The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898; Volume 50 / Explorations by early navigators, descriptions of the islands and their peoples, their history and records of the catholic missions, as related in contemporaneous books and manuscripts, showing the political, economic, commercial and religious conditions of those islands from their earliest relations with European nations to the close of the nineteenth century

by Unknown

STATEMENT VII

What can be produced for the royal exchequer by an increase in the tributes

In statement i is reckoned the number of two hundred [thousand] whole tributes, at the rate of ten reals each, which is the amount that they actually pay. This computation was made by reducing the tributes of mestizos to tributes of Indians, and in the same sense ought the increase which is discussed in this statement to be understood; for, although the mestizos pay twice as much tribute as the Indians, and consequently the increase ought to be double, the number also is duplicated, in order to avoid discrepancies and to facilitate the greater perspicuity and clearness of these statements by the definite number of two hundred thousand tributes, at the rate of ten reals each. As this is a very moderate rate, it can be increased in such ratio as shall be considered necessary; for this reason, I have set down separately in the following columns the amounts by which the royal treasury will benefit from an increase in the tributes—from ten reals to sixteen, which are two pesos; to twenty-four reals, which are three pesos; and to thirty-two reals, which are four pesos.

Increase in tribute,	of 6 reals		of 14 reals		of 22reals
	pes.	tom.	pes.	tom.	pes.	tom.
The increase of 6 reals, of 14 reals, and of 22reals in each one of the 200,000 whole tributes which statement imentions, amounts, as seen in the respective columns, to	150,000		350,000		550,000
The said increase in each one of the 9,000tributes mentioned in item 1, statement 6, amounts to	6,750		15,750		24,750
The said increase in each one of the 60,000tributes mentioned in item 2, statement 6, amounts to	45,000		105,000		165,000
The said increase in each one of 1,800 tributesmentioned in item 3 of said statement amounts to	870		1,389		2,970
The said increase in the tributes mentioned initem 4 of the said statement amounts to	1,528	7	3,567	3	5,605	7
The said increase in the tributes mentioned initem 5 of the said statement amounts to	147	3	343	7	540	3
Total	204,236	2	476,551	2	748,866	2
Summary
The increase of 6 reals, of 14 reals, and of 22reals in each tribute, according to the respective columns of thisstatement, amounts to	204,236	2	476,557	2	748,866	2
The increases and savings contained in the summaryof statement 6 amount to	1,312,833	3	1,312,833	3	1,312,833	3
Total amount of the increases andsavings of the royal revenue every year	1,517,069	5	1,789,384	5	2,061,693	5

Thus the increases and savings which the royal exchequer can practice in these islands, without increasing the royal tributes from the Indians, will be worth each year the sum of one million, three hundred and twelve thousand, eight hundred and thirty-three pesos, three tomins, as is shown in the items of statements v and vi.

If the tribute is increased from ten to sixteen reals (which are two pesos), the savings and increases will bring into the royal treasury the sum of one million, five hundred and seventeen thousand, and sixty-nine pesos, five tomins.

If the tribute is increased from ten to twenty-four reals, the said savings and expenses amount to the sum of one million, seven hundred and eighty-nine thousand, three hundred and eighty-four pesos, five tomins.

And if the tribute be increased to thirty-two pesos, the said savings and expenses amount to two millions, sixty-one thousand, six hundred and ninety-nine pesos, five tomins.

Note

All these computations of the savings and increases which this royal treasury can gain each year have been made without including in the totals the actual product of the tributes and other branches of the royal revenue in these islands; therefore, adding the said product to the total of the savings and increases which are here mentioned, there will result a greater amount than that which has been estimated. No matter how gloomily people may talk, the aforesaid statements are convincing that, even if these estimates are made lower, these islands can, notwithstanding these reductions, be maintained by their own resources alone; and in the future the royal exchequer can make good the great sums which the islands have hitherto cost, with the special advantage that the fortified towns and military posts can be put into very respectable condition, and be made superior to the forts of any hostile nation whatever.

