the farmers of my State, of our exports of spirits, corn, flour, and cured provisions. . . . . We have had a trade of some value to the South in our stock. We still continue it under great disadvantages. It is a ready-money trade—I may say it is the only money trade in which we are engaged. . . . . Are the gentlemen acquainted with the extent of that trade? It may be fairly stated at three millions per annum."
Mr. Benton urged the Western members to unite with the South, "for the purpose of enlarging the market, increasing the demand in the South, and its ability to purchase the horses, mules, and provisions, which the West could sell nowhere else."
The tariff of 1828, created great dissatisfaction at the South. Examples of the expressions of public sentiment, on the subject, adopted at conventions, and on other occasions, might be multiplied indefinitely. Take a case or two, to illustrate the whole. At a public meeting in Georgia, held subsequently to the passage of the "Woolens' Bill," the following resolution was adopted:
Resolved, That to retaliate as far as possible upon our oppressors, our Legislature be requested to impose taxes, amounting to prohibition, on the hogs, horses, mules, and cotton-bagging, whisky, pork, beef, bacon, flax, and hemp cloth, of the Western, and on all the productions and manufactures of the Eastern and Northern States.
Mr. Hamilton, of South Carolina, in a speech at the Waterborough Dinner, given subsequently to the passage of the tariff of 1828, said:
"It becomes us to inquire what is to be our situation under this unexpected and disastrous conjunction of circumstances, which, in its progress, will deprive us of the benefits of a free trade with the rest of the world, which formed one of the leading objects of the Union. Why, gentlemen, ruin, unmitigated ruin, must be our portion, if this system continues. . . . . From 1816 down to the present time, the South has been drugged, by the slow poison of the miserable empiricism of the prohibitory system, the fatal effects of which we could not so long have resisted, but for the stupendously valuable staples with which God has blessed us, and the agricultural skill and enterprise of our people."
In further illustration of the nature of this controversy, and of the arguments used during the contest, we must give the substance of the remarks of a prominent politician, who was aiming at detaching the sugar planters from their political connection with the manufacturers. We have to rely on memory, however, as we can not find the record of the language used on the occasion. It was published at the time, and commented on, freely, by the newspapers at the North. He said: "We must prevent the increase of manufactories, force the surplus labor into agriculture, promote the cultivation of our unimproved western lands, until provisions are so multiplied and reduced in price, that the slave can be fed so cheaply as to enable us to grow our sugar at three cents a pound. Then, without protective duties, we can rival Cuba in the production of that staple, and drive her from our markets."
CHAPTER X.
Tariff controversy continued—Tariff of 1832—The crisis—Secession threatened—Compromise finally adopted—Debates—Mr. Hayne—Mr. McDuffie—Mr. Clay—Adjustment of the subject.
The opening of the year 1832, found the parties to the Tariff controversy once more engaged in earnest debate, on the floor of Congress; and midsummer witnessed the passage of a new Bill, including the principle of protection. This Act produced a crisis in the controversy, and led to the movements in South Carolina toward secession; and, to avert the threatened evil, the Bill was modified, in the following year, so as to make it acceptable to the South; and, so as, also, to settle the policy of the Government for the succeeding nine years. A few extracts from the debates of 1832, will serve to show what were the sentiments of the members of Congress, as to the effects of the protective policy on the different sections of the Union, up to that date:
Mr. Hayne, of South Carolina, said: "When the policy of '24 went into operation, the South was supplied from the West, through a single avenue, (the Saluda Mountain Gap,) with live stock, horses, cattle, and hogs, to the amount of considerably upward of a million of dollars a year. Under the pressure of the system, this trade has been regularly diminishing. It has already fallen more than one-half. . . . . In consequence of the dire calamities which the system has inflicted on the South—blasting our commerce, and withering our prosperity—the West has been very nearly deprived of her best customer. . . . . And what was found to be the result of four years' experience at the South? Not a hope fulfilled; not one promise performed; and our condition infinitely worse than it had been four years before. Sir, the whole South rose up as one man, and protested against any further experiment with this system. . . . . Sir, I seize the opportunity to dispel forever the delusion that the South can find any compensation, in a home market, for the injurious operation of the protective system. . . . . What a spectacle do you even now exhibit to the world? A large portion of your fellow-citizens, believing themselves to be grievously oppressed by an unwise and unconstitutional system, are clamoring at your doors for justice: while another portion, supposing that they are enjoying rich bounties under it, are treating their complaints with scorn and contempt. . . . . This system may destroy the South, but it will not permanently advance the prosperity of the North. It may depress us, but can not elevate them. Beside, sir, if persevered in, it must annihilate that portion of the country from which the resources are to be drawn. And it may be well for gentlemen to reflect whether adhering to this policy would not be acting like the man who 'killed the goose which laid the golden eggs.' Next to the Christian religion, I consider Free Trade, in its largest sense, as the greatest blessing that can be conferred on any people."
Mr. McDuffie, of South Carolina, said: "At the close of the late war with Great Britain, every thing in the political and commercial changes, resulting from the general peace, indicated unparalleled prosperity to the Southern States, and great embarrassment and distress to those of the North. The nations of the Continent had all directed their efforts to the business of manufacturing; and all Europe may be said to have converted their swords into machinery, creating unprecedented demand for cotton, the great staple of the Southern States. There is nothing in the history of commerce that can be compared with the increased demand for this staple, notwithstanding the restrictions by which this Government has limited that demand. As cotton, tobacco, and rice, are produced only on a small portion of the globe, while all other agricultural staples are common to every region of the earth, this circumstance gave the planting States very great advantages. To cap the climax of the commercial advantages opened to the cotton planters, England, their great and most valued customer, received their cotton under a mere nominal duty. On the other hand, the prospects of the Northern States were as dismal as those of the Southern States were brilliant. They had lost the carrying trade of the world, which the wars of Europe had thrown into their hands. They had lost the demand and the high prices which our own war had created for their grain and other productions; and, soon afterward, they also lost the foreign market for their grain, owing, partly, to foreign corn laws, but still more to other causes. Such were the prospects, and such the well-founded hope of the Southern States at the close of the late war, in which they bore so glorious a part in vindicating the freedom of trade. But where are now these cheering prospects and animating hopes? Blasted, sir—utterly blasted—by the consuming and withering course of a system of legislation which wages an exterminating war against the blessings of commerce and the bounties of a merciful Providence; and which, by an impious perversion of language, is called 'Protection.'. . . . I will not add, sir, my deep and deliberate conviction, in the face of all the miserable cant and hypocrisy with which the world abounds on the subject, that any course of measures which shall hasten the abolition of slavery, by destroying the value of slave labor, will bring upon the Southern States the greatest political calamity with which they can be afflicted; for I sincerely believe, that when the people of those States shall be compelled, by such means, to emancipate their slaves, they will be but a few degrees above the condition of slaves themselves. Yes, sir, mark what I say: when the people of the South cease to be masters, by the tampering influence of this Government, direct or indirect, they will assuredly be slaves. It is the clear and distinct perception of the irresistible tendency of this protective system to precipitate us upon this great moral and political catastrophe, that has animated me to raise my warning voice, that my fellow-citizens may foresee, and foreseeing, avoid the destiny that would otherwise befall them. . . . . And here, sir, it is as curious as it is melancholy and distressing, to see how striking is the analogy between the colonial vassalage to which the manufacturing States have reduced the planting States, and that which formerly bound the Anglo-American colonies to the British Empire. . . . England said to her American colonies 'You shall not trade with the rest of the world for such manufactures as are produced in the mother country.' The manufacturing States say to their Southern colonies, 'You shall not trade with the rest of the world for such manufactures as we produce, under a penalty of forty per cent. upon the value of every cargo detected in this illicit commerce; which penalty, aforesaid, shall be levied, collected, and paid out of the products of your industry, to nourish and sustain ours.'"
Mr. Clay, in referring to the condition of the country at large, said: "I have now to perform the more pleasing task of exhibiting an imperfect sketch of the existing state of the unparalleled prosperity of the country. On a general survey, we behold cultivation extended; the arts flourishing; the face of the country improved; our people fully and profitably employed, and the public countenance exhibiting tranquillity, contentment, and happiness. And, if we descend into particulars, we have the agreeable contemplation of a people out of debt; land rising slowly in value, but in a secure and salutary degree; a ready, though not an extravagant market for all the surplus productions of our industry; innumerable flocks and herds browsing and gamboling on ten thousand hills and plains, covered with rich and verdant grasses; our cities expanded, and whole villages springing up, as it were, by enchantment; our exports and imports increased and increasing; our tonnage, foreign and coastwise, swelled and fully occupied; the rivers of our interior animated by the perpetual thunder and lightning of countless steamboats; the currency sound and abundant; the public debt of two wars nearly redeemed; and, to crown all, the public treasury overflowing, embarrassing Congress, not to find subjects of taxation, but to select the objects which shall be liberated from the impost. If the term of seven years were to be selected, of the greatest prosperity which this people have enjoyed since the establishment of their present Constitution, it would be exactly that period of seven years which immediately followed the passage of the tariff of 1824.
