FOOTNOTES:
[3] See “From Boer to Boer and Englishman,” by Paul M. Botha. London: Hugh Rees, 1901.
[4] See Macmillan’s Magazine, May 1900.
[5] This is published in full in the Weekly Times of December 1, 1899, and is fully referred to in Wilmot’s “History of Our Own Times in South Africa.” See also “The Truth about the Transvaal” and various other publications.
[6] See Daily News of May 10, 1900.
[7] Reported in the Times of May 24, 1900.
[8] Paper read at the Cradock Farmers’ Association in October 1893.
[9] This was Mr. Norton. See the dramatic manner in which this is referred to in the second volume of “The Life of Sir Harry Smith.”
RHODESIA
SOME PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS
By E. F. KNIGHT
Author of “Where Three Empires Meet”; “The Cruise of the ‘Falcon,’” &c.
In all the long romantic story of the making of the British Empire, no episode more strongly appeals to the imagination than the foundation of Rhodesia. Well is it named Rhodesia; for the history of Great Britain’s acquisitions on either side of the Zambesi, the 750,000 square miles of magnificent territories which lie under the sway of the British South Africa Company, is the history of the Englishman, Cecil John Rhodes: had it not been for whose foresight, statesmanship, untiring vigilance, determined but patient endeavour for years towards the accomplishment of his mighty schemes, the South African Plateau, with its gold-bearing reefs, its vast tracts of rich arable and pastoral lands, would have fallen into the hands of one or other of the foreign Powers which keenly contested with him its possession.
It is a trite saying that when the time is ripe for great doings on the part of a nation the necessary man invariably appears. It is a saying hardly warranted by fact, for many a golden opportunity have nations, Great Britain as often as others, lost because the right man was not forthcoming. Happily it has not been so in South Africa. It is almost certain that, had it not been for the accident of Mr. Rhodes seeking the South African shores for his health when a lad, the Germans and the Boers would have cut off the Cape Colony from all possibility of expansion to the north. Those Powers had even found their right men. The Transvaal had her stubborn Kruger; Germany had her shrewd and energetic agents and explorers preparing the way to annexation in different portions of the Dark Continent; while even Portugal had her D’Andrade, a man who displayed much of the spirit and enterprise of the Portuguese discoverers and conquerors of olden days. Cecil Rhodes took his place in South African affairs but just in time. The Transvaal War had been followed by a period of extraordinary apathy both in England and in the Cape Colony. No one seemed to care in the least what became of the territory lying beyond our then limits. At home men were sick of the very name of South Africa. Many would have gladly abandoned all our possessions about the Cape of Storms, and abdicated an Empire which seemed to bring us nothing but futile wars, disaster, and disgrace. It was at this critical period that Mr. Rhodes came to the front to save our supremacy in South Africa—too late, indeed, to save for us much that should have been ours; too late, for example, to secure our sovereignty over Namaqualand and Damaraland, territories which had been long recognised as being within Britain’s sphere of influence, which formerly had been annexed to the Cape, but which latterly had been totally neglected both by the Imperial and Cape Governments, so that the watchful Germans were left at liberty, first to establish their trading missions, and finally to assert their sovereignty over those extensive regions.
Five-Mile Spruit on Melsetter Road, Rhodesia
The richness and beauty of the highlands, extending over an immense area both north and south of the Zambesi, had for many years been known to both English and Boer travellers. Mr. Rhodes, in his early days at Kimberley, met many an adventurous wanderer who had come from that wonderful region, and their glowing tales perhaps first inspired in him that ambitious dream of the creation of a great new British colony that should include all the finest country in South and Central Africa. As far back as 1882, having commenced to take an active part in Cape politics, Mr. Rhodes took the initial steps towards the attainment of the one absorbing purpose of his life.
A HUNTER’S WAGGON, RHODESIA
Photo by Wilson, Aberdeen
Of fascinating interest is the story—a story for the most part yet untold to the world—of Cecil Rhodes’ long struggle with the Boers and Portuguese who attempted to keep the Empire-builder out of the Promised Land, and of his frequent forestallings of further German expansion at our expense. The first, the most critical and anxious period of all, was occupied with the contest for the very gate of the country, the right-of-way to the north, which we were so nearly losing, and without which our advance would have been hopelessly barred. The only outlet to the north from the Cape Colony lay through Bechuanaland, a vast region that was divided into several independent native kingdoms, and hemmed in between the Germans, then advancing from the west, and the Transvaal Boers on the east. This gateway to the north has been likened to the neck of a bottle; the narrow neck which, once passed, opens out into the broad and precious Zambesia. Kruger, clever and obstinate, commenced his career of attempted expansion by seizing this neck with the intention of thus cutting us off completely from the north. It was his ambition to extend the Boer rule westward to the German line, eastward to Delagoa Bay and the Indian Ocean, and northwards over the steppes of Zambesia. Pretorius had declared that the Transvaal had no boundary on the west, unless it were the Atlantic Ocean. The first struggle therefore between Rhodes and Kruger was for this vital point of vantage, the neck. Had Kruger grasped it the British flag would never have floated on the northern plateau, the Boers and Germans would have joined hands—there had been a talk of a German Protectorate over the Transvaal—and theirs, not ours, would have been the splendid prize. And what is more, seeing what a vast conspiracy had been organised against us, we should probably have lost the Cape Colony itself: the foundations of our Empire would have been shaken. Immense was the threatening peril to which we shut our eyes. The Transvaal War had left the Cape Colonists in a distinctly anti-British frame of mind. Disgusted at the follies of the Imperial Government, even those of British blood sympathised with the Transvaal Boers, and had no objection to the north falling into the hands of the Dutch Republicans. Indeed, the general feeling at the Cape at that time appears to have been republican. Cecil Rhodes had not only to out-manœuvre Germany, the Transvaal, and Portugal, but had also to overcome the opposition of colonial prejudice, and the complete indifference of the English to all affairs South African. He stood almost alone, and had to create a party for himself. Not only man of action, but diplomatist and opportunist in the best sense of the word, he played his game with wondrous skill, and succeeded at last in winning over the reluctant colonists to his views. The very Africander Bond became his ally for a time.
Cape to Cairo Railway. Laying the Rails
That struggle for the neck of Bechuanaland is an interesting story that cannot be told here. First Kruger attempted to establish himself in Mankoroane’s territory. Mankoroane, to protect himself, offered to cede his country to the Cape Colony, which point-blank refused it. Rhodes, in 1882, went himself to the chieftain, and so arranged matters that the Imperial Government found itself compelled to take over the district. Thwarted at this point, Kruger attempted to cut us off further to the north, and sent his agents to establish the freebooting republics of Goshen and Stellaland. Again Rhodes checked him. Going himself to Stellaland, he persuaded the Boers in possession to accept the British flag on the condition that our Government ratified their titles to the land they had occupied. The Warren expedition, despatched at last in consequence of the strong representations of Rhodes and his far-seeing ally, Sir Hercules Robinson, the then High Commissioner, resulted in the expulsion of the Boer freebooters from Montsioa’s country, where Mafeking now stands, and the extension of our protectorate over the whole of Bechuanaland. Then Rhodes arranged for the taking over of Khama’s land, and the gateway to the north was won. Foiled again, and thus hemmed in on the west, the stubborn Kruger sent his very able agent Grobler to Lobengula to obtain from him a Matabele concession to the Transvaal. Rhodes found that it was hopeless to attempt to bring the Imperial Government to a sense of the danger of the position, so now, before it was too late, he had to act promptly for himself. He sent Maguire Thomson and Rudd to Lobengula to obtain a concession from him before Grobler had carried out his mission. They were successful; the Governor ratified the concession. Dr. Jameson and Dr. Harris went to Matabeleland to deliver to the king the stipulated arms and ammunition; and despite the bitter opposition of the Cape statesman and consistently anti-British Englishman, Mr. Merriman, the deed of concession was sealed, and its validity was recognised by the Government. And thus in 1888, after years of patient endeavour, Cecil Rhodes at last had made the way clear for the realisation of his mighty scheme.
The sinews of war had now to be found; and Rhodes, in anticipation, before the granting of the concession, had made his provisions. First he had brought about the amalgamation of the diamond-mining companies, and then, as head of the great De Beers Corporation with its rent-roll of four millions sterling a year, he, in 1887, effected the alteration of the De Beers Trust Deed by a liquidation of the Company, so as to give the De Beers directors power to apply the Company’s funds to outside objects, that is, to the development of the North. Messrs. Barnato and Beit agreed to this on the condition of being made life governors, and ever since loyally co-operated with Rhodes in the execution of his scheme.
The next step was the granting of the charter by the British Government in 1889, and the creation of the British South Africa Company. Then Rhodes sent out the famous Pioneer Expedition to Mashonaland, and the white men established themselves in Rhodesia. It must be borne in mind that at that time and for years afterwards Rhodes had to be ever closely watching and cunningly circumventing the German Boers and Portuguese, who spared no effort to keep us from the north. Bismarck’s agent, Count Pffeil, was sent on a secret mission to South Africa and all but succeeded in anticipating Rhodes, and in winning for Germany a broad strip of territory that would have connected her eastern and western possessions, so forming a bar across Africa from ocean to ocean that would have effectually shut us out. Then there was the Boer trek into Mashonaland in 1891, when the Rhodesians guarded the drifts against the invaders—a scheme of Kruger’s that was frustrated without the shedding of blood. Even when the Pioneer Expedition was on its way, the energetic Portuguese D’Andrade was distributing the flags of his country among the chiefs, and attempting to get concessions that would cut Mashonaland off from Matabeleland. To defeat his plans Rhodes entered into a treaty with Umtassa, and obtained the Gazaland concession from Gungunyana, a concession which would have extended the Chartered Company’s possessions to the shores of the Indian Ocean had not Lord Salisbury refused to ratify it and acknowledged the claims of Portugal. Then again in 1889 Rhodes, whose Intelligence Department always supplied him in good time with information as to the doings of his rivals, hearing that Germany intended to cut us off at the head of Lake Nyassa, secretly sent Mr. H. H. Johnson to hoist British flags at Port Abercorn on Lake Tanganyika and other places, as proof of our occupation. The Portuguese also hoped to erect a wall against our expansion by connecting her eastern and western territories, and for this purpose an expedition set out from Angola to seize the Barotse country, but here Rhodes again forestalled them; his mission was the first to arrive in the country, and Barotseland was placed under our protection. The way these things were done by Rhodes’ agents, the hardships endured, the perils incurred by these adventurous men who—unlike the Portuguese agents who were always accompanied by large bands of armed men—plunged alone into these savage regions to carry out their hazardous missions, makes a wonderful story indeed of British pluck and enterprise.
The Pioneer Expedition set out in June 1890. The Pioneer Column, which had been enrolled by Major Frank Johnson, consisted of 187 men who had decided to try their fortunes in the new country, and it was accompanied by 650 mounted police, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Pennefather. The famous hunter, Selous, acted as guide. The ox-waggons carried provisions and other stores sufficient to supply the whole force for six months. For four hundred miles the Pioneers marched into Mashonaland, constructing a road as they went, and making drifts at the many rivers to enable the waggons to cross. Forts were built at intervals, and small garrisons were left in them. At last they came to their objective point, Mount Hampden; and hard by it they built Fort Salisbury, now the capital of all Rhodesia. The Pioneer Force was now disbanded, each man receiving, in addition to his pay, the right to peg out fifteen gold claims and 3000 acres of land. The men scattered over the country, prospecting for gold and pegging out their claims and farms. The first rainy season was a terrible one for them; it was an exceptionally bad year; all transport was interrupted, supplies fell short; the men had to live on native foodstuffs; great privations were endured; many died; and, as in every other part of our Empire, the ways of Rhodesia are strewn with the bones of the men who won the land for their country.
But the men who go out as the pioneers of the Empire are not easily discouraged. The settlement and development of the country was at once undertaken with energy. Arrangements were made for the administration of the new State; a legal system was created; roads were constructed; mining plant was brought up; mining operations commenced; land was brought under cultivation; stores were opened; townships were surveyed, and rose rapidly from the wilderness, handsome brick buildings taking the place of the huts in which the pioneers roughed it at first. But the development of the country was much retarded by the difficulty of communication and the enormous cost of transport. Little could be done until Rhodesia was afforded railway communication with the coast; so Mr. Rhodes made arrangements for the extension of the Cape railway from its then terminus at Kimberley, and for the construction of a line to Beira on the east coast.
The Chartered Company had not long effected its active occupation of Mashonaland before the Matabele impis resumed their murderous raids on the Mashonas, and in 1893 the Matabele war broke out, leading to the overthrow of Lobengula and the absorption of Matabeleland by the Chartered Company. Nearly every able-bodied white man in Mashonaland volunteered his services. Three columns, numbering nine hundred men in all, marched through the country, defeating the Matabele impis on the Shangani and Zambesi; Bulawayo was occupied, and with the gallant stand of Wilson and his little force, the war was brought to a conclusion.
Then the white man’s city began to rise from the veldt, hard by the burnt kraal of Lobengula. Towards the close of the war I travelled in an ox-waggon with some Boer transport riders from the Marico Valley in the Transvaal—about thirty miles from Mafeking—to Bulawayo. This beautiful valley (“the Granary of the Transvaal”) was the old home of Moselekatse, Lobengula’s father. It was a fat land; there is none so rich for a hundred leagues around; for tribes of Zulu blood will establish themselves in none but the best country, and they will trek far to find it. The rolling land of Marico is as fertile as it is beautiful. It is as green as Devon, and the pretty farmhouses of the prosperous people are scattered among rich pastures, great fields of corn, and fruit orchards. Fifty years ago the Boers and their Baralong allies drove Moselekatse and his raiding warriors out of Marico, and sent them trekking north to seek a new home. So northward they travelled, murdering and cattle-lifting as they went, traversing good country, but not such as would satisfy the Zulu, until at last, nearly five hundred miles from Marico, they came to a land even more favoured than that they had left, and settled down in what is now called Matabeleland. I followed their route, and could then understand their choice. Fair indeed to the eye appears the green, well-watered high veldt of Matabeleland as the traveller from the south opens it out on reaching the watershed between the Crocodile and the Zambesi rivers. Lieutenant Maund, who some years before had been sent to spy out Matabeleland, with justice reported that, “when compared to the country south of it, it was as Canaan after the wilderness.” When I reached the place where Bulawayo, with its stately buildings, now stands, I found a few hundred white men occupying a little temporary settlement of native huts and tattered tents that had sprung up round the newly-constructed fort; the building of the modern city had not commenced. A little later I was present at the first auction of township stands. The alternate land lots bearing even numbers, lining one side of what was to be the chief street, were sold. They fetched about £50 apiece. A few months afterwards the alternate stands bearing odd numbers were sold by auction; they all fetched over £400 apiece, the highest price realised being £900. Some of the stands, that could have been purchased for £50 each in 1893, are at the present time worth six or seven thousand pounds apiece, and realise that price when put on the market. I quote these figures to show that whatever critics at home may think of the future of Rhodesia, those on the spot have confidence in it. The Matabele War was scarcely over before the volunteers, having received their mining, farm, and loot rights, scattered over the country to prospect and peg out their claims. It was wonderful to observe how quickly, under Dr. Jameson’s able administration, everything was put in order, and Matabeleland began to assume the aspect of a settled country. Bulawayo was soon a fine city, having its water-works, electric lighting, hospitals, public schools, its imposing court-house and other handsome public buildings. Townships sprang up like mushrooms all over the high veldt in the vicinity of the gold-bearing reefs. The population rapidly increased. The Chartered Company, in the meanwhile, pushed on the railway from Mafeking towards Bulawayo, proceeded to construct the line from Umtali to Beira, and quickly placed Bulawayo into telegraphic communication with the outer world. And now there was every sign of prosperity; the development of the gold mines gave encouraging results; trade was good; the value of the land for farming was proved, and excellent crops were raised; Rhodesia’s future seemed assured. But it was fated that its progress should be retarded by an extraordinary succession of disasters; surely no new country was ever so sorely tried.
