WARNINGS OF HOSTILE INTENTIONS
The first evidence presented before the court of nations was that of France, in regard to the hostile intentions of Germany. To this Germany has made no official answer in the form of documentary evidence, and any inference as to the hostile intentions of France against Germany, if there were any, must be inferred by the reader without any help from cross-examination by the official advocates of Germany. The value of the French evidence must be judged by later events. Have they, or have they not, corroborated the anticipations of France, held for a year before the war, as to an attack upon her by Germany?
On March 17, 1913, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, wrote to M. Jonnart, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, transmitting reports by French military and naval attachés in Berlin to their respective French departments on German military affairs, and called his attention to the importance of the documents. Delay, he said, in the publication of the reports was due to lack of funds wherewith to provide for these military measures. The rich classes objected to a forced levy in times of peace, and the Federal states to the Imperial Government adopting direct taxation which had heretofore been reserved to them.
"However this may be, in increasing the strength of the German army the empire desires to leave nothing to chance in the event of a possible crisis.
"The German changes have produced a result unexpected by that country, viz., the proposal of the Government of the [French] Republic to reestablish the three years' service, and the manly determination with which this proposal has been welcomed in France. The surprise occasioned by these proposals of insisting on the absolute necessity of an increase of German military strength; the German proposals are represented as a reply to our own. The reverse is the case, since the immense military effort which France is undertaking is but the consequence of German initiative.
"The Imperial Government is constantly rousing patriotic sentiment. Every day the emperor delights to revive memories of 1813. Yesterday evening a military tattoo went through the streets of Berlin, speeches were delivered in which the present situation was compared to that of a hundred years ago.... It was of course to be expected that national patriotism would be worked up just when fresh sacrifices are being required, but to compare the present time to 1813 is to misuse an historical analogy. If, to-day, there is anything corresponding to the movement which a hundred years ago roused Germans to fight the man of genius who aspired to universal dominion, it is in France that such a counterpart would have to be sought, since the French nation seeks but to protect itself against the domination of force.
"Nevertheless, it is true that the state of public opinion in both countries makes the situation grave."
The first inclosure in M. Cambon's letter was the report of Lieutenant Colonel Serret. He speaks of a "virulent" article in the "Kölnische Zeitung" ("Cologne Gazette") on the menace of France, which, though immediately disavowed by the Government, cannot be disregarded, since its sentiments have been approved by other prominent newspapers, and it appears to express a "real feeling" among the people, a "latent anger." It throws light on the present German armaments.
"For some time now it has been quite a common thing to meet people who declare that the military plans of France are extraordinary and unjustified. In a drawing room a member of the Reichstag who is not a fanatic, speaking of the three years' service in France, went so far as to say: 'It is a provocation; we will not allow it.' More moderate persons, military and civil, glibly voice the opinion that France with her 40,000,000 inhabitants has no right to compete in this way with Germany.
"To sum up, people are angry, and this anger is not caused by the shrieking of certain French papers, to which sober-minded people pay little attention. It is a case of vexation. People are angry at realizing that in spite of the enormous effort made last year, continued and even increased this year, it will probably not be possible this time to outrun France completely.
"To outdistance us, since we neither will nor can be allied with her, is Germany's real aim....
"At the moment when German military strength is on the point of acquiring that final superiority which, should the occasion arise, would force us to submit to humiliation or destruction, France suddenly refuses to abdicate, and shows, as Renan said: 'her eternal power of renaissance and resurrection.' The disgust of Germany can well be understood.
"Of course the Government points to the general situation in Europe and speaks of the 'Slav Peril.' As far as I can see, however, public opinion really seems indifferent to this 'Peril,' and yet it has accepted with a good grace, if not with welcome, the enormous burdens of these two successive laws....
"To sum up, if public opinion does not actually point at France, as does the 'Kölnische Zeitung,' we are in fact, and shall long remain the nation aimed at. Germany considers that for our 40,000,000 of inhabitants our place in the sun is really too large.
"Germans wish for peace—so they keep on proclaiming, and the emperor more than anyone—but they do not understand peace as involving either mutual concessions or a balance of armaments. They want to be feared and they are at present engaged in making the necessary sacrifices. If on some occasion their national vanity is wounded, the confidence which the country will feel in the enormous superiority of its army will be favorable to an explosion of national anger, in the face of which the moderation of the Imperial Government will perhaps be powerless.
