The Story of the Great War, Volume 3 / History of the European War from Official Sources

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CHAPTER XLVI

RECAPTURE OF PRZEMYSL

The counteroffensive ended—of necessity—on May 24, 1915. The Russians could still offer an effective resistance between Krukienice and Mosciska, but the pressure of continuous attack against their positions around Hussakow grew fiercer every hour. The enemy was knocking at the outer ring of the forts; from the west the heaviest cannons were pouring shot and shell with such violence that the fall of Przemysl could no longer be prevented. Most of the troops had already been withdrawn, as well as the supplies and munitions; only a small garrison remained behind to man the guns of the forts to the last moment; the little avenue to safety on the east was still open.

On May 30, 1915, the Austrian batteries began their deadly work on the Grodek line near Medyka. The exit was under fire; since May 17, Przemysl had been invested from three sides, and the fourth was all but closed. From the northern side, guarded by the Bavarians under General Kneusel, twenty-one centimeter Krupp howitzers bombarded the Russian positions round Korienice and Mackovice, drawing ever nearer the forts commanding the road and railway to Radymno. The Tenth Austro-Hungarian Army Corps, approaching from Krasiczyn, endeavored to rush some of the outer works, but paid heavily for the venture. They settled down before the forts of Pralkovice, Lipnik, Helicha and Grochovce, and those round Tatarovka mountain. General Artamoff, the Russian commander of Przemysl, had laboriously reconstructed some of the old Austrian forts and equipped them with Russian 12-centimeter howitzers. As the Austrians had brought only their 15-centimeter howitzers, they were obliged to wait until their 30.5 batteries arrived before they could undertake any serious attack.

These batteries came on the scene about May 25, 1915, it took five days' preparation, and the final bombardment began on the 30th. It was an ironical circumstance that the Austrians and Germans were in numerous places sheltering themselves behind the very earthworks which the Russians had constructed when they were besieging the place two months earlier. There had been no time to destroy them on the retreat.

The northern sector of the outer ring of forts fell on May 30, 1915, when the Bavarians captured the Russian positions near Orzechovce. A terrific bombardment was directed against the entire northern and northwestern front; great columns of infantry were pushed forward to finish the cannons' work—still the Russians hung on, ever bent on doing all possible damage to the enemy.

The triumphal entry of the Austrian uhlans and artillery into Przemysl. Their horses are decorated with sprays of leaves

During the night of May 30-31, 1915, the enemy succeeded in approaching within 200 paces, and at some points even in gaining a footing in the precincts of Fort No. 7, around which raged an obstinate battle that lasted until two in the afternoon of the 31st, when he was repulsed after suffering enormous losses. The remnants of the enemy who had entered Fort No. 7, numbering 23 officers and 600 men, were taken prisoners.

Since the 20th of May, 1915, the clearing of the road had been going on; Von Mackensen battering the western forts and the river line as far as Jaroslav, and Boehm-Ermolli struggling to force the southern corner to get within range of the Lemberg railway. On his right, Von Marwitz had become stuck in the marshes of the Dniester between Droholycz and Komarno. The Bavarians on the north again let fly their big guns against the forts round Dunkoviczki on May 31, 1915. At four in the afternoon they ceased fire; the forts and defenses were crumpled up into a shapeless mass of wreckage. Now Prussian, Bavarian and Austrian regiments rushed forward to storm what was left. They still found some Russians there, severely mauled by the bombardment; but they could no longer present a front. They retreated behind the ring. The Tenth Austro-Hungarian Army Corps now made another attempt on Pralkovice and Lipnik. Von Mackensen's men captured two trenches near Fort No. 11—"they had to pay a heavy price in blood for every yard of their advance." Heavy batteries are also spitting fire against Forts Nos. 10 and 12. When the curtain of night fell over the scene of carnage and destruction, two breaches had been made in the outer ring of the forts.

