Opinion of the Augustinians
Your Lordship orders us to give our judgment whether it be lawful to make war on the Zambales, in view of the many injuries that they have been and daily are inflicting upon our people; and, if so be that the war is lawful and righteous, what measures may be taken to attain the end proposed therein, security.
In reply to this we say that, according to all the authorities, divines as well as canonists and jurists, three conditions are required in a war to make it a righteous one; and on these we will rest the justification of the war at present under consideration.
The first condition is that he who begins the war shall have authority; the second, just cause for making war; and third, righteous intention.
The first requires that he who begins the war and by whose order it is waged be a public person, as St Augustine declares, Contra Faustum Manichæum; cited by Gratian (23 qu. I. c. Quid culpatur): Ordo naturalis mortalium paci accommodatus hoc poscit, ut susctpiendi belli authoritas atque consilium penes principes sit. Whence it is clear, as St. Thomas says Page 192(2a 2æ, q. 40, art. I),[1] that a private person cannot lawfully make war; for, if he is aggrieved, he should resort to his superior for satisfaction; and it is as little within the right of a private individual to collect such a body of men as is requisite to carry on a war. The difficulty is to understand what is meant by “public person” or “prince;” for it is plain that it is not lawful for every prince or judge whatsoever to wage war. The solution of this difficulty, according to St. Thomas (ubi supra,) and Cajetanus (ibi and in Summa, ch. Bellum), and Castro (De justa hæreticorum punitione lib. 2, c. 4), is that by “public person” in the present case is understood the one who in his government depends not on another; such are the kings of Spain and France, also some free commonwealths, as Venice, Florence, and Ferrara: these have authority, without recourse to another, to wage war. But those princes and states whose government is not sovereign may not levy war without authority from their superior; and so the lords of Castilla and the viceroys and governors appointed by our king Philippus may not without a warrant make war.
What is said applies not when war is waged for defense against enemies, but in other circumstances; for if it is for defense, such war is permitted to any governor or king, as the authors say, because vim vi repellere licet;[2] and thus the viceroys and governors of the Indias have authority to levy war against disturbers Page 193of the peace and quiet of the states of which they are in charge, without necessity of resorting to his Majesty for permission.
The second condition of righteous war is that the cause for which it is waged shall be a just one, as St. Thomas says: “Those upon whom war is waged deserve it for the offenses that they have committed, and the grievances that they have inflicted upon the one who makes war on them.” Thus says St. Augustine (lib. 83. Quæstionum super Josue, 9. 10), and Gratian quotes him (23, q. 2, c. Dominus noster): Justa autem bella solent definiri quæ ulciscuntur injurias, si gens vel civitas plectenda est, quod vel vindicare neglexerit quod a suis improbe factum est, vel reddere quod per injuriam ablatum est.[3] And as this injury and grievance may be of many kinds, so too, many and various are the just causes of war; but we will consider here only those which make for the matter in hand, confirmed by the authority of Scripture.
