BELL’S ENGLISH HISTORY SOURCE BOOKS
General Editors: S. E. Winbolt, M.A., and Kenneth Bell, M.A.
ENGLAND AND NAPOLEON

BELL’S ENGLISH HISTORY SOURCE BOOKS

Scope of the Series and Arrangement of Volumes.

1.Roman Britain to 449.
2.449-1066.
3.1066-1154.
4.1154-1216.
5.1216-1307.
6.1307-1399.
7.1399-1485.
8.1485-1547.Immediately.
9.1547-1603.Now Ready.
10.1603-1660.“
11.1660-1714.“
12.1714-1760.“
13.1760-1801.“
14.1801-1815.Immediately.
15.1815-1837.
16.1837-1856.
17.1856-1876.
18.1876-1887.
19.1887-1901.
20.1901-1912.

The volumes are issued in uniform style.
Price 1s. net each.

ENGLAND AND
NAPOLEON

(1801-1815)
COMPILED BY
S. E. WINBOLT, M.A.

LONDON
G. BELL & SONS, LTD.
1912

INTRODUCTION

This series of English History Source Books is intended for use with any ordinary textbook of English History. Experience has conclusively shown that such apparatus is a valuable—nay, an indispensable—adjunct to the history lesson. It is capable of two main uses: either by way of lively illustration at the close of a lesson, or by way of inference-drawing, before the textbook is read, at the beginning of the lesson. The kind of problems and exercises that may be based on the documents are legion, and are admirably illustrated in a History of England for Schools, Part I., by Keatinge and Frazer, pp. 377-381. However, we have no wish to prescribe for the teacher the manner in which he shall exercise his craft, but simply to provide him and his pupils with materials hitherto not readily accessible for school purposes. The very moderate price of the books in this series should bring them within the reach of every secondary school. Source books enable the pupil to take a more active part than hitherto in the history lesson. Here is the apparatus, the raw material: its use we leave to teacher and taught.

Our belief is that the books may profitably be used by all grades of historical students between the standards of fourth-form boys in secondary schools and undergraduates at Universities. What differentiates students at one extreme from those at the other is not so much the kind of subject-matter dealt with, as the amount they can read into or extract from it.

In regard to choice of subject-matter, while trying to satisfy the natural demand for certain “stock” documents of vital importance, we hope to introduce much fresh and novel matter. It is our intention that the majority of the extracts should be lively in style—that is, personal, or descriptive, or rhetorical, or even strongly partisan—and should not so much profess to give the truth as supply data for inference. We aim at the greatest possible variety, and lay under contribution letters, biographies, ballads and poems, diaries, debates, and newspaper accounts. Economics, London, municipal, and social life generally, and local history, are represented in these pages.

The order of the extracts is strictly chronological, each being numbered, titled, and dated, and its authority given. The text is modernised, where necessary, to the extent of leaving no difficulties in reading.

We shall be most grateful to teachers and students who may send us suggestions for improvement.

S. E. WINBOLT.
KENNETH BELL.

NOTE TO THIS VOLUME

It will be obvious from the Table of Contents that, though there is a great wealth of illustrative matter for this period, I have preferred to draw largely upon the Diary and Correspondence of Charles Abbot, Lord Colchester, published in three volumes in 1861, and the Despatches of the Duke of Wellington, by Lieutenant-Colonel Gurwood. The latter is a very convenient selection. The title of the volume is justified by the fact that some eighteen out of the forty-eight pieces have more or less direct reference to England’s struggle with Napoleon.

S. E. W.

Christ’s Hospital,
October, 1912.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DATETITLEPAGE
Introduction [v]
1801. Battle of the BalticCampbell[1]
1801. State of Ireland “Diary of Lord Colchester”[3]
1801. Golf and FootballStrutt[8]
1802. Party Speeches of Sheridan and CanningStanhope[9]
1803-1815. Typical Vessels of the Royal NavyClowes[13]
1803. Desire for Pitt’s Return to OfficeStanhope[15]
1803. Canning on AddingtonStanhope[17]
1803. Notes by Pitt on the War, Germany, and NapoleonStanhope[18]
1803. Gun-boats for Defence“Diaries of George Rose”[20]
1804. The Poor in Manufacturing Towns“Gentleman’s Magazine”[21]
1804. Wheat, Flour, and Bread“Gentleman’s Magazine”[24]
1805. England and the Mediterranean (I.)Pitt[25]
England and the Mediterranean (II.)Nelson[26]
1805. The Blow that Killed Pitt (I.)Pitt[27]
The Blow that Killed Pitt (II.)Canning[28]
1805. Routine on a British Man-of-WarClowes[29]
1805. Nelson’s Plan for TrafalgarClowes[32]
1805. TrafalgarSouthey[34]
1806. The Younger PittScott[43]
1806. Ministry of All the TalentsEarl of Malmesbury[44]
1806. Military PlansLord Colchester[46]
1807. Catholic Emancipation (I.)Lord Colchester[47]
Catholic Emancipation (II.)Malmesbury[50]
1807. Party PoliticsLeigh Hunt[52]
1807. Berlin DecreesColchester[53]
1809. Corunna (I.)Colchester[55]
Corunna (II.)Charles Wolfe[55]
1809. Public Economy“Diaries of George Rose”[57]
1809. Resignation of PortlandColchester[58]
1809. Duel of Canning and CastlereaghColchester[59]
1806-1809. Military ExpensesColchester[60]
1809. Talavera: Protest by LordsProtests of the Lords[61]
1810. Walcheren ExpeditionColchester[62]
1810. Wellington’s Difficulties in SpainWellington’s Despatches[65]
1811. The RegencyColchester[71]
1811. Fête at Carlton HouseColchester[73]
1812. Weaving MachinesByron’s Letters[76]
1812. BadajozWellington’s Despatches[79]
1812. Murder of PercevalColchester[84]
1812. Sheridan’s Last Utterances in the HouseMoore[85]
1813. Sir Stapleton Cotton’s Military ServicesColchester[86]
1813. VittoriaWellington’s Despatches[87]
1814. Deposition of NapoleonByron’s Letters[95]
1814. Capture of ToulouseWellington’s Despatches[96]
1814. Duke of Wellington’s ThanksColchester[102]
1814. Negotiations with BuonaparteSouthey[105]
1815. Interview with Napoleon in ElbaVivian[109]
1815. WaterlooWellington’s Despatches[112]

ENGLAND AND NAPOLEON
1801-1815

THE BATTLE OF THE BALTIC (1801).
Source.—Thomas Campbell: Historical Lyrics and Ballads. P. 93.

I.

Of Nelson and the North
Sing the glorious day’s renown,
When to battle fierce came forth
All the might of Denmark’s crown,
And her arms along the deep proudly shone;
By each gun the lighted brand,
In a bold determined hand,
And the Prince of all the land
Led them on.

II.

Like leviathans afloat
Lay their bulwarks on the brine;
While the sign of battle flew
On the lofty British line:
It was ten of April morn by the chime:
As they drifted on their path,
There was silence deep as death;
And the boldest held his breath
For a time.

III.

But the might of England flushed
To anticipate the scene;
And her van the fleeter rushed
O’er the deadly space between.
“Hearts of oak!” our captains cried; when each gun
From its adamantine lips
Spread a death-shade round the ships,
Like the hurricane eclipse
Of the sun.

IV.

Again! again! again!
And the havoc did not slack,
Till a feeble cheer the Dane
To our cheering sent us back;—
Their shots along the deep slowly boom:
Then cease—and all is wail,
As they strike the shattered sail;
Or in conflagration pale
Light the gloom.

V.

Out spoke the victor then,
As he hailed them o’er the wave,
“Ye are brothers! ye are men!
And we conquer but to save!
So peace, instead of death, let us bring;
But yield, proud foe, thy fleet
With the crews, at England’s feet,
And make submission meet
To our King.”

VI.

Then Denmark blessed our chief,
That he gave her wounds repose;
And the sounds of joy and grief
From her people wildly rose,
As death withdrew his shades from the day:
While the sun looked smiling bright
O’er a wide and woful sight,
Where the fires of funeral light
Died away.

VII.

Now joy, Old England, raise
For the tidings of thy might,
By the festal cities’ blaze,
Whilst the wine-cup shines in light;
And yet amidst that joy and uproar,
Let us think of them that sleep
Full many a fathom deep
By thy wild and stormy steep,
Elsinore!

VIII.

Brave hearts! to Britain’s pride
Once so faithful and so true,
On the deck of fame that died
With the gallant good Riou!
Soft sigh the winds of Heaven o’er their grave!
While the billow mournful rolls
And the mermaid’s song condoles,
Singing glory to the souls
Of the brave!

IRELAND IN 1801.
Source.—Diary of Lord Colchester, 1861. Vol. i., p. 286.

Minutes of Proceedings in Ireland from July to Dec. 1801; and Outlines of Irish Business for 1802, reported and read over to Mr. Addington, Feb. 1802.

Irish Affairs, Jan. 1802.

I. Their present state, including a detailed Account of the Government Transactions there during the last Six Months.

II. Outline of the Public Business of Ireland for the Year 1802.

I. THE GOVERNMENT.

1. Lord-Lieutenant.—Unsettled powers; question whether a Lord-Lieutenant from England, administering the protection and patronage of the Crown subordinately to the King’s Ministers—or a Government by Lords Justices setting up for themselves, and tyrannising over their countrymen—or endeavour to govern Ireland entirely by a Secretary of State at Whitehall.

N.B.—No communication has been made to Lord Hardwicke in answer to the paper transmitted by him to Lord Pelham, containing remarks upon Lord Pelham’s proposition.

2. Chief Secretary.—Unsettled emoluments of the Office in Ireland. Unsettled footing of the Irish Office in London.

Query.—Suppress its establishment as an Office accredited with the Secretary of State for the Home Department; and as hitherto employed for soliciting Civil Patents and Military Commissions in the place of the old office of Resident Secretary (Fremantle and Jenkinson). And transfer the agency and fees of the business to the Secretary of State’s Office; leaving no establishment in London for the Chief Secretary to transact his business, except what assistance he may personally obtain for himself from Dublin Castle, etc.

N.B.—The salary and fees of this Office upon Peace Establishments, viz. about 5,000l. British, are not more than adequate to the necessary expenses of the office conducted with economy; having houses and servants in each country; and the removal of a family twice a year across the Channel.

3. Private Secretary.—Unprovided present subsistence, and no certain future provision.

4. Lord Chancellor (Lord Clare).—Hostile to any Government by Lord-Lieutenant. Desirous himself to be Lord-Deputy, or at the head of Lords Justices; and for Mr. Cooke to be Secretary of State under him.

5. Commander of the Forces.—Sir W. Meadows, cordially co-operating with the Lord-Lieutenant.

6. Royal Building, &c.—In the Castle a library for printed books upon Irish affairs. Orders also given for arranging the State Papers, &c., in the Birmingham Tower. Plans and estimate ordered for rebuilding the Castle chapel, and adapting it to choir service.

Parliament House.—A proposal transmitted to the King’s Ministers for selling it to the National Bank of Ireland, or appropriating it to Public Offices.

Phœnix Park.—Walls and roads ordered to be repaired; rights of Park officers ascertained; encroachments defeated.

7. Union Engagements.—Many liquidated. No vacant office has been given away without considering to what promise it could apply.

II. FINANCE.

1. Treasury Statements of Annual Income and Expenditure of Ireland assimilated to the British series of Public Accounts, and adapted to the same annual and quarterly periods.

2. Revenue Boards.—Examination into its past state by personal conference with each of the four senior Examiners; all of them agreeing that it was corrupt and inefficient; proved also by lists of Officers accused and protected; proved also by reports of Mr. Beresford, in 1792; and of the Acting Surveyor-General, Mr. Cooke, in 1800.

Division of the Board into Customs and Excise, as projected in Lord Townsend’s and Lord Buckingham’s Administration, and executed now in the manner prescribed by Mr. Beresford, in a letter written by himself on a former occasion; a copy whereof was delivered to me by Mr. B., with a recommendation of its being adopted for this purpose at this time.

Dublin Quay Regulated.—Tobacco stores, gate notes, &c., under advice of the Board, and upon suggestion and report of Mr. Croker, who was appointed acting Surveyor-General of the port, with joint approbation of Mr. Beresford and Mr. Annesley, and established in the Office of Surveyor-General by Lord Hardwicke.

Regulations enforced prohibiting all Revenue Officers from being traders.

Revision and Amendment of the Distillery Laws considered. Throughout Ireland the Surveyors-General ordered to report quarterly from their actual surveys.

N.B.—Dublin Customs’ duties are one half, and Dublin Excise duties one quarter of all Ireland.

A mode settled for passing Collector’s accounts in Dublin with more expedition, and (as in England) without their personal attendance.

Cruisers called in; inspection of repairs ordered, and a report upon the future complement of men for their Peace Establishment.

Additional officers appointed, not for patronage, but upon special reports of the Board, and upon considerations of personal merit, viz. two Surveyors-General, one Inspector-General, and one Inspector, and two Landwaiters in the Port of Dublin.

General plan for prevention of smuggling and illicit distilleries prepared for consideration.

Commercial regulations between Great Britain and Ireland considered, and reported upon by the Commissioners of Revenue.

3. Auditors of Public Accounts.—Their accounts methodised on the British plan, and brought up to 5th January, 1802, showing the actual amounts of debts due from Public Accountants.

4. Stamps.—After a previous investigation by the Treasury, and personal conference repeatedly with the Commissioners.

Establishment settled on the British model, and report upon the building purchased for the use of this Office before the Rebellion.

Consignments to distributors, and the appropriation of their receipts new modelled.

Debts from deceased and dismissed distributors called in; securities of distributors raised.

Inspectors-General ordered upon survey throughout Ireland, and to make quarterly reports; and two new inspectors added at inferior salaries, with prospect of succession to the higher, if merited.

Revision and amendment of the Stamp Laws prepared.

N.B.—Last summer, in the counties of Wicklow and Wexford, several Justices of Peace refused to convict in penalties for evading the Stamp Duties.

5. Crown Lands.—A report upon their state, extent, and value ordered to be made out in thirty-two books for the thirty-two counties.

6. Board of Works.—Appropriation of issues between May 1801, and August 1801, viz. 20,000l. having been called for, and no account being produced of time or place, of articles supplied, or work done, nor any check appearing; an inquiry directed for settling an efficient system of checks for the future; report made and instructions issued to take effect prospectively from 5th January, 1802.

