Chapter XX
JAPAN AND RUSSIA IN KOREA AND MANCHURIA
1893-1904
When the peace negotiations between the Japanese and Chinese plenipotentiaries were in progress at Shimonoseki, Russia and France had been preparing themselves to intervene, and Germany had for diplomatic reasons consented to aid the Russian overtures, while Great Britain, which had once before made a fruitless effort to bring about a concerted mediation by the powers, declared that she had no objections to Japan's claims. The plan of intervention having been matured, the Russian, French, and German representatives at Tōkyō called at the foreign office on April 23, 1895, and on their separate cordial reception, presented notes from their governments in which the latter counseled Japan to return to China the Liao-tung peninsula of South Manchuria, for its retention by Japan would, in their opinion, not only endanger the position of the Chinese capital, but also render the independence of Korea illusory, and permanently threaten the general peace of the Far East. While the notes were couched in polite terms, the Eastern squadrons of the three powers manifested such an activity as to demonstrate the determination of the intervening states to enforce their demand, if necessary, by a concerted appeal to arms. At this grave crisis the Japanese authorities agreed among themselves that after the exhausting war of the last eight months it would be impossible for Japan to fight single-handed with the three European powers. May 10, 1895, found the Japanese nation eagerly perusing the imperial decree which reiterated the unalterable devotion of the emperor to the cause of peace, for the sake of which the three friendly powers had advised, and his own sense of magnanimity also counseled, the retrocession to China of the entire peninsula of Liao-tung. The feeling excited among all ranks of the people by this memorable incident was intense. It seemed plain to everyone that the conduct of the powers in thus depriving Japan of what appeared to be a just fruit of her costly war could not have been animated by a genuine respect for the integrity of the Chinese empire. None wished the independence of Korea and the progress of China more deeply than did the Japanese, while, on the other hand, Russia, the central figure in the intervention, probably had a design upon Port Arthur and the whole of Manchuria. The fall of this vast territory into Russia's hands would eventually threaten the independence of Korea, and, consequently, the safety of Japan herself. The Japanese nation naturally awoke to the conviction that, in order to secure the peace of the East and the repose of Japan, the latter must strengthen and enrich herself, so that the humiliation of 1895 should never recur. The conviction was based, it should be clearly noted, not so much upon a desire for revenge as upon the determination to safeguard the common vital interests of Japan and the general Far East by means of progress and civilization. From 1895, therefore, began the most rapid advance in all directions of Japan's material power that has ever taken place in any period of the same length in her past history.
In China, however, the clever diplomacy of Russia entered a new epoch after the intervention of 1895. The first definitely known understanding between the two powers concerned a Chinese loan of four hundred million francs, $80,000,000, guaranteed by Russia and raised mainly at Paris in July, 1895, which was intended for the payment of one-half of the indemnity due to Japan. Then, the Russo-Chinese Bank was organized by a syndicate of capitalists of Paris and St. Petersburg, with its headquarters in the latter city, where the intimate friend of the tsar, Prince Ukhtomsky, was made its president. An important agreement was entered upon on September 8, 1896, between this bank and the Chinese minister at St. Petersburg, which has since proved to be the basis of many another striking document. By this agreement and also by the Russian statutes based upon it, it was provided that the Russo-Chinese Bank should undertake to organize the Eastern Chinese Railway Company, which should construct a branch line of the great Siberian Railway through the Hei-lung and Kirin provinces of Manchuria and connect it with the South Ussuri branch railway. Only Russian and Chinese subjects could be its shareholders. The Chinese government was to take over the road after eighty years without payment, or with a due payment after thirty-six years. It was also agreed that both imports and exports between China and Russia carried by the new railway should pay only two-thirds of the regular tariff rates of China.
No sooner was the first sod of the railway cut on its eastern extremity than events occurred which led to a further extension by the Russians of the railroad toward the most strategic points in the Liao-tung peninsula which they leased—points which had so recently been retroceded by Japan, on Russia's advice, for the peace and independence of China and Korea. It belongs to the history of China to recount how, at the murder by a mob of two German Catholic missionaries in Shan-tung, the government of the kaiser succeeded in March, 1898, in wresting from China a ninety-nine-year lease of the Bay of Kiao-chow and its hinterland, together with railway and mining concessions between the shore and Tsi-nan-fu. This was a signal for the advent of a remarkable series of territorial demarcations to be made by the rival powers of Europe which had been no less eager than Germany to seize the first opportunity to carve out their respective "spheres" of influence or interest on the soil of the feeble Chinese empire. The act of Germany disturbed the balance of power in the Far East which could not be restored until the aggressive passions of all competing powers should have been satiated. Great Britain obtained in February a pledge never to alienate to any other power any portion of the extensive provinces adjoining the Yang-tse River. This was followed by the lease to Russia for twenty-five years, subject to renewal, of Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan. The Russo-Chinese agreement signed on March 27 declared that the lease constituted no prejudice against the Chinese sovereignty over the territory, but was designed for the protection of the Russian navy in the waters of North China. It must be remembered that Russia with her immense dominion of Siberia had up to this time possessed no adequate naval station on its shores which was not bound by ice during the winter months. Now at length she secured the almost ice-free Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan, of which the former and a portion of the latter were agreed to be used exclusively for naval purposes, while the remaining portion of Ta-lien-wan was to be opened to the merchant vessels of all nations. The agreement further provided that a branch line might be built by Russia from the Manchurian railway to Ta-lien-wan and, as was later stipulated, to Port Arthur, and, if necessary, also a line from the open port of Niu-chwang to the Yalu River on the Korean border. A special agreement was further concluded on May 7 to supplement the one of March 27, which has been described. The Russian lease on the tip of the Liao-tung peninsula induced Great Britain, on July 1, to obtain under similar terms on the opposite promontory of Shan-tung the lease of the Bay of Wei-hai-wei. This port had still been under the occupation of Japanese troops, pending the final payment of the Chinese indemnity, but was now cheerfully evacuated by them to be replaced by the forces of the power with which the relations of Japan had already begun to be especially amicable. In South China the rivalry between France and Great Britain was manifested afresh by the proposed opening of the West River and concessions in Yunnan obtained by the latter, and the sphere created on the Kwang-chow Bay by the former. Japan also secured the pledge of non-alienation of the province of Fuh-kien, which lies opposite her new territory of Formosa.
