The historians' history of the world in twenty-five volumes, volume 17

by Unknown

CHAPTER III. THE TIME OF TATAR DOMINATION

[1235-1462 A.D.]

In the thirteenth century the steppes of central Asia sent forth a new conquering horde, constituting the last wave of that migration of peoples which had commenced in remote antiquity.[10] This Mongol-Tatar horde dominated Russia for 240 years and left enduring traces of its domination. It definitively broke the bond between western and eastern Russia, and thus contributed to the formation of the principality of Lithuania in the west; while in the east it promoted the rise of the principality of Moscow, which finally absorbed all the other Russian principalities, threw off their Tatar yoke, recoiled in its turn upon the steppe, and finally, by turning Russia into an empire, made forever impossible another invasion from the steppe.

The cradle of the Mongolian race was in all probability the country lying at the foot of the Altai Mountains. At the time of the appearance of Jenghiz Khan the Mongols were divided into numerous tribes, which were governed by their elders and lived in mutual enmity. An unpleasing description of the exterior and life of the Mongols is given by a Chinese writer, a contemporary of Jenghiz Khan, and also by Mussulman writers:

“Their faces are wide, flat, and square, with prominent cheek-bones, their eyes have no upper lashes, their beard and moustaches are of scanty growth, their general appearance is repulsive. But the present Tatar sovereign, Temuchin (Jenghiz Khan) is of enormous stature, with broad forehead and long beard, and distinguished for his valour. They reckon the year according to the growth of grass. When one of them is asked for his age, he replies—so many grasses. When asked for the number of the month, they laugh and reply that they do not know. The Tatars are born in the saddle and grow up on horseback. They learn to fight almost by instinct, for they hunt the whole year round. They have no infantry, but only cavalry, of which they can raise several hundred thousand. They hardly ever resort to writing, but all, from the commander-in-chief to the commander of ten, give their orders in person. When they want to take a big town, they first attack the small places in the vicinity, take all the inhabitants prisoners, and drive them forward to the attack. For this purpose a command is issued that every man on horseback should capture ten prisoners, and when this number is completed they are compelled to collect a certain amount of grass or wood, earth or stones. The Tatars urge them on night and day, killing those who become exhausted. Having reached the town, they are compelled to dig trenches or fill up fosses. In a siege the Tatars reck not of the loss of tens of thousands: hence they are invariably successful. When they capture a city they kill all without sparing either young or old, the beautiful or the ugly, rich or poor, those who submit or those who resist. No person, however distinguished, escapes this unrevokable penalty of death. The spoil is divided in proportionate shares among high and low. This people have no need of baggage or provision wagons; their herds of sheep, cows, horses, and other animals follow them on their marches, and they eat meat and nothing else. Their horses do not know barley, but they tear up the ground with their hoofs and live on the roots. As to their faith, the Tatars worship the sun at the time of its rising. They do not regard anything as forbidden, and eat all animals, even dogs and pigs. Marriage is unknown to them, but many men come to a woman, and when a child is born it does not know its father.”

Similar descriptions are met with in the narratives of Europeans who knew the Mongols in the days of their power.

JENGHIZ KHAN; THE TATAR INVASION

It was among this rude nomad people that Jenghiz Khan was born in 1162. The son of the chief of a tribe dwelling at the mouths of the Onon and the Ingoda, affluents of the Amur, Jenghiz was far removed from the focus of central Asian political life, and his power was originally very small. The first forty years of his life were spent in struggles with the surrounding peoples; it is even said that for ten years he was in captivity with the Nyûché, or Chûrché (the Manchurian rulers of northern China known under the name of the dynasty of Kin), during which time he became acquainted with Chinese customs and manners, and also with the weakness of the rulers of China. Having conquered various Mongolian tribes, he proclaimed himself emperor at a general assembly of the princes, which was held at the sources of the river Onon (1206).

“By thus taking the imperial title,” says V. P. Vasiliev, “he gave perfect expression to the purely Chinese conception that, as there is only one sun in the heavens, so there must be only one emperor on earth; and all others bearing this title, all states having any pretensions to independent existence thereby offend the will of heaven and invite chastisement.” His successes in Mongolia are explained by his surpassing military talent, the system of purely military organisation adopted by him, and by the fact that he gave places in his service to all those who were gifted, of whatever race they might be.[11] Jenghiz Khan’s conquests advanced rapidly; in 1206 he devastated the kingdom of Tangut (in southern Mongolia) and in 1210 he commenced a war with the Nyûché, ruling in northern China. The war dragged on, and meanwhile the shah of Khuarezm (Bokhara) gave offence to Jenghiz Khan by slaying the Mongolian ambassadors. Leaving his captains in China, the Mongolian khan marched to Bokhara (1219), whence, partly in pursuit of the shah and partly led on by the passion for pillage, the Mongolian troops directed their way to the west, doubled the southern shore of the Caspian Sea, crossed the Caucasus, and penetrated into the steppes of the Polovtsi.

[1223-1228 A.D.]

The leaders of these troops were Chépé and Subutai Bahadar. The Polovtsi applied for help to the Russian prince Mstislav Mstislavitch, and he called together the princes of southern Russia, amongst whom the most important were Mstislav Romanovitch of Kiev and Mstislav Sviatoslavitch of Tchernigov. The armies of the princes moved to the help of the Polovtsi, and although the Tatars sent ambassadors saying, “God has permitted us to come on our steeds with our slaves against the accursed Polovtsi; come and make peace with us, for we have no quarrel with you,” the princes decided upon a battle which took place by the river Kalka in the government of Iekaterinoslav. The Russian princes, who did not act in unison, were beaten (1223), and many were killed, amongst others Mstislav of Kiev. The Tatars did not penetrate far into Russia, but turned back and were soon forgotten.[12] Meanwhile the Tatar captains returned to Jenghiz Khan, who, having definitively subdued Tangut and northern China, died in 1227. He had during his lifetime divided his possessions amongst his four sons: to the descendants of Juji (then already dead) was allotted Kiptchak (that is the steppe extending from central Asia into southern Russia); to Jagatai, Turkestan; to Okkodai (Ogdai) China; to Tuli, the nomad camps adjoining the share of Okkodai. Over these princes was to be exalted the great khan, chosen in a solemn assembly of all the princes. In 1228 Okkodai was proclaimed great khan.

[1237-1241 A.D.]

At first the question of succession, then the final consolidation of the empire in northern China, and then again the commencement of the war with the south kept the princes around the great khan, and it was only in 1235 that Okkodai sent his nephew Batu, son of Juji, together with Manku, son of Tuli, and his own son Kuiuk, to conquer the western lands; to their number was added Sabutai, famous for his Kiptchak campaign. First of all they conquered the Bulgarians on the Volga, and then came to the land of Riazan. Here they exacted from the princes a tribute of a tenth of all their possessions both in lands and in men; the courageous resistance of the Riazan princes proved unsuccessful, chiefly because the princes of northern Russia did not unite, but decided on defending themselves separately. After the devastation of Riazan and the slaughter of her princes (1237), followed that of Suzdal. Having taken Moscow, the Tatars marched to Vladimir, where they slew the family of the grand prince, while he himself was defeated and killed on the banks of the Sit (1238). Thence they were apparently going to Novgorod, but returned—probably to avoid the marshes. On their way back, Kozelsk detained them for a long time, but it was finally taken and pillaged.

The tactics of the Tatars in this war consisted in first encompassing each region as hunters do, and then joining forces at one centre, thus devastating all. In the years 1239-1240 the Tatars ravaged southern Russia, and in 1240 they took and laid waste Kiev. All Europe trembled at the horrors of the Tatar invasion; the emperor Frederick II called for a general arming, but his calls were in vain. Meanwhile the Tatars advanced to Hungary (1241) and Poland, and defeated the Polish princes at Liegnitz in Silesia; and it was only the courageous defence of Olmütz in Moravia, by the Czech voyevod Iaroslav, and the gathering of armies under the command of the Czech king and the dukes of Austria and Carinthia, that finally caused the Tatars to turn back. They then founded their chief dwelling place on the Volga, where near the present town of Tsareva (government of Astrakhan) they established a wintering place for the horde—Sarai. There the Russian princes began to arrive with tribute. At first, however, they were obliged to go to the great khan in Mongolia; for the first khans, Okkodai, Kuiuk, and Mangku, were lawfully chosen by the princes, and maintained their authority over all the empire of Jenghiz Khan; and it was only from the time of Kublai (1260), who arbitrarily took possession of the throne and removed the seat of government to China, that the bond was definitively severed.

INFLUENCES OF TATAR DOMINATION

The domination of the Tatars over Russia is regarded by historians from various points of view: some (such as Karamzin and especially N. I. Kostomarov) ascribe a decided influence to the Tatars in the development of Russian life. S. M. Soloviov, on the contrary, is of the opinion that the influence of the Tatars was not greater than that of the Polovtsi. Both these opinions are extreme: it is senseless to deny the influence of the Tatars, for the reason that Russia was long associated with them, and that, since in her intercourse with the east, Moscow employed Tatar services, much that was eastern entered into the administration, notably the financial system; traces of eastern custom may also be found in the military organisation. These are direct consequences; the indirect ones are hardly less important, because a considerable share in the interruption of civilisation and the roughening of the manners and customs of the people may be ascribed to the separation of eastern Russia from western. On the other hand, it is impossible to regard the corporal punishments as entirely Tatar, for they were known in Byzantium, and came to Russia in the manuals of church statutes; they were known also in the west, and are to be met with in places which were but little under Tatar domination, such as Pskov. The opinion that the autocratic power had its origin in the domination of the Tatars must, it would seem, be entirely rejected, especially when we call to mind the constant preaching of the clergy, and the fact that John the Terrible directly appeals to the authority of the Bible and the example of the Roman emperors.

Civilisation and letters were almost unknown to the Tatars. The writers in their chanceries were for the greater part taken from the nations they had conquered, as were also the artists who embellished the wintering places of their khans. Much luxury was to be met with amongst them, but neither elegance nor cleanliness: in this respect they kept to the very end the customs of the Mongolian steppes. Also in moral respects they showed themselves dwellers of the steppes even to the end of their career in history. Cruel and coarse though they were, they possessed, however, some good qualities. They were temperate in their lives, and their cupidity was not so great as that of other Asiatic nations; they were far less given to deceit in trade—in general, with them, violence predominated over deceit.[b]

Throughout all of their conquests in Russia, they obviously acted upon a principle which was well calculated to facilitate their own complete ascendency. At first they destroyed the walled places that stood in the way of their projects, and afforded a means of defence to the people; they destroyed the population wherever they went, in order that the remnant which survived should feel the more surely the weight of their power; and, at length, as their advance became the more safe and certain, they relaxed slightly in their cruelties, enrolling under their standard the slaves they captured, thus turning their conquests into armaments. But the climate of Russia rendered it an unsuitable place for their location. As they could not remain upon the soil which they had vanquished, they established themselves on the frontiers to watch over their new possessions, leaving nominal Russian princes to fight for them against the invading tribes that continually rushed in. Those very invasions served also to strengthen the Tatar yoke, by weakening the resisting power of the natives.[d]

In conquering Russia they had no wish to take possession of the soil, or to take into their own hands the local administration. What they wanted was not land, of which they had enough and to spare, but movable property which they might enjoy without giving up their pastoral, nomadic life. They applied, therefore, to Russia the same method of extracting supplies as they had used in other countries. As soon as their authority had been formally acknowledged they sent officials into the country to number the inhabitants and to collect an amount of tribute proportionate to the population. This was a severe burden for the people, not only on account of the sum demanded, but also on account of the manner in which it was raised. The exactions and cruelty of the tax-gatherers led to local insurrections, and the insurrectionists were of course always severely punished. But there was never any general military occupation nor any wholesale confiscations of land, and the existing political organisation was left undisturbed. The modern method of dealing with annexed provinces was wholly unknown to the Tatars. The khans never for a moment dreamed of attempting to Tatarise their Russian subjects. They demanded simply an oath of allegiance from the princes, and a certain sum of tribute from the people. The vanquished were allowed to retain their land, their religion, their language, their courts of justice, and all their other institutions.