"This transformation of the condition of the country from gloom and distress to brightness and prosperity, has been mainly the work of American legislation, fostering American industry, instead of allowing it to be controlled by foreign legislation, cherishing foreign industry. The foes of the American system, in 1824, with great boldness and confidence, predicted, first, the ruin of the public revenue, and the creation of a necessity to resort to direct taxation. The gentleman from South Carolina, (General Hayne,) I believe, thought that the tariff of 1824 would operate a reduction of revenue to the large amount of eight millions of dollars; secondly, the destruction of our navigation; thirdly, the desolation of commercial cities; and, fourthly, the augmentation of the price of articles of consumption, and further decline in that of the articles of our exports. Every prediction which they made has failed—utterly failed. . . . . It is now proposed to abolish the system to which we owe so much of the public prosperity. . . . . Why, sir, there is scarcely an interest—scarcely a vocation in society—which is not embraced by the beneficence of this system. . . . . The error of the opposite argument, is in assuming one thing, which, being denied, the whole fails; that is, it assumes that the whole labor of the United States would be profitably employed without manufactures. Now, the truth is, that the system excites and creates labor, and this labor creates wealth, and this new wealth communicates additional ability to consume; which acts on all the objects contributing to human comfort and enjoyment. . . . . I could extend and dwell on the long list of articles—the hemp, iron, lead, coal, and other items—for which a demand is created in the home market by the operation of the American system; but I should exhaust the patience of the Senate. Where, where should we find a market for all these articles, if it did not exist at home? What would be the condition of the largest portion of our people, and of the territory, if this home market were annihilated? How could they be supplied with objects of prime necessity? What would not be the certain and inevitable decline in the price of all these articles, but for the home market?"
But we must not burden our pages with further extracts. What has been quoted affords the principal arguments of the opposing parties, on the points in which we are interested, down to 1832. The adjustment, in 1833, of the subject until 1842, and its subsequent agitation, are too familiar, or of too easy access to the general reader, to require a notice from us here.
CHAPTER XI.
Results of the contest on Protection and Free Trade—More or less favorable to all—Increased consumption of Cotton at home—Capital invested in Cotton and Woolen factories—Markets thus afforded to the Farmer—South successful in securing the monopoly of the Cotton markets—Failure of Cotton cultivation in other countries—Diminished prices destroyed Household Manufacturing—Increasing demand for Cotton—Strange Providences—First efforts to extend Slavery—Indian lands acquired—No danger of over-production—Abolition movements served to unite the South—Annexation of territory thought essential to its security—Increase of Provisions necessary to its success—Temperance cause favorable to this result—The West ready to supply the Planters—It is greatly stimulated to effort by Southern markets—Tripartite Alliance of Western Farmers, Southern Planters, and English Manufacturers—The East competing—The West has a choice of markets—Slavery extension necessary to Western progress—Increased price of Provisions—More grain growing needed—Nebraska and Kansas needed to raise food—The Planters stimulated by increasing demand for Cotton—Aspect of the Provision question—California gold changed the expected results of legislation—Reciprocity Treaty favorable to Planters—Extended cultivation of Provisions in the Far West essential to Planters—Present aspect of the Cotton question favorable to Planters—London Economist's statistics and remarks—Our Planters must extend the culture of Cotton to prevent its increased growth elsewhere.
The results of the contest, in relation to Protection and Free Trade, have been more or less favorable to all parties. This has been an effect, in part, of the changeable character of our legislation; and, in part, of the occurrence of events in Europe, over which our legislators had no control. The manufaturing States, while protection lasted, succeeded in placing their establishments upon a comparatively permanent basis; and, by engaging largely in the manufacture of cottons, as well as woolens, have rendered home manufactures, practically, very advantageous to the South. Our cotton factories, in 1850, consumed as much cotton as those of Great Britain did in 1831; thus affording indications, that, by proper encouragement, they might, possibly, be multiplied so as to consume the whole crop of the country. The cotton and woolen factories, in 1850, employed over 130,000 work hands, and had $102,619,581 of capital invested in them. They thus afford an important market to the farmer, and, at the same time, have become an equally important auxiliary to the planter. They may yet afford him the only market for his cotton.
The cotton planting States, toward the close of the contest, found themselves rapidly accumulating strength, and approximating the accomplishment of the grand object at which they aimed—the monopoly of the cotton markets of the world. This success was due, not so much to any triumph over the North—to any prostration of our manufacturing interests—as to the general policy of other nations. All rivalry to the American planters from those of the West Indies, was removed by emancipation; as, under freedom, the cultivation of cotton was nearly abandoned. Mehemet Ali had become imbecile, and the indolent Egyptians neglected its culture. The South Americans, after achieving their independence, were more readily enlisted in military forays, than in the art of agriculture, and they produced little cotton for export. The emancipation of their slaves, instead of increasing the agricultural products of the Republics, only supplied, in ample abundance, the elements of promoting political revolutions, and keeping their soil drenched with human blood. Such are the uses to which degraded men may be applied by the ambitious demagogue. Brazil and India both supplied to Europe considerably less in 1838 than they had done in 1820; and the latter country made no material increase afterward, except when her chief customer, China, was at war, or prices were above the average rates in Europe. While the cultivation of cotton was thus stationary or retrograding, everywhere outside of the United States, England and the Continent were rapidly increasing their consumption of the article, which they nearly doubled from 1835 to 1845; so that the demand for the raw material called loudly for its increased production. Our planters gathered a rich harvest of profits by these events.
But this is not all that is worthy of note, in this strange chapter of Providences. No prominent event occurred, but conspired to advance the prosperity of the cotton trade, and the value of American slavery. Even the very depression suffered by the manufacturers and cultivators of cotton, from 1825 to 1829, served to place the manufacturing interests upon the broad and firm basis they now occupy. It forced the planters into the production of their cotton at lower rates; and led the manufacturers to improve their machinery, and reduce the price of their fabrics low enough to sweep away all household manufacturing, and secure to themselves the monopoly of clothing the civilized world. This was the object at which the British manufacturers had aimed, and in which they had been eminently successful. The growing manufactures of the United States, and of the Continent of Europe, had not yet sensibly affected their operations.
There is still another point requiring a passing notice, as it may serve to explain some portions of the history of slavery, not so well understood. It was not until events diminishing the foreign growth of cotton, and enlarging the demand for its fabrics, had been extensively developed, that the older cotton-growing States became willing to allow slavery extension in the Southwest; and, even then, their assent was reluctantly given—the markets for cotton, doubtless, being considered sufficiently limited for the territory under cultivation. Up to 1824, the Indians held over thirty-two millions of acres of land in Georgia, Mississippi, and Alabama, and over twenty millions of acres in Florida, Missouri and Arkansas; which was mostly retained by them as late as 1836. Although the States interested had repeatedly urged the matter upon Congress, and some of them even resorted to forcible means to gain possession of these Indian lands, the Government did not fulfill its promise to remove the Indians until 1836; and even then, the measure met with such opposition, that it was saved but by one vote—Mr. Calhoun and six other Southern Senators voting against it.[32] In justice to Mr. Calhoun, however, it must be stated that his opposition to the measure was based on the conviction that the treaty had been fraudulently obtained.
The older States, however, had found, by this time, that the foreign and home demand for cotton was so rapidly increasing that there was little danger of over-production; and that they had, in fact, secured to themselves the monopoly of the foreign markets. Beside this, the abolition movement at that moment, had assumed its most threatening aspect, and was demanding the destruction of slavery or the dissolution of the Union. Here was a double motive operating to produce harmony in the ranks of Southern politicians, and to awaken the fears of many, North and South, for the safety of the Government. Here, also, was the origin of the determination, in the South, to extend slavery, by the annexation of territory, so as to gain the political preponderance in the National Councils, and to protect its interests against the interference of the North.