"It must be emphasized again that the Government is doing everything to increase patriotic sentiment by celebrating with éclat all the various anniversaries of 1813.
"The trend of public opinion would result in giving a war a more or less national character. By whatever pretext Germany should justify the European conflagration, nothing can prevent the first decisive blows being struck at France."
The second inclosure in M. Cambon's letter is the report of M. de Faramond, Naval Attaché. He says that there will be no increase in the German fleet this year, and that the whole military effort will be directed against France.
By October 1, 1914, the imperial army will be increased from 720,000 to 860,000 men, and proposed legislation will place the army corps near the French frontier most nearly on a war footing, in order on the very day of the outbreak of hostilities to attack us suddenly with forces very much stronger than our own. It is absolutely imperative for the Imperial Government to obtain success at the very outset of the operations....
"William II cannot allow a retreat to enter into his calculations, although the German soldier is no longer to-day what he was forty years ago, a plain religious man, ready to die at the order of his king. When it is remembered that at the last elections 4,000,000 votes were cast by the Socialists and that the franchise is only obtained in Germany at the age of twenty-five, it may be presumed that the active army, composed of young men from twenty to twenty-five, must contain in its ranks a considerable proportion of Socialists.
"It would indeed be foolish to think that the German Socialists will throw down their rifles on the day when France and Germany come to blows; but it will be very important that the Imperial Government should persuade them that on the one hand we are the aggressors, and on the other that they can have entire confidence in the direction of the campaign and its final result....
"And it is because a German defeat at the outset would have such an incalculable effect on the empire that we find in all the plans worked out by the general staff proposals for a crushing offensive movement against France.
"In reality the Imperial Government wishes to be in a position to meet all possible eventualities. It is from the direction of France that the danger seems to them greatest....
"In this connection I think it is interesting to quote a conversation which a member of our embassy had the other evening with the old Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck, as it may serve to reflect the opinions which dominate court circles.
"Referring to the new German military proposals Prince Donnersmarck spoke as follows:
"'French people are quite wrong in thinking that we harbor evil designs and want war. But we cannot forget that in 1870 popular opinion forced the French Government to make a foolish attack on us before they were ready. Who can assure us that public opinion, which in France is so easily inflamed, will not force the Government to declare war? It is against this danger that we wish to protect ourselves.'"
The prince, a veteran of the French war, expressed the opinion that Germany would again conquer France in event of another war.
"Frenchmen, who have a great facility for work, are not as punctual as Germans in the fulfillment of their duty. In the coming war that nation will be victorious whose servants from the top of the ladder to the bottom will do their duty with absolute exactitude, however important or small it may be. And Prince Donnersmarck added: 'An exactitude which played so great a rôle forty years ago in moving an army of 500,000 men will have a far greater importance in the next war, when it will be a question of moving masses far more numerous.'
"In this way the old prince gave expression to the confidence shared by all Germans in the superiority of their military organization."
The attaché then discusses German finances.
He mentions particularly the large loans raised by the empire and Prussia: 500,000,000 marks on January 29, 1912, and 350,000,000 marks on March 7, 1913. Quite an important part of these loans must have been applied to military expenses.
"The military law of 1913 will require quite exceptional financial measures.
"According to the indications given by the semiofficial press, the 'nonrecurring' expenditure will amount to a milliard marks, while the 'permanent' annual expenditure resulting from the increase of effectives will exceed 200,000,000 marks.
"It seems certain that the 'nonrecurring' expenditure will be covered by a war contribution levied on capital. Small fortunes would be exempted and those above 20,000 marks would be subject to a progressive tax. Presented in this guise the war tax would not be objected to by the Socialists, who will be able, in accordance with their usual tactics, to reject the principle of the military law and at the same time to pass the votes which assure its being carried into effect."
The attaché then discusses a subject already mentioned—the persuasion of the rich and bourgeois classes by the Government to submit to the increased taxation by "noisy celebrations of the centenary of the War of Independence" in order to convince them of the necessity of sacrifice, and to remind them that France is to-day, as 100 years ago, their hereditary enemy.