I protest and swear that I have understood the matter thus, and that, because I consider it feasible, judging from the experience of my office, I have [here] devoted myself to demonstrating more specifically that which in general is contained in the work entitled “Demonstration of the wretched and deplorable condition of the Philipinas Islands,” etc., which last year I presented before this superior government, and of which I rendered account to his Majesty, whose royal mind will consider what is most expedient for the glory of his monarchy, the conservation of these islands, and the advantage of the royal exchequer. It is to those ends that the savings and increases of revenue are directed that are found in these statements—which are the children of the zeal, affection, fidelity, disinterestedness, and assiduity with which I have devoted myself to the affairs of the royal service. Manila, July 10, 1766.

Don Francisco Leandro de Viana

---

[1] These expenses were paid from the royal treasury, “at the rate of 34 p. 3 r. for every cura or religious, every year” (Viana Respuestas, fol. 161). [↑]

[2] Explanation of “Plan of the present condition of Manila and its environs:”—“1. Royal fort. 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Small bastions of San Francisco, San Juan, Santa Ysabel, San Eugenio, and San Joseph. 7. Ancient redoubt. 8. Bastion of the foundry. 9. A kind of ravelin. 10. Bastion of San Andres or Carranza. 11. Bastion of San Lorenzo de Dilao. 12. Bastion and gate of the Parian. 13. Works of the reverse [obra de revez]. 14. Bastion of San Gabriel. 15. Small bastion and gate of Santo Domingo. 16. Small bastion and gate of the magazines. 17. Fortin. 18. Parish church and convent of the Parian. 19. Chapel of San Anton, a chapel of ease. 20. Convent and parish church of Dilao. 21. Parish church of San Miguel. 22. Hospital of San Lazaro. 23. Ruined convent of San Juan de Bagumbaya. 24. Ruined parish church of San Tiago. 25. Parish church of La Hermita. 26. Ruined hornwork of fascines. 27. Royal alcaizeria of San Fernando. 28. Parish church, convent, and large village of Binondoc. 29. Hospital for Chinese. 30. College, parish church, and village of Santa Cruz. 31. Parish church of Quiapo. 32. Convent and parish church of San Sebastian. 33. Convent, parish church, and village of the capital of the province of Tondoc. 34. Convalescent hospital and island of St. John of God. 35. House of Mayjalique. A. Masonry bridge of Maloza. B. Masonry bridge of San Lazaro. C. Masonry bridge of Dilao. D. Ruined house of Balete. E. Ruined edifice. F. Powder magazine. G. Ruined cavalier. Manila, September 30, 1767.

Don Feliciano Marquez”

[Below follows the scale of the plan, which is 500 varas to 9½ cm. The size of the original MS. map is 110 × 54 cm.] [↑]

[3] For the “Demonstration” here cited, see VOL. XLVIII, in which it is the final document. In the library of Edward E. Ayer, of Chicago, is a MS. book containing copies of letters by Viana written in 1767; the first of these (dated January 5) is addressed to the Marqués de Esquilace, and mentions the despatch to him and to the king, in the previous year, of copies both of the “Demonstration” and of the present statement of “Financial affairs of the islands.” He also relates how he has been actuated in his official duties by his zeal for the royal service, and has always upheld the rights of the crown; and in consequence he has been the mark for the hatred and enmity of all those who live by plundering the royal treasury, and who desire a fiscal who will allow them to do so without any opposition. The above-mentioned documents have, he says, “raised a furious tempest, the anger of those who fear the loss of their own profits, on which loss depends the rightful increase of his Majesty’s interests, and the saving of iniquitous expenditures.” Of the religious orders in the islands, he says: “They have great power, and much wealth which is acquired through what they unjustly collect from the royal exchequer and the Indians. No one dares to incur the hostility of the religious, for all fear the direful results of their power; and under pretext of a false piety, painted with the bright colors of the true, they have been wont to obtain whatever they have claimed. For this reason they have, ever since the conquest of the islands, burdened the royal exchequer with the increasing and numerous expenses occasioned in behalf of the said religious orders, instead of securing economies for it.” He claims “the glory of being the first one who, by dint of close application, has discovered the ‘philosopher’s stone’ for the enrichment of these islands and the royal exchequer.”