A Female Samoyed

The nature of the Tatar domination is well illustrated by the policy which the conquerors adopted towards the Russian church. For more than half a century after the conquest the religion of the Tatars was a mixture of Buddhism and paganism, with traces of sabaism or fire-worship. During this period Christianity was more than simply tolerated. The grand khan Kuiuk caused a Christian chapel to be erected near his domicile, and one of his successors, Khubilai, was in the habit of publicly taking part in the Easter festivals. In 1261 the khan of the Golden Horde allowed the Russians to found a bishopric in his capital, and several members of his family adopted Christianity. One of them even founded a monastery, and became a saint of the Russian church! The orthodox clergy were exempted from the poll tax, and in the charters granted to them it was expressly declared that if anyone committed blasphemy against the faith of the Russians he should be put to death. Some time afterwards the Golden Horde was converted to Islam, but the khans did not on that account change their policy. They continued to favour the clergy, and their protection was long remembered. Many generations later, when the property of the church was threatened by the autocratic power, refractory ecclesiastics contrasted the policy of the orthodox sovereign with that of the “godless Tatars,” much to the advantage of the latter.

At first there was and could be very little mutual confidence between the conquerors and the conquered. The princes anxiously looked for an opportunity of throwing off the galling yoke, and the people chafed under the exactions and cruelty of the tribute collectors, whilst the khans took precautions to prevent insurrection, and threatened to devastate the country if their authority was not respected. But in the course of time this mutual distrust and hostility greatly lessened. The princes gradually perceived that all attempts at resistance would be fruitless, and became reconciled to their new position. Instead of seeking to throw off the khan’s authority, they sought to gain his favour, in the hope of thereby forwarding their personal interests. For this purpose they paid frequent visits to the Tatar chief, made rich presents to his wives and courtiers, received from him charters confirming their authority, and sometimes even married members of his family. Some of them used the favour thus acquired for extending their possessions at the expense of neighbouring princes of their own race, and did not hesitate to call in Tatar hordes to their assistance. The khans, in their turn, placed greater confidence in their vassals, entrusted them with the task of collecting the tribute, recalled their own officials who were a constant eyesore to the people, and abstained from all interference in the internal affairs of the principalities so long as tribute was regularly paid. The princes acted, in short, as the khan’s lieutenants, and became to a certain extent Tartarised. Some of them carried this policy so far that they were reproached by the people with “loving beyond measure the Tatars and their language, and giving them too freely land, and gold, and goods of every kind.”[c]

ALEXANDER NEVSKI

[1245 A.D.]

The recognition of Tatar sovereignty was complete in the homage and tribute they demanded and received. Every prince was forced to solicit his investiture from the khan of Kiptchak; and even when Iaroslav was established as grand prince over the rest, Batu cunningly allowed several rivals to put in their claims to that authority, and obliged them to wait so long for his decision that the order of succession remained unsettled. This state of suspense in which the feudal lords were kept, and a series of famines which followed the destructive march of the Tatars, plunged the country into a condition of abject wretchedness.

During this period of indecision on the one hand, and forlorn imbecility on the other, the Lithuanians succeeded in appropriating to themselves some portions of the northwestern division of Russia; and the Swedes, and Danes, and Livonian knights of the sword proceeded to make demonstrations of a descent upon Novgorod. Alexander, however, who had succeeded his father in that principality, finding that the grand prince was unable to render him any assistance towards the defence of the city, anticipated the advance of the intruders, and giving them battle on the banks of the Neva gained a decisive victory. He immediately built strong forts on the spot to repel any future attempts, and returned in triumph to Novgorod. So signal was the overthrow of the enemy that Alexander was honoured by the surname of Nevski, in commemoration of the achievement.

Flushed with a triumph as unexpected as it was important, Alexander Nevski desired to enlarge the bounds of his power at home. The army was warmly attached to him, for his personal intrepidity was no less remarkable than his sagacity—qualities which were rarely so strongly developed in so young a man. The Novgorodians, however, always jealous of their municipal privileges, and suspicious of the motives of their rulers, resisted the extension of Alexander’s power, and, apprehensive that he would abuse his advantages, they remonstrated against his proceedings, and at last broke out into open rebellion. The proud spirit of the young prince was justly offended at the impetuous revolt of his subjects, and he retired at once from the city, going over to his father at Vladimir, to request the aid of a sufficient force to restore order. But Iaroslav, in the conviction of his own inadequacy, was unwilling to interfere with the wishes of the Novgorodians; and, conferring upon Alexander the inferior principality of Pereiaslavl, he sent another of his sons, at the request of the people, to reign over the disaffected province.

The Novgorodians, however, speedily discovered their error. The Danes, induced to speculate upon the absence of Alexander, a second time appeared within the boundary, and the new prince, an inexperienced young man, made choice of such measures as clearly proved him to be unfit for his office. The people became dissatisfied, and, being now convinced that Alexander was the only man who could relieve them in their difficulty, petitioned him to return; but he indignantly rejected the request. A second embassy, headed by the archbishop, was more fortunate, and Alexander Nevski once more placed himself at the head of the army, and obtained a second victory over the invaders. Resolved to profit by the obligations under which he laid his subjects by resuming, at their own instance, the reins of government, and by freeing them from the presence of a dangerous foe, he now pushed on to Livonia, and routed the combined forces of a triple alliance of Germans, Danes, and Tchuds, on the borders of Lake Peipus. This exploit, which the youthful hero achieved in the year 1245, not only obtained him the love and admiration of his own subjects, but speedily spread his name through every part of the empire, until it finally reached the court of the Golden Horde, where it elicited an unusual degree of curiosity and applause.

In the person of the prince of Novgorod, a new dawn of hope broke over Russia, and nothing but the disheartening feuds of the chiefs checked the growth of that incipient desire for liberty which the influence of his successes was calculated to create. Alexander was adapted to the occasion; and if the disunited sovereigns could now have consented to forego their low animosities, and to merge their personal differences in the common cause, Alexander was the instrument of all others the most fit to undertake the conduct of so gallant an enterprise. But it required an extraordinary combination of circumstances to awaken the Russian princes to a full sense of their degradation, and to inspire them with resolution to set about the rescue of their country from the chains of the spoiler. Alexander’s example was useless. He could do no more than demonstrate the possibility of improvement within the reach of his own domain; but for all purposes of a national and extensive character, his exertions failed to procure any favourable results.

[1252 A.D.]

On the death of the grand prince Iaroslav, whose reign appears to have passed unmarked by any events of importance, the khan invited or rather summoned Alexander to the horde. A number of competitors or claimants for the grand princedom had already brought forward their petitions: some were lingering in person at the court; others were represented by ambassadors bearing rich tributes; and all were in a state of considerable anxiety pending the decision of the Tatar. Alexander alone was silent. The fame of his deeds had preceded him. He did not come to supplicate for an honour to which he felt that he possessed an unexceptionable claim, but he attended as a point of duty, without reference to a nomination that could hardly increase his popularity. His independent bearing, his manly figure, and the general candour and fearlessness of his manners gained him at once the confidence and admiration of the khan, who did not hesitate to assure him that, although he had heard much in his favour, report had fallen short of his distinguished merits.

Auspicious, however, as this reception was, it did not terminate in Alexander’s appointment to the suspended sceptre of Vladimir. The policy of the Tatar was to keep the order of succession in periodical uncertainty, so that the Russians might the more distinctly see how much the destinies of the country depended on his supreme will. It was not until Alexander paid a second visit to the horde, in 1252, that he was raised to the dignity of grand prince. It was accorded to him in a very gracious spirit, and he entered upon his new office with more earnest zeal than had for a long time before been displayed by his predecessors.

The first act of the grand prince was an expedition against Sweden, undertaken with two objects: (1) to crush a formidable foe that occasionally harassed the frontier districts; and (2) to give employment and opportunity for pillage to his numerous army, which he had already taught to calculate upon the rewards of spoliation. The expedition terminated in victory. The triumphant army laid a part of the Swedish territory under contribution, succeeded in capturing a number of prisoners, and returned home laden with spoils.

These successes and the skilful policy of the grand prince made the most favourable impression on the mind of the khan, who now, whenever dissensions arose amongst the princes, either referred the adjustment of their differences to Alexander, or confiscated their dominions and annexed them to the grand princedom. Two instances of the latter description may be recorded as evidences of the cunning displayed by the Tatar in the protection of the Greek religion. While Alexander was at the height of his prosperity, the prince of Kiev, affected by some sudden admiration of the Roman Catholic ritual, signified his submission to the pope, acknowledging his holiness’s supremacy over the churches of his principality. Another prince, his brother-in-law, adopted a similar measure, which was equally offensive to Tatars and Russians. The khan, irritated by proceedings so directly at variance with his will, deprived them of their authority, and transferred their territories to the grand prince, who, according to some writers, was even assisted by the Tatars in seizing upon them.

The tribute which had been originally imposed upon the Russians by their conquerors had always been levied by the princes, the khan being satisfied to receive it at their hands. As the power of Alexander increased, the khan gradually recalled this system of delegation, and adopted a more strict and jealous mode of collection. The first contribution was raised upon the princes, as tribute money, and they were left to procure it amongst their subjects as well as they could. But it now assumed the shape of a tax on persons and property. In order to ensure the regularity of its payment, and protect the khan against evasions, Tatar officers were appointed in every district to attend exclusively to the rigid collection of the revenue. From this tax, which was imposed without distinction upon every Russian, and rated according to his means, the clergy alone were exempt: and even they, in one instance, were attempted to be taxed in later times; but the khan who sought to enforce it was obliged to yield to the double argument of long-established usage and weighty presents from the wealthy monks.

The new burthen lay heavily upon the people, and the mode in which it was enforced through foreign collectors, of the nation of their oppressors enhanced its mortifications. Universal discontent followed the tax-gatherers. They were treated with unreserved displeasure. It was with great difficulty they could carry into effect the objects of their unpopular mission, and in some places, particularly the cities where the population was more compact, and the communication of opinion more rapid and complete, they were received with execration. This resistance on the one hand no doubt produced increased severity on the other; and as the levy advanced, the people became less cautious in the exhibition of their feelings, and the collectors more rigorous and despotic. Novgorod, which had always been the rallying point for the assertion of freedom in Russia, took the lead in this revolt against the khan’s authority. The Novgorodians, to a man, refused to pay the tax, and even threatened to wreak their vengeance upon the officers who were appointed to collect it. The prince of Novgorod, one of Alexander’s sons, urged to extremities by his republican advisers, sanctioned these declarations of independence, and openly signified his determination to prevent the exactions of so ignominious a tribute within the districts dependent upon his rule. Alexander, perceiving, in this dangerous obstinacy of his son, the source of serious calamity to the empire at large, and knowing well that neither the Novgorodians, nor any other fraction of the Russian people, were in a condition to resist the powerful armies of the khan, should he be provoked to compel compliance at the point of the sword, undertook in person to appease the growing tumult, and presenting himself in the city, rebuked the inhabitants for having perilled the safety of the country by their contumacy, severely punished rash advisers of his son, and finally arranged the payment of the tax to the satisfaction of the Tatar offices. Still the Novgorodians were not content. They remonstrated against the unequal pressure of the tax, setting forth that it fell more grievously upon the poor than upon the rich, and that if they were obliged to submit to such a penalty, it should at all events be adjusted proportionately to the means of individuals. Even this difficulty Alexander was enabled to meet by assuming the responsibility of the payment himself, a vexatious and ungrateful duty, which, however, he willingly accepted, as it afforded him the means of quelling discontents that might have otherwise terminated in a sanguinary convulsion.[d]

Death of Alexander Nevski; Appreciation of His Character

[1263 A.D.]

