LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE INDIA COUNCIL

I wrote last year to your most illustrious Lordship, by way of Nueva España and Portugal, mentioning the pleasure which I felt at the news that your most illustrious Lordship held the presidency of the Council of the Indias; for besides the affection which I profess to your most illustrious Lordship, ever since I experienced your kindness in Balladolid, I have looked for the like success in the management of the important affairs which are entrusted to the Council, and I hope that these unfortunate and remote regions may have a share in the good results which their government needs.

In regard to the troubles which have afflicted this commonwealth: The Dutch, keen to avail themselves of opportunities to extend their commerce, sent hither a warship in the year forty-four, under pretext of an embassy; it was in charge of Monsieur Duvins, the second factor in their trade with Japon. He carried letters from the governor and council of Batavia for the governor and Audiencia here, in which it was stated that he came to look for a bark named “Cathalina Magdalena”—for which a Swiss heretic had given pledges to the Company at Batavia with his own person; it had sailed from here with the name “Sancta Ana,” and a commission from the governor here; but it was sold to the Company, who changed its name, and in the charge of the same Swiss it came back here to trade, with consignments belonging to the Dutch. And since, in order to send the squadron to China,[1] the departure of the vessels which were in this bay was prohibited, the said bark was compelled to winter here; and, under pretext of looking after these [commercial] interests, the Dutch sent their envoy with credentials. He carried himself, while here, with the air of an ambassador, and claimed that we should treat him as such, that we should give him audience in a session of the royal court, and that the auditors should visit him; but in polite terms he was given to understand that without express order from his Majesty he could not be treated as he desired; and it was resolved that answer should be made to the letters with entire courtesy—stating that no such bark as the “Cathalina Magdalena” had landed at these islands; but that, if through stress of any storm it should enter our ports, it should receive succor, and our friendly relations would be maintained in all things. His principal topic, however, was that free trade should be permitted to him here, and that the Dutch should bring us all the merchandise necessary for us. But, as he found no opening for a proposition of that sort—on account of the prohibition [of commerce] in the laws [of the kingdoms] and in the treaties of peace, and because of the damage which would ensue to the islands from admitting within them the different religion which neighbors so cunning and so powerful [as the Dutch] would undertake to impart to them—he returned home much disgusted, publishing to the Dutch that Manila could be captured with five hundred soldiers, and even urging this enterprise as an easy one on Barnet, the commander of the English squadron which was then at Batavia.

The Dutch, not discomfited by this repulse, or by the loss of 50,000 pardaos[2] (which are 37,500 pesos)—which as they write from Batavia, the above-mentioned ambassador expended—made an agreement with an English corsair who was at Batavia, with a ship of fifty-two guns and another of thirty, to the effect that under his own flag he should escort four Dutch ships, which they despatched to Acapulco last year with merchandise. And in order to hinder the galleon from leaving this port they deceived a Frenchman,[3] who was very well known here, hinting to him that the squadron of Barenet [sic] and the corsair were going to attack Manila; and they hastened his embarkation, at the cost of 4,000 pesos, in order that he might notify us here. Then they gave orders to the corsair, with two other ships of their own, to let themselves be seen at the entrance of Mariveles, in order to throw Manila into alarm and hinder the sailing of the galleon. By [causing] this fright they succeeded in their purpose to prevent the sailing of the ship, which was lightened of its cargo as soon as the information which the Frenchman gave reached us; and the 4,000 pesos were paid [to him] for the cost of this warning. The said four ships sailed to leeward, and sighted the coast of Ylocos, whence we had news of this. But they could not attain their principal object; for when the six ships had come together in China, and were laden with [goods worth] 900,000 pardaos (each containing six silver reals), they expected the vessel which, after having given that warning here, was to cross over to China[4] and carry to the Dutch a pilot for the navigation to Nueva España; but it could not reach China, and was obliged to go to Batavia. The four Dutch ships and the two [English] corsairs, resolved to carry out their project, sailed from Canton on the fourteenth of September, bound for the coast of Nueva España and Perú to carry on illicit trade,[5] and the English to make reprisals. But God, who chose to punish so mischievous a design, permitted that a hurricane should attack them, when they were four days out from Canton; and as a result the two corsairs were driven back to China—the larger vessel dismasted and battered, and the smaller one badly damaged. The four Dutch ships, badly leaking, spent twelve days in searching for an anchorage on the coast of Ylocos, in order to make repairs; but not finding one, they went back to Batavia, with their goods damaged. According to what is written to us in a despatch that is just received from Batavia—from a person who was sent there from here to make observations on the condition of the English piratical squadron—the Dutch lost on their merchandise half of its value; and the corsair sold for 17,000 pardaos his ship of fifty-two guns, with all its military supplies, since it was no longer fit for navigation, while he went with the other and smaller ship—it is said without [stopping for] food—to another port to repair it. [It is also reported] that the squadron of Barenet had departed for Bombain, toward the Persian Gulf, to cruise against the French, from whom he seized at the Straits [of Malacca] nearly a million pesos. The person who was sent from here to Batavia (who is a Malabar) with a balandra was detained there under the pretext that the governor had gone away, and orders were given that he should not be permitted to depart until the governor’s return. But he informed us of everything, by a vessel which he despatched with six men and a French pilot; and he reported that three Dutch fragatas were being equipped and laden with merchandise in order to carry on illicit trade at the entrance of [the Gulf of] Californias, carrying [respectively] forty, thirty, and twenty-five cannon. In his opinion, this was the cause of his detention, in order that, by news [from him] not reaching Manila, the galleon should not sail for Nueva España, and their intention not be known here.

