The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898 — Volume 17 of 55 / 1609-1616 / Explorations by Early Navigators, Descriptions of the Islands and Their Peoples, Their History and Records of the Catholic Missions, as Related in Contemporaneous Books and Manuscripts, Showing the Political, Economic, Commercial and Religious Conditions of Those Islands from Their Earliest Relations with European Nations to the Close of the Nineteenth Century

by Unknown

Trade of the Philippines

Official letter from the Marques de Montesclaros,[1] viceroy of Peru, directed to his Majesty, in regard to changing to España the trade between Mexico and Filipinas.

In behalf of the consulate[2] and corporation of the merchants of Sevilla, your Majesty was entreated to have the trade between Nueva España and Philipinas suppressed, and to order that it should be carried on only from those kingdoms [i.e., España and Portugal] with the said islands. Your Majesty upon hearing those merchants, was pleased to order me to make investigation and give my opinion in the matter. For that purpose you despatched your decree of September 1, 610, and I received it by these last mails.

The arguments which, it seems, were presented to your Majesty by the said letter and an enclosed memorial, for this purpose, are reduced to the exaggeration of the general and individual inconveniences and losses with which the voyage is attended at present in the route that is followed; and that those inconveniences and losses would all cease, and great and recognized blessings to the universal benefit of your Majesty’s kingdoms would result, if measures of the sort that those merchants desire were to be taken. Although one might satisfy the originator of the idea with less, we shall enlarge the reply to greater length bearing in mind that the dimensions of this scheme are not measured by his yard-rule; nor can the advantages resulting from it compare with the hundred per cent of their profits. We especially consider that we are talking with your Majesty through councilors and ministers of such high standing, among whom any state argument, however great, has its due consideration and place.

It is recognized, Sire, that the chief means of keeping these kingdoms tranquil is to make them dependencies of España, in what pertains not only to distributive and commutative justice, but also to whatever else is necessary for the preservation of life, in the spiritual as well as the temporal. But dependence of this sort, when viewed entirely and only from the sovereigns’ standpoint, is regulated by what is necessary and requisite that the vassals of regions so distant may live in the subjection, and render the obedience and loyalty that are due from them. Although this argument, since it is the most substantial, when it encounters the others most justly takes precedence of any other and private advantage of the vassals themselves and the kingdom, it would [not] be excusable to molest and vex the subjects with what is not actually necessary, if the above purpose could be attained at less cost and vexation to them. Accordingly, in the matter of restricting the mutual trade of certain kingdoms, and directing that trade to España alone, one must proceed with very great caution, and with measures adapted only to what the attainment of the chief end demands, in order that we may avoid as far as possible the harm that might result; since, if this body saw itself so disunited that it could not even avail itself of its own members, it might become desperate, and the whole might fall into decay, as is usual with those in despair.

They are persuading your Majesty that the trade of these kingdoms with España is decreasing. I, Sire, feel differently, and am persuaded that never were the profits resulting from it greater; nor am I less certain that such result must necessarily follow, in this manner.

It was known in the beginning that neither wine nor olive oil was produced in Nueva España, but these were brought from Castilla. Inspired by the example of the profits made by some persons, all—especially the inhabitants of Andalucía—began to plant vineyards and olive-orchards. He who had esteemed any kind of trade a degradation twenty years before, now, with the incentive of sending away his crops, shipped greater cargoes than would a whole fair of merchants. Consequently, the ocean trade increased, in a short time, from at most fifty or one hundred casks of wine and a few more jars of olive-oil—carried by one or two vessels, unauthorized and without register—to cargoes which fill thirty or forty vessels, that sail annually in a trading fleet. The vessel in which this is received is earthen, and of limited capacity; and what was slowly filling it continued to increase. Now this vessel is full to the brim, but still they obstinately continue to pour in more. Is it not evident that what is more than enough to fill it must overflow, and be the same as lost?