All was going well until the early part of 1896, when the first of its many scourges swept down on the unhappy land—the dreaded rinderpest came from the North, and despite every precaution that could be taken to prevent its spreading, it destroyed over 90 per cent. of the cattle in the country, and played like havoc among the wild game. It is difficult for one who was not in Rhodesia at the time to realise the magnitude of this misfortune. As this was a land then entirely dependent upon oxen for transport, a stoppage was put to agricultural and mining operations; and the cattle-owning native population suffered greatly. Before the rinderpest broke out the average price of an ox in Rhodesia was £6, and now, though it is over five years since the rinderpest was stamped out, the price is about £28. Transport rates rose from 10s. to £5 per 100 lbs., and all the necessaries of life went up to famine prices. These figures, which will be found in an interesting pamphlet written by Mr. P. S. Inskip of the British South Africa Company’s service, will convey some idea of the situation. Absolute ruin faced the settlers; it is wonderful that the bulk of them did not abandon the country in despair, but pioneers are not easily disheartened, and they stubbornly struggled on, taking every possible measure to mitigate the effect of the plague.
Rhodesian Natives Washing Clothes
But misfortune followed on misfortune. The rinderpest was raging when the Matabele rose, and the Rhodesians had to suppress a formidable rebellion, which was rendered the more difficult to cope with by the scarcity of oxen. The white settlers were massacred in outlying districts; there were heroic rescues, the rising spread to Mashonaland, and it was not until 1897 that the rebellion was crushed and peace for a little while came to the troubled land. Our total casualties were 690; and of the white settlers in the country alone 390 were killed and 150 were wounded, that is, 10 per cent. of the population. The Company spent £360,000 in compensating the settlers for the losses the rebellion had brought upon them.
It had fortunately been discovered that the rinderpest could be stamped out by inoculation, but no sooner had this plague been conquered by science than a terrible outbreak of red-water decimated the remaining cattle. Locusts, too, came in unwonted numbers to devour the crops, and horse sickness was very destructive. Then, on the top of all Rhodesia’s troubles, came the but just concluded Boer war cutting off this inland territory from its communications with its commercial and military bases on the coast, retarding its development, and once more calling on its manhood to abandon industry and take up arms for their country. The Rhodesians responded well to the call; twelve and a half per cent. of the population fought in the war, and it will be in the memory of all how well they acquitted themselves in the defence of Bechuanaland and the relief of Mafeking. Thanks to the foresight of Cecil Rhodes, Matabeleland was ours. Had it not been so, the Boers when defeated in war would have trekked north into the rough country—through which it would have been almost impossible for us to follow them—there to form new independent states, to intrigue against us as before. It would have been the old story over again; and after a few years we should have been plunged into another Boer war. But Rhodes had hemmed in the two Boer Republics. The quarrel had to be fought out within their boundaries. There was no outlet for them into the wilderness this time.
THE OUTLET BELOW VICTORIA FALLS, ZAMBESI RIVER.
After Photo by G. W. Wilson, Aberdeen.
Notwithstanding these successive disasters the Chartered Company and the settlers had done much during those few troublous years to develop the country. The rinderpest and the native rebellion made it all the more urgent to complete the railway system that was to open communication with the coast. The Company hurried on the construction. In November 1897 the line had been extended from Mafeking to Bulawayo, and in 1899 the line from Salisbury to Beira was completed. Then the line from Bulawayo to Salisbury was pushed on; this connection has just been completed, and one can now travel by rail without changing carriage from Capetown to Beira viâ Bulawayo and Salisbury. Another line is being constructed through the Wankie coalfields which will cross the Zambesi near the Victoria Falls. How short a time ago it seems since the man who had visited the Falls was regarded as a great explorer! Other branches, too, will shortly open communication to the various goldfields.
Macheckie Railway Bridge on the Salisbury Line, Mashonaland Railway
It is worthy of notice that Rhodesia, though the most remote from the coast, was the one State in South Africa whose industries were kept going during the war, so that the conclusion of peace found her ready for an immediate expansion of her trade. This was due to the wise policy of the Company. Early in 1900 it was represented to the Administration that unless communication, which had been interrupted at the commencement of the war, was soon restored, work could not proceed on the mines; the native labourers would have to be discharged, and the mines would have to be closed down. The Administration realised that it would not only be disastrous to throw so many Europeans and natives out of work, but that the closing down of the mines would convince the Matabele that there was truth in the report which the Boer agents were diligently spreading to the effect that the English were being driven out of the country, and that the opportunity for rebellion had arrived. The Administration therefore came to the assistance of the mining community by making arrangements for the importation of sufficient necessaries for six months through Beira, at a fixed transport rate of £25 per ton from Port Elizabeth. The Company found itself about £5 a ton out of pocket by this arrangement, but great distress was saved. At the opening of the war the price of grain and meal rose 100 per cent.; but the Hon. Sir Arthur Lawley, the then Administrator of Matabeleland, warned the Chamber of Commerce at Bulawayo that if the cost of necessaries rose too high he would open the Government Stores—in which a large reserve of supplies had been laid up at the outbreak of the war—and sell to white men at a reasonable rate. This had the desired effect for a time, but later on the merchants took an unfair advantage of the situation, whereupon the Administrator carried out his threat, and so brought prices sharply down again. The result of this policy was excellent; the development of the mines proceeded, even if slowly; the crops were sown and there was a good harvest; the natives remained quiet and readily paid their hut-tax, which amounted to a larger sum than had been raised in any previous year.
Considering all the disasters, from the rinderpest down to the Boer War, that have befallen the country, it is indeed wonderful that so much has already been done towards the development of the resources of Rhodesia. There are critics at home who maintain that the country is valueless, that there are no payable gold reefs in it, else the mines would by this time have been working at a profit. People in the old days spoke in the same way of the Rand. Now, it was not until 1897, when the railway reached Bulawayo, that the real development of the mines commenced, and since then the country has produced gold to the value of a million and a quarter sterling, and this with a very limited number of stamps running. The gold belt extends for about 500 miles. Out of the 114,000 claims that have been pegged out, only 737 have been worked at all. Some of the mines have already paid dividends. The future possibilities of these yet practically untouched goldfields no one can estimate.
It had been naturally expected that so soon as the opening of the Rhodesian railways lowered the cost of transport rapid progress would be made in the working of the mines, and critics at home express their wonder that more has not been done; but the enormous increase in the cost of local transport due to the rinderpest has cancelled the advantage gained by the low railway rates from the south. Before the railway was constructed or the rinderpest appeared, the transport from Mafeking to Bulawayo, a distance of 500 miles, was ten shillings per 100 lbs. It costs as much as that now to transport mining machinery by ox-waggon from the Bulawayo railway-yard to a mine only 50 miles distant; and some of the mines are as far as 200 miles from a railway station. The branch lines that are being constructed will bring many of the mines within easy reach of the railway, but no great general progress can be made throughout Rhodesia until cattle become plentiful and cheap again. The Chartered Company is taking active steps to restock the country. The importation of cattle on a large scale, both by the various companies and by individuals, is now proceeding. Cattle of an excellent breed, suitable to the climate, are being brought from Angoniland, and will be crossed with Kerry or Jersey bulls. Importers of stock intended for breeding purposes can carry them over the Rhodesian railways at considerably reduced rates. Moreover, the Administration advances money to farmers on easy terms, on the security of their farms, to enable them to purchase cattle. With regard to the rinderpest, inoculation has proved successful, and the Government should be able to subdue any fresh outbreak by using the serum which is now manufactured at Kimberley.
Now that peace has come to South Africa, all that Rhodesia wants to enable her to make rapid progress is cheap transport, which she will shortly have, and abundant and efficient native labour; for surely the sore trials of her youth, which she so pluckily endured and survived, are over at last. The gold is there; the majority of the reefs are permanent, and to quote from the report of the Chartered Company’s Resident Consulting Engineer:—“What the future may hold it is impossible to say, but the most grievous pessimist must surely admit that the experimental stage has been safely passed, and that Rhodesia has been proved to be a valuable gold-mining country of which the possibilities are enormous.” The recent discovery of valuable coal deposits will greatly assist the development of the country’s resources, more especially benefiting the gold-mining industry, for the timber is becoming exhausted in the vicinity of the mines, and the price of wood fuel is ever advancing. A careful examination of one small section of the Wankie bed shows that it will yield 1000 tons a day of coal of excellent quality for the next hundred years. It is too early yet to discuss the value of the iron, copper, and other ores which exist in Rhodesia.
To turn to agriculture. There seems to be no production of the temperate and sub-tropical zones that does not flourish on the favoured, well-watered soil of Southern Rhodesia. The area under cultivation is rapidly extending. The one great drawback is the locust. However, farming pays well despite occasional bad seasons. Here is a story that exemplifies the tenacity, under disaster, of the Rhodesian settler. In one year, when the successive locust swarms ate up the land, a certain farmer sowed his farm with mealies. The locusts devoured the crop: undiscouraged, he sowed his fields a second time: again he lost his crop. Yet a third time he sowed, and got his harvest in safely. Despite the two failures, he now realised a handsome profit. Happily, in the season of 1898-99 locusts almost entirely disappeared, and apparently they have never since invaded the country in their former numbers. It is claimed that this is due to the extensive use of toxine, with which for the last few years a campaign of extermination has, with apparent success, been carried on against these scourges of the land. The toxine has been distributed among the white farmers and the native chiefs, with instructions for its use, and satisfaction with the results has been generally expressed. An energetic farmer does well in Rhodesia, and finds among the mining communities an ever-increasing market for his produce. At present the principal products are mealies, barley, wheat, oats, forage, and potatoes, and excellent crops are raised. Market farming and dairy farming in the vicinity of the towns are industries that require little capital, and are exceedingly profitable. Boer tobacco is produced in large quantities, and experiments that have been tried with American seed have proved the suitability of soil and climate for the cultivation of the superior qualities of tobacco. Oranges, peaches, walnuts, apples, bananas, figs, cherries, vines, and other fruits do very well in Rhodesia. In the yet uncolonised north of this vast territory wild rubber of high commercial value covers large tracts of country. The Chartered Company is taking steps to protect the plant against the destructive native methods of extraction, and to make it a source of wealth to Rhodesia as well of revenue to itself. In several districts the cultivation of coffee and tea promises to prove successful.
The Wankie Expedition
As elsewhere in South Africa, the chief difficulty in the way of the development of the country is the disinclination of the idle natives to work on the mines or elsewhere, all the more so now that so many have been spoilt by the excessive wages paid to them by the military authorities during the war. The native of Mashonaland, for example, living in a country blessed with a fruitful soil and splendid climate, protected by our rule from the raids that used to devastate his lands, reaping his crops in security, assisted by the Administration in hard times of rinderpest or locust scourge, is now more than ever loth to work. He can earn as much as £3 a month with food and lodging. But for the protection which he enjoys, and which enables him to wax rich, he only contributes to the expenses of Government his hut-tax of ten shillings. An increase in his hut-tax might induce him to work for a few weeks in the year. If nothing will overcome his deep-rooted indolence, other labour must be imported. Arabs from Aden are already working in some of the mines.
The pay of the skilled white miner is 30s. a day. Throughout Rhodesia the artisan earns good wages, the blacksmith and the bricklayer, for example, receiving respectively 30s. and 35s. a day in Salisbury. Detractors of Rhodesia are constantly asserting that the white population is outrageously taxed, each settler, they state, having to pay £40 per annum to the Chartered Company in the shape of taxes; and a well-known politician, beloved of Little Englanders, has publicly declared that this is the case. It appears that these ingenious people arrived at this conclusion by dividing the amount of the Company’s revenue, £440,000, by the number of Europeans in the country, namely, 12,000, which certainly does give a result of nearly £40 per head. It is thus assumed that all the Company’s revenue is derived from the taxation of the settlers. Now, in the first place, out of this £440,000 of revenue, £113,000 represents the amount of the native hut-tax, and is therefore not contributed by white people at all. Another £23,000 is derived from the sales and rent of land, the Company’s property; and another £58,000 from the telegraph and postal services, which up till now have been worked at a loss. No one can maintain that these items fall under the head of taxation. To go further, another £86,000 of the Company’s revenue is paid directly by the mining companies that have been floated—that is, by the shareholders in England, not by the people of Rhodesia. These figures added up amount to £280,000, which leaves a balance of £160,000—the taxation laid on the settlers, that is, about £13 per head. To go still further, of this £160,000, £73,000 is derived from the duties on wines, spirits, and tobacco. Therefore if one puts these luxuries out of the calculation the taxation amounts to only £7 a head per year, which is anything but high when one bears in mind that there are no paupers in Rhodesia, that women and children are few, and that the large bulk of the population are adult males in the prime of life earning high wages.
Rhodesian Mining. The Dobie Mill
The climate of the Rhodesian plateau is undoubtedly healthy and well suited to British colonists. It is a land where the white man can work in the fields. The British children reared here are as rosy of cheek and as sturdy of limb as those at home. There is, of course, malaria in the lowlands, but that will disappear before occupation and civilisation, even as it has done in once unhealthy districts of the Transvaal and the Cape Colony. It is the same with the diseases that affect domestic animals: thus horse-sickness once prevailed far to the south, and gradually has been driven north before advancing civilisation. The dreaded tsetse fly too, fatal to horses and cattle, can only exist where the larger wild beasts abound, and vanishes with the latter wherever the white man establishes himself. The rinderpest, in killing off the wild buffalo, did one good service: the tsetse disappeared with the buffalo, and now only frequents remote and unfrequented regions.