June 2, 1915, dawned—a bright, warm summer's day; the sun rose and smiled as impassively over the Galician mountains, and valleys, and plains as it had smiled through countless ages before the genius of man had invented even the division of time. From all sides of the doomed fortress eager, determined men were advancing; Fort No. 10 was captured at noon by the Twenty-second Bavarian Infantry Regiment; later in the day the Prussian Grenadier Guards took possession of Fort No. 12; during the night the besieger's troops marched into the village of Zuravica, within the outer ring. Austrian troops had broken through from the southwest and also penetrated the inner circle.

June 3, 1915, dawned and again the sun smiles over Galicia and sees the same iron belt of machinelike men still nearer the fortress; but the haggard defenders, where are they? Gone! Flown! They have vanished during the night. Austrians and Bavarians march into the town early in the morning. The only enemies they meet are the dead.

Przemysl has fallen again—fallen before twenty times as powerful a blow as that which struck it down seventy-two days earlier.

Before proceeding with the progress of Von Mackensen and his mighty "phalanx," let us briefly trace the progress of Von Linsingen, whom we left on the road to Stryj and the Dniester, or rather, attempting to force that road. While the forts of Przemysl were being smashed in the north, Von Linsingen was pounding and demolishing the Russian positions between Uliczna and Bolechov. Heavy mortars and howitzers were at the same time being placed into position in front of the Russian trenches between Holobutow and Stryj.

On May 31, 1915, they began to roar, and before long the trenches were completely pulverized—the very trenches that thousands of Germans and Austrians had died in in vain attempts to carry by assault. The Thirty-eighth Hungarian Honved Division were sent to finish the work of clearance and take possession of Stryj. The entire Russian line withdrew to the Dniester, step by step, ever fighting their favorite rear guard actions, killing and capturing thousands of their enemies. They retired behind the Dniester, but maintained their hold on any useful strategical position south of the river, so far as was possible without imperiling the continuity of their line.

We must also consider two more Austro-German sectors in order to bring the combatants stationed there into line with the Germanic advance—the Uzsok Pass and the Bukowina-cum-Eastern Galicia sectors. In the former the army of Von Szurmay stood beside that of Von Linsingen opposite the Ninth Russian Army. Von Szurmay led his men out of the pass and advanced northward on May 12, after the fall of Sanok had forced the Russians away from their positions in the vicinity of it. Their line of retreat was threatened by the Austrian approach to Sambor.

On May 16, 1915, Von Szurmay moved across the upper Stryj near Turka and passed along secondary roads in the direction of the oil districts of Schodnica, Drohobycz and Boryslav, arriving on May 16-17, 1915. Von Linsingen's troops had started their advance on the same day as those of Von Szurmay, when the Russians round Koziowa had to retire for the purpose of keeping in touch with their line: the same pressure that Sambor exerted on the Uzsok. Here again the Russians adopted rear-guard tactics and considerable fighting occurred during their retreat to Stryj and Bolechow, both of which were eventually captured by Von Linsingen.

In Eastern Galicia and the Bukowina matters had come almost to a standstill between Lechitsky and Von Pflanzer-Baltin about the middle of May, 1915. When the former had cut the latter's connection with the main line, the brigade of General von Blum and other adjoining German troops on the extreme right of Von Linsingen tried hard to relieve the pressure of Lechitsky on the Austrian forces. Not till after the fall of Przemysl was the connection restored, when the Russians had to fall back from Kalusz and Nadvorna; on June 9 they evacuated Obertzn, Horodenka, Kocman and Sniatyn. Lechitsky was also compelled to withdraw from the Bukowina between Zaleszczyki, Onut, and Czernowitz, where the Austrians were moving along the Dniester in the north, the Pruth in the south, and over the hills in the center against the village of Szubraniec. Here the Russians once more inflicted severe losses on the Austrians, but being in danger from a flanking movement by the Forty-second Croatian Infantry through the Dniester forests, they retired from the Bukowina on to Russian territory on June 12, 1915.[Back to Contents]

CHAPTER XLVII

CAPTURE OF LEMBERG

The capture of Przemysl and of Stryj terminates the second stage of the Austro-German offensive in Galicia. The third stage may be described as the battle for Lemberg, or Lwow. Lemberg is the ancient capital of Galicia, and formerly bore the name of Lwow. The Austrians many years ago had changed it to "Lemberg." When the Russians captured the town on September 3, 1914, they had given it back the old Slavonic name, which, however, was destined soon to be transformed back again into the more pronounceable appellation of "Lemberg."

