CHAPTER LXXXIII
THE FIRST BLOW AGAINST THE ALLIES
On October 29, 1914, came news of a Bedouin invasion of the Sinai peninsula and an occupation of the important Wells of Magdala on the road to the Suez Canal. England became alarmed, and her composure was not restored by the news that came a few hours later. Claiming that Russia had taken aggressive action in the Black Sea, three Turkish torpedo boats sailed into Odessa Harbor, shelled the town, sank a Russian guardship, and did other considerable damage.
On the following day, October 30, 1914, the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople asked for his passports and the British and French representatives with evident reluctance soon followed suit. On November 1 Turkey was definitely and irretrievably at war with the Entente Powers and an ally of Germany and Austria.
The war from the point of view of the Turkish people was a matter of four frontiers. There was the Dardanelles to guard; there was Egypt and the Suez Canal to be threatened and perhaps captured; there was the Caucasus, where across towering mountains and deep gorges the Ottoman faced the Russian, his hereditary and most feared enemy; and finally there was Mesopotamia. All of these theatres of possible warfare presented military problems, and one of them naval problems among the most intricate and interesting of those facing the nations involved in this unprecedented war. In the Caucasus the mountains and the scarcity of broad passes and good roads, the almost entire lack of railway facilities and the whole nature of the country rendered offensive operations as difficult as on the northeast frontier of Italy or in the Carpathians. In Syria and on the road to the Suez Canal, the waterless desert, the entire absence of railways, the paucity and inadequacy of roads and the nature of the obstacles to be crossed before an invasion of Egypt was possible made the task one of terrible difficulty. In the Dardanelles the peninsula of Gallipoli, strong as it was in natural advantages, was open to naval attack from two and perhaps three sides and its defense must prove not only a costly affair but one the issue of which must be constantly open to doubt. Lastly in Mesopotamia the task for the Turks was a comparatively easy one, for an invading army must meet with constant difficulties through lack of water, excessive heat, absence of roads and railways and distance from real base of supplies.
At the time of Turkey's entry into the war, military opinion all over the world was divided on the question of the relative efficiency of her army. All agreed, however, that as an individual fighting animal the Turk had few if any equals. Centuries of warfare had established his reputation, and the wonderful defense of Plevna had set the seal upon it. On the defensive, it was believed by many, he was unbeatable, conditions of supply and equipment being equal.
The Balkan War, however, had been a severe blow to his prestige. It was widely felt that his defeat by the Bulgars, the Serbians, and the Greeks had revealed serious, even vital, weaknesses in the Ottoman army. Consequently the test of Turkey in the Great War was anxiously awaited by both allies and foes. Tremendous issues were at stake, and the failure or success of the soldiers of the Crescent in standing before the troops of Russia, France, and Great Britain was bound to have an important, perhaps decisive, influence on the outcome of the struggle as a whole.
It is doubtful if the general staff of any of the warring countries had any accurate or dependable figures of the Turkish army. Especially was this so of the army on a war footing. At one time only Mohammedans were permitted to serve with the colors, the citizens of other religious beliefs being called upon to pay a yearly tax in lieu of service. Of recent years, however, that law was altered, and in the Balkan War Mohammedan and Christian served side by side and fought with equal ardor for their country. Just how large a proportion of the Christian population had been incorporated into the army at the time of the outbreak of hostilities few experts were in any position to estimate.
Germany, because of her painstaking investigations in Turkey as well as in every other country, probably was in possession of more accurate data than any other nation, not even excepting the Turks themselves. The best neutral authorities speak of 1,125,000 as the total war-time strength of the Ottoman forces, but that estimate was made prior to the war and before the world had learned that nations under modern conditions are able to place a much larger proportion of their available manhood in the field than was ever thought possible. Probably the Turkish war strength was underestimated. The chief difficulty was not in finding the men, but in providing quickly equipment, and at the outset that was evidently a very real obstacle in Turkey.
The Turkish army was essentially a German creation, and largely the personal accomplishment of that very able military organizer and student of war, Field Marshal von der Goltz. Von der Goltz spent a decade with the Turkish army, and returned to Germany only to reorganize the eastern defenses of his country in preparation for the Great War. When Turkey entered the struggle he returned to Constantinople at Enver Bey's personal request.
The Turk does not become subject to military duty until he reaches the age of twenty. Then, however, for the next two decades he belongs to the army, either actually or potentially. The first nine years are spent in the Nizam or first line, first with the colors and then in immediate reserve. Then come nine years in the Redif or Landwehr, and, finally, two years in the Mustaph'-phiz or Landsturm.