It is necessary in order to comprehend the situation with any degree of clearness, sharply to distinguish the nature of the Russian concessions in Liao-tung from those of all the other "spheres" in North and South China. It was alone in the former instance that new naval posts of great moment were directly connected by a railroad with the military centers of an enormous and contiguous dominion which represented an expansion through centuries. The creation of naval posts on the strategic points of the peninsula would be sufficient, as was avowed by Russia herself three years before, to threaten Peking, render the independence of Korea illusory, and continually imperil the peace of the Far East, and its dangers must further be measured by the immense pressure which might be exercised with the military resources of all the Russias that lay behind Liao-tung and were now connected thereto by rail.
The situation was made worse by an Anglo-Russian railway agreement of April 28, 1899. The origin of this document belongs to the history of China. It suffices here to point out that it provided that Great Britain should not seek any railway concession north of the Great Wall, and Russia should observe the same principle in the Yang-tse basin. The peculiarity of this agreement consists in the fact that one of its signatories was not, as usual, the Chinese government, but that two European powers thereby pledged themselves not to infringe upon each other's sphere of railroad concession in China. Diplomatic exigencies might (as they have since done beyond the wall) induce one of the parties to interpret the railroad sphere in the light of a political sphere.
The peculiarly favorable position of the United States rendered it both possible and desirable for her to maintain in China the principles of the territorial integrity of the empire and of the equal opportunity therein for the economic enterprise of all nations—the latter principle often called that of the "open door." Between the end of 1899 and the beginning of 1900 Secretary Hay induced the great powers, though with nominal success, to declare anew that they would observe the avowed policy of the "open door" in their respective spheres in China. He had, however, hardly received the replies of the powers when the reports of an anti-foreign campaign of an unusually serious character began to arrive from China. The story of the so-called Boxer uprising, with its thrilling episodes, will be told in the volume on China, and here it is enough for us to observe its two features, namely, Japan's share in the suppression of the trouble, and the bearing of the latter upon the Manchurian question.
By the middle of June, 1900, the representatives of twelve powers, as well as many other foreigners and native Christians, had already found themselves besieged in Peking and gallantly defending themselves against the frequent attacks of the Boxers and imperial troops; Admiral Seymour and his twelve hundred marines had already found it impossible to force their way to the relief of the besieged foreigners. At this juncture the government of Great Britain perceived that no other power could with greater dispatch and success come to the rescue of the legations than Japan. The latter, however, had resolved to act only in concert with other powers, or, if alone, only at their united and explicit request. She therefore contented herself with transporting 3000 soldiers for Taku to move strictly in unison with the forces of the other allies. The negotiation carried on by Lord Salisbury with the continental governments in relation to the advisability of requesting Japan immediately to mobilize 25,000 or 30,000 troops from her shores had resulted, early in July, in evoking from Germany a dissent from the proposition so long as the allies could act in harmony, and from Russia a reply that she deemed it unwise to intrust a single power with the restoration of order in China, but that she would welcome 20,000 or 30,000 additional troops from any one of the powers which would move in perfect accord with the others. Impatient of the dilatory and indefinite replies, the British government went so far as to guarantee on its own responsibility the cost of mobilizing the desired number of troops from Japan. This was on July 6, and on the same day Japan at last resolved to dispatch, with no condition whatsoever from the other powers, troops aggregating 22,000. By this time the Japanese Chancellor Sugiyama and the German Minister von Ketteler had been murdered in Peking, the Taku forts had been taken by the allies, and the prospect had been that both the British and the German forces would soon aggregate 10,000 men. Tientsin fell before the allies on July 14, three days before the arrival of the fresh troops from Japan. After three weeks at Tientsin during which nothing could be done, 15,780 allied forces, of which 8000 were the Japanese, began to march toward Peking on August 4. All along the way there were sanguinary encounters with the Boxers and Chinese troops, so that the allies probably lost 800 men before they reached Peking on August 14. The Japanese soldiers, after a terrible battle lasting for nearly fifteen hours till 9.50 P. M., bombarded the eastern walls at two of the gates and rushed into the Forbidden City, while previously a column dispatched by them had led the rest of the allied forces toward the British legation through the gate which the Russians had exploded about 5 P. M. With what wild burst of joy and enthusiasm the foreigners, who had been defending themselves under unspeakable difficulties within the walls of the British legation, received the triumphant entry of the allied soldiers may better be imagined than told. The siege had at length been raised, the imperial court had fled toward Si-ngan, and the capital of China fell into the hands of the powers.
It is unnecessary to remind the reader that all during this memorable campaign the Japanese soldiers won universal praise for their dash and discipline. With no less admiration were their commissariat system and method of transportation regarded by their comrades. Repeatedly was it seen by impartial observers that even in orderliness among themselves and just and moderate treatment of the non-combatants, the troops of the non-Christian Japan were behind those of no Christian country then represented in North China. They excelled also in the power of organization and control in their dealings with the people of Peking, who had come under the provisional government of the conquering powers. All these merits were externally visible, but only the Japanese soldier himself will know what burning love of his country's name, which he carried deep in his bosom, animated him with courage and patience and bridled his animal passion. He marched shoulder to shoulder with the troops of the powers, three of which had five years before treated his country with indignity and forced her to forsake the price of the blood of her sons only to appropriate it for themselves. He could now show them that he had not been forever reduced by them into an insignificant position, but, on the contrary, had advanced beyond his former degree of military efficiency, and could vie with any one of them either in the art of war or in the moral qualities that constitute the modern soldier. His experience was invaluable both in training his mind and body and in demonstrating anew that, after all, his racial identity was hardly a bar against his full participation in the arts of civilization. As precious for his country may be regarded the fact that her position in the East rose, through the North China campaign, considerably higher in the esteem of the powers than even after the Chinese war of 1894-1895. Otherwise the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 probably would not have been so soon formed. Nor could Japan have since proceeded with her national activities with such a calm confidence.