From every point of view the future of Rhodesia now looks hopeful. The young State suffered from every calamity that can befall a new country, but was too vigorous to succumb. The Company and the Rhodesian community have displayed pluck, energy, and patriotism in the hour of Britain’s danger, and every loyal Englishman must sincerely wish Rhodesia prosperity. As regards the prospects of the Chartered Company itself, I will conclude by calling attention to one point. Up till now the Company has been compelled to maintain a large and expensive military force, costing £276,000 a year. Now that the Boer war has been brought to a conclusion, the necessity for so large a force has ceased to exist, and Mr. W. H. Milton, the Senior Administrator of Southern Rhodesia, has recommended, as sufficient to meet the requirements of the country, the maintenance of a force of 400 Europeans and 400 natives, with a simple organisation on the lines of the Cape Police. The cost of this, he maintains, should not exceed £100,000 per annum. If his proposal is accepted, the revenue of the Chartered Company should balance its expenditure, and the corner will be turned.
PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES
By JAMES STANLEY LITTLE
Author of “South Africa,” “The Progress of the British Empire in the Nineteenth Century,” “The United States of Britain,” &c. &c.
The magnificent vagueness of the subject the editor of this volume has, in his wisdom, thought fit to apportion to me might have its conveniences, were it not that such pregnant matters as emigration, federation, education, irrigation, and half-a-dozen subjects besides, all of which bristle with problems and possibilities of the most clamant kind, are ruled out of this paper, in that their consideration has been entrusted to highly competent and patriotic writers, upon whose preserves it would be unbecoming to poach. Nevertheless, it must be obvious to everybody that it will not be possible to attempt a comprehensive analysis of the problems and possibilities of the future, and to keep entirely clear of these all-important factors in the case; seeing that every political, ethnical, financial, and economic problem impinges on these special subjects of which one and all are a part.
THE RESETTLEMENT OF THE TRANSVAAL A BOER FAMILY RETURNING TO THEIR FARM.
Drawing by Chas. M. Sheldon.
As to the political situation to-day, it seems scarcely to be apprehended in this country that the lines of cleavage between parties and factions at the Cape, and indeed in the new colonies, are by no means simple ones. In South Africa generally it is not merely a case of Briton versus Boer; it is not in Cape Colony simply a case of Dutch Africander versus British loyalist. In the Transvaal the problem is not solely how to bring the Boers and English together, or how to conciliate and retain the loyalty of those men, largely of British origin, formerly known as Uitlanders. A labour party, championing a programme practically identical with that with which all students of later-day politico-social questions are familiar, is coming into existence, and is, I think, certain to make itself a power in the land as time advances. It has been frequently, if somewhat hastily, assumed that in South Africa generally parties will follow the lines of division common to most civilised communities, and range themselves in camps, the composition of which will be determined respectively by the place of residence and occupation of the units of the people; the interests, sentiments, and aspirations of the town dwellers being at variance with those of the rural inhabitants. In a sense, we may take the people of Johannesburg to represent what passes for the urban population of old-settled countries. Roughly speaking, the citizens of the older established and smaller towns were dependent for their existence, and are likely to continue to be so dependent, on the agriculturists, since outside the Rand the Transvaal had no industries, no manufactures worth considering: for some time to come she is not likely to have any. So the Rand stood and stands for the towns, and the Uitlanders for the townsmen. The rest of the State stood and stands for the country, and, the agriculturists being mainly Dutch, the Boers stand for the countrymen. In the future, however, the race question, which has practically overruled any dividing lines drawn on the basis of townsmen and countrymen in Cape Colony, should cease to govern, in quite the old way, the political antagonisms of the inhabitants of the Transvaal; in any case, if the various schemes for settling British farmers in the land are crowned with reasonable success, it will no longer be possible to regard the rural Transvaalers as simply Boers, and the townsmen as simply Britishers. At present in the Transvaal there exists, of course, the great and principal division of its people, the British and philo-British versus the Dutch and philo-Dutch. But the interests of the great mining companies are not now, and never can be, on all-fours with those of the operatives; while the traders are likely to find their ideals at variance with those of the mining magnates and operatives alike. Obviously there will be no immediate community of interest and aim between the old Boer farmers and the new British elements introduced on to the land. The differences of the townsmen are likely to be more strictly economic than political; but they must necessarily take a political complexion in the process of their devolution. It would be rash to attempt anything in the shape of a precise forecast; but it certainly seems to me quite unlikely that the future divisions into parties of the citizens of the Transvaal can take the simple form of Briton versus Boer. No doubt the existence of the two races, living side by side, with the remembrance of a century’s differences between them, will continue to give a decided tincture to the parties to be formed in the future. It depends entirely on the kind of statecraft Great Britain brings to bear on the settlement of the new colonies and on its results, whether the progressive elements in the existing population—the population waiting for the gates to be opened to it may, for the purposes of this argument, be considered as entirely progressive—range themselves on the side of British imperialism, or whether they will join themselves to those forces, already existing, which openly or secretly aim at the establishment of a republican régime. It is quite a mistake to suppose that these forces—republican sympathies, that is to say—are at the moment entirely to be sought for in the Boer camp. It is, or it ought to be, common knowledge that the internal movement for reform on the Rand, and for the elimination of the Dopper-Hollander dominance of Pretoria, was not exactly inspired or sustained by men who wished to see the Transvaal an integral portion of the British Empire. At the same time, it is not denied that a great many sympathisers with this movement, and not a few of its active supporters—the late Mr. Rhodes, for instance—were above all things anxious that when the Transvaal flag was hauled down the Union Jack should be run up.
Apart, however, from such considerations, matters of history, it may be allowed that whatever the nationality or preferences of respective Uitlanders at that time of day, a rough sense of justice would reconcile most of them now to the flag of the country, which at enormous sacrifice of treasure and men has procured their release from the bondage of Pretoria. It is equally certain, more so in fact, that their acceptance of the British flag, now and hereafter, is and will be contingent on the treatment they receive at the hands of the new Government. Already many voices are heard in the land declaring that, so far from the new Government having brought relief to the mining industry and to the Uitlanders—and it must be clearly understood by all Englishmen, however much they may resent the fact, that upon the prosperity of the mines not only the welfare of the Transvaal but of all South Africa depends—it has increased its burdens. The limits of space will not permit any exhaustive examination into the basis of this complaint. Mr. Chamberlain, before these lines are in the hands of the public, will doubtless be on the spot examining into the grounds of the complaint. It would be clearly impossible for any one to accuse me, of all persons, of favouring the millionaires, or of holding a brief for their views and interests. But this is not a millionaires’, or a mining question; it is the question of the to be or not to be of South Africa as a British dependency. It may be said at once, that if, as Mr. Chamberlain at one time indicated, the somewhat contradictory and superficial report drawn up by Sir David Barbour, full of inconsistencies and injustices as it is, is to be accepted by the British Government, then I would not care to purchase at any price a seven years’ repairing lease—a repairing lease with a vengeance—of British tenure of South Africa, much less the freehold of the property. Whether he be a financial expert or not, no man who possesses a sound working knowledge, personal knowledge, of South Africa and its affairs can study this report and preserve his equanimity. It fills one with fear and trembling. Sir David Barbour’s proposals savour of the arbitrary confiscation of mining profits. This perhaps, standing alone, would not matter much from a South African point of view, since the loss would mainly fall on the hundreds of thousands of English and foreign shareholders interested in the mines; according to the Statist, the British public has something like £250,000,000 invested in the mines. However, it is not with such losses we are at present concerned. My contention is that if the Transvaal is taxed out of all proportion to its wealth—its immediate or permanent prospects even; if the new colonies, despite the heavy losses from the war, and the serious—for a long time to come it will be serious—dearth of labour contingent thereon, is burdened with taxation, the incidence of which is to be double, or in any case greatly in excess of the monstrous charges levied by Kruger and his advisers; if the Transvaal is to be saddled with a heavy war debt, then the financial, political, and economic ruin of South Africa in general, and the Transvaal in particular, must follow as an inevitable consequence, and this will happen even should a short respite be given. I have set forth again and again, in the columns of the Times and Post, and in the Anglo-African journal I formerly conducted, that apart from the uneconomic and impolitic nature of these suggestions, they are morally unsound. He who calls the tune must pay the piper. The British people, by allowing themselves to be ruled and betrayed by men who persisted in blinding their eyes to the writing on the wall, though there were Daniels in abundance to interpret it to them; by allowing themselves to be served by an army wholly inadequate in numbers, and largely composed of inefficients, are responsible for the cost of a war which never would have taken place had British pro-consuls and colonists on the spot been trusted; their counsel listened to here, and their hands freed and actions upheld yonder.
Moreover, all such heroic schemes of taxation in the interest of the British taxpayer, of which Sir David Barbour’s report is a type, are based on proleptic statistics of an expansion which after all is problematical, and which in any case will not become solid fact if onerous conditions are imposed upon the Rand in advance of that expansion. The profits from the mines, great as they ought to be if we do not strangle the goose right away, are ephemeral profits—thirty to fifty years will see the last of them. Possibly the high-water mark of production will be reached twenty years hence, and from that time the decline will begin as in the case of the Australian and Californian mines. It is obvious, therefore, that a heavy war debt must press disastrously on the industry during its growth and during its decline. Taxation seems to have been proposed on the basis of the anticipation, as if it were already an accomplished fact, of the most prosperous days possible of attainment by the industry, and in entire obliviousness of the fact that no sooner is the zenith reached than gradual decline, ending in extinction, must supervene. Unjust taxation would be a suicidal policy; it would retard the flow of capital, render all but a few higher-grade mines unprofitable, with the result that the budgets of the new colonies would show deficits year after year. Not only would capital awaiting employment be frightened into other channels, but schemes of federation would remain sterile schemes; and the hope of a prosperous and united South Africa would continue a mere day-dream, impossible of accomplishment.
I have put this question of the taxation of the Transvaal in the forefront of this paper, because it is of pressing importance and immediate interest. Scarcely less important, though the subject will probably be dealt with more fully by another pen, is the question of land settlement. We are approaching this matter too parochially and timidly. If the land companies and burghers will not part with suitable land to settlers on reasonable terms, they must be made to do so. The example of New Zealand must be followed. It is absolutely essential that we should plant out settlers on a large scale; especially is it essential in view of the fact that the loyalty of the dwellers in Johannesburg and other mining centres is not to be counted on confidently. With these men commercial considerations are certain to be dominant. Even if they are not given the solid reasons for discontent already foreshadowed, reasons, real and imaginary, in plenty are certain to crop up. Hence their loyalty will not be a matter of sentiment, but one of calculation. Further, every help and encouragement must be given to the right kind of settlers; the country which spent over two hundred millions sterling in making South Africa a possible place for Englishmen to live in, should not grudge another ten, twenty, or if necessary thirty millions to make the conditions of life sufficiently attractive to the emigrating English agriculturist. The conditions underlying land settlement have been carefully studied by Mr. Arnold Forster’s Land Commission, and they were lucidly set forth in the report of that Commission. It remains for the Imperial Government to make them operative, by coming to the country for generous support. I can do no more here than record my absolute conviction, for what it may be worth, that if land settlement in the new colonies is to find its own level, so to speak; if we are trusting to men with the necessary capital, some £300 or more, to come forward in anything like sufficient numbers to affect appreciably the question of British versus Boer in favour of the British, or the problem of self-seeking Cosmopolitanism (purely commercial interests) versus sentimental and patriotic Imperialism, we are building our hopes on sand. The drawbacks to farming in Africa are many: absence of transport (and obviously without well-devised and speedily carried out railway schemes the internal development of South Africa is impossible); absence of navigable rivers; recurrent droughts (here again I may say that nothing less can avail than grand schemes of organised irrigation such as those favoured by Mr. Hedger Wallace and by Mr. Willcocks in his luminous report); cattle disease and locusts. The ignis fatuus of the Rand, it must always be remembered, is ever present to lure away the settler when he has once been induced to settle. To the Englishman the love of isolation is not generally the strongly developed vice or virtue it is with the Boer. Consequently, we must go before the settler and prepare the way for him. Large and well-organised schemes of planting families on communal principles, freely scattered over the land in the midst of the Boers, both from an economic and political point of view, are absolutely necessary if we are to retain our hold on the country, or ensure its permanent prosperity. Under proper conditions and safeguards, generous schemes of female immigration must be initiated. It has been said, and I do not gainsay it, that South Africa requires almost immediately 70,000 more women. Also the Children of the State, the waifs and strays, the foundlings, those who are physically and morally fit, of course, should be sent out to South Africa, there to be carefully prepared in proper establishments for colonial life. In this matter we may well learn wisdom from the early Dutch settlers, who, under an arrangement with the Amsterdam authorities, received into their midst a number of foundlings. From these the present race of sturdy burghers has sprung. The subject is too vast for detailed treatment here; else much might be said about the policy of obliging all male settlers to bind themselves to a course of military training and contingent service, and as to the expediency of encouraging a respectable number of Canadians and Australians to make their home in South Africa. It is, in any case, obvious that no tentative tinkering with the question of land settlement can avail.
The sooner we face this necessity the better; since the sooner it is in a fair way to being faced, mastered, and provided for, the sooner can those electoral and legislative concessions we have promised the Boers, and which honour, justice, and expediency oblige us to grant at the earliest possible date, be granted. As things now are, we have a British autocracy in power, alternating in turn between the desire to repress the clamant demands of the one great industry of South Africa—the gold mines, and dread of that powerful confederacy—the Rand magnates. The methods and example of the great financial corporations and financial princes are not, to write temperately, conducive to the elevation of public morals; nor do they tend to give to the public life of a colony a high or healthy tone. Students of Mr. Cecil Rhodes’ career cannot fail to notice the disintegrating effect on that great patriot’s manners, and on his public and private procedure, which resulted from his close association with, and inexplicable reliance on, men, most of whom (it would be invidious to specialise the exceptions) lived and moved and had their being on a plane infinitely lower than Rhodes’ natural one. The destinies of the new colonies are for the moment nominally in the hands of British officials. These officials have practically nobody to go to for counsel but the mining and financial experts. This is not as it should be. The sooner there is a free play of interests and opinions between the Boers, British settlers, and Johannesburgers the better. These divergent classes, all colonial, however antagonistic their interests and prejudices, must fight out their differences among themselves as best they may. The British official, excellent as he is in dealing with subject races, is not seen at his best in controlling men of his own flesh and blood—men, I should say, of his own colour—when these men are in a position of political inferiority to himself.
