CONSTRUCTIVE FORCES OF THE EMPIRE
Had the age of the empire been merely a period of decay, it certainly would not have had the strength to accomplish a work of civilisation which is practically operative in Latin countries to this day. And as a matter of fact, nothing can be less correct than such an assertion, witnessing, as it does, to a very slight acquaintance with the period in question. Rather must we say that republican Rome would not have been equal to the task; a new empire had to arise, upon a fresh basis, stable at home and strong abroad, assuring and guaranteeing legal protection and security throughout the world, in order to accomplish this pacific mission. The Roman body politic was in the throes of dissolution; in a peaceful reign of half a century Augustus created it anew, and if his work does not bear the stamp of genius, if we cannot exonerate it from the charge of a certain incompleteness, yet with slight modifications it held the Roman empire together for three centuries, and stood the test of practical working. Had Julius Cæsar lived longer, had he been destined to see the realisation of his great projects, he would no doubt have built up a work of greater genius and more homogeneous character, but it is an open question whether it would have proved equally lasting after the death of its creator. Great men make the history of the world, and determine the course of events, but the potent and arbitrary personality, which would fain conjure present and future to serve its will, imposes fetters on the course of subsequent development which later generations cannot and will not endure.
Augustus gave Rome a new system of government—an imperial system. The old Roman constitution, originally intended for a city, admirable as it was, could no longer serve as the basis of a state that had become a world-wide empire; it had, moreover, been completely shattered in the conflicts of the last century of the republic. To restore the republic was impossible, its obsequies had been celebrated on the fields of Pharsalia and Philippi. After the battle of Actium, which merely decided whether the name of the emperor should be Antonius or Octavian, and, possibly, whether the centre of the new empire should lie in the East or the West, the only question which could arise was that of the form, not of the essential character, of the new creation.
There can be no doubt that Julius Cæsar would have ascended the throne of Rome as absolute imperator after his return from the Parthian expedition, and Octavian as well had it in his power to claim sovereignty without limitation of any kind, for the whole army and fleet were under his command; but he rested content with a more modest title and took the reins of government, not as imperator but as princeps. He did not found a monarchy but a diarchy, as it has been aptly styled, in which the power was to be permanently divided between the emperor and the senate. It was a compromise with the old republic, a voluntary constitutional limitation of the sovereign prerogative by which all the rights pertaining to the people and the senate—legislation no less than legal jurisdiction, the right of coinage no less than the levy of taxation, the disposal of the revenue and expenditure of the state, and finally (after the accession of Tiberius and ostensibly in compliance with a clause in the testamentary dispositions of Augustus), the appointment of magistrates—were to appertain, under well-defined rules, in part to the princeps and in part to the senate. The empire was to be elective, as the old Roman monarchy had been; the nomination to the throne was to proceed from the senate, but on the other hand the supreme command of the army and fleet was vested in the emperor in virtue of his proconsular authority, which extended over all parts of the empire outside the limits of the city of Rome. The legions were quartered in the provinces under his jurisdiction, while in those governed by the senate, with a few exceptions which soon ceased to be, all that the governors had at their disposal was a very moderate force of auxiliary troops.
Roman Trophies
We have no reason to doubt the honesty of Augustus’ intentions, but it is obvious that all the prerogatives of the senate insured it a fair share in the government only so long as the sovereign chose to respect them. The reign of terror under his successors sufficed to set in the most glaring light the absolute impotence of the senate when opposed to a despot, and overturned the neatly balanced system of Augustus. It is easier, we cannot but confess, to blame the author of this system and to demonstrate its impracticability than to put a better in its place. For can it be supposed that if Augustus had set up an absolute monarchy such as Cæsar contemplated, the Romans would have been spared the tyranny of a Caligula or a Nero? Again, if Augustus had handed over to the senate even a share in the command of the army, would the empire have been so much as possible, or would he not immediately have conjured up the demon of civil war? Nor was the co-operation of the senate in the government altogether a failure; it proved salutary under emperors such as Nerva and his successors. The history of all ages goes to prove that chartered rights are of no avail against despots, and what guarantee is there in modern monarchies for the maintenance of a constitution confirmed by oath, except the conscience of the sovereign, and, even more, the steadfast will of the nation, which will endure no curtailment of its rights?