In 1262, disturbances arose in the country of Rostov, where the people became exasperated at the violence of the Tatar collectors of tribute; a council was called together and the collectors were driven out of Rostov, Vladimir, Suzdal, Pereiaslavl, and Iaroslavl; in the last mentioned town the enraged inhabitants killed the collector Izosim, who had embraced Mohammedanism to become a Tatar tax-gatherer, and persecuted his former fellow-citizens worse than the Tatars themselves. Naturally such an occurrence could not be calmly passed over by the horde, and Tatar regiments were already sent to take the Christians into captivity. In order to avert this calamity from the people, Alexander repaired a fourth time to the horde; he was evidently successful, possibly because of the Persian War which was then greatly occupying the khan Bergé. But it was his last work; he left the horde, where he had passed the whole winter, a sick man, and died on the way back to Vladimir on the 14th of November, 1263; “having laboured greatly for the Russian land, for Novgorod and Pskov, for all the grand princedom, and having given his life for the orthodox faith.” By preserving Russia from calamities on the east, and by his famous exploits for faith and country in the west, Alexander gained for himself a glorious memory throughout Russia and became the most conspicuous historical personage in Russian history from Monomakh to Donskoi. A token of this remembrance and fame is to be found in the special narrative of his exploits that has come down to us. “The grand prince Alexander Iaroslavitch,” says the author of the narrative, “conquered everywhere, but himself was nowhere conquered;” there came to Novgorod from the western countries a famous knight, who saw Alexander, and when he returned to his own land he said: “I have gone through many countries and nations, but nowhere have I seen such a one, no such king among kings and no such prince among princes;” and a similar honourable mention was made of him by the khan. When, after the death of his father, Alexander came to Vladimir, his coming was terrible, and the news of it flew even to the mouth of the Volga, and the Moabite women began to frighten their children by saying: “Be quiet, the grand duke Alexander is coming!” It happened once that ambassadors were sent to him from great Rome by the pope, who had commanded them to speak to Alexander as follows: “We have heard of thee, O Prince, that thou art honourable and wonderful, and that thy country is great, therefore have we sent unto thee two of the wisest of our twelve cardinals, that thou mayest hearken to their teaching.” Alexander, having taken counsel with his wise men, wrote down and described to the pope all that had taken place from the creation of the world to the seventh œcumenical council, and added: “All this is well known unto us, but we cannot accept your teachings.” Following in the footsteps of his father, Alexander gave much gold and silver to the horde to ransom prisoners. The metropolitan Cyril was in Vladimir when he heard of the death of Alexander, which he thus announced to the people: “My beloved children! learn that the sun of the land of Russia has set;” and all the people cried out in reply: “Then we perish!”[e]

“It was as vassal and agent of the khan,” says Brueckner, “that Alexander broke the resistance of Novgorod and compelled it to pay tribute. On the one hand representing the interests of the khan and repressing the revolts of the Russians, on the other hand mollifying the anger of the khan and acting like a shrewd diplomat, Alexander represents a curious combination of egotism and patriotism. We are not in the possession of sufficient evidence to form a just estimate of the measure of his services or of his opportunistic policy, but he is certainly a most interesting character in that unfortunate and disgraceful period of Russian history.”[i]

The Grand Princedom

With the death of Alexander commenced afresh the hurtful contests of the princes for the grand princedom. The division of interests which had gradually grown up amongst the Tatars, greatly increased the internal disorders of Russia. Nogay, the Tatar chieftain, who had thrown off the rule of the khan of Kiptchak, asserted his sovereignty in the southern provinces, and contended against his rival of the horde, for the right of tribute in many districts which had hitherto acknowledged implicitly the government of the first conqueror. This strife between the ruling powers produced much treachery amongst the Russian princes, who generally allied themselves to the chief who happened at the moment to obtain the ascendency, and who thus played a false game to assist them in the accomplishment of their own individual objects. In this way they wasted their strength; for whenever a prince profited by the sale of his allegiance, he paid so dearly for the assistance which procured him the end he had in view, that the gain in such a case was usually discovered to be a severe loss. The grand princedom was the prize for which they all struggled; and in the contentions which marked the struggle, almost every inferior principality became more enfeebled than before.

Alexander Nevski was one of the few great men whose names stand apart from the tumultuous throng that crowd the early pages of Russian history. He was a wise statesman, and a brave soldier. His victories over the enemies of his country were not less remarkable for completeness and brilliancy, than his measures of domestic improvement were distinguished by prudence and foresight. The Danes, the Swedes, the Lithuanians, and the Teutonic knights severally gave way before him: he enlarged the bounds of his territory, inspired his army with a fresh spirit of activity, rebuilt several Russian cities that had been destroyed during the Tatar invasions, and founded others in well-chosen situations. Russia, under his sway, might have redeemed her fallen fortunes; but the unnatural hostility of the feudal princes to the grand princedom, their hatred to any chief whose virtues elevated him above them, and their ruinous conflicts amongst themselves upon insignificant grounds of quarrel, paralysed the efforts of Alexander, and deprived him of the power of rendering that service to his country which he was eminently qualified to confer. His fame was so universal, that his death gave opportunity to the display of a fresh burst of superstitious feelings. His approaching decease was said to have been notified to the metropolitan by a voice from heaven; and as the body lay in the coffin, the dead man was said to have opened one of his hands, as the prayer of absolution was spoken by the officiating clergyman. These miracles obtained Alexander a niche amongst the Russian saints; and, less in honour of his real merits than his attributed powers, he was duly canonised after death. Some centuries subsequently, a monastery was raised to his memory by Peter I, and his relics were removed to St. Petersburg with extraordinary ceremonies of devotion. An order of knighthood was afterwards instituted in his name, which ranks amongst its members some of the monarchs of Europe. These facts connected with the reputation of Alexander Nevski in Russia are memorable, as proofs of the veneration in which he was held.[d]

The khans committed a serious fault in preserving a grand prince; it was a still more striking one, and a consequence of the first, to place in his hands a sovereignty disproportioned to those by which he was surrounded, to select him for too long a time from the same branch, and to give him armies to establish himself, and the means of seducing even themselves by the most costly presents. The consequence of this was, that the appanaged princes dared not enter so readily into a contest with the grand princes, who were already more powerful than themselves, and were so formidably supported. Not daring to contend with them, they turned their arms against each other, and thus enhanced by their own weakness the strength of the grand princes.

Nevertheless, till 1324, that is, for a century posterior to the Tatar invasion, the power of the grand princes was doubtful; but then, amidst the crowd of pretenders to the grand princedom, two rival branches made themselves conspicuous, and the other princes of the blood resigned to them an arena, in which the scantiness of their own resources no longer permitted them to appear. One of these branches was that of the princes of Tver; the other that of the princes of Moscow.[g]

THE GROWING ASCENDENCY OF MOSCOW

[1303-1313 A.D.]

Muscovite Woman

Moscow becomes a princely appanage at a rather late date, although it is mentioned in the chronicle as early as 1147. The place is also called Kutchkovo. With this appellation there is connected a tradition, which seems quite trustworthy, that Moscow had belonged to a certain Kutchka, and the chronicle also speaks of the Kutchkas as relatives of the wife of Andrew Bogoliubski and of his murderers. It seems that the first prince of Moscow was Michael Iaroslavitch, who died in 1248. Other princes are mentioned as having been at Moscow before that time, but it is difficult to decide whether they resided there temporarily or permanently. The true line of Moscow princes begins with Daniel Alexandrovitch Nevski], who died in 1303 and was succeeded by his son Iuri, the famous rival of the Tver princes.[b]

Iuri married, in 1313, the sister of Usbek Khan. It was then that, after having excited the hatred of the Novgorodians, in persisting to subdue them by means of the Tatars, Michael of Tver drew down upon his head all the wrath of Usbek, by defeating Iuri, and taking prisoners his wife, who was the khan’s sister, and Kavadgi, a Tatar general, who came to put the prince of Moscow in possession of the grand princedom.

For Usbek, after having preferred and supported the rights of Michael of Tver to the grand principality, had changed his mind in favour of Iuri of Moscow, who had become his brother-in-law. The enmity of Usbek, however, remained suspended, until his sister, the wife of Iuri, and the prisoner of Michael, expired at Tver. Iuri then hastened to the horde, and accused Michael of having poisoned the princess. The offended pride of Usbek lent itself to this base calumny; he entrusted the investigation of the affair to Kavadgi; appeared to the summons; the vanquished passed sentence on his vanquisher, whom he caused to be put to death; and the infamous Iuri of Moscow was appointed grand prince in the place of his murdered rival (1320). His triumph was short: being accused of withholding the tribute due to the khan, he journeyed to the horde, and was assassinated by the son of his victim, who was himself immediately executed by Usbek. This vengeance restored the grand principality to the branch of Tver, in the person of Prince Alexander Michael’s second son. It remained in it for three years; but then, in 1328, this madman caused all the Tatars at Tver to be massacred. To the brother of Iuri, Ivan I, surnamed Kalita,[13] prince of Moscow, Usbek immediately gave Vladimir and Novgorod, the double possession of which always distinguished the grand princedom. This concession formed, in the hands of Ivan, a mass, the connection of which Tver, weakened as it was, did but little diminish. Consequently, with this power, and the troops that Usbek added to it, Ivan speedily compelled all the Russian princes to combine, under his orders, against the prince of Tver; who, after having undergone various misfortunes, was executed with his son at the horde.

Here begin the two hundred and seventy years of the reign of the branch of Moscow. This first union of the Russians, under Ivan I, denominated Kalita, constitutes an epoch; it exhibits the ascendancy of this second grand prince of Moscow over his subjects; an ascendancy the increase of which we shall witness under his successors; and for which, at the outset, this branch of the Ruriks was indebted to the support they received from the Tatars. For as a word from the khan decided the possession of the throne, that one of the two rival branches of Moscow and Tver was sure to triumph which displayed the most shrewd and consistent policy towards the horde. It was not that of the princes of Tver which thus acted. On the contrary they sometimes solicited the protection of the khans, and sometimes fought against them; we have even seen one of them ordering the massacre of the Tatars in his principality.

The princes of Moscow pursued a different system; they no doubt, detested the yoke of the khans as much as their rivals did; but they were aware that, before they could cope with the Tatars, the Russians must be united, and that is was impossible to subject and unite the latter without the assistance of the former. They therefore espoused the daughters of the khans, manifested the utmost submission to the horde, and appeared to be wholly devoted to its interests.