The mention of this subject reminds me, that one of the most effective arguments in favour of granting representative institutions to the new colonies as quickly as may be is to be found in the native question. In this matter, as indeed in every matter, colonial opinion asserting itself through the necessarily imperfect, but only possible, system of parliamentary institutions, must be respected. As to the native question, an enormous majority of British South Africans, though it may reprobate certain tendencies to undue harshness, brutality even, still observable in the conduct of Boers of the baser sort, is nevertheless convinced that the Dutch attitude toward the native is, in its essence, the only possible or safe one. There is not the smallest fear that anything in the shape of compulsory labour will be sanctioned by any legislature in South Africa. But that the principles and provisions of that most statesmanlike Act, the Glen Grey Act, will be further extended there can be no doubt.
That the labour question throughout South Africa, and especially as it affects the mining industry, is among the more difficult problems of the future, most persons are aware. It is said that in five years’ time 320,000 natives will be required at Johannesburg to work the mines, irrespective of enormous domestic requirements there. To this total we must add the hundreds of thousands needed for industrial and household work throughout South Africa. It is estimated that in five years’ time there will be no more than 600,000 working Kaffirs south of the Zambesi. It is obvious that under the most favourable computation the supply is certain to continue to be totally inadequate to the demand. This is the more apparent when it is remembered, that it is only possible to get a small proportion of able-bodied Kaffirs to work at all, and that the average service of these willing ones is not more than four months a year, taking one year with another. Doubtless the new laws as to capitation tax, and the modifications in the direction of greater stringency in the hut tax, alterations which must have the effect of reducing the economic evil of polygamy, will effect some amelioration in the conditions now obtaining. But the lowering of wages and the prohibition of the liquor sale have retarded the immediate supply. I have had to listen before now to arguments in favour of the unrestricted sale of liquor to the natives, and in advocacy of establishing drinking booths from one end to the other of the Rand. This would be as suicidal, politically and socially, and in the long run as uneconomic a policy as could well be devised, to say nothing as to its cynical immorality. Of course, when schemes of organisation are perfected, and labour is largely drawn from Central Africa, the employers will enjoy some measure of relief; but in the end, unless relief comes from that highly debatable source—the importation of coolie labour—the prejudice against white labour in Africa will have to break down: a way out, I am sure, always provided the whites can be differentiated and segregated from the blacks, which cannot but be fraught with results of lasting benefit to the country, in procuring for it a solid substratum of Caucasian settlers who will become the industrial backbone of the country. The indirect advantages of such an innovation cannot be reaped, however, if schemes of heavy taxation are to be sanctioned. The margin between loss and profit in working most of the mines—they are what are called in city slang “low-grade propositions”—is so small, that a slight increase even in the price of labour would often make mining unprofitable.
The employment of white labour would have the effect of disabusing the minds of the natives of the growing conviction that they are necessary to our well-being and existence. The truth is not so far short of this; but we must not make it apparent: we must try to make it less true than it is. During the war the native, spoiled by the military, did not gain respect for the Englishman. He is a shrewd fellow, and although our arms were victorious in the end, he cherished no delusions. Man for man, he has seen for himself how much more effective as a fighter the Boer was than the Briton. Enjoying special advantages—his knowledge of the country and his control over the Kaffirs—the Boer was enabled to make the best use of his superior marksmanship, tactics, and mobility; with the result that it was easy for him to inflict much greater damage on his opponents than that opponent, with all his courage and spirit, could inflict in return. The native has seen our men lying in ghastly, mutilated masses. He has seen few such spectacles on the Boer side. The native is no sentimentalist. He is much like a prevalent type of modern young woman—fond of laughing, enjoyment, gew-gaws and sweets, while viewing everything from the standpoint of self-interest. In brief, despite his jollity he is as hard as nails. It is perfectly right that we should show him some consideration as the descendant of tribes who conquered the land some century or so earlier than we conquered it; for, except so far as being an inhabitant of the continent is concerned, it is absurd to talk of the existing South African tribes as aborigines. But if the “nigger” will not work, he must in the long run give place to men who will, to British and Continental labourers and to other British subjects—the coolies of India, for instance—men who will work, and who are now starving, or are on the brink of starvation, for the want of it. That this step is not to be taken lightly I am free to admit. It is fraught with grave difficulties and dangers—political, economic, and ethnical—considerations which are by no means to be minimised even if for a larger good—South Africa cannot be allowed to languish for lack of labour—they will have to be ignored.
LORD MILNER
By Mortimer Menpes.
From “War Impressions,” by arrangement with Messrs A. & C. Black, London.
There can many, indeed in most directions, the civil administration of the new colonies, so far as it has been provided, is highly creditable to Lord Milner and the able men associated with him. So excellent and so thorough is the work accomplished—in education, in replacing the machinery of the higher civil administration throughout the colonies—that, without hyperbole, it may be said to fill one with admiration and wonder. If one could always be sure of getting such a man as Joseph Chamberlain at the Colonial Office, and such a man as Alfred Milner as High Commissioner, one would be strongly in favour of retaining permanently as much power as possible in the hands of the holders of these two offices. But it is not possible to count upon a succession of such ministers. It is noteworthy, and I would especially emphasise the point in view of what is to follow, that the appointment of Lord Milner and Mr. Chamberlain to their respective offices may be said to have been in defiance of precedent. Since the institution of the Colonial Secretaryship half-a-century ago, ministers appointed to the office have almost invariably been noblemen of little or no importance. Again, Lord Milner’s earliest career was not official. He was quite out of the groove in which the men who become colonial governors usually run. It is regrettable, that the success of these two statesmen does not give the Government heart of grace to put appointments in the new colonies more largely into the hands of men of proved initiative and originality—men who have not had any good which may have been in them strangled by red tape and flummery in the public offices. The complaint as to the appointments made in the Transvaal—appointments of untried striplings and callow fledglings from the universities, is doubtless exaggerated; but it is well to remember that putting power into the hands of the “curled darlings of the nation” was one of the chief causes, among many contributory causes, of the failure of Sir Theophilus Shepstone’s policy; the reason why the annexation of the Transvaal, with the tacit consent and approval of the majority of its people, was subsequently repudiated by them.
However that may be, it is extremely regrettable that a country, possessing so many good men, men in every way indicated by their abilities and achievements as successful administrators in posse, is constantly at a deadlock for the lack of suitable public servants. I could mention spontaneously, without having time for reflection and for selection, a round dozen, probably a score, men of parts full of the sense of our imperial responsibilities, and certain to be able and zealous in the Empire’s service: men accustomed to positions in which initiative and sound judgment are demanded of them, who, pining to be men of action, to play their part, however humble, in affairs of State, affairs of which they possess a firm grip, are condemned to enforced inactivity, buried away in country houses, or, let us say, wasting their energies in mere constructive synthesis or destructive criticism, for which, alas! no one is much the better. These men, the born administrators of our over-seas dominions, are lost to the Empire, because of the red-tape exclusiveness and jealousy of the ruling classes of this country.
I have been betrayed for the moment into an academic consideration, and let me say here that I sorrowfully endorse—I might add that in a large measure I have publicly anticipated—most of the strictures on our system of misgovernment, corruption, and panoplied vice set forth in the letters of that sturdy Africander signing himself by his true initials “P. S.” Under these abuses we groan, and it is difficult to continue to hope that we shall escape from their tyranny, and rise again to that full manhood of our race asserted in the spacious days of Elizabeth, and again when Napoleon threatened our shores. Our grand old country is sinking deeper and deeper into the morass of spiritual and intellectual indifferentism, sordid materialism, and time-serving opportunism. One sees scant justification for optimism, unless, indeed, Judgment should descend upon us and beneficently scourge us back to our nobler past.
It is not, however, with these larger issues I am at this moment directly concerned. Despite the constant drains upon our best and most vital manhood the possession—protection and administration—of the most extensive empire of this or any age impose upon the United Kingdom, upon, that is to say, a small and no longer rapidly increasing nation, I do not believe that there would be any ground for the fear that we have annexed more territory than we can effectively administer, or that we have incurred greater responsibilities than we can sustain, if we had the presence of mind, the initiative and sense to utilise those latent sources of unexhausted supply we now wilfully neglect. The immediate bearing of these remarks reveals itself when the serious problem of the personnel of the magistracy of the new colonies is mentioned. Every one knows that the landdrosts under the old régime, men for the most part rough and unlettered, were habitually underpaid and habitually corrupt. The inadequate salaries paid to these men are, it seems, now being continued to the new magistracy, and this despite the enormous increase in the cost of living, with the result that men of quite inferior parts are mainly available for the positions; while, when from stress of life and circumstance, men of the right stamp, men to whom Boer and Kaffir can look up as their natural superiors, chance to fill these offices, they are unable, by reason of their poverty, to live in a way or to comport themselves in a manner consistent with the dignity of their offices.
In the Transvaal, and indeed in South Africa generally, it behoves us to welcome all comers from Europe and America, not being adventurers or wastrels—all and sundry who can contribute to the good of the country and who are willing to become loyal citizens. It will be madness to attempt to build up a South African nation from these islands alone. England is a small country and the English are gradually ceasing—and this tendency is certain to increase—to rear large families. In the past, in our own land as well as in our realms beyond the seas, our chief glory has been in our genius in amalgamating different strains, bringing them all into the fold as patriotic Britons. The British Empire is now more than ever a crucible wherein metals, precious and base, may be wrought into a fine amalgam. Whether as a limb of a great and regenerated British Empire, and therein my individual hopes lie, or as a powerful republic on the pattern of the United States, there ought to be no question as to the future of South Africa. Mr. Chamberlain said again only the other day that the prosperity of South Africa in the not far distant future would doubtless exceed the dreams of the most sanguine visionary. So let it be. Many shrewd Americans are of the same mind. No doubt the immediate expansion in South Africa’s import trade is due to military requirements, while the shrinkage of its export trade may be attributed mainly to the war having put a stop to the recovery and exportation of gold. The cost of living throughout South Africa, at present extraordinarily high, is certain to be reduced to more reasonable limits when the railways are permanently relieved from the control of the military. It must be remembered, too, that while a fair proportion of favoured individuals among the colonists have reaped huge harvests by the war, a far greater number have been crippled and ruined outright by it. It is not for me to deal with the problems of trade; but I may say that even should some scheme of the favoured-nation kind be extended to British imports by the South African Realm to be, that in itself would not serve, nor will the spirit of patriotic preference for British goods suffice to preserve the trade of South Africa for this country. The matter rests with our manufacturers, exporters, and their agents; and no one, not being a self-deceived egoist, can pretend that the more alert, adaptive, and modern methods of American and German houses are not certain, unless our countrymen turn over a new leaf, to prove too much for our laissez-faire, self-sufficiency, and careless indifference.
In this matter the best men, be they English, German, or Yankee, will win. But this is a home rather than a South African question. In any case, we may expect soon to see a considerable influx of capitalists, farmers, and traders, and they cannot but give an impetus to South Africa’s reviving fortunes, let political ineptitude do its worst. I have endeavoured to show wherein lie the chief obstacles to progress in the new colonies. In the old—Natal would in any case seem to have an era of immediate prosperity before her—the future is darkened by considerations all too apparent for the most optimistic or blind to overlook or ignore. The Africander Bond and the Dutch Reformed Church have not buried the hatchet. Throughout South Africa it is, of course, the duty of the loyal South African of British origin or British sympathies to endeavour to recognise at their best the many sterling qualities of the Dutch, and to forgive with what charity he may their besetting sins, condoning them as the resultants of environment and circumstance. It is also their duty to recognise that the past mistakes of Downing Street were chiefly due to lack of brain and thought, rather than to lack of heart, and to determine to work with all true patriots for the lasting good and welfare of South Africa.
Unhappily there is ample evidence to show that the Dutch Reformed Church and the Africander Bond are as active for evil as ever. How great is the terrorism exercised by the Commissie van Toezicht (the Secret Council of the Bond) is illustrated to-day by the abject recantation of the Rev. Mr. Botha, a pastor who, having counselled his countrymen to submit to the inevitable and accept British rule as far back as September 1901, now stands in the white sheet of repentance, and abjectly craves to be forgiven for what he calls his temporary weakness and backsliding! Undoubtedly disloyalty to the British Empire throughout South Africa has its fons et origo not in the Transvaal but at the Cape. For the moment the Bond lies low. It has gained everything it can hope to gain for the present. This the most superficial student of Cape politics can see. The problem of how to reconcile divergent elements at the Cape, and to make the Cape Dutch as loyal to the Empire as the French Canadians to-day, not that their loyalty is unimpeachable, is an extremely complicated one. At the Cape it is by no means merely a question of Dutch versus English or of Town versus Country. Many of the most active enemies of Great Britain are to be found in the houses of the old Dutch families inhabiting the suburban districts of Cape Town—Wynburg, Rondebosch, and so forth. It is also true that among those old Dutch families no more loyal subjects of the king are to be found. Unhappily English associations, close intercourse with Government House, intermarriage with English families, and education at our universities or at the Temple here, do not always ensure that the Dutch Africander will be loyal to Great Britain. Even more to be regretted is the fact that many colonists of pure British descent, birth even, are merely nominally loyal to the Imperial connection, if as much as that. Their loyalty is of the opportunist kind. Because of their hatred of the Dutch propaganda, and because they fear that the Dutch, if left to themselves, would become “top dog,” they tolerate British institutions. We cannot blame them over much for this attitude, when we remember how miserably we have deserted our countrymen in the past; how we have left them to the tender mercies of the Dutch; how we have neglected their warnings and advice, and brought ruin and misery upon them because of our short-sightedness and stiff-neckedness.
Even now the British colonist has many substantial excuses for averring that loyalty does not pay. In view of these facts it behoves Great Britain to admit frankly her past errors and to resolve, if she means to retain her hold on South Africa, to order her footsteps differently in the future. It behoves Great Britain, if she would avoid future risks of triangular disloyalty and the grave disasters, local and international, which might supervene on another period of neglect and snubbing, to trust the men on the spot. It behoves her to govern South Africa firmly, consistently, and unemotionally; to have done with Majubanimity and all its works once and for all; all folly, such as paltering with the language and education questions, whereby the sentiments and interests of loyal British colonists are flouted and ignored. Great Britain must, however, do everything that she can consistently do to bring the two European races—English and Dutch—together. If she is to do this, if England is to retain a firm grip on South Africa, we must continue strong, let it be said rather we must renew our strength here in the centre of the Empire. Within the next half-century it is probable that the last ounce of gold will have been extracted from the Transvaal’s deepest deep levels. Within half that time the impending struggle of the world Powers to establish themselves in unassailable positions will have taken place. Germany is forced by an inexorable law of self-preservation to find an outlet for her commerce and her people on the seas. Every thinking German, from the Kaiser downwards, tells us as much frankly. We can see it for ourselves. She must find employment, food, and raiment for her highly prolific people, for their own land is by no means rich in natural wealth. As to Africa, our hold on it depends entirely upon the strength of our national grip. If our hand is growing flabby and listless, and, alas! there are too many indications that such is the case; if France is to gain her ends in the Mediterranean; if sentimental views in regard to the natives are to prompt us to stand idly by while such organisations as the so-called Ethiopian Church of the United States working from the south, and the emissaries of a militant Mahommedanism from the north, conspire informally to undermine their loyalty, then our days in Africa are numbered. In the last event, our hold on that continent in general and South Africa in particular depends upon character, especially the character of our ruling classes. The possibilities of this country in Africa are magnificent; but the problems to be solved, if these possibilities are to be realised, must appal and finally overcome all but the stoutest of heart. The world, and South Africa with it, will fall to the nation which breeds and sustains the best men.