On account of all these advices, and those which we had previously received by way of China making the same statement about the English, it was resolved here that, since the chief [cause for] fear, which was the said squadron—which occasioned the letter with order from the Marqués de la Enseñada,[6] to give warning that a ship should not sail from here with cargo—had ceased, and since the commonwealth was in the most deplorable extremity, with a shipment of goods which had been driven back to port, and laden and unladen the second time, and in evident risk of being lost, a final effort was made by dividing the cargo between two ships equipped for war. One of these carried seventy cannon and the other fifty-two (seventy and forty [respectively] being mounted), and a corresponding number of men, resolved to defend their property and with sufficient force to make resistance to the entire squadron of Barenet, whose ships carried fifty-two, forty-five, forty, and thirty cannon. For the cost of this enterprise the body of merchants offered to aid with 50,000 pesos in Acapulco; and this effort seemed necessary, for, as the viceroy of Mexico had orders not to allow any money to come here, he understood them so strictly that last year he sent a bark[7] without one real. Nevertheless, he was not ignorant that the situado had not been sent here for three years: that with this, and the failure of the [Acapulco] trade, the treasury of the islands ran short 60,000 pesos each year in customs and anchorage duties; that the citizens would necessarily be reduced to poverty, and that these domains were utterly helpless; and that by despatching the aid in November it would arrive here in entire safety from the English—who only through general lack of military foresight were able to secure the prize which they made; for these islands have various ports where our ships can land (thus mocking the enemy), as occurred in the late war; but when they come by the ordinary route and the artillery is in the hold, no other result [than their capture] can be expected.

The damage, most illustrious Sir, is already done, but it calls to heaven for a remedy for the future. That which I propose is, that, since [the merchandise for] this commerce was formerly supplied, either by sending our barks to the Malabar coast, or by Armenians, Moros, or Malabars coming thence with their ships and goods—only tolerating that they might bring some French pilot—orders be given to observe this plan so strictly that warning be given to the Audiencia, the archbishop, and the city [of Manila] that they shall give information if the governor shall contravene those orders, and some exemplary punishment be meted out. For the despotic power which the governors, under pretext of their services, have assumed is great; and the freedom which they have given to the English and the French[8] has arrived at being general license. From this prohibition it follows that they cannot gain so much knowledge about the country and its forts, and that they cannot so greatly injure this commerce, [as hitherto]; for the Asiatics are never so shrewd as the Europeans, and their only concern is for their business, without meddling in observations of our forts or our forlorn condition. To this remedy I add that which I have proposed to the Council, and which on this occasion I repeat.

