WILLIAM CAROL[1]
[Footnote 1: Reproduced in condensed form from The World's Work by the kind permission of Doubleday, Page & Co.]
In order to understand the situation in Mexico, it is necessary to get firmly in our minds that there are in reality two Mexicos. One may be called American Mexico and the other Mexican Mexico.
The representative of the new, half-formed northern or American Mexico was Francisco Madero—rich, educated, well mannered, honest, and idealistically inclined. The representative of the old Mexico is Huerta—"rough, plain, old Indian," as he describes himself, pugnacious, crafty, ignorant of political amenities, without understanding of any rule except the rule of blood and powder.
By the law of 1894 Diaz changed the character of the land titles in Mexico. Many smaller landowners, unable to prove their titles under the new system, lost their holdings, which in large measure eventually fell into the hands of a few rich men. In the feudal south this did not cause so much disturbance. But in the north the growing middle class bitterly resented it. Madero became the spokesman of this discontent. In his books and in his program of reform, "the plan of San Luis Potosi," he attacked the Diaz regime. And then in 1910 he joined the rebel band organized by Pascual Orozco in the mountains of Chihuahua. With his weakened army Diaz was unable to cope with this revolution, and in October, 1911, Madero became President.
The country was then at peace, except for the band of robbers led by Zapata in the provinces of Morelos and Guerrero. These are and have been the most atrocious of the many bandits with which Mexico is infested. No outrage or barbarity known to savages have they left untried. Madero attempted to buy them off, but to no avail. He then sent military forces against them, one column commanded by General Huerta, but with no success.
In the mean time, Pascual Orozco, who emerged from the Madero revolution as a great war hero in his own State, was given no post of responsibility under the new Government, but was left as commander of the militia in the State of Chihuahua. The adherents of the old Diaz régime took this opportunity to win him over to their side, for Orozco's fighting was done purely for profit, not for principle. A reactionary movement, with Orozco at its head, broke out in February, 1912. Five thousand men were quickly got together. The Madero Administration—a Northern Administration in the Southern country—was not fully organized, and, with the army not yet rehabilitated, found itself seriously embarrassed. Had Orozco been an intelligent and competent leader he probably could have marched straight through to Mexico City at that time, as the only governmental troops that were available to fight him were only about sixteen hundred, which he defeated and nearly annihilated at Rellano in Chihuahua. Their commander, General Gonzalez Salas, Madero's war minister, committed suicide after the defeat.
The only general available at the time who had had experience in handling large forces in the field was Victoriano Huerta. Although he had never especially distinguished himself, Huerta's record shows that he was one of the most progressive members of the army.
Huerta's column encountered little resistance. Chihuahua City was occupied on July 7th, and later, Juarez. The rebels were not pursued to any extent away from the railroads. They separated into bands, keeping up a guerrilla warfare, raiding American mining camps and ranches, and seizing and holding Americans and others for ransom. Prominent among these leaders of banditti was Inez Salazar, a former rock driller in an American mine, who raised a force in Chihuahua and declared against Madero. Little was done to destroy these rebel bands by the Federals, and no engagements of any size took place. In fact, it was a current rumor that the Federals did not wish to put them down. In the first place, the regular army was the same old Diaz organization which considered Madero largely as a usurper and which remained with the established Government in a rather lukewarm manner. Besides, the bands of Orozco, Salazar, and others were instigated and supported by the adherents of the old regime, and, although opposed to the Mexican army, both had many ideas in common regarding the Madero Administration. Furthermore, the officers and men of the army were receiving large increases of pay for the campaign.