How far Japan had outrun in the march of national progress her neighboring empire of China, whose disciple she once was, was strikingly illustrated by the telegraphic messages that the emperors of the two nations exchanged both before and after the capture of Peking. Nor can a stronger refutation of the oft-repeated theory that one day Japan will revive the moribund China and form with her a pan-"yellow" alliance powerful enough to exclude the Caucasian influence from the Orient, be found than in the comparison of the Chinese epistles and the Japanese replies in which both emperors faithfully expressed the attitude of their respective nations. On July 3, or half a month after the fall of the Taku forts, his majesty the emperor of China telegraphed a personal message to the Japanese emperor in which he laid great stress upon the idea that in the present rivalry between the East and the West, the former was supported by only two nations, the Chinese and the Japanese. Could it be China alone that the Occidental powers covet with their tiger's eye? "If China should fall," said his majesty, "perhaps your country would be unable to stand alone." On the strength of this argument, the Son of Heaven made an earnest appeal to his fellow-sovereign to sink minor differences and rescue the Orient from the impending crisis. To this remarkable communication responded the emperor of Japan, saying that he considered it incumbent upon China immediately to suppress the internal disorder and save the foreign envoys, whose persons were inviolable, and that after the restoration of normal order by China's own efforts Japan would, during the negotiations of the powers, safeguard the interests of the great empire. The author of the original message may have thought Japan a renegade of the Orient, but the reply of the latter's sovereign implied her irrevocable policy of acting upon the dictates of the most advanced standards of mankind—a policy which is infinitely removed from the defensive position of one form of civilization or one section of the earth's surface as over against another. Nearly three months later, on September 24, the Chinese emperor again communicated from Ta-yuan to the Japanese sovereign his sense of gratitude for the work of the latter's soldiers, and solicited his persuasion of the other powers to expedite the conclusion of peace. In reply, Japan's ruler suggested that peace would follow if the court should at once return to Peking, calm the minds of the people, and manifest to the powers its sincere regrets for the recent outrages, and also if the reactionary ministers were removed from office and a new government was organized of men whose ability was universally recognized.
It was after a number of conferences that, on November 9, the peace commissioners at Peking came to the final conclusion regarding the terms of peace, which were reduced into an identical note two months later. This protracted period of negotiation was mainly due to the difficulty of maintaining a strict harmony between the several powers on all points under discussion. We cannot tarry over the details of the discussion, for they properly belong to the history of China. Nor need we point out the exact contributions that Japan made toward the peace settlement, which were in the main of a moderating character. Of the indemnity, amounting to 450 million Hai-kuan taels ($333,900,000), Japan shared about 7.73 per cent. Previous to the conclusion of peace an incident occurred at Amoy which has caused misunderstanding in certain quarters. On August 24 a mob burned a Japanese Buddhist building in the city, upon which some Japanese bluejackets were landed to protect the consulate and the resident subjects of Japan. More marines were later landed, and still more were reported to be coming via Formosa. A widespread rumor ensued that Japan was bent on the occupation of Amoy, and the consternation among the citizens ran so high that the local taotai, together with a large number of literati and wealthy merchants, made a personal appeal to the Japanese consul to evacuate, themselves pleading to indemnify the burned building and the landing of the marines. In the meantime a British and a German war vessel had arrived, and the Japanese reinforcements bound for Amoy had been recalled from Formosa. The people who had unnecessarily dreaded the presence of the Japanese forces now began to manifest contempt of the Japanese residents in Amoy, whose position was imagined to have suddenly fallen at the coming of the foreign marines. A general evacuation soon followed the restoration of order, leaving the status of the Japanese in the city much the same as before the incident. Although it can hardly be concealed that some of the Japanese residing in Fuh-kien and Formosa were at the time animated by a certain degree of chauvinism, the intentions of the government at Tōkyō could not have been but entirely pacific.
Perhaps in no other instance have the powers more repeatedly and unequivocally given expression to their avowed devotion to the doctrine of the territorial integrity and the open door in China than during and after the Boxer insurrection. Not the least clear declarations came from Russia, whose conduct, however, could at least as well be explained by another principle which she has persistently denied. Facts would lead one to suppose that she at first regarded the trouble in North China as slight enough to die of its own inanity or be readily suppressed by the assistance of herself alone. Count Muraviev, the Russian foreign minister, even prophesied that order would be restored within two weeks. The serious nature of the uprising, however, soon made it evident that it hardly was an occasion for any single power thus to ingratiate itself with the helpless Chinese government. Russia hence joined the concert of the powers in the march toward Peking, but at least some of her press and authors continued to regard her joint action with the allies as rather incidental, for, according to their opinion, the trouble had been caused by the offensive acts of the other powers in China in which Russia had had no share. Subsequent events show, however, that, if she attached a relatively small importance to the conditions in North China, Russia at the same time grasped the Manchurian situation with great celerity and vigor. It is impossible to judge from our present state of knowledge whether the aggressive attitude of Russia in Manchuria preceded or followed the appearance of threatening signs of danger against her interests in that territory. Most of the actual troubles, however, seem to have occurred after Russia had suddenly assumed, from June 26 on, a belligerent movement in Manchuria on a vast scale which was to cost her in the end no less than sixty-two million rubles.[1] In a few days adjoining regions in Siberia were declared as in a state of war, and troops from Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Blagovestchensk, and the Trans-Baikalia, as well as from European Russia, began to press into Manchuria. It is as unnecessary as impossible to mark at each point of the widespread warfare that followed whether the initiative was taken by the Chinese or by the Russians. It is evident that some strategic points in Manchuria had already been infested by the Boxers and their sympathizers, who set about from what time is not known, obstructing and damaging railroad construction, attacking the churches, and persecuting the converts in the southern region, and, on July 16, bombarding the Russian city of Blagovestchensk across the Amur, the navigation of which was consequently stopped, and a week later murdering some eighty Russians in An-tung near the Korean border. Other outrages followed as the Russian aggression excited more resentment among the Chinese. The forces of the tsar occupied the open port of Niu-chwang, where on August 5 they organized a provisional government. The Russian possession of Niu-chwang was followed, before the allies entered into Peking, by that of Hun-chun, Argun, Harbin, Aigun, San-sin, and other centers scattered over the surface of Manchuria, while in July the dismissal by the Chinese government of the Chinese manager of the Manchurian railroad which had hitherto been partly under the nominal control of China, left the Russians in full and sole possession.