Observing the aforesaid freedom, the Dutch have ventured to come [against us] with the ease which the Swiss heretic had represented to them; and if this Swiss had not been allowed to come here with his bark, he would not have involved us in such difficulties with the Dutch, for they, in pique, undertook to introduce their commerce into Nueva España—tempting the viceroy with 300,000 pesos which they carried thither last year, planning to give him this money so that he should tolerate [their trading]. And since they are now returning I fear that they are planning to occupy some port in California,[9] in order that it may serve them as a magazine—like the island of Curazas [i.e., Curacoa] in the North Sea—and to make arrangements for carrying on their commerce from Batavia with the same ease as from here. And in order to prevent these or others from undertaking such a scheme (which would be the destruction of America), I have collected testimony regarding all which can aid the Council to realize how, without any expense to the royal treasury, and with the men of whom we have here more than enough belonging to the navy-yard and ships, [Manila] can be fortified for that part of America, for the security of both these and those domains; but I hope for the success of the former proposition, in order not to pile up schemes. I assure your most illustrious Lordship that this can be pushed forward in a way which will be very useful to the nation; because, in order to keep the Dutch under control, it is enough that they know that we keep in readiness the three galleons each of seventy cannon, which the commerce ought to have, and four fragatas besides, with which we can disturb the commerce of the Straits for the inland regions. This is especially easy to do with the English, because, even though they send squadrons from Europa, many of their men die, and they use up their men as fast as they gain ground; and in this country they can never do us harm if we do not give way [to negligence], as hitherto [we have done].

I hope that your most illustrious Lordship will pardon the annoyance of this, as springing from my zeal[10] for the service of the king and the welfare of the nation; and I confide in the inborn devotion [thereto] of your most illustrious Lordship, whose life I entreat God our Lord to preserve for the many years which I desire and need. Manila, July 16, 1746. Most illustrious Sir, I kiss the hands of your most illustrious Lordship. Your most devoted and humble servant,

Pedro Calderon y Henriquez (with rubric)

[Addressed: “To the most illustrious Señor Don Joseph de Carbajal y Lancaster, of the Council and cabinet of the Indias, and president of the Council.”]


[1] War had been declared by England against Spain in October, 1739, in consequence of injuries inflicted on British commerce in the West Indies; but letters of marque and reprisal had been issued by the English government in July preceding, under which Captain Edward Vernon captured the city of Portobello (November 22, 1739), and the castle at Cartagena. Captain George Anson also was placed in command of a large fleet, to harass the Spaniards along the coast of Peru, then to proceed northward, attack Panama, and capture the Spanish treasure-fleet, in which proceedings Vernon was to coöperate with him. Anson’s fleet was broken up by storms and sickness, and the two commanders failed to make connections; so Anson, after various depredations on the western coast of South America, sailed to China, where he repaired his ship. Then he set out to meet the Spanish galleon from Acapulco, the “Covadonga;” and on June 30, 1743, Anson captured this vessel after a hot fight, with over 1,500,000 pesos of silver, mostly in coin. To avenge this loss, a squadron of four ships (the one here mentioned in our text) was despatched by the Manila government in pursuit of Anson; they went to China, but could not find the Englishman, who had sailed for his own country. [↑]

[2] Pardao (or pardo): a coin used in Portuguese India, worth 3 tostoons 3 vintens (Michaelis). This is equivalent to 360 reis, or to very nearly 35 cents in United States money. [↑]

[3] After Governor Torre’s death (September 21, 1745), the government of the islands ad interim was assumed by Fray Juan de Arrechedera, bishop-elect of Nueva Segovia. His first care was to inspect the defenses and supplies of Manila, in view of the dangers which menaced the colony from the English; and he sent to Batavia for cannon, guns and ammunition, his envoy being a Frenchman who was well accredited in the foreign factories, named Antonio Piñon, who is probably the man mentioned by Calderon. Piñon returned to Manila with those supplies, to the value of 38,995 pesos. (Concepción, Hist. de Philipinas, xi, pp. 305, 306.) [↑]