An instance showing this disposition on the part of the Federals occurred in the State of Sonora in October, 1912. General Obregon, now the commander of the Sonora State forces, was at that time a colonel of the army and had his battalion, composed largely of Maya Indians, at Agua Prietá, just across the border from Douglas, Ariz. Salazar's band of rebels had crossed the mountains from Chihuahua and had come into Sonora. Popular clamor forced the Federal commander at Agua Prietá to do something, and accordingly he ordered Obregon to take his battalion, proceed south, get in touch with Salazar, and "remain in observation." Salazar was looting the ranch of a friend of Obregon's near Fronteras. The rebel had taken no means to secure his bivouac against surprise; his men were scattered around engaged in slaughtering cattle, cooking, and making camp for the night. Obregon deployed his force and charged Salazar's camp. Forty of Salazar's men were killed, and a machine gun and a number of horses, mules, and rifles were captured; whereupon Salazar left that part of the country. Upon Obregon's return to Agua Prietá he was severely reprimanded and nearly court-martialed for disobeying his orders in not "remaining in observation" of Salazar, and attacking him instead. Had Obregon been given a free hand, he undoubtedly could have destroyed Salazar's force.
After Salazar's defeat at Fronteras, he moved east again, and about a month later appeared near Palomas, a town about three miles from the international boundary south of Columbus, N.M. At Palomas there was a Federal detachment of about one hundred and thirty men under an old colonel. They had been sent there to protect various cattle interests in that vicinity; and they had a considerable amount of money, equipment, and ammunition for maintaining and providing rations and forage for themselves and for some outlying detachments. Salazar, hearing of this, demanded that the money and equipment be immediately surrendered. Upon being refused, Salazar, with about three hundred and fifty men, attacked. A furious battle was fought, ending in a house-to-house fight with grenades—cans filled with dynamite, with fuse attached, which are thrown by hand. Salazar's force captured the town after the Federals had suffered more than 50 per cent. in casualties, including the Federal commander, who was wounded several times; the rebels suffered more than 30 per cent. casualties. The town, in the mean time, was wrecked. This particular instance shows that the Mexicans fight and fight well from a standpoint of physical courage. The general idea that the Mexicans would not fight, which Americans obtained during this period, was obtained because they did not care to in the majority of cases.
Meanwhile, General Huerta, having "finished" his Chihuahua campaign in the autumn of 1912, was promoted to the rank of General of Division (Major-General) and decorated for his achievement. It was rumored in many places at that time that General Huerta was about to turn against the Madero Government. Madero, suspecting his loyalty, ordered him back to Mexico City. Huerta took his time about obeying this order, and, when he reported in Mexico City, obtained a sick-leave to have his eyes treated. Huerta was nearly blind when Felix Diaz's revolt broke out in Vera Cruz in October, 1912, and probably thus escaped being drawn into that unsuccessful demonstration.
From this time until the coup d'etat of February 8, 1913, there was no large organized resistance to the Madero Administration, although banditism increased at an alarming rate in all parts of the Republic. The Diaz-Reyes outburst, in Mexico City on February 8, 1913, which resulted in the death of Madero and Suarez and the elevation of Huerta to practical military dictatorship, was brought about by the adherents of the old regime, who looked upon Madero's extinction as a punishment meted out to a criminal who had raised the slaves against their masters. This view prevailed to a considerable extent in Mexico south of San Luis Potosi. In the North, however, the people almost as a whole (at least 90 per cent. in Sonera, and only to a slightly lesser extent in the other provinces) saw in it the cold-blooded murder of their political idol at the hands of unscrupulous moneyed interests and of adherents of the old regime of the days of Porfirio Diaz.
The resentment was general in the North—this new, largely Americanized North, Venustiano Carranza, the governor of Coahuila, organized the resistance in the provinces of Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas, while Maytorena, the governor of Sonora, and Pesqueira (later in Washington, D.C., as Carranza's representative), with Obregon as the head of their military forces, rapidly cleared that State of Federals, with the exception of the port of Guaymas. These fights were no mere bloodless affairs, but stubbornly contested, with heavy casualties, as a decided principle was involved in the conflict. Villa, the old bandit and personal enemy of Huerta, organized a force in Sonora, and Urbina did likewise in northern Durango. Arms, and especially money to buy them with, were hard to get. Funds were obtained from the tariff at ports of entry, internal taxation, amounting at times to practical confiscation, contributions, and gifts from various sources. It is said that the Madero family put aside $1,000,000, gold, for this purpose.