Thus was the land conquered in Perú. True reports were published concerning its so great abundance of wealth—that it was considered easier and cheaper to arm men and shoe horses with silver than with iron; and that for one quire of paper ten pesos of gold were paid, for one cloth cloak one hundred pesos, and for one horse three or four thousand pesos. At this report, various kinds of merchandise were brought, and had a continual good outlet and sale; and they were taken in the necessary quantity. Years passed, and the treasure—which was too plentiful, because it was in possession of people who had no use for it—came into the hands of those who finally saw it disseminated through the world—and for this reason the share of each part is less. The account that should be taken of reason and common sense is forgotten, and men persuade themselves blindly that, since they get a thousand for five hundred, with one million they must make two: And as if they could expect the same profit from supplying necessity and from adding to abundance, they multiply their trading-fleets and double their investments. Is it not evident that if their shipments are in excess, their profits must fall short, and that the ratio between the two cannot be equal to what it was before? Let the records of the customs duties belonging to your Majesty be examined, where those who profit and those who lose pay on account of what they produce; and they will tell how not only the commerce has not declined, but also that rather, through its having increased so greatly, the danger of losing the invested money results.

What their provinces can digest and assimilate, Sire, should be exported to the Indias, and a limit should be set to the hope of their increase, and endeavor should be made to preserve them in the extremely flourishing condition which they reached; and if efforts pass those limits, then, instead of causing the Indias to increase, it will be a greater blow, whereby they will slip back more quickly along the coast of decline.

Coming then to the particular matter, the question is one of suppressing the commerce now carried on with the Philipinas Islands by way of the South Sea. This may be advantageous to España in two ways: in making the kingdom of Méjico absolutely dependent on España’s aid, without leaving it any other recourse: and in increasing the proportions of their present trade by adding to that kingdom [i.e., España] that commerce from those islands by way of the Ocean Sea,[3] to which it is desired to direct the trade-route.

In the first place, it will be considered that Nueva-España passed many years without any communication with the Philipinas, and that the same will happen now if that commerce be taken away, although at the outset there may be some ill-feeling among them; and that the prevention of a thing so temporary, and in one province only, ought not to over-balance what is of so different an importance, as that España (the seat of your Majesty’s monarchy) should have plenty of money. For all that México sends to Manila will go to España, and should have an outlet for its merchandise, since from that must be supplied what Nueva-España now receives from the islands.

In order that Nueva-España may preserve itself if this trade be suppressed, the years while it lived without that trade have no consequence; for it would be a mistake to compare a period when that kingdom was in so early an infancy[4] that the royal incomes therein scarcely amounted to thirty or forty thousand ducados, and when in the whole kingdom the amount of outside capital employed did not surpass two hundred thousand, with what El Cerro[5] now alone produces, where one reckons the product by millions and takes no account of the tens and hundreds. From all this one may infer that whoever sits down to a meal, however plentiful, when he sees it growing less would doubtless have sufficient strength to call out and plead his hunger; and much more when we baptise business with the name of diet.

But this has not much force, since it is not intended to suppress, but only to change the mode of this supply. In order to see whether it be feasible, one should consider, that, barring certain articles of adornment and luxury, the chief exports from España to Méjico are wine, oil, and linen, and from the Philipinas woven and raw silk.

The former products, in whatever quantity needed, must always be bought from España. There is no other region that can supply them, nor does Méjico itself produce them; therefore its enforced dependence on España follows. However, in what pertains to linen, Méjico may supply itself in part by using the cloth that the Indians make from cotton. The rest (namely, silks supplied by Manila) may be obtained in great abundance, without begging it from anyone, by only encouraging the industry in any of Méjico’s provinces. These are very suitable for it, especially the province of Misteca,[6] where it could be cultivated and woven admirably.