N.B.—By Comptroller of Accounts (who has controlled the Barrack Accounts), and two Privy Councillors.

All the old accounts ordered to be balanced and closed to 5th January, 1802, where a debt stated in November to be 11,000l., was stated in January to be a debt of 37,000l.; though no new work was ordered or executed in the interval. And it appeared also that no final accounts had been settled with the tradesmen for [1] years. How many years?

N.B.—During the period within which this debt was incurred, there was an annual issue to the Board of from 25,000l. to 32,000l. a year. No new building, except one house, which cost 3,000l., was erected. The Castle or public apartments are worse furnished than any private gentleman’s house in England.

Note.—The First Commissioner of the Board, consisting of seven, is also sole Barrackmaster-General; and has the sole expenditure of nearly 300,000l. a year. And the latest of his accounts delivered in to be audited, viz. March, 1800, did not come down to a later period than 25th March, 1796.

N.B.—Lord Tyrawley, from a very moderate beginning, is reputed to have made a landed property of 10,000l. a year, out of private trusts (viz. law arrears, &c.), and out of public offices, viz. the Board of Works and Barrack Office.

As to the economy of his department, ex uno disce omnes. Ready-made sentry-boxes sent in carts from Dublin to Cork. Extravagant expense of carriage, and destruction of the articles themselves.

GOLF AND FOOTBALL (1801).
Source.—Strutt’s Sports and Pastimes of the People of England, 1801. Pp. 93 and 97 of Methuen’s edition, 1903.

There are many games played with the ball that require the assistance of a club or bat, and probably the most ancient among them is the pastime now distinguished by the name of golf. In the northern parts of the kingdom golf is much practised. It requires much room to perform this game with propriety, and therefore I presume it is rarely seen at present in the vicinity of the metropolis. It answers to a rustic pastime of the Romans which they played with a ball of leather stuffed with feathers, called paganica, because it was used by the common people: the golf-ball is composed of the same materials to this day; I have been told it is sometimes, though rarely, stuffed with cotton. In the reign of Edward III. the Latin name cambuca was applied to this pastime, and it derived the denomination, no doubt, from the crooked club or bat with which it was played; the bat was also called a bandy, from its being bent. Golf, according to the present modification of the game, is performed with a bat, not much unlike the bandy: the handle of this instrument is straight, and usually made of ash, about four feet and a half in length: the curvature is affixed to the bottom, faced with horn and backed with lead; the ball is a little one, but exceedingly hard; being made with leather, and, as before observed, stuffed with feathers. There are generally two players, who have each of them his bat and ball. The game consists in driving the ball into certain holes made in the ground; he who achieves it the soonest, or in the fewest number of strokes, obtains the victory.

Football is so called because the ball is driven about with the feet instead of the hands. It was formerly much in vogue among the common people of England, though of late years it seems to have fallen into disrepute, and is but little practised. I cannot pretend to determine at what period the game of football originated: it does not, however, to the best of my recollection, appear among the popular exercises before the reign of Edward III., and then, in 1349, it was prohibited by a public edict; not, perhaps, from any particular objection to the sport in itself, but because it co-operated, with other favourite amusements, to impede the progress of archery. When a match at football is made, two parties, each containing an equal number of competitors, take the field, and stand between two goals, placed at the distance of 80 or 100 yards the one from the other. The goal is usually made with two sticks driven into the ground, about two or three feet apart. The ball, which is commonly made of a blown bladder, and cased with leather, is delivered in the midst of the ground, and the object of each party is to drive it through the goal of their antagonists, which being achieved the game is won. The abilities of the performers are best displayed in attacking and defending the goals; and hence the pastime was more frequently called a goal at football than a game at football. When the exercise becomes exceeding violent, the players kick each other’s shins without the least ceremony, and some of them are overthrown at the hazard of their limbs.

SHERIDAN FOR ADDINGTON, CANNING FOR PITT (1802).
Source.—Stanhope’s Life of Pitt, 1862. Vol. iii., p. 415.

The great speech of Sheridan was, however, reserved till the 8th of December, when the Army Estimates came forward. They were moved by Mr. Charles Yorke as Secretary at War. “I was much surprised,” said Mr. Yorke, “when, on another evening, I heard an Hon. gentleman (Mr. Fox) maintain that there was no reason why a larger establishment than usual in former periods of peace should be maintained in Great Britain; and that there were reasons why even a smaller force would suffice everywhere but in the West Indies.” It was no hard matter for Mr. Yorke to argue against this proposition, or to point out the dangers that impended from the Continent of Europe. He could reckon on the support of the House for the proposal which his speech contained—to provide for a regular force of nearly one hundred and thirty thousand men, counting officers, and including the regiments in India. This was an increase on the establishment voted on the first conclusion of the peace.

Then and after some other speeches Sheridan rose. He referred to Fox as to the man whom of all men upon earth he most loved and respected. But these sentiments did not withhold him from some keen animadversions, although in covert terms, upon the course which Fox had latterly been seeking to promote. He approved of the King’s Speech. He approved of the large establishments. He approved of Addington as Minister. What (he asked) had other members really to allege against that Right Hon. gentleman? Theirs was a mere capricious dislike; for no better reason than is given in an epigram of Martial, or in an English parody upon that epigram:

“I do not like thee, Dr. Fell,
The reason why I cannot tell;
But this I’m sure I know full well,
I do not like thee, Dr. Fell.”

Those who call to mind that Addington already bore the nickname of “the Doctor,” and who know the keen relish of the House of Commons for almost any jest, may easily imagine the roars of laughter with which Sheridan’s allusion was received.

Sheridan proceeded in a strain of blended wit and argument. “What,” he said, “did these gentlemen expect from the present Chancellor of the Exchequer? We treated him when in the Chair of this House with the respect he merited.... But did they expect that when he was a Minister he was to stand up and call Europe to Order? Was he to send Mr. Colman, the Serjeant-at-Arms, to the Baltic and summon the Northern Powers to the Bar of this House? Was he to see the Powers of Germany scrambling like Members over the benches, and say—Gentlemen must take their places? Was he expected to cast his eye to the Tuscan gallery, and exclaim that strangers must withdraw? Was he to stand across the Rhine, and say—The Germans to the right, and the French to the left? If he could have done these things, I for one should always vote that the Speaker of the House should be appointed the Minister of the country. But the Right Hon. gentleman has done all that a reasonable man could expect him to do.”

“Sir,”—so Sheridan continued—“I confess I wish to know what Mr. Pitt himself thinks. I should be glad to hear what his sentiments are of the call made for him; and loudly too, in another place by a vigorous statesman.[2] I well remember, Sir, and so do we all, the character Mr. Pitt gave of the present administration. Does he mean to retract that character? I cannot suppose he does.... Sir, when I see so many persons anxious about that gentleman, I am glad to hear that his health is re-established. But how, I would ask, can we with any consistency turn out the man who made the peace to bring in the man who avowed his approbation of it?... I suspect, therefore, that the political Philidor’s game has been misunderstood; that his friends have displaced a knight and a castle when they should only have taken two pawns; that they have made an attempt to checkmate the King when they had no instructions for doing it. I cannot forget the period when the august Person of the Sovereign was held up as the only man who was against extending privileges to the Catholics in Ireland; and I cannot, therefore, brook the idea of calling that Right Hon. gentleman back to power, and forcing him upon the Crown.... Mr. Pitt the only man to save the country! If a nation depends only upon one man, it cannot, and I will add, it does not deserve to be saved; it can be saved only by the Parliament and people.”

Next after Sheridan rose Canning. In his great speech that evening he displayed not only a luminous eloquence, but the rarer gift (rarer, I mean, in him) of perfect discretion. He desired to express his sentiments, not of satisfaction merely, but of thankfulness, for the part which his Hon. Friend (Mr. Sheridan) had that day done.

“It is by no means the first time,” he said, “that my Hon. Friend, throwing aside all petty distinctions of party feeling, has come forward, often under circumstances of peculiar difficulty, often discouraged, always alone, as the champion of his country’s rights and interests, and has rallied the hearts and spirits of the nation.[3] I trust we shall now hear no more of those miserable systems, the object of which is not to rouse us to ward off our ruin, but to reconcile us to submit to it.... ‘We have nothing to dread from France but a rivalry in commerce,’ says the Hon. gentleman opposite to me (Mr. Fox). Look round, Sir, on the state of the world, and can such an argument even from such a man need farther refutation?”

“And what, Sir”—so Canning went on in another passage—“what is the nature of the times in which we live? Look at France, and see what we have to cope with, and consider what has made her what she is? A man. You will tell me that she was great, and powerful, and formidable before the date of Bonaparte’s Government; that he found in her great physical and moral resources; that he had but to turn them to account. True, and he did so. Compare the situation in which he found France with that to which he has raised her. I am no panegyrist of Bonaparte; but I cannot shut my eyes to the superiority of his talents, to the amazing ascendency of his genius. Tell me not of his measures and his policy—it is his genius, his character, that keeps the world in awe. Sir, to meet, to check, to curb, to stand up against him, we want arms of the same kind. I am far from objecting to the large military establishments which are proposed to you. I vote for them with all my heart. But, for the purpose of coping with Bonaparte, one great commanding spirit is worth them all. This is my undisguised opinion. But when I state this opinion thus undisguisedly, is my Right Hon. Friend (Mr. Pitt) to be implicated in a charge of prompting what I say?...

“Sir, of all the imputations to which that Right Hon. gentleman could be subjected, I confess I did think that of intrigue and cabal the least likely to be preferred against him by any man who has witnessed his public conduct.... No, Sir. Never did young Ambition, just struggling into public notice and aiming at popular favour, labour with half so much earnestness to court reputation and to conciliate adherents, as my Right Hon. Friend has laboured since his retreat from office not to attract, but to repel; not to increase the number of his followers, but to dissolve attachment and to transfer support. And if, whatever has been his endeavour to insulate and individualize himself in political life, he has not been able to succeed wholly, even with those who would sacrifice to his wishes everything but their attachment to him—if with the public he has succeeded not at all, what is the inference? what but that, retreat and withdraw as much as he will, he must not hope to efface the memory of his past services from the gratitude of his country?—he cannot withdraw himself from the following of a nation; he must endure the attachment of a people whom he has saved.”

TYPICAL VESSELS OF THE ROYAL NAVY (1803 to 1815).
Source.—Clowes: The Royal Navy, 1900. Vol. v. (1803 to 1815), p. 15.

Models of many of the most typical vessels which were added to the Navy during the period under review are to be seen at Greenwich. Among them are whole or half-block models of the following ships:

Name. Length of Gun-deck. Beam. Depth in Hold. Tons. Men. Guns. When and where Built, or how Acquired, etc.
Ft. In. Ft. In. Ft. In.
Caledonia 205 0 54 6 23 2 2,616 875 120 Launched 1808, at Devonport. Designed by Sir W. Rule.
Hercules 176 1 48 4¼ 21 0 1,750 590 80 Launched 1815, at Chatham. Designed by Surveyor’s Dept.
Bulwark 181 10 49 3 20 7 1,940 590 74 Launched 1807, at Portsmouth. Designed by Sir W. Rule.
Java 171 11½ 44 1 14 3 1,458 480 60 Launched 1815, at Devonport. Designed by Surveyor’s Dept.
President 173 3 44 4 13 11 1,533 480 50 Taken 1815, from the Americans.
Chesapeake 151 0 40 11 13 9 1,135 315 48 Taken 1813, from the Americans.
Lively 154 1 39 6 13 6 1,076 284 46 Launched 1804, at Woolwich. Designed by Sir W. Rule.
Euryalus 145 2 38 2½ 13 3 946 264 42 Launched 1803, by Adams, Bucklershard. Designed by Sir W. Rule.
Lacedemonian 150 4 40 0½ 12 9½ 1,073 264 38 Launched 1812, at Portsmouth. Built after the French Hébé, taken in 1782.
Barbados 140 0 36 7 16 0 800 195 36 Ex. Brave. Taken from the French, 1804.
Eden 108 6 30 8 9 0 451 150 28 Launched 1804, by Courtney, Chester. Designed by Sir W. Rule.
Andromeda 129 7 36 5⅜ 11 0 812 195 24 Ex. Hannibal. Taken 1812, from the Americans.
Florida 119 5½ 32 0 14 2 539 135 20 Ex. Frolic. Taken 1814, from the Americans.
Epervier 95 1 28 6 8 9½ 315 121 16 Taken 1803, from the French.
Cadmus 90 3 24 6 11 0 237 76 10 Launched 1808, by Dudman, Deptford. Designed by H. Peake.

DESIRE FOR PITT’S RETURN TO OFFICE (1803).
Source.—Stanhope’s Life of Pitt, 1862. Vol. iv., p. 28.

Mr. Long to Mr. Pitt.

Bromley Hill,
April 3, 1803.

Dear Pitt,

I am anxious to give you some account of what passed between Addington and myself upon my return, reserving details upon the whole subject till we meet. He seemed extremely anxious that you should not consider a pending negotiation as any obstacle to coming forward at the present moment, but it is hardly necessary to say what he stated upon this subject, because he has since altered his opinion, and rather thinks the fit time would be when the negotiation is brought to a point either way, which (in conjunction with Lord Hawkesbury, Lord Castlereagh, and your brother) he is satisfied will be determined before you meet at Bromley Hill. Upon the whole question of arrangement he seemed disposed to adopt what you had authorized me to state, not as anything settled, but as a general idea upon the subject, but at the same time expressed great difficulties about Lord Hobart (none about Lord Pelham). He ended this part of the subject by saying that of course you were the best judge of those persons who had claims upon you, but that he trusted you would not decide anything upon this point (if the thing proceeded to that length) without also considering the fair pretensions of those who had claims upon him. I instanced Bragge, Smyth, Lord C. Spencer, and Wickham, as persons accidentally placed in the situations they held, and whom it might be necessary to call upon to give way: he admitted the justice of what I said upon all these persons, and of the possible necessary arrangement respecting them, but added that he believed the last particularly agreeable to the Chancellor of Ireland and the Lord Lieutenant, and also well qualified for his office. With respect to Lord Grenville, he thought it impossible to admit him or any of his friends at the present moment without a marked degradation of himself and his colleagues, but that he could not mean to proscribe them, or to preclude you from taking whatever assistance you thought right at any future time. I then mentioned Canning and Rose: he said the first had been personally offensive to him; but upon my submitting to him whether he could justify the suffering even personal offence to stand in the way of what he had taken so much pains to convince me was a necessary public arrangement, he seemed very much softened upon this point, and with respect to Rose he stated no objection. There was no difficulty in leaving the vacancies at the Treasury, provided something else was done for Broderick, for whom he had pledged himself to provide. He then showed me a letter from Lord St. Vincent, requesting, on account of his state of health, that he would find him a successor as soon as he conveniently could, and expressed a wish to send the papers which referred to the points upon which you desired information. It is very probable you may want further information upon these subjects, which of course you can have at Bromley Hill.