Though a few individuals went over to the Constitutionalist cause, the Mexican regular army remained true to the ad interim Government. The revolutionists either held or rapidly possessed themselves of the great railroad lines in the majority of cases. Huerta, who is an excellent organizer, soon appreciated the magnitude of the revolt and rushed troops to the north as rapidly as possible, his strategy being to hold all railroad lines and cities with strong columns which would force the revolutionists to operate in the intervals between the railroads. Then Huerta, with these columns as a supporting framework, pushed out mobile columns for the destruction of the rebel bands.
The Carranzistas understood this plan and, to meet it, tore up all the railroads that they could and adopted as their fixed plan never to risk a general engagement of a large force. For the first few months, the rebels, who had adopted the name of Constitutionalists, continued recruiting their forces and destroying the railroads. The Federals tried to repair the railroads and get enough troops into the north to cope with this movement. They obtained new military equipment of all descriptions, the army was increased, and old rebels, such as Orozco and Salazar, sympathizers or tools of the old régime, were taken into the Federal forces as irregulars and given commands.
To understand the apparent slowness of the Federals in moving from place to place and their inability to pursue the rebels away from the railroads, some idea must be given as to their system of operating. The officers of the regular army are well instructed and quite competent. The enlisted men, however, come from the lowest strata of society, and, except in the case of a foreign war, have to be impressed into the ranks. They bring their women with them to act as cooks and to transport their food and camp equipage. Military transportation, that is to say, baggage trains of four-mule wagons and excellent horses for the artillery, does not exist in the Mexican army. In fact, when away from a railroad, the "soldaderas," as the women are called, carry nearly everything; and they obtain the food necessary for the soldiers' rations. A commissariat, as we understand it, does not exist. This ties the Federals to the railroads, as they can not carry enough ammunition and food for any length of time.
On the other hand, those who first saw Obregon's rebel forces in Sonora and Villa's in Chihuahua were surprised at their organization. There were no women taken with them. They had wagons, regular issues of rations and ammunition, a paymaster, and the men were well mounted and armed.
With Obregon, also, were regiments of Yaqui Indians, who are excellent fighting material. These forces were mobile, and could easily operate away from the railroad. They lacked artillery, without which they were greatly handicapped, especially in the attack on fortified places and on stone or adobe towns. As most of the horses and mules were driven away from the railroads, the insurgents could get all the animals they wanted.
The first large battle occurred on May 9-10-11-12th outside of Guaymas, between Ojeda's Federals and Obregon's Constitutionalists, at a place called Santa Rosa. The Federal advance north consisted of about twelve hundred men and eighteen pieces of artillery. They were opposed by about four thousand men under Obregon, without artillery. Eight hundred Federals were killed and all their artillery captured. The Constitutionalists lost two hundred and fifty men killed and wounded. Comparatively few Federals returned to Guaymas. Each side killed all the wounded that they found, and also all captives who refused to enlist in the captor's force. This success was not followed up and Guaymas remained in the hands of the Federals. The artillery captured by the Constitutionalists had had the breech blocks removed to render them unserviceable; new ones, however, were made in the shops at Cananca by a German mechanician named Klaus.
In the summer, Urbina captured the city of Durango, annihilating the Federals. The city was given over to loot and the greatest excesses were indulged in by the victors. Arson, rape, and the robbing of banks, stores, and private houses were indiscriminately carried on. Horses were stabled in the parlors of the homes of the prosperous citizens, and many non-combatants were killed by the soldiers before order was restored.
At this time the only points held by the Federals on the boundary between the United States and Mexico were Juarez, in Chihuahua, and Nuevo Laredo, in Tamaulipas. The railroads south of these points were also in the physical possession of the Federals but subject to continual interruption at the hands of the Constitutionalists. Venustiano Carranza had established headquarters at Ciudad Porfirio Diaz (Piedras Negras) across the Rio Grande from Eagle Pass, Tex. He started on a trip, during the late summer, through the northern provinces to confer with the leaders of the Constitutionalist movement in order to bring about better coordination of effort on their part. He went through the States of Coahuila, Durango, Chihuahua, and Sonora and established a new headquarters in Sonora. Since then the efforts of the Constitutionalists have been much better coordinated, with the result that they have had much better success.