Admitting the above, my opinion is that, allowing that Nueva-España could be maintained, although with difficulty, without trade with the Philipinas, it must be by means that would prove harmful to those islands alone—which would lose this aid without any resultant good to España; since they would not ask for those products of España which they at present demand, or increase those which they are now exporting because of the increase of money [in Nueva España]. And we have already stated that Nueva-España is incapable of consuming more wine and oil than it now uses.

But if all this should cease, and España should have to supply the above-mentioned necessities because of shutting the door to the trade in the Philipinas, the bulk of silk stuffs would have to be brought from Francia and Flandes, to whom España always gives her treasures in exchange for this merchandise. For Constantinopla is so far from Italia, and so little do gold and silver suit that route—or else the French and the rebels[7] are so skilful in getting this product away from us, that one may doubt whether they do not take it all with them. According to this, he who is not suspicious enough to believe that the merchants of Sevilla alone consider as enemies prejudicial to your Majesty’s crown those who do not trade much with them, should be astonished that they direct and regulate the reform so that the Chinese cannot avail themselves of the silver of Nueva España. For it is a fact that the Chinese do us no other harm than to keep the silver; and that the merchants do not consider that by that other road all tends to come into the hands of him who exerts himself with it in order to attempt and compass to acquire what remains.

Let us examine, then, what interest would accrue to España in the other point, the appropriation to itself of the trade with the Philipinas. The consulate says that España will be enriched with the exportation, to Manda[8] and Xapon, of its products and other merchandise that will go to those islands, where they also desire so ardently to have an abundance of what is brought from there [España?] and from China; and this will easily prevent the loss of the great quantities of silver that pass by this road from Nueva España.

To the first, sufficient answer is made with what experience, that great teacher in such matters, has taught us to the contrary—to me, at least, during the time while I governed in México. For, since your Majesty was pleased to order me in a decree, dated December 17, 604, to give my opinion as to whether export duties would better be levied on the merchandise sent to the Philipinas from the port of Acapulco—since all the other merchandise sent thence, to Guatimala and Perú, pays two and one-half per cent—and that in order to do this I should investigate the quality and nature of the said merchandise, I made special efforts to ascertain these facts. After examining the registers of several years I found that, even if the duty should be collected from the Philipinas exports as from the others, it would not amount to two hundred pesos of eight reals each year; for all those goods were articles of luxury, and in very small quantity. I sent your Majesty an official report of this in my letter of February 17, 606. On August 19 of the same year, I received a reply, ordering me to make no change so long as the trade did not increase to such an extent that I thought it inadvisable; and in such case to advise your Majesty of it confidentially. Consequently, since there will be no greater exportation from Nueva España of like commodities from that kingdom [i.e., España]—where there are no others, and whence only these would be sent—the same thing would result.[9] One errs in saying that those goods are desired in Manila and Xapon, since cloth stuffs (the only thing lacking to them) besides being a merchandise of so great value that he who would export them so far to the Philipinas would lose them—are not used, because of the heat; and in Xapon, where the cold might make them sought, they cost very little, for the natives clothe themselves with the taffetans of that country, and use cotton quilts. Consequently, I have also answered what was alleged concerning the increase of the duties that would accrue to your Majesty from the export duties in España and the import duties at Manila.

The other argument namely, that España would be filled with products from China and Xapon—may be conceded to them; but it remains for them to show us the utilty that would accrue to them, after the goods had been obtained. For I, on the contrary, regard them as a very great harm, since with those goods would cease the present industry [in España] of the raising of silk, its weaving and trade; and all this would be exchanged for what is so much poorer and of so little durability. It is a fact that even now we are experiencing that, and are discovering here the harm caused by even the small quantity of silk of this class [i.e., the Chinese silk]; it comes mixed with that of España, in almost all the velvets and taffetans brought from España, for in but two days’ time they become useless.