I saw Lord Castlereagh the next day: very anxious that you should be induced to come into the proposal, even during negotiation, if, contrary to all appearances, it should be protracted. He argued the cases of war, of peace, and of protracted negotiation very ably, as each affording sufficient grounds for your placing yourself at the head of the Government. If we were led into war, no person could conduct it with effect but yourself. You could prevent the negotiation spinning out to a disadvantageous length; and in peace, the state of parties was the ground upon which he urged the necessity of your taking the Government. Neither he nor Lord Hawkesbury concealed from me the necessity for a change. Lord H. was of opinion Lord Grenville could not possibly come in under this arrangement, but seemed to think there would not be any difficulty at a future period.... I have made some endeavours to obtain the opinion of the City: as far as I have been able to ascertain it, it is uniform—a very strong wish that you should take the lead in Government, but an almost equally strong opinion that Grenville should be no part of it. Thornton gave me some strong grounds for supposing this was the general opinion upon both points; but as I know how often people give their own opinion as the public opinion, only for the purpose of strengthening it, I receive a public opinion with some caution. At the same time I have heard the [same] from so many quarters, that I believe it is not mistaken; and there is one point at least in which I think you will concur with me—that pending the negotiation it would be extremely prejudicial to yourself to take office with Grenville; for if it ended in war, his influence would be supposed to have occasioned it; and things are certainly in that state in which it is the general wish that we should at least give ourselves every fair chance of preserving peace....

I have only had time to scribble this as fast as I could since Huskisson told me he was going to Walmer. I hope you will find it intelligible.

Ever yours,
C. L.

VERSES BY CANNING AGAINST ADDINGTON (1803).
Source.—Stanhope’s Life of Pitt, 1862. Vol. iv., pp. 58, 59, 60.

Praise to placeless proud ability
Let the prudent Muse disclaim;
And sing the statesman—all civility—
Whom moderate talents raise to fame.
* * * * *
Splendid talents are deceiving,
Tend to counsels much too bold;
Moderate men we prize, believing
All that glitters is not gold.

When the faltering periods flag,
Or the House receives them drily,
Cheer, oh cheer him, brother Bragge!
Cheer, oh cheer him, brother Hiley!

Each a gentleman at large,
Lodged and fed at public charge,
Paying, with a grace to charm ye,
This the fleet, and that the army.

Brother Bragge and brother Hiley,
Cheer him! when he speaks so vilely;
Cheer him! when his audience flag,
Brother Hiley, brother Bragge.

If blocks can from danger deliver,
Two places are safe from the French:
One is the mouth of the river,
The other the Treasury Bench.

Pitt is to Addington
As London to Paddington.

NOTES ON THE WAR, GERMANY, AND NAPOLEON, BY PITT (1803).
Source.—Stanhope’s Life of Pitt, 1862. Vol. iv., p. 223.

The War.

(Paper-mark, 1803.)

“Whether the attacks should be numerous or few in order to strengthen them, and in what points:—

“1. South of Italy.—Besides Neapolitans, 10 or 15,000 British troops and as many Russians; besides free corps raised in Albania and Italy, the latter by the King of Sardinia.

“2. North of Italy.—Switzerland and South of Germany.—Austrian troops supported by 60,000 Russians as auxiliaries.

“North of Germany.—40,000 Russians, with a body of Hanoverians, a Swedish army, and a diversion from England. To advance towards the Low Countries.

“The operations on the two flanks may be modified according to the conduct of Turkey. These will probably only act when forced. Austria and Sweden may, it is thought, be brought to act voluntarily.

“It is not meant by diversion that any descent should be made from hence in the beginning, but that we should continue to menace their coasts, and not attempt anything in the interior till after some decided success.

“Advantages to be given to any Power if necessary should be regulated with a view to the future safety of Europe, and the zeal shown by each Power. It is supposed nothing can be proposed for Prussia consistent with the safety and interests of the rest of Europe, except the provinces she ceded to France. Austria is expected from the little which has passed to be very moderate, and content with inconsiderable acquisitions in Germany and Italy.

“King of Sardinia should not only be re-established, but his share should be made as large as possible.

“Switzerland should be arrondi, and its position strengthened as much as possible.

“The same principle should be followed with respect to Holland.”

Germany.

(Paper-mark, 1803.)

“The present situation of the German body neither good for the countries themselves nor for Europe.

“Should a part of it be englobé by the two great Powers, or a third great State formed in the middle of Germany? This can scarce be thought of, from its injustice to so many Princes of the Empire.

“Could a more concentrated Federative Government be formed out of the different States; and should not in that case both Austria and Prussia be separated from it?

“Principle of mediation being to precede war.

“Intimate union necessary between England and Russia, who are the only Powers that for many years can have no jealousy or opposite interests.”

Napoleon.

“I see various and opposite qualities—all the great and all the little passions unfavourable to public tranquillity—united in the breast of one man, and of that man, unhappily, whose personal caprice can scarce fluctuate for an hour without affecting the destiny of Europe. I see the inward workings of fear struggling with pride in an ardent, enterprising, and tumultuous mind. I see all the captious jealousy of conscious usurpation dreaded, detested, and obeyed—the giddiness and intoxication of splendid but unmerited success—the arrogance, the presumption, the self-will of unlimited and idolized power, and—more dreadful than all in the plenitude of authority—the restless and incessant activity of guilty but unsated ambition.”

GUN-BOATS FOR DEFENCE (1803).
Source.—Diaries ... of the Right Hon. George Rose, 1860. P. 69.

Mr. Pitt to Mr. Rose.

Margate,
Oct. 18th, 1803.

Dear Rose

I received your letter just as I left home this morning. I had not forgot your wish to have a description of our gun-boats; but as many of my friends here are more expert in fitting a boat, or fighting it, than in writing or drawing, I could not at once obtain one which would explain to you the last improved mode of fitting as accurately as I wished. But Mr. Whitby, the Assistant of Sheerness Yard, who has been appointed to superintend the work, and whom I saw yesterday, has promised me to send immediately to your house, in Palace Yard, a small model of the frame and slide, which will, I trust, completely answer the purpose. I should hope it will reach your house in a day or two, and you will, I take for granted, send orders for its being immediately forwarded to you by coach. We have now fitted, or are fitting, I believe, about 170 boats between Margate and Hastings, which, I think, will contribute not a little to giving the enemy a good reception whenever they think proper to visit us. By the intelligence I collect, and by the orders for extraordinary preparation which are received from London by this post, I am much more inclined than I have ever been hitherto to believe that some attempt will be made soon. In this situation I am likely to have my time very completely occupied by the various concerns of my regiment and my district. I hope, however, to find some interval for attending a little to the cursory remarks, when I hear from Long, which I am expecting to do every day. Our volunteers are, I think, likely, to be called upon to undertake permanent duty, which, I hope, they will readily consent to. I suppose the same measure will be recommended in your part of the coast. I wish the arrangements for defence were as forward everywhere else as they are in Hythe Bay, under General Moore. We begin now to have no other fear in that quarter than that the enemy will not give us an opportunity of putting our preparations to the proof, and will select some other point, which we should not be in search of in the first instance. I write here to save the post, as I shall not get back to Walmer till a late hour.

Ever sincerely yours,
W. Pitt.

CONDITION OF THE POOR IN MANUFACTURING TOWNS (1804).
Source.—Gentleman’s Magazine. Vol. 74, July to December, 1804, p. 710.

July 17.

Mr. Urban,

“Judge not, lest you be judged.”

The benevolence and humanity of Dr. Lettsom must ensure esteem; and certainly the trouble he has taken to meliorate the condition of the labouring poor must deserve praise, and be grateful to his own feelings, but, in the way of doing good, there is much delicacy required; and while we are zealous in our endeavours to promote an active charity in one particular instance, we should be careful, in the extension of this important Christian duty, not to forget the other Christian branch of charity to others also.

In his Remarks on the Condition of the Children of our labouring Poor, this worthy medical gentleman has, I think, been too partial in confining his subject to the great manufacturing towns of this kingdom, and very particularly so in his comparative view of the new Lanark Mills and those of Holy-well and Manchester.

I have always understood there is great difficulty in the attempt of separating the cause of the evil which a state derives from the immorality and the emasculated condition of the poor, from the important benefits which it derives from the increasing manufactures carried on by these objects of our speculation. That the regulation of the morals and the health of the rising progeny of a state, as conducive to industry and to opulence, demands every attention, it is needless to argue; but let us see the great difficulties which our principal manufacturing towns labour under, such as Birmingham and Manchester, compared with the less contaminated primitive and more hardy poor connected with the manufactories of Scotland.

From several generations past, the manufactories of our great commercial towns have encouraged the most extensive employment to the labouring poor; motley groups of individuals from various quarters have been lured to them; the parental stock in various particulars originally defective in point of stamina, and their progeny of course, unhappily tainted with the same misfortune; the gleanings of work houses from the capital, from many parts of the country, have been thrown into these great towns; forsaken children from impure connexions, in whom squalid poverty has laid the foundation of many disorders, and which growing up and settling in these places have been communicated to a succeeding race: this evil is therefore not the present growth of our large factories. In Scotland, it is but of late years the manufactures have sprung up; the stamina of their labouring poor is naturally more hardy and less corrupted, not having the intercourse of the Southern provinces; and by recruiting constantly from the same parental source, no wonder that the children at the Lanark Mills have been found more healthy than those of the English manufacturing towns.

Although the proprietor of the Lanark Mills may deserve praise for his attention to the health of the children employed in his establishment, it does not follow that other gentlemen, eminently signalized for their enterprising spirit, industry, and abilities, owing to the natural advantages of Mr. Dale,[4] deserve a public exposure and stigma.

I think Mr. Bott, of Nantwich, in Cheshire, is highly to be commended, for his denial of an entry into his manufactory; and if the visit of the benevolent Mr. Neild was only to wrest from his mill articles of crimination for an exposure before the public, Mr. Bott has acted very wisely, by the interdiction of curiosity and intrusive inquiry at his own expense; but there are many other reasons which may be fairly alledged for this gentleman’s refusal. I am informed, that it frequently happens that many persons, on gaining admittance to these extensive manufactories, have suborned the artisans from their employers, and in various other respects have caused much disorder to the establishment.

By the law of the land, it is ordained that these factories should be opened to the regular and periodical visits of Magistrates; therefore, by thus exposing the partial evils of these extensive commercial establishments, which few human undertakings of such a vast magnitude can be exempt from, where such immense numbers of hands are employed, an oblique reflection is doubtless cast on the judicial administration of the State.

The benevolence and zeal of a patriotic character should recommend itself in a more effectual manner than by publicly praising one man or set of men at the expense of others, equally, and in the fullest extent as much deserving. All memorials for the public good should be circulated through the hands of the civil Magistrate or members of the country where the evil exists; reforms can thus be more certainly obtained than by innuendos, which but too generally carry with them the appearance of party consideration, or other interested motives.

Conservator.

ANNUAL STATEMENT OF WHEAT, FLOUR, AND BREAD FOR THE YEAR 1804.
Source.—Gentleman’s Magazine. Vol. 74, January to June, 1804, p. [iv].

Wheat.

Quantity of Quarters returned per Month. Highest Price per Quarter in the Month. Monthly Arrangement, 1804. Lowest Price per Quarter in the Month. Average Price per Quarter for the the Month.
Qrs. Bush. Shillings. Shillings. s. d.
25,789 3 63 January 35 53 8½
19,253 5 60 February 32 52 1¼
22,465 2 61 March 35 50 8¼
22,813 1 62 April 30 51 8¾
17,198 0 59 May 32 51 8¾
18,877 8 58 June 32 51 1¾
30,517 4 70 July 32 54 11¼
50,437 2 80 August 37 64 2¼
45,199 3 85 September 42 70 6¼
64,684 7 93 October 42 73 5
69,001 1 132 November 50 88 11¼
51,933 3 135 December 62 10 3¼

Total, 438,170 quarters, 3 bushels. Average per quarter, 70s. 8½d.

Flour.

Quantity of Quarters returned per Month. Highest Price per Quarter in the Month. Monthly Arrangement, 1804. Lowest Price per Quarter in the Month. Average Price per Quarter for the the Month.
Shillings. s. d. s. d.
71,797 55 January 36 6 49 1½
61,191 50 February 37 44 9½
73,366 50 March 30 44 10¾
60,904 50 April 38 44 9¼
48,641 50 May 39 44 9¼
69,795 50 June 37 44 10¼
86,321 60 July 37 49 4¼
67,421 75 August 45 63 2
40,586 75 September 50 63 11¾
84,443 84 October 56 71 4¾
49,954 105 November 65 87 8½
59,110 105 December 80 98 3½

Total, 773,529 sacks. Average, per sack, 58s. 1d.

Bread.

Price of the Quartern Loaf, Wheaten, per Week.

Note.—The Assize is set on Tuesday in every week, and takes place on the Thursday following; therefore the under is dated on Thursday.

d. d. d. d.
January5 9¼April5 8½July5 8½October 4 12
“12 9¼“12 8½“12 8¾“11 12¼
“19 9¼“19 8½“19 9¼“18 12¼
“26 9“26 8¼“26 9¼“25 12¾
February2 9May3 8¼August2 9¾Novem.1 13¼
“9 8½“10 8½“9 10“8 13½
“16 8½“17 8½“16 10¾“15 14½
“23 8½“24 8½“23 12“22 16
March1 8½“31 8½“30 12“29 16½
“8 8½June7 8½Septem.6 11¼Decem.6 16½
“15 8½“14 8½“13 11“13 16¾
“22 8½“21 8½“20 11½“20 16½
“29 8½“28 8½“27 11½“27 16¼

ENGLAND AND THE MEDITERRANEAN.

I. Pitt on Malta (1805).

Source.—Stanhope’s Life of Pitt, 1862. Vol. iv., p. 306.

Mr. Pitt to M. Novosiltzoff (Extract).

Downing Street,
June 7, 1805.

