NOTES ON EXPERIENCE GAINED AT THE FRONT
By General Sir O’Moore Creagh, V.C.
1. The experience gained at the front in the present campaign may be divided broadly under two heads: Firstly, the test under war conditions of the general principles upon which the British Army has been trained in peace. Secondly, knowledge concerning the tactics of the enemy and his method of employing various arms. With regard to the former of these two heads of information, it is important to note that the broad principles upon which the training of the British Army has been based are described by a General Officer as being sound, and that the need of paying strict attention to them in carrying out training is emphasized by him. On the other hand, valuable experience has been gained as to the best method of applying these general principles to the peculiar conditions which have so far prevailed in the present campaign, including the tactics adopted by the enemy. Information based on this experience, more especially so far as it concerns the employment of musketry in attack and defence, is included in these notes, as it may prove useful to officers in training their commands.
2. These notes, therefore, do not affect the general principles of training laid down in this book. They merely deal with the application of these principles to the peculiar conditions which have so far obtained in the course of the campaign. These conditions may at any time give place to others, for it must be remembered that in no two military operations is the situation exactly the same. Instructors, therefore, must avoid the mistake of training their men for any particular given conditions of warfare, and remember that general principles and broad rules alone are applicable to the leading of troops in war (Infantry Training, 1914).
3. German Musketry.[2]—(i) The Germans consider it unnecessary to teach men to fire at distances beyond 400 metres. Their plan of infantry attack (see diagram, p. ix) is devised to get within this range without opening fire. Accordingly, judging distance is practised by officers only, and no attention is devoted to the indication of targets, concentration of fire, or to fire direction and control generally, as practised in the British Army. To concentrate the fire of a platoon or company on one spot at 1,000 yards range was considered by Germans to be a waste of ammunition. Their training seems to have been limited to independent firing by battalions on large areas of ground.
(ii) Only some of their men were practised in rapid firing, which averaged eight or nine rounds a minute, as against the fifteen well-aimed shots a minute which British troops are trained to deliver in rapid firing. In this respect it may be mentioned that the straight bolt of the German rifle is not so easy to work as the bolt of the British rifle, nor is its clip so easy to put in. When put to the test of war, the musketry of the German infantry is characterized by British officers as poor and “lamentable.”
4. British Musketry.—On the other hand, the German officer referred to in the footnote below described British musketry under the test of war as “marvellous,” and, in doing so, expressed the views generally held in the German Army as the result of experience. He states that the Germans had counted on being able to rush the British troops by weight of numbers by the plan of attack described in the next paragraph; but they found themselves unable to do so because the British rifle fire was “so straight and so quick.” He added that “they had never had a chance against the British,” because, although they reckoned on their third line with their machine-guns being able to get within 400 yards of the enemy, they had never been able to do this over open ground against the British, because their first line was down too soon—sometimes at 800 to 1,000 yards. Again, on the Aisne, this German officer’s machine-gun battery came under the concentrated fire of British infantry at 1,000 yards, and though his men suffered heavily from it, they were unable to reply to the British, as they were unable to see them.
5. A German Plan of Infantry Attack.—(i) The diagram on page ix gives a rough idea of a German plan of infantry attack in close formations, as explained by a German officer. The first line is looked on as cover from bullets for the second and third lines, to enable these two lines to get close to the enemy with the minimum of loss. The Germans considered massed formations to be the only way to get up close to the enemy. Both ranks of each line in these formations are close together. When their third line is stopped, they have standing orders to dig in at once, and for this purpose the third line carries shovels and small picks. It has already been explained that, owing to the tremendous effect of British musketry fire, this German plan of attack has repeatedly failed after very heavy loss has been incurred.
(ii) As regards fire effect, the Germans had considered the machine-gun to be the most valuable method of discharging bullets, and an enormous amount of time, trouble, and ammunition has been expended on machine-gun training, as well as upon their artillery, upon which they relied largely in their plan of attack. Notes referring to German machine-guns will be found in Machine-Gun Training of this series.
6. German Night Attacks.—(i) The enemy’s night attacks are made without scouts or advanced parties, and the advance is made with great rapidity. Infantry in trenches must always be ready to open a burst of rapid fire at a few seconds’ notice; so long as this can be done, there will be no chance of a trench being rushed. Supports should be in the cover-trenches, and, when the firing-line is attacked, should not fire, but rely on the bayonet.
Diagram showing a German Plan of Infantry Attack in Close Formations.
(ii) The Germans usually attack about 3 p.m. (winter) or at dusk, and then entrench during the night within 200 yards of our lines. They also take advantage of fog in the early morning. They make a little progress in this way, but it is slow work, and they have lost enormously, as already stated. They shoot badly with the rifle, and the effect of their fire is chiefly obtained by artillery and machine-guns.
7. Flares to illuminate Foreground at Night.—(i) No fixed apparatus can be set in the field for the reliable lighting of foreground at night which will survive a prolonged bombardment and bad weather, or admit of renewal or attention in the close presence of the enemy. This does not apply to electric searchlights employed in carefully chosen and protected sites in connection with harbour and fortress defences, nor to flares or bonfires set for the purpose of providing a single illumination for a given purpose, such as a signal or landmark.