That by this means would be prevented the exportation of silver from Nueva-España, is an opinion that one might value and thank them for, if they were not trying to withdraw the silver from another and more important region, where the harm would be greater. But, supposing that what now goes from México will be sent later from Castilla and Andalucía, it seems that the only utility will be found in the less occasion [for buying Chinese goods] that each of those provinces would have, so that the export of silver would be in smaller quantity. That is to be regulated by the wealth of each province, and by their facilities for diverting it. All the silver that Nueva-España obtains now comes from its own provinces, or is brought from the provinces of Perú. The bulk of it is used in the trade with España, some in that with the Philipinas, and very little in the retail trade of its own cities and towns; for although Nueva-España has intercourse with Perú, it never uses more than the products of the country for that. What is sent to the islands goes by way of Acapulco, which is the only port in all the South Sea where this despatch is made or can be made. That España would have more silver if it retained within its bounds what it receives, seems to be undeniable, since therein is gathered the silver of México, Perú, and all the Indias. But the gates by which that silver issues [from España]—now it is known whether there are any—are, to speak correctly, as many as there are seaports and sterile districts, with the usual and accustomed communication between them.

Accepting this as true—on which is based assertions of those who say that less silver will be sent to Manila from a kingdom where conditions are such [i.e., España] than México [now] gives—I, at least, no matter how long may be the argument, do not comprehend so obscure a secret; on the contrary, I am persuaded that España will be no poorer thereby. For, if this mouth be stopped, España must be drained, by those that remain (as is done today), of all of this article that other kingdoms are offering it, as in a flood. But with equal certainty, I understand that incomparably more money will go to the Philipinas by this road than now goes by the other. And to assert that this loss will cease because, with the increase of trade with Xapon, the merchandise which must go to España will come from that country, is a statement without foundation. For if this argument were worth anything, it must have the same force, in preventing what is today carried from México; since trade with Xapon from Manila is open and permitted to all who wish it.

The consulate is trying also to strengthen its proposition with the improvements that it pretends to find in the voyage, if it were to be made by the cape of Buena-Esperanza. But, discussing that point by what I have been able to learn of it, I find that the emperor and king our sovereign, of glorious memory, your Majesty’s grandfather, having been persuaded that the discovery and conquest of the Spice Islands—the name then given to those islands today included in the name of Philipinas or Malucas—pertained to the crown of Castilla, inasmuch as they were within the line drawn by his Holiness, Alexander VI, for the division of the world, ardently desired, and made extraordinary efforts, so that his vassals might make that voyage without touching at the ports and lands of the kingdom of Portugal. For that purpose he made an agreement with Fernando de Magallanes to discover [such a route]. The latter discovered and gave name to the strait in this region at the south. Although by the result [of Magallanes’s expedition] one could recognize the great difficulty and danger of the voyage, his Majesty would not desist from the undertaking. On the contrary, he immediately sent, in the year 25, two other fleets by that way while, at the same time, he sent a ship under command of an intelligent man to find a new entrance by the coast of Labrador and the Bacallaos.[10] Following up the attempt, he ordered Don Fernando Cortés, conqueror of Nueva-España, to attempt this expedition from Nueva-España. He would not have ceased like means until attaining it, had not he made that contract or agreement concerning those islands with the king of Portugal in the year 29.[11] That put an end to the enterprise until afterward, when Don Antonio de Mendoza, viceroy of Nueva-España, took up again the same search in the year 42, and continued to persevere in it, so that it was realized during the latter years of the governorship and life of Don Luis de Velasco, who succeeded the said Don Antonio in that office.

I would, Sire, narrate in minute detail to your Majesty these labors, and those of many others, who lost their lives and possessions at various times to see the accomplishment of so important a matter, if I were not afraid of making a history of this letter—in order to entreat you that, since God our Lord ordained that a good desired by so many should be enjoyed with so great quietness in these most fortunate days of your Majesty, you will not permit the glory of this happiness to be disturbed and obscured; for the motives and efforts of so suspicious a people embarrass it. They, in order to gain their own private interests, try to cover them with this cloak of convenience and conservation of so superior authority. And although it appears that a great part of the former injuries are lacking today, since the kingdom of Portugal (although by light of a separate crown) is under the universal domain of your Majesty, still, the zeal and affection that your Majesty has always felt in greater proportion for the inhabitants of Castilla ought not on that account to cease; since there is also no cessation of the rancor and hostility with which the Portuguese, in all the Indias where they rule, withhold the friendly intercourse that they owed to the Castilians as the vassals of the same sovereign.