Viana also relates in this letter the enmity of Francisco Salgado against him, because he has, by insisting on the rights of the crown, secured sentences against Salgado in two lawsuits—one denying his claim for 36,000 pesos in the iron-mine contract, and the other compelling him to pay into the royal treasury the sum of 28,000 pesos, due from him as farmer of the wine monopoly—notwithstanding this man’s wealth and his persistent efforts to corrupt the royal officials. “This is a very unusual thing in Manila, where rich persons, like Salgado, know the method of making their iniquitous dealings secure, by dint of presents and bribes, which are frequent. It is by this means that the said Salgado succeeded in gaining the good will of the present governor of these islands [i.e., Raón], by offering him 20,000 pesos in cash (as is well known and notorious) in order that the wine monopoly might be awarded to him at its sale, for the sum of 24,000 pesos in each year. I opposed this, proving by documents that the said monopoly produced more than 54,000 pesos, after deducting all expenses; and that the poverty and the urgent necessities of the royal treasury protested against the sacrifice of the 30,000 pesos of which the exchequer would be deprived every year.” He says that the governor tried to secure the award at that low rate to Salgado; but Viana appealed to the royal Audiencia, in which the case was pending when he wrote, and Raón and Salgado were both afraid of losing the great profits which otherwise they would have gained. He implores the minister “to exert his influence to check the rapidity with which these islands are hastening to their utter ruin.” Further reports and letters by Viana in regard to the Salgado affair are found in this book (Cartas y consultas), at fol. 6–11, 15–23, 30–37; the wine monopoly was finally sold for 40,000 pesos a year, thanks to Viana’s persistent efforts. [↑]

[4] Spanish, baylio, meaning a knight commander of the Order of Malta—i.e., the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem. The following word is spelled “Frey” because it denotes a member of a military order. (Velázquez.) [↑]

[5] Expediente: this word has numerous meanings in Spanish, some of which are difficult to define in English. In this case it apparently means “the collection of all the papers belonging to a subject or business;” it may also denote “a summary or abstract, a legal process, official acts, or judicial inquiry.” Another meaning is, “any subject, claim, importunity, or analogous matter submitted to investigation, and depending upon a decision or warrant.” (Dominguez.)

The law here referred to (Felipe IV, June 18, 1658) provides that the religious who are charged with the instruction of the Indians shall receive “a stipend of 50,000 maravedis in each year for each doctrina of 400 tribute-payers, which rule shall be inviolably observed.” [↑]

[6] Spanish, vajo de Campana, literally, “under the bell,” i.e. of the church. In an opinion rendered on April 17, 1765 (Respuestas, fol. 121, 122), Viana recommends that the Audiencia issue strict orders to die corregidor of Tondo to proceed to the reduction of the Indians dispersed through his province into villages—providing them with suitable dwelling-places from the lands belonging to the respective villages, or from the vacant crown lands. He enumerates the advantages (the religious ones being most important of all) which will follow to the Indians as well as to the government from this change; and asks that the religious ministers be charged not to interfere with the secular authorities in carrying out this plan, but rather use their influence to persuade the Indians to submit to it quietly. This plan is but the beginning of his scheme to bring about, as fast as it can be secured, the reduction of all the natives in all the provinces to obedience to Spanish dominion.

On fol. 132v, 133 are opinions regarding applications which were made soon afterward by certain persons or communities to be exempted from the enforced reduction to village life; Viana refuses to entertain these, insisting that all the natives must be brought “under the church bell,” in order that they may be instructed in religion, that their souls may be saved. (Cf. fol. 146, 147, 156, 162, 185.)

He also urged (fol. 139), on May 9, 1765, that all unsettled Indians in the province of Cagayan should be returned to their respective villages. [↑]

[7] See the tariff established by Archbishop Camacho (VOL. XLII, pp. 58–64.) [↑]