"If it is established that the German Government are doing their utmost to secure that the payment of this enormous tax should be made in full, and not by way of installment, and if, as some of the newspapers say, the whole payment is to be complete before July 1, 1914, these facts have a formidable significance for us, for nothing can explain such haste on the part of the military authorities to obtain war treasure in cash to the amount of a milliard."
On April 2, 1913, M. Etienne, French Minister of War, wrote to M. Jonnart, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, enclosing a German official secret report concerning strengthening of the army. This report is interesting in that it mentions knowledge that, as a result of her entente with France and Russia, Great Britain was prepared to send an expeditionary force of 100,000 to the Continent, and confesses that Germany refrained from declaring war on France at the time of the Agadir incident because of "the progress made by the French army, the moral recovery of the nation, and the technical advance in the realm of aviation and of machine guns."
"Public opinion is being prepared for a new increase in the active army, which would ensure Germany an honorable peace and the possibility of properly ensuring her influence in the affairs of the world. The new army law and the supplementary law which should follow will enable her almost completely to attain this end....
"Neither ridiculous shriekings for revenge by French chauvinists, nor the Englishmen's gnashing of teeth, nor the wild gestures of the Slavs will turn us from our aim of protecting and extending Deutschtum (German influence) all the world over.
"The French may arm as much as they wish, they cannot in one day increase their population. The employment of an army of black men in the theatre of European operations will remain for a long time a dream, and in any case be devoid of beauty.
"Our new army law is only an extension of the military education of the German nation. Our ancestors of 1813 made greater sacrifices. It is our sacred duty to sharpen the sword that has been put into our hands and to hold it ready for defense as well as for offense. We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of our people that our armaments are an answer to the armaments and policy of the French. We must accustom them to think that an offensive war on our part is a necessity, in order to combat the provocations of our adversaries. We must act with prudence so as not to arouse suspicion, and to avoid the crises which might injure our economic existence. We must so manage matters that under the heavy weight of powerful armaments, considerable sacrifices, and strained political relations, an outbreak (Losschlagen) should be considered as a relief, because after it would come decades of peace and prosperity, as after 1870. We must prepare for war from the financial point of view; there is much to be done in this direction. We must not arouse the distrust of our financiers, but there are many things which cannot be concealed.
"We must not be anxious about the fate of our colonies. The final result in Europe will settle their position. On the other hand we must stir up trouble in the north of Africa and in Russia. It is a means of keeping the forces of the enemy engaged. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that we should open up relations, by means of well-chosen agents, with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, in order to prepare the measures which would be necessary in the case of a European war. Of course in case of war we should openly recognize these secret allies; and on the conclusion of peace we should secure to them the advantages which they had gained. These aims are capable of realization. The first attempt which was made some years ago opened up for us the desired relations. Unfortunately these relations were not sufficiently consolidated. Whether we like it or not it will be necessary to resort to preparations of this kind, in order to bring a campaign rapidly to a conclusion.
"Risings provoked in time of war by political agents need to be carefully prepared and by material means. They must break out simultaneously with the destruction of the means of communication; they must have a controlling head to be found among the influential leaders, religious or political. The Egyptian School is particularly suited to this purpose; more and more it serves as a bond between the intellectuals of the Mohammedan world.
"However this may be, we must be strong in order to annihilate at one powerful swoop our enemies in the east and west. But in the next European war it will also be necessary that the small states should be forced to follow us or be subdued. In certain conditions their armies and their fortified places can be rapidly conquered or neutralized; this would probably be the case with Belgium and Holland, so as to prevent our enemy in the west from gaining territory which they could use as a base of operations against our flank. In the north we have nothing to fear from Denmark or Scandinavia, especially as in any event we shall provide for the concentration of a strong northern army, capable of replying to any menace from this direction. In the most unfavorable case, Denmark might be forced by Great Britain to abandon her neutrality; but by this time the decision would already have been reached both on land and on sea. Our northern army, the strength of which could be largely increased by Dutch formations, would oppose a very active defense to any offensive measures from this quarter.
"In the south, Switzerland forms an extremely solid bulwark, and we can rely on her energetically defending her neutrality against France, and thus protecting our flank.