I am quite persuaded that there is little difference between these two routes as regards the weather and dangers of the sea. For, although the Nueva-España vessels consume not longer than sixty days, and sometimes less, the return voyage is of longer duration, and the whirlwinds and gales more continuous. And although I believe that voyages made by way of the cape of Buena Esperanza take more than the three months that the prior and consuls assert (especially since the vessels have to stop at one or two way-stations), yet, in regard to this, I estimate the two routes as equal. But in point of certain security, the advantage lies greatly with the voyages made by way of the South Sea, as it is at all times so free from enemies. No further proof is necessary regarding this statement than the fact that not a single vessel going to and fro between Acapulco and Cavite and the port of Manila has been captured;[12] while very many vessels take that other route, which are so heavily armed that, in comparison with the first, one may consider them as more than fortresses. The warning that the Dutch make use of this route [i.e., through the Strait of Magellan] cannot force me to believe the contrary; and by it without so many advantages as those enjoyed by your Majesty’s ships they have made themselves almost complete masters of all the Spice Islands, for they had no other routes from which to select this one. I assert from the prudence with which the Dutch consider what is of advantage to them, that if they could enjoy so great convenience as Nueva-España possesses, they would not take the risk of running by the coast and ports of your Majesty as they do today by the open sea, where they might meet one who would resist their progress. An excellent proof of this truth is their so-oft repeated effort to find a passage through the strait of Anian.[13] For they consider it more conducive to the peace of their voyage to experience rough and unknown seas, than to be liable to the sudden surprises to which those that are milder and more traversed are liable. The mastery that I know them to exercise in those districts, is to enter for pillage and barter, as they usually do, even in the very kingdoms of your Majesty which are nearest to the defense and power of your fleets And if, in addition, the Dutch have any trading-posts, established and manned with soldiers, it is not necessary that España should trouble itself to dislodge them, but the governor of the Philipinas, and the soldiers and ships of Malaca and of the viceroy of India, should attempt it; and it will be easy to drive them out at once. In truth, however, (that I may always discuss a similar case), our design must be more difficult to attain than theirs; for they content themselves with going where they are received, and of receiving what they are given, without caring much whether others enter that district, while your Majesty desires, as is right, to be absolute and sole ruler, and to shut the gate to all who do not enter under the name and title of vassals.

As to the difficulty and delay of sending aid to the islands, although it is understood that the enemy is attempting some entrance in the islands, I can easily comprehend that it would be easier to build a fleet in España, and that it would be despatched much more quickly than from these provinces. But I have always considered that, in this regard, Sire, he who has so extensive a monarchy as your Majesty, must see that each part of it have all the force necessary for its sole defense, without being dependent for so costly and remote reenforcement, as would necessarily be the case did your Majesty send it from the the ports of that kingdom. Consequently, I presume that, if the islands should find themselves in a like necessity, either they would have to resist an attack with their presidios and walls, or (to extend the hope farther) that they would not have need for more aid than what they could secure from Malaca with the galleons of that crown. The aid that is not so pressingly needed, and which, it seems, must necessarily come from España—such as infantry for the presidios—is sent there with some difficulty, because of the long distance overland from Veracruz to the port of Acapulco, in a land so open that the companies necessarily lose some men. But it would prove more costly should your Majesty, in order to avoid this, have to form a fleet on occasions when it would be necessary. However, I have thought that an effort might be made, some time, to send the soldiers who must go to the islands in the trading fleet or galleons sailing to Puertobelo;[14] and to advise the president [of the Audiencia there], somewhat earlier, to have small boats provided to take the soldiers by river from Chagre to Cruces. Since from that point to Panama it is only five leguas overland, the men might be taken there easily and at little expense. The viceroy of Peru, having been notified beforehand, should, without any expense to your Majesty, have a vessel at Panamá, where the soldiers could embark and go to Acapulco. There they could change ships for those in the Philipinas line. By this method some of the greatest inconveniences could be avoided.