The first ground of a righteous war may exist when one is hindered from doing what he may by right do. This is matter of natural and divine law and on this ground Julius Cæsar, as Lucan represents him (lib. 1), made defense of his conduct in waging war against the Roman state—viz., that the state had blocked to him, a Roman citizen, the route to Rome; and so he said, arms in hand, Omnia dat qui justa negat.[4] On this ground, as St. Augustine says (in Quaest. Num. q. 43),[5] the children of Israel justly Page 194made war on the kings of the Amorites (Ut legitimum, c. 21), for having withstood their passage through their country when they were on their way to the promised land, although the Israelites had given assurance that they would do no damage to the lands, the crops, or the vineyards of the Amorites. And so says St. Augustine (and he is quoted ubi supra, last chapter), Notandum est sane quemadmodum justa bella gerebantur a filiis Israel contra Amoritas: innoxius enim transitus denegabatur qui jure humanæ societatis aequissimo patere debebat.[6] Upon which passage Joannes Andreas in his gloss well says: Licet enim transire per alienum agrum jus non sit, tamen quia necessarius et innoxius erat iste transitus illi prohibere non debuerunt; item quia via publica erat et nemo prohibetur via publica.[7]
The second ground, as I said, of a righteous war is the self-defense of the prince or of his subjects. This ground also is matter of both natural and divine right; for even as self-defense is a natural right, on which right is founded the rule of vim vi repellere, so too in the prince is the defense of his subjects—for the care which the prince has of his subjects is as essential on his part as is the care which each one of them has for himself; hence, if the subjects are aggrieved Page 195by their enemies, the prince may justly in their defense make war, and vim vi repellere. This is much better than that the individual should himself avenge the wrong; for the individual can lawfully defend himself and his property only in continente, as Sylvester declares (Bellum, 2 § 3), but he may not avenge past wrongs, nec sua repetere save by recourse to his judge and superior.[8] Whatever goes beyond that is contrary to law and good government and, as Cajetan says, is extra moderamen tutelæ,[9] it being an essential condition of the right vim vi repellere that it be done cum moderamine. But the prince and the state have the same authority with respect to their enemies at whose hands they have suffered injury, which they have with regard to their own subjects; and hence not only may they defend themselves lest either they or their subjects suffer injury, but they may avenge injuries by inflicting punishment, exact satisfaction for damage done, and take the enemies' lives, if so the quiet and safety of their subjects require. Under this head come the many wars waged by King David against the Philistines, mentioned in the Scriptures; as also the war of the Machabee captains against the kings Antiochus and Demetrius.
The third cause and ground is rebellion and disobedience of subjects. This was the ground of David's war with Sheba, son of Bichri, who raised a revolt, as you may read in II Sam. 20;[10] and this is Page 196what St. Augustine says (Contra Faustum Manichæum, I. 22, c. 74): Adversus violentiam resistentium sive deo sive aliquo legitimo imperio jubente gerenda ipsa bella suscipiuntur a bonis ubi eos vel jubere tale aliquid vel in talibus obedire juste ordo ipse constringit (in c. Quid culpatur, ubi supra.)[11]
The fourth cause and ground for a righteous war is when there is default of keeping faith or carrying out agreements; for in such case the party who has been wronged may lawfully make war on him who, by not keeping faith, has done him injury. This made Joran [Jehoram], king of Israel, wage war on Mesa [Mesha], king of Moab, for his having failed to keep the agreements and to pay the tribute which he had promised to pay to his suzerain, King Ahab; and that this war was just is clear, for that he was assisted therein by the holy and righteous Jehoshaphat, king of Judah, with the approval of the prophet Elisha—who in the name of the Lord urged them on to war, and promised them a sure victory—as is seen in II Sam. ch. 3. These four causes and grounds, or any one of them by itself, justify war; and there are other grounds also, but these are the most certain and the most applicable to the matter in hand.
The third condition which, as we have said, must Page 197be fulfilled to make a war righteous is a right intention on the part of him who wages it; because, failing this, even when the other two conditions concur—to wit, authority and just cause—a faulty intention may render and does render the war unjust. This condition is also laid down by St. Augustine (Contra Faustum), and he is quoted by Gratian (in c. Quid culpatur); and as his words are of great weight and define wherein a bad intention consists, it is well to quote them: Quid culpatur in bello? an quid moriuntur quandoque morituri ut dominentur in pace victuri? Hoc reprehendisse timidorum est non religiosorum. Nocendi cupiditas, ulciscendi crudelitas, impacatus atque implacabilis animus, feritas rebellandi, libido dominandi et si quae sunt similia: haec sunt quae in bellis jure culpantur.[12] And what must be the right intention of the prince in levying war the same Augustine declares in the book De Verbo Domini; and the passage is found in c. A pud, ubi supra: Apud veros dei cultores et ipsa bella peccata non sunt quae non cupiditate aut crudelitate sed pacis studio geruntur ut mali coerceantur et boni subleventur.[13] Peace is the end that is to be sought in war, and so saith Aristotle (lib. 10 Ethicorum): Bellum gerimus ut in pace degamus.[14] And Augustine Page 198says the same (Epist. ad Bonifacium): Non quaeritur pax ut bellum exerceatur, sed bellum geritur ut pax acquiratur.[15]
But here it is to be noted that this right intention which is here required is a condition no more essential to a righteous war than to other good works, for in all these it is required, and without it no work is virtuous; and hence it is that if this right intention be wanting in the prince who levies war and in those who urge it, he would sin by wrong intention, but if the other two conditions be fulfilled, he, as Soto says, will not be held to make amends for the injuries that may be done in the war. So, too, if a judge orders a robber to be hanged, granted that ex odio suspendat,[16] he will not be held to restitution, if on the testimony adduced the man deserved hanging. Reply
Having ascertained the conditions required to make a war just, from them we shall be able clearly to decide whether such is the war against the Zambales at present under discussion. To this question we will answer affirmatively: that it is lawful without any scruple whatever, for in it the three conditions meet which are required for a just war, as we have already said.