I certainly have always felt that, as long as the execution of the Treaty of Amiens was in question, this country had no right to look to any object [touching Malta] but that of endeavouring to secure for it, if possible, a real and secure independence according to the spirit of that treaty. But a fresh war, produced by the conduct of France, having once cancelled that treaty, I cannot consider this country as bound by any intentions it has professed with a view to the execution of the treaty; and on general grounds of moderation and justice, I cannot think this country called upon to offer such an addition to all the other sacrifices of acquisitions made during the war, especially in return for concessions on the part of France which can afford no adequate security for Europe.

The possession of Malta appears to be of the most essential importance to great and valuable interests of our own, and to our means of connexion and co-operation with other Powers. Some naval station in the Mediterranean is absolutely indispensable; but none can be found so desirable and secure as Malta. Notwithstanding this sentiment, however, if the arrangement proposed respecting Malta could secure by negotiation an arrangement really satisfactory on the Continent, and particularly adequate barriers both for Italy and for Holland, and if we could obtain the only substitute for Malta which we think could at all answer the purpose (namely, Minorca), we are ready to overcome our difficulties on this point; but on any other ground the sacrifice is one to which we cannot feel ourselves justified to consent. It has, therefore, been impossible to ratify that part of the 10th article which relates to this subject, and which was referred hither for decision. We have also found ourselves under the painful necessity of protesting against any step which can lead to making our established principles of maritime law the subject of any revision or discussion. We have endeavoured to explain frankly and without reserve the motives which guide us on both points. They are, to our own minds, convincing and conclusive.

II. Nelson on Sardinia (1805).

Source.—Stanhope’s Life of Pitt, 1862. Vol. iv., p. 328.

Lord Nelson to Mr. Pitt.

Gordon’s Hotel, 6 a.m.,
Aug. 29, 1805.

Sir

I cannot rest until the importance of Sardinia, in every point of view, is taken into consideration. If my letters to the different Secretaries of State cannot be found, I can bring them with me. My belief is, that if France possesses Sardinia, which she may do any moment she pleases, our commerce must suffer most severely, if possible to be carried on. Many and most important reasons could be given why the French must not be suffered to possess Sardinia; but your time is too precious to read more words than is necessary; therefore I have only stated two strong points to call your attention to the subject. I am sure our fleet would find a difficulty, if not impossibility, in keeping any station off Toulon, for want of that island to supply cattle, water, and refreshments, in the present state of the Mediterranean; and that we can have no certainty of commerce at any time, but what France chooses to allow us, to either Italy or the Levant.

I am, &c.,
Nelson and Bronte.

THE BLOW THAT KILLED PITT (1805).

“How I leave my country!” (Pitt’s last words).

Source.—T. Holland Rose: Pitt and Napoleon. London: G. Bell and Sons. Pp. 312, 332, 333.

(a) Pitt to Lord Harrowby.

Downing Street,
October 30, 1805.

I enclose you a very gloomy account from one of our Dutch correspondents,[5] from which however I am inclined to deduct as he proposes at least one half. And though the remainder would be bad enough in itself, I see nothing in the consequences at all alarming, if Austria has the courage to pursue the only policy which is safe under such circumstances. Allowing for the great loss the French must evidently have sustained, they must probably require some interval before they can move to the Inn, and that march must be from 100 to 150 miles. If the Austrians and Russians on the Inn were to be 100,000 men by the 20th of this month, the further reinforcements they must probably receive from the Tirol and Salzburg, from such part of the Ulm army as may find its way to them, and from the Austrian reserves, must enable them to make a stout and probably an effectual resistance in that position. And they have still to expect a second army of 50,000 Russians in no long time, and, I should hope, 40,000 more of the reserve originally intended by Russia to have been kept on the frontier of Lithuania, but which might surely now be converted into an active force. Add to this that if Bonaparte advances to the Inn, he will be at least 300 miles from his frontier, just about the time the Prussian force will be collected at Bayreuth, and his allies probably advancing from Saxony and Hesse, the first of which places seems not more than 80 miles, the second 150 and the third 200 miles from points that would cut off all communication with Mentz, Manheim, and Strasburg. I am only unreasonable enough to desire that the Prussian army may move for this object within five days from your arrival, and everything may yet take a decisive turn in our favour before Christmas. We are flattering ourselves that as the wind is nearly due north, you may be able to sail, but I take the chance of this finding you still at Yarmouth.

(b) Canning to Pitt.

South Hill,
January 4, 1806.

If Sturges had not written to me yesterday, and I had only my newspapers of this morning to trust to, I should have made out a very good consolatory case from the materials which they furnish. But they are not altogether sufficient to counteract the impression of Sturges’s first intelligence; and I must therefore refer to you for more substantial and certain consolation.

1. If the Emperor of Russia has not given up the game personally; and if he is still in a situation to communicate with the Emperor of Germany, I have hopes that his influence may yet induce the E. of G. to break the armistice, before it has led to peace. It is obviously (upon the map) the interest of Austria to do so.

2. My second hope is from the co-operation of Prussia, but that (which was my only hope yesterday) is a good deal weakened by the resolution which Sturges announced to me of the Russian army retreating through Hungary. Thro’ Hungary! Into Hungary with a view to the first object, I can understand. But a retreat commenced thro’ Hungary at the same moment with the offer to Berlin of the use of Russian armies is more perplexing than encouraging.

3. If the very worst happens that is now threatened—if Austria does make a separate peace, and is abolished as a Power, and if Prussia lies down and licks Bonaparte’s feet, and is forgiven and gets Hanover assigned to her for her submission—still, with Russia unpledged to peace and committed in war, we are better off than we were before the Coalition took place. We must then, I think, set about making a new treaty with Russia with a view to joint negotiation hereafter. But still this is not the hopeless state of things in which (when we were looking at the possibility of it three months ago) we thought we should have nothing to do but to return an answer to Bonaparte’s neglected letter of January last. Nothing like it.

“One of the greatest comforts that you could send me would be the intelligence that you are going on well and getting stout. I did not very much like the late accounts of you.... I take for granted you do not mean to attend the funeral.”[6]

Note.—The last fatal news of Austerlitz was received by Pitt on January 13, 1806, and he died ten days afterwards, on January 23.

ROUTINE ON A BRITISH MAN-OF-WAR—THE REVENGE (1805).
Source.—Clowes’ Royal Navy, 1900. Vol. v., p. 21.

“Our crew were divided into two watches, starboard and larboard. When one was on deck the other was below: for instance, the starboard watch would come on at eight o’clock at night, which was called eight bells; at half-past is called one bell, and so on; every half-hour is a bell, as the hour-glass is turned, and the messenger sent to strike the bell, which is generally affixed near the fore-hatchway.[7] It now becomes the duty of the officer on deck to see that the log-line is run out, to ascertain how many knots the ship goes an hour, which is entered in the log-book, with any other occurrence which may take place during the watch. At twelve o’clock, or eight bells in the first watch, the Boatswain’s Mate calls out lustily, ‘Larboard watch, a-hoy.’ This is called the middle watch, and when on deck, the other watch go below to their hammocks, till eight bells, which is four o’clock in the morning. They then come on deck again, pull off their shoes and stockings, turn up their trousers to above their knees, and commence ‘holy-stoning’ the deck, as it is termed (for Jack is sometimes a little impious in the way of his sayings). Here the men suffer from being obliged to kneel down on the wetted deck, and a gravelly sort of sand strewed over it. To perform this work they kneel with their bare knees, rubbing the deck with a stone and the sand, the grit of which is often very injurious. In this manner the watch continues till about four bells, or six o’clock; they then begin to wash and swab the decks till seven bells, and at eight bells the Boatswain’s Mate pipes to breakfast. This meal usually consists of burgoo, made of coarse oatmeal and water; others will have Scotch coffee, which is burnt bread boil’d in some water, and sweetened with sugar. This is generally cooked in a hook-pot in the galley, where there is a range. Nearly all the crew have one of these pots, a spoon, and a knife; for these things are indispensable; there are also basins, plates, etc., which are kept in each mess, which generally consists of eight persons, whose berth is between two of the guns on the lower deck, where there is a board placed, which swings with the rolling of the ship, and answers for a table.... At half-past eight o’clock, or one bell in the forenoon watch, the larboard watch goes on deck, and the starboard remains below. Here again the ‘holy-stones,’ or ‘hand-bibles,’ as they are called by the crew, are used, and sometimes iron scrapers. After the lower deck has been wetted with swabs, these scrapers are used to take the rough dirt off. Whilst this is going on, the cooks from each mess are employed in cleaning the utensils and preparing for dinner; at the same time the watch are working the ship, and doing what is wanting to be done on deck.

“About eleven o’clock, or six bells, when any of the men are in irons, or on the black list, the boatswain or mate are ordered to call all hands; the culprits are then brought forward by the Master-at-Arms, who is a warrant-officer, and acts the part of Jack Ketch when required; he likewise has the prisoners in his custody, until they are put in irons, under any charge. All hands being now mustered, the Captain orders the man to strip; he is then seized to a grating by the wrists and knees; his crime is then mentioned, and the prisoner may plead; but, in nineteen cases out of twenty, he is flogged for the most trifling offence or neglect, such as not hearing the watch called at night, not doing anything properly on deck or aloft which he might happen to be sent to do, when, perhaps, he has been doing the best he could, and, at the same time, ignorant of having done wrong, until he is pounced on, and put in irons. So much for legal process. After punishment, the Boatswain’s Mate pipes to dinner, it being eight bells, or twelve o’clock; and this is the pleasantest part of the day, as at one bell the piper is called to play ‘Nancy Dawson,’ or some other lively tune, a well-known signal that the grog is ready to be served out. It is the duty of the cook from each mess to fetch and serve it out to his messmates, of which every man and boy is allowed a pint, that is, one gill of rum and three of water, to which is added lemon acid, sweetened with sugar. Here I must remark that the cook comes in for the perquisites of office, by reserving to himself an extra portion of grog, which is called the over-plus, and generally comes to the double of a man’s allowance. Thus the cook can take upon himself to be the man of consequence, for he has the opportunity of inviting a friend to partake of a glass, or of paying any little debt he may have contracted. It may not be known to everyone that it is grog which pays debts, and not money, in a man-of-war. Notwithstanding the cook’s apparently pre-eminent situation, yet, on some occasions, he is subject to censure or punishment by his messmates, for not attending to the dinner properly, or suffering the utensils of his department to be in a dirty condition. Justice, in these cases, is awarded by packing a jury of cooks from the different messes, for it falls to the lot of each man in a mess to act as cook in his turn. The mode or precept by which this jury is summoned is by hoisting a mess swab or beating a tin dish between decks forward.... At two bells in the afternoon, or one o’clock, the starboard watch goes on deck, and remains working the ship, pointing the ropes, or doing any duty that may be required, until the eight bells strike, when the Boatswain’s Mate pipes to supper. This consists of half a pint of wine, or a pint of grog, to each man, with biscuit, and cheese or butter. At the one bell, or half-past four, which is called one bell in ‘the first dog-watch,’ the larboard watch comes on duty, and remains until six o’clock, when that is relieved by the starboard watch, which is called the ‘second dog-watch,’ which lasts till eight o’clock. To explain this, it must be observed that these four hours, from four to eight o’clock, are divided into two watches, with a view of making the other watches come regular and alternate.... By this regular system of duty, I became inured to the roughness and hardships of a sailor’s life. I had made up my mind to be obedient, however irksome to my feelings, and, our ship being on the Channel Station, I soon began to pick up a knowledge of seamanship.”

NELSON’S PLAN OF ACTION FOR TRAFALGAR (1805).
Source.—Clowes’ Royal Navy, 1900. Vol. v., p. 127.

After declaring his intention of keeping the fleet in such a position of sailing that the order of sailing should be the order of battle, Nelson went on to say:—

“If the enemy’s fleet should be seen to windward in line of battle, and that the two lines ... could fetch them, they will probably be so extended that their van could not succour their rear. I should therefore probably make the second in command’s signal to lead through about the twelfth ship from their rear, or wherever he could fetch, if not able to get so far advanced. My line would cut through about their centre.... The whole impression of the British fleet must be to overpower [from] two or three ships ahead of their commander-in-chief—supposed to be in the centre—to the rear of their fleet. I will suppose 20 sail of the enemy’s line to be untouched. It must be some time before they could perform a manœuvre to bring their force compact to attack any part of the British fleet engaged, or to succour their own ships; which, indeed, would be impossible without mixing with the ships engaged.... British to be one-fourth superior to the enemy cut off. Something must be left to chance. Nothing is sure in a sea-fight, beyond all others. Shot will carry away the masts and yards of friends as well as of foes; but I look with confidence to a victory before the van of the enemy could succour their rear; and then that the British fleet would, most of them, be ready to receive their 20 sail of the line, or to pursue them should they endeavour to make off.... The second in command will, in all possible things, direct the movements of his line, by keeping them as compact as the nature of the circumstances will admit. Captains are to look to their particular line as their rallying point; but, in case signals cannot be seen or clearly understood, no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy.”

Should the enemy wait in line of battle—as he actually did at Trafalgar—to receive an attack from windward—

“the divisions of the British fleet will be brought nearly within gunshot of the enemy’s centre. The signal will most probably then be made for the ... lines to bear up together; to set all their sails, even their steering sails, in order to get as quickly as possible to the enemy’s line, and to cut through, beginning at the twelfth ship from the enemy’s rear. Some ships may not get through their exact place, but they will always be at hand to assist their friends. If any are thrown round the rear of the enemy, they will effectually complete the business of 12 sail of the enemy. Should the enemy wear together, or bear up and sail large, still the 12 ships composing, in the first position, the enemy’s rear are to be the object of attack of the lee line, unless otherwise directed by the Commander-in-Chief, which is scarcely to be expected, as the entire management of the lee line, after the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief are signified, is intended to be left to the judgment of the admiral commanding that line. The remainder of the enemy’s fleet ... are to be left to the management of the Commander-in-Chief, who will endeavour to take care that the movements of the second in command are as little interrupted as possible.”[8]

TRAFALGAR (1805).
Source.—Southey: Life of Nelson (1813).