All branches of the Turkish army were not equally good. Cavalry and infantry were probably the equal of corresponding troops in the armies of any other country, but the inefficiency of the artillery was blamed for the débâcle of the Balkan War. Many of the thousands of German troops poured into Turkey before and after she entered the war were trained gunners sent with the object of stiffening the weakest arm of the Turkish army.
The Turkish army has always suffered, as have the armies of many other countries, from a shortage of properly trained officers. Since the advent of the Young Turks, and especially since Enver Pasha, with his German training, succeeded to the position of Minister of War and Commander in Chief, the personnel of the officers' corps has been vastly improved. But it takes years—yes, generations—to create an adequate supply of officers and noncommissioned officers for an army of the proportions of Turkey's, and the assistance of the German stiffening must have been of inestimable advantage to the Ottoman command.
At the outbreak of the war the Turkish army was disposed in four regional groups. The number of men actually with the colors, according to the best estimates, was 500,000, with another 250,000 trained men in immediate reserve awaiting equipment. In or near Constantinople were about 200,000 troops, including the First, Third, and Fifth Corps, a part of the Sixth, and four cavalry brigades. In Thrace, watching the uncertain Bulgars and Greeks, were the Second and most of the Sixth Corps with cavalry regiments and frontier guards. In Palestine, menacing the Suez Canal, were the 40,000 troops of the Eighth Corps, besides unnumbered irregular Arab forces, who could not, however, be depended upon. In the Caucasus the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Corps and three brigades of cavalry were facing the Russian forces across the winding frontier. At Bagdad the Thirteenth Corps, and at Mosul the Twelfth, stood guard over Mesopotamia.
For centuries England had had a very genuine and active interest in the Persian Gulf, recognizing its strategic and potential commercial importance with that foresight which has distinguished her statesmen and traders for generations. Russia had been regarded as the most likely nation to contest England's predominance in that quarter of the world, and her every move was watched and checkmated in Downing Street.
At the outbreak of the war, however, and for a decade before, Germany had given many signs that she had to be reckoned with in any arrangements in the waters washing the shores of Mesopotamia. And it soon became apparent that the domination of that part of Turkey was to be one of the chief spoils of victory. Much has been written about Germany's territorial ambitions. Much of it is based upon pure speculation, but publicists in Germany make no disguise of the Fatherland's desire to win and make a political and economic unit of the countries now embraced in Germany, Austria-Hungary, Servia, perhaps Rumania, Bulgaria, and Turkey in Europe and Asia. One has but to take up the map and outline this aggregation of states and turn to a table of statistics to realize the enormous advantages and powers of such a unit. Politically and economically, it would dominate Europe as has no other power for many generations. Economically and financially, it would be absolutely independent of the rest of the world, but even if it were not, no nation or combination of nations could afford to attempt to isolate it.[Back to Contents]
CHAPTER LXXXIV
BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA
It was some such considerations as these working in the minds of the members of the British Government that impelled them to undertake an offensive in Mesopotamia almost immediately after the break of relations with Turkey. But in addition there were two other reasons. Russia feared a Turkish attack in force in the Caucasus and called to England and France for a diversion. The Mesopotamia campaign working on the right flank of the Turkish forces, as a whole, was an ideal operation intended to draw troops from the Russian frontier. Secondly, the moral effect of any considerable British success in Mesopotamia, and especially the capture of Bagdad, was bound to be very great. Bulgaria, Greece, and Rumania were believed to be waiting for a cue to enter the struggle, and perhaps turn the scales in the Balkans, while the attitude of the Mohammedans in the French and British possessions was largely dependent upon the prestige of those two countries.
Finally, in considering the relative importance of particular campaigns, observers are likely to lose sight of the tremendous importance of possession. In law possession is said to constitute nine points. In warfare, and in diplomacy, which must eventually follow, possession is even more important. When the plenipotentiaries of the warring nations gather around the peace table to arrive at a basis of settlement and the cards are laid on the table, that nation in possession of disputed territory, whatever may be her military and financial condition, is in a position to largely influence the terms. Only by the concession of equivalent advantages or considerations will it be possible to oust her.
How widely this is recognized will be evidenced by the scramble that is made by each of the warring nations to secure possession of the land regarded as its particular sphere of influence. This is true of Mesopotamia, as of many other parts of Europe, Asia, and Africa.