And first, in this war is found the first condition, namely, authority in the one who wages it, for he is persona publica, the governor of these isles; and also he has a superior who is our king. But since the cause is self-defense, as will later be proved, he has Page 199no need of other permission to defend his state against enemies who molest it, as we have proved.
In this war, the third condition, too—we shall speak of the second later—is fulfilled, namely, right intention; for its end is the peace and security of the subjects, disturbed by these their enemies. And this peace it has not been possible to secure by means of our benevolent efforts, although such means have been tried—as appears from our labors to that end last year in sending religious of our order, and persons known to the Zambales, to persuade them to desist from wrongdoing and be our friends, granting them a general pardon for the wrongs they had committed against us; and although the Zambales promised, and made oath in their fashion, they have defaulted utterly, committing since then many atrocious wrongs against our people, as appears from the reports on that matter which have been drawn up. And, forasmuch as nothing has been gained through kindness, comes now, as a last and drastic remedy, the resolution to win peace and security for the king's subjects by waging war on his enemies; and this is the right intention that is required according to Aristotle and St. Augustine, as before quoted. But even suppose this intention to be lacking, it is already said and proved above that this condition is not in such sort essential as to oblige to indemnification.
It remains that we look into the second condition of just warfare, to wit, that just cause exist for waging it. This condition, in which might be presented greatest difficulty, is the clearest and plainest part of the matter before us; for not only are some of the four causes and grounds pointed out by us, as being any one of them in itself sufficient, but all the just Page 200causes are here concurrent. The first condition is fulfilled in that these Zambales impede the general traffic by sea and land of those who go to Pangasin and Ylocos and Cagayan. And, albeit the traffic works damage neither to them nor to their lands, but uses a common highway, yet they sally out upon the highways and kill and rob passengers, as appears from the reports.
Concurs also the second cause; for, although these Zambales are not molested by our people, they assault and murder them, not only falling upon them in the highways, as already said, but also seeking them out in the settlements while they are laboring in the fields; so that neither in their fields nor their homes are our people safe—which also is shown in the reports.
Furthermore, after promising obedience to our king and to the governor on his behalf, they have rebelled and renounced obedience, as we have said; and this is the third of the reasons which, as we said, justify the war.
Finally, the war is justified by their failure to keep their word and their pledges of friendship; for, as is well known, they have again and again, in the time of previous governors, been reconciled and have promised friendship, and thus have obtained pardon for their acts. And in the year just past this was done with greater formality and more solemn assurances, as appears from the record; but notwithstanding this, breaking the compact of peace, they have since then inflicted other and graver injuries—sallying out as robbers into the public routes by land and by sea, making descents on our settlements and murdering everyone on whom they can lay hands, be they Page 201Indians or Spaniards, seculars or ecclesiastics. Indeed, it is well known that last year they murdered a religious of our order, and they were tracking our provincial and two others, his companions; but all these, thanks to their own watchfulness, escaped.