Now this policy, which, at the commencement of the Mongol invasion acquired for Alexander Nevski the empire of all Russia, gave it, seventy-four years later, still more completely to Ivan I: for the sway of the Tatars was then more recognised; the Russians were more docile to their yoke; and the cities, which composed the grand principality were more powerful in themselves, and also by comparison with the rest of Russia, which became daily more and more exhausted. The wealth of Ivan I was another cause of the extension of his power.

[1323 A.D.]

The complaints of the prince of Tver, in 1323, prove that Iuri I, grand prince of Moscow, when he undertook to execute the vengeance of his brother-in-law Usbek, against Tver, was also entrusted with the collecting of the tributes; which, however, he retained, instead of sending them to the horde. Ivan Kalita, his brother and successor, profited by this example. Thus it was, that by making themselves lieutenants of the khan, the Muscovite grand princes first became the collectors, and finally the possessors, of the taxes throughout the whole of Russia; and thus they succeeded to all the rights of conquest enjoyed by the Tatars, and to their despotism.

There can be no doubt that one of the most copious sources of power to those sovereigns was the periodical census and the perpetual imposts, so alien to feudalism, and especially to a feudalism of princes: these imposts and censuses nothing but the Tatar conquest could have established, and they were inherited by the grand princes. Already, in the first half of the fourteenth century, these taxes had rendered Ivan Kalita rich enough to purchase entire domains and appanages,[14] the protection of Usbek Khan, and the preference of the primate, who removed his residence from Vladimir to Moscow, by which means the latter city became the capital of the empire.

It was by virtue of his authority as collector for the Tatars that Ivan Kalita practised extortion upon his subjects. We see him requiring a double tribute from the Novgorodians, under pretext that such was the will of the khan. Armed against the Russians with the dread inspired by the Tatar name, and against the Tatars with the money of the Russians; intoxicating the khan and his courtiers with gold and adulation in his frequent journeys to the horde; he was enabled, as lord paramount, to bring about the first union of all the appanaged princes against his competitor, the prince of Tver, whom he drove from Pskov and from Russia, being aided by the primate with the thunder of the church, then heard in the empire for the first time. The nobility imitated the clergy. Impelled either by fear, or cupidity, several boyars of other princes rallied round this grand prince, preferring the fiefs of so rich and so potent a lord paramount to those of the petty princes whom they abandoned.

Ivan Kalita pushed forward with horrible vigour in his ambitious career. “Woe, woe to the princes of Rostov!” exclaims Nicon, “because their power was destroyed, and everything was concentrated in Moscow.” In fact, from the Kremlin, which he fortified, Ivan proclaimed himself the arbiter of his kinsfolk; he reigned in their principalities by the medium of his boyars; he arrogated to himself the right of being the sole distributor of fiefs, judge, and legislator; and if the princes resisted, and dared to wage against him a war of the public good,[15] he hurried to the horde, with purse in hand, and denunciation on his lips; and the short-sighted Usbek, deceived by this ambitious monitor, was impolitic enough to disembarrass him of the most dangerous of his competitors, whom he consigned to frightful torments. The prince of Tver and his son were the most remarkable victims of this atrocious policy.

Meanwhile, Lithuania, which, from the period of the first overwhelming of Russia by the Tatars, had emancipated itself from its yoke, had now become a conquering state. About 1320, Gedimin, its leader, seized on the Russian appanages of the south and west, which had long ceased to be dependent upon the grand principality of Vladimir. Kiev, Galitch, Volhinia, became sometimes Lithuanian, sometimes Polish or Hungarian: driven to despair, their inhabitants emigrated; they formed the two military republics of the Zaparogians and Cossacks of Don. Rallying around them the unfortunate of all countries, they were destined to become one day strong enough to make head against the Turks and Tatars, between whom they were situated; and thus to embarrass the communication between those two peoples, whom a common religion, origin, and interest conspired to unite.

The grand principality was, on the other hand, repeopled by unfortunate fugitives from the southern Russian provinces, who sought refuge at Moscow. The empire, it is true, lost in extension; but it was thus rendered more proportionate to the revived power of its grand prince, who had also fewer competitors in it: those who remained could not, in point of resources, be compared with the grand principality. After all, it was much better that the latter should one day have to recover some provinces from a foreign foe, than from its domestic enemies: it was suffering an external evil instead of an internal one, which is the worst of all.

Thus, the macchiavellism of Ivan prospered. It is true that, by the confidence with which he inspired the horde, and the terrible war which he waged against his kinsmen, he restored to Russia a tranquillity to which she had long been a stranger. A dawning of order and justice reappeared under a sceptre acquired and preserved by such horrible acts of injustice; the depredations to which Russia had been a prey were repressed; commerce again flourished; great marts and new fairs were established, in which were displayed the productions of the East, of Greece, and of Italy; and the treasury of the prince was swelled still further by the profit arising from the customs.[16]

Such were the rapid effects of the first steps which Ivan took to execute the system of concentration of power; this great political impulse was so vigorously given, that it was perpetuated in his son Simeon the Proud, to whom Ivan left wherewithal to purchase the grand princedom from the horde, and in whom he revived the direct succession. Accordingly, Simeon effected, against Novgorod, a second union of all the Russian princes. It is to be remarked, that he was obliged to cede one half of the taxes to his brothers; but, at the same time, he reserved to himself the whole authority, which soon gives to its possessor the mastery of the revenue.

[1353 A.D.]

Simeon having died without children, in 1353, after a reign of twelve years, Ivan II, his brother, purchased the sovereignty with the wealth of Kalita. After the six years’ reign of Ivan II, this system and this order of succession were, indeed, transiently interrupted in the person of a prince, alien to the branch of Moscow; but we shall soon see the great Dmitri Donskoi establish them as fixed principles; that prince did not neglect to increase the wealth[17] of his grandfather Ivan. The people had given to Ivan the surname of The Purse; as much, perhaps, with allusion to his treasures, as to the purse, filled with alms for the poor, which is said to have been always carried before him. At a later period, the constantly progressive riches of the grand princes of Moscow enabled them to enfeoff directly from the crown lands three hundred thousand boyar followers; and next, to keep up a body of regular troops, sufficiently strong to reduce their enemies and their subjects.[18]

[1359 A.D.]

This system of concentration of power which Ivan Kalita commenced, by means of his wealth, by the union of the sceptre with the tiara, and by restoring the direct order of succession; his horrible but skilful macchiavellism against the princes holding appanages; finally, the fifty years’ repose which, thanks to his policy, and to their dissensions, the Tatars permitted Russia to enjoy; these are the circumstances which entitle Ivan to be considered as standing next after Alexander Nevski among the most remarkable grand princes of the third period. It was he who had the sagacity on this stubborn soil to open and to trace so deeply the path which led to monarchical unity, and to point out its direction so clearly to his successors that they had nothing to do but to persevere in it, as the only safe road which it was then possible for Russia to follow.

This concentration of power brought about great changes from 1320 to 1329; as, at that epoch, all the Russian princes in concert solicited from the horde the recall of the Tatar governors. It was then that, more firmly fixed, the throne of the grand princes became the rallying point of the Russians: along with the consciousness of their strength, it inspired them with a public spirit, which emboldened them. This good understanding was, in reality, an effect of the ascendency which a direct and sustained succession, in a single branch of the Ruriks, had already given to it over all the others.

The Principle of Direct Succession

In fact, sometimes natural justice, sometimes oriental negligence and cupidity, often the fear of being disobeyed, and lastly, and especially, the power and riches of the princes of Moscow—whose presents always surpassed those of the other princes—all these motives had induced the khans to allow the succession to the grand principality to descend regularly from father to son in the branch of Moscow.[19] This natural order of succession Dmitri Donskoi, in 1359, established by a treaty, in which his kinsmen consented to renounce the mode of succession from brother to brother. It was the most remarkable among them, Vladimir the Brave, who was the first to sign this act. In several other conventions, Vladimir acknowledged himself the vassal and lieutenant, not merely of Dmitri, but also of Vasili his son, and even of the son of Vasili, when he was only five years of age. This example, set by a prince who, of all the possessors of appanages, was the most renowned for his prudence and his valour, was followed by the others. Thus, like the Capets, kings of France, did Ivan I, and particularly Dmitri Donskoi, begin the monarchy by restoring the direct succession, in causing, while they lived, their eldest sons to be recognised as their successors. Afterwards we see Vasili, son of Dmitri, persevering in this practice, and Vasili the Blind, his grandson, raising up his tottering throne, and preparing the autocracy of the fourth Russian period, by associating with himself his next heir, the great Ivan III.

It is easy to conceive the infallible effect of this order of succession, and with what promptitude it must necessarily have extended and consolidated the power of the grand princes. In fact, the ideas of the father being transmitted to the son by education, their policy was more consistently followed up, and their ambition had a more direct object. The nobles could not fail to attach themselves more devotedly to a prince whose son and heir, growing up amongst them, would know only them, and would recompense their services in the persons of their children; for the necessary consequence of the succession of power in the same branch, was the succession of favours and dignities in the same families.

Even before Dmitri had established the principle, the boyars saw the advantages which this order of succession held out to them. Here, as elsewhere, the fact preceded the law. This was the reason of their restoring the direct line in the grandson of Ivan Kalita; it was they who made him grand prince at the age of twelve years, and who subjected the other princes to him. In like manner, about 1430, they maintained this order of succession in Vasili the Blind. Contemporary annalists declare that these ancient boyars of the grand principality detested the descent from brother to brother; for, in that system, each prince of the lateral branch arrived from his appanage with other boyars, whom he always preferred, and whom he could not satisfy and establish but at the expense of the old. On the other hand, the most important and transmissible places, the most valuable favours, an hereditary and more certain protection, and greater hopes, attracted a military nobility around the grand princes. In a very short time, their elevation to the level of the humbled petty princes flattered their vanity, and completed their junction with the principal authority. This circumstance explains the last words of Dmitri Donskoi to his boyars, when he recommended his son to their protection. “Under my reign,” said he, “you were not boyars, but really Russian princes.” In fact (to cite only some examples), we see that his armies were as often commanded by boyars as by princes, and that, from this epoch, it was no longer a prince of the blood, but a boyar of the grand prince, who was his lieutenant at Novgorod.

Nay, more, when the succession from father to son was once established, there were, at the very beginning, two minorities (those of Dmitri, and of Vasili, his grandson), during which the boyars composed the council of regency, governed the state, and were the equals, and even the superiors, of the princes who held appanages. This will explain why, in 1392, the boyars of Boris, the last prince of Suzdal, gave up him and his appanage to Vasili Dmitrievitch of Moscow. The motive is to be found only in their interest; as the grand prince of Moscow entrusted them with the government of the appanages, and thus substituted the nobles in the place of the princes.

A very remarkable circumstance, with respect to Dmitri Donskoi, is, on the one hand, the energy with which he subdued those princes, and, on the other, his circumspect treatment of his boyars. According to Karamsin, it is more especially to their pride and jealousy of the tyssiatchsky of Moscow (the boyar of the city, or of the commune, a sort of civil and military tribune, elected by the people), that we are to attribute the abolition of that office by Donskoi. During the preceding reign, another tyssiatchsky of Moscow, who claimed precedence of even the boyars of the grand prince, had been murdered by them.

Dmitri Donskoi

When this hereditary protection afforded by the grand princes of the Moscow branch was once fairly established, the nobles of each appanage, who constituted its army, had thenceforth an asylum, and, as it were, a tribunal for redress, to which they could appeal whenever they were dissatisfied with their prince. It was this which made Tver fall before Ivan Kalita; for the sovereign prince of that first and last rival of Moscow having preferred to his boyars the people of Pskov, who had defended him, the former withdrew to Moscow.

