The Strategy and Tactics of the Allies.
The hour of the counter-offensive was about to strike. The Allies had overcome the crisis due to the shortage of men. The British Army had been reorganized. The American forces had greatly increased in numbers. The fighting spirit of the French was higher than ever. The material strength of the Allies was satisfactory, and included large numbers of the new offensive arm: the tank, destined to relieve and support the infantry, and combat the German shock troops.
Lastly, the Allies were now grouped under a single chief: Foch, who knew where and when to strike.
The Allied Armies, he declared, have arrived at the turning of the ways; in the thick of battle they have regained the initiative, and their strength enables them to retain it; the principles of war command them to do so. The time has come to abandon the defensive attitude necessitated till now by numerical inferiority, and to take the offensive.
The action of the Commander-in-chief of the Allied Armies will, in future, aim at maintaining his hold on the German Commandment, giving him no respite which would allow him to recover and reconstitute his forces. To that end, separate surprise attacks will be made successively, as rapidly as possible, so as to augment progressively the disorganization of the enemy's armies and the confusion of the German Commandment, until the day of the general offensive, and of the final attack which will crumble up the whole of the adversary's front.
A comparison of this conception of Foch's with that of Ludendorff brings out all its suppleness and power.
The counter-offensive by the armies of Mangin and Degoutte in the Château-Thierry pocket, begun on July 18, was scarcely over, when the Second Battle of the Somme broke out.
The Allied Military Chiefs.
From left to right: PÉTAIN, HAIG, FOCH and PERSHING.
In this new battle of the Somme, the retreat of the German armies on the Hindenburg Line, in August-September 1918, was effected under the pressure of four successive thrusts:
I.—The operations carried out simultaneously by the British 4th Army and the French 1st and 3rd Armies against the Albert, Montdidier, Lassigny salient, to clear the Paris-Amiens railway. (Pages 38-45.)
II.—The British offensive north of the Somme, coinciding with the French offensive between the Oise and the Aisne. (Pages 46-49.)
III.—The British offensive on the Scarpe and the French offensive on the Ailette. (Page 50.)
IV.—The Franco-British offensive against the advanced defences of the Hindenburg line. (Page 51.)
I.—THE ATTACK ON THE SALIENT OF ALBERT-MONTDIDIER-LASSIGNY.
August 8-13, 1918.
Preliminary Operations of July.
Throughout July, the Allies carried out different local operations, in order to improve their positions and prepare for the coming offensive.
As early as July 4, Australians supported by Americans, had begun to advance between Villers-Bretonneux and the Somme, by capturing the village and wood of Hamel.
On July 9, after a brilliant attack between Castel and the north of Mailly-Raineval, the French captured Castel, and on the 23rd, Mailly-Raineval, which brought them nearer the Avre.
These different actions, and the flattening of the Cantigny salient by the American 1st Div. on May 28, had warned the enemy.
On August 2, the Germans fell back on the Ancre, and on the 3rd to the Avre. The bulk of their forces were withdrawn east of these rivers, leaving only light forces on the west bank.
On the Marne, Ludendorff had just suffered a severe defeat. From July 18 to August 4, his armies had been driven back from the Marne to the Vesle, where they organized new positions. (See the Guide: The Second Battle of the Marne.) In the belief that this effort had temporarily exhausted the Allies, Ludendorff was planning new operations in Flanders, when he was surprised by a new and powerful Allied Offensive. From that point, the initiative remained with Foch.