THE FUTURE OF THE MINING INDUSTRY
By F. T. NORRIS
The future prosperity of South Africa mainly depends upon the development of her vast and indisputable gold wealth, for, albeit she possesses other resources in undoubtedly lavish abundance, the means for the utilisation of these latter are dependent, in a large measure, upon the effective exploitation of her auriferous reserves. This fact was explicitly stated by Sir David Barbour, the financial expert appointed by the Imperial Government to report in 1901 on the resources of the Transvaal, and that this impartial official opinion is echoed by all competent observers prior to and since his investigations only confirms its correctness. As to the magnitude to which the mining industries in the Transvaal may ultimately attain opinions differ, but, says this authority, and this view is confirmed by experts, it is certain that the production of gold will continue to increase largely for some years at least; that there will be a corresponding growth in the production of coal, and it is possible, and perhaps probable, that valuable mines of other minerals, and especially of diamonds, may be opened. He therefore opines that, from an economic point of view, the prospects of the future for a considerable period are quite satisfactory, and it is unnecessary to speculate as to what may ultimately happen.
Public opinion on the Rand is unanimous that absolutely vital questions for the mines’ future are, for the moment, labour and taxation. A comprehensive and impartial view of the circumstances of the mines must force the conclusion that such contentions are perfectly sound. Naturally, however, the dimensions of the latter factor have less weight since the reduction of the customs tariff and the previous abolition of monopolies, and, with the pending solution of the question of dynamite, the mining industry is now not only in a vastly superior economic condition than it ever was, but has been placed in a position to sustain, not without some difficulty maybe at the outset, all the prospective burdens of projected Imperial taxation. In saying “not without difficulty,” the crux of the present economic situation, as looked at by the leading and responsible section of the mining industry and competent individuals at large, is touched. For the judiciousness or otherwise of the immediately heavy incidence of the share of the cost of the war, which it may be contemplated to place on the Transvaal, is what causes the present misgivings; and, with the operative capacity of 1898 still some ten to fifteen months ahead, the immediate call for heavy contributions can only act as a drag upon progress. It is with this consideration in view that the Chamber of Mines, in a recent letter to Lord Milner, asked for a delay of five years before making a first payment, in order to allow time for the industry to recover its former level, and that other authorities have also entered their protests.
Prospecting for Gold: Panning a Sample
The inference that an immediate and heavy increase of taxation is to be made to meet the war debt obligations may possibly be gratuitous, and probabilities confirm this supposition, for it is at issue with the Government expert’s special recommendations. From this point of view, Sir David Barbour’s observations are worth reciting for their direct bearing. He says: “The sound policy for the Transvaal is to so frame its system of taxation as not to increase unnecessarily the initial capital expenditure, or enhance the cost of working. I shall take it for granted that it is not intended to impose excessive or crushing taxation on either of the Colonies, or to exact such a share of their revenue as would cripple or starve the Administration. Subject to these considerations, I shall assume that any surplus of revenue over expenditure, or any special assets that the Colonies may possess, can fairly be taken towards meeting a portion of the cost of the war.” Further: “If the additional taxation which I recommend ... be imposed ... it may be anticipated that after two years from the conclusion of peace that Colony will be in a position to set aside a portion of its ordinary revenue towards meeting the cost of the war. I am unable at present to form an estimate of the amount which it may be possible to set aside in this way.... On the assumption that the contribution of the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal towards the cost of the war is to be limited to the amount which they can pay without imposing excessive taxation or starving the Administration, it will be obvious from what is said in the preceding portion of this report, and especially in paragraph 62, that it is impossible at the present time to specify any definite sum as that which ought to be paid. I suggest that the Imperial Government should fix the maximum sum which, under any circumstances, they would require to be paid. Such portions of the total amount of contribution, so fixed as it may be found from time to time that the Colonies can bear, should be made a charge against them. If, in the course of time, it is found that the Colonies are unable to pay the whole sum, under the conditions as to taxation and cost of administration which I have already specified, the balance should be written off.” So far as the immediate incidence of war taxation is concerned, it is therefore highly probable that the Government, who have adopted their financial expert’s views almost in toto with regard to fiscal reform, will do the same with regard to the levy of the war contribution.
WASHING PLANT OF DE BEERS DIAMOND MINES AT KIMBERLEY
Photo by Wilson, Aberdeen
But another phase of the same subject is revealed in the extent of the contribution which the Transvaal should be called to bear compared with that of the other South African Colonies. In the thoughts of some, tinctured still perhaps with a touch of the recent bitterness of the war, the Transvaal should bear the heaviest share; but it is to be observed that this is not the opinion of the responsible heads of the mining industry, who, while admitting the justness of assuming their proper proportion of the proposed burdens, appropriately point out that both the Orange River Colony and the Cape Colony (for a part of the latter’s population) were fellow-sharers in the beginnings and the conduct of the war, and should bear a due portion of the resultant financial burdens, while Natal, it is contended, cannot fairly be allowed to escape contribution to the extent at least of the valuable Transvaal territory which has been allotted to her. Pending formal announcements of the Government’s intentions—and it is to be observed a contribution from the Orange River Colony is contemplated in Sir David Barbour’s report—many huge lump sums have been mentioned, which it is proposed to levy on the Transvaal alone. Such reports naturally have not only alarmed the mining industry, but disturbed the confidence of international capitalists, upon whom the future development of the wealth of the goldfields in the first place rests. The extent of the alarm which is felt is shown by the Johannesburg Chamber of Mines as a body pleading in their recent communication to Lord Milner for a “reasonable sum” to be fixed, and by the rough estimates of this sum propounded by others, as, for instance, Mr. Freeman Cohen, chairman of the Potchefstroom Exploration and Gold Mining Company, who indicates £30,000,000 as the specific figure, while Mr. Bleloch adventures the sum of £35,000,000. This last gentleman’s summing up of the situation is that the mines can pay, and are willing and forward to pay, provided the incidence at the first be made light, and that the burden of the £55,000,000 estimate of the Government’s financial expert be shared by the other Colonies in the proportion, say, of £5,000,000 from each, to lessen the burden on the mining industry as much as possible, especially the low-grade section, and also as a matter of equity, and he advocates in addition—to augment the disposable revenue—the levy of a 5 per cent. tax on the profits of other industries (banks, &c.), the creation of death dues and of a land tax; also the beneficial reservation to the Government of portions of each new mining field to be opened.
That the whole weight of the taxation of the Transvaal should not be made to fall upon one industry is, of course, consonant with reason, policy, and equity. Pending the pronouncement of its actual intentions, and in view of the alarmist rumours which are spread about, it behoves the Government, to allay the very natural apprehensions entertained, to give an early and explicit outline of its proposals, and in this connection the projected visit of the Right Hon. J. Chamberlain to the Colonies is of the best augury. From his place in Parliament that statesman has already disclaimed, on several occasions, proposals anent the immediate imposition of heavy taxes attributed to the Imperial Government, and the probabilities are that those recently published in London are as baseless as they are vague.
The dependence, to a large extent, of the development of the mining industry on the fostering and assistance, or otherwise, accorded by the existing Government is a point too painfully brought home to the Rand mining industry by past experience to need demonstration; wherefore the sound common-sense statesmanship of those now responsible for the prosperity of the Empire is a valuable guarantee that the various problems now absorbing the attention of the industry will be treated in a fair, just, and liberal manner.
The Rand mining industry, at the moment, is undoubtedly in the throes of one of those periodic waves of depression incident to all great gold-mining fields, though to the Rand in a less degree than to the others, on account of the certain results which may be reckoned upon from the stable nature of its geological formation. Capital required for its development is in many cases being withheld, investors looking askance at its demands with obvious misgivings. This attitude is undoubtedly due to impatience, and disappointment that progress has not been more rapid since peace has been declared.
The Infancy of a Gold-Mine: Winding Quartz with a Whim
Apparently it was assumed that only a cessation of hostilities was needed for the mines to hurry up and resume their old-time rate of production and prosperity. Such an assumption ignores the real difficulties of reconstituting a country and its industries, devastated and disorganised for three years by war, and setting up an entirely new order of things. As a matter of fact, the progress actually achieved has been marvellous, and as much, or even more, than could have been expected in like cases. It has apparently been forgotten that civil government has only within a few weeks replaced the military in the main administrative channels. The railway network of the sub-continent has only been thrown open to the free transport of merchants’ goods within the past month, and the limitation of transit to the Rand, and the interior generally, is a most serious matter, by reason of the fact that the trunk railways from the coast are only single lines. For the clearance at the ports of the accumulations of mining machinery, mining stores, building materials, foodstuffs, and general merchandise, months are required, and this clearance must take place ere the railway traffic can fall back into its normal grooves. Abundance of labour, too—always a crucial question with mining operations, whether they be on the Rand, in Rhodesia, or elsewhere in the sub-continent—is, for a variety of causes, not yet available, although measures have been taken by the Government and the mining industry, acting in concert, which have placed this subject on a more satisfactory footing than it ever enjoyed. Other advances have been made in the improvement of the status of the industry, such, for instance, as the reduction of the customs duties, which enormously improve the industry’s chances of future remunerative working. Some desiderata are certainly unfulfilled, such as reduced railway rates; but the instalment of reforms made affords a fair basis on which working can be resumed with admirable chances of remuneration and profit. This being so, the unreasonableness of the show of impatience that progress has not been more rapid, and the undeservedness of the distrust with which the industry is professed to be regarded in some quarters, are obvious. A sober view of the situation of the Transvaal at the present moment must undoubtedly force the confession that the amount of solid work done in solving the many problems simultaneously surging up for solution in a new colony besides mining,—repatriation, resettlement, &c.—and in rebuilding generally the body politic, is of substantial volume, and that the progress hitherto made, in removing the difficulties which beset the mining industry, are sufficient augury that whatever remains unalleviated will receive its due and satisfactory attention in the near future.
In an old (1876) edition of “Chambers’s Encyclopædia,” under the heading of “Africa—Productions,” is the statement that “It would be hazardous to assert that Africa is deficient in mineral wealth, though, judging from our present imperfect knowledge, it does not seem to be extremely rich.” Little did the compilers of this well-known work think that, in the space of less than twenty-five years, a town of about 150,000 inhabitants would spring up as the centre of a mining country which now takes rank as the first gold-producer in the world. The gold production of the Rand to date is indeed stated to equal one-ninth of the coined gold in circulation throughout the world, while its potential reserves are probably fourfold this amount. In 1887 the United States occupied first rank among gold-producing countries, Australia being second, and Russia third, the total gold production of the world being only £18,000,000. In 1898, South Africa occupied the premier position with 28 per cent. of the aggregate world’s production, and her contribution, moreover, represented only 3½ millions less than the world’s aggregate in the first-named year. In 1899, owing to the war, it just managed to fall short of the headship. Since its start, the Rand gold-fields have produced gold to the handsome aggregate amount of £81,000,000 sterling. On the fortunes of South Africa, the influence exerted by this stupendous accretion to its wealth is past question, for the output of £20,000,000 of gold in 1898 formed 80 per cent. of the subcontinent’s aggregate exports in that year, while 68 per cent. of it was disbursed in labour, foodstuffs, mining stores, and material in the course of its winning. It is only needful to glance back at the modest proportions of South Africa’s trade movement before the discovery, first of diamonds and then of gold, to recognise how much it owes to its mineral wealth, and more particularly to that of gold, for its present-day prosperity. Its populations, its cities and ports, its railway network, its multifarious industries from agriculture upwards, and its merchant firms and commercial activity have each and all been stimulated and enlarged enormously by it. As in the case of Australia and other older gold-producing countries, the output of gold, primarily from the Witwatersrand fields, has acted like a perennial stream, fructifying and rendering teemful the arid wastes, and making the very wilderness to blossom as the rose.
The gold-bearing quartz-pebble conglomerate beds, called by the Boers “banket”—the discovery of gold in the outcrops of which in 1883 started the Witwatersrand mining industry—form a series of strata going down at an angle of about 30 degrees to hitherto unknown depths—over 8000 feet have already been plumbed—and extending over a tested lateral distance of more than 50 miles.
CYANIDE WORKS (NEW COMET MINE) AT JOHANNESBURG
The tailings are run into the huge vats, and the cyanide of potassium a deadly poison percolates through, and carries off the gold in solution.
Photo by Barnett & Co., Johannesburg
Section of a Gold Mine. (Photo by Horace W. Nicholls, Johannesburg)
These beds lie in series, that particular one which contains most of the gold being called the Main Reef series, comprising the Main Reef proper and a number of subordinate reefs or bands. The thickness of the Main Reef is from 3 to 12 feet, that of the Main Reef Leader 3 feet on the average, and the South Reef thinner than the latter, but having a richer gold contents than either. These are the beds chiefly worked, the gold being disseminated throughout the matrix mainly in crystals, visible gold being only occasionally seen, but in fairly regular quantities, so that the results of working, whether in the richer or poorer reefs, are capable of being accurately forecasted. The knowledge of the nature and extent of the beds has only gradually been brought together, and is still incomplete in parts even for the 15 miles section of the Rand which has been longest under working, and discoveries are of almost daily occurrence extending the sum of information regarding their composition and incidence. In the section situated between the Langlaagte Estate Mine in the west and the New Comet in the east, one profitable mine after another follows almost without a break. The eastern and western extensions are, for the main part, still terra incognita; but the several mines scattered along their stretch have confirmed the identity and value of the formation, which is held by experts to warrant the belief in the existence of wealth even exceeding the Rand proper.