From what has been said it stands amply proved that the war to be waged against the Zambales is a just one, and, beyond all scruple, as well on the part of him who sets it on foot as of those who take part in it.
But it may be that some one will, in opposition to what has been said, cite to us certain law texts to the effect that when a number of persons or a town sins, even if all or most of them are guilty, yet they should be pardoned. In the Decretum (dist. 50, c. ut constitueretur) St. Augustine says, writing to Bonifacius: Ubi per graves dissentionum scissuras non hujus aut illius hominis periculum sed populorum plurimorum strages jacet, detrahendum est aliquid severitati ut majoribus sanandis malis charitas syncera subveníat.[17] And (1 q. 7 c. Quoties) Pope Innocent, as cited by Gratian, says: Quoties a populis auta turba peccatur, quia in omnes propter multitudinem vindicari non potest inultum solet transire.[18]
Much to the same effect is what is said by Alexander III (c. Extra, De clerico excommunicato), and also by Honorius III (in the last chapter, De transact.). And the reason for this is that in a multitude Page 202or in a town are many innocent persons, and it were a grave injustice to require that they shall suffer the rigorous punishment awarded to the guilty; while it is certain that in a war one suffers as much as the other; and hence, lest the innocent be punished, the guilty should be pardoned. To the objection which cites these testimonies in proof that parcendum est multitudini[19] Castro makes apt reply (lib. 2 De justa haereticorum punitione c. 14), that the proposition is true and applies when the multitude or town purposes amendment, and there is fair hope of the same; but if the case is otherwise, and they persist in their evil ways after being admonished, reason says they shall be punished rigorously. The opposite course would only give them occasion to go on and become more hardened in their sin and misdoing, and cause others, after the example of these, to do the same—that appearing to them to be lawful, when they see that it is not punished. And such is the teaching of c. Qui vult, de Pænitentia, 3. 6., attributed to St. Augustine: Cum enim tot sunt qui labuntur ut pristinam dignitatem ex authoritate defendant et quasi usum peccandi sibi faciant, rescindenda est spes ista.[20] Then, as these Zambales have many times been warned, and have promised and sworn peace and amends, and have totally defaulted, as we have already said, and have taken occasion, from the lenity shown them, to do greater mischiefs with more boldness—mistaking for timidity the kindliness that we have used toward them—it follows that, numerous Page 203though they are, we ought no longer to dissemble with them, but must punish them sternly; for the more numerous they are, the more mischief they do.
What we have stated in enforcing our thesis affords us occasion for explaining here the mode of procedure in this war, and—assuming it to be a lawful war, as has been sufficiently proved—for inquiring what considerations may be urged by those who carry on the war. And, for the sake of brevity and clearness, we will resolve the matter into a few points, without any arguments, for these points are corollaries of a just war.
First: If, to attain what is purposed—to wit, to bring the said Zambales under control—it becomes necessary that we burn their crops, their houses, and their other properties, and even kill those who make resistance, even if the presumption be that among them are some who are guiltless—it is lawful to do all this during war, until the final victory is won which is purposed. We say “if necessary,” for unless the purpose of all that is done in the war is the final victory, such deeds will be impious and tyrannical. And hence the matter should not be left to the arbitrary will of the soldiers, but should be directed by the order of him who governs them.
Second: Also, if during the war there be lack of subsistence, or of other supplies needed for its prosecution, these may be taken from what the enemy have, even though the owners be guiltless, and this without obligation to restitution—the reason being that cum licet bellum licet apponere media necessaria ad finem victoria.[21] Page 204
Third: Ex jure gentium, during the war, all movables taken from any one of the enemy belong to him who has them, and there is no obligation to restitution: Sylvester Presbyter (Bellum, 1 § 10), and Cajetan (in Summa). I say “during the war,” because when it is ended non licet ultra praedari.[22]
Fourth: After they are reduced to subjection, those who are most guilty may be condemned to death, as also such others as regard for the security and tranquillity of the land may determine. But it will not be lawful to kill those of them who are found to be guiltless, even though it be feared that they may be mischievous in the future; for no grievance has been suffered at their hands, and means can be found of holding them securely, as we will show presently. Those of the inhabitants of a state who are usually deemed guiltless are lads not yet old enough to bear arms; old men incapacitated by age, save in the case that heretofore they have been mischievous; and the women, unless it appear that they too have engaged in war. But it will not suffice to say with Soto that they supply provisions for their husbands during the war, for that is a natural right and obligation. All the rest are deemed guilty, failing proof to the contrary; here strict investigation is to be made, lest wrong be done.