[4] It is clear that the name China (which the French and Italians pronounce Cina) is not the original name of that kingdom, but is one imposed upon it by the foreigners who went thither to trade and barter; it was adopted by the Portuguese, and afterward by our people of the Philippines. Father Julio Aleni, a Jesuit, in a book written in the Chinese language says, in discussing this point: “China, according to foreigners, signifies ‘the country or kingdom of silk;’ and, since there is so great abundance of that commodity therein, those who sailed thither to buy it would say, ‘Let us go to the country of silk,’ or ‘to China,’ which means the same. The like statement was made to me by Don Fray Gregorio Lopez, bishop of Basilea, in whose charge is now the church of China, a religious of ours, and a native of that empire. To this opinion also incline Trigautius and Kircher.” The most common and ordinary name which those people give to their empire, not only in books but in conversation, is Chung Kue, that is, “the kingdom in the middle.” In former times they gave this name to the province of Hò Nan, which lies almost in the middle and heart of that empire; from that region it was afterward applied to that entire country. Others say that the Chinese regarded their kingdom as being in the middle of the world, through their ignorance of the many kingdoms that the world contains. For that reason they also call it Tien Hia, that is, “the world,” or, “the largest or principal part of the world.” Another name they very commonly give to it, calling it Hoa Kue, or Chung Hoa, which means “flowery kingdom,” or “garden, forest, and pleasant place of the middle of the world.” In the time of the emperor Xun this name was much used, and it is still used in literature. It is a very suitable name for that empire, for in truth it is throughout a beautiful garden and a peaceful and pleasant forest. (Domingo F. Navarrete’s Tratados historicos, pp. 1, 2.) [↑]

[5] See Raynal’s account of “the settlements, wars, policy, and commerce of the Dutch in the East Indies,” in his Établissemens et commerce des Européens, i, pp. 151–260. An interesting description of Batavia, the capital of the Dutch possessions in the Orient, is given in pp. 221–228; and an account of the organization, administration, and policy of the Dutch East India Company, in pp. 158–161, 228–255. The foundation and early history of the Dutch settlement at the Cape of Good Hope are related in pp. 201–213. [↑]

[6] Apparently a member of the royal Council; he sent orders that during the war with Great Britain no galleon should sail from Manila for Acapulco, stating that the king thus decreed in order to prevent those rich cargoes from falling into the hands of the English. The merchants petitioned Governor Arrechedera to suspend this decree, at least by permitting them to send to Acapulco the goods which had been registered for that port three years before—which were already damaged by this delay, and would be ruined by a longer one; he did so (with the advice of his counselors), and the galleon “Rosario” and the patache “Pilar” were sent with cargoes in June, 1746. To accomplish this, in the exhausted condition of the colonial treasury, the merchants were obliged to contribute 50,000 pesos for the outfitting of the ships and other expenses; and the royal officials, with the consent of the ecclesiastical cabildo, borrowed from the funds in the treasury belonging to the cathedral 29,805 pesos. The ships were manned with crews of 500 and 350 men respectively. They made the voyage safely, and returned to Manila with the situado for that year and 30,000 pesos on the arrearages in those of previous years. The “Rosario” was again despatched with a cargo, and with request for the situados which had been held back in Mexico; as these amounted to six, the islands were in great need, and the royal treasury almost empty; but the vessel was ill-constructed, and was driven back to port by storms. [↑]

[7] Concepción says (Hist. de Philipinas, xi, p. 237) that this was “a little vessel, which was in the service of the missions and presidios in California;” the viceroy sent it because, having heard nothing from Manila for a long time, he feared that Anson had caused destruction there. [↑]