(ii) For the temporary illumination of foreground during an engagement with the enemy, the best method is to employ hand and rifle “illumination grenades,” which ignite on impact with the ground upon the same principle as in the detonation of the explosive or fighting grenades. By this means temporary illumination can be concentrated at the exact points at which it is most required. In siege warfare or trench fighting at close quarters there is special use for a combined incendiary and illumination bomb or grenade fired from a trench mortar. These bombs would be charged with inflammable material and liquid, such as cotton waste in petrol, together with a small charge of explosive, which would ignite and scatter the contents freely upon impact.
8. British Infantry Formations in Attack—(i) Advance under Rifle or Machine-Gun Fire.—Small columns in what are known as “artillery formations” should never be adhered to when there is a possibility of their coming under close or medium range fire of infantry or machine-guns. Troops have suffered severely from insufficient extension, and the adoption of rigid lines, and also from pushing forward in close formations without taking the proper military precautions. Loose elastic formations adapted to the ground, with men at eight or ten paces interval, are the least vulnerable.
(ii) Advance under Artillery Fire.—Several times it has been necessary to advance under unsubdued artillery fire. Small columns at 50 yards’ interval and 300 yards’ distance have been found to be the best method of avoiding casualties. The 19th Brigade lying in the open in this formation were shelled by two batteries for half an hour, and had only twenty-five casualties.
9. Cover and Fields of Fire.—(i) Owing to the effect of German artillery fire, cover from view has become more important than field of fire. It is better to have a field of fire of 100 yards and to be invisible than to have one of 600 yards and be an easy target for artillery. Owing to the enemy’s artillery fire by day, digging is nearly always done at night, and this requires much practice. Some sort of rough cover from shrapnel and head cover is made if time allows, and also if it can be made without making the trench conspicuous.
(ii) Defensive Positions and Sites of Trenches.—Whenever possible, trenches should be sited so that they are not under artillery observation. This point is regarded as of great importance, and an extensive field of fire is a secondary consideration. Trenches should therefore be sited having regard to possible observation stations on ground occupied by the enemy, and not solely with regard to the possible artillery positions of the enemy. In open country it is better to select a “back position,” behind the crest of a hill, with a field of fire of 300 or 400 yards. This compels the enemy to expose his infantry to rifle and shrapnel fire, and affords his artillery little opportunity of observation. Such positions were held on the Aisne, with slight loss to our troops and heavy loss to the enemy. A field of fire of 100 yards is regarded as satisfactory if it cannot be increased without loss of concealment from artillery observation.
10. Care of Rifles.—(i) The following directions are issued with regard to the care of rifles on service. New rifles are inclined to work somewhat stiffly at first, owing to slight roughness of the bearing surfaces of the bolt and bolt-way. This can be appreciably lessened by frequent and systematic manipulation of the bolt, the bearing surfaces being well oiled. Primary extraction—the first loosening of the fired cartridge in the chamber—can be improved by placing a fired case in the chamber, and working the bolt-lever up and down without drawing back the bolt.
(ii) Rifles must be kept clean and well oiled, and it has been found necessary to make an inspection daily or even oftener. Particular care must be taken to see that the chamber is scrupulously clean. If it is permitted to become dirty, great difficulty in extraction is likely to be experienced. It has also been found that cartridges get rusted into their clips, and that they should be moved at least weekly. Magazine springs may also become weak, if the magazine is continually kept loaded with ten instead of five rounds.
11. Conclusion.—(i) Up to the present the tactics of the enemy and the conditions of warfare of the campaign on the Continent have resulted as a rule in giving the infantryman fairly short fields of fire and more or less visible targets. This has accentuated the value of rapid, accurate fire within close range, to which particular attention should be paid in training men. On the other hand, when opportunity has afforded, the value of fire direction and control has been demonstrated by the effect of British rifle fire beyond close range.
(ii) The principles of training laid down in the Musketry Regulations and in this book as a whole should, therefore, be adhered to and carried out systematically. Above all, the sound principles that troops should be trained to make the best possible use of their weapons, not only at one but at all ranges of the battlefield, and that they should be trained to adapt their instruction to a variety of conditions, and not to any given conditions, should be observed faithfully. The correct application of general principles to the ever-varying circumstances of warfare should be the object of any sound system of military training.
(iii) The following subjects of training may be mentioned as being especially important in relation to the present campaign:
1. Rapid fire.
2. Entrenching, especially in the dark.
3. Cover from view of artillery for the trenches.
4. Bringing enfilade fire to bear on enemy’s trenches whenever possible.
5. Skilful use of machine-guns. Infantry must be careful when advancing that an enemy’s machine-gun is not hidden on the flank ready to open enfilade fire. Some regiments have lost very heavily from being caught in this way.
O’M. CREAGH.
London, 1915.