Knowledge as to the depth to which the reefs descend has been slowest in accumulating. When the outcrops were first worked in the central section, it was believed that there was little or no gold in the lower levels. Since 1898, however, deep and yet deeper depths have been explored, especially in following the richer reefs, and always with the similar result of meeting with the same, or a superior, grade of ore contents peculiar to the higher sections of the particular reef, so that the inference is strengthened to certainty that profitable exploitation is only limited to the ultimate depth at which modern mining can be carried on. The problem, therefore, is one for the engineers; for, apart from the increased temperature in the lower levels, which can be met by roomier shafts, and the occurrence of water, which is likewise capable of being dealt with, the only difficulty to be met with is that concerned with the hoisting appliances for such enormous depths. So recently as May last the London Chamber of Mines, and more recently the Johannesburg Association of Mining Engineers, were engaged on the solution of this question. It is needless to anticipate the results of their deliberations, the point turning upon the choice betwixt two systems, only so far as to state that means for solving the difficulties of the task are considered to be available, at least, to such depths as 5565 feet on the slope, and that the results of mining at these great depths can be made to show a substantial profit. It may be added, however, that in consequence of the increased cost to reach the ore, the need for the utmost reduction of working costs becomes paramount.
The circumstances of gold-mining on the Rand have, therefore, features quite distinct from those of quartz-reef, alluvial, or other kinds of mining, and approximate to those of coal winning, especially in the matter of the depth and regularity of the conglomerate formation. Its peculiarities have created a method of mining, the outcome of costly experiment, experience, and skill, which will remain a lasting asset to future ages.
The future gold production of the Rand mining industry is a subject which enchains the attention alike of the investor and the curious. In approaching the subject of the unexploited gold contents of the banket formation, figures are handled which simulate the fabulous, and almost excuse the disbelief with which all such estimates are received in some quarters. Confirmation of the approximate correctness of the computations may, however, be obtained in two ways: firstly, from the past yield of the gold-fields in the seventeen years since their start; and secondly, from the verification of former prognostications which subsequent outputs have furnished. So far as regards the former, the fact of the production of £81,000,000 of gold since the start of the industry up to now, under well-known circumstances is, in the first place, proof positive that the gold exists; and, in the second, affords inferential grounds for assuming that, given at all similar circumstances, mining operations will yield like results. This is, of course, taking the lowest ground, for it is indubitable that the circumstances will not be alike, but vastly improved, in which case the value of the results will be proportionately enhanced. As to the confirmation which results from the verification which later outputs have furnished, both of the trustworthiness of the bases on which former forecasts were made and of the prognostications themselves, there may be instanced the forecasts of such early computators as Mr. Hamilton Smith, Mr. C. D. Rudd, and others. The former, in 1892, in a report on the future production of the Rand fields, made by request of Messrs. Rothschild, adventured an opinion which is worth quoting textually. He said: “With the active and energetic men who have this industry in hand, and always supposing that the foregoing theories be correct, in three or four years from now the producing power of the mines and their reducing works will, I think, be increased to an output of five or six million tons of ore per annum, worth a gross yield of over £10,000,000. At this rate the available supply of ore, as conjectured above, will last for more than thirty years.”
As an actual fact, in four years from the time of his writing the above, the Rand gold yield from 69 companies working amounted to 5,325,355 ozs., the total production being of the gross value of £10,583,616; so that, far from his estimate being too sanguine or exaggerated, it was a literal forecast of the actuality. He subsequently expressed the opinion that the full producing power of the Rand would be reached by the end of the century, when the output might be expected to exceed £12,500,000 per annum. As a matter of fact the total value of gold produced in the Transvaal in 1898 was over £15,000,000, most of which came from the Rand, and, had mining operations in 1899 not been interrupted by the war, the output in that year would have reached to over £18,000,000. Mr. Smith based his estimate on a working depth of 5200 feet, and on an area of the reef only 11 miles in extent, but since his time deep mining has been successfully prosecuted to 7000 feet. Inference and analogy, therefore, both afford strong support to the correctness of estimates, based on the results of past working, of the future gold contents of the Witwatersrand reefs, which estimates, as appears, are more likely to be under-reckoned than otherwise, from the sheer immensity of the subject, and from the necessarily imperfect knowledge of the potentialities of so huge a problem.
The divergencies in the several estimates made from time to time in the past of the total gold available from the Rand banket beds have in part arisen from the sheer inability of those making the estimates to anticipate the striking developments which have successively been made. So far back as 1893, 325 millions, and subsequently 450 millions and 700 millions, have been adventured by various persons. The relative moderateness of these estimates, compared with more recent ones, is due, as in the case of that of Mr. Hamilton Smith, to the under-valuation of the potentialities of deep-level mining, which are only now becoming fully apparent. One of the more recent estimates—that of Mr. Bleloch—based on working depths of 3000 to 7000 feet, and taken over an area of fifty miles, embracing the district between Randfontein and Holfontein, computes an available gold yield of £2,871,000,000 sterling, or eight times as much as the estimate of 1893.
Although so enlarged, the total actually understates potentialities by being exclusive of possible discoveries beyond these limits, and also by the estimates being framed on the older ratios of gold recovery to ore tonnage, thus ignoring the application of the latest scientific methods to the treatment of the poorest ore, which would tend to enhance the results considerably. Apart from these limitations, this estimate of 2871 millions is made in the most systematic manner, from careful calculations, area by area, according to the thickness of the reefs, the tonnage per claim, and the value per ton as they have been shown from past working. The total tonnage of payable ore available is estimated at 1,378,000,000. The average gold value per ton of ore in the figures works out at 41s. 7d., but in the actuality this varies from 78s. in the richest mines down to actual loss in the least paying of low-grade ores. In these stupendous figures are included the contributions of the great deep-level mines, the growing proportions of whose contributions to the aggregate output is already becoming a noteworthy feature, while the extent of their development cannot be foreseen. Mining engineers are indeed already considering the specifications of equipments for negotiating depths deeper than 7000 feet, and even in 1899 the possibility of mining at 12,000 feet was considered. Certainly the mining of minerals in other parts of the world has shown the feasibility of operations at much greater depths than those mentioned.
MINES ON THE LINE OF REEF AT JOHANNESBURG
Photo by Wilson, Aberdeen
The ascertainment of the proximate gold contents of the Transvaal mining area leads up to the question, How and when is this stupendous wealth to be rendered available? In other words, what is likely to be the gold production in the several years from now on, and how long will this rate of production continue? or what are the chances of the early exhaustion of the mining industry? To take the last item first, it is the growing conviction of Rand mining engineers that the amount of available gold is only limited by the extent to which mining operations can be prosecuted below the surface. Mining engineers had up till recently generally agreed to fix a depth of 8000 feet as the utmost limit to which mechanical appliances and other circumstances will allow them to follow the descent of the reefs, and the available gold yield is calculated on this basis. But there is no finality in this statement of depth, and already, as we have remarked, engineers are calculating for deeper delvings, and 9000 and even 12,000 feet have been spoken of. This latter increase of 4000 feet—from 8000 to 12,000 feet—would alone augment the gold estimate by 50 per cent. For the rest, and retaining the 8000 feet limit estimate as the measure of the exhaustion of the present Rand, this is naturally controlled by the rate of production per year, which itself is dependent on the particular circumstances of the industry during the period in question.
The yearly production of gold from now onwards offers no insurmountable obstacle to a fairly exact appreciation. It is merely a rule of three calculation: if in the past, under given circumstances, working results have been as follows; in the future, with the same or like circumstances, the results will be such. Various computations from time to time have been made on these bases, among the most recent being those of Mr. Cooper-Key and Dr. Hatch in 1899, Mr. Goldring and Mr. Bleloch in 1901, and quite recently Messrs. Leggett and Hatch (on 47 miles of the Rand only, and working to depths of 4000 to 7000 feet). Mr. Cooper-Key’s forecast, which was made in 1899, was for the output of the three following years, the war not having then been anticipated. The basis of his calculation, like that of Mr. Goldring’s, was the number of stamps or the milling power employed. If in 1898, he argued, there were in work on the Central, Eastern, Far Eastern, and Western sections of the Rand 6000 stamps, at the end of 1899 this number would probably be increased by 165, or to a total of 6165; at the end of 1900 the increase made would be 1730 and the total 7895; at the end of 1901 the total would have risen to 9845; and at the end of 1902 to 11,785. On the basis of 1800 tons milled per stamp, of an average value of £2 per ton, and with an average number of stamps of 7000, 9000, and 10,500 in the three years, the output would have been: 1900, £25,200,000; 1901, £32,400,000; and 1902, £37,800,000. Mr. Goldring, who is the Secretary of the Johannesburg Chamber of Mines, likewise framing his calculation on certain yearly increases in the milling power, calculated that in the five years following the full resumption of mining operations, 17,000 stamps would be at work, or an increase of 11,000 on the number before the war. Allowing for a fall in the grade of ore milled, in consequence of cheaper methods permitting of a lower grade of ore to be dealt with, the 17,000 stamps, he considered, would produce at least £50,000,000 sterling a year. Writing before the war, and basing his estimate on observations made by Mr. Eckstein that in five years the number of stamps in working would be 12,000, Dr. Hatch, likewise following the milling power basis, calculated for a yearly gold production of £36,000,000. Mr. Bleloch’s opinion, taking the production in the nine working months of 1899 of £20,000,000 as a basis, is that the rate of production would probably double itself after the war. “If this be so,” he adds, “in fifty years’ time the product of the Rand will have reached over £2,000,000,000, and if such an accelerated progress is made, the whole of the vast amount now estimated may be dug out of the Rand within sixty or seventy years.” The latest estimate published, that of Messrs. Leggett and Hatch, going on the basis of the average increase of production of £4,000,000 per year in the three years before the war, and that the production in 1899—a broken year owing to the war—was £19,000,000, concludes that, allowing eighteen months from January 1, 1902, for the industry to be restored to the conditions existing in August 1899, a similar increase of production will bring the output to at least £30,000,000 per annum by June 30, 1906, and if this rate of production were to be maintained from then on, the total production of £1,233,560,700 would give a life from January 1, 1902, of forty-two years and a half. But as the production will decline gradually, instead of coming to a sudden stop, the life of the industry is likely to be prolonged for some considerable number of years beyond the period indicated. If, on the other hand, the annual output should exceed £30,000,000 for any considerable period, as is, perhaps, within the bounds of possibility, this would partially offset the extension of life due to the gradual decline of production. It is to be added, in explanation of Messrs. Leggett and Hatch’s estimate, that it contemplates working along a strike of forty-seven miles only, and to the restricted depth of from 4000 to 6000 feet.
The following tabulated comparison of these several estimates will assist their comprehension, it being explained that Mr. Bleloch’s estimate is reduced to the extent of 25 per cent. as a set-off for probably barren sections, &c.:—
| Year. | Mr. Cooper-Key (1899). | Dr. Hatch (1899). | Mr. Goldring (1901). | Messrs. Leggett & Hatch (1902). | Mr. Bleloch (1901). | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| £ | £ | £ | £ | £ | |||||||
| 1898 | ... | ... | 20,000,000 | ... | ... | ||||||
| 1899 | ... | ... | ... | 19,000,000 | 20,000,000 | ||||||
| 1900 | 25,200,000 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ||||||
| 1901 | 32,400,000 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ||||||
| 1902 | 37,800,000 | ... | ... | ... | 15,000,000 | ||||||
| 1903 | ... | ... | 50,000,000 each year | 30,000,000 each year | 20,000,000 | ||||||
| 1904 | ... | 36,000,000 | 25,000,000 | ||||||||
| 1905 | ... | ... | 35,000,000 each year | ||||||||
| 1906 | ... | ... | |||||||||
| 1907 | ... | ... | |||||||||
| 1908 | ... | ... | ... | ||||||||
| 1909 | ... | ... | ... | ||||||||
| 1910 | ... | ... | ... | ||||||||
| 1911 | ... | ... | ... | ||||||||
| 1912 | ... | ... | ... | ||||||||
| 1913 | ... | ... | ... | ||||||||
| 1914 | ... | ... | ... | ||||||||
| 1915 | ... | ... | ... | 40,000,000 each year | |||||||
| 1924 | ... | ... | ... | ||||||||
| 1925 | ... | ... | ... | 45,000,000 each year | |||||||
| 1934 | ... | ... | ... | ||||||||
| 1935 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 40,000,000 each year | ||||||
| 1944 | ... | ... | ... | ... | |||||||
| 1945 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 30,000,000 each year | ||||||
| 1954 | ... | ... | ... | ... | |||||||
| 1955 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 30,000,000 each year | ||||||
| 1964 | ... | ... | ... | ... | |||||||
| 1965 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 15,000,000 each year | ||||||
| 1974 | ... | ... | ... | ... | |||||||
These several estimates are of course to be looked upon merely as approximations, and they are, moreover, not framed on exactly the same bases. They, however, agree in the main that the 1899 output of roundly £20,000,000 will be increased to some point between £30,000,000 and £50,000,000 within a few years’ time, and maintained thereat, more or less continuously, for periods varying over 45 and 65 years. The production of the several estimates for the whole period gives an average of £37,000,000, which is only slightly higher than that of Mr. Bleloch, which is £35,714,285. This, consequently, is the handsome yearly output which the Rand mining industry offers in the near future—an amount which alone equals the total production of the whole world in 1897—if the circumstances are at least equal to those which previously prevailed.
Head-Gear of the Witwatersrand Gold-Mining Co.
(Photo by Horace W. Nicholls, Johannesburg)
Having advanced the question of the future of the mining industry to the extent of showing a possible gold yield of at least 2,871 millions, spread over a period of seventy years at the rate of between 37 and 40 millions a year, at a moderate estimate, it is pertinent to inquire somewhat into the efficacy of the means for securing this return, the location of anything and its appropriation being two distinct matters. As implied previously, the realisation of this huge prospective gold yield depends upon the circumstances of the industry being at least equal to those of the past. If found to be superior, the ultimate realisation will only be made the more certain. These circumstances may be conveniently classified as external and internal. So far back as the Industrial Commission of 1897 it was recognised that the essentials for the development of the Rand were reduction of taxes and economy in working. The evidence of all the prominent heads of mining groups, both English and foreign, then tendered, in the sum amounted to this. Where the circumstances of a mine are such that they can only be worked at a higher cost than their returns, or with only an infinitesimal profit, either costs must be reduced or the mine compelled to close down. In many cases a reduction of working costs of so moderate an amount as 2s. per ton means the life of a mine, and less than this spells bankruptcy. Where mines had exhausted every effort to reduce working costs, it was also contended with justice that they had established a claim for moral and material assistance on the part of the Government, where it could be properly accorded; indeed, a personal interest, so to say, attached to Government interference, in that the national revenues were jeopardised when mines failed of successful working. The assistances asked for by the mining industry, and which the Government were able to accord, are now notorious, but are worth reciting for the bearing they have on our present subject. They were fiscal reforms conducing to cheapening of labour by reducing the cost of living both for whites and natives; increase in the effectiveness of native labour by the proper enforcement of the Liquor Law, the cancellation of the local spirit monopoly, and the withdrawal of the right of free imports of spirits from Mozambique and the Orange Free State; abolition of monopolies which tended to enhance the cost of materials used in the mines, including those of dynamite, cement, &c.; reduction of rail rates, and abrogation, by arrangement, of the transit dues levied by the coast Colonies, thus lessening first and working costs of mining equipments and materials; promotion of large public works directly or indirectly affecting the mines, such as provision of adequate water supplies, construction of railways, &c.; finally, an equitable and sympathetic attitude of the Governing Power to all and every question having relation to the country’s staple industry. So far as these reforms were appraisable, they were reckoned to be equivalent to a saving of not less than 6s. per ton in working costs. What practical chance there was of gaining the relief sought under the old régime is shown by the futile results of the Industrial Commission’s labours.