Jesus Carranza and Pablo Gonzalez were left in charge at Ciudad Porfirio Diaz by Venustiano Carranza when he left on his trip. Shortly after this a Federal column was organized under General Maas for the capture of the railroad between Saltillo and Ciudad Porfirio Diaz. This column slowly worked its way to Monclova and then to Ciudad Porfirio Diaz, which it occupied on October 7th; the Constitutionalists ripped up the railroad and destroyed everything that might be useful to the Federals and a good deal that could not, and offered very little resistance. Villa, in the mean time, having been reenforced by men from Durango and some from Sonora, had been operating in Chihuahua with considerable success. He had fallen on several small Federal columns, destroyed them, and obtained about six pieces of artillery, besides a fresh supply of rifles and ammunition. In September, he had interposed his force between the Federals at Chihuahua City and Torreon, at a place called Santa Rosalía. Villa and the Federals each had about four thousand men. The Federals from the south were making a determined attempt to retake Durango and had started two columns for Torreon of more than two thousand men each, one west from Saltillo, another north from Zacatecas. These had to repair the railroad as they went. Torreon was being held by about one thousand Federal soldiers.
Villa was well informed of these movements, and also of the fact that, in their anxiety to take Durango, a Federal force of about 800 men, under General Alvirez, was to leave Torreon before the arrival of the Saltillo and Zacatecas columns. Having the inner line, Villa with his mobile force could maneuver freely against any one of these. He accordingly left a rear guard in front of the Federals at Santa Rosalía, and, marching south rapidly, met and completely defeated General Alvirez's Federal column about eighteen miles west of Torreon, near the town of Aviles. General Alvirez and 287 of his men were killed, fighting to the last.
Villa then turned toward Torreon. The "soldaderas" of Alvirez's force had escaped when the fight at Aviles began and reached Torreon, quickly spreading the news. The Federal officer in command attempted to round them up, but to no avail, and Torreon's weak garrison became panic stricken, put up a feeble resistance, and evacuated the town. Villa occupied it on the night of October 1st. He sent his mounted troops against the Federal columns from Saltillo and Zacatecas, tearing up the railroad around them, until they both retreated. He maintained splendid order in Torreon; sent a detachment of one officer and twenty-five men to the American consul to protect American interests, and stationed patrols throughout the city with orders to shoot all looters. At first, a few stores containing provisions and clothing were looted, and some Spaniards who were supposed to be aiding the Federals were killed, but the pillaging soon stopped. Villa's occupation of Torreon thus contrasted strikingly with Urbina's occupation of Durango.
The capture of Torreon made precarious the military position of the Federals in Chihuahua, as Torreon was their principal supply point. When Villa's advance reached Santa Rosalía, the Federals evacuated their fortified position at that place and concentrated all available troops at Chihuahua City. They expected that a decided attempt would be made by Villa to take it. The Federals did succeed in repelling small attacks against Chihuahua on November 6th-9th and, to strengthen their garrison, they reduced the troops in Juarez until only 400 remained. Villa, while keeping up the investment of Chihuahua City, prepared a force for a dash on Juarez, and on the night of November 14th-15th the Federal garrison at that place was completely surprised and the city was captured.
These are the main events (to December 1st) that marked this chapter in the inevitable struggle between the new Mexico and the old, before the United States by interfering actively in the tumult changed the entire character of the war. The Carranza practise of killing the wounded shows that even the North has much to learn in civilized methods of warfare. On the other hand, the self-restraint exercised, in many cases, against looting captured towns, indicates that progress has been made. This account also indicates that the new Mexico, in aims as well as in material things, is getting the upper hand.