[8] Viana had said, in an official opinion rendered on January 14, 1765: “Notwithstanding these arguments [among which Viana mentions the frauds committed in the sale of these boletas], the royal junta of the exchequer would not have decided upon the application of the galleon’s lading to the benefit of the royal treasury if the necessity had not been most urgent, and this measure indispensable; and the distribution would have continued, in accordance with the favor bestowed by our kings and sovereigns to the commerce here—which has no right of justice to the boletas, nor is his Majesty under obligation to distribute them, since they have been assigned [to the citizens] by his royal clemency as a mere favor and benefit, and as alms. No one ought to be surprised that this favor, this benefit, and this alms should be suspended when there are no funds, and no means for paying it, and when it is applied in order to meet the unavoidable expenditures of the royal treasury, and to the payments which in justice must be made to the troops and other people employed in the royal service and the defense of these dominions. For it would not be just that for the sake of distributing the boletas, to which there is no obligation in justice, there should be failure in paying the claims which by every rule of law are due, and to meet the expenses which are unavoidable for the conservation of these islands.” (Respuestas, fol. 73.) It is evident from this that the above measure was put into force temporarily, at least, in 1764, as a necessary expedient in the distressed condition of the islands after the English evacuation; and that Viana now recommends it as a permanent regulation. [↑]

[9] There is an interesting statement in Viana’s Respuestas, fol. 151–155, regarding the iron mine of Santa Ynes and its early history. One Francisco Salgado claimed to have discovered it, and tried to operate it for some time; but he finally abandoned the work, and it (or rather the right to work it) was sold, some years afterward, by the government to the highest bidder. Viana says of this mine: “It is called a mine, but more properly is a quarry of rocks containing iron, with which rocks the mountains of Santa Ynes abound; and in order to obtain them no vein is followed, nor is there need for tunnels, as there is in the mines.” Salgado sold considerable iron from Santa Ynes, including 2,000 picos of it to the royal storehouses at four pesos a pico, instead of the current rate of ten pesos; this low price was claimed by the royal fiscal as the right of the crown, in the term of Ezpeleta as governor. In 1765, Salgado was claiming from the government 36,000 pesos, to reimburse him for the losses he had met in operating Santa Ynes; but Viana sturdily opposed this, saying that the mine naturally belonged to the crown, and that Salgado had forfeited any rights which he might have had therein, and did not make any claims to the mine at the time when it was placed in the hands of Francisco Casañas and Juan Solano, as he should have done in order to render them valid at the present time; moreover, he had made various misrepresentations of the matter at different times, and ought to be punished for falsehood.

In fol. 158, 159, Viana states that (in 1765) Casañas is dead, and Solano pays to the royal treasury five hundred pesos a year. Viana is anxious to prevent the abandonment of the mines (which he fears in view of the losses and injuries caused by the late war), since they contain enough iron to supply all India, and ought to be operated for the benefit of the royal treasury, thus saving the great expense which it incurs in buying iron from China, and preventing the drain of so much money from the islands. He therefore proposes that some two hundred Chinese be placed at work in the mines to operate and develop them, and build the necessary furnaces and other appliances; this will also reduce the population of the Parian, and will cost nothing to the treasury save the rations for the Sangleys, who should be compelled to cultivate the lands near the mines and raise most of what is needed for their support and that of their families (for the married ones should be selected for this colony). They should be placed under a manager of skill and energy, with twenty-five or thirty soldiers at his disposal. From this enterprise, “numberless advantages would ensue for the king and for the public. The consumption of iron in the islands amounts to from 80,000 to 100,000 pesos’ worth annually; and even the most ordinary sort, that from China, costs seven to eight pesos a pico for bars, and twelve to thirteen when wrought into nails, balls, etc.” By the above plan the cost of producing the iron would be reduced to about three pesos a pico. All the Sangley ironworkers should therefore be seized, and transported to the mines. [↑]

[10] “In the eastern part of the Philippines, cock-fights must have been unknown in Pigafetta’s time; he saw the first gamecocks in Paláuan.” (See Pigafetta’s mention of these fights, in VOL. XXXIII, p. 211.) “In the ‘Ordinances of good government’ of Hurtado Corcuera, in the middle of the seventeenth century, gamecocks were not mentioned. In 1779 they first added to the revenue from taxation; and in 1781 the government farmed the right to collect entrance-money in the cockpits (galleras, from gallo, “cock”), for $14,798 a year. In 1863 the revenue from these places made an item in the budget of $106,000.” A special ordinance regarding cock-fights was dated at Madrid, March 21, 1861; among its provisions is permission for this sport to be held on Sundays and feast-days, from the conclusion of high mass until sunset. “The craving to gain money without work they can with great difficulty withstand, and many are, through the passion for gambling, drawn into borrowing money at usury, embezzlement, and theft, and even highway robbery; the bands of robbers on both sea and land consist, for the greater part, of ruined gamesters.” (Jagor, Reisen, p. 22.) [↑]