Thus far Russia had no more subdued all Manchuria than the allies had restored order in North China, and the tsar's government surprised the other powers, on August 25, only ten days after the rescue of the legations in Peking, by declaring Russia's intention to withdraw her minister and troops from Peking. It was thought by observers, and freely admitted by some Russian writers, that this unexpected move by Russia was by no means out of the line of her traditional policy of conferring favor upon the neighbor whose house should as long as possible be left in a state of confusion and disorder. The proposition was deemed none the less as acceptable in principle as impracticable in detail at that early date. In regard to Manchuria, the same Russian circular of August 25 declared that evacuation would occur as soon as peace was permanently restored and measures were taken to protect the railways, and other powers threw no obstacle in the way. It was soon seen, however, that the armed pacification of Manchuria could not so abruptly stop. On the contrary, the occupation of many strategic points, including Ninguta, Tsitsihar, Mukden, Kin-chow, and An-tung, was yet to come, until early in December the entire three eastern provinces had completely fallen into the hands of the Russians.
It was doubtless with a grave apprehension of this Manchurian situation that Great Britain had induced Germany to sign, on October 16, 1900, the ill-fated Anglo-German agreement. It sought to effect a difficult combination of three principles not easily reconcilable with one another: the integrity of the remaining territory of China, an open door, and equal advantage to men of all nations in the trading ports and marts, and the protection of the interest already acquired in China by the signatories. The strength of the combination was further reduced by the manner in which the first and the third principles were upheld in the agreement, which declared that neither power would make use of the present complication to acquire any territorial advantages, but that if another power should act contrary to this view, then the signatories might consult together as to the measures of protecting their own interests. At their invitation to accept the principles of the agreement, Russia, as well as France, cleverly replied that they saw therein nothing other than the same old principles which they had repeatedly advocated, while the United States expressed assent to the first two of the principles, but deemed the third as not concerning her. Japan entered the agreement as a signatory. Judged from the very purpose for which the document had been framed by Great Britain, the agreement may be said to have ended in a failure, for what was the use of reiterating the first principle if Manchuria was not considered a part of the Chinese territory, whose integrity was thereby respected? Yet Count von Bülow, imperial chancellor of Germany, said in the Reichstag on March 15, 1901, as he again did toward the end of 1903, that the Anglo-German agreement had no reference to Manchuria. "I can imagine nothing," he was reported to have said, "which we regard with more indifference" than Manchuria. "The Yang-tse agreement" was the name given to the document by the Germans, who were pleased to interpret it as applying with particular force, not to Manchuria, but to the British sphere in the basin of the great river which had always been an eyesore to Germany. With one of the contracting parties at variance with the very aim of the agreement, it was useless for the marquis of Lansdowne to declare, on August 6, 1901, that it "most unquestionably extended to Manchuria, which was part of the Chinese empire." It is to be doubted that the convention had exerted the slightest influence in staying the hand of Russia in the three eastern provinces.
Toward the close of 1900 appeared in the London Times a dispatch from its Peking correspondent, Dr. George E. Morrison, containing the contents of a secret treaty alleged to have been concluded in November between Tsang-chi, the Tartar-general at Mukden, and Admiral Alexiev, which stipulated that Tsang should pacify Manchuria and then report the detail of his administration of the territory to a Russian resident to be stationed at Mukden. This convention was not ratified either by the tsar or by the Son of Heaven. This was merely a prelude to a more serious development. Early in 1901, when the peace commissioners at Peking were discussing the matter of the punishment to be demanded of China for the local officials who had been privy to the Boxer outrages, Russia showed signs of isolating herself from the concert of the powers and taking side with the Chinese sentiment. This characteristic action of the Russians was accompanied by the rumor of negotiations for a secret convention carried on at St. Petersburg between the government of the tsar and the Chinese minister. Of this supposed convention several versions were afloat, some of which would have one believe that in its scope were comprised, not only Manchuria, but also Ili, the New Territory, Mongolia, and the provinces of Kan-su, Shen-si, and Shan-si, as Russian spheres of one sort or another. Either in its truer form or after some concession on the Russian part, the secret treaty, as it was more definitely known, was said to have contained the following eight points, which are worthy of enumeration as showing at least some of the original intentions Russia had regarding Manchuria: 1, that Russia should continue the military occupation of Manchuria pending the restoration of order and the settlement of the question of war indemnity; 2, that China should consult Russia as to where and how many Chinese troops might be stationed in Manchuria; 3, that China should at any time dismiss at Russia's request those Manchurian generals and other officials whose conduct was deemed prejudicial to mutual amity; 4, that the number of the Chinese police should also be determined by consulting Russia, and the use of artillery should be forbidden; 5, that there should be organized a special official system for the neutral territory already marked; 6, that no railway or mining concession in Manchuria should be granted to citizens of any other nation without consulting Russia; 7, that the railroad indemnity should, through an agreement made with the railway company, be wholly or in part paid by the profit of the roads; and 8, that Russia should be allowed to construct a branch line from the Manchurian railway to the Great Wall. The result of these demands, were they real and had China granted them, would have been a complete Russian protectorate over Manchuria, for although it was made to imply that the military occupation of Manchuria should cease with the restoration of peace, such concessions were demanded as would tend to perpetuate the Russian control of the territory. Japan first saw the gravity of the situation, and communicated about the matter with the United States and Great Britain. The last power consulted other powers. The powers thus assumed a united front in warning China of the unwisdom of concluding with a single power before she had reached a common agreement with all the allies. The protest, however, bore no appreciable effect upon Russia, which persisted in avowing that the intended agreement was unlike the one reported in the press, but was merely a provisional step toward the evacuation of Manchuria. Before the end of March, Japan and Great Britain directly communicated with Russia, which adroitly retorted to the latter that it was not customary with the tsar's government to show to a third power a treaty to be concluded with an independent nation. To Japan's request to submit the agreement to the discussion of the allied powers' commissioners at Peking, with whom all matters concerning the late complication should rest, Russia replied that the intended treaty contained injury to none and might well be made public after conclusion. This reply was dated March 26. On April 5 Japan forwarded to Russia her second message, supported by a firm determination. Russia now suddenly withdrew her demands, declaring at the same time that, owing to the obstruction placed in the way of effecting the first move preliminary to the eventual evacuation of Manchuria, she was obliged to maintain for the present the military occupation of its provinces.
