CIRCULAR TO THE GOVERNORS OF THE STATES.
Office of Finance, February 15th, 1782.
Sir,
In the circular letter, which I did myself the honor to transmit on the 19th day of October last, I stated our situation as clearly and explicitly as I could, so that you might be in a capacity to form a solid judgment as to what would be proper. I am now to inform you, that the most recent and authentic information from Europe, contains the reiterated determination on the part of France, to grant us no further pecuniary aid. Spain appears to have neither the inclination nor the ability to afford any, and in Holland it can only be obtained from individuals, who will always require security, and of consequence will not lend to the United States, who as you well know have no security to give. The want of proper funds has so reduced domestic credit, that we can draw no resources from thence, and until domestic credit is established, foreign credit cannot exist, for it is absurd to expect, that foreigners will confide in a government, which has not the confidence of its own citizens.
It is hardly possible to describe the consequences, which have followed on a loss of credit. We have seen the people diffident, jealous, and unhappy, nor have they yet recovered, even where the removal of undue restrictions has given them time to breathe from the load of oppression. But the public is, if possible, in a still worse situation. No persons will trust the public from a deep apprehension of ruin if they should, and consequently our operations must be bounded by the taxes, which can be collected, while at the same time we must contend for our very existence as a free country at an expense, which we cannot limit because we cannot limit the efforts made against us. Whenever proper methods shall have been taken to restore credit, the benefits arising from it will be as evident to all, as the want is now, to those who are intrusted with the administration. Our expense at this moment is greater than it ought to be, though less than it was, and I cannot retrench, because I have not sufficient means in my power, and have not at this moment any certain reliance on sufficient aid from the several States.
I am much inclined to believe, that individuals in the several Legislatures are unacquainted with the real state of affairs, or flatter themselves that they are better than they really are, even after information. If gentlemen would consider seriously the situation of the public servants, they would at least not suspect them of describing our dangers as greater than they are. They could not, for instance suppose, that I would give a high coloring to the disorders of our finances, because they must see, that on the contrary, I should derive a degree of credit from the general belief, that such disorders do not exist. And when I declare my apprehensions, I injure so far my own operations. My reason for describing our situation in its true light is, that the States may be excited to grant us relief. I might by an appearance of wealth extend my operations for a little while, but in the end they would fail, and how we should then be extricated, no man can tell. At present I must bear the evils, which result from the want of resources, and limit my views accordingly, but it would be madness to inculcate an opinion, that things are worse than they are, because then I could not derive the full benefit of those resources which we have. You must, therefore, be convinced, that I give you no exaggerated account, and I trust, Sir, that your Legislature will give due weight to assertions, which they have every reason to believe, and which if neglected, they will be convinced of by a melancholy and perhaps fatal experience.
Many people flatter themselves with the hope of peace. But on what is it founded? Has the enemy given the slightest evidence of a desire for it? Instead of suing for peace, they talk only of war; they prepare only for war; and when they might have got rid of one enemy by a word, they disdained it. Although Holland offered a separate peace, England refused to accept it; nor have we heard that she has agreed even to negotiate for, much less to conclude, a general peace. She enjoys full credit, and therefore she can carry on the war; and the object of it on her part is so great, that therefore she will carry on the war. Hitherto she has carried it on alone and unsupported. Years have elapsed since it was pretended, that she could not find resources for another campaign, and yet campaigns have succeeded each other with increasing expense, and are still likely to go on. With a credit like hers, there can be no want of the means, and therefore we have no reason to expect that she will be deprived of them while that credit exists. How soon she may find associates, or how soon we may lose them, no man can say. While the mutability of all human affairs continues to be the theme of common and daily observation, no wise man will rely on the frailty of human opinion, and yet opinion may in a moment sway the politics of different powers, so as totally to change all present appearances. While the war continues England has hope. The times and chances which happen to all may favor her, and at worst she can conclude a peace, which cannot be much more pernicious than the loss of these States. We ought therefore to expect that Great Britain will continue the war, and we ought even to expect that she will find allies to assist her in it. We ought therefore to prepare ourselves for increasing efforts of opposition.
But admitting that negotiations were opened, and in a train of effect, what then would be our situation? Are we in capacity to insist on useful and honorable terms? There is hardly a State in the Union but has an interest in objects, which under our present circumstances are unattainable. While the enemy continue in possession of New York and Charleston, we cannot expect such a peace as every good American ought to desire. Nor shall we obtain that security, without which peace is no longer a blessing.
The successes of the last campaign will undoubtedly derange the plans of the enemy for a time, but whether or not those successes will prove decisive must depend upon ourselves. If we indolently lie still until the enemy can obtain reinforcements, our prospects at the close of next campaign may be as gloomy as at the opening of the last. If we exert ourselves to strike the enemy before he can receive aid, we may perhaps drive him entirely away, and then indeed we shall have reason to expect peace. It has been the common trick of the enemy to pretend at every success we have obtained, nay during every winter of the war, that it would immediately cease, and they have had emissaries among us to inculcate that idea. The consequences have been, that we have never been in a state of preparation as soon as they have, notwithstanding the Atlantic ocean lies between the two countries, and places them at least three months asunder as to all military operations.