The power of Ivan Kalita being once raised by the Tatars’ aid, and by the re-establishment of the direct line of succession, and thoroughly developed by his son and grandson, Simeon the Proud and Dmitri Donskoi, it followed, as a natural consequence, that he who was most able to reward and to punish drew around him, and retained, the whole of the nobles. These constituted the sole strength of the appanaged princes; their defection, therefore, completed the subjugation of the princes. Dmitri Donskoi was, therefore, in reality sovereign, as is proved by his treaties with the princes who held appanages, all of whom he reduced to be his vassals. And, accordingly, notwithstanding the appanages which he gave to his sons, and the dissensions which arose out of that error—an error as yet, perhaps, unavoidable—the attachment of the nobles, for which we have just assigned a reason, always replaced the legitimate heir on the throne.

[1366 A.D.]

Already, so early as about 1366, the Russian princes could no longer venture to contend against their lord paramount by any other means than by denunciations to the horde; but to what khan could they be addressed? Discord had created several: what result was to be hoped from them? Divided among themselves, the Tatar armies had ceased to be an available force. The journeys to the Golden Horde, which had originally contributed to keep the Russian princes in awe, now served to afford them an insight into the weakness of their enemies. The grand princes returned from the horde with the confidence that they might usurp with impunity; and their competitors with envoys and letters, which even they themselves well knew would be of no avail. It was, then, obvious in Russia, that the only protecting power was at Moscow: to have recourse to its support was a matter of necessity. The petty princes could obtain it only by the sacrifice of their independence; and thus all of them became vassals to the grand prince Dmitri.

Never did a great man arise more opportunely than this Dmitri. It was a propitious circumstance, that the dissensions of the Tatars gave them full occupation during the eighteen years subsequent to the first three of his reign:[20] this, in the first place, allowed him time to extinguish the devastating fury of Olgerd the Lithuanian, son of Gedimin, father of Iagello, and conqueror of all Lithuania, Volhinia, Smolensk, Kiev, and even of Taurida; secondly, to unite several principalities with his throne; and lastly, to compel the other princes, and even the prince of Tver, to acknowledge his paramount authority.

The contest with the latter was terrible: four times did Dmitri overcome Michael, and four times did the prince of Tver, aided by his son-in-law, the great Olgerd, prince of Lithuania, rise again victorious. In this obstinate conflict, Moscow itself was twice besieged, and must have fallen, had it not been for its stone walls, the recent work of the first regency of the Muscovite boyars. But, at length, Olgerd died; and Dmitri, who, but three years before, could appear only on his knees at the horde, now dared to refuse the khan his tribute, and to put to death the insolent ambassador who had been sent to claim it.

We have seen that, fifty years earlier, a similar instance of temerity caused the branch of Tver to fall beneath that of Moscow; but times were changed. The triple alliance of the primate, the boyars, and the grand prince, had now restored to the Russians a confidence in their own strength: they had acquired boldness from a conviction of the power of their grand prince, and from the dissensions of the Tatars. Some bands of the latter, wandering in Muscovy in search of plunder, were defeated; at last the Tatars have fled before the Russians! they are become their slaves, the delusion of their invincibility is no more!

The burst of fury which the khan exhibited on learning the murder of his representative, accordingly served as a signal for the confederation of all the Russian princes against the prince of Tver. He was compelled to submit to the grand prince, and to join with him against the horde.

The Battle of the Don or Kulikovo (1380 A.D.)

[1380 A.D.]

Russia now began to feel that there were three things which were indispensably necessary to her; the establishment of the direct succession, the concentration of the supreme power, and the union of all parties against the Tatars. The movement in this direction was taken very opportunely; for it happened simultaneously that the Mongolian chief, Mamai, was also disembarrassed of his civil wars (1380), and he hastened with all his forces into Russia to re-establish his slighted authority; but he found the grand prince Dmitri confronting him on the Don, at the head of the combined Russian princes and an army of two hundred thousand[21] men. Dmitri put it to the choice of his troops whether they would go to encounter the foe, who were encamped at no great distance on the opposite shore of the river, or remain on this side and wait the attack? With one voice they declared for going over to the assault. The grand prince immediately transported his battalions across the river, and then turned the vessels adrift, in order to cut off all hopes of escaping by retreat, and inspire his men with a more desperate valour against an enemy who was three times stronger in numbers. The fight began. The Russians defended themselves valiantly against the furious attacks of the Tatars; the hosts of combatants pressed in such numbers to the field of battle, that multitudes of them were trampled under foot by the tumult of men and horses. The Tatars, continually relieved by fresh bodies of soldiers as any part was fatigued by the conflict, seemed at length to have victory on their side. Nothing but the impossibility of getting over the river, and the firm persuasion that death would directly transport them from the hands of the infidel enemy into the mansions of bliss, restrained the Russians from a general flight. But all at once, at the very moment when everything seemed to be lost, a detachment of the grand prince’s army, which he had stationed as a reserve, and which till now had remained inactive and unobserved, came up in full force, fell upon the rear of the Tatars, and threw them into such amazement and terror that they fled, and left the Russians masters of the field. This momentous victory, however, cost them dear; thousands lay dead upon the ground, and the whole army was occupied eight days in burying the bodies of the dead Russians: those of the Tatars were left uninterred upon the ground. It was in harmony of this achievement that Dmitri received his honourable surname of Donskoi.[g]

Significance of Battle of Kulikovo

The chronicles say that such a battle as that of Kulikovo had never before been known in Russia; even Europe had not seen the like of it for a long time. Such bloody conflicts had taken place in the western half of Europe at the beginning of the so-called Middle Ages, at the time of the great migration of nations, in those terrible collisions between European and Asiatic armies; such was the battle of Châlons-sur-Marne, when the Roman general saved western Europe from the Huns; such too was the battle of Tours, where the Frankish leader saved western Europe from the Arabs (Saracens). Western Europe was saved from the Asiatics, but her eastern half remained long open to their attacks. Here, about the middle of the ninth century, was formed an empire which should have served Europe as a bulwark against Asia; in the thirteenth century this bulwark was seemingly destroyed, but the foundations of the European empire were saved in the distant northwest; thanks to the preservation of these foundations, in a hundred and fifty years the empire succeeded in becoming unified, consolidated—and the victory of Kulikovo served as a proof of its strength. It was an omen of the triumph of Europe over Asia, and has exactly the same signification in the history of eastern Europe as the victories of Châlons and Tours have in that of western Europe. It also bears a like character with them—that of a terrible, bloody slaughter, a desperate struggle between Europe and Asia, which was to decide the great question in the history of humanity: which of these two parts of the world was to triumph over the other.

But the victory of Kulikovo was one of those victories which closely border upon grievous defeats. When, says the tradition, the grand prince ordered a count to be made of those who were left alive after the battle, the boyar Michael Aleksandrovitch reported to him that there remained in all forty thousand men, while more than four hundred thousand had been in action. And although the historian is not obliged to accept the latter statement literally, yet the ratio here given between the living and the dead is of great importance to him. Four princes, thirteen boyars, and a monk of the monastery of Troitsa, were among the slain. It is for this reason that in the embellished narratives of the defeat of Mamai we see the event represented on one hand as a great triumph and on the other as a woeful and lamentable event. There was great joy in Russia, says the chronicler, but there was also great grief over those slain by Mamai at the Don; the land of Russia was bereft of all voyevods (captains) and men and all kinds of warriors, and therefore there was a great fear throughout all the land of Russia. It was this depopulation through loss of men that gave the Tatars a short-lived triumph over the victors of Kulikovo.[e]

THE DESTRUCTION OF MOSCOW (1382 A.D.)

[1382 A.D.]

The immediate and inevitable consequence of the battle was a sensible reduction of the Russian army. The numbers that fell before the Tatars could not be easily or speedily supplied: nor were the means of a fresh levy accessible. Those districts from which the grand army was ordinarily recruited had already exhausted their population; all the remote principalities had contributed in nearly equal proportion, and the majority of the rest of the empire was composed of persons who were unaccustomed to the use of arms, having been exclusively occupied in tillage or commerce. These circumstances, which did not damp the joy of the victory, or diminish its real importance, presented to the implacable foe a new temptation for crossing the border. But it was not until two of the wandering hordes had formed a junction that the Tatars were able to undertake the enterprise. The preparations for it occupied them two years. In 1382, the hordes of the Don and the Volga united, and making a descent upon the frontier provinces with success, penetrated as far as Moscow. The city had been previously fortified by the boyars with strong ramparts and iron gates; and Dmitri, trusting with confidence to the invincibility of the fortifications, left the capital in the charge of one of his generals, while he imprudently went into the interior to recruit his army. His absence in the hour of danger spread consternation amongst the peaceable part of the inhabitants, particularly the clergy, who relied upon his energies on the most trying occasions. The metropolitan, accompanied by a great number of the citizens, left the city upon the approach of the Tatars. The small garrison that remained made an ineffectual show on the ramparts, and the Tatars, who might not otherwise have gained their object, prevailed upon the timidity of the Russians, who consented to capitulate upon a promise of pardon. The Tatars observed their pledge in this instance as they had done in every similar case—by availing themselves of the first opportunity to violate it. They no sooner entered Moscow than they gave it to the flames, and massacred every living person they met in the streets. Having glutted their revenge with a terrible scene of slaughter and conflagration, they returned home, satisfied with having reduced the grand princedom once more, after their own fashion, to subjection. They did not perceive that in this exercise of brutal rage they strengthened the moral power of Russia, by giving an increased motive to co-operation, and by rendering the abhorrence of their yoke still more bitter than before. All they desired was the physical and visible evidence of superiority; either not heeding, or not comprehending, the silent and unseen progress of that strength which combined opinion acquires under the pressure of blind tyranny.

Dmitri, thus reduced to submission, was compelled once more to perform the humiliating penance of begging his dignity at the hands of the khan. Empire had just been within his grasp; he had bound up the shattered parts of the great mass; he had effected a union of sentiment, and a bond of co-operation; but in the effort to establish this desirable end, he had exhausted the means by which alone it could be perpetuated. Had the Tatars suffered a short period more to have elapsed before they resumed the work of spoliation, it is not improbable but that a sufficient force could have been raised to repel them: but they appeared in considerable numbers, animated by the wildest passions, at a time when Dmitri was unable to make head against their approach. The result was unavoidable; and the grand prince, in suing to be reinstated on the throne from which he was virtually expelled, merely acquiesced in a necessity which he could not avert.

But the destruction of Moscow had no effect upon the great principle that was now in course of development all over the empire. The grand princedom was still the centre of all the Russian operations: the grand prince was still the acknowledged authority to which all the subordinate rulers deferred. While this paramount virtue of cohesion remained unimpaired, the incursions of the Tatars, however calamitous in their passing visitations, had no other influence upon the ultimate destiny of the country than that of stimulating the latent patriotism of the population, and of convincing the petty princes, if indeed any further evidence were wanted, of the disastrous impolicy of wasting their resources in private feuds.