It was again rumored in June that another secret Manchurian convention was afoot, which, if real, however, must have miscarried. No more successful was the patriotic effort of the Viceroy Chang Chih-tung and the late Viceroy Liu Kan-yi to create among the peace commissioners a sentiment for the opening to foreign trade of the whole of Manchuria. Toward the last of August Paul Lessar was appointed the Russian minister at Peking. The peace protocol agreed upon between China and the allied powers was finally signed on September 7, 1901, the imperial court was expected shortly to return to Peking, and the Chinese government began to look anxiously for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the realm. Seizing this opportunity, Russia proposed a new Manchurian treaty whose comparatively mild terms made it appear acceptable at this moment to the Chinese commissioners, especially to the pro-Russian, Li Hung Chang. According to the reported tenor of this treaty, the Manchurian evacuation was to be completed within two or three years, the Chinese troops at Mukden were to be trained by Russian officers, and their numbers to be determined by consulting Russia's wishes, and, as in the treaty withdrawn in April, Chinese artillery was forbidden. Considering the feeble attitude of the Chinese commissioners, it would have been extremely difficult for Japan and Great Britain effectively to protest against the acceptance of the Russian demands had not the Viceroys Liu and Chang strongly reminded the emperor and the empress dowager of the direct peril to the dynasty which might result from virtually forsaking its ancestral home, Manchuria, to a foreign power whose ambition knew no bounds. In accordance with the wishes of the court, the dying Li Hung Chang, on his sick-bed, saw Lessar and appealed to the Russian friendship for China to modify the terms of the proposed agreement. Li soon passed away, on November 7, leaving the gravest problem of China in a state of extreme uncertainty. Prince Ching presented a counter-proposition, which among other things requested the evacuation of Manchuria within one year. Russia's reply to this note arrived in Peking the last of January, 1902, and was found to contain a demand for an exclusive mining concession to Russia of all Manchuria, which is noted for its untold stores of minerals. Against this the United States, Great Britain, and Japan entered a firm protest. Secretary Hay, in his note of February 3, reminded the Russian and Chinese governments of the repeated assurances made by the tsar's foreign minister of his devotion to the principle of the open door in all parts of China, and said: "An agreement whereby China gives any corporation or company the exclusive right or privilege of opening mines, establishing railroads, or in any other way industrially developing Manchuria, can but be viewed with the gravest concern by the government of the United States. It constitutes a monopoly, which is a distinct breach of the stipulations of the treaties concluded between China and foreign powers, and thereby seriously affects the rights of American citizens." As usual, Russia, in her reply, so strongly reinforced her former pledges of the principle of the open door that the government at Washington found it impossible to dispute them without questioning Russia's integrity, which Hay was not disposed to do. By this time, however, an important event had taken place in the diplomatic world which was popularly regarded as a virtual protest against what was considered the Eastern policy of Russia—namely, the conclusion of the agreement of the Anglo-Japanese alliance signed at London on January 30, 1902.
The fair and open principles of this agreement may best be seen from its text, which was as follows:
"The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, actuated solely by a desire to maintain the status quo and general peace in the extreme East, being moreover specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea, and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations, hereby agree as follows:
Article I.
"The High Contracting Parties having mutually recognized the independence of China and Korea, declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country. Having in view, however, their special interests, of which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, while Japan, in addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree politically as well as commercially and industrially in Korea, the High Contracting Parties recognize that it will be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other power, or by disturbances arising in China or Korea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the High Contracting Parties for the protection of the lives and property of its subjects.
Article II.
"If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defense of their respective interests as above described, should become involved in war with another power, the other High Contracting Party will maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent other powers from joining in hostilities against its ally.
Article III.
"If, in the above event, any other power or powers should join in hostilities against that ally, the other High Contracting Party will come to its assistance, and will conduct the war in common, and will make peace in mutual agreement with it.
Article IV.
"The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another power to the prejudice of the interests above described.
"Whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, the above-mentioned interests are in jeopardy, the two governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly.
Article VI.
"The present agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for five years from that date.
"In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said five years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, ipso facto, continue until peace is concluded."
To the Anglo-Japanese agreement Russia and her ally France retorted in the following declaration of March 16:
"The allied Russo-French Governments are wholly pleased to discern that the Anglo-Japanese convention supports the essential principles which, according to the reiterated statement of France and Russia, constituted and still constitute the foundation of their policy. Both governments believe that the support of these principles is also a guarantee of the interests of the Far East. They are compelled, however, not to lose from view the possibly inimical action of other powers, or a repetition of disorders in China, possibly impairing China's integrity and free development, to the detriment of their reciprocal interests. They therefore reserve to themselves the right to take measures to defend these interests."
In this connection may be related the diplomatic comedy enacted at Shanghai in October, in which the newly formed Anglo-Japanese alliance played a part. According to the just wishes of the Chinese authorities, Great Britain proposed on July 31 to Japan, Germany, and France to withdraw the troops the four powers had been stationing at Shanghai, where peace had been restored. Japan and France cheerfully assented, on the condition, however, that all the parties should agree. Germany showed an inexplicable dilatoriness in giving a definite answer, proposing that the four powers should first come to an agreement as to the date of a joint evacuation. Great Britain fixed November 1, to which France agreed. Japan, however, delayed, as she descried a secret movement being made by one of the parties. Finally, Japan heard on October 6, and Great Britain on the 8th, that Germany had secured from the Chinese government a pledge that it would give no additional rights to any power in the Yang-tse basin, the British influence over which had always embarrassed the German policy in China. The stroke dealt by Germany could have been aimed at no other power but Great Britain. The former notified the latter that her intention was to prevent any power from taking the present opportunity to come to a secret agreement of an exclusive nature with China—a possibility altogether incompatible with the terms of the alliance so recently framed. At the same time, the Chinese government pretended that it had made no special pledge to Germany. Great Britain, now fully advised by Japan of the nature of the case, declared that it would be unnecessary and undesirable to bind only a few powers to guarantee the integrity of a portion of the Chinese empire, and that to such an agreement, if any, she would not consider herself in any way bound. She also expressed to Prince Ching her resentment of his duplicity. In the meantime, the Viceroy Chang Chih-tung, from whom the German consul had sought a similar pledge to one that had been given by the prince, flatly refused the demand. Germany ended the affair with a clever but unconvincing explanation to Great Britain. Seeing that the sky was clear, Japan evacuated Shanghai, alone and boldly, on November 22. The other powers soon followed.