"As was stated above, the situation with regard to the small states on our northwestern frontier cannot be viewed in quite the same light. This will be a vital question for us, and our aim must be to take the offensive with a large superiority from the first days. For this purpose it will be necessary to concentrate a large army, followed up by strong Landwehr formations, which will induce the small states to follow us or at least to remain inactive in the theatre of operations, and which would crush them in the event of armed resistance. If we could induce these states to organize their system of fortification in such a manner as to constitute an effective protection for our flank we could abandon the proposed invasion. But for this, army reorganization, particularly in Belgium, would be necessary in order that it might really guarantee an effective resistance. If, on the contrary, their defensive organization was established against us, thus giving definite advantages to our adversary in the West, we could in no circumstances offer Belgium a guaranty for the security of her neutrality. Accordingly, a vast field is open to our diplomacy to work in this country on the lines of our interests.
"The arrangements made with this end in view allow us to hope that it will be possible to take the offensive immediately after the complete concentration of the army of the Lower Rhine. An ultimatum with a short-time limit, to be followed immediately by invasion, would allow a sufficient justification for our action in international law.
"Such are the duties which devolve on our army and which demand a striking force of considerable numbers. If the enemy attacks us, or if we wish to overcome him, we will act as our brothers did a hundred years ago; the eagle thus provoked will soar in his flight, will seize the enemy in his steel claws and render him harmless. We will then remember that the provinces of the ancient German Empire, the County of Burgundy and a large part of Lorraine, are still in the hands of the French; that thousands of brother Germans in the Baltic provinces are groaning under the Slav yoke. It is a national question that Germany's former possessions should be restored to her."[Back to Contents]
REPORT OF M. CAMBON IN 1913
On May 6, 1913, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, wrote to M. Stephen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, giving an account of an interview with the German Secretary of State, Herr von Jagow, concerning the conference of ambassadors in London on May 5th, and the results there obtained. It was agreed by Cambon and Von Jagow that the immediate crisis was over. Cambon submitted proofs of the anxiety of the German Government over the crisis.
"1. Von Jagow had questioned a colleague of Cambon about Russia's situation in the Far East, whether there was cause for Russia to fear difficulties in that quarter which would cause her to retain troops there. The ambassador answered him that he knew of absolutely no trouble in the Far East, and that Russia had her hands free for Europe.
"2. The mobilization of the German army is not restricted to the recall of reservists to their barracks. There is in Germany a preliminary measure which we have not got, and which consists in warning officers and men of the reserve to hold themselves ready for the call, in order that they may make the necessary arrangements. It is a general call to 'attention' and it requires an incredible spirit of submission, discipline, and secrecy such as exists in this country, to make a step of this kind possible. If such a warning were given in France, a thrill would run through the whole country, and it would be in the papers the next day....
"The intention of the General Staff is to act by surprise. 'We must put on one side,' said General von Moltke, 'all commonplaces as to the responsibility of the aggressor. When war has become necessary it is essential to carry it on in such a way as to place all the chances in one's own favor. Success alone justifies war. Germany cannot and ought not to leave Russia time to mobilize, for she would then be obliged to maintain on her eastern frontier so large an army that she would be placed in a position of equality, if not of inferiority, to that of France. Accordingly,' added the general, 'we must anticipate our principal adversary as soon as there are nine chances to one of going to war, and begin it without delay in order ruthlessly to crush all resistance.'
"This represents exactly the attitude of military circles and it corresponds to that of political circles; the latter, however, do not consider Russia, in contradistinction to us, as a necessary enemy....
"From these events the following conclusions may be drawn ... these people are not afraid of war, they fully accept its possibility and they have consequently taken the necessary steps. They wish to be always ready.
"As I said, this demands qualities of secrecy, discipline and of persistence; enthusiasm alone is not sufficient. This lesson may form a useful subject of meditation when the Government of the [French] Republic ask Parliament for the means of strengthening the defenses of the country."
On July 30, 1913, M. Pichon, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, made an official report on the state of German public opinion, as derived from French diplomatic and consular agents. It said that:
"1. The treaty of November 4, 1912, is considered a disappointment for Germany.
