CHAPTER XIV
THE BATTLE OF VERDUN—THE GERMAN ATTACK
Toward the close of 1915 the German General Staff decided on a vast onslaught on the French front that would so crush and cripple the fighting forces of France that they would cease to count as an important factor in the war. A great action was also necessary owing to the external and internal situation of the German Empire. The time was ripe for staging a spectacular victory that would astonish the world, intimidate Greece and Rumania, and stiffen the weakening hold that Germany had on Turkey and Bulgaria.
The German General Staff knew that Russia was arming several hundred thousand new troops, that Great Britain had reenforced her armies on the Continent, that the Allies were amply supplied with guns and shells, and that in the spring they would undertake an offensive on a large scale that would go far toward ending the war. In order to anticipate this threatened onslaught the German staff decided to strike, hoping to gain a victory before the Allies were entirely ready.
Having arrived at this decision, the next problem was to select the battle field, and Verdun was decided upon. At first this choice created general astonishment, for the capture of Verdun would only mean the gaining of a certain number of square miles of territory. But the German staff believed that the capture of the ancient fortress of Verdun would have a powerful effect on public opinion at home and abroad. As a military operation they were confident that such a victory might have a decisive effect on the future of the war. It was hoped that the French army, already weakened, would receive a crushing blow from which it could never recover. An intelligent German prisoner explained the German point of view: "Verdun sticks into our side like a dagger, though sheathed. With that weapon threatening our vitals, how can we think of rushing on France elsewhere? If we had done so, the Verdun dagger might have stabbed us in the back as well as in the side."
In order to sustain the German people's faith in the Hohenzollern dynasty there was urgent necessity that the crown prince should gain a success. The capture of Verdun would reestablish his somewhat tarnished military reputation and might force an exhausted France to sue for peace.
The loss of Verdun and its girdle of forts would have made the situation of the defenders very difficult, they would find it a serious problem to hold back the German hosts while organizing a new line of defense from St. Mihiel to Ste. Ménéhould. Moreover as the German lines formed a semicircle around the French position at Verdun an immense number of guns could be massed against a small area.
In the matter of railway facilities the Germans had every advantage. They possessed fourteen strategic lines, while the French had only one ordinary double line, which was in easy range of the German guns south of Vauquois, and a narrow gauge from Verdun to Bar-le-Duc. This terrible handicap was in time overcome by the French, who brought to perfection a system of motor transport by road that enabled them at a moment's notice to bring up men, ammunition, and supplies to the defense of Verdun.
The French positions around the fortress had not greatly changed since the closing months of 1914, when the French carried the village of Brabant and Haumont Wood and occupied the southeast corner of Consenvoye Wood. Two formidable natural barriers had been secured by the Germans: Forges Wood on the left, a long crest east and west confronting the French lines and bisected its full length by a ravine. Protected from French fire from the south, it afforded an excellent artillery position, while the trees served as a screen against aerial observation. The position also commanded a clear view of the French left at Brabant. To attack Forges Wood it would be necessary to advance over an open space entirely bare of any natural protection. On the right of the French positions the Germans occupied a strong post on a sort of island that overlooked the Woevre plain and having on one side a steep cliff.
The possession of these two strong positions by the Germans exposed the French flanks to artillery fire from every direction. It was impossible that the French line, bent into a salient in front of Haumont and Caures Wood, could hold out if the Germans massed a great number of guns against it.
When the struggle in the Verdun sector began the French left was resting on the centers of Brabant, Consenvoye, Haumont, and Caures Wood, their first position. The second was marked by a line passing through Samogneux, Hill 344, and Mormont Farm.
The French center included the Bois de la Ville, Herbebois, and Ornes, with the woods of Beaumont, La Wavrille, Les Fosses, Le Chaume, and Les Caurières as the second position.
The Forts At Verdun.
The French right included Maucourt, Mogeville, the Haytes-Charrières Wood, and Fromezey, with a second position covering Bezonvaux, Grand-Chena, and Dieppe. Back of these positions the line of forts was distinguished by the village of Bras, Douaumont, Hardaumont, the fort of Vaux, La Laurée, and Eix. Between this line of forts and the second position an intermediate position on the reverse side of the slope had been begun from Douaumont to Louvemont, on the Poivre and Talou Hills, but at the time of the opening assault the work had not made much progress.
The Germans prepared for the offensive with the most exhaustive labors, and as far as it was humanly possible left nothing to chance. Roads were made through the woods and up the slopes, firm foundations were laid down, and the heavy guns were dragged to elevated positions. As the result of these weeks of herculean toil there were massed against the selected sector over a thousand guns brought from every quarter—Serbia, Russia, and the west front. The proportion of heavy guns was much larger than had ever been employed in preparing attacks of this kind.