THE DEATH OF DMITRI DONSKOI; HIS PLACE IN HISTORY

The example of Dmitri Donskoi had clearly pointed out the course which it was the policy of the grand prince to follow; but, in order to place his own views beyond the reach of speculation, and to enforce them in as solemn a manner as he could upon his successors, that prince placed a last injunction upon his son, which he also addressed in his will to all future grand princes, to persevere in the lofty object of regeneration by maintaining and strengthening the domestic alliances of the sovereignty, and resisting the Tatars until they should be finally driven out of Russia. His reign of twenty-seven years, crowned with eventful circumstances, and subjected to many fluctuations, established two objects which were of the highest consequence to the ultimate completion of the great design. Amidst all the impediments that lay in his way, or that sprang up as he advanced, Dmitri continued his efforts to create an order of nobility—the boyars, who, scattered through every part of the empire, and surrounding his court on all occasions of political importance, held the keys of communication and control in their hands, by which the means of concentration were at all times facilitated. That was one object, involving in its fulfilment the gradual reduction of the power of the petty princes, and contributing mainly to the security of the second object, which was the chief agent of his designs against the Tatars. In proportion as he won over the boyars to his side, and gave them an interest in his prosperity, he increased the power of the grand princedom. These were the elements of his plan: the progressive concentration of the empire, and the elevation of the grand princedom to the supreme authority. The checks that he met in the prosecution of these purposes, of which the descent of the Tatar army upon Moscow was the principal, slightly retarded, but never obscured, his progress. The advances that he had made were evident. It did not require the attestation of his dying instructions to explain the aim of his life: it was visibly exemplified in the institutions he bequeathed to his country; in the altered state of society; and in the general submission of the appanages to a throne which, at the period of his accession, was shaken to its centre by rebellion.[d]

[1389 A.D.]

In 1389 Dmitri died at the early age of thirty-nine. His grandfather, his uncle, and his father had quietly prepared ample means for an open decisive struggle. Dmitri’s merit consisted in the fact that he understood how to take advantage of these means, understood how to develop the forces at his disposal and to impart to them the proper direction at the proper time. We do not intend to weigh the merits of Dmitri in comparison with those of his predecessors; we will only remark that the application of forces is usually more evident and more resounding than their preparation, and that the reign of Dmitri, crowded as it was from beginning to end with the events of a persistent and momentous struggle, easily eclipsed the reigns of his predecessors with their sparse incidents. Events like the battle of Kulikovo make a powerful impression upon the imagination of contemporaries and endure long in the remembrance of their descendants. It is therefore not surprising that the victor of Mamai should have been given beside Alexander Nevski so conspicuous a place amongst the princes of the new northeastern Russia. The best proof of the great importance attributed to Dmitri’s deeds by contemporaries is to be found in the existence of a separate narrative of the exploits of this prince, a separate embellished biography. Dmitri’s appearance is thus described: “He was strong and valiant, and great and broad in body, broad shouldered and very heavy, his beard and hair were black, and very wonderful was his gaze.” In his biography the severity of his life is extolled, his aversion to pleasure, his piety, gentleness, his chastity both before and after marriage; among other things it is said: “Although he was not learned in books, yet he had spiritual books in his heart.” The end of Dmitri is thus described: “He fell ill and was in great pain, then it abated, but he again fell into a great sickness and his groaning came to his heart, for it touched his inner parts and his soul already drew near to death.”

Live-fish Merchant

The important consequences of Dmitri’s activity are manifested in his will and testament, in which we meet with hitherto unheard-of dispositions. The Moscow prince blesses his eldest son Vasili and endows him with the grand principality of Vladimir, which he calls his paternal inheritance. Donskoi no longer fears any rivals to his son, either from Tver or Suzdal. Besides Vasili, Dmitri had five sons: Iuri, Andrew, Peter, John, and Constantine; but the two latter were under age, Constantine having been born only four days before his father’s death, and the grand prince confides his paternal domain of Moscow to his four elder sons. In this domain, that is in the town of Moscow and the districts appertaining to it, Donskoi had ruled over two parts or shares, the share of his father Ivan and of his uncle Simeon, while the third share was under the rule of Vladimir Andreevitch, to whom it now remained. Of his two shares the grand prince left one half to his eldest son Vasili; the other half was divided in three parts among the remaining sons, and the other towns of the principality of Moscow were divided among the four sons; Kolomna went to Vasili, the eldest, Zvenigorod to Iuri, Mozhaisk to Andrew, Dmitrov to Peter.

THE REIGN OF VASILI-DMITRIEVITCH (1389-1425 A.D.)

From the very commencement of his reign the young son of Donskoi showed that he would remain true to the traditions of his father and grandfather. A year after the khan’s ambassador had placed him on the grand prince’s throne at Vladimir, Vasili set out for the horde and there purchased a iarlik (letter-patent of the khans) for the principality of Nijni-Novgorod, which not long before, after many entreaties had been obtained from the horde by Boris Constantinovitch. When the letter heard of Vasili’s designs, Boris called together his boyars and said to them with tears in his eyes: “My lords and brothers, my boyars and friends! remember your oath on the cross, remember what you swore to me!” The senior among his boyars was Vasili Rumianietz, who replied to the prince: “Do not grieve, my lord prince! we are all faithful to thee and ready to lay down our heads and to shed our blood for thee.” Thus he spoke to his prince, but meanwhile he sent to Vasili Dmitrievitch, promising to give up Boris Constantinovitch to him. On his way back from the horde, when he had reached Kolomna, Vasili sent from there to Nijni the ambassador of Toktamish and his own boyars. At first Boris would not let them enter the town, but Rumianietz said to him: “My lord prince, the khan’s ambassador and the Muscovite boyars come here in order to confirm peace and establish everlasting love, but thou wishest to raise dissensions and war; let them come into the town; what can they do to thee? we are all with thee.” But as soon as the ambassador and boyars had entered the town, they ordered the bells to be rung, assembled the people, and announced to them that Nijni already belonged to the prince of Moscow. When Boris heard this he sent for his boyars and said to them: “My lords and brothers, my beloved drujina! remember your oath on the cross, do not give me up to my enemies.” But this same Rumianietz replied: “Lord prince! do not hope in us, we are no longer thine, we are not with thee, but against thee!” Boris was seized, and when somewhat later Vasili Dmitrievitch came to Nijni, he placed there his lieutenants; and Prince Boris, with his wife, children, and partisans, he ordered to be carried away in chains to various towns and kept in strict imprisonment.[e]

[1395-1412 A.D.]

The princes of Suzdal, Boris’ nephews, were banished, and Vasili also acquired Suzdal. Later on the princes of Suzdal made peace with the grand prince and received back from him their patrimonial estates, but from generation to generation they remained dependants of Moscow and not independent rulers. In 1395 took place an event which raised the moral importance of Moscow: on account of an expected invasion of Timur (Tamerlane), which, however, never took place, Vasili Dmitrievitch ordered to be transported from Vladimir to Moscow that famous ikon which Andrew had formerly taken from Kiev to his beloved town of Vladimir; this ikon now served to consecrate the pre-eminence of Moscow over all other Russian towns.

Following in the steps of his predecessors, Vasili Dmitrievitch oppressed Novgorod, but did not however entirely attain to the goal of his designs. Twice he endeavoured to wrest her Dvinsk colonies from her, taking advantage of the fact that in the Dvinsk territories a party had been formed which preferred the rule of the Moscow grand prince to that of Grand Novgorod. The people of Novgorod were fortunate in defending their colonies, but they paid dearly for it: the grand prince laid waste the territory of Novgorod, and ordered some of the inhabitants who had killed a partisan of his at Torzhok to be strangled; but worse than all, Novgorod itself could not get on without the grand prince and was obliged to turn to him for help when another grand prince, namely the Lithuanian, attempted its conquest.

At that period the horde was so torn up with inward dissensions that Vasili had not for some years paid tribute to the khan and regarded himself as independent; but in 1408 an unexpected attack was made on Moscow by the Tatar prince Edigei, who like Mamai, without being khan himself, made those who bore the name of khan obey him. Vasili Dmitrievitch being off his guard and thinking that the horde had become weakened, did not take early measures against his wily adversary, who deceived him by his hypocrisy and pretended good-will. Like his father he escaped to Kostroma, but provided better than his father for the defence of Moscow by confiding it to his brave uncle, Prince Vladimir Andreevitch. The inhabitants themselves burned their faubourg, and Edigei could not take the Kremlin, but the horde laid waste many Russian towns and villages. Moscow now learned that although the horde had no longer the power to hold Russia in servitude, yet it might still make itself terrible by its sudden incursions, devastations, and capture of the inhabitants. Shortly thereafter, in 1412, Vasili went to the horde to do homage to the new khan Djelalledin, brought him tribute, and made presents to the Tatar grandees, so that the khan confirmed the grand principality to the prince of Moscow, although he had previously intended to bestow it upon the exiled prince of Nijni-Novgorod. The power of the khans over Russia was now only held by a thread; but for some time yet the Moscow princes could take advantage of it in order to strengthen their own authority over Russia and to shelter their inclinations under the shadow of its ancient might. Meanwhile they took measures of defence against the Tatar invasions, which might be all the more annoying because they were directed from various sides and from various fragments of the crumbling horde. In the west the Lithuanian power, which had sprung up under Gedimin, and grown great under Olgerd, had attained to its utmost limits under Vitovt.

Strictly speaking, the supreme authority over Lithuania and the part of Russia in subjection to it belonged to Iagello, king of Poland; but Lithuania was governed independently in the quality of viceroy by his cousin Vitovt, the son of that Keistut who had been strangled by Iagello. Vitovt, following the example of his predecessors, aimed at extending the frontiers of Lithuania at the expense of the Russian territories, and gradually subjugated one after another of them. Vasili Dmitrievitch was married to the daughter of Vitovt, Sophia; throughout his reign, he had to keep up friendly relations with his kinsman, and yet be on his guard against the ambitious designs of his father-in-law. The Muscovite prince acted with great caution and prudence, giving way to his father-in-law as far as possible, but safeguarded himself and Russia from him. He did not hinder Vitovt from taking Smolensk, chiefly because the last prince of Smolensk, Iuri, was a villain in the full sense of the word, and the inhabitants themselves preferred to submit to Vitovt, rather than to their own prince. When however Vitovt showed too plainly his intentions of capturing Pskov and Novgorod, the grand prince of Moscow openly took up arms against his father-in-law and a war seemed imminent; but in 1407 the matter was settled between them, and a peace was concluded by which the river Ougra was made a boundary between the Muscovite and the Lithuanian possessions.

VASILI VASILIEVITCH (AFTERWARDS CALLED “THE BLIND” OR “THE DARK”)

[1425-1435 A.D.]

