Allied Unity of Command.
Events had forcibly demonstrated the urgent necessity for Allied unity of command. On March 26, a War Council, composed of M.M. Poincaré, Clemenceau, Lord Milner, Haig, Pétain and Foch, empowered the latter to coordinate the action of the Allied Armies on the Western Front.
"At the moment when Foch was to take precedence of Pétain and Haig, what was the position of the armies, as regards the directives of the High Command? In other words, how was the Anglo-French battle being directed? The position is defined in the General Orders of Pétain and Haig, the former of whom prescribed:
"To keep the French forces grouped, to protect the Capital; essential mission;
"To ensure the liaison with the British; secondary mission;
"The latter prescribed that everything possible should be done to avoid severance from the French;
"Should this be unavoidable, to fall back slowly, covering the Channel Ports.
"If we place these two orders side by side, their divergence strikes us painfully. It is patent that the instructions of the two great chiefs had not the same object in view, and did not tend towards the same end. One was thinking of Paris, the other of the Channel Ports. Each would evidently consecrate the bulk of his forces and resources to what he considered the essential task. To sum up: on the German side, there was only one battle; on the Allies' side, there were two: the battle for Paris, and the battle for the ports. Had this situation continued, our defeat was certain.
British and French reinforcements in a village. (Photo imperial War Museum)
"Foch's first thought, from the moment he took over the direction, was to cause this disastrous divergence to cease. To the two commanders-in-chief he prescribed the maintenance, at all cost, of the liaison between their armies. The accessory thus became the essential. The vital point was to ensure the junction between the Allied Armies, and to that end, to cover neither Paris, nor Calais, but Amiens. The battle which, till then, had been double, became single, i. e. the Battle for Amiens.
"Such was the strategical idea which, during the following days, Foch strove to materialise. Motoring from G.H.Q. to G.H.Q., he impressed the same thing upon all; on Haig, Pétain, Gough, the latter's successor, Rawlinson, Fayolle, Debeney and Humbert. By dint of repetition, this idea was to be deeply impressed into the minds of the executants.
"To ensure liaison, to keep the troops where they were, to prevent voluntary retreat, above all, to avoid effecting relief during the battle, to throw the divisions into the line of fire, as they arrived—such were the orders which were constantly on his lips during the days which followed". (La bataille de Foch, by Raymond Recouly).
On March 28, General Pershing offered Foch the direct and immediate help of the American Forces: I come to tell you that the American people would consider it a great honour for our troops to take part in the present battle. I ask this of you in my name and theirs. At this time, the only question is to fight. Infantry, artillery, aviation, all we have is yours.
Henceforth, the battle was directed from Foch's headquarters, temporarily installed at Beauvais. Twice a day, couriers maintained communications between Foch and the British and French G.H.Q's.
Line of British and French Sharpshooters. (Photo Imperial War Museum).
The Fall of Montdidier.
The Growing Resistance on the Wings.
By the 27th, the German attacks had lost much of their earlier sting. The French, whose resistance was stiffening steadily, harassed the enemy unceasingly.
Their infantry, now thirty-six miles from their base, could only be revictualled with great difficulty. The Allied airmen bombed their convoys and the railway stations incessantly.
Their artillery had difficulty in keeping up with the infantry, and the latter were not always efficiently supported.
Meanwhile, the Allies steadily organized their defences. Gen. Pellé's group, with strong positions on the bastions of the Île de France, repulsed the enemy's repeated assaults.
Montdidier fell, but in face of the Allies' increasing
resistance, the enemy could advance no further.
Five attacks on Mont Renaud were broken.
From Canny to the Oise, the Allies stood firm.
General Debeney.
Held on this front, the enemy deviated towards Montdidier, overwhelming Gen. Robillot's forces, which fell back on Rollot. The Germans reached Montdidier, Piennes, Rubescourt and Rollot. A wide breach was thus made between Gen. Humbert's left and the right of Gen. Debeney's Army, then taking up its positions on the tablelands before the valley of the Avre.
General Rawlinson.
Photo Russell, London.
It was a tragic moment. Gen. Debeney telegraphed to Gen. Fayolle: There is a gap of nine miles between the two armies, with nobody to fill it. I ask General Fayolle to have troops brought up in motor-lorries and despatched north of Ployron, to resist at least the passing of the Cavalry.
March 26-27.
British reinforcements arrived north of the
Somme. The Germans converged towards Montdidier.
A few hours later, two divisions of Humbert's Army filled the breach.
Exhausted by their terrible losses, the enemy were brought to a stand.
East of Rollot, the essential portions of the massif of Boulogne-la-Grasse were strongly held.
Behind the Avre, trains and lorries were bringing up the divisions of Debeney's Army.
The British received reinforcements, and stayed their retreat in the outskirts of Albert.
The thrust against their line was now less violent, the enemy forces converging towards Montdidier.
Gen. Rawlinson replaced Gen. Gough.
The Ancre at Albert.
The Battle for Amiens.
The Allies consolidate their front and counter-attack.
After the fall of Montdidier, the fourteen divisions of von Hutier's army converged towards the pocket to the south-west.
Seven other divisions, marching against the British front between the Somme and Arras, suddenly turned south. On the 28th, 80,000 Germans made for the gap, through which 160,000 men of von Hutier's army were already pressing. In all, 240,000 men were about to attack on a seventeen-mile front.
General Humbert's left maintained an aggressive defensive.
On March 28, they counter-attacked. The 4th Zouaves captured Orvillers and Boulogne-la-Grasse, threatening the enemy on the flank at Montdidier. Seeing the danger, the Germans retook part of the conquered positions. The moral effect was, however, considerable, indicative as it was of the Allies' determination to re-act.
Barricade at the entrance to Merville-au-Bois.
On the 29th, these counter-attacks were continued, thus mobilising many enemy units on this front, which were preparing to attack on the Avre.
French artillery in Moreuil.
During these two days, General Debeney, further north, was concentrating his forces along the front of Le Quesnel, Hangest, Pierrepont, Mesnil-Saint-Georges, Rubescourt. There can be no question, he declared, of crossing to the left bank of the Avre.
On March 29, the Germans were firmly held
at the bottom of the pocket.
The Germans attacked at dawn on the 28th. To the west of Montdidier, Mesnil-St.-Georges was captured. The 166th Division, which had just detrained, stayed the thrust at Grivesnes and Plessier. A battalion of the 5th Cav. Div. fighting on foot, recaptured Mesnil and Fontaine-sous-Montdidier.
At the junction with the British, the attack was more violent. Capturing Hangest, the Germans slipped along the valley of the Luce, driving back the British. The resistance of the latter stiffened, however, and they maintained their positions on the right bank of the Avre.
On the 29th, the enemy renewed the attack with fresh divisions, especially at Demuin and Mézières, where the defenders were driven back along the Avre. However, Gen. Debeney's Army was now completed by the arrival of the 127th, 29th and 163rd Divisions. Its junction with the British, was strongly reinforced.
Before Arras, astride the Scarpe, the British fell back into line with Byng's Army, repulsing several violent attacks. (Sketch, p. 26).
On the evening of March 29, the enemy were firmly held at the bottom of the pocket, the sides of which stood firm.