"2. France—a new France—undreamed of prior to the summer of 1911, is considered ... to want war.
"Members of all the parties in the Reichstag, from the Conservatives to the Socialists [and of all classes of the people] are unanimous on these two points, with very slight differences corresponding to their position in society or their political party. Here is a synthesis of all these opinions:
"The treaty of November 4 is a diplomatic defeat, a proof of the incapacity of German diplomacy and the carelessness of the Government (so often denounced), a proof that the future of the empire is not safe without a new Bismarck; it is a national humiliation, a lowering in the eyes of Europe, a blow to German prestige, all the more serious because up to 1911 the military supremacy of Germany was unchallenged, and French anarchy and the powerlessness of the Republic were a sort of German dogma....
"And the attitude of France, her calmness, her reborn spiritual unity, her resolution to make good her rights right up to the end, the fact that she has the audacity not to be afraid of war, these things are the most persistent and the gravest cause of anxiety and bad temper on the part of German public opinion....
"German public opinion is divided into two currents on the question of the possibility and proximity of war.
"There are in the country forces making for peace, but they are unorganized and have no popular leaders. They consider that war would be a social misfortune for Germany, and that caste pride, Prussian domination, and the manufacturers of guns and armor plate would get the greatest benefit, but above all that war would profit Great Britain.
"The forces consist of the following elements:
"The bulk of the workmen, artisans, and peasants, who are peace loving by instinct.
"Those members of the nobility detached from military interests and engaged in business, such as the grands seigneurs of Silesia and a few other personages very influential at court who are sufficiently enlightened to realize the disastrous political and social consequences of war, even if successful.
"Numerous manufacturers, merchants and financiers in a moderate way of business, to whom war, even if successful, would mean bankruptcy, because their enterprises depend on credit, and are chiefly supported by foreign capital.
"Poles, inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, and Schleswig-Holstein—conquered, but not assimilated and suddenly hostile to Prussian policy. There are about 7,000,000 of these annexed Germans.
"Finally, the governments and the governing classes in the large southern states—Saxony, Bavaria, Württemburg, and the Grand Duchy of Baden—are divided by these two opinions: an unsuccessful war would compromise the Federation from which they have derived great economic advantages; a successful war would profit only Prussia and Prussianization, against which they have difficulty in defending their political independence and administrative autonomy.
"These classes of people either consciously or instinctively prefer peace to war; but they are only a sort of makeweight in political matters, with limited influence on public opinion, or they are silent social forces, passive, and defenseless against the infection of a wave of warlike feeling.
"An example will make this idea clear: The 110 Socialist members of the Reichstag are in favor of peace. They would be unable to prevent war, for war does not depend upon a vote of the Reichstag, and in the presence of such an eventuality the greater part of their number would join the rest of the country in a chorus of angry excitement and enthusiasm.
"Finally it must be observed that these supporters of peace believe in war in the mass because they do not see any other solution for the present situation. In certain contracts, especially in publishers' contracts, a clause has been introduced cancelling the contract in the case of war. They hope, however, that the will of the emperor on the one side, France's difficulties in Morocco on the other, will be for some time a guaranty of peace. Be that as it may, their pessimism gives free play to those who favor war....
"On the other hand there is a war party with leaders and followers, a press either convinced or subsidized for the purpose of creating public opinion; it has means both varied and formidable for the intimidation of the Government. It goes to work in the country with clear ideas, burning aspirations, and a determination that is at once thrilling and fixed.
"Those in favor of war are divided into several categories; each of these derives from its social caste, its class, its intellectual and moral education, its interests, its hates, special arguments which create a general attitude of mind and increase the strength and rapidity of the stream of warlike desire.
"Some want war because in the present circumstances they think it is inevitable. And, as far as Germany is concerned, the sooner the better.
"Others regard war as necessary for economic reasons based on overpopulation, overproduction, the need for markets and outlets; or for social reasons, i. e., to provide the outside interests that alone can prevent or retard the rise to power of the democratic and socialist masses.
"Others, uneasy for the safety of the empire, and believing that time is on the side of France, think that events should be brought to an immediate head. It is not unusual to meet, in the course of conversation or in the pages of patriotic pamphlets, the vague but deeply rooted conviction that a free Germany and a regenerated France are two historical facts mutually incompatible.