It is estimated that between April 28, 1915, and the recapture of Przemysl the Russian forces in Galicia had been diminished by at least a quarter of a million casualties. The heaviest losses occurred among Dmitrieffs troops in the first days of May, 1915, but in the battles on the San, at the close of the month, the forces of Von Mackensen's "phalanx" were also greatly reduced. Along the entire Galician front, it is computed that quite 600,000 Austro-German troops were put out of action.

While the fight for Przemysl was in full swing an important event of the war occurred—Italy joined the enemies of Austria on May 3, 1915; the Dual Monarchy had now to defend her western frontier as well. Dankl and Von Bojna were transferred to the Italian front with a considerable portion of their Galician troops. A general redistribution of units was effected among the Austrian and German armies. The army of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand was held along the lower San as far as Sieniava. Von Mackensen was advancing east of Jaroslav along the railway toward Rawa-Ruska. Boehm-Ermolli was fighting on the road to Lemberg from Mosciska. An army under Count Bothmer was operating near the Dniester marshes, beyond which, farther south, a group of armies under Von Linsingen (mainly German) had forced the passage of the Dniester at Zuravno, and was trying to advance on Lemberg and catch Ivanoff's main forces on the flank. This last movement, if successful, would be the most effective method of crushing the retreating Russian armies: being thus outflanked, some of their lines of retreat would be cut and a dissolution of a large portion of the retiring forces could hardly have been avoided. However, all attempts in this direction failed. The Russians gradually rolled up their line on the Dniester from west to east, keeping step with the retreat of the armies which were facing west. With strong reenforcements from Kiev and Odessa Brussilov commanded the Dniester front under the direction of General Ivanoff. If only the ponderous advance of Von Mackensen could have been arrested, Brussilov would have had little difficulty in sweeping Von Linsingen back to the Carpathian barrier. A somewhat similar condition existed in the north, where the Austrians were at the mercy of Ivanoff's strong right wing.

The archduke's front was smashed at Rudnik early in June, 1915; his forces were driven back a day's march and lost 4,000 men in prisoners, besides many guns. The Second, Third and Fourth Tyrolese regiments were almost annihilated. German troops were hurried to the rescue. Boehm-Ermolli also got into serious difficulties at Mosciska, where the Russians held him up for a week with a furious battle. Ivanoff was scoring points against all his individual opponents excepting only Von Mackensen. The "phalanx," always kept up to full strength by a continuous influx of reserves and provided with millions of high-explosive shells, not only pursued its irresistible course eastward, but had to turn now right, now left, to help Austrian and German commanders out of trouble. Heavy howitzers lumbered along the way to Rawa-Ruska—not to Lemberg, but to the north of it, on the flank of the Russian army still holding the Lower San. This army had therefore to retire northward to the river line of the Tanev stream, cautiously followed by the archduke's forces. The "phalanx" had again saved them from disaster. Similarly, at Mosciska, when Boehm-Ermolli tried to storm the Russian position by mass attacks, his infantry was driven back with such terrible punishment that they could not be induced to make another advance. There was nothing to be done here, but wait till Von Mackensen turned the flank of the Russian position for them, which he did in one of the most stubborn conflicts of the war—the battle of the Lubaczovka, a tributary of the San between Rawa-Ruska and Lemberg. Never were the fighting abilities of Slav and Teuton more severely tested. For over a week the struggle raged; a half million men were brought up in groups and flung against the Russian front. Shell, shrapnel, bullets and asphyxiating bombs finally wore down the Russian resistance.

