THE BATTLE OF VERDUN
A battle which was destined to last much longer than the entire Franco-German war of 1870–1871, and which absorbed the efforts of Germany throughout the year, began on February 21st, 1916.
The choice of this battlefield was perhaps less paradoxical than has been said. For the German High Command to take Verdun was to crush the French right, capture an important strategical position and secure an immense moral effect. Moreover, the enemy feared an Allied offensive and was disturbed by the continued increase of their strength in men and material. To forestall this offensive was to make it fail and keep the initiative of the operations. Moreover, the Germans desired to impress the public opinion of the world, which had begun to doubt their ultimate victory. Greece and Roumania seemed inclined to abandon their neutrality, and the time appeared ripe to prove by a crushing blow that German force had not diminished. Lastly, they were influenced by home political considerations; the rationing of the population had depressed the public morale and provoked dissension between the political parties and the states; the prestige of the Crown Prince, after his failure in the Argonne, had considerably declined; a great victory was necessary to strengthen German morale, appease dissension and, by rehabilitating the Crown Prince, enhance the prestige of the Imperial family.
GENERALS JOFFRE AND PÉTAIN AT THE G.H.Q. OF THE 2ND FRENCH ARMY AT
SOUILLY, IN FEBRUARY, 1916.
The Germans, who had fourteen railways at their disposal, and who, during a long and careful preparation, had concentrated seven army corps and extraordinarily powerful artillery, comprising at least 3,000 guns of all calibres, attacked the French, who had a river in their rear and whose one solitary broad-gauge railway was under enemy gun-fire. By sacrificing men and material on a lavish scale the enemy counted on rapidly overcoming all obstacles, level the French trenches, crush the centres of resistance under a deluge of 17-inch, 15-inch and 12-inch shells, isolate them with barrage fire from 8-inch guns and poison-gas shells, and occupy the destroyed positions—such were to be the German tactics. They were so sure, by repeated smashing blows, of breaking through between Bras and Douaumont, and, by their attack on Verdun, of forcing the French to withdraw their wings, that they neglected first to attack the French positions on the left bank and in the Woevre plain, with the result that their colossal effort broke down before the tenacious resistance and heroism of the French.
THE “SACRED WAY,” AND THE NARROW-GAUGE MEUSE RAILWAY.
In February, 1916, only one broad-gauge railway connected Verdun, via St. Menehould, with the rest of France. At the outset of the offensive it was cut by enemy gun-fire between Parois and Dombasle. There remained the narrow-gauge Meuse railway and the road. The carrying capacity of the former was increased to 2,000 tons per day, while the motor service along the “Sacred Way” was organised to such a pitch that it was able to ensure the transport of the troops, the evacuation of the wounded and the revictualling of 250,000 combatants.