"Others are bellicose from 'Bismarckism,' as it may be termed. They feel themselves humiliated at having to enter into discussions with France, at being obliged to talk in terms of law and right in negotiations and conferences where they have not always found it easy to get right on their side, even when they have a preponderating force. From their still recent past they derive a sense of pride ever fed by personal memories of former exploits, by oral traditions, and by books, and irritated by the events of recent years. Angry disappointment is the unifying force of the Wehrvereine [defense leagues] and other associations of Young Germany.
"Others again want war from a mystic hatred of revolutionary France; others, finally, from a feeling of rancor. These last the people who heap up pretexts for war.
"Coming to actual facts, these feelings take concrete form as follows: The country squires, represented in the Reichstag by the Conservative party, want at all costs to escape the death duties, which are bound to come if peace continues. In the last sitting of the session which has just closed the Reichstag agreed to these duties in principle. It is a serious attack on the interests and privileges of the landed gentry. On the other hand, this aristocracy is military in character, and it is instructive to compare the Army List with the Year Book of the nobility. War alone can prolong its prestige and support its family interest. During the discussions on the Army Bill a Conservative speaker put forward the need for promotion among officers as an argument in its favor. Finally this social class, which forms a hierarchy with the King of Prussia as its supreme head, realizes with dread the democratization of Germany and the increasing power of the Socialist party, and considers its own days numbered. Not only does a formidable movement hostile to agrarian protection threaten its material interests, but in addition the number of its political representatives decreases with each legislative period. In the Reichstag of 1878, out of 397 members, 162 belonged to the aristocracy; in 1898, 83; in 1912, 57. Out of this number 27 alone belong to the Right, 14 to the Center, 7 to the Left, and 1 sits among the Socialists.
"The higher bourgeoisie, represented by the National Liberal party, the party of the contented spirits, have not the same reasons as the squires for wanting war. With a few exceptions, however, they are bellicose. They have their reasons, social in character.
"The higher bourgeoisie is no less troubled than the aristocracy at the democratization of Germany. In 1871 they had 125 members in the Reichstag; in 1874, 55; in 1887, 99; in 1912, 45. They do not forget that in the years succeeding the war they played the leading rôle in Parliament, helping Bismarck in his schemes against the country squires. Uneasily balanced to-day between Conservative instincts and Liberal ideas they look to war to settle problems which their parliamentary representatives are painfully incapable of solving. In addition, doctrinaire manufacturers declare that the difficulties between themselves and their workmen originate in France, the home of revolutionary ideas of freedom—without France industrial unrest would be unknown.
"Lastly, there are the manufacturers of guns and armor plate, big merchants who demand bigger markets, bankers who are speculating on the coming of the golden age and the next war indemnity—all these regard war as good business.
"Among the 'Bismarckians' must be reckoned officials of all kinds, represented fairly closely in the Reichstag by the Free Conservatives or Imperial party. This is the party of the 'pensioned,' whose impetuous sentiments are poured out in the 'Post.' They find disciples and political sympathizers in the various groups of young men whose minds have been trained and formed in the public schools and universities.
"The universities, if we except a few distinguished spirits, develop a warlike philosophy. Economists demonstrate by statistics Germany's need for a colonial and commercial empire commensurate with the industrial output of the empire. There are sociological fanatics who go even further. The armed peace, so they say, is a crushing burden on the nations; it checks improvement in the lot of the masses and assists the growth of Socialism. France, by clinging obstinately to her desire for revenge, opposes disarmament. Once for all she must be reduced for a century to a state of impotence; that is the best and speediest way of solving the social problem.
"Historians, philosophers, political pamphleteers, and other apologists of German Kultur wish to impose upon the world a way of thinking and feeling specifically German. They wish to wrest from France that intellectual supremacy which, according to the clearest thinkers, is still her possession. From this source is derived the phraseology of the Pan-Germans and the ideas and adherents of the Kriegsvereine [war leagues], Wehrvereine, and other similar associations too well known to need particular description. It is enough to note that the dissatisfaction caused by the treaty of November 4 has considerably swelled the membership of colonial societies.