Toward the close of December, 1915, the Germans received strong reenforcements, the first to arrive being three divisions which had fought in the campaign against Serbia. From other fronts also they flowed in, and the two corps which had held the Vauquois-Etain sector was increased to seven. Some of the finest German troops were included in these armies, such as the Third Brandenburg Corps and the Fifteenth Corps. It was evident that the Germans counted on the battle of Verdun to decide the fighting in France, for just before the offensive began General Daimling addressed his troops in these words: "In this last offensive against France I hope that the Fifteenth Corps will distinguish itself as it has ever done by its courage and its fortitude."
Starting from the north of Varennes the German order of battle on the day of attack was as follows: On the extreme right were the Seventh Reserve Corps, comprising the Second Landwehr Division, the Eleventh Reserve Division (later relieved by the Twenty-second Reserve Division), and the Twelfth Reserve Division in the order given. Northeast of Verdun, and facing the French lines, were the Fourteenth Division and the Seventh Reserve Corps, with the Eleventh Bavarian Reserve Division in support. To the left of these armies was a central force, comprising the Eighteenth Corps, the Third Corps, the Fifteenth Corps, and the Bavarian Ersatz Division in the order named.
It was estimated by a competent French military authority that the Germans had under arms in this sector up to the 16th of March a grand total of 440,000 men, of which 320,000 were infantry. When the battle opened, the Germans were at least three times as strong in numbers as their opponent.
Before the date fixed for the great offensive the Germans undertook many local attacks on the French front with a view to deceiving their antagonists as to their real objective. In Artois, Champagne, and the Argonne Forest there was some strenuous mine fighting, and at Frise in Santerre the Germans gained some ground only to lose it a little later.
A bombarding squadron of Zeppelins which the Germans sent out along the Verdun front to cut railway communications fared badly. The French antiaircraft guns brought down a number of Fokkers and a Zeppelin in flames at Revigny, but the raiders succeeded in cutting the Ste. Ménéhould line, leaving only a narrow-gauge road to supply Verdun.
At 4.15 in the morning of February 21, 1916, the great battle began, the German guns deluging the sector with shells of every caliber that smashed and tore the French positions and surroundings until the very face of nature was distorted. French trench shelters vanished and in Caures Wood and La Ville Wood men were buried in the dugouts or blown to fragments. Telephone lines having been cut, communication could only be maintained by runners. News of the great destruction wrought by the German guns, far from depressing the French fighting units, had a stimulating effect. The French front lines crumbled away under the deluge of fire, but their occupants still clung tenaciously to the débris that remained. The German guns were everywhere, and it was useless for French aerial observers to indicate any special batteries for bombardment. The Germans had the greater number of guns and the heavier, but the French artillery was better served on the whole, and there was less reckless expenditure of ammunition. As an illustration of the brilliant work of the French artillery, an eyewitness has described the defense of a position southeast of Haumont Wood. Here one battery was divided into flanking guns in three positions—one to the southeast of Haumont Wood, a second to the south, and a third to the north of Samogneux. The two other batteries were to the south of Hill 312; there was also a supporting battery of six 90-mm. guns. In response to the German attack the French replied with a curtain of fire, but, unchecked by the fearful loss of life, they began to swarm in from all sides.
"They reached Caures Wood by the crests between Haumont Wood and Caures Wood itself, and advanced like a flood on our positions. The section which attempted to hold them back adjusted its range to their rate of progress and mowed them down wave after wave. Swept by the storm of shells, the Germans continued to advance and some succeeded in making their way around to the rear of the guns. The French by this time had come to the end of their ammunition, but they did not lose their head, and, destroying their pieces, retreated, bringing a wounded sergeant major along with them."
A battery of 90's on the Haumont knoll was forced to stop firing. Pierrard, an adjutant whose battery had ceased to exist, was dispatched by the commander to help.
"Pierrard collected his companions and attached himself to the battery, which opened fire again with tremendous effect. Those guns were in action under him for forty-eight hours, during which he kept up constant communication with the group commander, the burden of his song being an incessant demand for ammunition for this truly epic duel with the Germans.
"Unfortunately it was impossible to get supplies up. The Germans were so near that Pierrard and his men used their rifles against them; then, finding the position untenable, they blew up their guns and retired." It was during this retreat that the gallant Pierrard was killed.