Incapacitated by physical exhaustion and outnumbered by three to one, the Russian infantry gave way on June 13, 1915. The "phalanx" drove into their ranks and advanced rapidly in a northerly direction on its great flanking movement. But the Russian spirit was not broken, for at this critical moment General Polodchenko rode out with three regiments of cavalry—the Don Cossacks, the Chernigov Hussars, and the Kimburn Dragoons. They dashed into the unbroken lines of the triumphant German infantry like a living hurricane, sabered the enemy, and put thousands on the run. Swerving aside, they next charged deep into the German rear, mauled the reserves into confusion, hacked their way out again and captured several machine guns. The most remarkable feature about this extraordinary exploit was the fact that the losses sustained by the cavalry amounted only to 200 killed and wounded. The effect on the "phalanx," however, was such that no more attacks were made that day, and the Russians were able to retire to the hills near Rawa-Ruska. Ivanoff was now compelled to draw reenforcements from other parts of the line to strengthen his front at Rawa-Ruska. This meant weakening Ewarts's against the archduke and Brussilov against Boehm-Ermolli. The downfall of the Dunajec-Biala front had been attributed by the Russian War Staff to overconfidence or neglect on the part of General Dmitrieff, who was subsequently relieved of his command and replaced by General Lesch. At an official inquiry Dmitrieff was exonerated and reinstated on the reasonable ground that, whatever precautions of defense he might have taken, they would have proved ineffective against the preponderance of the German artillery.

After the battle of Lubaczow the Russian line drew back about twenty miles. For the defense of Lemberg the front ran in a concave form from along the River Tanev, five miles from Rawa-Ruska, down to Grodek and Kolodruby; then eastward behind the Dniester to Zuravno and Halicz. The marshes of the Dniester, then swollen by heavy rains, formed a good natural defense; the intrenchments on the hills north of Grodek to Rawa-Ruska protected the approaches to Lemberg from that direction. The weakest spot lay around Janov, fifteen miles north of Grodek, where the level ground would permit the easy transport of heavy artillery. This position had been fortified with trenches and wire entanglements. Here also were concentrated the troops withdrawn from other parts of the line, and four armored trains with quick-firing guns from the depot at Rovno. General Ivanoff had no intention of making any decisive stand against the "phalanx"; neither did he think of risking his armies in a battle for Lemberg. That town was certainly of great military and political importance—worth a dozen Przemysls—and worth fighting for. But for that he would need artillery in enormous quantity. Von Mackensen carried 2,500 guns with him, as well as siege trains of heavy howitzers. Ivanoff possessed none of these, and could therefore hope only to fight rear-guard actions while retiring before Von Mackensen. In any other part of the Galician line except the center he had little to fear. We left Von Linsingen forcing the Dniester at Zuravno. He got the bulk of his army across, the main advance commanded by Von Bothmer, who captured the northern heights and penetrated the forests near the Stryj-Tarnopol railway. They were less than fifty miles from Lemberg.

The "retreating" Brussilov suddenly turned round and fell on Von Bothmer's advance. The fight lasted three days, with the result that the Austro-Germans were obliged to fall back across the Dniester, leaving behind 2,000 killed and wounded, besides 17 guns, 78 machine guns, 348 officers and 15,430 men as prisoners, June 8-10, 1915.

On June 11, 1915, however, the Germans renewed the attack on Zuravno, recaptured the town, and on June 12 were five miles north of it. By June 13 they had made ten miles, when Brussilov lashed out again. Within two days the Germans were back on the Dniester. Von Mackensen had meanwhile concentrated a new series of heavy batteries around Jaroslav and formed a new "phalanx" (with reenforcements) west of the San between Piskorovice and Radymno. Another attempt was preparing to break through Ivanoff's right wing.

A violent bombardment began on June 12, 1915, and Austro-Hungarian troops crossed the river and occupied both Sieniava and Piskorovice. Next day the advance spread along the whole line, extending from Tarnoviec on the Zlota to the Radymno-Javorov road, pressing north and eastward against the Russian front. Pivoting on Sieniava, Von Mackensen swung his right toward Mosciska, which Von Marwitz captured on June 14, 1915. The same night the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's entire army was slowly wheeling from the San toward the Tanev, facing due north.