"We come finally to those whose support of the war policy is inspired by rancor and resentment. These are the most dangerous. They are recruited chiefly among diplomatists. German diplomatists are now in very bad odor in public opinion. The most bitter are those who since 1905 have been engaged in the negotiations between France and Germany; they are heaping together and reckoning up their grievances against us, and one day they will present their accounts in the war press....
"During the discussion on the Army Bill one of these warlike diplomatists exclaimed: 'Germany will not be able to have any serious conversation with France until she has every sound man under arms.'
"In what terms will this conversation be couched? The opinion is fairly widely spread, even in Pan-German circles, that Germany will not declare war in view of the system of defensive alliances and the tendencies of the emperor. But when the moment comes she will have to try in every possible way to force France to attack her. Offense will be given if necessary. That is the Prussian tradition.
"Must war, then, be considered as inevitable?
"It is hardly likely that Germany will take the risk if France can make it clear to the world that the Entente Cordiale and the Russian alliance are not mere diplomatic fictions but realities which exist and will make themselves felt. The British fleet inspires a wholesome terror. It is well known, however, that victory on sea will leave everything in suspense. On land alone can a decisive issue be obtained.
"As for Russia, even though she carries greater weight in political and military circles than was the case three or four years ago, it is not believed that her cooperation will be sufficiently rapid and energetic to be effective.
"People's minds are thus getting used to consider the next war as a duel between France and Germany."
On November 22, 1913, M. Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, reported to M. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, an account of a recent conversation between the Kaiser and the King of the Belgians in the presence of General von Moltke, Chief of the General German Staff, which gravely impressed King Albert. It showed that German enmity against France was increasing, and that the Kaiser had ceased to be the friend of peace. The Kaiser had come to believe that war with France was inevitable; and, when it did come, that German success was certain. General von Moltke strengthened his sovereign in these opinions:
"This time the matter must be settled, and your majesty can have no conception of the irresistible enthusiasm with which the whole German people will be carried away when that day comes.
"The king of the Belgians protested that it was a travesty of the intentions of the French Government to interpret them in that sense, and to let oneself be misled as to the sentiments of the French nation by the ebullitions of a few irresponsible spirits or the intrigues of unscrupulous agitators.
"The emperor and his chief of the General Staff nevertheless persisted in their point of view.
"During the course of this conversation the emperor seemed overstrained and irritable. As William II advances in years, family traditions, the reactionary tendencies of the court, and especially the impatience of the soldiers, obtain a greater empire over his mind. Perhaps he feels some slight jealousy of the popularity acquired by his son, who flatters the passions of the Pan-Germans and who does not regard the position occupied by the empire in the world as commensurate with its power. Perhaps the reply of France to the last increase of the Germany army, the object of which was to establish the incontestable supremacy of Germany is, to a certain extent, responsible for his bitterness, for, whatever may be said, it is realized that Germany cannot go much further.
"One may well ponder over the significance of this conversation. The emperor and his chief of the General Staff may have wished to impress the king of the Belgians and induce him not to make any opposition in the event of a conflict between us....
"The Emperor William is less master of his impatience than is usually supposed. I have known him more than once to allow his real thoughts escape him....
"If I may be allowed to draw a conclusion I would submit that it would be well to take account of this new factor, namely, that the emperor is becoming used to an order of ideas which were formerly repugnant to him, and that, to borrow from him a phrase which he likes to use, 'we must keep our powder dry.'"
[See also letter of M. Allizé, French Minister at Munich, of July 10, 1914, in pages following.]
The next evidence presented before the court of the world is that by Serbia and her witnesses, the nations thus far, to all appearances, interested solely in maintaining the peace of Europe, as to Serbia's non-responsibility for the assassination of the hereditary Archduke of Austria at Sarajevo, Bosnia, on June 28, 1914, and as to her sincere desire to do all she could, short of impairing her sovereignty and suffering national humiliation; and that by Austria-Hungary and the same witnesses that were brought forward by Serbia as to Serbia's complicity in the assassination, and to Austria-Hungary's right to fix this, and to exact guaranties that Serbia should not in the future prosecute her evil designs against Austria-Hungary.[Back to Contents]