[11] Spanish, vecinos, which is probably a clerical error for tiempos, as indicated by the context. The implication in “forty-eight” is, apparently, that the cock-fight would be a regular holiday amusement. [↑]

[12] This recommendation by Viana was carried out later by Governor Basco (see pp. 53–55. ante). [↑]

[13] In some of Viana’s official opinions (Respuestas, fol. 114v–117, 128–132), he gives advice regarding the farming-out of the wine monopoly. He protests (March 27, 1765) against the action of the board in charge of this matter, who proposed to give this privilege to Andres del Barrio (the only bidder at the auction), for 16,000 pesos a year for five years. He states that it had at the previous sale brought 26,000 pesos, when the amount consumed was the same as at present; and the farmer’s returns from this monopoly ought to be even more now, since the regular soldiery now number 2,000, against less than 1,500 at the last sale, and some years hardly 1,000, while the net profit of this trade, if it be carried on with energy and business ability, ought to average over 30,000 pesos a year. Viana also protests against granting the monopoly on buyo to Pedro Tagle (also the only bidder) for 10,000 pesos, when the board had decided to offer it for 12,000 in order to dispose of it more easily, while the royal officials had valued it at 14,000. The board made reply to these objections, with arguments which Viana characterizes as weak, and proceeds to demolish with his usual energy. He complains that they acted without even notifying him to attend their proceedings, when they ought to be aware that he, as fiscal, is a member of the board. They have cited the prices first paid for the wine monopoly (10,000 and 15,000 pesos respectively; cf. VOL. XLVII, pp. 118, 119), without considering that those were for the term of three years only, while the present term is five years; and the prices paid before the English war were, at the last sale, 26,000 pesos, and at each of the two preceding ones 20,500. He states that the Spaniards of the city are poor, and consume little wine from the monopoly shops; but this is not the case with the soldiers, nor with the natives, who now are receiving higher wages than before the war, and are comparatively rich through it since they are selling all kinds of supplies at higher prices than ever before. Viana says that Francisco Salgado, the last holder of this monopoly, began it without any means of his own (having lost all he had in working an iron mine); but at the end of the five years he had gained from the monopoly 200,000 pesos. He estimates that the expenses of administering the business are 40,000 pesos annually, and adding to this 26,000 for the government dues, and 40,000 for the contractor’s gains, the total amount of the business is 106,000 pesos a year. If the Acapulco galleon and its successful voyages could be depended upon more certainly, the Spaniards would have more money to spend, and the wine monopoly would be even more profitable. Viana makes an interesting comparison between the administration of monopolies in the islands and that in Spain, where the circumstances are so different that, as he says, the laws of Castilla on this point are “absolutely impracticable” in the Philippines; moreover, in Spain the monopoly must be considered in connection with the impost of alcabala, “which is not collected on anything in these islands.” He urges that the board at least restrict the term of the monopoly of wine to four years, if they sell it at the rate of 16,000 pesos; and that for six years the rate be made 20,000. Also, that if the buyo monopoly be sold for 10,000 the term be made four years, and the rate be 9,000 [sic] for six years. If they will not do this, these monopolies should be administered by the government directly, and not farmed out at all. (From an entry dated May 10 (fol. 141v), it appears that the wine monopoly was purchased by Theodora Fagoaga.)

Apropos of his statement regarding the alcabala, cf. what he says on fol. 134, regarding a request made by the alcalde-mayor appointed for the province of Pangasinan, who asked a reduction of alcabala and bonds [fianzas] (presumably required for his faithful administration of that office). Viana advises against such reduction, saying of the alcabala, “There is the same reason for paying the same amount as in the past, because the commerce is the same; and the said impost is not so much for alcabala as for the privilege of trading allowed to the alcaldes-mayor, relieving them from the oath which they formerly took.” [↑]

[14] Probably the worst of these abuses were checked by the formation of a naval bureau by the decree of 1800 (see “Events in Filipinas,” ante, last paragraph). [↑]