ANECDOTE OF JOHN H. PEYTON IN A CRIMINAL CASE.
Shortly after his eldest son, William, entered upon the practice of law in 1823, when attending court at the Warm Springs, Bath Co., he mortified his father, John Howe Peyton, exceedingly by a piece of off-hand levity, which the latter regarded as a most undignified proceeding, unworthy of the profession. Young Wm. Peyton was employed to defend a man charged with horse stealing, and as there was only circumstantial evidence to prove his guilt, W. M. Peyton, who was much exhilarated, for it must be remembered that the case came on after dinner, set up the defence that according to the principles of science, and of a new science likely to prove both useful and ornamental, it was impossible his client could be guilty. He then referred to and explained the theories of Gall and Spurzheim, and declared that according to the phrenological bumps on the head of his client, theft was a crime he was incapable of committing. He argued with much gravity and ingenuity in this direction, amidst the suppressed giggling of the bar, to the great chagrin of his father, who was the public prosecutor, and to the thorough mystification of the county court. This body was composed of country gentlemen unacquainted with law, and it was one of their boasts that they made up their decisions, not so much in accordance with the principles of common law, as of common sense. W. M. Peyton went on, and drawing from his desk a copy of Combe's phrenology, illustrated it with plates, exhibited it to the jury, and declared that at the point on the pericranium of his client, where there should be a protuberance if he were capable of robbery, there was not the slightest development, and asked, what is the value of science, if we discard its teachings? He then made an animated and eloquent appeal to the feelings of the jury, based upon the humane principle of the common law, that it is better that ninety-nine guilty men should escape than that one innocent person should suffer, and declaring his conviction of the prisoner's innocence, asked them to give him the benefit of every doubt and lean to the side of mercy.
His father, in reply, commented severely upon the airiness of his son, as inconsistent with the administration of justice and the dignity of the profession. He ridiculed Gall and Spurzheim's far-fetched theories, which he declared were not scientific deductions, but only speculative opinions, and brought the whole defence into contempt, by referring to the human skeleton, saying, "If you run your eye down the spine it alights upon the oscoccygis." Neither the court nor the jury understanding what these words meant, but overcome by the ludicrous manner of Mr. Peyton, both burst into a hearty laugh. "Now," he continued, "this oscoccygis is nothing more nor less than a rudimentary tail, as Lord Monbeddo has well said, and I suppose we shall have some modern philosopher startling the world again with the proposition that man once flourished a tail, but of which the civilized use of a chair has, in process of time, deprived him." He continued, somewhat in this style, "I say nothing against philosophers nor tails, both are useful in their way. What would a cow do without her tail, especially on our fly-pestered prairies, or the Pampas of South America? What would a monkey do without this caudal appendage and its prehensile quality? With him it takes the place of hands. And shall we have philosophers telling us we received our hands when we lost our tails, and that the monkey lost the use of his hands because of his peculiar facility of using a tail? A beautiful science," said he, "is the phrenology, according to the theory of the learned counsel for the prisoner. To all standing in the unenviable position of his client, it will prove, if the learned gentleman be correct, not only a thing of beauty, but a source of comfort and a joy forever. To the murderer, the burglar, the highwayman, to all in fact, who wish to be rid of the responsibility which attaches to their actions, it will become a positive blessing. Not to these only, but to the entire community—it opens a brilliant prospect of life, of life as it should be in this enlightened age, at this advanced period in the progress of the world. Upon the ruins of our present immature civilization it will uprear a charming state of society. Under the vivifying influence of this new system, mankind will be happy, perfectly happy; and until the auspicious day when the new order commences, this 'consummation so devoutly to be wished,' need not be anticipated. Throughout the world, at least so much of it as is illuminated by the light of phrenology, perfect liberty will obtain, and the present generation will wonder at the darkness in which their ancestors groped. Justice will reign supreme, and our statute books will be no longer disgraced by those dreadful laws founded in ignorance, superstition and cruelty, which consigns a helpless and irresponsible man, criminal you call him, to the merciless hands of the executioner. It will be clear as the noon-day sun, that law and liberty cannot co-exist, that they are natural enemies. Along with this knowledge will come a resolution to demolish the whole system of our jurisprudence, to cart off the rubbish and substitute in the place thereof a new, nobler, and higher civilization. Poor weak man will no longer be held accountable for his actions. The infirmities of his nature will become a recognized principle, that men are but men, will be evident to all men. It will be understood that from the foundation of the world it was determined, pre-destined, and fore-ordained that he should act thus and thus, and that, therefore, he cannot be justly rewarded for any action however meritorious, nor punished for any crime, as we term it, how atrocious soever. Men will stand aghast that laws should have existed, and for so many ages, for afflicting a human being for actions, over which it is clear, according to the prisoner's counsel, he had no control—actions, in fact, which they were bound to perform, by an irresistible law of human nature. Then will it be seen that men commit murder, perpetrate rape, and apply the torch because they cannot help it. Gentlemen of the jury; no line of argument would be shorter. I leave you to determine its soundness."