Villeneuve was a skilful seaman, worthy of serving a better master and a better cause. His plan of defence was as well conceived, and as original, as the plan of attack. He formed the fleet in a double line, every alternate ship being about a cable’s length to windward of her second ahead and astern. Nelson, certain of a triumphant issue to the day, asked Blackwood what he should consider as a victory. That officer answered, that considering the handsome way in which battle was offered by the enemy, their apparent determination for a fair trial of strength, and the situation of the land, he thought it would be a glorious result if fourteen were captured. He replied, “I shall not be satisfied with anything short of twenty.” Soon afterwards he asked him if he did not think there was a signal wanting. Captain Blackwood made answer, that he thought the whole fleet seemed very clearly to understand what they were about. These words were scarcely spoken before that signal was made, which will be remembered as long as the language, or even the memory of England shall endure—Nelson’s last signal—“England expects that every man will do his duty!” It was received throughout the fleet with a shout of answering acclamation, made sublime by the spirit which it breathed, and the feeling which it expressed. “Now,” said Lord Nelson, “I can do no more. We must trust to the great Disposer of all events, and the justice of our cause. I thank God for this great opportunity of doing my duty.”

He wore that day, as usual, his Admiral’s frock-coat, bearing on the left breast four stars of the different orders with which he was invested. Ornaments which rendered him so conspicuous a mark for the enemy, were beheld with ominous apprehensions by his officers. It was known that there were riflemen on board the French ships; and it could not be doubted but that his life would be particularly aimed at. They communicated their fears to each other, and the Surgeon, Mr. Beatty, spoke to the Chaplain, Dr. Scott, and to Mr. Scott, the public Secretary, desiring that some person would entreat him to change his dress, or cover the stars: but they knew that such a request would highly displease him. “In honour I gained them,” he had said, when such a thing had been hinted to him formerly, “and in honour I will die with them.” Mr. Beatty, however, would not have been deterred by any fear of exciting his displeasure, from speaking to him himself upon a subject in which the weal of England, as well as the life of Nelson, was concerned, but he was ordered from the deck before he could find an opportunity. This was a point upon which Nelson’s officers knew that it was hopeless to remonstrate or reason with him; but both Blackwood, and his own Captain, Hardy, represented to him how advantageous to the fleet it would be for him to keep out of action as long as possible; and he consented at last to let the Leviathan and the Téméraire, which were sailing abreast of the Victory, be ordered to pass ahead. Yet even here the last infirmity of this noble mind was indulged; for these ships could not pass ahead if the Victory continued to carry all her sail, and so far was Nelson from shortening sail, that it was evident he took pleasure in pressing on, and rendering it impossible for them to obey his own orders. A long swell was setting into the Bay of Cadiz. Our ships, crowding all sail, moved majestically before it, with light winds from the south-west. The sun shone on the sails of the enemy, and their well-formed line, with their numerous three-deckers, made an appearance which any other assailants would have thought formidable; but the British sailors only admired the beauty and the splendour of the spectacle; and, in full confidence of winning what they saw, remarked to each other what a fine sight yonder ships would make at Spithead!

The French Admiral, from the Bucentaure, beheld the new manner in which his enemy was advancing—Nelson and Collingwood each leading his line; and pointing them out to his officers, he is said to have exclaimed, that such conduct could not fail to be successful. Yet Villeneuve had made his own dispositions with the utmost skill, and the fleets under his command waited for the attack with perfect coolness. Ten minutes before twelve they opened their fire. Eight or nine of the ships immediately ahead of the Victory, and across her bows, fired single guns at her, to ascertain whether she was yet within their range. As soon as Nelson perceived that their shot passed over him, he desired Blackwood, and Captain Prowse, of the Sirius, to repair to their respective frigates, and on their way to tell all the Captains of the line-of-battle ships that he depended on their exertions; and that if by the prescribed mode of attack they found it impracticable to get into action immediately, they might adopt whatever they thought best, provided it led them quickly and closely alongside an enemy. As they were standing on the front of the poop, Blackwood took him by the hand, saying he hoped soon to return and find him in possession of twenty prizes. He replied, “God bless you, Blackwood; I shall never speak to you again.” ...

The enemy continued to fire a gun at a time at the Victory, till they saw that a shot had passed through her main-topgallant sail; then they opened their broadsides, aiming chiefly at her rigging, in the hope of disabling her before she could close with them. Nelson, as usual, had hoisted several flags, lest one should be shot away. The enemy showed no colours till late in the action, when they began to feel the necessity of having them to strike. For this reason the Santissima Trinidad, Nelson’s old acquaintance, as he used to call her, was distinguishable only by her four decks, and to the bow of this opponent he ordered the Victory to be steered. Meantime an incessant raking fire was kept up upon the Victory. The Admiral’s Secretary was one of the first who fell; he was killed by a cannon-shot while conversing with Hardy. Captain Adair, of the Marines, with the help of a sailor, endeavoured to remove the body from Nelson’s sight, who had a great regard for Mr. Scott; but he anxiously asked, “Is that poor Scott that’s gone?” and being informed that it was indeed so, exclaimed, “Poor fellow!” Presently a double-headed shot struck a party of marines who were drawn up on the poop, and killed eight of them, upon which Nelson immediately desired Captain Adair to disperse his men round the ship, that they might not suffer so much from being together. A few minutes afterwards a shot struck the fore-brace bits on the quarter-deck, and passed between Nelson and Hardy, a splinter from the bit tearing off Hardy’s buckle, and bruising his foot. Both stopped, and looked anxiously at each other; each supposed the other to be wounded. Nelson then smiled, and said, “This is too warm work, Hardy, to last long.”

The Victory had not yet returned a single gun. Fifty of her men had been by this time killed or wounded, and her main-topmast, with all her studding sails and her booms, shot away. Nelson declared that in all his battles he had seen nothing which surpassed the cool courage of his crew on this occasion. At four minutes after twelve she opened her fire from both sides of her deck. It was not possible to break the enemy’s line without running on board one of their ships. Hardy informed him of this, and asked him which he would prefer. Nelson replied, “Take your choice, Hardy; it does not signify much.” The Master was ordered to put the helm to port, and the Victory ran on board the Redoutable, just as her tiller ropes were shot away. The French ship received her with a broadside; then instantly let down her lower-deck ports, for fear of being boarded through them, and never afterwards fired a great gun during the action. Her tops, like those of all the enemy’s ships, were filled with riflemen. Nelson never placed musketry in his tops. He had a strong dislike to the practice, not merely because it endangers setting fire to the sails, but also because it is a murderous sort of warfare, by which individuals may suffer, and a commander now and then be picked off, but which never can decide the fate of a general engagement.

Captain Harvey, in the Téméraire, fell on board the Redoutable on the other side. Another enemy was in like manner on board the Téméraire; so that these four ships formed as compact a tier as if they had been moored together, their heads lying all the same way. The Lieutenants of the Victory seeing this, depressed their guns of the middle and lower decks, and fired with a diminished charge, lest the shot should pass through, and injure the Téméraire. And because there was danger that the Redoutable might take fire from the lower-deck guns, the muzzles of which touched her side when they were run out, the fireman of each gun stood ready with a bucket of water, which, as soon as the gun was discharged, he dashed into the hole made by the shot. An incessant fire was kept up from the Victory from both sides, her larboard guns playing upon the Bucentaure and the huge Santissima Trinidad.

It had been part of Nelson’s prayer, that the British fleet might be distinguished by humanity in the victory which he expected. Setting an example himself, he twice gave orders to cease firing upon the Redoutable, supposing that she had struck, because her great guns were silent; for, as she carried no flag, there was no means of instantly ascertaining the fact. From this ship, which he had thus twice spared, he received his death. A ball fired from her mizen-top, which in the then situation of the two vessels was not more than fifteen yards from that part of the deck where he was standing, struck the epaulette on his left shoulder, about a quarter after one, just in the heat of action. He fell upon his face, on the spot which was covered with his poor Secretary’s blood. Hardy, who was a few steps from him, turning round, saw three men raising him up. “They have done for me at last, Hardy,” said he. “I hope not,” cried Hardy. “Yes,” he replied; “my backbone is shot through.” Yet even now, not for a moment losing his presence of mind, he observed, as they were carrying him down the ladder, that the tiller ropes, which had been shot away, were not yet replaced, and ordered that new ones should be rove immediately; then, that he might not be seen by the crew, he took out his handkerchief, and covered his face and his stars. Had he but concealed these badges of honour from the enemy, England perhaps would not have had cause to receive with sorrow the news of the battle of Trafalgar. The cockpit was crowded with wounded and dying men, over whose bodies he was with some difficulty conveyed, and laid upon a pallet in the Midshipmen’s berth. It was soon perceived, upon examination, that the wound was mortal. This, however, was concealed from all except Captain Hardy, the Chaplain, and the medical attendants. He himself being certain, from the sensation in his back and the gush of blood he felt momently within his breast, that no human care could avail him, insisted that the Surgeon should leave him, and attend to those to whom he might be useful; “for,” said he, “you can do nothing for me.” All that could be done was to fan him with paper, and frequently to give him lemonade to alleviate his intense thirst. He was in great pain, and expressed much anxiety for the event of the action, which now began to declare itself. As often as a ship struck, the crew of the Victory hurrahed, and at every hurrah a visible expression of joy gleamed in the eyes and marked the countenance of the dying hero. But he became impatient to see Captain Hardy; and as that officer, though often sent for, could not leave the deck, Nelson feared that some fatal cause prevented him, and repeatedly cried, “Will no one bring Hardy to me? He must be killed! He is surely dead!” An hour and ten minutes elapsed from the time when Nelson received his wound before Hardy could come to him. They shook hands in silence, Hardy in vain struggling to suppress the feelings of that most painful and yet sublimest moment. “Well, Hardy,” said Nelson, “how goes the day with us?” “Very well,” replied Hardy; “ten ships have struck, but five of the van have tacked, and show an intention to bear down upon the Victory. I have called two or three of our fresh ships round, and have no doubt of giving them a drubbing.” “I hope,” said Nelson, “none of our ships have struck.” Hardy answered, “There was no fear of that.” Then, and not till then, Nelson spoke of himself. “I am a dead man, Hardy,” said he; “I am going fast; it will be over with me soon. Come nearer to me. Let my dear Lady Hamilton have my hair, and all other things belonging to me.” Hardy observed, that he hoped Mr. Beatty could yet hold out some prospect of life. “Oh, no!” he replied; “it is impossible. My back is shot through. Beatty will tell you so.” Captain Hardy then once more shook hands with him, and, with a heart almost bursting, hastened upon deck.

By this time all feeling below the breast was gone; and Nelson, having made the Surgeon ascertain this, said to him: “You know I am gone, I know it. I feel something rising in my breast”—putting his hand on his left side—“which tells me so.” And upon Beatty’s inquiring whether his pain was very great, he replied, “So great, that he wished he was dead. Yet,” said he, in a lower voice, “one would like to live a little longer too!” And after a few minutes, in the same undertone, he added, “What would become of poor Lady Hamilton, if she knew my situation!” Next to his country she occupied his thoughts. Captain Hardy, some fifty minutes after he had left the cockpit, returned; and, again taking the hand of his dying friend and commander, congratulated him on having gained a complete victory. How many of the enemy were taken he did not know, as it was impossible to perceive them distinctly; but fourteen or fifteen at least. “That’s well,” cried Nelson, “but I bargained for twenty.” And then, in a stronger voice, he said: “Anchor, Hardy; anchor.” Hardy, upon this, hinted that Admiral Collingwood would take upon himself the direction of affairs. “Not while I live, Hardy,” said the dying Nelson, ineffectually endeavouring to raise himself from the bed: “Do you anchor.” His previous order for preparing to anchor had shown how clearly he foresaw the necessity of this. Presently calling Hardy back, he said to him in a low voice, “Don’t throw me overboard:” and he desired that he might be buried by his parents, unless it should please the King to order otherwise. Then reverting to private feelings: “Take care of my dear Lady Hamilton, Hardy: take care of poor Lady Hamilton. Kiss me, Hardy,” said he. Hardy knelt down and kissed his cheek: and Nelson said, “Now I am satisfied. Thank God, I have done my duty.” Hardy stood over him in silence for a moment or two, then knelt again and kissed his forehead. “Who is that?” said Nelson; and being informed, he replied, “God bless you, Hardy.” And Hardy then left him—for ever.

Nelson now desired to be turned upon his right side, and said, “I wish I had not left the deck; for I shall soon be gone.” Death was, indeed, rapidly approaching. He said to the Chaplain, “Doctor, I have not been a great sinner:” and after a short pause, “Remember that I leave Lady Hamilton and my daughter Horatia as a legacy to my country.” His articulation now became difficult; but he was distinctly heard to say, “Thank God, I have done my duty.” These words he repeatedly pronounced; and they were the last words which he uttered. He expired at thirty minutes after four—three hours and a quarter after he had received his wound....

The Redoutable struck within twenty minutes after the fatal shot had been fired from her. During that time she had been twice on fire—in her fore-chains and in her forecastle. The French, as they had done in other battles, made use in this of fire-balls and other combustibles; implements of destruction which other nations, from a sense of honour and humanity, have laid aside; which add to the sufferings of the wounded, without determining the issue of the combat: which none but the cruel would employ, and which never can be successful against the brave. Once they succeeded in setting fire, from the Redoutable, to some ropes and canvas on the Victory’s booms. The cry ran through the ship, and reached the cockpit: but even this dreadful cry produced no confusion: the men displayed that perfect self-possession in danger by which English seamen are characterized; they extinguished the flames on board their own ship, and then hastened to extinguish them in the enemy, by throwing buckets of water from the gangway. When the Redoutable had struck, it was not practicable to board her from the Victory; for, though the two ships touched, the upper works of both fell in so much, that there was a great space between their gangways; and she could not be boarded from the lower or middle decks, because her ports were down. Some of our men went to Lieutenant Quilliam, and offered to swim under her bows, and get up there; but it was thought unfit to hazard brave lives in this manner.

What our men would have done from gallantry, some of the crew of the Santissima Trinidad did to save themselves. Unable to stand the tremendous fire of the Victory, whose larboard guns played against this great four-decker, and not knowing how else to escape them, nor where else to betake themselves for protection, many of them leaped overboard, and swam to the Victory: and were actually helped up her sides by the English during the action. The Spaniards began the battle with less vivacity than their unworthy allies, but they continued it with greater firmness. The Argonauta and Bahama were defended till they had each lost about four hundred men; the San Juan Nepomuceno lost three hundred and fifty. Often as the superiority of British courage has been proved against France upon the seas, it was never more conspicuous than in this decisive conflict. Five of our ships were engaged muzzle to muzzle with five of the French. In all five the Frenchmen lowered their lower-deck ports, and deserted their guns; while our men continued deliberately to load and fire, till they had made the victory secure....