Vasili Dmitrievitch died in 1425. His successor, Vasili Vasilievitch, was a man of limited gifts and of weak mind and will, but capable of every villainy and treachery. The members of the princely house had been held in utter subjection under Vasili Dmitrievitch, but at his death they raised their heads, and Iuri, the uncle of Vasili Vasilievitch, endeavoured to obtain the grand principality from the horde. But the artful and wily boyar, Ivan Dmitrievitch Vsevolozhsky, succeeded in 1432 in setting aside Iuri and assuring the grand principality to Vasili Vasilievitch. When Iuri pleaded his right of seniority as uncle, and in support of his claim cited precedents by which uncles had been preferred, as seniors in years and birth, to their nephews, Vsevolozhsky represented to the khan that Vasili had already received the principality by will of the khan and that this will should be held above all laws and customs. This appeal to the absolute will of the khan pleased the latter and Vasili Vasilievitch remained grand prince. Some years later this same boyar, angered at Vasili because the latter had first promised to marry his daughter and then married Marie Iaroslavna, the granddaughter of Vladimir Andreevitch Serpukhovski, himself incited Iuri to wrest the principality from his nephew. Thus Russia again became the prey of civil wars, which were signalised by hideous crimes. Iuri, who had taken possession of Moscow, was again expelled and soon after died. The son of Iuri, Vasili Kossoi (the Squinting) concluded peace with Vasili, and then, having treacherously violated the treaty, attacked Vasili, but he was vanquished, captured, and blinded (1435). After a few years the following events took place at the Golden Horde: the khan Ulu Makhmet was deprived of his throne and sought the aid of the grand prince of Moscow. The grand prince not only refused him his aid, but also drove him out of the boundaries of the territory of Moscow. Ulu Makhmet and his partisans then established themselves on the banks of the Volga at Kazan, and there laid the foundations of a Tatar empire that during a whole century brought desolation on Russia. Ulu Makhmet, as ruler of Kazan, avenged himself on the Muscovite prince for the past, was victorious over him in battle, and took him prisoner. Vasili Vasilievitch only recovered his liberty by paying an enormous ransom. When he returned to his native land, he was against his will obliged to lay upon the people heavy taxes and to receive Tatars into his principality and give them estates. All this awakened dissatisfaction against him, of which the Galician prince Dmitri Shemiaka, the brother of Kossoi, hastened to take advantage, and joining himself to the princes of Tver and Mozhaisk, in 1446 he ordered Vasili to be treacherously seized at the monastery of Troitsa and blinded. Shemiaka took possession of the grand principality and kept the blind Vasili in confinement, but observing an agitation among the people, he yielded to the request of Jonas, bishop of Riazan, and gave Vasili his liberty, at the same time making him swear that he would not seek to regain the grand principality. Vasili did not keep his oath, and in 1447 the partisans of the blind prince again raised him to the throne.

[1447-1448 A.D.]

It is remarkable that from this period the reign of Vasili Vasilievitch entirely changed in character. While he had his eyesight, Vasili was a most insignificant sovereign, but from the time that he lost his eyes, his reign becomes distinguished for its firmness, intelligence, and decision. It is evident that clever and active men must have ruled in the name of the blind prince. Such were the boyars: the princes Patrikeev, Riapolovski, Koshkin, Plesktcheev, Morozov, and the famous voyevods, Striga-Obolenski and Theodore Bassenok, but above all the metropolitan Jonas.

Jonas Becomes Metropolitan

Russian Woman

Jonas was a native of Kostroma. When he was made bishop of Riazan he did not in any wise become a partisan of the local views, his sympathies inclined to Moscow because, in conformity with the conditions of that epoch, Jonas saw in Moscow alone the centre of Russian unification. In 1431, at the death of the metropolitan Photius, Jonas was elected metropolitan, but the patriarch of Constantinople had already named the Greek Isidore to that office. This Isidore had participated in the capacity of Russian metropolitan, in the Florentine council which had proclaimed the union of the Greek church with the Roman, the pope of Rome to be the head of the Universal church. Isidore, together with the patriarch of Constantinople and the Byzantine emperor had submitted to the pope; for Isidore was at heart a Greek: all his aims were directed to the salvation of his perishing country, and like many other Greeks he hoped through the pope to arouse Europe against the Turks. It was these hopes that had caused the Greeks of that time to sacrifice the independence of their church. In the eyes of Isidore Russia too was to serve as an instrument for Greek patriotic designs; but the union was rejected at Moscow, Isidore was driven out, and for some years the office of metropolitan of Moscow remained unoccupied. Kiev had its own metropolitans since the days of Vitovt, but Moscow did not wish to have anything to do with them. The bishop of Riazan, Jonas, having been already named metropolitan by the Russian clergy, enjoyed at Moscow a pre-eminent importance and influence, and finally, in 1448, this archbishop was raised to the rank of metropolitan by an assembly of the Russian bishops, without regard to the patriarch. This event was a decisive breach with the past, and from that time the eastern-Russian church ceased to depend upon the patriarch of Constantinople and acquired full independence. The centre of her supreme power was Moscow, and this circumstance definitively established that moral importance of Moscow, which had been aimed for by the metropolitan Peter, which had been held up by Alexis, and which had received greater brilliancy from the transfer of the ikon of the Blessed Virgin from Vladimir. From that time the Russian territories not yet subject to Moscow and aiming to preserve their independence from her—Tver, Riazan, Novgorod—were bound to her more closely by spiritual bonds.

When he had for the third time ascended the throne of Moscow, the grand prince designated as co-regent with himself his eldest son Ivan, who was thenceforth called grand prince like his father, as is shown by the treaties of that period. It was from that time that the political activity of Ivan commenced and gradually widened; and there is no doubt that when he attained his majority it was he, and not his blind father that directed the accomplishment of the events which led to the strengthening of Moscow. Prince Dmitri Shemiaka, who had been obliged to promise on his oath to desist from any further attempts upon the grand principality, did not cease to show his enmity against Vasili the Dark. The clergy wrote to Shemiaka a letter of admonishment, but he would not listen to their remonstrances, and the armies of Moscow marched with the blessing of Jonas and accompanied by the young prince, against Shemiaka in Galicia. Shemiaka was defeated and fled to Novgorod, where the inhabitants gave him a refuge, and Galicia with its dependencies was again joined to Moscow. Shemiaka continued to plot against Vasili, took Ustiug, and established himself there; but the young prince Ivan Vasilievitch drove him out, and Shemiaka again fled to Novgorod. The metropolitan Jonas issued an edict declaring Shemiaka excommunicated from the church, forbidding orthodox persons to eat and drink with him, and reproaching the people of Novgorod for having received him. It was then decided at Moscow to put an end to Shemiaka by secretly murdering him; the secretary Borodati, through Shemiaka’s boyar Ivan Kotov, induced Shemiaka’s cook to prepare and serve to him a poisoned fowl (1453).

[1462 A.D.]

Vasili the Dark died on the 5th of March, 1462, from an unsuccessful treatment of burns. He outlived his chief counsellor, the metropolitan Jonas, by a year, the latter having died on the 31st of March, 1461.[h]

A REVIEW OF THE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT DURING THE TATAR PERIOD

The beginning of the fourteenth century was the commencement of a new epoch in the life of Russia; in its two halves two empires began to crystallize: that of Moscow in the east and that of Lithuania in the west, and the scattered elements began to gather around the new centres. Such a centre for eastern Russia was Moscow, until then an insignificant town, rarely mentioned in the chronicles, being the share of the younger and therefore less powerful princes. Under Daniel Aleksandrovitch[22] the town of Moscow constituted the whole principality. With the acquisition of Pereiaslavl (1302), Mozhaisk (1303), and Kolomna (1308) this region became somewhat more extended, but when it fell to the share of Ivan Danilovitch after the death of his brother Iuri, it was still very insignificant; and yet through its resources the princes of Moscow managed to become the first in eastern Russia and little by little to gather round them the whole of eastern Russia. The rise of the principality of Moscow is one of the most remarkable phenomena in the history of Russia. It is therefore not surprising that particular attention should have been directed towards it by historians, and by the light of their united investigations the phenomenon becomes sufficiently clear.

In the thirteenth century, under the domination of the Tatars in eastern Russia, there was a continual struggle amongst the princes for the title of grand prince, to which they also strove to unite the possession of Vladimir. We also observe another distinctive feature of the time, which was that the princes did not remain to live in Vladimir, but only strove to unite it to their own possessions, and thus augment them, and, if possible, secure them for their families. The struggle was for the preponderance of one family over another through the extension of its territorial possessions. In the Kievan period, whoever became prince of Kiev, removed to Kiev, and named someone of his own family as ruler in his own principality, so that if Kiev were lost and it should pass into another family, he would not lose his own patrimony.

During the Tatar period we note a new phenomenon: the princes did not merely separate themselves from their patrimonial lands, but even from their capitals; for instance: Iaroslav lived in Tver, Basil in Kostroma, Andrew in Gorodeza, Dmitri in Pereiaslavl, and so on. The power of a grand prince at that time was only a hegemony, a preponderance over other princes; as a testimony of their independence the other princes, the elders of their families (such as Riazan, Tver, etc.) began also to call themselves grand princes, and the preponderance of the grand prince of Vladimir little by little lost its significance. To all this there must yet be added another special circumstance, that in order for anyone to unite Vladimir and its territory to his possessions and thus obtain the predominance, a iarlik or letter of the khan was required; no rights were necessary and a wide field was open for every guest. Thus there appeared a new basis for the right of succession: the favour of the khan. To obtain this favour was the aim of all the princes, to keep it—a peculiar art. Whoever possessed this art would be the head over all eastern Russia, and whoever could maintain this position was bound to subordinate all the rest to himself. In consequence of this, the first condition for success at that time was a dexterous tactfulness, and whoever possessed this quality must come out victor. This dexterousness was a peculiar distinction of the Muscovite princes, and in it lay the chief cause of their success. They had neither power nor higher rights, and all their hopes were founded on their own skill and the favour of the khan. They had no riches, and their patrimonial lands, poor and secluded, away from the great rivers which were then the chief means of communication, did not yield them large means.

But to ensure success with the khan, his wife, and the princes of the horde, money was necessary; so they became saving and scraping, and all their capacities were directed to the acquisition of gain. Their qualities were neither brilliant nor attractive, but in their position it was only by these sober qualities that anything could be obtained. Alexander Iaroslavitch (Nevski) pointed out to his successors that their policy should be to give way when necessary and to wait when uncertain. He who followed this counsel was successful; whosoever hurried, like Alexander Mikhailovitch (of Tver), was a loser in the game.

But while taking advantage of every means of influence at the horde, the Muscovite princes did not lose sight of those means by which they could also act within Russia itself. Ivan Danilovitch managed to induce the metropolitan St. Peter to come to Moscow, and his successors continued to reside in that town. The alliance with the spiritual power, the only power that embraced the whole of Russia, was of extraordinary advantage to the Muscovite princes.

The metropolitan could exert his influence everywhere. Thus Theognost closed the churches at Pskov when that city offered an asylum to Alexander Mikhailovitch, and St. Sergius did likewise at Nijni-Novgorod when it accepted a prince to whom Moscow was opposed. This alliance was a most natural one: if the princes needed the authority of the church, the clergy—at that time the representatives of the most advanced ideas concerning the civil order—sought to realise that order of which it stood in need even for its purely economic interests. There is not the slightest doubt that one of the chief causes of the devotion of the clergy to the views and policies of the Muscovite princes, lay in its conviction that it was bound to derive material advantages from the concentration of all power in the hands of one prince. In fact, while the system of appanages prevailed, it was, on the one hand, extremely difficult for the clergy to enjoy its possessions and privileges in security, because the maintenance of this security depended not on one, but on many; while on the other hand, the princes of appanages infringed on clerical privileges more frequently than the grand prince. The dispersion of the monastic estates over several principalities still further contributed to the desire of the clergy for the abolition of the appanage system, which increased the difficulties of managing those estates. Especially in the case of war among the princes of appanages, the clergy of one appanage might easily be deprived of its possessions in another appanage, because at such a time all means of injuring the enemy were considered permissible.