It was not the increased demand for cotton, alone, that served as a protection to the older States. The extension of its cultivation, in the degree demanded by the wants of commerce, could only be effected by a corresponding increased supply of provisions. Without this, it could not increase, except by enhancing their price to the injury of the older States. This food did not fail to be in readiness, so soon as it was needed. Indeed, much of it had long been awaiting an outlet to a profitable market. Its surplus, too, had been somewhat increased by the Temperance movement in the North, which had materially checked the distillation of grain.
The West, which had long looked to the East for a market, had its attention now turned to the South, as the most certain and convenient mart for the sale of its products—the planters affording to the farmers the markets they had in vain sought from the manufacturers. In the meantime, steamboat navigation was acquiring perfection on the Western rivers—the great natural outlets for Western products—and became a means of communication between the Northwest and the Southwest, as well as with the trade and commerce of the Atlantic cities. This gave an impulse to industry and enterprise, west of the Alleghanies, unparalleled in the history of the country. While, then, the bounds of slave labor were extending from Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia, Westward, over Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi and Arkansas, the area of free labor was enlarging, with equal rapidity, in the Northwest, throughout Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Michigan. Thus, within these provision and cotton regions, were the forests cleared away, or the prairies broken up, simultaneously by those old antagonistic forces, opponents no longer, but harmonized by the fusion of their interests—the connecting link between them being the steamboat. Thus, also, was a tripartite alliance formed, by which the Western Farmer, the Southern Planter, and the English Manufacturer, became united in a common bond of interest: the whole giving their support to the doctrine of Free Trade.
This active commerce between the West and South, however, soon caused a rivalry in the East, that pushed forward improvements, by States or Corporations, to gain a share in the Western trade. These improvements, as completed, gave to the West a choice of markets, so that its Farmers could elect whether to feed the slave who grows the cotton, or the operatives who are engaged in its manufacture. But this rivalry did more. The competition for Western products enhanced their price, and stimulated their more extended cultivation. This required an enlargement of the markets; and the extension of slavery became essential to Western prosperity.
We have not reached the end of the alliance between the Western Farmer and Southern Planter. The emigration which has been filling Iowa and Minnesota, and is now rolling like a flood into Kansas and Nebraska, is but a repetition of what has occurred in the other Western States and Territories. Agricultural pursuits are highly remunerative, and tens of thousands of men of moderate means, or of no means, are cheered along to where none forbids them land to till. For the last few years, public improvements have called for vastly more than the usual share of labor, and augmented the consumption of provisions. The foreign demand added to this, has increased their price beyond what the planter can afford to pay. For many years free labor and slave labor maintained an even race in their Western progress. Of late the freemen have begun to lag behind, while slavery has advanced by several degrees of longitude. Free labor must be made to keep pace with it. There is an urgent necessity for this. The demand for cotton is increasing in a ratio greater than can be supplied by the American planters, unless by a corresponding increased production. This increasing demand must be met, or its cultivation will be facilitated elsewhere, and the monopoly of the planter in the European markets be interrupted. This can only be effected by concentrating the greatest possible number of slaves upon the cotton plantations. Hence they must be supplied with provisions.
This is the present aspect of the Provision question, as it regards slavery extension. Prices are approximating the maximum point, beyond which our provisions can not be fed to slaves, unless there is a corresponding increase in the price of cotton. Such a result was not anticipated by Southern statesmen, when they had succeeded in overthrowing the protective policy, destroying the United States Bank, and establishing the Sub-Treasury system. And why has this occurred? The mines of California prevented both the Free-Trade Tariff,[33] and the Sub-Treasury scheme from exhausting the country of the precious metals, extinguishing the circulation of Bank Notes, and reducing the prices of agricultural products to the specie value. At the date of the passage of the Nebraska Bill, the multiplication of provisions, by their more extended cultivation, was the only measure left that could produce a reduction of prices, and meet the wants of the planters. The Canadian Reciprocity Treaty, since secured, will bring the products of the British North American colonies, free of duty, into competition with those of the United States, when prices, with us, rule high, and tend to diminish their cost; but in the event of scarcity in Europe, or of foreign wars, the opposite results may occur, as our products, in such times, will pass, free of duty, through these colonies, into the foreign market. It is apparent, then, that nothing short of extended free labor cultivation, far distant from the seaboard, where the products will bear transportation to none but Southern markets, can fully secure the cotton interests from the contingencies that so often threaten them with ruinous embarrassments. In fact, such a depression of our cotton interests has only been averted by the advanced prices which cotton has commanded, for the last few years, in consequence of the increased European demand, and its diminished cultivation abroad.
On this subject, the London Economist, of June 9, 1855, in remarking on the aspects of the cotton question, at that moment says:
"Another somewhat remarkable circumstance, considering we are at war, and considering the predictions of some persons, is the present high price and consumption of cotton. The crop in the United States is short, being only 1,120,000,000 or 1,160,000,000 lbs., but not so short as to have a very great effect on the markets had consumption not increased. Our mercantile readers will be well aware of this fact, but let us state here that the total consumption between January 1st and the last week in May was:
CONSUMPTION OF COTTON.
| 1853. | 1854. | 1855. | |
| Pounds, | 331,708,000 | 295,716,000 | 415,648,000 |
| Less than 1855, | 83,940,000 | 119,932,000 | |
| Average consumption of lbs. per week, | 15,600,000 | 14,000,000 | 19,600,000 |
"Though the crop in the United States is short up to this time, Great Britain has received 12,400,000 lbs. more of the crop of 1854 than she received to the same period of the crop of 1853. Thus, in spite of the war, and in spite of a short crop of cotton, in spite of dear corn and failing trade to Australia and the United States, the consumption of cotton has been one-fourth in excess of the flourishing year of 1853, and more than a third in excess of 1854. These facts are worth consideration.
"It is reasonably expected that the present high prices will bring cotton forward rapidly; but as yet this effect has not ensued. . . . . Thus, it will be seen that, notwithstanding the short crop in the States, (at present, they have sent us more in 1855 than in 1854, but not so much as in 1853,) the supply from other sources, except Egypt, has been smaller in 1855 than in either of the preceding years, and the supply from Egypt, though greater than in 1854, is less than in 1853." [From India, the principal hope of increased supplies, the imports for 1855, in the first four months of the year, were less by 47,960,000 lbs. than in 1854, and less by 64,000,000 lbs. than in 1853.[34]] "We may infer, therefore, that the rise in price hitherto, has not been sufficient to bring increased supplies from India and other places; but these will, no doubt, come when it is seen that the rise will probably be permanent in consequence of the enlarged consumption, and the comparative deficiency in the crop of the United States."
After noticing the increasing exports of raw cotton from both England and the United States to France and the other countries of the Continent, from which it is inferred that the consumption is increasing in Europe, generally, as well as in Great Britain, the Economist proceeds to remark:
"A rapidly increasing consumption of cotton in Europe has not been met by an equally rapidly increasing supply, and the present relative condition of the supply to the demand seems to justify an advance of price, unless a greatly diminished consumption can be brought about. What supplies may yet be obtained from India, the Brazils, Egypt, etc., we know not; but, judging from the imports of the three last years, they are not likely to supply the great deficiency in the stocks just noticed. A decrease in consumption, which is recommended, can only be accomplished by the state of the market, not by the will of individual spinners; for if some lessen their consumption of the raw material while the demand of the market is for more cloth, it will be supplied by others, either here or abroad; and the only real solution of the difficulty or means of lowering the price, is an increased supply. This points to other exertions than those which have been latterly directed to the production of fibrous materials to be converted directly into paper. Exertions ought rather to be directed to the production of fibrous materials which shall be used for textile fabrics, and so much larger supplies of rags—the cheapest and best material for making paper will be obtained. But theoretical production, and the schemers who propose it, not guided by the market demands, are generally erroneous, and what we now require is more and cheaper material for clothing as the means of getting more rags to make paper.
"Another important deduction may be made from the state of the cotton market. It has not been affected, at least the production of cotton with the importation into Europe has not been disturbed by the war, and yet it seems not to have kept pace with the consumption. From this we infer that legislative restrictions on traffic, permanently affecting the habits of the people submissive to them, and of all their customers, have a much more pernicious effect on production and trade than national outpourings in war of indignation and anger—which, if terrible in their effects, are of short duration. These are in the order of nature, except as they are slowly corrected and improved by knowledge; while the restrictions—the offspring of ignorance and misplaced ambition—are at all times opposed to her beneficent ordinances."
The Economist of June 30, in its Trade Tables, sums up the imports for the 5th month of the year 1855; from which it appears, that instead of any increase of the imports of cotton having occurred, they had fallen off to the extent of 43,772,176 lbs. below the quantity imported in the corresponding month of 1854.
