GENERAL ASPECTS OF CONTROL

Such is the nature of the nitrogen resources. The resource situation as a whole is represented graphically in [Figure 15]. None other can compare with it for inclusiveness. Its sources are animal, vegetable, mineral, and atmospheric, which is to say, universal; and out of this unparalleled diversity has grown an industrial development as complex as it is diversified, and, incidentally, in view of its bearing on food and munitions supply, as important as it is complex. The situation at best can be but imperfectly grasped, for it has been but inadequately studied. In transgressing all set rules of resource occurrence, it transgresses the limits set for organized investigation. Geologists have studied one phase of the situation, electrochemists another, sanitation experts another, and so on; and the various commercial interests involved have seen to the giving of publicity where publicity would do the most good.

Table 66.—Statistics of Nitrogen Production

YearOrganic nitrogenChemical nitrogen
Dried blood; tankage; guano; fish scrap; cotton seed cake and meal; etc.Sodium nitrateFixation compoundsBy-product ammonium sulphate
World’s
production,
tons		Domestic
production,
tons		Imports,
tons		World’s productionDomestic
production,
tons		Imports,
tons		World’s
production,
tons		Domestic
production,
tons		Imports,
tons
Ammon.
sulph.
(Haber),
tons		Calcium
nitrate
(Arc),
tons		Cyanamid,
tons
1900Data for organic nitrogen indefinite,but probably about equal to the total for chemical nitrogen.........................  540,000   27,600    8,411
19011,328,664...  203,960...............  580,000   29,279   14,486
19021,349,300...  205,245...............  600,000   36,124   18,146
19031,485,279...  272,947...............  640,000   41,873   16,777
19041,559,091...  228,012...............  650,000   54,664   16,667
19051,754,605...  321,231...............  694,575   65,296   15,288
19061,800,500...  372,222......      386......  778,365   75,000    9,182
19071,846,036...  364,610......    1,874......  906,255   99,300   30,114
19081,970,974...  310,713......    2,767......  970,200   83,400   38,238
19092,110,961...  428,429...   45,450   12,734......  987,840  106,500   42,914
19102,465,415...  529,172......   22,596...      7641,104,705  116,000   92,342
19112,521,023...  544,878......   59,479...    5,6171,206,135  127,000   94,633
19122,585,850...  486,352......  115,688...    7,1341,356,075  165,000   59,542
19132,772,254...  625,862   20,000  181,800  173,026...   14,6561,532,475  195,000   65,775
19142,463,356...  541,715   60,000...  208,070...   29,5361,320,000  183,000   75,010
19151,755,291...  772,190  150,000...  845,388...   20,5641,690,000  249,000   36,370
19162,912,893...1,218,423  300,000...1,053,439...   38,0232,000,000  285,000   12,962
19172,950,000...1,555,839  500,000  300,000  954,765...   44,146...  325,000
19182,900,000...1,845,192............   43,070

Fig. 15.—Nitrogen sources and their cycles of utilization.

Fig. 16.—Wartime developments in the production of nitrogen. Figures are thousands of tons.

But an investigation working on the basis of geology alone can not cope with the situation; neither can one on the basis of technology alone; nor one on the basis of organic chemistry, or bacteriology alone; nor yet one prepared to employ any or all of these means, but only with a view to some special end. Nor yet again does the discordant grinding of many axes make a noise from which it is possible to gather an adequate comprehension. The nitrogen situation has been inadequately treated because it has been inadequately studied. It has been studied piecemeal, always through the medium of limited means or with some special end in view. It is not a series of technical problems in geology, in bacteriology, in fixation, in munitions supply, and the like. It has to do with a composite economic structure, building for the dependence of society in peace and war alike. Until treated as such, the needs of the situation are bound to be inadequately met and its control a matter of perilous uncertainty. The present discussion makes no pretense of supplying this deficiency or of doing much of anything more than to show the extent to which it exists.

[Figure 15] is designed to show not so much the scope of the resources as their composite functioning in the system of nitrogen supply. The influence of geography in the control of resources so universally available is bound to be subordinate. True, it enables Chile to exercise monopolistic control over the mineral nitrate supply, but it leaves the way open for the development of others; and while acknowledging the fullness of our dependence, as shown in [Figures 16] to [18] and [Table 66], we must not lose sight of the fact that it is so not of necessity, but because we have been content to leave it so rather than undertake to develop supplies of our own. So, too, with political control; what is gained in one direction is, potentially at least, offset by the possibilities opening up in others. Control of the sea gives a control over the mineral nitrate supply as absolute as that in Chile’s territorial monopoly. Yet in the recent great war, Germany, with her shipping obliterated at the outset, was not made to suffer materially from a nitrogen shortage. Britain’s supremacy of the sea went for naught. In the years before the war the force due in season to exercise control over the nitrate supply served only to stimulate the development of domestic potentialities, with the result that when the test came Germany’s proved actually to be the more advantageous equipment.