It will be recalled that the Anglo-Japanese agreement was announced in the midst of the negotiations between Lessar and the Chinese government concerning Manchuria. During the diplomatic flurry attending the momentous declarations made first by Japan and Great Britain and then by Russia and France, the Manchurian negotiation seemed to have been temporarily forgotten, until the world was taken by surprise to hear of the conclusion, on April 8, 1902, of a new Russo-Chinese convention regarding the three eastern provinces, which went into force simultaneously with the signing of the agreement at three o'clock in the afternoon of that memorable day. Not the least surprising feature of it was the remarkable mildness of its terms. Russia promised, upon the condition that China should protect the Russian railways, Russian subjects, and their enterprises in Manchuria, to evacuate the territory and restore it to Chinese sovereignty. The evacuation was to take place at three different periods within the ensuing eighteen months, as follows: from regions west of the Liao River, by October 8, 1902; from the rest of the province of Sheng-king and the province of Kirin, by April 8, 1903; and, finally, from the Amur (Hei-lung) province, by October 8, 1903. Pending the evacuation, the number of Chinese troops and the sites of their stations in Manchuria should be determined by consultation between the Chinese and Russian officers, but after the evacuation those troops might be freely distributed at the direction of the Chinese officers. Then, however, the Russian Government should be notified of every change made in this respect. Suppressing other points in the convention which do not concern us directly, it is seen that it says nothing about Chinese territories outside of Manchuria, and, within the latter, contains no new mining or railway demands, while it appears to promise an eventually complete restoration of Manchuria to China. The moderate tone of the present instrument as compared with the former abortive conventions, and coming so soon after the renewed declaration of the Russo-French alliance of its devotion to the principle of the territorial integrity of China, seemed to confirm the sincerity of Russia's avowed intention in the East.
The first period of the Manchurian occupation, according to this convention, was to close on October 8, 1902. Before that date the Russian forces had completely withdrawn from that part of the Sheng-king province lying to the west of the Liao River. Russia had fulfilled her pledge. It was alleged, however, by several eyewitnesses that the so-called evacuation largely meant the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chinese quarters into the numerous and extensive Russian barracks and blockhouses along the Manchurian railway. The most important section of Manchuria, namely, the rest of the Sheng-king and the whole of the Kirin province, was, according to the convention, to be evacuated on April 8, 1903. That day came and passed, without seeing, except in a few places, even the nominal evacuation. In the midst of a suspense full of apprehension the Russians lodged at the Chinese foreign office, as a price for the yet unfulfilled evacuations, new demands in seven articles, which astounded the diplomatic world. The demands were in substance as follows: 1, the non-alienation of any part of Manchuria to any other power; 2, the right to construct a Russian telegraph line between Niu-chwang and Peking; 3, the promise that under no pretext any other foreigner should be employed in North China; 4, the sole management of the customs tariff at Niu-chwang by the Russo-Chinese Bank, and the Russian supervision of the quarantine service at the same port; 5, the opening of no new port or mart in Manchuria to foreign trade; 6, the maintenance of the status quo in the Mongolian administration; and, 7, the pledge to be made by China that all the privileges that the Russians enjoyed before the late émeute should not hereby be affected. The Japanese minister, Uchida, entered on April 21 a vigorous protest at the foreign office at Peking, and was followed by the British and American ministers. The United States, which had already been negotiating with China for the opening of two new ports in Manchuria, where she possessed the greatest interest of any nation in the import trade, made a query on April 24 direct to St. Petersburg as to the authenticity of the reported demand. She was assured both by the Russian foreign minister and Minister Cassini, as was Great Britain by the Russian representative at London, that the published reports of the proposed convention were absolutely incorrect. It appeared as if the Russian disclaimer were final and a signal diplomatic success had been accomplished by Secretary Hay. But to say that the reported articles were incorrect was not the same as to say that they were entirely unfounded, or even that every one of them was incorrect. The government of the tsar seems to have left sufficient room in its statements for the inference not only that there was proceeding a pourparler with the Chinese foreign office, but also that some of the rumored articles were not to be denied. However that may be, it is noteworthy that the knowledge of the Russian demand aroused among the leading classes of the Chinese people a patriotic ebullition not known even during the Japanese war and the Boxer insurrection. Petitions from all of the eighteen provinces reminded the Peking government in the strongest terms that the loss of Manchuria would lead to a widespread uprising in the empire, a repetition of the anti-foreign crusade of 1900, a probable wholesale partition of the Middle Kingdom by the rebels and the powers, and an eventual downfall of the ruling dynasty. In this remarkable upheaval, merchants and students, including those staying in Japan, took no less active part than the officials and literates, who, as the ruling class, are usually the most alive to the interests of the government and the civilization of China. Under these circumstances it is not strange that before May 10 the foreign office at Peking replied to the Russian government that the former could assuredly not concede to a demand that ignored previous agreements, the stipulations of which China had never violated.
This reply of China to Russia hardly had a greater effect to settle the dispute than did the pacific disclaimer given about ten days before by Russia to the United States, but on the contrary, was followed by a month the uncertain and trying nature of which to Prince Ching and his foreign office has seldom since been equaled during the whole period of the negotiations. While Pokotilov, the influential Peking agent of the Russo-Chinese Bank, was reported to be freely dispensing gifts and favors to win over certain members of the office and of the inner court, the Russian chargé, Plançon, demanded an immediate reply to three of the once proposed seven articles, which pertained to the non-alienation of the Manchurian territory, the opening of no new ports, and the maintenance of the status quo in Mongolia. Prince Ching, as well as the empress dowager, seemed to waver, or at least to bide time. The attempt of some patriots to install in the foreign office the most respected Viceroy Chang Chih-tung fell through, and the attitude of the Japanese government was deemed not sufficiently reassuring to encourage China once more to assume a decisive tone. In the meantime the Russian minister, Lessar, returned on May 29 to Peking after an absence, and severely reprimanded the foreign office for frequently allowing diplomatic secrecy to be violated. In his conference with Prince Ching, on June 10, he renewed the demand in each of the seven articles, every one of which the prince however, was obliged to refuse, as before. At Lessar's intimation that an indiscriminate refusal would result in serious disadvantages to China, and his suggestion that some substitute for the old demand might be devised for mutual benefit, the prince had only to request the minister of the tsar to present his own substitute, as the former naturally had none. A new demand was accordingly presented, which embodied the first, fourth, and sixth articles of the former convention, the fourth being now stated in two articles. Prince Ching begged for five days' delay, and temporarily secluded himself from the world, his negotiation with Lessar being in the meanwhile carried on by secret correspondence. The protests from the Japanese, American, and British ministers, as well as the renewed demand of the two former to open new ports in Manchuria, did not avail.