The Economist of September 1, 1855, in continuing its notices of the cotton markets, and stating that there is still a falling off in its supplies, says:
"The decline in the quantity of cotton imported is notoriously the consequence of the smallness of last year's crops in the United States. . . . . It is remarkable that the additional supply which has made up partly for the shortness of the American crop comes from the Brazils, Egypt, and other parts. From British India the supply is relatively shorter than from the United States. It fails us more than that of the States, and the fact is rather unfavorable to the speculations of those who wish to make us independent of the States, and dependent chiefly on our own possessions. The high freights that have prevailed, and are likely to prevail with a profitable trade, would obviously make it extremely dangerous for our manufacturers to increase their dependence on India for a supply of cotton. In 1855, when we have a short supply from other quarters, India has sent us one-third less than in 1853."
The Economist of February 23, 1856, contains the Annual Statement of Imports for 1855, ending December 31, from which it appears that the supplies of cotton from India, for the whole year, were only 145,218,976 lbs., or 35,212,520 lbs. less than the imports for 1853. Of these imports 66,210,704 lbs. were re-exported; thus leaving the British manufacturers but 79,008,272 lbs. of the free labor cotton of India, upon which to employ their looms.[35]
This increasing demand for cotton beyond the present supplies, if not met by the cotton growers of the United States, must encourage its cultivation in countries which now send but little to market. To prevent such a result, and to retain in their own hands the monopoly of the cotton market, will require the utmost vigilance on the part of our planters. That vigilance will not be wanting.
CHAPTER XII.
Consideration of foreign cultivation of Cotton further considered—Facts and opinions slated by the London Economist—Consumption of Cotton tending to exceed the production—India affords the only field of competition with the United States—Its vast inferiority—Imports from India dependent upon price—Free Labor and Slave Labor cannot be united on the same field—Supply of the United States therefore limited by natural increase of slaves—Limited supply of labor tends to renewal of slave trade—Cotton production in India the only obstacle which Great Britain can interpose against American Planters—Africa, too, to be made subservient to this object—Parliamentary proceedings on this subject—Successful Cotton culture in Africa—Slavery to be permanently established by this policy—Opinions of the American Missionary—Remarks showing the position of the Cotton question in its relations to slavery—Great Britain building up slavery in Africa to break it down in America.
The remark which closes the preceding chapter was made in 1856. An opportunity is now offered for recording the results of the movements of Great Britain to promote cotton culture in her own possessions between that and 1859. The results will be startling. Few anti-slavery men in the United States expected that Great Britain would so soon be engaged zealously in establishing slave labor in Africa, or that Lord Palmerston should publicly commend the measure. The question is one of so much importance as to demand a full examination. The extracts are taken, mainly, from the London Economist, a periodical having the highest reputation for candor and fair dealing. On Feb. 12, 1859, the Economist said:
"We are not surprised that the future supply of cotton should have engaged the attention of Parliament on an early night of the Session. It is a question the importance of which can not well be overrated, if we refer only to the commercial interests which it involves, or to the social comfort or happiness of the millions who are now dependent upon it for their support. But it has an aspect far loftier and even more important. At its root lies the ultimate success of a policy for which England has made great struggles and great sacrifices—the maintaining of existing treaties, and perhaps the peace of the world. Every year as it passes, proves more and more that the question of slavery, and even of the slave trade, is destined to be materially affected, if not ultimately governed, by considerations arising out of the cultivation of this plant. It is impossible to observe the tendency of public opinion throughout America, not even excepting the Free States, with relation to the slave trade, without feeling conscious that it is drifting into indifference, and even laxity. In every light, then, in which this great subject can be viewed, it is one which well deserves the careful attention equally of the philanthropist and the statesman.
"It has been said, that in the case of cotton we have found an exception to the great commercial principle of supply and demand. Is this so? We doubt it. We doubt if, on the contrary, we shall not find, upon investigation, that it presents one of the strongest examples of the struggle of that principle to maintain its conclusions. No doubt the conditions of its production have made that struggle a severe one; but, nevertheless, it has not been altogether unsuccessful. Eighteen years ago, (in 1840) the total supply of cotton imported into this country was 592,488,000 lbs.: with temporary fluctuations, it had steadily grown until it had reached, in the last three years, upwards of 900,000,000 lbs., showing an increase of more than fifty per cent. Nevertheless, the demand had been constantly pressing upon the supply, the consumption has always shown a tendency to exceed the production, and the consequent result of a high price has, during a majority of those years, acted as a powerful stimulant to cultivation. But, practically speaking, we possess but two sources of supply, and both present such powerful obstacles to extended cultivation, that we are not surprised at the habitual uneasiness of those whose interests demand a continually increasing quantity. Those two sources are the United States and British India. It is true that Brazil, Egypt, the West Indies, and some other countries, furnish small quantities of cotton; but when we state that of the 931,847,000 lbs., imported into the United Kingdom in 1858, the proportion furnished by America and India was 870,656,000 lbs., leaving for all other places put together, a supply of only 61,191,000 lbs., notwithstanding the many laudable efforts, both on the part of Government, and of the mercantile community, to encourage its growth in new countries, it will be admitted that, as an immediate and practical question, it is confined to those two sources. They are not only the sources from whence the largest supplies are received, but they are also those where the chief increase has taken place.
"In 1840 the supply received from the United States was 487,856,000 lbs. Since that time, with some considerable fluctuations, it has steadily increased, until in 1858 it rose to 732,403,000 lbs.—the maximum quantity having reached in 1856, 780,040,000 lbs. Yet, great as this increase has been, it appears that it has not been equal to the increased demand, if we may judge from the price, at the two periods.[36] The large supplies of the last three years have commanded prices at least sixteen per cent. higher than the smaller supplies from 1840 to 1842. Every encouragement, therefore, which high and remunerative prices could give to increased cultivation has been liberally afforded to the cotton-growing States of America.
"But whatever the price, there is a condition which places an absolute limit upon the growth. Land in every way suited for the purpose, is abundant and cheap. Means of transport is of the cheapest and best kind, and is without limit. The limit lies in the necessary ingredient of labor. If cotton had been the produce of free labor, no doubt the principle of supply and demand would have solved the difficulty. The surplus of the Old World would have steadily maintained the balance between the two in the New World. Ireland, Germany, Switzerland, the Southern parts of France, and Portugal, would have sent their surplus labor to the best market. As it is, the two kinds of labor—that of the freeman and that of the slave—can not be united in the same cultivation. The slave States of America are, therefore, dependent for any increase of labor only upon themselves. The consuming States can draw supplies only from the breeding States. It is, therefore, exactly in proportion as the slave population increases that the cotton crop becomes larger. Taking the average of three or four years at any period of the history of the United States for the last forty years, it will be found that the growth of cotton is equal to one bale for each person of the slave population. The calculation is well known. When the slave population was two millions, the average produce of cotton was two millions of bales:—as the one rose the other increased. The slave population is now about three millions and a half; the cotton crop of the present year is computed at from 3,500,000 to 3,700,000 bales. The high price of cotton, and the great profit attached to its cultivation, have no doubt furnished the greatest stimulant to an increase of that part of the population. In the competition for more labor, the price of slaves was enormously increased. Some years ago the price of a slave was about £100; now they are worth from £200 to £400. But what must be the tendency of this fearful competition for a limited supply of human labor—limited as long as the slave trade is prohibited—unlimited as soon as the slave trade is legalized? What is the actual condition of the Southern States at this moment? There is on the ground and being secured, according to computation, the largest cotton crop ever known. The last estimates vary from 3,550,000 bales to 3,700,000 bales. A very few years ago it was calculated that cotton at any thing above four cents the pound for "middling quality" on the spot was a profitable crop. Now, the price for the same quality on the spot is fully ten cents the pound;—and it has been about the same or higher for a long time. What is the consequence? A correspondent writing by the last mail says: 'The people of this section of the country feel made of gold, and every thing here is, of course, going at full cry—every planter wants to open more land and buy more negroes.' What do these facts suggest? Do they furnish no explanation of the strong desire in the Southern States to possess Cuba? Do they furnish no explanation of the exaggerated irritation got up last year in respect to the West India squadron, and the demand of the American Government, we fear too successfully made, that the right of search in the mitigated form in which it existed should be altogether abandoned? A people familiarized not only with slavery, but also with the slave trade as between one class of States and another, can hardly be expected to entertain a very strong repugnance to a slave trade from beyond the seas. That cargoes of imported slaves have recently been landed in the United States is not denied:—that vessels fitted out as slavers have recently been seized in American ports, we know upon official authority. The same correspondent whom we have already quoted, says there are two great questions which occupy the Southern States at this moment. The one is the acquisition of Cuba. 'The other,' he says, 'is one which has been presented to me forcibly during my sojourn in the South, and that is the increase of slave population. You must have noticed an illicit importation of negroes from Africa landed in Georgia. This has undoubtedly been done, and I doubt not also that other negroes have been landed. It is of course the desire of every honest man that the whole force of the government should be used to put down such a trade, and punish the offenders; but I fear the profits of the trade are so enormous that it will be carried on in the face of all opposition. Negroes are now worth here from 1,000 to 2,000 dollars a-piece. The subject of their being introduced is being openly discussed, and the propriety of the trade being again legalized. It is plain this discussion will by and by take shape. Will not the government be obliged to listen to it, and what will be the result? When labor is so profitable it will be obtained. How? I confess to looking upon this subject with great anxiety. The feeling with regard to slavery both in the North and South has undergone a material change in the last four years. It is now looked upon with far less abhorrence.' Is it possible to separate the danger which is here presented so forcibly from the question of the high price of cotton? We know by experience the influence which the Southern States can exercise upon the election of a President. . . . . . . If the free States are indifferent, we know that, at whatever risk, the slave States will have their own way; and with them it is plain that much must depend upon the price of cotton and the motives which it furnishes to 'open more land and buy more negroes.'