And lastly, as the concluding argument of this discourse, I remind your Majesty that since the Philipinas Islands are surrounded by enemies so powerful as are Xapon and China—one because of its strength and valor, and the other because of its incredible multitude of inhabitants—with only the seven hundred Spaniards that the islands had, during my government of Nueva España, who could bear arms (a number now increased somewhat by the presidios of Terrenate and Thidore), they are preserved solely for this reason, that by their means the trade of those countries is opened to your Majesty’s kingdoms. Thus said the emperor of Xapon, when he was advised to conquer Manila. The Chinese king wrote the same words to Don Pedro de Acuña, when the latter suspected that the insurrection made in those islands by the Chinese king’s vassals had been made by his orders. And it must be considered seriously that if the trade be carried on by way of the cape of Buena Esperanza, it would be quite possible that the Chinese—who, in order to go to Manila, have to sail, both in the open and among islands, with some risk and danger because of the smallness of their craft—after seeing that the Spanish ships had to make a way-station at Malaca or Xava, would go from the river of Canton, which is the gateway from which the Chinese ships set out, coasting from land to land along their own country, and would change the bulk of their trade to Portuguese ports, and thus deserting Manila. If they did this, the principal support and defense of Manila would fail, and its enemies would change their opinion, since they would no longer enjoy the benefits that now attract them.

For all the above, Sire, my opinion is that, if the matter were in its beginnings, from no other part could this trade be directed than from Nueva España; for it is nearer the islands, and is the region from which less silver can go. And should this cease, without doubt that kingdom would be greatly weakened, and the Philipinas destroyed—and none of this to España’s advantage. On the contrary it would be to España’s greater loss, since that country would be filled with merchandise of little value, at double the money that would be derived from its sale. The dependence of all the other kingdoms, which is now sure and not uncertain, would possibly be endangered by venturing upon the execution of this plan; and your Majesty would also be obliged, in order to make the sea safe in this route, to have two war vessels to accompany every trading vessel, notwithstanding the extraordinary cost which this would involve.

The other things mentioned in the memorial, namely, [original MS. broken; the appointment(?)] of officials, soldiers, and sailors now engaged in this despatch do not seem of such nature that they oblige me to answer them in detail. It is certain that the viceroys appoint very suitable persons, and will always do so, since they rely on their honor; and the commander does not care to overload the vessels, since he is not interested in the freight charges. Consequently, when the auditor of Manila obliges them to load much cargo in Cabite, they usually unload and leave goods on the shoals that they meet, whence arise innumerable complaints and suits. The pilots and sailors are examined in what is necessary for them, and the soldiers are sufficient for a navigation route of so great safety. If it is true that the latter are lazy and vagabonds, few times have I seen men enlisted in any region who are not such, or who do not desire to be such. Although there may be things to correct in all matters, there are other reforms less costly and easier.

Your Majesty might wish to have these arguments in briefer form; but, although I have omitted some things, the matter is of so great moment that I have not been able to pass over anything that I judge essential for your proper decision in this matter.

May God preserve your Majesty as Christendom has need. Los Reyes, April 12, 1612.

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[1] The Marquis de Montesclaros (third marques of the title, see Vol. XIII, p. 228) was born posthumously probably at Sevilla; and was a knight of the Order of Santiago, and gentleman of the bedchamber. Throughout his offices as viceroy of Nueva España and of Peru, he showed ability and determination, and his policy was approved. See Moreri’s Dictionnaire, vi, p. 268; and Bancroft’s History of Mexico, iii, pp. 5, 6.