The total British loss in the battle of Trafalgar amounted to one thousand five hundred and eighty-seven. Twenty of the enemy struck. But it was not possible to anchor the fleet, as Nelson had enjoined; a gale came on from the south-west. Some of the prizes went down, some went on shore; one effected its escape into Cadiz; others were destroyed. Four only were saved, and those by the greatest exertions. The wounded Spaniards were sent ashore, an assurance being given that they should not serve till regularly exchanged; and the Spaniards, with a generous feeling which would not perhaps have been found in any other people, offered the use of their hospitals for our wounded, pledging the honour of Spain that they should be carefully attended there. When the storm, after the action, drove some of the prizes upon the coast, they declared that the English who were thus thrown into their hands should not be considered as prisoners of war; and the Spanish soldiers gave up their own beds to their shipwrecked enemies. The Spanish Vice-Admiral Alva died of his wounds. Villeneuve was sent to England, and permitted to return to France. The French Government say that he destroyed himself on the way to Paris, dreading the consequences of a court-martial; but there is every reason to believe that the tyrant, who never acknowledged the loss of the battle of Trafalgar, added Villeneuve to the numerous victims of his murderous policy.

THE YOUNGER PITT (1806).
Source.—Sir W. Scott.

I.

O, dread was the time, and more dreadful the omen,
When the brave on Marengo lay slaughtered in vain,
And beholding broad Europe bow’d down by her foemen,
Pitt closed in his anguish the map of her reign!

Not the fate of broad Europe could bend his brave spirit
To take for his country the safety of shame;
O, then in her triumph remember his spirit,
And hallow the goblet that flows to his name.

II.

Round the husbandman’s head while he traces the furrow
The mists of the winter may mingle with rain.
He may plough it with labour and sow it in sorrow,
And sigh while he fears he has sow’d it in vain;
He may die ere his children shall reap in their gladness;
But the blithe harvest-home shall remember his claim;
And their jubilee-shout shall be softened with sadness,
While they hallow the goblet that flows to his name.

III.

Though anxious and timeless his life was expended,
It toils for our country preserved by his care,
Though he died ere one ray o’er the nations ascended,
To light the long darkness of doubt and despair;
The storms he endured in our Britain’s December,
The perils his wisdom foresaw and o’ercame,
In her glory’s rich harvest shall Britain remember,
And hallow the goblet that flows to his name.

MINISTRY OF ALL THE TALENTS (1806).
Source.—Diaries ... James Harris, first Earl of Malmesbury, 1844. Vol. iv., p. 349.

February 1.—His Royal Highness was cold with me for several days; but when he found my opinion to be the prevalent one, and even that of the King himself, he very handsomely gave way, and, having sent for me, by a fair and honest avowal of his mistake, left me more satisfied with him than before. The new Ministry was appointed a few days after this.

Lord Grenville and Fox were its two leaders, and their respective adherents and friends made up the Cabinet.[9]

The Prince of Wales went most heartily and unbecomingly with them, and lowered his dignity by soliciting office and places for his dependents, and by degrading himself into the size of a common party leader.

From this moment I withdrew entirely from official men, my determination being to act as if Mr. Pitt was alive, and to endeavour to regulate my political conduct, and that of those I influenced, on what I supposed would be his, were he still in existence, whether in or out of office.

I told this to Lords Bathurst and Camden on the 27th January, considering these two as more personally, and less politically, attached to him, than any one else, not excepting Canning himself.

On the 4th February, Lord Carrington came to me in consequence of my having canvassed him for his interest at Cambridge University for Lord Palmerston. This he promised me in the handsomest manner; but I was surprised—when I lamented Mr. Pitt’s death, and spoke of the wisdom and propriety of his friends’ acting together, and in conformity to his doctrines and principles—to find Lord Carrington lukewarm on the subject. He said he conceived “we were all now free to act as we pleased. All bond of union was dissolved; no obligation remained with anyone to abide by a party which had lost its leader, and with its leader everything.” He said this in so very positive a way, that I contented myself with saying my sentiments were directly contrary to his, but that it was not for me to dispute with him on a point rather of feeling than of party. Lord Carrington was profuse in his lamentations on the death of Pitt, and equally so in his profession of friendship and gratitude to him, and respect for his memory, and, as a proof, he instanced his wish, that the part of Mr. Pitt’s debts, arising from a loan his friends contributed to raise for him in 1800, should not be produced when the items of them were laid before the House. [N.B. the House had voted a public funeral, and to pay Mr. Pitt’s debts immediately after his death, which Wyndham (strange to say) opposed, giving as a motive that no public funeral had been decreed to Burke.] Lord Carrington, however, said he was overruled by the Bishop of Lincoln, Prettyman[10] (who had been Pitt’s private tutor at Cambridge), who assured him it was one of Pitt’s last dying requests, that the six friends who had advanced him certain sums should be repaid. (They were Lord Bathurst and Carrington, Steele, Bishop of Lincoln, and two others, who at the time never would take any acknowledgment, or ever expected to be repaid.) This assertion of the Bishop of Lincoln, Lord Carrington said, shut his mouth, and the debt was laid before the House, which raised his (Pitt’s) debts to 43,000l.

Ministers went on quietly, and with a very large majority, the whole year of 1806. In June an idea was suggested to make a push at them before the Recess, and I had several conversations with Canning, and one with Perceval on the subject, and constant ones with the Duke of Portland, who, by having undergone an operation for the stone, was wonderfully recovered.

MILITARY PLANS (1806).
Source.—Diary of Lord Colchester, 1861. Vol. ii., p. 49.

House of Commons.—Mr. Fox attended; and Mr. Wyndham opened his military plans: about 350 Members present. His speech lasted four hours. Lord Castlereagh spoke next—about an hour and a half. Mr. Fox about an hour, and Mr. Yorke the same; he was followed by Sir James Pulteney, General Tarleton, and Colonel Crawfurd, &c. The House rose at half-past one without any division; and leave was given to bring in four Bills. The first of which was for the repeal of the additional force, or Parish Recruiting Act; the others for further suspending the militia ballot; altering the levy en masse, or training Act; and for increasing the Chelsea Hospital privileges and allowances.

Mr. Wyndham’s plan consisted in these points:—

1. To supply, maintain, and increase the regular army, by recruiting for term of years, renewing the service at the end of seven and fourteen years: even for a further period; making twenty-one years in the whole. The second and third periods of renewed service to be attended with some small increase of pay, e.g. 6d. for the first, and 1s. per week for the second period, and an increased Chelsea pension to every soldier at the end of twenty-one years. Also an increase of widows’ pensions, and of the Compassionate List; and this to be the only mode of recruiting.

2. To reduce the militia gradually to its original or lowest standard, viz. about 36,000 for England, by not filling up the vacancies.

3. The volunteer establishment to be reduced in expense, by striking off inspecting field officers, permanent duty pay, and lowering the high allowances to the lowest rate, called the August allowances. The clothing now due (being the fourth year) to be continued for this issue only, and no person hereafter becoming volunteer to have any assistance from Government but arms; and an exemption from the operation of the General Training Act.

4. All persons of military age, from eighteen to forty, to be liable to be trained to arms when called out by classes, but not to be embodied in corps; and to be relieved also from the training, either by entering into a volunteer corps, or paying a fine; and the numbers for training, e.g. 100,000 for one year, to be taken by lot out of the given classes.

CATHOLIC EMANCIPATION (1807).

I. Lord Colchester’s Diary.

Source.—Diary of Lord Colchester, 1861. Vol. ii., p. 92.

[Feb.] 28th.—Lord Hawkesbury called on the Catholic clauses in the Mutiny Bill, to express his alarms, and those of the Archbishop of Canterbury, and Perceval and Sir William Scott, about the apprehended extension of the Irish law of 1793, by now enabling Catholics to be Generals on the Staff.

Sunday, March 1st.—Lord Sidmouth called. He desired to deposit with me his determination not to agree to granting the Catholics liberty to hold staff commissions. The King had with difficulty been persuaded by Lord Sidmouth to consent even to extend the Irish Act of 1793 to Catholic officers in the army, when coming to England; but had acceded to it at last, as a strict consequence of the Union; the Irish law then in force being virtually adopted for England. Lord Howick admitted that in the House of Commons he had given no other intimation of his notice. The Duke of Bedford and the Irish Government had understood the same things, and explained the concession on this ground to be only to the Catholics in Dublin. That it was now proposed, because the minute of Cabinet had been worded generally, that it should be carried into effect in its largest sense; and the King was again to be asked for his consent. The Cabinet were about to meet this day upon that express topic.

2nd.—Lord Sidmouth called. The Cabinet had parted yesterday upon a resolution to proceed with the Catholic clauses, although they admitted that the King had not been specifically acquainted with that part of the measure which enabled Catholics to become Generals on the Staff; and although Lord Sidmouth had consented only to the application of the law of 1793; and although Lord Henry Petty, and Lord Holland, and Lord Howick allowed that he had never consented beyond that; and although Lord Howick admitted that, in his notice to the House of Commons, he had not in his own mind, any larger measure, &c. &c. But Lord Grenville declined to be the person who should state the subject again to the King or ask his consent upon it. Lord Sidmouth said he certainly would not interfere by volunteering his advice to the King; but, when he should see the King on Wednesday, he should, if asked by the King, give his own opinion and act upon it, whether sanctioned by the King or not; and so the Cabinet parted.

In the House of Commons Lord Howick first mentioned to me the Catholic clauses, and asked whether I thought they must necessarily pass through a Committee of the whole House, as being of religion. I told him that had really never occurred to me, but I would look into it and let him know; and although I entirely disapproved of what he was about, it was no reason why we should not freely converse about all the forms of proceeding.

The House engaged from six in the evening till six in the morning, hearing counsel and witnesses on the Westminster petition, complaining of Mr. Sheridan for having tampered with witnesses.

3rd.—Searched precedents for Catholic clauses. Lord Howick postponed the Mutiny Bill Committee. I showed him the precedents I had collected. He hoped “I should not take any part in the Committee.” But I told him that “I must inevitably do so.”

4th.—Lord Howick wrote me the following note:—

[Private.]

Stratton Street,
March 4, 1807.

My dear Sir,

I believe I shall alter my course of proceeding respecting the new clauses, and introduce a new Bill instead. As the measure is the subject of a notice for discussion to-day, though in another form, I take it for granted there can be no objection to my moving for leave to bring in a Bill, if I should ultimately determine to do so, instead of moving an instruction on the clauses in a committee.

I am afraid I have been guilty of an omission in not moving for an address in answer to the King’s message, which I see was done in the House of Lords yesterday; but, as the treaty was not laid before the House, and the only matter on which a proceeding of the House was to be had was voting the money, I thought it was the best way to refer the message to the Committee of Supply; in which it was proposed to vote to-day the sum advanced to the King of Prussia. Will you have the goodness to let me know, when I come to the House to-day, whether this has been the usual course of proceeding; or whether, if it should not be deemed sufficiently respectful, anything can now be done to correct the error.

I am, my dear Sir,
Ever yours sincerely,
Howick.

He drank tea with me in my room behind the chair. I told him I wished he would confine his Bill to the Irish Law of 1793. To that I could agree; but not without the same exclusion from the high military offices. He said, “That was but a small object.” I replied, “But the principle is large. You will never satisfy Mr. Keogh.” He said, “Oh, I did not think of trying at that. But I have said too much on this subject to let things remain as they are; we must do what satisfies us, whether it satisfies Mr. Keogh or not.”

II. Letter from the Duke of Portland to the King.

Source.—Diaries and Correspondence of James Harris, first Earl of Malmesbury, 1844. Vol. iv., p. 360.

Copy of a Letter from the Duke of Portland to the King, sent Thursday Evening, March 12th, 1807, to the Queen’s House, acknowledged by Colonel Taylor Friday Morning the 13th.

Burlington House,
March 12th, 1807.

Sir,

I am so sensible of my presumption in addressing your Majesty on a subject of a public nature, that nothing but the confidence I have in your Majesty’s goodness, and the attachment I bear your Majesty, would induce me to do it. But it is a subject of such infinite magnitude, that, were I silent, I feel I should deserve to forfeit that I am most ambitious to be considered, of being looked upon by your Majesty as one of your Majesty’s most loyal and devoted subjects and servants.

Your Majesty will probably anticipate the subject on which I cannot but express my anxiety to lay my sentiments at your Majesty’s feet.

It is the Bill just proposed by Lord Howick, granting indulgences to the Catholics; a measure, that should any peculiarity of circumstances have induced your Majesty to acquiesce in, I should still think that by following the dictates of my own conscience and voting against it, I should not offend your Majesty.

But, impressed as I am with a belief of what must be your Majesty’s opinions and wishes, I could not forgive myself were I to conceal from your Majesty that your opinion is mistaken and your wishes not generally understood; and, humbly permit me to represent to your Majesty that it cannot well be otherwise, since one of your Majesty’s principal Ministers in the House of Commons brings in the Bill. Should I be wrong, and your Majesty has not given your consent to the measure in its present shape, I have little apprehension in giving it as my opinion that it may ultimately be defeated in its progress, though not, I fear, till it comes into the House of Lords; but, for this purpose, I must fairly state to your Majesty, that your wishes must be distinctly known, and that your present Ministers should not have any pretext for equivocating upon the subject, or any ground whatever to pretend ignorance of your Majesty’s sentiments and determination, not only to withhold your sanction from the present measure, but to use all your influence in resisting it.

The effect of such a proceeding is so obvious, that I would not suggest it, did I not believe that your Majesty’s business would be at a stand in such a case; and that persons would not be ready to come forward (should your Majesty think fit to call upon them) who are capable and willing to undertake the management of your Majesty’s affairs. But for this purpose it would be highly necessary and advantageous that the public should know the necessity to which your Majesty was driven of taking the conduct of your affairs out of the hands of those who now administer them; that for this purpose your Majesty should send for Lord Grenville, and state to him distinctly, that either your sentiments had been misrepresented or that you never had consented to the measure proposed by Lord Howick, and that, consistently with the opinion your Majesty had uniformly expressed, it never could or would have your Royal assent. It would then remain with Lord Grenville and his colleagues to take their part; possibly they might give way and still remain your Majesty’s Ministers; but, should they refuse to submit themselves to your Majesty’s pleasure, the necessity of employing other persons would be obvious to the whole world. The designs (which my feelings may possibly lead me unjustly to attribute to them) could no longer be mistaken, viz.: that the most venerated and sacred barriers of our constitution should be undermined and sapped for the purpose of introducing a new system into Church and State, and that your Majesty was reduced to the necessity of submitting to them or quarrelling with your Parliament.