"But with what an enormous interest does this view of the case invest the cultivation of cotton in India. It is the only real obstacle that we can interpose to the growing feeling in favor of slavery, to the diminishing abhorrence of the slave trade in the United States. It is the only field, competition with which can, for many years to come, redress the undue stimulant which high prices are giving to slave labor in America. Nor do the facts as regard the past discourage the hope that it may be successfully used for that purpose. In 1840 the supply of cotton from India was 77,011,000 lbs.;—in 1858 it had risen to 138,253,000 lbs.: having been in the immediately preceding year no less than 250,338,000 lbs. The average importation for four years from 1840 to 1843 amounted to 83,300,000 lbs.:—the average importation for the last four years has been 178,000,000 lbs. or somewhat more than double that of the former period. In some important respects the conditions of supply from India differ very much from those which attach to and determine the supply from America. In India there is no limit to the quantity of labor. There may be said to be little or none to the quantity of land. The obstacle is of another kind; it lies almost exclusively in the want of cheap transit. Our supplies of India cotton are not even determined by the quantity produced, but by that which, when produced, can profitably be forwarded to England. It is, therefore, a question of price whether we obtain more or less. A rise in the price of one penny the pound in 1857, suddenly increased the supply from 180,000,000 lbs. in 1856 to 250,000,000 lbs. in 1857. A fall in the price in 1858 again suddenly reduced it to 138,000,000 lbs. It was not that the production of cotton varied in these proportions in those years, but that at given prices it was possible to incur more cost in the transit than at others. The same high price, therefore, which at present renders a large supply possible from India, creates an unusual demand for slaves in the United States. But would not the same corrective consequence be produced if we could diminish the cost of transit in India? Every farthing a pound saved in carriage is equivalent to so much added to the price of cotton. Four-pence the pound in the Liverpool market for good India cotton, with a cost of two-pence from the spot of production, would command just as great a supply as a price of five-pence the pound if the intermediate cost were three-pence. The whole question resolves itself into one of good roads and cheap conveyance. Labor in India is infinitely more abundant than in the United States, and much cheaper; land is at least as cheap; the climate is as good;—but the bullock trains on the miserable roads of Hindostan cannot compete with the steamers and other craft on the Mississippi. No doubt we have new hopes in the district of Scinde, and in the aid of the Indus. We have new hopes in the railways which are being constructed,—not only in cheapening transit, but even more in improving the condition in which native produce will be brought to market. Whatever, therefore, be the financial sacrifice which in the first place must be made for the purpose of opening the interior of India, it should be cheerfully made, as the only means by which we can hope permanently to improve the revenues of India, to increase and cheapen the supply of the most important raw material of our own industry, and to bring in the abundant labor of the millions of our fellow-subjects in India, to redress the deficiency in the slave States of America, and thus to give the best practical check to the growing attractions of slavery and the slave trade."
On March 5, 1859, the editor resumes the subject, and discusses the bearing which the movements making in Africa are likely to have upon these interests.
"We pointed out in a recent number the very close connection between the traditional policy of England in resisting the slave trade, and the efforts which are now making to find other sources of cotton supply besides the United States. We showed that a cry is now arising in the United States, for the renewal of the slave trade—a cry stimulated principally by the high price of cotton. We showed that for every slave in the Southern States there is on the average a bale of cotton produced annually, and that as the demand for cotton, and consequently the price of cotton rises, the demand for slaves and the price of slaves rises with it. In the words of a correspondent whom we then quoted, 'every planter wants to open more land and buy more negroes.' Hence the demand in the South for the recently successful attempt to smuggle slave-cargoes into Georgia. If, then, either in India or any other quarter of the world, it be possible either to cheapen the carriage or facilitate the growth of cotton, so as to bring it into the English markets at a price that can compete successfully with the American cotton, we are conferring a double benefit on mankind—we are increasing the supply of one of the most necessary, and, relatively to the demand, one of the least abundant, articles of commerce, on the steady supply of which the livelihood of millions, and the comfort of almost every civilized nation on the face of the earth, depends, and by means of the increased competition we are diminishing the force of the motive which is now threatening the United States with a renewal of the slave trade. We cannot, therefore, well conceive of stronger considerations than those which are now urging Englishmen to do what may be in their power for the promotion of an increased supply from cotton-growing countries other than the States of America.
"Besides these reasons which apply to the promotion of the cotton-supply in India, or in our own West Indian islands, there is one peculiar to the case of Africa which makes it important that no opportunities of encouraging the cotton-growth of that continent should be neglected. The African supply, if ever it become large, will not only check the rise in the price of cotton, and therefore of slaves in America,—but it will diminish the profits of slave exportation on the coast of Africa. Experience has now sufficiently proved to us, that no one agency has been so effective in paralyzing the slave trade as the growth of any branch of profitable industry which convinces the native African chiefs that they can get a surer and, in the long run, larger profit by employing their subjects in peaceful labor, than they can even get from the large but uncertain gains of the slave trade. . . . . Once let the African chiefs find out, as in many instances they have already found out, that the sale of the laborer can be only a source of profit once, while his labor may be a source of constant and increasing profit, and we shall hear no more of their killing the hen which may lay so many golden eggs, for the sake only of a solitary and final prize."
The American Missionary, of April, 1859, gives a condensed statement of a discussion in the British Parliament, last summer, in which the condition of cotton culture in Africa was brought out, and its encouragement strongly urged as a means of suppressing the slave trade, and of increasing the supplies of that commodity to the manufacturers of England. S. Fitzgerald, Under Secretary of State, said:
"He did not scruple to say that, looking at the papers which he had perused, it was to the West Coast of Africa that we must look for that large increase in our supply of cotton which was now becoming absolutely necessary, and without which he and others who had studied this subject foresaw grave consequences to the most important branch of the manufactures of this country. Our consul at Lagos reported:
"The whole of the Yoruba and other countries south of the Niger, with the Houssa and the Nuffe countries on the north side of that river, have been, from all time, cotton-growing countries; and notwithstanding the civil wars, ravages, disorders and disruptions caused by the slave trade, more than sufficient cotton to clothe their populations has always been cultivated, and their fabrics have found markets and a ready sale in those countries where the cotton plant is not cultivated, and into which the fabrics of Manchester and Glasgow have not yet penetrated. The cultivation of cotton, therefore, in the above-named countries is not new to the inhabitants; all that is required is to offer them a market for the sale of as much as they can cultivate, and by preventing the export of slaves from the seaboard render some security to life, freedom, property, and labor." Another of our consuls, speaking of the trade in the Bight of Benin in 1856, said:
"'The readiness with which the inhabitants of the large town of Abbeokuta have extended their cultivation of the cotton plant merits the favorable notice of the manufacturer and of the philanthropist, as a means of supplanting the slave trade.'"
"It was worthy of notice that while the quantity of cotton obtained from America between 1784 and 1791, the first seven years of the importation into this country was only 74 bales; during the years 1855 and 1856 the town of Abbeokuta alone exported nearly twenty times that quantity. He thought he might fairly say that if we succeed in repressing the slave-trade, as he believed we should, we should in a few years receive a very large supply of this most important article from the West Coast of Africa."