DRIVING AN “END” IN MAY CONSOLIDATED MINE, JOHANNESBURG
In some places the holes for blasting are bored by Kaffirs, but as a rule the drives are made with the use of boring machines driven by compressed air. There are few accidents underground, as the rock is so hard that there is little fear of the “levels” falling in. The chief danger is from the gas after blasting ...
But the altered circumstances of the mining industry since the war are evidenced by the reforms already consummated and under weigh, comprising among them some of the leading demands of 1897. This fact is conclusive that, so far as external circumstances are concerned, the mining industry is not only in the enjoyment of equally favourable circumstances with those existing previously, but even greatly superior. By so much, therefore, is the perspective of the gold yield to which we have made allusion assisted towards becoming a reality.
Kaffir Compound, New Primrose Gold Mine, Johannesburg
As regards the internal circumstances on which the progress of the mining industry depends, these are the employment of the most improved methods and means of production. They comprise the most perfected machinery and appliances, and the latest processes of metallurgical and chemical science. Speaking generally, it may be said that on the Rand at the present time are employed the most up-to-date skill and technical knowledge, and the latest devised mechanical appliances. This, by the way, is only true of individual mines however. The equipment of the mass varies greatly, and necessarily so, since the conditions of one mine differ vastly from those of its neighbour; and distant and even contiguous localities require unlike treatment, according to the nature of the ore or reef worked and other local conditions. The improvement effected hitherto is evidence, however, of the initiation and energy which have been displayed by the heads of the mining industry in the past, and an earnest for the future, while the progress achieved abides as an invaluable guide for all future mining operations in like geological formations.
The knowledge of how best to treat the peculiarities of the banket reef has, however, only been slowly gained, and at the cost of much money and many unavoidable blunders. For instance, the only metallurgical operation for the extraction of gold employed up to 1889 was the stamping mill, and fine gold and amalgam were necessarily abundant in the tailings which were cast away on the spoil heap. The cyanide process, and that of the treatment of slimes, were only applied in 1891 and 1898 respectively. Their use has added millions to the yearly output of gold. The amalgamation process, the chlorination treatment of concentrates, and the use of frue vanners are other innovations gradually introduced as results of experiment and experience, and which have likewise increased the efficacy of the extractive operations. Similar progress has been shown in the improvement effected in the mechanical equipment. At first the mining operations were confined to the primitive digging of a huge trench over the site of the outcrop, with the simplest delver’s tools furnished by the locality. This method has advanced to the stage of sinking shafts to the enormous depth of a mile into the bowels of the earth, equipped with the most elaborate hoisting plant, with underground equipment lit and worked by electricity, and the complementary surface establishments, at a cost running into hundreds of thousands of pounds. There yet lies before the industry the general adoption, not only of these but of other improvements which experience has shown to be desirable, such as the practice of sorting of ore, the use of heavier batteries on the score of greater economy, &c., and their utilisation is merely a question of time. As, therefore, all these improvements and betterments have been successively made, and the mining industry is only now gradually—it is not yet, so far as a large number of them are concerned—entering into the full use of them, it is obvious that future mining operations must not only enjoy the same favouring circumstances as those which enabled the huge mining output of the past, but a very much better environment, through the more general use of all those methods which experience and science have shown to be advisable. As a consequence, and in the measure of the value of these improvements, will the effective output be ameliorated from now onwards.
The value of the improved circumstances of the mining industry alluded to is convertible into figures in the terms of working costs and divisible dividends. The former may be said to be the barometer of the latter. In the past, in the early days of the mining industry, when the problems of mine equipment and gold extraction and winning were only imperfectly understood, the wasteful expenditure of money on inefficient methods and appliances swallowed up in many cases every vestige of profit.
Cyanide Works. Witwatersrand Gold-Mining Co.
(Photo by Horace W. Nicholls, Johannesburg)
It was incidental to the first operations on the then unknown geological formation of the Rand, when the very science of the goldfields had to be created. Costs of working on the Rand are now, through the excellent system devised by the Chamber of Mines, tabulated so that the outlay of individual mines, or of the mining industry in the aggregate, may be seen at any moment at a glance. For instance, taking the record for the eight years from 1890 to 1898 inclusive, for example, the working costs ranged from 80.8 per cent. of the total value of the gold produced by eighty-five companies in 1890 down to 68.1 per cent. in 1898, the last full year before the war, the decrease showing the extent of the progress made in reducing the working costs. Simultaneously the dividends increased from 19.2 to 31.9 per cent., testifying to the close kinship with the costs factor. These figures are a general average taken over the aggregate of the mines working, and do not represent the ratios of working costs of individual mines, which differ of course according to the greater richness of the ore, the fewer difficulties to be dealt with in winning it, and the methods employed to secure the end in view. This is exemplified by the fact that in a few of the best equipped mines costs have been brought down to as low as 17s. 6d. per ton, while on others they rise to 79s. 6d. and above. The Robinson mine is a case where, despite adverse circumstances, the enlightened employment of the latest appliances of science and mechanics has resulted in reducing costs to an extremely low level. In 1888 the working costs of the mine were 72s. 1d. per ton; in 1892 they were reduced to 46s. 5d., and in 1896 to 30s. 11d. They have subsequently been reduced to a still lower figure, and this despite the fact that the ore changed from an oxidised character to a pyritic, involving greater difficulty and cost to treat. This mine was the first to introduce frue vanners, the cyanide process and the treatment of slimes, expending as much as £80,000 in the last innovation. By means of these it raised its gold extraction from 65 to 90 per cent., and gave encouragement and impetus to all mining on these fields. The latest costs published for the month of September this year of thirty-six mines in working give an average of 26s. 3d. per ton, which shows that operating charges are now at about the same ratio as they were before the war. Although so reduced, however, they are still relatively higher than they may be expected to be when the mines settle back into their normal grooves. The reason for this is that only a few mines are now working up to their full battery power, and, while costs are on the full scale, results are less, surface dumps are being drawn upon for mill service instead of the mine itself, owing to lack of full supply of labour, &c. When, however, the effects of the important fiscal reductions just made have had time to exercise their effect in reducing the cost of imported mining stores, foodstuffs, and the smaller machinery and metal goods charged by the mines to the working account, further reductions in the working costs will be possible. Of the actual money value of this per ton of ore milled, various opinions have been ventured. It has been estimated by experts that it is possible under favouring circumstances to reduce the expense of working by some 10s. per ton, at which rate ore yielding over 5.6 dwt. per ton bullion could be made to yield a profit. The importance of this not only in improving the present position of all mining undertakings, but in stimulating the low-grade mines to come into the working stage, can hardly be overestimated. With the various difficulties besetting the mining industry removed, the future working cost level should be lower than at any preceding period, taking into account the benefit of the recent fiscal reductions and other governmental assistance in prospect.
GENERAL VIEW OF THE SURFACE WORKS OF A RAND GOLD MINE (KNIGHT’S)
Showing the head-gear at top of the shaft, the stacks locating the engine-rooms. A sloping tramway will be seen leading down from the shaft-head, and iron waggons bringing the crushed ore, and taking it away to the “battery” or “mill.” The waggons are driven by an endless wire rope, and discharge automatically. Beyond, in the middle distance, may be seen the huge white heap of “tailings,” the waste débris after the gold has been extracted. Each mine has its own electric-light plant.
Photo by Barnett & Co., Johannesburg
Allusion has been made to the probable continuation of the Rand formation beyond its present area; but, as a matter of fact, the Witwatersrand series of reefs, or an amplification of them, has been more or less proved for a distance of nearly one hundred miles to the north and south. The strike of the reefs is not uniformly continuous—in fact, the reefs are intersected by quite a numerous series of faults, and in many places they have been subjected to extensive denudation, to the extent of complete obliteration of the outcrop in places. Nevertheless at various points very remunerative mines have been established, and although, on the whole, the character of possessing a low-grade ore is attributed to these reefs, this is probably due more to the very incomplete prospecting to which the area has been subjected than to any actual lack contrasted with the better known central section of the Rand. On this subject Mr. Bleloch makes the apposite observation that “it is not reasonable to think that only the richest portions of the Witwatersrand zones have been laid open on the surface, and that the sections which remain covered are poor. It is probable that many portions of these hidden areas contain reefs, if not rich at least payable, and this may especially be hoped for in that region where the reefs are completely hidden, and at the two ends of which, where they are exposed, they are found to be payable.”
General View of Surface Works. Witwatersrand Gold-Mining Co.
(Photo by Horace W. Nicholls, Johannesburg)
The eastern section of this greater Rand is about 30 miles in extent, or 140 miles if the contours of the outcrops be followed. In the western section the conglomerate may be followed for 90 miles as far as Klerksdorp, when the formation swerves back to the Vaal River. So far back as 1890 gold-bearing reefs on the banks of the Vaal River were known, and identified by experts as the south-western rim of the Witwatersrand basin; but lack of railway facilities and cheap coal then precluded their profitable working. This district is now surrounded by railways, and the circumstances are so improved that the possibility of creating a new Rand in the locality is regarded as feasible by both experts and capitalists, as, albeit only low-grade ore has as yet been met with, this is properly held to be hardly a fair index of what lies below, for experience in the Central Rand has shown that the reefs often improve lower down. The recently reported “new discoveries” of reefs actually refer to this particular district.
The prospect before these outlying areas of the Rand is further authoritatively confirmed by a recent report of the Commissioner of Mines, in which he observes: “While the expansion of the Witwatersrand is certain, the future of mining in the outlying districts will largely depend upon the introduction of a mining law which will give greater facilities and hold out greater rewards to the individual prospector and small capitalist.” This observation is true regarding many other mining fields in the Transvaal besides that of the Greater Rand.
Although in speaking of gold-mining in the Transvaal the Witwatersrand is usually meant, it must not be lost sight of that the Transvaal possesses other gold-fields of great potentialities and of older date. The De Kaap fields in the Barberton district were the object of attention before those of the Witwatersrand were discovered, and at one time bulked hugely in the public eye. Unknown reserves, both of alluvial and quartz gold, exist, those reefs of the latter which have been worked yielding in many cases a much higher ratio of gold to the ton than do the famed banket beds of the Witwatersrand. The Sheba mine in this district, a case in point, is one of the most remarkable gold mines in the world, nearly 90 feet of ore having been taken out of some stopes. The quartz reefs extend over a distance of 30 miles, mainly in the hilly districts, while the alluvium occurs in most of the river valleys. The development of the district in the past has been hampered by a number of remediable causes, chief among which are unscientific working, monopolist concessions, excessive railway and customs burdens, and general governmental neglect. With the removal of these, gold-mining here is believed by experts to offer prospects not inferior, perhaps, to those of the Rand. The recent Government proclamation throwing open the district to pegging, with the contemplated modifications in the Gold Law favouring prospectors, are earnests that this splendid mineral reserve will at last have that justice done to it which is its due. Next in importance to the De Kaap gold-fields come those of the Lydenburg district. The gold exists here in a similar quartz reef formation, with, also, unusually rich alluvial tracts; but not one-tenth of its resources are known, although since the start of the workings an output valued at £2,000,000 sterling has been achieved. A number of paying companies are at work, but the drawbacks under which the development of these fields labour are very much those which prevail on the Barberton fields. The northern gold-beds, including the Zoutpansberg, Klein Letaba, Murchison, Selati, &c., are likewise of the quartz formation, and they have been worked to a limited extent over a longer period than either of the two preceding fields. The Murchison gold-belt is particularly noticeable among these fields. The principal or southern reef, 18 inches in thickness, is said to extend for 18 miles, and to be workable down to 1000 feet, and to contain a gold contents of £25,000,000 sterling. The northern reef is estimated to be capable of producing £20,000,000 of gold. Development waits, in all these auriferous regions, primarily on the provision of railway facilities to get up machinery and mining requisites; and the extension of the Pietersburg line, which has been promised, or the completion of the long-projected Selati railway from where it left off, would be as the breath of life to the mining industry here. Two other promising mining fields, generally separately grouped but really a portion of the De Kaap system, are the Komati or Steynsdorp and the Swazieland gold-fields. The former exists on the Swazieland border, not far from Barberton, and is rightly regarded as merely an outlier of the mineral formations of that district. The numerous reefs have, however, only yielded as yet low-grade and refractory ores. The Swazieland fields have only been prospected in the north-west of that territory, but the results have shown that a considerable body of ore exists. Its gold output in 1898 totalled 8256 oz. Minor fields are those of Malmani, on the western border near Mafeking, the Pretoria quartz reefs, and the banket beds of Vryheid (the last now incorporated into Natal). The prospects of all these fields are very large, and their requirements are alike. Conditions tending to lessen the cost of working, and facilities to induce the advent of the prospector and to justify the investment of capital, will reverse in their cases the dubious records of the past, while adding immensely to the wealth of the Transvaal’s gold production resources.
PRITCHARD STREET, JOHANNESBURG
Photo by Horace W. Nicholls, Johannesburg
From “South Africa,” by permission.
The sum of the foregoing observations is that the future of the Transvaal mining industry presents a vista of incalculable prosperity. In the restricted area of the Central Rand alone there is a treasure of at least £2,871,000,000 awaiting appropriation; and, beyond this huge sum, there are reserves in the Greater Rand which, reckoned on the basis of mileage alone, would sixfold this amount. Moreover, as the confines of the Rand reef formation have not yet been determined, should they be found to stretch into Natal and Zululand on the one hand, or into Rhodesia on the other, as recent discoveries would seem to indicate, the productive possibilities of the future are enlarged proportionately. Apart from its banket reefs the Transvaal likewise possesses huge gold reserves in its quartz reef fields in the De Kaap, Lydenburg, Zoutpansberg, and other districts to the south-east, east, and north, not to speak of the already opened and promising grounds on the extreme west, which await development when the Rand conglomerate beds are exhausted, if they do not—as in all probability they will—receive attention beforehand. The value of these resources is attested by the best of all evidence—that of actual productive yield in the past. In the matter of circumstances, means, and paying results from mining, it has been shown, and it is incontestible, that the industry now stands, in every particular, upon a much more advantageous basis than it ever enjoyed. As regards processes and mechanical appliances, the new era opens with the substantial asset in hand represented by the accumulated skill and knowledge of past painful and costly experience and experiment, so that new mines making a start may lay down their equipments with the greatest practical certainty and economy and assurance of successful results, even on low-grade properties previously deemed unremunerative. In respect of external circumstances, the conditions are already so improved, or in course of improvement, that working costs have been—and will be more so in the future, when all the beneficent proposals contemplated by the Government, and the local advantages resulting from the new order of things have had time to come into operation—lessened to the extent of yielding substantial accretions to the dividends of the already paying mines, while facilitating the development of the deeper mines, and the multitude of minor low-grade concerns hitherto incapable of profitable working. Estimates have been adventured in the earlier part of this chapter of the amount of the saving of working costs to the extent of 10s. per ton, but this is a pure approximation, and the actual outcome is likely to be twofold or more. Similarly the yield of gold per year from the Rand central district of 37 to 40 millions is only a rough estimate, the production in the future, as in the past, being likely to be much above the forecasts, taking into view the beneficent circumstances which will henceforth rule, the full appraisement of which is at present impossible.