[2] The consulate (see Vol. XIII, p. 57) of Sevilla was formed in accordance with a law dated August 23, 1543; it authorized the exporting merchants of that city to meet annually for the election of prior and consuls to administer, regulate, and guard the commercial interests of those merchants. See the laws enacted regarding this institution, in Recopilación de leyes, lib. ix, tit. vi.

[3] The Atlantic Ocean; the new trade-route opened by the Portuguese a century before led to the Atlantic via the Cape of Good Hope.

[4] Spanish, tan en las mantillas, i.e., the long outer garments in which an infant is dressed.

[5] Referring to the Cerro Gordo (“rich hill”) of Potosi; see Vol. XIV, p. 306.

[6] Perhaps the region known as Miztecapan, which has fertile valleys.

[7] A truce of eight months, to begin with May, 1607, was arranged between Spain and the United Provinces, in which for the first time Spain gave up its claims to control the latter. This paved the way to the long truce of twelve years signed at the meeting of the States-General at Bergen-op-Zoom, in April, 1609, in which the independence of the United Provinces was recognized (see Vol. XI, p. 166, note 27). But that independence was completely recognized and assured only by the treaty of Westphalia or Münster (in October, 1648), which also opened to the Dutch the ports of the Eastern and Western Indias.

[8] Thus in the text, according to the editor of Docs. inéditos; apparently an error for Manila.

[9] That is, if the Philippine trade to Nueva España were suppressed the commodities from Spain which are now shipped to Manila via Acapulco, and are mainly articles of luxury, would not find any greater sale in the Orient than before.

[10] In 1525 Esteban Gomez—who had been one of Magalhães’s pilots (Vol. 1, pp. 263, 319) was sent by Charles V “to find a route to Cathay” north of Florida. He had but one caravel with which to make this voyage, but he went to the Bacalaos (New-foundland coast), and thence as far south as Florida. His discoveries were noted on the map of the cosmographer Diego Ribero (1529). Gomez’s voyage is described by Peter Martyr.

[11] Referring to the treaty of Zaragoza (Vol. II, pp. 222–240).

[12] Montesclaros has forgotten the capture of the “Santa Ana” by Candish. See Vol. VI, p. 311, and Vol. XV, appendix A.

[13] The fictitious strait of Anian (for which name see Bancroft’s History of Northwest Coast, i, pp. 53–56), was the supposed western terminus of the northwest passage, whose eastern terminus Cortereal was thought to have found in Hudson Strait. A kingdom marked Anian is shown On Ortelius’s map (Theatrum orbis terrarum, Antwerp, 1574), with the strait just north of it, above 60°. Both the kingdom and district are shown on a number of old maps. Du Val’s map (Paris, 1684) of North America, which shows California as an island, portrays the strait of Anian directly north of it, between 45° and 50° of latitude. Vaugondy’s map (that of 1750 corrected), Paris, 1783, shows the strait between 50° and 55°. Comparing the latter with Russel’s general map of North America, 1794, the Anian strait appears to coincide with the strait between Queen Charlotte’s Island and the mainland, the modern Hecate Strait. Vizcaino had orders to look for this strait on his voyage, and explore it.

[14] Puertobelo, now called Porto Bello, is situated on the isthmus of Panama, almost directly north of Panama—in the old department of Panama of the United States of Colombia; but now (as the other places herein named) in the independent state of Panama—and but little west of Aspinwall, the Atlantic terminus of the Panama Canal. Chagre is the modern Chagres, and lies on the Atlantic side of the isthmus southwest of Porto Bello; there empties the Chagres River, which can be ascended to Cruces, which is twenty miles north of Panama, the Pacific terminus of the canal, capital of the old department of Panama, and of the present state of Panama.