"Mr. J. H. Gurney said he had received from Mr. Thomas Clegg, of Manchester, a few figures, from which it appeared that while in 1852 only 1800 lbs. of cotton had been brought into Great Britain from Africa, in the first five months of the present year it was 94,400 lbs.
"Mr. Buxton said: 'There was no question now, that any required amount of cotton, equal to that of New Orleans in quality, might be obtained. A very short time ago Mr. Clegg, of Manchester, aided by the Rev. H. Venn, and a few other gentlemen, trained and sent out two or three young negroes as agents to Abbeokuta. These young men taught the natives to collect and clean their cotton, and sent it home to England. The result was, that the natives had actually purchased 250 cotton-gins for cleaning their cotton. Mr. Clegg stated that he was in correspondence with seventy-six natives and other African traders, twenty-two of them being chiefs. With one of them Mr. Clegg had a transaction, by which he (the African) received £3500. And the amount of cotton received at Manchester had risen, hand over hand, till it came last year to nearly 100,000 lbs.' Well might Mr. Clegg say, that this was 'a rare instance of the rapid development of a particular trade, and the more so because every ounce of cotton had been collected, all labor performed, and the responsibility borne by native Africans alone.' The fact was, that the West African natives were not mere savages. In trade no men could show more energy and quickness. And a considerable degree of social organization existed. He could give a thousand proofs of this, but he would only quote a word or two from Lieutenant May's despatch to Lord Clarendon, dated the 24th of November, 1857. Lieutenant May crossed overland from the Niger to Lagos, and he says:
"A very pleasing and hopeful part of my report lies in the fact, that certainly three-quarters of the country was under cultivation. Nor was this the only evidence of the industry and peace of the country; in every hut is cotton spinning; in every town is weaving, dyeing; often iron smelting, pottery works, and other useful employments are to be witnessed; while from town to town, for many miles, the entire road presents a continuous file of men, women, and children carrying these articles of their production for sale. I entertain feelings of much increased respect for the industry and intellect of these people, and admiration for their laws and manners."
"Lord Palmerston said: 'I venture to say that you will find on the West Coast of Africa a most valuable supply of cotton, so essential to the manufactures of this country. The cotton districts of Africa are more extensive than those of India. The access to them is more easy than to the Indian cotton district; and I venture to say that your commerce with the Western Coast of Africa, in the article of cotton, will, in a few years, prove to be far more valuable than that of any other portion of the world, the United States alone excepted.'"
The London Anti-Slavery Reporter, as quoted by the American Missionary of March, 1859, says:
"A few days ago, Mr. Consul Campbell addressed us, saying: 'African cotton is no myth. A vessel has just arrived from Lagos with 607 bales on board, on native account. Several hundred bales more have been previously shipped this year.'
"In order to afford our readers some idea of the extraordinary development of this branch of native African industry and commerce, we append a statement which will exhibit it at a single glance. We have only to observe that we are indebted to Mr. Thomas Clegg, of Manchester, for these interesting particulars, and that the quantities ordered have been obtained from Abbeokuta alone. He is about to extend the field of his operations. Four Europeans have gone out, expressly to trade in native cotton; and several London houses, encouraged by the success which has attended Mr. Clegg's experiment, are about to invest largely in the same traffic. The quantity of raw cotton which has already been imported into England, from Abbeokuta, since 1851, is 276,235 lbs., and the trade has developed itself as follows:
| 1851-52 | 9 | Bags or Bales | lbs. 1810 |
| 1853 | 37 | ditto | 4617 |
| 1854 | 7 | ditto | 1588 |
| 1855 | 14 | ditto | 1651 |
| 1856 | 103 | ditto | 11,492 |
| 1857 | 283 | ditto | 35,419 |
| 1858 | 1819 | ditto | 220,099 |
"The last importation includes advices from Lagos up to the 1st of last November. Since that time, the presses and other machinery sent out, have been got into full work, and the quantity of the raw staple in stock has rapidly accumulated, the bulk shipped being on 'native account.' Each bag or bale weighs about 120 lbs. Let it be borne in mind that the whole of this quantity has been collected, all the labor performed and the responsibility borne by native Africans; while the cost of production, Mr. Clegg informs us, does not exceed one half-penny a pound in the end. It can be laid down in England at about 41/4d. a pound, and sells at from 7d. to 9d."
The great point of interest in this movement consists in the fact, that in promoting the production of cotton in Africa, Englishmen are giving direct encouragement to the employment of slave labor. It is an undeniable fact, that from eight-tenths to nine-tenths of the population of Africa are held as slaves by the petty kings and chiefs; and that, more especially, the women, under the prevailing system of polygamy, are doomed to out-doors' labor for the support of their indolent and sensual husbands. Hitherto the labor of the women has, in general, been comparatively light, as the preparation of food and clothing limited the extent of effort required of them; but now, the cotton mills of England must be supplied by them, and the hum of the spindles will sound the knell of their days of ease. That we are not alone in this view of the question, will appear from the opinions expressed by the American Missionary, when referring to this subject. It says:
"An encouraging feature in this movement is, that the men engaged in it all feel that the suppression of the slave trade is absolutely essential to its success. The necessity of this is the great burden of all their arguments in its behalf. It thus acts with a double force. There can be no question that the development of the resources of Africa will be an effectual means, in itself, of discouraging the exportation of slaves, while at the same time those who would encourage this development are seeking the overthrow of that infamous traffic as the necessary removal of an obstacle to their success.
"There is, however, one danger connected with all this that can not be obviated by any effort likely to be put forth under the stimulus of commerce, or the spirit of trade. This danger can be averted only by sending the missionaries of a pure gospel, a gospel of equal and impartial love, into Africa, in numbers commensurate with the increase of its agricultural resources and its spirit of general enterprise.
"The danger to which we allude is not merely that of worldliness, such as in a community always accompanies an increase of wealth, but that the slavery now existing there may be strengthened and increased by the rapid rise in the value of labor, and thus become so firmly rooted that the toil of ages may be necessary for it removal. All this might have been prevented if the spirit of Christian enterprise had gone ahead of that of commerce, and thus prepared the way for putting commerce, under the influence of Christianity. For years Africa has been open to the missionary of the cross, to go everywhere preaching love to God and man, with nothing to hinder except the sickliness of the climate. This evil, and the dangers arising from it, business men are willing to risk, and within the next ten years there will be thousands, and tens of thousands, looking to Africa for the means of increasing their riches."
From all this it appears, that the question of slavery is becoming more intimately blended with cotton culture than at any former period; and that the urgent demand for its increased production must establish the system permanently, under the control of Great Britain, in Africa itself. Look at the facts, and especially at the position of Great Britain. The supply of cotton is inadequate to the demands of the manufacturing nations. Great Britain stands far in advance of all others in the quantity consumed. The ratio of increased production in the United States cannot be advanced except by a renewal of the slave trade, or a resort to the scheme of immigration on the plan of England and France. It is thought by English writers, that the renewal of the slave trade by the United States is inevitable, as a consequence of the present high prices of cotton and slaves, unless the slave traders can be shut out from the slave markets of Africa. They assume it as a settled principle, that the immigration system is impracticable wherever slavery exists; and that the American planter can only succeed in securing additional labor by means of the slave trade. Then, according to this theory, to prevent an increased production of cotton in the United States, it is only necessary to make it impracticable for us to renew that traffic.
The supply of cotton from India is not on the increase, nor can be, except when prices rule high in England, or until rail roads shall be constructed into the interior, a work requiring much time and money. The renewal of the slave trade by the United States, on a large scale, would, of course, cheapen cotton in the proportion of the amount of labor supplied. In this view the writers referred to are correct. They are right also in supposing that a reduction below present prices, of a cent or two per pound, would be ruinous to India in the present condition of her inland transportation. They desire, very naturally, therefore, that prices should be kept up for the advantage of India, so that its cotton can bear export. But while high prices benefit India, they also enrich the American planter, and afford him inducements to renew the slave trade.