Fifth: Ex jure gentium, those captured in a just war are held as slaves. Paludanus (in 4. d. 15, q. 3) holds that this is not to be understood as applying to Christian captives; and such is the truth, and this provision is observed among Christian kings. But, as these Zambales are not Christians, they may be dealt with according to the jus gentium, and made Page 205slaves. Yet, inasmuch as they are a people of small mental capacity, and hence do not realize the seriousness of their crime, they ought not to be treated with the full vigor of law; and therefore it seems to us that it will be enough to make them slaves for a limited time, ten or fifteen years.
Sixth: The war ended, his Lordship the governor may exact from the Zambales all the costs of the war, and indemnification for all the losses suffered; and he may, by way of chastisement, levy from them some tribute: for all this is jus belli in the case of a just war, such as is this, as stands proved.
Seventh: Since it is not enough to punish past crime unless a remedy is applied for the future; and since a wide experience has shown that little confidence is to be reposed in the word and the character of this people; and since to leave them in their mountains would be to give them occasion and good opportunity for doing mischief and damage hereafter, as always in the past: it seems to us that inasmuch as these Zambales are few and have not in their villages or in their territory any cultivated fields or any fixed settlements, it will be advisable, as security against their returning to their old ways, to transplant them from the mountain region to peopled districts, depriving them of arms, and giving them a village site and lands upon which, with police control and under a government, they may live and cultivate their farms. This we deem the ultimate remedy, and as being necessary for the ends of peace and security at which we aim.
Finally: It seems to us from the experience we have had in this matter, and from what we have seen, that the expeditions sent against these Zambales have Page 206been ineffective because this method was not employed. The plan should be carried out chiefly by means of the Indians of Pampanga and the Zambales of Pangasinan—people who know the country and its hiding-places and coverts; and who, as being more agile than Spaniards, bear more easily the toils of the march over the routes that have to be traversed, owing to the wildness of the region, which, as is well known, is very great. In payment of the costs to these Indians, the slaves captured in the war might be apportioned to them; and in virtue of this compact they will not commit the cruelties and murders to be apprehended from them. Besides, this will benefit the state; for, having more field-hands, they will plow and cultivate more land. Further, as regards the Panpangos, they will in this way obtain satisfaction for the many and serious wrongs that they have suffered from the Zambales in the way of both murders and robberies.
Such, with all respect for the better judgment of others, is our opinion regarding the matter proposed to us by your Lordship, with command to declare our views. This we do, recommending always moderation and Christian charity, which should ever be practiced, and especially in dealing with this people—who, as we have said, do not realize the gravity of their offense; and on whom, therefore, the penalties of the law ought not to be inflicted in all its rigor. And, to signify that this is our judgment, we confirm it with our names. Given at San Augustin de Manila, the nineteenth day of January, 1592.
Fray Joan de Valderrama, provincial
Fray Alonzo de Castro, definitor
Fray Lorenso de Leon, definitorPage 207
Fray Joan de Tamayo, prior
Fray Antonio Serrano, prior
Fray Diego Gutierrez
Fray Diego Muñoz
Fray Diego Alvarez
Fray Alonso de Montalvan, superior
Fray Matthias Manrique
Fray Alonso de Paz[23]
[Endorsed: “Opinion of the Augustinian fathers regarding the Cámbales.” “Opinion of the Augustinian fathers upon waging war against the Zambales.”] Page 208