Under such circumstances I cannot but believe, and cannot fear to assure your Majesty, that the nation as well as individuals will come forward in support of the established laws of the realm, and that persons will be found able to carry on your Majesty’s business with talents and abilities equal to those of your present Ministers. If your Majesty should suppose that in the forming of such an Administration, I can offer your Majesty any services, I am devoted to your Majesty’s commands; but, while I say this, I feel conscious that my time of life, my infirmities, and my want of abilities are not calculated for so high a trust. I, however, can say that if, in this very momentous crisis, your Majesty calls upon me, I will serve you zealously and faithfully to the end of my existence.[11]

PARTY POLITICS (1807).
Source.—Extract from the Prospectus of The Examiner. By Leigh Hunt.

The great error of politicians is that old fancy of Solon, who insisted that it was infamous for a citizen to be of no party, and endeavoured by a law to make the Athenians hypocrites. This conceit not only destroys every idea of mediation between two parties, but does not even suppose that both may be wrong. Yet all history may convince us, that he who resolutely professes himself attached to any party, is in danger of yielding to every extreme for the mere reputation of his opinion: he will argue for the most manifest errors of this or that statesman, because he has hitherto agreed with him—an obstinacy as stupid, as if a pedestrian were to express his satisfaction with a tempest at night, because he had enjoyed sunshine in the morning.

The big and little Endians in Gulliver have not yet taught us the folly of mere party: and one of the most ridiculous inconsistencies in the human character is that enjoyment which all ages have expressed in satirical productions, without receiving benefit from them: they drink the physic with a bold and pleasant countenance, and instantly prepare to counteract its effect; or rather, every man thinks the physic excellent for everybody but himself.—“Party,” says Swift, “is the madness of many for the gain of a few.” When Scarmentado in Voltaire arrived at Ispahan, he was asked whether he was for black mutton or white mutton: he replied, that it was equally indifferent to him, provided it was tender. A wise man knows no party abstracted from its utility, or existing, like a shadow, merely from the opposition of some body. Yet, in the present day, we are all so erroneously sociable, that every man, as well as every journal, must belong to some class of politicians; he is either Pittite or Foxite, Windhamite, Wilberforcite, or Burdettite: though at the same time two-thirds of these disturbers of coffee-houses might with as much reason call themselves Hivites or Shunamites, or perhaps Bedlamites.

THE BERLIN DECREES (1807).
Source.—Diary of Lord Colchester, 1861. Vol. ii., p. 134.

Tuesday, December 1st.—Received the following letter from Perceval:

Dear Mr. Speaker,

The Parliament will not meet till the Thursday after the birthday. I am culpable in not having sent you earlier intelligence, but the day was not fixed till Wednesday last, and, of the determination not to meet till near the birthday, unless circumstances particularly required it, you were apprised by me before.

* * * * * * * *

The business of recasting the law of trade and navigation, as far as belligerent principles are concerned, for the whole world, has occupied me very unremittingly for a long time; and the subject is so extensive, and the combinations so various, that, even supposing our principles to be right, I cannot hope that the execution of the principle must not in many respects be defective; and I have no doubt we shall have to watch it with new provisions and regulations for some time.

The short principle is that trade in British produce and manufactures, and trade either from a British port or with a British destination, is to be protected as much as possible. For this purpose all the countries where French influence prevails to exclude the British flag shall have no trade but to and from the country, or from its allies. All other countries, the few that remain strictly neutral (with the exception of the colonial trade, which backwards and forwards direct they may carry on) cannot trade but through this being done as an ally with any of the countries connected with France. If, therefore, we can accomplish our purposes, it will come to this, that either those countries will have no trade, or they must be content to accept it through us.

This is a formidable and tremendous state of the world; but all the part of it which is particularly harassing to English interests was existing through the new severity with which Buonaparte’s decrees of exclusion against our trade were called into action.

Our proceeding does not aggravate our distress from it. If he can keep out our trade he will; and he would do so if he could, independent of our orders. Our orders only add this circumstance: they say to the enemy, if you will not have our trade, as far as we can help it you shall have none. And as to so much of any trade as you can carry on yourselves, or others carry on with you through us, if you admit it, you shall pay for it. The only trade cheap and untaxed which you shall have, shall be either direct from us, in our own produce and manufactures, or from our allies, whose increased prosperity will be an advantage to us.

* * * * * * * *

Yours, very truly,
Sp. Perceval.

CORUNNA (1809).

I. Bulletin of Jan. 21.

Source.—Diary of Lord Colchester. Vol. ii., p. 164.

[Jan.] 21st.—The annexed bulletin was circulated.

Downing Street,
Jan. 21st.

Brigadier General Stewart arrived this morning at Lord Castlereagh’s with despatches from Sir John Moore, dated Corunna, 13th inst., upon which place he had directed his retreat, and not on Vigo, as he originally intended. Sir John Moore had effected his retreat to Corunna with the loss of only part of his baggage; there had been repeated skirmishes with the rear guard, in which we had uniformly repulsed the enemy, and at Vigo Sir John Moore offered the enemy battle, but the French declined it. The enemy, when Brigadier General Stewart left Corunna, were in force in the neighbourhood, but it was trusted that Sir John Moore would effect his re-embarkation without much loss, as the transports which he had sent for from Vigo were entering the Bay at Corunna, when General Stewart sailed on the 14th.

II. The Burial of Sir John Moore at Corunna (1809).

Source.—Charles Wolfe.

I.

Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note,
As his corse to the rampart we hurried;
Not a soldier discharged his farewell shot
O’er the grave where our hero we buried.

II.

We buried him darkly, at dead of night,
The sods with our bayonets turning;
By the struggling moonbeam’s misty light,
And the lantern dimly burning.

III.

No useless coffin enclosed his breast,
Not in sheet or in shroud we wound him;
But he lay like a warrior taking his rest,
With his martial cloak around him.

IV.

Few and short were the prayers we said,
And we spoke not a word of sorrow;
But we steadfastly gazed on the face that was dead,
And we bitterly thought of the morrow.

V.

We thought, as we hollowed his narrow bed,
And smoothed down his lonely pillow,
That the foe and the stranger would tread o’er his head,
And we far away on the billow!

VI.

Lightly they’ll talk of the spirit that’s gone,
And o’er his cold ashes upbraid him;—
But little he’ll reck, if they let him sleep on
In the grave where a Briton has laid him.

VII.

But half of our heavy task was done
When the clock struck the note for retiring:
And we heard the distant and random gun
That the foe was sullenly firing.

VIII.

Slowly and sadly we laid him down,
From the field of his fame fresh and gory;
We carved not a line, and we raised not a stone—
But we left him alone with his glory!

IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC ECONOMY (1809).
Source.—Diaries ... Right Hon. George Rose, 1860. Vol. ii., p. 336.

Lord Mulgrave to Mr. Rose.

Admiralty,
Feb. 4th, 1809.

My dear Rose,

It must be ever unpleasant to me not to accede at once to any measure proposed by you and by Canning; more especially as I find the Memorial is in the hands of the clerks of the Council before I had an opportunity of answering your note.

Since I came into office I have proceeded on all questions of augmentation of salaries, on a strong impression of the importance of public economy, and on a full conviction that the advance of any one salary does not rest there, but raises a cry of claim, founded upon relative duties and rank, with an air of justice from precedent; which involves either an excessive increase of charge to the public, or an imputation of harshness and injustice, against the person in authority, who rejects the authority of the precedent, and refuses the increase demanded. I feel how impossible it is for me to follow up the principle I have set out upon either with comfort to myself or advantage to the public, if I alone pursue it. Upon all the demands of clerks for increase of salary, I have consulted Perceval, to ascertain how far the general charges upon the funds of Government would be influenced by such increase; because I know that the advance in one department must be followed by a similar advance in every other. I relinquished, on the representation of Perceval, a most important, and almost necessary, measure of increasing the appointments of the Naval Lords of the Admiralty. I rejected the recommendation of the Commissioners of Naval Revision for the addition of £200 per annum to the Commissioners of the Navy, because I did not think that increase necessary, whilst so many eager candidates were pressing for the situation. If the Paymaster to the Treasurer of the Navy has his salary raised, will not the Commissioners of Victualling and Transport Boards, whose duties are so constant and laborious, especially the former, have a claim to a similar advance? I have refused the advance to the Commissioners at the Cape as recommended by the Commissioners of Naval Revision; and in short I have consented to no increase of salary without being persuaded that proper persons could not be found without such increase; and therefore, as far as my consent is required, I cannot give it, but upon that persuasion, in any case. I am aware that I have created much dissatisfaction by holding the public purse-strings so close; but it is from an apprehension that without very rigid economy we can neither retain the goodwill of the public, nor hold out against the perseverance and resources of the enemy.

Ever yours sincerely,
Mulgrave.

RESIGNATION OF PORTLAND (1809).
Source.—Diary of Lord Colchester, 1861. Vol. ii., p. 200.

Sunday, Sept. 10th.—Received the following letter from Perceval.

[Most private and confidential.]

Downing Street,
Sept. 9th, 1809.

My dear Mr. Speaker,

I cannot let the week close without giving you some information (though I have delayed till now giving you any, with the hopes of giving you more than I am able, even at present) upon a subject of great importance.

The Duke of Portland has resigned, the King only desiring he would keep his office till some arrangement might be made for his successor. The story is a great deal too long for a note or a letter; suffice it to say, that it is mixed in some respects with the most painful considerations that it has ever been my misfortune to have felt.

Whether it will be possible for us to form any arrangement, or what it will be, I really cannot at present state to you, as I do not know myself. According to present appearances, Castlereagh cannot stay with us, from a sense of what is due to himself; and Canning will not. Conceive me then, and my situation in your house, under such circumstances, and judge whether, if these appearances are realised, it would be just by the King or by the country in me, to affect to be able to remain either without them or some other strength, where how to acquire it is not very easy to imagine.

I wished you not to know this subject from any other quarter but myself, and I feel that I have only whetted your curiosity, and it would take a volume to communicate it fully. Possibly, therefore, till a personal meeting, I must defer the full explanation. The result, whatever it may be, you shall hear as soon as I can tell you. The cruel thing upon Castlereagh is, that though this is entirely independent of the late expedition, it is next to impossible but that the public impression will connect the two together.

I am, my dear Mr. Speaker,
Yours very truly,
Sp. Perceval.

DUEL OF CANNING AND CASTLEREAGH (1809).
Source.—Diary of Lord Colchester, 1861. Vol. ii., p. 209.

Letter from Mr. Perceval.

Downing Street,
Sept. 20th, 1809.

Dear Mr. Speaker,

I have had so much to say that I have no time to say it; but I might have found time to have thanked you for your kind and ready answer to my former letter.

You have judged me perfectly right. If you had asked my advice I could not have been so dishonest as not to have given it for the decision you have made. Castlereagh and Canning have been fighting. Thank God Canning is not severely hurt, and Castlereagh is not touched. Terrible, all this, for public impression. What we are to do is not finally settled. It must end in an attempt to form an united Government with our opponents. But it is a bitter pill to swallow for more than one.

When I can tell you anything positive, and can get a moment to tell it, I will.

Yours very truly,
Sp. Perceval.

MILITARY EXPENSES (1806-1809).
Source.—Diary of Lord Colchester, 1861. Vol. ii., p. 239.

The military expenses of the last four years have been:—
1806.—Army£16,605,000
Navy15,448,000
Ordnance4,366,000
£36,419,000
1807.—Army£16,661,000
Navy (Expedition to Copenhagen)19,673,000
Ordnance4,464,000
£40,798,000
1808.—Army£17,365,000
Navy (Expedition to Spain and Portugal)18,156,000
Ordnance3,980,000
£39,501,000
1809.—Army£17,459,000
Vote of Credit2,500,000
19,959,000
Navy (Expeditions to
Spain and Portugal, and Walcheren)18,986,000
Vote of Credit500,000
Additional1,291,000
20,777,000
Ordnance 5,275,000
Total £46,011,000

TALAVERA: PROTEST BY LORDS (1809).
Source.—Protests of the Lords. Vol. ii., 1741-1825, p. 423.

January 26, 1810.—The thanks of the Lords were voted to Lord Viscount Wellington for his services on the 27th and 28th of July, 1809, at the victory of Talavera. The title of Viscount Wellington of Talavera was conferred on the 4th of September, 1809. The motion was made by Lord Liverpool and opposed by Lords Suffolk, Grosvenor, and Grey. The following protest was inserted:

1st. Because in the battle of Talavera, though eminently distinguished by those splendid proofs of discipline and valour which his Majesty’s troops have never failed to display, we cannot recognize those unequivocal characteristics of victory which can alone form an adequate title to the thanks of this House. On the contrary, that the British army appears to have been improvidently led into a situation, in which the repulse of the enemy, effected with a great loss, produced neither security from a subsequent attack, nor relief from the distress under which our brave troops were suffering, and was immediately followed by the necessity of a precipitate retreat, whereby our wounded were left to fall into the hands of the enemy.

2ndly, Because, by voting the thanks of this House on such an occasion, we diminish the value of the most honourable reward we have it in our power to confer, whilst we indirectly sanction the propriety of that elevation to the honours of the peerage, with which his Majesty, without inquiry, was advised to mark his approbation of the commander of his army in Spain, at a time when his ministers were informed of the unfortunate consequences which might be expected to follow, and in fact did follow, that dear-bought success.

Charles Grey, Earl Grey.
James Maitland, Lord Lauderdale
(Earl of Lauderdale).

WALCHEREN EXPEDITION (1810).

A.—A Squib on the Expedition.

Source.—Diary of Lord Colchester, 1861. Vol. ii., p. 232.

The following squib was published in the papers at this time on the Walcheren Expedition:

Extract from the Grand Romantic Drama lately performed for the Amusement of the Emperor of France.

Act I., Scene 1.—Cabinet Council discovered; Naval and Military Officers attending.