No thinking man can hesitate a moment in the opinion, that we ought to prepare for an early and vigorous campaign, in order to take New York and Charleston. But some persons of sanguine temperament say, that the enemy will evacuate one of these places. If it be so, surely they will be so much stronger at the other, and of course it will be so much the more difficult to expel them from it. Possibly they may incline to evacuate one of these places, and if so they will be determined by the knowledge of our force. If we are formidable it will be an additional reason with them for evacuation. But other persons still more sanguine suppose, that they will evacuate both places. This is surely absurd, for even if they negotiate for peace, they will hold something as a ground, on which to make demands, and if they prosecute war, they will certainly not abandon the objects of it. Admitting, however, that the enemy may have some thoughts of this sort, surely the determination will be greatly influenced by the consideration of our relative force or imbecility. And even if they should entirely quit the United States, still there are objects well worth fighting for, objects too which cannot be obtained without fighting.
Every reason, therefore, combines in showing the propriety of commencing our operations very early, and, therefore, everything has been done for the purpose, which the means in my power would admit of. It remains only with the several States to provide men and money, and to make that provision as early as possible; for the old adage, that "he who gives early doubles thereby his gift," can never be more applicable than on the present occasion. For whatever may be the different opinions of different men, all must agree, that the only way to secure peace is to be prepared for war. And depend upon it, that if we neglect the present moment, we shall have bitter cause to lament our negligence.
In the letter before mentioned, I did myself the honor to observe, that I expected the future expenditures would be greatly curtailed. This has happened, but I also observed, that the most rigid economy had its bounds, and could not exist without the punctual performance of those engagements, on which the first steps towards it must depend. I have not yet reached those bounds, for reasons I have already stated, and how long it will be before I arrive at them, must depend on the ability to perform the engagements I have made; and surely it is unnecessary to add, that this ability must depend on the exertions of the States. I mentioned also, that I should shortly advertise for contracts, as the most effectual means of husbanding our resources.
With respect to this matter of contracts, I have some reason to believe that it has been misunderstood, and, therefore, I shall take the liberty, of giving some little information on the subject. When I was called into office, I had a thorough conviction, that supplying by contracts was the most effectual and most economical, but I had no money, and credit was at so low an ebb, that most people doubted whether any one would contract. At that time, the State of Pennsylvania gave me assurances of hard money to procure the articles of specific supplies due from that State on the requisition of Congress. I immediately purchased a part of those supplies on my private and personal credit and assurances, and I advertised for a contract to supply rations at Philadelphia. By degrees I extended the contracts throughout Pennsylvania; whereas, if I had advertised for them at once, I might, probably, have failed in obtaining proposals; or if not, those who inclined to risk it would have made the public pay dear for the credit reposed in the Minister. The contracts of Pennsylvania were paid out of moneys granted for furnishing the supplies, and the articles are carried to account on the requisitions. Having reason to expect support from the middle and eastern States, I have extended the contracts for supplies through all the country northward and eastward of Potomac river; and in order that you may judge of the effect, I will mention, that, on application for pay to the department of the issuing Commissary, I required a return of them, and of their monthly pay; which being made, I found that within that district it amounted to ten thousand five hundred and twentyfive dollars; which is annually for the salary alone, exclusive of all other expenses, one hundred and twenty six thousand dollars.
The rations delivered at West Point and its dependencies are supplied at the rate of nine and a half ninetieths of a dollar for each ration; consequently, that sum will yield one million one hundred and ninetysix thousand five hundred and twentysix rations, which is something more than three thousand two hundred and seventyeight per day. But when it is considered, that salaries were not the only expenses of a department, it is certainly estimating within bounds to suppose, that five thousand soldiers are now fed every day on what it formerly cost the public to support the issuers of provisions in a part of the United States. I should have pursued the business of contracting throughout America, had I received any assurances of taxation, which would warrant the procedure. But I had none, and I did not dare risk myself in making engagements, which I found no probability of keeping. But whenever I can see any way clear, I shall certainly do it, and, I trust, that the effects will be as beneficial as they have been elsewhere.
Having already observed on the necessity of early and vigorous exertions, and mentioned that I had done everything towards them which was in my power, I have only to add, that unless we are properly supported, everything so done has been thrown away. The views of the Commander in Chief will be disappointed; the combinations intended with our allies will be deranged, and the enemy will derive that advantage from our negligence, which we might have derived from their weakness.
It gives me great pain to learn that the public service is too often interrupted, and the attention of men diverted from it by little trivial disputes of a private, partial, or local nature, which are comparatively of little consequence. This is a conduct unworthy of wise men, and such as cannot be justified. Surely it is best first to provide for the defence of our country before we squabble about minute objects of controversy. If we should be told that the British were so materially divided in their Parliament, that in contentions about trivial disputes they delayed granting to the Crown effectual aid of money, we should certainly form very splendid expectations from that circumstance. Judge then, whether our enemy's hopes are not raised by our dissensions. Or rather let me ask, if they have not loudly asserted that they would prove ruinous to the cause of independence; nay, have they not boasted that those dissensions originated in British influence or British gold? What then must be the opinion of foreigners and strangers? What will they not conclude from a conduct, which according to their habits of reasoning, can only be accounted for by disaffection, folly, or madness? Let us, for heaven's sake, while engaged in a cause the most honorable, the most virtuous, and which must endear the present generation to future ages; let us preserve a conduct noble, dignified, and worthy of that glorious cause; in pursuit of the greatest, the dearest object which man can possess; in the fair road to peace, liberty, and safety, let us not fall out by the way. But united to, and supporting each other, let our efforts be equal to our claims, and let us show that we have the perseverance to obtain what we had the spirit to demand. Let us at once become independent; really and truly independent; independent of our enemies, of our friends, of all but the Omnipotent.
I have the honor to be, &c.
ROBERT MORRIS.