"But to be serious," said Mr. Peyton, who though cheerful in his disposition, had a manner so tempered with gravity as to check the indecent levity, "I must refer, before closing, to the conduct of the prisoner's counsel, and remark that some speakers are more anxious to display their eloquence, than to promote the public good. Now when this is the case, as I must charitably suppose it to be on this occasion, oratory is a useless gift, and such fine speeches as we have had to-day are simply disgusting. When great talents are employed to support a bad cause, perhaps from selfish motives, I trust and believe that this is not the case now, they are objects of universal contempt. Oratory, with all its pleasing charms becomes an instrument of mischief, when used by an unprincipled man as, when resorted to by a good man, its happy influences almost exceed belief. An orator, who thus uses his talents, without reference to his personal interests, if he do not succeed in his efforts, at least enjoys self approbation and that of his God."
In this manner Mr. Peyton threw the defence into ridicule and disrepute. This sound sense and keen sarcasm was too much for Wm. Peyton's after dinner eloquence, and from a brief consultation, the jury returned and delivered a verdict condemning the prisoner to the penitentiary for two years.
The Hon. David Fultz, of Staunton, recently judge of the circuit superior court of Augusta county, who was present on this occasion, told the writer twenty years ago that he had never, during his career at the bar, been so much interested or amused by any trial as this. The disgust of my father at such a defence being set up, the elation of his son at the probable success of his ruse, the bewilderment of the court and jury, both of whom seemed lost in a fog, the suppressed merriment of the audience, which did not comprehend exactly all that was transpiring, but which to some extent entered into the fun, rendered the whole scene inimitable.
mr. peyton's views as to a fiddling lawyer.
"Music," said Mr. P., "is out of place in a court house, I never knew a fiddling lawyer to succeed, especially if nature designed him to play that useful, yet much despised instrument, the 'second fiddle,'—a good enough instrument for a duet, but one on which no successful solo was ever played."
mr. peyton on religious and political topics.
In 1840, Mr. P. and his brother-in-law, Colonel Wm. L. Lewis, met at the home of a mutual friend. In religion Col. L. was a Roman Catholic and in politics a disciple of John C. Calhoun. Discussion arose between them and became so warm on the part of Col. Lewis, that their friends feared they might result in a feud. Not so, however. Mr. P.'s moderation was equal to his vigor, and he soothed his brother's discomfitures by his logical reasoning.
"There is no necessity, William," he would say, "for difference of opinion creating hostility. It must be admitted by all that there is great variety in the tastes, habits and opinions of mankind, and it is necessary that it should be so. That partial discord tends to general harmony is more than poetically true, for, if all men were to set their minds upon living in the same climate, or under the same government; or, if all the people of a country had an unconquerable desire to live in the same town; if all the inhabitants of a town were to have a good opinion of only one physician, or of only one preacher, or lawyer or mechanic, or could only relish one article of food, or fancy only the same dress; or, if all men were to fall in love with the same woman, or all the women with the same man, what would be the consequence? Why from a feeling of seeming agreement, universal discord would result.
"Even the value of truth is best appreciated by the opposition it meets with, and falsehood and error are detected by the discriminating powers of opposite sensations and feelings. That there should not be uniformity upon many important subjects, such as the theory of government, etc., must be the stamp of heaven. For myself, I claim freedom of opinion as an inherent right, provided it does not disturb the established order of society. I fear your nullification views go this length. However, let me proceed: No man has a right to be offended at my opinion, or hold me in contempt for entertaining it, for it does him no injury; and what I claim for myself, common justice requires that I should allow to others; and did we well consider, that this disparity of an over-ruling Intelligence, we surely should not suffer it to be the cause of feelings of animosity to our fellow human beings, though their political or religious opinions should be the opposite of our own—still less such old friends as ourselves. For," continued Mr. Peyton, "unless we had been subjected to the same involuntary impressions and sensations that other persons have been, which is, perhaps, impossible, we can be no judges of the merits of their opinions, or how they have outraged truth and reason, even admitting that they are in error. If it should be contended that truth and reason are immutable, and when two differ upon a fundamental truth, there must be deviation from reason and truth in one of the parties. I would admit it to be so, if the question was susceptible of mathematical demonstration.
"This is rarely the case—were I to meet a man who should contend that two and two do not make four, or that the amount of degrees in three angles of a triangle are not equal to the amount of degrees in two right angles, I must justly charge him with folly or wilful falsehood; but, in whatever does not admit of demonstration, our convictions are our feelings; and our feelings depend more upon involuntary impressions than we are often willing to allow. Certainly truth and reason are the most likely to prevail with cultivated minds, for truth and reason are the most likely to make the right impression, but we are too apt to over-value our own kind of knowledge, while we underrate that of others.