Irritating to Japan as was the Manchurian situation, she was confronted in Korea by a still more serious state of things. The diplomatic history of the latter country since the conclusion of the war of 1894-1895 may now be briefly recounted. The years between 1895 and 1898 witnessed violent fluctuations of influence between the Russians and the Japanese in Korea. The Japanese had been too eager for reform, and, at least on the occasion of the murder of the queen on October 8, 1895, had allowed themselves to be too much influenced by their less responsible element to withstand the obstruction and diplomacy of the Russians. It was not until the departure of Waeber, the astute Russian minister, and until the activity of the Russians in China had become all-engrossing, that the latter's influence was again eclipsed by that of the Japanese. During this period of struggle Russia and Japan concluded three agreements defining their position in Korea, namely, the Komura-Waeber memorandum signed at Seul on May 4, 1896, the Yamagata-Lobanov protocol signed at St. Petersburg on June 9, 1896, and the Nishi-Rosen protocol concluded at Tokyo on April 25, 1898. Some of the more permanent of the terms of these agreements deserve notice, as they gave to Japan a conventional ground for her negotiations with Russia in 1903-1904, just prior to the war. The two governments "recognized definitively the sovereignty and the entire independence of Korea, and mutually engaged themselves to abstain from all direct interference in the internal affairs of that country." No military teacher or financial adviser should be furnished to Korea by either power without consulting the other. In view of the large development of the Japanese commercial and industrial enterprises in Korea, the Russian government agreed not to impede the development of the commercial and industrial relations between Japan and Korea. In case further definitions of principles should become necessary or other points for discussion should arise, the representatives of the two powers should be instructed to negotiate amicably. The arrangement made in these agreements was from its nature temporary, and would have created fresh complications even if its terms had been strictly observed.
As soon as her hands were freer in Manchuria, Russia, represented at Seul by the ambitious Pavlov, and also by the semiofficial diplomats, Baron Gunzburg and Miss Sonntag, employed such means as befitted the peculiar situation of Korea in their persistent effort to overthrow Japanese and promote Russian influence in the peninsula. For this purpose they made to the Korean court propositions of almost every conceivable nature, including demands for concessions at Masampo, Chinhai Bay, and Kojedo Island, in the south, for the right to build telegraph and railway lines in the north, and for the employment of Russian financial advisers and military instructors. It was not till April, 1903, however, that, simultaneously with her pressure upon Peking, Russia began to work the timber concession which she was said to have secured in 1896, when the Korean king had taken refuge in the Russian legation at Seul. Early in May, ostensibly to defend the forest land, forty-seven Russian soldiers arrived at Yongam-po on the Yalu, where, despite protests from the Korean government, an extensive tract of land was seized and fortification was begun. Presently, one hundred, and then two hundred more Russian troops arrived, while on the Manchurian side of the frontier fresh troops entered An-tung and Feng-hwang-Cheng, so that the pressure of the Russian forces was heavily felt upon the Korean border.
At length the Japanese government came to the decision that it should deal directly with the government of the tsar in order to establish once and for all the integrity of China in Manchuria, as well as the independence and reform of Korea, to define the respective rights and interests in those countries of Japan and Russia, and radically and fundamentally to free the general peace of the Far East from the factors that had continually and profoundly threatened it. The decision in its main points had been reached by the press and the entire nation long before the cabinet ministers and privy councilors met before the throne, on June 23, and built thereon a definite policy to be pursued in the coming negotiations with Russia. These negotiations were attended by tortuous delays on the part of Russia, but the Japanese nation, realizing that never in their long history had they been confronted with a graver national problem, met it with a remarkable perseverance. The government, also, conducted itself with dignity and consideration, for none knew better than it that the immediate peace of the East was dependent upon the success of the pending negotiations. The different motives of Russia and Japan for these negotiations and the different spirit in which each carried them on may be well seen in the following official statements made by the respective governments soon after the diplomatic relations between them had been severed. The Russian communication, issued on February 9, 1904, by the foreign office at St. Petersburg, said:
"Last year [1903] the Tōkyō cabinet, under the pretext of establishing the balance of power and a more settled order of things on the shores of the Pacific, submitted to the imperial government [of Russia] a proposal for a revision of the existing treaties with Korea. Russia consented, and Viceroy Alexiev was charged to draw up a project for a new understanding with Japan in coöperation with the Russian minister at Tōkyō, who was intrusted with the negotiations with the Japanese government. Although the exchange of views with the Tōkyō cabinet on this subject was of a friendly character, the Japanese social circles and the local and foreign press attempted in every way to produce a warlike ferment among the Japanese and to drive the government into an armed conflict with Russia. Under the influence thereof the Tōkyō cabinet began to formulate greater and greater demands in the negotiations, at the same time taking most extensive measures to make the country ready for war.
"All these circumstances could not, of course, disturb Russia's equanimity, but they induced her also to take military and naval measures. Nevertheless, to preserve peace in the Far East, Russia, so far as her incontestable rights and interests permitted, gave the necessary attention to the demands of the Tōkyō cabinet, and declared herself ready to recognize Japan's privileged commercial and economic position in the Korean peninsula, with the concession of the right to protect it by military force in the event of disturbances in that country. At the same time, while rigorously observing the fundamental principle of her policy regarding Korea, whose independence and integrity were guaranteed by previous understandings with Japan and by treaties with other powers, Russia insisted on three points:
"(1.) On a mutual and unconditional guarantee of this principle.
"(2.) On an undertaking to use no part of Korea for strategic purposes, as the authorization of such action on the part of any foreign power was directly opposed to the principle of the independence of Korea.
"(3.) On the preservation of the full freedom of navigation of the Straits of Korea.
"The project elaborated in this sense did not satisfy the Japanese Government, which in its last proposals not only declined to accept the conditions which appeared as the guarantee of the independence of Korea, but also began at the same time to insist on provisions to be incorporated in a project regarding the question of Manchuria. Such demands on the part of Japan, naturally, were inadmissible, the question of Russia's position in Manchuria concerning in the first place China, but also all the powers having commercial interests in China. The imperial government, therefore, saw absolutely no reason to include in a special treaty with Japan regarding Korean affairs any provisions concerning territory occupied by Russian troops.