From “South Africa,” by permission.
Altogether, therefore, the outlook is one of undimmed brightness, for the misgivings entertained in some quarters regarding new taxation burdens to be imposed, calculated to hamper or hinder the progress of the industry, must be allowed to have no shadow of substance. The pronouncements of the Government hitherto, and the recommendations of their Transvaal adviser, are clear on this head. Taxation will naturally have to be borne, and the tax on profits was accepted in principle by the mining industry before the war. Its incidence, whatever be the amount, will only reduce to a fractional extent that portion of the yield set apart for dividends, which will bear the burden, whatever it be, with the greater ease in view of the accretion of dividends rendered possible by the new conditions. There are, indeed, grounds for assuming that a part of the agitation on foot is lacking in singleness of aim, and engineered by persons who have some secondary object to gain. The rank and file of the mining industry, as well as the best sense of the Anglo-Saxon community, has, however, confidence in the Government that it will do nothing harmful to the best interests of the new Colonies in general, and its staple industry in particular, and, moreover, will be true to the English principle of inviting the taxed to its councils. It is in this particular light that the visit of the Secretary of State for the Colonies to South Africa has such special interest at this juncture.
MILL (OR BATTERY) OF A GOLD MINE (SALISBURY AND JUBILEE, JOHANNESBURG)
The powdered ore is washed down over the plates. The deafening roar from the stamps sounds in quiet evenings, from a distance, like the roar of the sea on a rocky coast.
Photo by Barnett & Co., Johannesburg
THE AGRICULTURAL OUTLOOK
By LOUIS CRESWICKE
Almost the last message of that prophetic statesman Rhodes was characteristic: “Support Milner through thick and thin,” he curtly and emphatically said. It is therefore Lord Milner’s opinion of the future settlement of the country which should not merely be read, but marked and learnt and inwardly digested, by all who are anxious for the development of British interests in the new Colonies, and who shrink from a recurrence of the horrible scenes of the past, which owed their origin mainly to long years of vacillation on the part of Governments that “swallowed up” the Boers at one moment only to disgorge them the next. Lord Milner, as Mr. Chamberlain has put it, “is the most effective instrument in our possession.” To his subtle yet gigantic brain, to his detailed yet comprehensive labours, we are indebted for a plan out of the chaos, a practical plan by which Briton and Boer may be efficiently planted side by side on the soil for the agricultural and political well-being of the newly-acquired Colonies.
It must be remembered that the agricultural resources of the conquered territory have hitherto been inadequately developed. As it was half a century ago, so it remains to-day—a pastoral country importing its cereals, its dairy produce, and even its hay from foreign parts. The motto of the Boer has never been “Forward,” nor has industry been his strong point. The happy farmstead of five thousand acres which served to keep his ancestor, served also to keep him comfortably till the date of the war. Progress lay not with him but with the British settlers in the region of the Rand, or with the crafty Hollanders who pulled the wires of the misguided autocrat whose ambitious aim was to “stagger humanity.”
The sole appreciable advance came from Great Britain. While mining hummed apace, agriculture crept laboriously; the country, teeming with promise, remained in parts entirely barren, in others overrun by the uncombatted yellow tulip or the incango, both weeds deadly to the soil.
The veldt and the karroo, say the pessimists, offer no home for the Englishman. They moreover aver that only so long as the mines hold out will the settler remain in South Africa. But there are others, Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner among them, who see in the country the latent possibility of modern North America, or, at least, a great agricultural future which will endure long after the history of the mineral districts is a closed volume. The science of irrigation in its most modern development—“the foundation-stone on which can be built the permanent prosperity of South Africa”—is capable of transforming the profitless deserts into flowering gardens and fruitful orchards which in very few years will do more than pay their way. But to properly develop any scheme requiring eternal vigilance, industry, and foresight, it is necessary that a goodly sprinkling of the enterprising British population shall be dispersed all over the land, so that not in the towns alone will the characteristics of the dominant race be maintained.
Wellwood Farm in Graaff Reinet District
(Mixed grass and karroo veldt)
Some one has said South Africa must irrigate or perish. This may be a truism; but it is also very certain that South Africa, while irrigating, must offer homes to a leavening mass of sound and desirable British settlers before the irrigation schemes under discussion can effect the agricultural transformation which, in British hands, might speedily come to pass. The nature of this settlement and the expedition of it, from an economic, social, and political point of view, is declared by Lord Milner to be of supreme importance. A new and progressive farming population must reinforce the old; for, it is most essential “that the old condition of things shall not be reproduced, in which the race division coincided almost completely with a division of interests, the whole country population being virtually Boer, while the bulk of the industrial and commercial population was British.” The three great essentials of any successful scheme, according to Lord Milner’s showing, are these: it must have magnitude, it must deal with land of good quality, it must attract settlers of the right kind. In the matter of magnitude there are many and intricate questions to be discussed. Land settlement must be undertaken on a large scale else it will be politically unimportant, the Boer States will remain Boer States in all but name, and any money advanced by the British speculator will be like the talent hidden in a napkin—just a talent and nothing more, till the end of the chapter! The Government must assert its paternity; it must control, it must assist. On all sides simultaneous effort must be made to march in time with the progressive note that, once struck, must be continuously and consistently re-echoed throughout the length and breadth of the new Colonies. The best quality of land must invite the best quality of settler, though regulations must be sufficiently elastic to meet the wants of the settler with capital, and also those of the settler with little more than practical experience. They must vary, too, with the varying character of the farms. The reason for this necessity has concisely been explained by Lord Milner: “Take only the broad distinction between dry and irrigated farms, familiar to every South African. Evidently a much larger area is required in the former than in the latter, while the experience needed by the farmer would vary greatly in the two cases. In the former he would be mainly employed in stock-raising, while in the latter in the cultivation of cereals; and in favourable neighbourhoods market gardening would be the most profitable industry. Australian ranchers seem peculiarly suited to the high veldt, while the corn lands of the ‘Conquered Territory’ could have no better occupants than young progressive farmers from the Scottish lowlands. And there are intermediate types of farms suited to settlers of the most varied experience and resources.”
A rough draft of the terms on which the Orange River Colony Government proposed to offer Government land to British settlers affords an insight into the big projects that are afoot. The draft was submitted to the British Government about the middle of 1902 in order that sanction might be given to the principle of the conditions set forth. Here—abbreviated—are the conditions of lease:—
“The settler shall pay the annual rent due by him to the Government in half-yearly instalments, the first of which shall be due six months after his taking possession. The settler holding under a lease shall have the right, with the approval of the Government, at any time after the completion of his first year’s tenancy, to enter upon the system of purchase by instalments, by giving three months’ notice to the Government of his intention to do so before the date when his next half-yearly instalment falls due. In that case his leasehold tenure shall be held to cease from the date of the payment of such instalment, and he shall be entitled to acquire the land on the same terms as a settler taking it on the purchase system, save and except that he shall not have a year’s grace before beginning to purchase by instalments, but that the first of his sixty half-yearly instalments shall become due six months after the date of his last payment under the lease. Every lease shall be for five years, but shall be renewable at the option of the settler for a further period of five or ten years.”
The grounds on which the Government may cancel the lease shall be the following:—
“Failure to pay in full any half-yearly instalment of rent, or any sum due in respect of advances within three months of its becoming due.
“Neglect to cultivate the land in a proper and husbandlike manner to the satisfaction of the Government, or to apply any money advanced by the Government for the purpose specified.
“Conviction for any criminal offence punishable by death or by imprisonment without option of a fine.”
The Government will be prepared to make advances to the settler for such permanent improvements as the Government may approve, such as drainage, fencing, farm buildings, tree-planting, the sinking of wells, making of roads, reclamation of waste land, or any other work calculated to permanently enhance the value of the land, provided—
“That the sum of such advances shall not at any time exceed the capital which the settler has himself expended, or can satisfy the Government that he is prepared to expend, in connection with the cultivation of the land.
“That the total outstanding amount at any one time shall not exceed five times the rent of the land.”
All advances made by the Government in accordance with the foregoing section shall be repaid by the settler with interest at £5 per centum within ten years by twenty equal half-yearly instalments.
Among the conditions of purchase it is stated:—
“The settler shall acquire the freehold of the land by paying to the Government for the period of thirty years an annual sum amounting to £5, 15s. per centum of the purchase price. This annual sum shall be paid in two half-yearly instalments of £2, 17s. 6d. per centum of such price.... If the settler affix to his holding any engine, machinery, or any other fixture, or erect a building which he is not authorised by the Government to affix or erect, the said fixture or building shall be the property of the settler and removable by him within a reasonable time after the cancellation of his contract, provided that he first discharges all debts due by him to the Government, and that after the removals he makes good any unavoidable damage thereby occasioned. The settler must give one month’s notice of his intention to remove such fixture or building, and on receipt of such notice the Government may elect to purchase such fixtures or building after a valuation as provided for.”
During the currency of the contract of purchase the settler will not be liable to pay any quit-rent or land-tax, or to make any other payment to the Government than those provided for by the contract. But from the time of the land becoming the freehold of the settler under any of the provisions it shall be subject to any quit-rent or land tax payable to the Government, to which any other freehold land may from time to time be subject, according to the laws of the Orange River Colony. The settler shall be liable, both before and after the acquisition of the freehold, to pay any rates which may be lawfully levied on the land for local purposes, but such rates shall not, during the period of thirty and a half years from the date of the settler’s taking possession under the contract of purchase, exceed 1d. per £1 per annum of the purchase price of the land.
In reply to the Colonial Secretary’s telegram stating his belief that the settlement of farmers from England would not be successful unless the farms were close together, Lord Milner answered: “I quite agree that farmers from home should not be isolated. But we want farms of various characters. Dry farms, as you suppose, are much in demand by Australians. I have a number of excellent applicants of this class, and could to-morrow dispose of twice as many dry farms as we possess in healthy parts of the Transvaal to selected Australasians who have served in war and have agricultural experience and some capital. Generally speaking, I do not think it desirable to encourage agricultural settlers from home. It would be better to give the first chance to the men on the spot, whether oversea colonists or yeomen. This would not permanently exclude men from home, as a long time must elapse before we can deal with some of the land we have, and I hope to go on acquiring more. But land immediately available should be offered to those already here who cannot afford to wait.”
Everything mainly depends on the size of the settlement scheme. To be of use it must be rapidly pushed forward with all the vigour that the Government can bring to bear on the subject. The ball, once effectively set rolling, would then move by the force of its own impetus. First some three or four thousand settlers on land acquired by Government would set the example, and quickly, round them would flock private persons from the oversea Colonies or Great Britain who, discovering that the Government meant business, would follow suit, acquire land, and settle down in British constellations, so that the sharp social and political division between town and country would cease to exist and the past state of agricultural stagnation could never return. Thus, much would be done “to consolidate South African sentiment in the general interests of the Empire.”
A Farm in the Karroo Proper
(A typical stone-faced earth bank of a water dam in foreground)
In regard to the quality of the land, a very small quantity of the land available in the Transvaal is suited to British settlers, and but little, though excellent, Government land is to be obtained in the Orange River Colony. In both Colonies most of the land is privately owned. Much of this land may come into the market, and many farmers may be found willing to part with a portion of their property in order to obtain capital for the restocking of the other portion. But, thinks Lord Milner, unless the Government is armed with a general power of expropriation—not necessarily for use save in emergency—it will be impossible to get sufficient land, or even to make the best use of the land we already have or may hereafter acquire by voluntary purchase. For, knowing his Boer through and through, he rightly assumes that one or two recalcitrant owners might prevent an irrigation scheme for a whole district, or otherwise obstruct the distribution of a given area into farms suitable for settlers. But, far from wishing to dispossess the Boer farmer and create a class of landless and discontented men, Lord Milner expresses his belief that it is our duty and interest to preserve the Boer as a farmer though not as a large negligent landowner. Unless land is purchased and British settlers are speedily installed, an opportunity will be lost which will never recur, and neglect of the present may endanger the future peace and prosperity of South Africa. In fact, the key to the situation, the key to the gate which will let in a steady influx of agricultural immigrants, is made up of two things—powers of expropriation and money.
There are naturally many quibblers belonging to the “Foreigners’ friend and Britons’ foe” party who look askance at these proposals, and, indeed, at any proposals which might endow colonisation with what they call a political, but which should properly be termed an Imperial, trend. The idea of outnumbering the Dutch inhabitants seems to them preposterous—even vindictive. They would prefer the British Government and the British taxpayers, in matters connected with their own policy and their own expenditure, to be out-voiced by the inhabitants of the territory they have spent blood and treasure to conquer. But to discuss the arguments of these quibblers would be sheer waste of time and of space. Obstructions ever have their value. As the impediment in the shell of the oyster brings about the growth of the pearl, so the obstruction in the bivalve of politics has brought forth the jewel of Imperial solidarity.
But it may as well be mentioned that the expropriation suggestion which also excites the ire of Radicals, is by no means an invention solely directed against the Boers in the conquered States. The precedent is to be found in the legislation of New Zealand. The Land for Settlements Act, 1894, enables the Government of that Colony, if no private agreement can be arrived at, to take land compulsorily for settlement, subject to a price fixed by valuation and a certain compensation.
As regards settlers—the third great essential of Lord Milner’s scheme—the future looks rosy enough. There are many who served in the war and have a right to preference, who are eager to live on the land and farm it, and who do not seek to acquire it merely as a speculation or a makeshift. Hundreds of hale and hearty fellows, men of experience and resource, men who have the pluck to succeed, and men who have the courage to challenge failure, have already offered themselves and wait patiently till their turn may arrive. Were the land forthcoming, it would not be exaggeration to say that some 10,000 and more of our fellow-countrymen would be cultivating it within the twelvemonth.