Here Great Britain is thrown into a dilemma. The slave trade to America must be prevented, in her opinion, or it will ruin the East Indies. To prevent the renewal of this traffic—to keep up the price of cotton as long as may be necessary, for the benefit of India, and prevent a supply of African slaves from reaching the American planter—is a problem that requires more than an ordinary amount of skill to solve. That skill, if it exists any where, is possessed by British statesmen, and they are now employed in the execution of this difficult task. They are convinced that free labor cannot be found, at this moment, any where in the world, to meet the growing demands for cotton. To supply this increasing demand, a new element must be brought into requisition; or rather old elements must be employed anew. Her cotton spindles must not cease to whir, or millions of the people of Great Britain will starve at home, or be forced into emigration, to the weakening of her strength. The old sources of supply being inadequate, a new field of operations must be opened up—new forces must be brought into requisition in the cultivation of cotton. Slave labor and free labor, both combined, are not now able to furnish the quantity needed. Free labor cannot be increased, at present, in this department of production. Slave labor, therefore, is the only means left by which the work can be accomplished—not slave labor to the extent now employed, but to the extent to which it may be increased from the ranks of the scores of millions of the population of Africa.
This is the true state of the case; and the important question now agitated is: Who shall have the advantages of this labor? Two fields, only, present themselves in which this additional labor can be employed—Africa and America. Great Britain is deeply interested in limiting it to Africa, which she can only do by preventing a renewal of the slave trade to America: for she takes it for granted that we will renew the slave trade if we can make money by the operation. South Africa is unavailable for this purpose, as it is under British rule, and slavery abolished within its limits by law. Nothing can be done there, as it is filling up with English emigrants who will not toil, under a burning sun, in the cotton fields; and they can not be permitted to reduce the natives again to slavery. West Africa alone, affords the climate, soil, and population, necessary to success in cotton culture. To this point the attention of Englishmen is now mainly directed. One feature in the civil condition of West Africa must be specially noticed, as adapting it to the purposes to which it is to be devoted. The territory has not been seized by the British crown, as in South Africa, and British law does not bear rule within its limits. The tribes are treated as independent sovereignties, and are governed by their own customs and laws. This is fortunate for the new policy now inaugurating, as the native chiefs and kings hold the population at large as slaves. Heretofore they have sold their slaves at will, as well as their captives taken in war, to the slave traders. Now they are to be taught a different policy by Englishmen; and the African slaveholders are to be convinced that they will make more money by employing their slaves in growing cotton, than in selling them to be carried off to the American planters. This done, and the transportation of laborers to the United States will be prevented. This will put it out of the power of our planters, to increase their production of cotton so as to reduce prices; and this will enable India to complete her rail roads, so as to be able to compete with American cotton at any price whatever.
But this new policy, if successful, will do more than stop the slave trade, to the supposed injury of the American planter. England will thereby have the benefit of the labor of Africa secured to herself. With its scores of millions of population under her direction, she hopes to compete with American slavery in the production of cotton; and not only to compete with it, but to surpass it altogether, and, in time, to render it so profitless as to force emancipation upon us. She will there have access to a population ten fold greater than that of the slave population of the United States; and the only doubt of success exists in the question, as to whether the negro master in Africa can make the slave work as well there as the white master in America has done here.
But how shall England, in this measure, preserve her "traditional policy," in which she pledged herself no longer to cherish slave labor. This will be very easily done. She need not authorize slavery in Western Africa; but as it already exists among all the tribes "by local law," she has only to recognize their independence, and bargain with the chiefs for all the cotton they can force their slaves to produce. This has already been done, by Englishmen, at several points in Africa, and will doubtless be resorted to in many other portions of that country. The moral responsibility of establishing slavery permanently in Africa, will thus be thrown upon the chiefs and kings, as it has heretofore been upon the American planter; and Great Britain can reap all the advantages of the increased production of slave labor cotton, while her moralists can easily satisfy the conscience of the people at home, by declaiming against the system which secures to them their bread.
Here now the policy of British statesmen can be comprehended. They must have cotton. The products of free labor would be preferred, but as it can not be had, in sufficient quantities, they must take that of slave labor. To allow the American planter to supply this want, by renewing the slave trade, would ruin India and benefit America. To save India, and, at the same time, to secure the cotton demanded by the manufacturers, slavery is to be encouraged in Africa; and this is to be done as a means not only of preventing the slave trade, and checking the extension of slavery in America, but of multiplying the fields of cotton cultivation—a policy very essential to the wants of the British nation. Thus, slavery is to be promoted in Africa as an effectual means of checking it in America; it is to be converted into a blessing there, and made instrumental in wiping out its curse here!
And this, now, is the result of England's philanthropic efforts for African freedom. Her economical errors, in West Indian emancipation, are to be repaired by the permanent establishment of slavery in Africa! But what must be the practical moral effect of her policy? What must be the opinion entertained of the negro race, when Great Britain abandons her policy in reference to them? This is not hard to divine. It will wipe out the odium she has managed to cast upon the system; and, so far as her example is concerned, will justify the American planter in refusing to emancipate his slaves. Her conduct is a practical acknowledgment of the Southern theory of the African race—that slavery is their normal condition, otherwise she must have adopted the same policy in West Africa that she has in South Africa.
But before closing this part of our investigations, it may be well to examine the claims of Great Britain in relation to her humanity towards the African, or any of the inferior races doomed to lives of toil—such as the coolies of India and the laborers of China.
The contest for the advantages of supplying the increasing demands for cotton, is between Great Britain operating in India and Africa, and the American planter operating by an increased amount of labor furnished by means of the slave trade. The contest between the parties may be imagined as assuming this form: A portion of the American planters insist, that they should be allowed to manage this matter; but Great Britain says, nay: my subjects can do it better than you can. You Americans are governed by mercenary motives: we Britons by philanthropic intentions. You Americans have made no sacrifices for the cause of humanity: we Britons have emancipated our West India slaves.
Aye, aye, replies the American planter; we understand all about the humanity of which you boast. Your special type of philanthropy is fully displayed in the history of your West Indies. Look at it. The total importation of slaves from Africa into your West Indian Islands, was 1,700,000 persons; of whom and their descendants, in 1833, only 660,000 remained for emancipation; we had less than 400,000 imported Africans, of whom and their descendants there existed among us, in 1850, more than 3,600,000 persons of African descent; that is to say, the number of Africans and their descendants in the United States, is nearly eight or ten to one of those that were imported, whilst in the British West Indies there are not two persons remaining for every five imported.[37] And besides, we have 500,000 free colored persons among us, a number nearly equal to that which your emancipation act set at liberty, and more than the whole number imported. Your slavery seems to have been a system of wholesale slaughter: ours the reverse.
All true, says Britain: but then we have ceased to do evil, and are learning to do well. We found "that slavery was bearing our colonies down to ruin with awful speed; that had it lasted but another half century, they must have sunk beyond recovery."[38]
What! says the planter; sunk beyond recovery! why, we find our slaves rapidly increasing, and ourselves almost "made of gold." Be pleased to explain, why slavery in the hands of Englishmen should be so destructive, while with the American it is not only profitable to the slaveholder himself, but the comfort of the slaves has been so well secured, from the first, that their natural increase has been about equal to that of any other people in the full enjoyment of the necessaries of life.
Certainly, says Britain: having done our duty, we are free to confess, that "what gave the death blow to slavery, in the minds of English statesmen, was the population returns, which showed the fact, 'the appalling fact,' that although only eleven out of the eighteen islands had sent them in, yet in those eleven islands the slaves had decreased in twelve years, by no less than 60,219, namely: from 558,194 to 497,975![39] Had similar returns been procured from the other seven colonies (including Mauritius, Antigua, Barbadoes, and Granada,) the decrease must have been little, if at all, less than 100,000! Now it was plain to every one that if this were really so, the system could not last. The driest economist would allow that it would not pay, to let the working classes be slaughtered. To work the laboring men of our West Indies to death, might bring in a good return for a while, but could not be a profitable enterprise in the long run. Accordingly, this was the main, we had almost said the only, topic of the debates on slavery in 1831 and 1832. Is slavery causing a general massacre of the working classes in our sugar islands, or is it not, was a question worth debating, in the pounds, shillings, and pence view, as well as in the moral one. And debated it was, long and fiercely. The result was the full establishment of the dreadful fact. The slaves, as Mr. Marryatt said, were 'dying like rotten sheep.' Whatever then may be said for West Indian slavery, this damning thing must be said of it, that the slaves were dying of it. Then came emancipation."[40] And in performing this act—in demonstrating to the world the destructive character of slavery—Englishmen expected America to follow their example, and to emancipate her slaves also.