First Cabinet Minister. We now are met in grave deliberation
Upon the plan for Antwerp’s subjugation,
That we may not despatch this expedition
Without due caution, knowledge and precision.
Ye officers of military fame,
We wish for your opinion of the same.
1st Mil. Officer. I wrote before my reasons in detail,
Why I esteem your plan quite sure to fail.
Lord C—gh. You think ’twill fail?
2nd Mil. Officer. And so do I.
3rd Mil. Officer. And I.
Lord C—gh. All of you think so: better go and try.
But, ere our army sails, ’tis fit we know
Something about the place to which they’ll go.
Pray, sirs, is Antwerp fortified or no?
1st Mil. Officer. Rumour reports it fortified full well,
But I, not having been there, cannot tell.
2nd Mil. Officer. I know no more.
3rd Mil. Officer. Nor I, I do declare.
Lord C—gh. Well, well—they’ll see directly they get there.
Lord M—ve. But as the chief design of this great feat,
Captain, will be to take the Antwerp fleet;
Say, can the frigates, or can any ship,
Sail up above, and so give us the slip?
Naval Officer. Had I been there, I could have told you what
The water’s depth; but having ne’er, cannot.
Lord M—ve. This is no cause our plan should be forsaken,
It will be known as soon as Antwerp’s taken.
Lord E—n. But shan’t we lose the fleet? Then there’ll be laughter.
Lord M—ve. Lose it? If they go up, mayn’t we go after?
Lord E—n. Our friend the smuggler says the troops are few;
And then the garrison—Pray what think you?
1st Mil. Officer. Few on the coast may be, and in the town;
But from the country they can soon bring down
A force too large for us to hope to lick;
And all that’s done must be done very quick.
Lord Ch—m. Fear not: delay was ne’er a fault of mine;
And every morning I’ll get up at nine—
Dressed, breakfast done by twelve—no speed I’ll lack,
And do it all completely in a crack.
1st Cab. Min. Brave warriors, your advice and information
Has now received our full consideration.
[Exeunt Mil. and Naval Officers.
Lord C—gh. As secrecy’s the soul of expeditions,
I see no use in telling the physicians
Whither it’s going; but desire they would
Send plenty of what physic they think good.
Enter Sir Lucas Pepys.
(To Sir L. P.) Prepare (I can’t tell rightly against when)
Physic enough for forty thousand men,
But do it quick; what’s proper you can tell.
[Exit Sir L. P.
Mr. P—l. Now there’s no fear but all will answer well;
So excellent we’ve made each preparation,
And all so accurate our information.
When Parliament meets next how fine a story
Shall we not have to tell of wars and glory.
[Exeunt.
Manet, Mr. C—g, Solus.
Mr. C—g. Most of this plan is gibberish to me,
But I shall quietly lie by and see
How it goes on; and then, if all succeeds,
I share the praise; but if it ill proceeds
I’ll try what, leaving this ungoverned crew,
Setting up statesmen for myself will do.
[END OF ACT FIRST.]

The rest of the play is of so very tragic and horrible a cast, that we think the author will not be justified in bringing it forward, and we decline publishing any further extracts at present.

B.—Debate on the Expedition.

Source.—Diary of Lord Colchester, 1861. Vol. ii., p. 243.

[March] 30th.—House of Commons. Resumed Walcheren debate. At four in the morning divided four times.

I. To censure the policy, 227; against it, 275.

II. To justify it, 272; against it, 232.

III. To censure the retention, 224; against the censure, 275.

IV. To excuse the delay in evacuating it, 253; against that, 232.

Adjourned after seven o’clock.

The second division, the largest in this Parliament except that of June 1807, upon the address of the change of Ministry.

N.B.—It was the general opinion that the only resolution upon this business which was indisputably untrue was the unanimous vote that the failure was not imputable to any misconduct of the officers by sea or land.

My own opinion certainly was contrary to any such resolution. For, first, it was in evidence that the wind and weather did not prevent Lord Huntley from landing in Cadsand, in good time to have destroyed the batteries of Breskens, and opened a passage for the fleet up the Wieling Channel, clear of Flushing. And, secondly, there was no evidence to prove that the whole fleet might not have gone up that channel with Lord Gardner’s squadron, instead of going originally into the Stonediep: the further deviation into the Roompot, which ruined the whole prospect of getting to Antwerp up the West Scheldt, was probably inevitable after the fleet had once missed their entrance by Cadsand and the Wieling Channel.

It suited the Opposition to exculpate the land and naval service, because then the failure (by their reasoning) exclusively followed from the plan, and the plan only. It also suited the Ministers, partly because they had advised the King to tell the City of London that there was no ground for military inquiry (they then not knowing of Lord Chatham’s narrative); and partly from a proper desire to avoid throwing blame upon those who served under them by their own appointment.

WELLINGTON’S DIFFICULTIES IN SPAIN (1810).
Source.—Selections from the Wellington Despatches. Gurwood. P. 409.

I. To the Right Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo,
2nd Dec., 1810.

I am afraid that the Spaniards will bring us all to shame yet. It is scandalous that in the third year of their war, and having been more than a year in a state of tranquillity, and having sustained no loss of importance since the battle of Ocaña, they should now be depending for the safety of Cadiz, the seat of their Government, upon having one or two more or less British regiments; and that after having been shut in for 10 months, they have not prepared the works necessary for their defence, notwithstanding the repeated remonstrances of General Graham and the British officers on the danger of omitting them. The Cortes appear to suffer under the national disease in as great a degree as the other authorities, that is, boasting of the strength and power of the Spanish nation, till they are seriously convinced they are in no danger, and then sitting down quietly and indulging their national indolence.

II. To the Right Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo,
16th Dec., 1810.

I have had some difficulties lately with the Spanish muleteers attached to the British army, in consequence of the general requisition which is said to be made of all individuals of the military ages for the army.

I doubt very much whether this requisition is or can be enforced; and I believe that the magistrates in the different districts are very glad to show the activity and steadiness with which they execute the law, by calling for these people who they know will quit with reluctance the lucrative business in which they are engaged, to serve as soldiers. However, I cannot encourage them to stay away when they are called for; and I very much apprehend that the army will be reduced to the greatest distress if they should leave us, notwithstanding the pains which I have taken, and the expense which I have incurred, to have it equipped as it ought to be with the means of transport.

It appears to me that the production of a certificate from me, or Colonel Alava, or Colonel O’Lawlor, that a man is employed as a muleteer with the British army, might exempt him from service as a soldier, without any great violation of principle or any inconvenience. I do not believe that the whole number of persons of this description exceeds 500; and of these many cannot be of the military ages.

I hope some arrangement will be adopted upon this subject; and I can only say that if something is not done, and I am to be deprived of all those persons of this description who have until now been attached to this army, I shall be entirely crippled, and it will be a question whether we ought not to quit the Peninsula entirely. I doubt that even here we could exist one day without their assistance.

III. To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo,
21st Dec., 1810.

I did not know what to say about the reduction of the number of our transports in the Tagus: I have no apprehension that we shall be obliged to embark, and no idea that the enemy will for a length of time be in a situation to oblige us to think of such an operation; but I cannot, as an Officer, be so certain of the course of events as to tell you that the transports may be withdrawn.

It may be necessary to request your attention for a few moments to explain our situation in reference to that of the enemy, and the general state of affairs in the Peninsula as affecting this question. I have no doubt that the enemy is not, and does not consider himself, able to force the position of the allies in this country. Indeed, I believe I have the means of beating the force now opposed to me, in their own position, of course with the sacrifice of a certain loss of men.

I think that the paper published in the Moniteur of the 23rd November shows that our position in front of Lisbon is considered so strong, that it ought not to be attacked in front; and, from the perusal of that paper, I am of opinion that the enemy will endeavour to maintain a position in this country with the troops now in it, probably reinforced by some of those now on the frontier, and will endeavour to dislodge us by occupying the countries north of the Douro and south of the Tagus, and thus distress us for supplies. The accomplishment of this plan will require an enormous force and some length of time; but when I recollect that in the last year the whole of the north of Spain, and of Old Castille, were abandoned by the enemy, even before the battle of Talavera, I cannot doubt that they will abandon those countries likewise upon the existing emergency, which will give them a part of the force they require.

I am also certain that, if the British army should not be obliged to evacuate Portugal, the French army must withdraw from Andalusia. I think it not improbable, therefore, that a large part of it, if not the whole of the French army in Andalusia, will be introduced into the southern parts of this kingdom.

I do not despair of holding my ground against this accumulation of force, and I have taken measures to prevent the only inconvenience which it can produce, viz., a deficiency of supplies. But as these troops are all within a few marches of me, and an order from Paris would not only put them in motion, but they could be in this country almost before the transports could arrive in England, I cannot think it advisable, in the existing situation of affairs, to send them out of my reach.

The question whether I should attack the enemy in the position which he now occupies has been well considered by me. I have a superior army, I think, by 10,000 men, or one sixth, including the Spaniards; and, notwithstanding some defects in its composition, I think I should succeed. But the loss must necessarily be very great in killed and wounded; and the necessity which would exist of exposing the troops to the weather for some days and nights would throw a great proportion of this convalescent army into the hospital. Then what is to be gained in this action, in which failure would be the loss of the whole cause? Nothing at present that I know of, excepting to relieve the northern provinces and Andalusia from the presence of the enemy; which relief it is probable that the course of events will bring about, without the risk and loss of an action.

But there is another view of this question, which is a very serious one, and has made much impression upon my mind. If the northern provinces of Spain and Andalusia should be relieved from the pressure and presence of the enemy by the course of events, or by exertions in Portugal, what will the cause gain by this relief? In the last year I cannot forget that I brought upon myself and General Cuesta not less than 5 corps d’armée, and the King’s guards and reserve, more than equal to a 6th corps; and that when the whole of Castille and the north of Spain was cleared of the enemy, not a man was put in the field by those provinces, nor even one raised!

In this year I have had 3 corps d’armée, the most numerous and efficient in Spain, upon my hands for 8 months. The kingdom of Galicia has been entirely free from the enemy, and Castille partially relieved. The Spanish army in Galicia have made no movement whatever, as General Mahy says, for want of great coats; but in fact, because they want pay, clothing, means of subsistence, transport, discipline, and every thing which can keep a body of men together in an operation. In Castille nothing has been done, excepting that the guerrillas have been more daring and successful in their robberies.

The relief of Andalusia would, I fear, make no difference in the situation of affairs there. I do not think it quite certain that the enemy would be obliged to raise the siege of Cadiz, although it is probable that he would. But if the siege of Cadiz were not raised, the general cause would derive no advantage from the relief of Andalusia; and even if the raising the siege of Cadiz were the consequence of the relief of Andalusia, I doubt that there are means at Cadiz of putting into the field the troops now composing the garrison of that place, so as to render them a disposable force for the cause of their allies, or that any benefit would be derived from that event, excepting that it would place at the disposal of the allies the means which the enemy have collected for the siege of Cadiz, and retard, and probably prevent, the operation.

Your Lordship will probably deem this a melancholy picture of prospect, in the Peninsula, but you may rely upon its truth. This state of affairs in Spain is the result of some defects in the national character, aggravated by the false principles on which all the affairs of the country have been conducted since it attempted to shake off the yoke of France. The Spaniards have consequently no army; no means of raising one; no authority to discipline an army if they could raise one; no means to arm, equip, clothe, or feed anything which could be collected under that name. The war in the Peninsula, therefore, as far as the Spaniards are concerned in it, cannot take a regular shape. It must be confined to the operations of the guerrillas, upon which the calculations are very different from those which would be made in respect to the operations of a more regular force.

If all this be true, our business is not to fight the French army, which we certainly cannot beat out of the Peninsula, but to give occupation to as large a portion of it as we can manage, and to leave the war in Spain to the guerrillas. As long as the French do not interfere with our supplies, or the resources of the Portuguese Government, or any point of our security, I think it very immaterial whether they are in Spain or Portugal. Indeed, adverting to the greater difficulties they have in subsisting in the latter country and in keeping up their communications, I believe it is more advantageous that they should be where they are. Their numbers are certainly diminishing daily, while they do us no mischief; on the contrary, we are nearer to our resources than ever we were, and they leave the whole of the north of Spain open to the operations of the guerrillas.

But if the army now in Portugal is to be assisted by other corps, operating north of the Douro and south of the Tagus, before I can have secured the supplies of provisions I require, I must then seek to dislodge them by more determined means than I have tried hitherto. These means, God knows, may fail; or I may be prevented from trying them by the weather, or by other circumstances over which I can have no control. In all these cases it would be terrible not to have transports at hand, and I cannot advise they should be sent away.

It is certainly astonishing that the enemy have been able to remain in this country so long; and it is an extraordinary instance of what a French army can do. It is positively a fact that they brought no provisions with them, and they have not received even a letter since they entered Portugal. With all our money, and having in our favour the good inclinations of the country, I assure you that I could not maintain one division in the district in which they have maintained not less than 60,000 men and 20,000 animals for more than 2 months. This time last year I was obliged to move the British cavalry only from the district which they now occupy with their whole army, because it could not be subsisted. But they take everything, and leave the unfortunate inhabitants to starve.

THE REGENCY (1811).
Source.—Diary of Lord Colchester, 1861. Vol. ii., p. 316.

[Feb.] 5th.—Perceval showed me the following letter which he had just received from the Prince of Wales:

Carlton House,
Feb. 4th, 1811.

The Prince of Wales[12] considers the moment to be arrived which calls for his decision with respect to the persons to be employed by him in the administration of the executive government of the country, according to the powers vested in him by the Bill passed by the two Houses of Parliament, and now on the point of receiving the sanction of the Great Seal.

The Prince feels it incumbent upon him at this precise juncture to communicate to Mr. Perceval his intention not to remove from their situations those whom he finds there as His Majesty’s official servants. At the same time the Prince owes it to the truth and sincerity of character, which, he trusts, will appear in every action of his life, in whatever situation he may be placed, explicitly to declare that the irresistible impulse of filial duty and affection to his beloved and afflicted father, leads him to dread that any act of the Regent might, in the smallest degree, have the effect of interfering with the progress of his sovereign’s recovery.

This consideration alone dictates the decision now communicated to Mr. Perceval.

Having thus performed an act of indispensable duty, from a just sense of what is due to his own consistency and honour, the Prince has only to add that, among the many blessings to be derived from His Majesty’s restoration to health, and to the personal exercise of his royal functions, it will not, in the Prince’s estimation, be the least, that that most fortunate event will at once rescue him from a situation of unexampled embarrassment, and put an end to a state of affairs, ill calculated, he fears, to sustain the interests of the United Kingdom in this awful and perilous crisis; and most difficult to be reconciled to the general principles of the British Constitution.