It is evident that the Turkish military authorities were taken somewhat by surprise by the rapidity with which the British Government in India perfected their arrangements for an attack upon Mesopotamia. Knowing that the total British army was extremely limited, it was thought that France, and possibly Egypt, would absorb British military activity for some months to come. There was every reason, however, why the British should not delay the attack upon the shores of Mesopotamia washed by the Persian Gulf. Running down to the left bank of the Shat-el-Arab to a point (Abadam) almost directly opposite the Turkish village of Sanijeh was the enormously important pipe line of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Now this pipe line was one of the main supplies of the British navy which, with the launching of the newer superdreadnoughts, was becoming increasingly dependent upon oil instead of coal. So much was this so that the British admiralty some time before the war bought a controlling interest in this same Anglo-Persian Oil Company. It was, then, primarily to protect this fuel supply from a Turkish raid that an early descent upon the Mesopotamian coast was planned.
On November 7, 1914, the Poona Brigade, composed of white and Indian troops, under command of Brigadier General W. S. Delamain, appeared off the Turkish village of Fao, where an antiquated Turkish fort lies amid a grove of palm trees. Against Persian Gulf pirates it could have put up a valiant fight, but it was a poor match for the guns of the British gunboat Odin. The defenders fled and the British force sailed up the Shat-el-Arab. At Sanijeh they effected a landing, intrenched, and awaited the coming of two additional brigades.
It soon became apparent that the Turks, either because they were not prepared or because they preferred to make their real stand nearer their base of supplies, did not intend to offer any serious opposition to the British advance. They adopted tactics designed to harass and delay the invaders, however, and on the 11th of November a small force moved out of Basra and engaged the Indian troops attached to General Delamain's command. After a sharp action the Turks retired. No further opportunity was given them to attack in small force, for two days later Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Barrett arrived at Sanijeh with the Armednagar and the Belgaum Brigades, both made up of Indian troops with a stiffening of British regiments.
By November 16, 1914, the whole of the British forces were ashore, and on the following day at daybreak General Barrett ordered an advance. The main Turkish forces were located at Sahil, about halfway between Sanijeh and Basra. The battle was opened by an artillery duel. The British had a great advantage in the possession of gunboats, upon which had been mounted guns of considerable caliber. The Turks had selected their positions with great skill and knowledge, and despite the heavy artillery preparation, the British troops, when they did advance, were badly punished. Recent rains had made the ground heavy, almost marshy, and the entire absence of vegetation gave the Turkish riflemen and machine-gun crews an excellent chance to work. Slowly the Turks were forced out of their advance positions, but just as the invaders were about to take advantage of the retreat of the enemy a curious phenomenon occurred. Between the advancing British and the retiring Turks a mirage interposed and effectually screened the movements of the latter. Because of this and the heavy ground no pursuit was possible.
This action, resulting in the loss of 353 of the British force and an even larger number of the Turkish troops (estimated by the British at 1,500, but which is almost certainly an exaggeration), decided the fate of Basra. Some opposition was made to the passage of the British river expedition, and at one point an unsuccessful attempt was made to block the passage of the Shat-el-Arab by the sinking of three steamers.
About ten o'clock in the morning of November 22, 1914, the British river force, after silencing a battery that had been hurriedly erected by the Turks just below the town, reached Basra, and General Barrett hoisted the British flag on the German Consulate, the customhouse having been fired by the retreating Turks. Some time was spent by the invaders at Basra in preparing a base.
It was not until December 3, 1914, that Lieutenant Colonel Frazer of General Barrett's force with Indian troops and some of the Second Norfolks advanced on Kurna, fifty miles above Basra, at a point where the Tigris empties into the old channel of the Euphrates. Lieutenant Colonel Frazer's force was accompanied by three gunboats, an armed yacht, and a couple of armed launches. The troops landed four miles below the town and intrenched, while the river force moved up and shelled Kurna. When the troops advanced, it immediately became apparent that the strength of the Turks had been underestimated and that Lieutenant Colonel Frazer's force was much too small to dislodge them. After losing heavily, Frazer ordered a retreat to the intrenchments four miles down the river, and sent word to Basra for reenforcements.
On December 6, 1914, General Fry appeared with additional troops, and plans were laid for attacking Kurna on the flank. Just as the scheme was nearing completion, however, Turkish officers appeared at the English camp and asked for terms. Conditions were refused, and finally the Turks laid down their arms.
With the capture of Kurna the British secured control of the delta of the Euphrates, made impossible any raid upon the Persian Gulf and its oil supply except in great force, and laid the foundations of an ambitious campaign against the strategic points of the whole of Mesopotamia. Elaborate intrenched camps were built at Kurna, and near-by at Mezera, to await the coming of larger forces and supplies.[Back to Contents]
Footnote 1: The British admiralty did not clear up the mystery of her disaster.[Back to Main Text]