[8] Raynal devotes book iv of his Établissemens et commerce des Europées (t. i, pp. 400–548) to the “voyages, settlements, wars, and commerce of the French in the East Indies.” The first voyage to India undertaken by a French commercial company (1601) was commanded by Pyrard de Laval, whose account of his adventures in the Maldive Islands has already been cited in these volumes; but this enterprise was unsuccessful. After various abortive attempts by Frenchmen to engage in the Oriental trade, an East India Company was formed in France (1664) by the great Colbert, with an exclusive charter and many special privileges. The company made a settlement in Madagascar, which was abandoned in 1670, and the French ships then went to India, where they established a post at Surat, and afterward one at Pondicherry. At first the trade prospered, especially at the latter post; but after a time the affairs of the company were mismanaged, its funds diminished so that ruinous expedients, only temporarily successful, were resorted to; its markets at home were spoiled by the sale of India goods, taken by French privateers from English and Dutch prizes, at very low prices; for lack of money, the company could not keep up its purchases in India; heavy duties were laid on all India goods; the conduct of the home government toward the company was, although vacillating, generally oppressive, and its administration corrupt; and the company long struggled on the brink of ruin. At the end of the fifty years’ term of their charter, they secured (1714) an extension for ten years more; and in the period of “frenzied finance” engineered by John Law (1716–21) various other trading companies were merged in this one, which later was substantially aided by the French government. For a time the company acquired great power and extensive territories in India; but war broke out between France and England, and in 1761 Pondicherry was captured and destroyed by the English. Afterward, from 1764 to 1769, the company conducted a prosperous Oriental trade; but its affairs had long been mismanaged, and the government had meddled with these unduly, while there had been much corruption among both its directors and its officials. It was found to be heavily indebted, and its finances fell into almost hopeless confusion; and finally a royal decree dated August 15, 1769, suspended the exclusive privileges granted to the Company of the Indies, and gave all Frenchmen liberty to navigate and trade beyond the Cape of Good Hope. The company thereupon undertook to liquidate their affairs, and made over to the government (April 7, 1770) their property, the latter assuming the debts and obligations of the company.

In the period 1725 to 1770, the East India Company of France sent out 761 trading ships, an average of 17 each year; the number in 1725 was 33, but it dwindled toward the close of that period until, in 1769, it was but 3; the ships, during the 45 years, were manned by 87,223 men, an average of 115 to each ship. The amount of merchandise carried to the Indias varied from 7,800,000 livres’ worth (in 1769) to 612,000 (in 1764), and for the entire period was 133,000,000. The vessels that returned to France numbered 585; they carried thither goods which had cost 344,000,000 livres in the East, and which were sold in France for 636,000,000: the years in which these sales produced most profit were: 1741, a gain of 12,327,000 livres; 1752, 13,719,000 livres; and 1755, 12,785,000 livres. During the first decade, the company paid on its sales, as duties to the crown, the sum of 25,000 livres annually; then until 1765, with a few exceptions, 3,000 livres a year; and during 1765–71, sums varying from 538,000 to 126,000 livres a year. The annual dividends varied usually from eight and a quarter to three millions of livres; steadily decreasing (in groups of years) to the latter figure; in 1746 the dividend was 15,000,000, but in that year the company borrowed the large sum of 25,000,000. In 1765 the dividend was but 766,000 livres. Its capital in 1725 was 100,000,000 livres due from the crown, and 39,835 in its ships and other assets. In June, 1747, the government increased its obligations to the company to 180,000,000 livres, in compensation for depriving it of the monopoly of the sale of tobacco, and engaged to pay it the interest on that sum forever at the rate of five per cent. (See a tabulated statement of the affairs of the French company, at the end of the atlas volume of Raynal’s work.)

After the exclusive privileges of the company were suspended, the India commerce was carried on by private persons, and steadily flourished. Raynal presents another table, showing the net product of this private commerce, as indicated by the sales at the French port of l’Orient, during 1771–78 inclusive, of merchandise brought from the Indies, China, and the islands of France and Bourbon; it shows a regular and large increase, save in 1778. The amounts of these sales vary from 10,336,000 livres in 1771 to 27,509,000 in 1777; in the following year the amount was but 14,026,000. The total sales for the eight years amounted to 149,273,000 livres, an annual average of 18,659,000. [↑]

[9] “[Lower] California serves as a way-station for the vessels which sail from the Philippines to Mexico; Cape St. Lucas, situated at the southern extremity of the peninsula, is the place where they halt. They find there a good port, fresh food, and signals which warn them if any enemy has appeared in those places which are most dangerous for them. It was in 1734 that the galleon landed there for the first time; and the orders given to it, and its necessities, have drawn it to that place ever since.” (Raynal, Établissemens et commerce des Européens, ii, p. 106.) [↑]

[10] The writer of this letter was one of the auditors of the royal Audiencia at Manila (Concepción, Hist. de Philipinas, xi, p. 295). [↑]