And thereby deceived yourselves, says the planter, into the ruin of your islands, without effecting any good for the Africans at large, and but little for those upon whom your bounties were bestowed. And, then, we cannot see the vastness of your philanthropy, in allowing such destructive cruelties to prevail so long, and in only emancipating your slaves when it was apparent they must soon become extinct under the lash, as applied by the hands of Britons. We know that you claimed that slavery was the same everywhere, and that humane men in our country were deceived into the belief that American slavery was as ruinous to life as British West Indian slavery. We know that the elder Mr. Buxton, in 1831, used this language, "where the blacks are free they increase. But let there be a change in only one circumstance, let the population be the same in every respect, only let them be slaves instead of freemen, and the current is immediately stopped;" and, in support of this, his biographer adds: "This appalling fact was never denied, that at the time of the abolition of the slave trade, the number of slaves in the West Indies was 800,000; in 1830 it was 700,000; that is to say, in twenty-three years it had diminished by 100,000."[41] This assertion, that slavery is always destructive of life, was made by Mr. Buxton, in the face of the fact, that ten distinct sets of our Census tables were then accessible to him, in each one of which he had the evidence that American slavery, instead of reducing the number of our slave population, tended to its rapid increase. From this and kindred acts of that gentleman, we came to the conclusion, that, though he might be very benevolent, he was not very truthful; and was, therefore, a very unsafe guide to follow, as you must now acknowledge; unsafe, because your emancipation on a small scale, before securing a general emancipation by other countries, has thrown you under the necessity of now attempting to establish slavery elsewhere on a large scale; unsafe, because your negro population have not made half the moral progress under freedom, that ours have done under slavery; and because, that, where cultivation has depended upon the emancipated negro alone, with a single exception, the islands have almost gone to ruin.[42]
You misinterpret facts, says Britain: our islands are not ruined; no, by no means. Under slavery they would have been totally ruined; but emancipation has placed them in a position favorable to a full development of all their resources. "It is to be borne in mind that the influx of free labor is exactly one of those advantages of which a land is debarred by slavery. It is a part of the curse of slavery that it repels the freeman. When we are told that to judge of the effect of emancipation we must exclude those colonies that imported coolies, we reply at once that this useful importation has been one of the many blessings that freedom has brought in her train."[43]
I understand your views now, says the planter: but for emancipation, your colonies would have sunk to irretrievable destruction. That measure has prepared the way for the coolie system; and under its operations the prosperity of your islands is on the increase. But what is the character of this coolie system, that is working such wonders? In what does it differ from the slave trade, of which you desire to deprive us? And what must be its effects upon the colored population, which have received their freedom at your hands, and whose moral elevation your Christian missionaries are laboring to promote? On this point I would not multiply testimony. The character of the coolie traffic is but too well understood, and is now believed by all intelligent men to be the slave trade in disguise. A writer, representing the anti-slavery society of Great Britain, makes these statements.[44]
"I am prepared to show, that fraud, misrepresentation, and actual violence are the constituent elements of the immigration system, even as it is now conducted, and that no vigilance on the part of the government which superintends its prosecution can prevent the abuses incidental to it. . . . . In China, especially, this is notoriously the case, and I refer you to Sir John Bowring's despatches on Immigration from China, for the fullest revelations. I need only add, that he designates the Chinese coolie traffic as being in every essential particular 'as bad as the African slave trade,' and that he recommends its entire prohibition. . . . . The mortality during the sea-voyage is so great, that the Emigration Commissioners declare 'these results to be shocking to humanity, and disgraceful to the manner in which the traffic is carried on.' I beg to call your special attention to the term 'traffic,' and to refer you for particulars of the mortality, to the Emigration Commissioners' Report for 1858. They may be briefly summarised. During the season 1856-57 the deaths at sea amounted to 17.26/100 per cent. on 4,094 coolies shipped from Calcutta—a rate which, if computed for the whole year, instead of 90 days, the term of the voyage, would average upwards of 70 per cent. The rate of mortality on shipments of Chinese bound to British Guiana, varied from 14 per cent. to 50. . . . . On shipments of Chinese bound to Havanna, on board British vessels, the death-rate fluctuated between 20 per cent. and 60. Yet, sir, immigration is said, by its advocates, to be now conducted on an improved system. . . . . We come now to the treatment of the coolie, as soon as he is discharged from the ship. There is no official evidence, that I am yet aware of, to show what abuses of authority he is subjected to, but the Jamaica Immigration Bill, now awaiting the sanction of Her Majesty's Government, proves that the imported laborer is, during his term of service, subject to conditions quite incompatible with a system of free labor, and the same remark applies to other colonies. That the immigrants are liable to ill usage and neglect, may be gathered from the reports of travelers who have seen them in every stage of destitution and misery; and that they are peculiarly affected by the kind of service they contract to render, and by climate, is sufficiently proved by the awful mortality during industrial residence, which we are assured the Immigration Agent General's returns for Jamaica show to be equal to 50 per cent. Sir E. B. Lytton admits it to be 33 per cent. But if we accept his correction—which I confess I am not prepared to do without knowing upon what evidence he makes it—I maintain that even this death-rate establishes the startling fact, that coolie labor in Jamaica is proportionately more destructive to human life than slave labor in Cuba."
On the question of the influence that the coolie immigration exerts upon the emancipated blacks in the West Indies, the Editor of the London Economist very justly remarks:
"Bringing with them depraved heathen habits, and the detestable traditions of the worst forms of idolatry, and always looking forward to their return as the epoch when they will renew their heathen worship and find themselves again among heathen standards of action,—they are almost proof against the best influences which can be brought to bear upon them, and, what is worse, they are not only proof against the good, but missionaries for evil. They are closely associated in their labor with a race that is just emerging out of barbarism with the fostering care of Christianity, and we need not say that their social influence on such a race is deteriorating in the extreme. The difficulty would be indefinitely diminished, were the new immigrants a permanent addition to the population. By careful regulations for that purpose, they might, in that case, be subdued by the higher influences of their English teachers; but the prospect of speedy restoration to the country and habits of their birth, entirely foils such attempts as these. How far this great difficulty can be overcome; and if it cannot, how far it may more than balance the moral and physical advantages of a fuller labor market,—it requires the most careful inquiry to determine." Here now are four distinct points upon which the testimony shows, conclusively, that the coolie system is worse than ever the slave trade has been represented to be; and that as the slave trade is opposed on the ground of the destruction of human life which attends it, so the coolie system should be abandoned upon the same grounds. The points are these: 1st, the frauds and cruelties incident to the procuring of immigrants; 2d, the mortality during the middle passage; 3d, the mortality in the islands where they are employed; 4th, the influence of the heathen coolies in demoralizing the emancipated blacks among whom they are intermingled. These points demand serious consideration by Britons, as well as Americans—by those who would reopen the slave trade, as well as those who would substitute for that traffic the immigration system.
And now, in conclusion, says the planter, I must beg to demur to Britain's claiming a monopoly of all the philanthropy in the world toward the African race; and upon that claim founding another which, if granted, will secure to her the monopoly of all the labor of Africa itself; and I would beg, further, that myself and my fellow planters may be excused, if we cannot see any thing more in all her movements than a determination to have a full supply of cotton, even at the risk of dooming Africa to become one vast slave plantation.
While a faithful view of the plans and expectations of the British, in relation to the production of cotton in Africa, has been presented, it would be doing injustice to the reader not to give a few facts, in closing, which indicate that their success, after all, may not equal their anticipations. The Rev. T. J. Bowen,[45] says of African cotton generally, that "the staple is good, but the yield can not be more than one-fourth of what it was on similar lands in the Southern States;" and of Yoruba, in particular, he says, that "both upland and sea island cotton are planted; but neither produces very well, owing to the extreme and constant heat of the climate." Of this, Mr. Bowen, who is a native of Georgia, must be regarded as a good judge. He spent six years as a missionary of the Baptist Church in exploring the Abbeokuta and Yoruba country. This cause of short crops in Yoruba is evidently incurable. It does not exist in equal force in Liberia and its vicinity. Mr. Bowen says: "The average in the dry season is about 80 degrees at Ijaye, and 82 at Ogbomoshaw, and a few degrees lower during the rains. I have never known the mercury to rise higher than 93 degrees in the shade, at Ijaye. The highest reading at Ogbomoshaw was 97.5." These places are from 100 to 150 miles inland.[46]
Another remark. The confidence with which it is asserted, that immigration is impracticable as a means of obtaining labor, wherever slavery prevails, will remind the reader of another theory to which Englishmen long tried to make us converts: that slave labor is necessarily unprofitable and should be abandoned on economical grounds. Now they are forced to admit that our planters seem to "be made of gold." Perhaps these same planters can use immigrant labor as successfully as slave labor. If necessary, doubtless, they will make the attempt, notwithstanding the opinions entertained beyond the sea.