On June 16, 1915, the left of this line was already inside the borders of Russian Poland, and its right wing along the entire Tanev front. By June 16 numerous towns and villages were taken by the Germans. The Wolff Telegraphic Bureau announced that Von Mackensen's army had captured 40,000 men and 69 machine guns, which undoubtedly referred to all the Galician groups, for on June 12, 1915, Von Mackensen had "replaced" the Archduke Frederick as generalissimo of the Austro-Hungarian armies. The "phalanx" was pressing against Rawa-Ruska, Magierow, and Janov; Boehm-Ermolli against Grodek, part of which he captured by a midnight assault on June 16. In five weeks the Russian line or front in Galicia had shrunk from 300 miles to about 100. Before Dunajec, when it was united with the northern groups, it had represented the longest battle line in the history of the world.

The Russians began to evacuate Lemberg about June 17, 1915, the day Von Mackensen's right entered Javorov. On the 19th his advance guard was approaching Rawa-Ruska. Boehm-Ermolli was meanwhile undergoing severe punishment near Komarno, where an Austrian advance force endeavored to get through the Grodek Lakes. The Russian artillery drove them back; for three days there were furious bayonet and cavalry charges and counter-charges; despite the most terrific bombardments the Austrian attacks were broken by the desperate Russians. On this occasion, at least, the Russians were well supplied with shells hurriedly sent by rail from Kiev, which enabled them to repulse the Austrians on the lakes. Boehm-Ermolli is said to have lost half of his effectives in his attempt to penetrate through Grodek and Dornfeld, fifteen miles south of Lemberg.

Von Mackensen again came to the rescue by making a great turning movement in the district of Zolkiev, about sixteen miles north of Lemberg, and attacking the Russian positions about Janov, forcing the Russians over the hills and the Rawa-Ruska railway to Zolkiev. His left wing, resting on Lubaczov, swung northward in a wheeling movement to envelop Rawa-Ruska. But the Russians intercepted the move; ferocious encounters and Cossack charges threw the Germans back to their pivot with heavy losses on both sides. Von Mackensen's center, however, was too strong, and Ivanoff desired no pitched battle—the only way to check its advance. He therefore fell back between Rawa-Ruska and Lemberg, yielding the former to Von Mackensen and the latter to Boehm-Ermolli, who was able to lead his battered troops into the town on June 22, 1915, without further resistance. Brussilov now had to withdraw from the Dniester. As at Przemysl, the Russian garrison departed with all stores and baggage before the victors arrived. Lemberg had been in Russian possession for 293 days.

A German attack near Rawa-Ruska was repulsed by the Russians on June 25, 1915. For two days the "phalanx" rested to replenish its stock of shells; when these had arrived along the Przemysl line, Von Mackensen turned northward in the direction of Kholm on the Lublin-Brest-Litovsk railway. On his left marched the Austro-Hungarian army of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand. These two armies drop out of the Galician campaign at this stage and become part of the great German offensive against the Polish salient. The gigantic enveloping movement had failed in the south; it was now to be attempted against the Russian line in front of Warsaw, conducted by Von Hindenburg and Von Gallwitz in the northern sector, and by Von Mackensen, assisted by General Woyrsch and Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, in the southern. These operations are described in the pages following.

More than three-fourths of Galicia had now been reconquered, and it was left to the Austrians and the Germans to complete the conquest. The campaign was one of the greatest operations of the war. An English military writer thus describes the achievement: "Only a most magnificent army organization and a most careful preparation, extending to infinite detail, could execute a plan of such magnitude at the speed at which it was done by the Austrian and German armies in May, 1915."

Not yet, however, were the Russian armies destroyed; to the German War Staff it was not now a question of taking or retaking territory, but of striking a final and decisive blow at the vitals of Russia. The continuous series of reverses suffered by Boehm-Ermolli and Von Linsingen exerted an important effect on the end of the Galician campaign: it frustrated the plan of eliminating the Russian forces. The battle lines in France and Flanders could wait a while till the Russian power was annihilated.