"In point of real utility, the knowledge of the man who is skilled in the breeding and feeding of cattle is more valuable to society than is the knowledge of him who is skilled in mathematics, yet the latter will look down upon the former, when, perhaps, the only advantage he has over him is the being able to convey his knowledge in more correct and perspicuous language; and unless we possessed all kind of knowledge in an equal degree, we are liable to be imposed upon in some things, either by thinking too much upon them, or too much, to the exclusion of other branches of knowledge, the possession of which, though seemingly foreign to the subject, may be necessary to its clear elucidation; for it is by possession of general knowledge only that we can claim a superior title to correctness in every particular. A may be able to solve a difficult problem in mathematics; B can not do this, but B can make a plow upon true mechanical principles which A can not; if C can do both, C must be superior to A or B; but all mankind are in the situation of A or B, as possessing only partial knowledge. We should all, therefore, be indulgent to each other's deficiencies. Still, my superior in general knowledge and learning, may be the dupe of a weak prejudice, without justifying an impeachment of either. I have a brother-in-law," he would look askant at Colonel Lewis when getting off this kind of fillip, "of whose cleverness and general knowledge I have a very high opinion, yet in politics we are quite opposite. We indeed worship different idols, and the only superiority I can pretend to claim over him is, that I can bear for him to adore his idol, even in my presence, and yet keep my temper—a compliment he can not always repay."
"Fudge!" exclaimed the Colonel, jumping to his feet and walking hastily to and fro across the room, "I may warm with the subject, but as to being offended with you it is out of the question. I never have and never will so far forget myself."
"Come, come, be seated," Mr. Peyton would rejoin, giving him a friendly tap on the shoulder. "Let me proceed. Of course you will not think I wish to depreciate the value of truth and reason, I only wish to urge that the seeming want of them in others may be deceptions, and should not be the cause of contempt, acrimony or ridicule. All are enamoured with even the shadow of truth, and should see the substance, if in their power, but placed in a variety of lights and shades, some can only see the shadow, and mistake it for the substance." Thus their fraternal discussions proceeded and terminated in the discomfiture of Col. Lewis, who though a clever man, an eloquent talker, full of confidence, and abundance of zeal, was no such logician as Mr. Peyton, and left not the slightest pain rankling in his bosom.
"Now, William," said Mr. Peyton, "I cannot flatter myself that I shall convince you of any errors, which, in my opinion, you have been guilty of in this respect. That is no reason, however, why I should not attempt to make you entertain a disbelief of all foolish impossibilities. For example, there is the fallacious science of astrology—it has been the game of a few designers in all ages, for sordid interest, to have duped others and been duped themselves. In ancient times they were, in Alexandria, compelled to pay a certain tax, which was called the 'Fool's Tax,' because it was raised on the gain that these impostors made from the foolish credulity of those who believed in their powers of soothsaying. Well may believers in this science be called 'fools,' when they do not seem to consider that if the principles of judiciary astrology were correct, and its rules certain, the hands of the Almighty would be tied, and ours would be tied also. All our actions, all our most secret thoughts, all our slightest movements: would be engraven in the heavens in ineffaceable characters, and liberty of conduct would be entirely taken away from us. We should be necessitated to evil as to good, since we should do absolutely what was written in the conjectured register of the stars, otherwise there would be falsehood in the book, and uncertainty in the science of the astrologer. How we should laugh at a man who thought of settling a serious matter of business by a throw of the dice. Yet the decision of astrology is just as uncertain. Our fate depends upon places, persons, times, circumstances, our own will; not upon the fantastical conjunctions inspired by charlatans.
"Suppose two men are born on our planet, at the same hour and on the same spot. One becomes a hewer of wood and a drawer of water, and the other an emperor, or a commander-in-chief of an army. Ask an astrologer the cause of the difference. In all probability he will reply, 'It was so willed by Jupiter.'
"Pray what is this Jupiter? Why it is a planet, a body without cognizance, that acts only by its influence. How comes it then that Jupiter's influence acts at the same moment and in the same climate in so different a manner? How can that influence differ in its power? How can it take place at all? How can it penetrate the vast extent of space? An atom—the most minute molecule of matter would stop it, or turn it from its course, or diminish its power. Are the stars always exercising an influence, or do they exercise it only on certain occasions? If they exercise an influence only periodically, when the particles which, it is intended, are detached from them, are moving to our sphere, the astrologer must know the precise time of their arrival in order to decide rightly upon their effect. If on the other hand, the influences are perpetual, with what wonderful speed they must rush through the vast extent of space! How marvelous too must be the alliance they form with those vivacious passions which originate the principal actions of our lives! For if the stars regulate all our feelings and all our proceedings, their influence must work with the same rapidity as our wills, since it is by them our will is determined."
his religious belief.