In the increase of power of the Muscovite princes a leading part also belongs to the Moscow boyars, whose activity was principally displayed during the youth or minority of the grand princes.[23]

Such were the principal causes of the strength of the Moscow princes; to them should be added (according to the historians N. V. Stankevitch and S. M. Soloviov) the central position of the principality of Moscow, both in the sense that Moscow is near the sources of the chief rivers, and that an attack from without must first fall on the surrounding principalities. But these causes are evidently secondary and would have no significance without the others: Moscow is not so far from the other principalities that these advantages would belong to her alone. It was much more important that a wise policy, by preserving Moscow from the attacks of the Tatars, attracted thither an increased population and thus enriched the principality. A final important cause was the weakening of the Tatar horde and its dismemberment at the end of this period, of which the princes of Moscow did not fail to take advantage for their own ends.[b]

THE INFLUENCE OF TATAR DOMINATION

Karamsin, in relating the history of the invasion of Russia by the Mongols, makes some reflections on the consequences of the domination of these barbarians for the Russian people. In spite of his devotion to autocratic power, he cannot prevent himself from keenly regretting the liberty which this power had superseded.

“There was a time,” he says, “when Russia, shaped and elevated by the unity of the sovereign power, yielded neither in force nor civilisation to the foremost of the European powers founded by the peoples of Germany on the ruins of the Western Empire. Having the same character, the same laws, the same usages, the same political institutions, which were communicated to Russia by the Varangian or Norman princes, she took her place in the new political system of Europe with some real claims to a great importance, and with the remarkable advantage of being under the influence of Greece, the only one of all the powers which had not been overthrown by the barbarians. This happy time for Russia, is that of Iaroslav the Great. Strengthened by both Christianity and public order, she possessed a religious teaching, schools, laws, an important trade, a numerous army, a fleet, unity of power, and civil liberty. What was Europe at the beginning of the eleventh century? The theatre of feudal tyranny, of the weakness of sovereigns, of audacity amongst the barons, of slavery in the peoples, of superstition and of ignorance. The genius of Alfred and Charlemagne shone through the darkness, but soon faded away; their memory only has survived, their beneficent institutions, their generous intentions, disappeared with them.

“The shadow of barbarism, by veiling the horizon of Russia, hid Europe from its sight at the very time at which enlightenment was beginning to spread there; when the people began to shake off slavery, and the towns to contract alliances for their mutual guarantee against oppression; when the invention of the compass extended navigation and commerce; the time which saw the foundation of universities, in which fine manners began to soften, etc. During this period Russia, oppressed and torn asunder by the Mongols, was collecting all her forces merely that she might not perish. There was then no question of civilisation for the Russians. The rigours of the climate did not permit the Mongols to establish themselves in Russia as they had done in China and India. The khans wished to reign over Russia only from afar. But the envoys of the horde, representing the person of the khan, did what they chose in Russia; the traders, even the Mongol vagabonds, treated Russians as vile slaves. What was the natural consequence? Moral degradation. Forgetting national pride Russians learnt base cunning—the ruses and bravado of the weak. They deceived the Tatars, and one another they deceived still more. While ransoming themselves at the price of gold from the oppressions of the barbarians, they became more greedy, and less sensitive to insults and to shame, exposed as they were to the violence of foreign tyrants. From the time of Vasili Iaroslavitch down to that of Ivan Kalita (that most unhappy period!) Russia resembled a black forest rather than a state; might appeared to be right; he who could pillage, pillaged, foreigners and natives alike; there was no safety, either on the roads or at home; robbery destroyed property everywhere. And when this terrible anarchy began to disappear, when the stupor and the terror had ceased, and law, which is the soul of society, could at least be re-established, it was then necessary to have recourse to a severity unknown to the ancient Russians. Light pecuniary fines had formerly sufficed for the repression of theft, but already in the fourteenth century, thieves were hanged. The Russian of Iaroslav’s day knew no other blows than those he might receive in a private quarrel; under the yoke of the Mongols corporal punishment was introduced. It may be that the present character of the nation still offers traces which were impressed upon it by the barbarity of the conqueror. It must be remarked also that, together with other noble qualities, valour and military courage grew visibly weaker. Formerly the princes had struck with the sword; during this period they redressed their grievances by means only of baseness and complaints brought before the khans. If, after two centuries of such slavery, Russians have not lost all moral sense, all love for virtue, and all patriotism, let us thank the influence of religion; it is religion which has maintained them in the position of men and citizens, which has not allowed hearts to grow hard, and conscience to be silenced. Humiliated as Russians they again raised themselves under the name of Christians, and they loved their country as being a country of true believers.

“The internal constitution of the state was changed; everything which was free, everything which was founded on ancient rights, civil or political, became extinct. After having humbly cringed to the horde, the princes returned to their homes as terrible masters, for they were commanding in the name of a supreme suzerain. That which could not be done either in the days of Iaroslav the Great or in those of Andrew and of Vsevolod III, was accomplished noiselessly and without difficulty in the time of the Mongols. At Vladimir and everywhere else, except Novgorod and Pskov, there was no longer heard the sound of the vetché bell, that manifestation of popular sovereignty; a manifestation which was often tumultuous, but dear to the descendants of Slavo-Russians. This right of the ancient towns was no longer known to the new towns, like Moscow and Tver, which became important during the Mongol dominion. Once only do the chronicles make mention of the vetché of Moscow and they speak of it as an extraordinary event—when the capital, threatened by the enemy, and abandoned by the sovereign, found itself thrown on its own resources. The towns had lost the right of electing their chiefs, who, by their importance and the splendour of their elective dignity, had given umbrage not only to the princely dignitaries but to the princes themselves.”[f]

Wallace’s View

The Tatar domination did not by any means Tatarise the country. The Tatars never settled in Russia proper, and never amalgamated with the people. So long as they retained their semi-pagan, semi-Buddhistic religion, a certain number of their notables became Christians and were absorbed by the Russian noblesse; but as soon as the horde adopted Islam, this movement was arrested. There was no blending of the two races such as has taken place—and is still taking place—between the Russian peasantry and the Finnish tribes of the north. The Russians remained Christians, and the Tatars remained Mahommedans; and this difference of religion raised an impassable barrier between the two nationalities.

It must, however, be admitted that the Tatar domination, though it had little influence on the life and habits of the people, had a very deep and lasting influence on the political development of the nation. At the time of the conquest Russia was composed of a large number of independent principalities, all governed by the descendants of Rurik. As these principalities were not geographical or ethnographical units, but mere artificial, arbitrarily defined districts, which were regularly subdivided or combined according to the hereditary rights of the princes, it is highly probable that they would in any case have been sooner or later united under one sceptre; but it is quite certain that the policy of the khans helped to accelerate this unification and to create the autocratic power which has since been wielded by the czars.[c]

FOOTNOTES

[10] [This is, of course, meant only in a limited sense. The migration of peoples still continues with unabated force, but its centre has moved from Asia to Europe. Thence it moves in a two-fold direction: on the one hand, from western Europe to America and Australia; and on the other hand, from eastern Europe to the remotest confines of Asia.]

[11] [A modern army inevitably loses in numbers and its difficulties increase as it advances from its base of operations into the enemy’s country. The very reverse was the situation of the Tatars. They needed no base of operations, for they took along with them their flocks, their tents, and all their belongings, and while their flocks fed upon the grassy steppes, they in turn fed upon their flocks. And the nomadic and predatory tribes whom they encountered on their march led the same kind of life as themselves, and were easily induced to join in the certain expectation of plunder. Thus the tide kept on ever increasing and gaining in force. In fact, the Tatars can hardly be styled an army, but a people in motion.

k[a]]

[12] [At first the Russians had only very vague notions as to who this terrible enemy was. The old chronicler remarks briefly: “For our sins unknown people have appeared. No one knows who they are or whence they have come, or to what race and faith they belong. They are commonly called Tatars, but some call them Tauermen, and others Petchenegs. Who they really are is known only to God, and perhaps to wise men deeply read in books.” Some of these “wise men deeply read in books” supposed them to be the idolatrous Moabites who had in Old Testament times harassed God’s chosen people; whilst others thought that they must be the descendants of the men whom Gideon had driven out, of whom a reverent saint had prophesied that they would come in the latter days and conquer the whole earth, from the East even unto the Euphrates, and from the Tigris even unto the Black Sea.[c]]

[13] Or the Purse.

[14] In the governments of Novgorod, Vladimir, Kostroma, and Rostov, and the cities of Duglitch, Bielozersk, and Galitch.—[See Karamsin, and an act of Dmitri Donskoi.]

[15] From 1333 to 1339 the princes who held appanages espoused the cause of the prince of Tver against the grand prince of Moscow, whom they called a tyrant. In 1339 the grand prince of Moscow returned to the horde, and so terrified Usbek Khan by his denunciations against the prince of Tver and other princes, that the khan immediately summoned them to the horde, in order to restrain, or get rid of them.—[See Karamsin.]

[16] See Kamenevitch (translated by Karamsin), describing the great mart of Mologa, where the commerce of Asia and of Europe met in the seventy inns of its Slavonian suburb; and where seven thousand two hundred pounds’ weight of silver were collected for the treasury of the prince.

[17] See the treaty of Dmitri Donskoi with Vladimir his uncle, who promised to pay to him the tribute of his appanage, which bore the name of the khan’s tribute; and the second treaty with the same Vladimir, by which the latter prince engaged that his boyars should pay to Dmitri the same tax which the grand prince might think proper to impose on his own boyars.

[18] It was thus that, in France, in 1445, Charles VII took advantage of the exactions of the English, and of the terror which they inspired, to render perpetual the temporary taxes, and to keep up a permanent corps of twenty-five thousand men.

[19] Usbek, it is true, with macchiavellian policy, designated all the children of Ivan I as his successors; but, in 1340, he allowed Simeon, the oldest and ablest of them, to make himself sole master of the throne. Ianisbek Khan nominated Ivan II, the brother of Simeon, after his death and that of his children, to the exclusion of a prince of the branch of Tver or Nevski. A prince Dmitri, of the Nevski branch, who had been made grand prince by a whim of Naurus Khan, was deposed in 1362 by Murat Khan, who chose Dmitri Donskoi, grandson of Ivan I, and son of Ivan II. Taktamuisch also gave the throne to Vasili II, the eldest son of Donskoi (1389). Lastly, Ulu-Mahomet nominated Vasili III, son of Vasili II, and father of the great Ivan III, whom this long succession rendered so powerful that he completely crushed the horde.

[20] From 1362 to 1380.

[21] [150,000 in Soloviov and Rambaud.]

[22] A son of Alexander Nevski.

[23] “The origin of the Russian aristocracy,” says Turgeniev[f], quoting from Karamzin, “is lost in the most remote antiquity. The dignity of boyar is perhaps even more ancient than that of prince; it distinguished the knights and the most notable citizens, who, in the Slav republics, commanded the armies and administrated the country. This dignity appears never to have been hereditary, but only personal. Although in the course of time it was sometimes conferred by the princes, each of the ancient towns had nevertheless its own boyars, who filled the principal elective offices; even the boyars created by the princes enjoyed a certain independence. Thus, in the treaties of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, we often see the contracting parties confirming to the boyars the right of quitting the service of one prince to enter the service of another. Dissatisfied at Tchernigov, the boyar went with his numerous following to Kiev, Galitch, or Vladimir, where he found new fiefs and tokens of general respect. But when southern Russia had become transformed into Lithuania, when Moscow began to grow larger at the expense of the neighbouring principalities, when the number of princes possessing appanages began to diminish, at the same time that the sovereign’s power over the people was becoming more unlimited, then the dignity of boyar also lost its ancient importance. Popular power was favourable to that of the boyars, which acting through the prince on the people, could also act through these latter on the prince. This support at last failed them. Nothing remained to the boyars but to obey their prince, or to become traitors or rebels; there was no golden mean to take, and in the face of the sovereign, no legal means of opposition existed. In a word absolute power was developing itself.”