So it goes. Control over the nitrogen resources themselves is impossible. They are too universally available. Their only susceptibility to control is in the shaping of their development. This is too important a matter to be disregarded with impunity and left to develop without guidance. The modern nation that does so courts the irrepressible disaster of a nation at war but bereft of the means not only of waging war but of maintaining a food supply as well. From [Figure 16] may be gathered the quality of attention given the matter of domestic supply by the different nations immediately before and during the war. Germany, it will be observed, heeded the call to give the matter special attention well before the war and had an independent system of supply developed in readiness, drawing upon the atmosphere and coal-product nitrogen with the results already chronicled. Great Britain did not ignore the importance of nitrogen, but placed reliance on her supremacy of the sea and paid little or no attention to shaping the course of developments. Nor did its importance go unheeded elsewhere abroad, and the foothold gained for fixation in France, Italy, Austria, Russia, and Japan was, it is safe to say, not wholly automatic. The United States alone among the great nations up to the outbreak of hostilities in Europe in 1914 neglected to take any special precautions whatever.

Fig. 17.—Nitrogen developments in the United States. 1. Wartime expansion for munitions manufacture. 2. Field of competitive opportunity for Chilean nitrate, air nitrate fixation, improved coal-fuel practice, shale-oil ammonia, bacterial fixation, improved sanitation, etc. 3. Field of opportunity reserved to coke-oven recovery. 4. Developments indicated for coke-oven recovery.

Fig. 18.—Nitrogen developments for the world, 1900-1918.

The war, when it came, far exceeded all expectations as to magnitude, and so in consequence did the demand for specially developed nitrogen supplies. To meet the emergency, some could be deflected from agricultural channels, but nothing like what was required, for food was just as important as munitions. The organic sources offered no help. Rather they were a hindrance; for organic nitrogen, broadly speaking, comes as a by-product of sanitation, and as such develops as the outgrowth of civilization’s refinements. There was a measurable response from the carboniferous sources, but these could not be made to meet the emergency, for, being of by-product order, the supply is determined not in response to the demand for nitrogen but for the major products. Dependence on the native mineral source in Chile was out of the question, or at least precarious for any country except Great Britain. Accordingly, of the four great sources it remained for atmospheric nitrogen to meet the emergency. Thus, the war in bringing the nitrogen situation emphatically to the fore, communicated practically the whole weight of its tremendous impetus to development in the one direction of fixation. The result is shown in [Figure 18].

Roused by the nightmare of war in 1914, even the United States awoke to the perils if not to the real needs of the domestic situation. It is a striking and highly significant fact that despite the fundamental importance of nitrogen, the awakening found us absolutely without any formulated program of action, even military or agricultural, let alone anything of comprehensive economic scope. A hysterical effort at improvising a program ensued. We were not yet in the war, and public interest was just roused to the gullible stage. The opportunity for private pickings from public favors was too promising to go by the board. The only prospect opening up lay in the direction of fixation developments, and fixation in the hands of the promoter is one of the most appealing propositions imaginable. Its major requirements are nitrogen and power. With the former inexhaustibly present in the air and the latter inexhaustibly available in the wasting waterpowers of the country, nothing it would seem, could offer greater promise. Add to this the reflection that cheap nitrogen means cheap fertilizer, and cheap fertilizer means lowered cost of foodstuffs, and the proposition broadcasted over the country is complete. Out of the confusion of interests, public, political, and private, a program was finally evolved, following our entry into the war, calling for the erection of a series of fixation plants with an aggregate producing capacity of around 85,000 tons of fixed nitrogen annually. For the present is must suffice to say that the war ended before any of these had reached the producing stage, and the United States, like Great Britain, depended on imports.

The charts comprising [Figure 16] show the influence of the war in the development of nitrogen distributively among the countries concerned. The Scandinavian developments, while actuated from wholly commercial motives, were so largely influenced by the politically stimulated market that they may well enough be included in that general class of politically controlled developments. The same is true for the neutral countries in general. [Figure 18], based on the best information obtainable, is designed to bring out the collective influence of the war in contributing to the world’s supply. Organic nitrogen is disregarded both because it involves too many uncertainties and because the wartime emphasis was all in the direction of chemical nitrogen. This figure takes into consideration only the actual production and leaves out what was in process of construction when the war ended. Accordingly, while in one respect it overrates the effect of the war by including strictly commercial operations that very possibly might have transpired anyway, in another it underrates the situation by disregarding developments like those in this country. The best that can be done is to consider these as balancing each other, which, all things considered, is probably fair enough for all practical purposes. Taken on this basis, the net effect of the war, it will be observed, was to swell the production of fixed nitrogen some 40 or 50 per cent. above the figures indicated for the normal rate of expansion.

Thus the wartime shortage was made up; but all this is history. Now that the war is over, the question arises as to whether the world is due to face the situation in reverse. In making ready for war, and finally in meeting its demands, has the world been building up a 50 per cent. over-production beyond the needs of peace? Offhand, the answer would seem to be in the affirmative, but the question is not one that can be answered offhand. Agriculture is capable of absorbing an indefinite amount of nitrogen, and the war has wrought a lasting change in the agricultural situation. The changed agricultural conditions make room for much, perhaps for all, of the increment to nitrogen production. The development cannot be sustained, however, on its present arbitrary preferential basis of political expediency. Least of all can it be sustained on that basis in this country. Normally, we do not and can not be made to think in terms of war. The reason is evident enough, and its recurrent force is already apparent. Distasteful as the fact may be in some of its extremes of application, the only rational procedure is to accept it and fashion our measures of economic preparedness so that the normal activities of peace will keep our economic forces exercised and in trim for the test of war. It was recognized all along before the war that without an assured source of nitrogen supply, our system of defense was hollow; but we succeeded in building up no means of supply in direct response to political needs. We managed to get comfortably started during the war, but it remains to be seen to what extent this artificially nourished development is fitted to withstand the bitter strife of competition ahead.