After the fall of Lemberg, Ivanoff withdrew the main body of his troops toward the river line of the Bug, Boehm-Ermolli following up behind. Again that unfortunate general was roughly handled—another of his divisions was annihilated southeast of Lemberg in a rear-guard action. Von Linsingen directed his efforts against the Gnila Lipa and Halicz, while Von Pflanzer-Baltin still operated on the Dniester. For many months the Russians and Austrians faced each other in eastern Galicia; they were still skirmishing at the end of the year. Both Russia and Austria had more important matters on hand elsewhere: the former against Germany in the north, and the latter with her new enemy—Italy. Galicia became a side issue.

The Galician campaign will rank as one of the most instructive episodes in military history, an example of unparalleled calculation, scientific strategy, and admirable heroism, involving, it is computed, the terrible sacrifice of at least a million human lives.[Back to Contents]

PART VII—RUSSO-GERMAN CAMPAIGN

CHAPTER XLVIII

WINTER BATTLES OF THE MAZURIAN LAKES

The battle known in the German official accounts as the "Winter Battle in Mazurian Land" is sometimes described as the "Nine Days' Battle." In this sense it is to be considered as beginning on the 7th of February, 1915, and ending on the 16th, when the German Great Headquarters reported that the Tenth Russian Army, consisting of at least eleven infantry and several cavalry divisions, had been driven out of its strongly fortified positions to the east of the Mazurian Lake district, forced across the border, and, having been almost completely surrounded, had been crushingly defeated. In fact, however, fighting continued as part of the same action until the 21st of February, 1915, when the pursuit of the defeated army ended.

The forces engaged in this titanic conflict were the Russian Tenth Army, consisting, according to the Russian version, of four corps, under General Baron Sievers, and the German East Prussian armies, under General von Eichhorn, operating on the north on the line Insterburg-Lötzen, and General von Bülow on the line Lötzen-Johannisburg to the south of Von Eichhorn. Sources favorable to the Allies represent the strength of General Sievers's army as 120,000 men. They assert that the total German force consisted of nine corps, over 300,000 men. These are said to have included the Twenty-first Corps, which had been with the Crown Prince of Bavaria in the west; three reserve corps, also from the west; the Thirty-eighth and Fortieth Corps, new formations, from the interior of Germany; the equivalent of three corps from other sections of the eastern front; and a reserve corps of the Guard. The German official description of the battle credits the Russians with having had in this sector of the battle front in East Prussia at the beginning of February six to eight army corps, or about 200,000 men.

For months the heavy fighting in the east had centered on other sections of the immense battle line, running from the Baltic to the Carpathians. The second general Russian offensive, the great forward thrust of the Grand Duke Nicholas toward Cracow in the direction of Berlin, aimed through the center of the German defense, had been met, and the German counterthrust toward Warsaw had come to a standstill in the mud of Poland and before the stone-wall defensive of the Russians on the Bsura and the Rawka. Attacks launched by the Russians against the East Prussian frontier, centering at Lyck, in January, 1915, seemed to forebode a fresh Russian offensive intended to sweep back the German armies in this section whose position on the Russian right wing was a continual threat to the communications of the Russian commander in chief.

The Germans, disposing of comparatively weak forces, estimated at three army corps, were compelled to yield a strip of East Prussian territory, and had fallen back to positions of considerable natural strength formed by the chain of Mazurian Lakes and the line of the Angerapp River. They reported their forces standing on the defensive here as 50 per cent Landwehr, 25 per cent Landsturm, and only 25 per cent other troops not of the reserve. Repeated attempts of the Russians to gain possession of these fortified positions had, however, broken down. They had been directed especially against the bridgehead of Darkehmen and the right wing of the German forces in the Paprodtk Hills. Wading up to their shoulders in icy water, the hardy troops of the Third Siberian Corps had attempted in vain to cross the Nietlitz Swamp, between the lakes to the east of Lyck.