"The imperial government, however, did not refuse, so long as the occupation of Manchuria lasts, to recognize both the sovereignty of the Emperor of China in Manchuria and also the rights acquired there by other powers through treaties with China. A declaration to this effect had already been made to the foreign cabinets. In view of this the imperial government, after charging its representatives at Tōkyō to present its reply to the latest proposal of Japan, was justified in expecting the Tōkyō cabinet to take into account the considerations set forth above and that it would appreciate the wish manifested by Russia to come to a peaceful understanding with Japan. Instead of this the Japanese Government, not even awaiting this reply, decided to break off negotiations and to suspend diplomatic relations. The imperial government, while laying on Japan the full responsibility for any consequences of such a course of action, will await the development of events, and the moment it becomes necessary will take the most decisive measures for the protection of its rights and interests in the Far East."
The official statement given by the Japanese foreign office on the night of February 8 reads as follows:
"It being indispensable to the welfare and safety of Japan to maintain the independence and territorial integrity of Korea, and to safeguard her paramount interests therein, the Japanese Government finds it impossible to view with indifference any action endangering the position of Korea, whereas Russia, notwithstanding her solemn treaty with China and her repeated assurances to the powers, not only continues her occupation of Manchuria, but has taken aggressive measures in Korean territory. Should Manchuria be annexed to Russia, the independence of Korea would naturally be impossible. The Japanese Government, therefore, being desirous of securing permanent peace for eastern Asia, by means of direct negotiations with Russia, with the view of arriving at a friendly adjustment of their mutual interests in both Manchuria and Korea, where their interests meet, communicated toward the end of July last such desire to the Russian Government, and invited its adherence. To this the Russian Government expressed a willing assent. Accordingly, on August 12, the Japanese Government proposed to Russia, through its representative at St. Petersburg, the basis of an agreement which was substantially as follows:
"(1.) A mutual agreement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean empires.
"(2.) A mutual engagement to maintain the principles of an equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations with the natives of those countries.
"(3.) A reciprocal recognition of Japan's preponderating interests in Korea, and that Russia has special interests in railway enterprises in Manchuria, and a mutual recognition of the respective rights of Japan and Russia to take measures necessary for the protection of the above-mentioned interests, so far as the principle of article 1 is not infringed.
"(4.) The recognition by Russia of the exclusive rights of Japan to give advice and assistance to Korea in the interests of reform and good government.
"(5.) The engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the eventual extension of the Korean railway into southern Manchuria, so as to connect with the Eastern Chinese [i. e., Manchurian] and the Shan-hai-kwan—Niu-chwang lines.
"It was the intention of the Japanese Government originally that a conference should take place between its representatives at St. Petersburg and the Russian authorities, so as to facilitate progress as much as possible in reaching a solution of the situation, but the Russian Government absolutely refused to do so, on the plea that the Tsar planned a trip abroad; and for other reasons it was unavoidably decided to conduct the negotiations at Tōkyō. It was not until October 3 that the Russian Government presented counter-proposals. She therein declined to engage in respect to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China, and stipulate the maintenance of the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China, and requested that Japan declare Manchuria and its littoral as being entirely outside of her sphere of interest. She further put several restrictions upon Japan's freedom of action in Korea; for instance, while recognizing Japan's right to dispatch troops, when necessary, for the protection of her interests in Korea, Russia refused to allow her to use any portion of Korean territory for strategical purposes; in fact, Russia went so far as to propose to establish a neutral zone in Korean territory north of the thirty-ninth parallel.
"The Japanese Government failed utterly to see why Russia, who professed no intention of absorbing Manchuria, should be disinclined to insert in the convention a clause in complete harmony with her own repeatedly declared principle respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China. Furthermore, this refusal on the part of the Russian Government impressed the Japanese Government all the more with the necessity for the insertion of that clause.
"Japan has important commercial interests in Manchuria, and entertains no small hopes of their future development; and politically she has even greater interests there by reason of Manchuria's relations to Korea, so she could not possibly recognize Manchuria as being entirely outside her sphere of interest. These reasons decided Japan absolutely to reject the Russian proposal.
"Accordingly, the Japanese Government explained the foregoing views to the Russian Government, and at the same time it introduced other necessary amendments in the Russian counter-proposals. They further proposed, with regard to the neutral zone, that if one was to be created it should be established on both sides of the boundary line between Manchuria and Korea, with an equal width, say, of fifty kilometers.
"After repeated discussions at Tōkyō, the Japanese Government finally presented to the Russian Government its definitive amendment on October 30. The Japanese Government then frequently urged the Russian Government to give it an early reply, but this was again delayed, and only delivered on December 11. In that reply Russia suppressed the clauses relating to Manchuria so as to make the proposed convention apply entirely to Korea, and maintained its original demand in regard to the non-employment of Korean territory for strategical purposes, as well as a neutral zone; but the exclusion of Manchuria from the proposed convention being contrary to the original object of the negotiations, which were to remove causes of conflict between the two countries by a friendly arrangement of their interests, both in Manchuria and Korea, the Japanese Government asked the Russian Government to reconsider the question, and again proposed the removal of the restriction regarding the use of Korean territory, and the entire suppression of the neutral zone, on the ground that if Russia was opposed to the establishment of one in Manchuria it should not establish one in Korea.
"The last reply of Russia was received at Tōkyō on January 6. In this reply it is true Russia proposed to agree to insert the following clause in the proposed agreement:
"'The recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as outside her sphere of interest, while Russia, within the limits of that province, would not impede Japan or any other power in the employment of rights or privileges acquired by them under existing treaties with China exclusive of the establishment of a settlement.'
"But this was proposed to be agreed upon only upon conditions maintaining the clauses regarding a neutral zone in Korean territory and the non-employment of Korean territory for strategical purposes, the conditions whereof were impossible for Japan to accept, as had already been fully explained to Russia. It should further be observed that no mention was made at all of the territorial integrity of China in Manchuria, and it must be self-evident to everybody that the engagement now proposed by Russia would be of no practical value so long as it was unaccompanied by a definite stipulation regarding the territorial integrity of China in Manchuria, since treaty rights are only coexisting with sovereignty. Eventually, the absorption of Manchuria by Russia would annul at once those rights and privileges acquired by the powers in Manchuria by virtue of treaties with China."
Both the negotiations and the general diplomatic relations between Japan and Russia were severed by the former power on February 5. With this, diplomacy passed into war.