Mr. Peyton was a firm believer in the doctrines of Christianity, and the experience of his life was that true happiness is only found in the observance of her precepts. He held that man must have some religion and the most perfect was that handed by Christ to his Apostles. He did not attach great importance to sects, and when asked whether he was a Catholic, Presbyterian or Episcopalian, answered that he did not find such words in the Testament—he was merely a Christian; he believed in what was revealed to us in the Bible and submitted himself with humility to the Almighty power. He was brought up in the Episcopalian church and died a member of it.
mr. peyton's originality and power of illustration.
"I recall a conversation," says one of Mr. P.'s biographers, "just after a protracted term of the Augusta Circuit Court, in which the late Judge Lucas P. Thompson and Gen. B. G. Baldwin bore the leading parts. Gen. B. was paying generous tribute to Mr. Peyton's force and originality. Judge Thompson remarked in substance, that he had never seen Mr. Peyton go through a cause deeply interesting and moving him, in which he did not utter some view or sentiment illuminated by genius, or at the least, some illustration marked by a bold originality; and he instanced two causes, tried at the last term—one a civil suit and a very heavy will case, in which he made a novel and scorching application of a familiar fable of Æsop. I forbear to give its details, because both the critic and his subject have passed from earth.
"In the same cause three signatures were to be identified and proved—that of the testator and also of the attending witnesses—all three having died since their attestation. Many witnesses were called to prove the genuineness of the three names. Opposing counsel sought to badger the witnesses by urging them to specify what peculiar marks there were in the handwriting and signatures, whereby they could speak so positively as to their identity and genuineness. This of course for the most part they could not do, and in the argument of the cause before the jury the same counsel strove to throw discredit and contempt upon those witnesses (all men of good character) for their failure and inability so to describe the quality and peculiar marks in the calligraphy of the signers as to show they were familiar with their handwriting. In his reply to those sallies of his opponents, Mr. Peyton swept away the whole airy fabric by a single happy illustration:
"'Gentlemen,' he said, 'You have often been assembled in crowds on some public or festive occasion. Your hats have been thrown pell-mell in a mass with perhaps a hundred other hats, all having a general resemblance. Suppose you had attempted to describe your hat to a friend or servant, so that he might go and pick it out for you. It has as many points for accurate description as a written signature—its color, height of crown, width of brim, its band, lining, &c. Do you think that friend or servant could by any possibility have picked out your hat for you? And yet when you went yourself, the moment your eye would light upon it, you instantly recognize it amongst a hundred. Familiarity with it has stamped its picture on your mind and the moment you see it, the hat fills and fits the picture on your mind as perfectly as the same hat fits your head.'
"The jury were evidently won, and gave full credence to the ridiculed witnesses.
"The other instance during the same term (cited by Judge Thompson) occurred in the celebrated prosecution of Naaman Roberts for forgery—in forging the name of Col. Adam Dickinson to a bond for six hundred dollars.
"The body of the bond was confessedly the handwriting of the prisoner at the bar. That was admitted. The signature was a tolerably successful attempt at imitating the peculiar handwriting of Adam Dickinson. But no expert could look at the whole paper and fail to see a general resemblance between the body of the instrument and the signature, raising a strong conviction in the mind that both proceeded from the same hand.
"The defense strongly insisted upon excluding the body of the instrument from the view of the witness, by covering it with paper, or turning it down, and so confining the view to the signature only—upon the familiar doctrine of the law of evidence forbidding a comparison of various handwritings of the party, as a ground for an opinion upon the identity of genuineness of the disputed writing. And this point was ably and elaborately argued by the prisoner's counsel.
"The learned prosecutor met it thus:
"'Gentlemen this is one entire instrument, not two or more brought into comparison. Let me ask each one of you, when you meet your friend, or when you meet a stranger, in seeking to identify him, what do you look at? Not his nose, though that is the most prominent feature of the human face; not at his mouth, his chin, his cheek; no, you look him straight in the eye, so aptly called the "window of the soul." You look him in the eye, but at the same time you see his whole face. Now put a mask on that face, leaving only the eyes visible, as the learned counsel would have you mask the face of this bond, leaving to your view only the fatal signature.
"'If the human face so masked was the face of your bosom friend, could you for a moment identify him, even though permitted to look in at those "windows of the soul?" No; he would be as strange to you as this accursed bond has ever been strange to that worthy gentleman, Colonel Adam Dickinson, but a glance at whose face traces the guilty authorship direct to the prisoner at the bar.'
"This striking illustration seemed to thrill the whole audience as it virtually carried the jury."