WHAT CONTROL MEANS IN THE UNITED STATES
In years of good business before the World War, the United States used an equivalent of 3,000 to 4,000 short tons of concentrates, carrying 60 per cent. WO3 per annum. When the war began there was a lull while the attacked countries caught their breath and prepared for a long struggle. After plans had been made, and the manufacture of munitions had begun on a grand scale, the demand for tungsten rose enormously. All kinds of ores were taken at fabulous prices. Ores carrying tin, phosphorus, sulphur and bismuth, that before would not have been considered by steel makers, were taken with avidity, and there was a great scramble for deposits. In October, 1918, the United States was using tungsten ores at the rate of 20,000 tons per annum. Meanwhile prospecting had uncovered so many new deposits and they were so actively exploited that great stocks of ores were accumulated in the Entente countries. On the other hand, in this country many of the known deposits showed signs of impoverishment, a number after being worked profitably for a short time became wholly inoperative, and it is likely that some of the deposits that have seemed to be the richest will never again produce largely. Among the new discoveries were the contact metamorphic deposits of the Great Basin, in California, Nevada and northeastern Utah. They were partly developed, and several promise well, but the irregularity of contact metamorphic ore deposits is notorious.
In 1916 with prices ranging from $15 to $93.50 per unit, the United States produced 5,969 tons of concentrates; in 1917 while still under the impetus of the 1916 boom, with prices ranging around $25 per unit, 6,144 tons; and in 1918, with prices still averaging about $25 per unit, 5,041 tons, although little was produced in December. Under a price of $17 per unit, which tariff advocates think can be reached by means of a tariff of $10 per unit, it seems improbable that the United States can depend on a production of more than 3,000 tons per annum for the next three years. There are, of course, possibilities of a larger production and there are equal possibilities of a smaller. Should another great war take place, an event that is not beyond the range of imagination, the United States would probably begin by using tungsten at the rate of 20,000 tons of concentrates per annum. Unless the price were even more extravagant than the highest price in 1916, $93.50 per unit, the United States could not produce half of its needed concentrates, and the time required to reach even that output would be far too long for safety. Of course, such a production would be much better than none, but the United States should, for safety, have within reach at least a year’s supply.
The Pacific, around the borders of which are the largest tungsten deposits, is by many looked upon as the next large theatre of war, and however vitally they were needed, the obtaining of supplies of tungsten ores might become impossible though the blocking of trade routes. It would, therefore, seem vastly better that, instead of putting a premium on the quick depletion of our own supplies, which are already too meager, we should use the rich low-priced ores now being mined in the Orient. These cheap ores we may have in trade for the asking, and it would be one of the best forms of national life insurance for the government to store 10,000 tons of these ores while they may be had.
The argument is often made that by putting a high tariff on tungsten ores we would have our own deposits so developed that quick production could be made when needed; also that with the need we would find more ores. Both arguments are specious. What is meant is not development but removal. No one will open a tungsten mine to let the ores stand against the country’s day of need. The finding of new ores is a probability, but the quantity is wholly a question. Few tungsten mines of the United States can be profitably worked at the present price of about $7 per unit, and the mines are now closed. The number of persons dependent on the mining of American tungsten ores is small, probably less than 900 in peace times. At present most tungsten miners have already obtained other employment, and practically all could obtain employment fully as profitably in other mines, many of which are short handed, so that no great hardship would be worked. As a matter of national economy, the United States can not afford to throw away its chance to buy cheap tungsten ores while they are available. Aside from the question of insurance and even of existence during another war, not to buy South American ores is to throw away South American trade. In a degree this is also true of Chinese and Japanese ores.
The metallurgy of tungsten, like that of other metals, is being improved constantly, and should our ores remain in the ground for a time they will be of greater absolute value when mined, for there will be less waste in conversion. If our ores are mined now under an artificially high price, we will always pay a high price for tungsten ores, for when ours are used the ores in other countries will have diminished in quantity and increased in cost; prices would be higher and we would have to buy at the advanced rate. On the other hand, by holding our markets open to cheap ores from any quarter, we will stand on an equal footing with other countries and will always have a reserve of high-priced ores available in an emergency.
There is but one crop of ore. Deliberately to turn over all the cheap tungsten ores of the world to our competitors, allowing them this advantage in making high-speed steels with which to compete in foreign trade with our steels and with all products on and in which they are used; to put a premium on the early depletion of our own deposits of this indispensable metal; and to compel our use always of high-priced ores—these would be economic crimes.