At the beginning of February, 1915, finally Von Hindenburg had been able to obtain fresh German forces and to put them in position for an encircling movement against the Russians lying just to the east of the lakes, from near Tilsit to Johannisburg. With the greatest secrecy the reenforcements, hidden from observation by their fortified positions, and the border forces maintaining the defense, were gathered behind the two German wings. The Russians apparently gained an inkling of the big move that was impending about the time the advance against their wings was under way. The first news of the opening of the battle came to the public in a Russian official announcement of the 9th of February, 1915, to the effect that on the 7th the Germans had undertaken the offensive with considerable force in the Goldap-Johannisburg sector. The northern group of Germans began its movement somewhat later from the direction of Tilsit.

Extensive preparations had been made by the German leaders to meet the difficulties of a winter campaign under unfavorable weather conditions. Thousands of sleighs and hundreds of thousands of sleigh runners (on which to drag cannon and wagons), held in readiness, were a part of these preparations for a rapid advance. Deep snow covered the plain, and the lakes were thickly covered with ice. On the 5th of February, 1915, a fresh snowstorm set in, accompanied by an icy wind, which heaped the snow in deep drifts and made tremendously difficult travel on the roads and railways, completely shutting off motor traffic.

The Germans on the south, in order to come into contact with the main Russian forces, had to cross the Johannisburg Forest and the Pisseck River, which flows out of the southernmost of the chain of lakes. The attacking columns made their way through the snow-clad forests with all possible speed, forcing their way through barriers of felled trees and driving the Russians from the river crossings.

Throughout the 8th of February, 1915, the marching columns moved through whirling snow clouds, the Germans driving their men forward relentlessly, so that, in spite of the drifted snow which filled the roads, certain troops covered on this day a distance of forty kilometers. The Germans under General von Falck took Snopken by storm; those under General von Litzmann crossed the Pisseck near Wrobeln. The immediate objectives of these columns were Johannisburg and Biala, where strong Russian forces were posted.

On the 9th the southern column, under Von Litzmann, was attacked on its right flank by Russians coming from Kolna, to the south of them. The German troops repelled the attack, taking 2,500 prisoners, eight cannon, and twelve machine guns. General Saleck took Johannisburg, and Biala was cleared of the Russians. The advance of these southern columns continued rapidly toward Lyck.

The German left wing at the same time fell overwhelmingly on the northern end of the Russian line. On the 9th they took the fortified Russian positions stretching from Spullen to the Schorell Forest and nearly to the Russian border. They had here hard work to force their way through wire entanglements of great strength. Having noticed signs of a retreat on the part of their opponents, these German forces had on the preceding day begun the attack without waiting for the whole of their artillery to come up. The Russians retreated toward the southeast.

Swinging forward toward the Russian border, the German left wing now exerted itself to the utmost to execute the sweeping encircling movement for which the strategy of Von Hindenburg had become famous. The Russian right wing had been turned and was being pressed continually toward the southeast. The German troops rushed forward in forced marches, ignoring the difficulties which nature put in their way. By the 10th of February these columns reached the Pillkallen-Wladislawow line, and by the 11th the main highway from Gumbinnen to Wilkowyszki. The right wing, up to the capture of Stallupoehnen, had taken some 4,000 prisoners, four machine guns, and eleven ammunition wagons. The center of this army, at the capture of Eydtkuhnen, Wirballen, and Kibarty, took 10,000 prisoners, six cannon, eight machine guns, numerous baggage wagons, including eighty field kitchens, three military trains and other rolling stock, a large number of gift packages intended for the Russian troops, and, of chief interest to the fighting men, a whole day's provisions.

On the afternoon of February 10 some one and a half Russian divisions had come to a halt in these three neighboring villages: Eydtkuhnen, Kibarty, and Wirballen. Although it was known that the Germans were approaching, it was apparently regarded by the Russians as impossible that pursuers would be able to come up with them in the raging snowstorm. So certain were they of their security that no outposts were put on guard. Only thus could it happen that the Germans, who had not allowed the forces of nature to stop their advance, arrived right at the Russian position on the same day, though with infantry alone and merely a few guns, everything else having been left behind, stuck in the snowdrifts.[Back to Contents]