The indomitable courage of the French gunners in this great battle is described in another instance by a French officer who was present:
"A certain battery was being terribly shelled. A 305-mm. shell burst and killed the captain, the adjutant, a sergeant major and five gunners. Do you think that the others stopped? Not at all; they took off their coats and, working in their shirt sleeves, increased their efforts to intensify the curtain of fire and to avenge their leaders and comrades."
The defense of Caures Wood by Lieutenant Colonel Driant's chasseurs was one of the most brilliant and dramatic incidents in the battle of Verdun. The deluge of German shells had destroyed the deepest French dugouts, and before noon their stronghold had been smashed in, burying an officer and fourteen men beneath the débris. The bombardment continued until the French defenders were left without a single shelter worthy of the name. When the Germans began to attack Haumont, their front-line skirmishers, to create confusion, wore caps that imitated the French, and were also provided with Red Cross brassards. The attempted deception was soon discovered, and the Germans were forced to pay heavily for the trick. In spite of great losses the Germans continued to advance, succeeded in gaining a foothold in the French first-line trenches, and held on. Throughout the night there were many counterattacks and constant grenade fighting, but the French maintained their positions.
On the second day of the assault the Germans resumed their terrific bombardment. Trenches were obliterated, and portions of the forest were swept away. About noon a large body of German troops attacked French positions in Caures Wood, trying to turn their flanks from two sides, Haumont and La Ville Wood. The French fought with desperate energy, but the Germans had one gun that raked their chief position, and the iron ring of the enemy gradually contracted. To attempt to defend the position longer in the face of such conditions would mean death or captivity and reluctantly the French commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Driant, gave the order to retire. Driant waited to see the last of his men through the wood. He was never heard of again.
The retiring column, leaving the shelter of the wood, encountered heavy machine-gun fire, and, greatly depleted in numbers, finally gained the first line of the second position at Beaumont.
No attempt was made by the Germans to advance on the Woevre front. In the territory of Soumazannes, La Ville Wood, and Herbebois the French firmly maintained the supporting line.
The tactics pursued by the Germans during the first days of the battle of Verdun were ably considered and not lacking in thoroughness. Their favorite method was to break into defensive sectors with heavy artillery, and then completely surround them by barrage fire. After the destructive work of the guns they sent forward a scouting party of a dozen or fifteen men to report on the extent of the damage. Following them came bombers and pioneers, and then a strong body of infantry. Theoretically, this system had merit, but it did not always work out as perfectly as the German strategists had planned. Their artillery fire often failed to win the ground and make it safe for their infantry to advance and occupy it. The French artillery endeavored to isolate the attacks, should they succeed in reaching the French lines, and their fearless infantry by vigorous counterattacks prevented the Germans from making any important advance.
The fighting for Haumont was continued on February 22, 1916. The strong resistance the French had offered to the furious attacks of the German infantry may be called a failure. But they succeeded in holding back the Germans until their reserves had time to reach the scene and prepare a new defensive line.
Early in the morning of the 22d the Germans had increased their bombardment. Shells of the largest caliber fell, uprooting trees and demolishing houses.
When the Germans attacked Consenvoye Wood with flame projectors and advanced toward the western edge of Haumont Wood, the French could not move out of the village, so dense was the curtain of fire around them.
Braving this blasting storm, troops of the Haumont garrison occupied the half-ruined works on both sides and in front of the place, while the southern exit was held by some reserves that had reached the scene.
Haumont and the ravine to the south were flooded with German shells of the largest caliber. Early in the afternoon they were falling at the rate of twenty a minute. The French held on undismayed. The village crumbled into a mass of débris. The principal French defense, a redoubt of concrete, was smashed, and some eighty men were buried in the ruins. A number of machine guns were also lost, and the ammunition dump was destroyed.
About 5 o'clock in the evening a German battalion attacked Haumont, advancing in three columns. The remnant of French troops manned the trenches. The few remaining machine guns were brought into action and, being well served, wrought havoc in the enemy's ranks, but the deadly advance continued, regardless of the heavy losses incurred.
The French then assembled every survivor in some trenches southeast of Haumont, and with three machine guns continued the fight. But the Germans had the advantage of numbers. They penetrated to the center of the village, and finally surrounded the French battalion headquarters.
After premises were fired by means of flame projectors, the French colonel and his staff, facing capture or death, were fortunate in escaping through the German machine-gun barrage without a single casualty. They had been forced to evacuate Haumont, but their sustained and splendid defense of the place was one of the bravest deeds that marked the Homeric struggle at Verdun.
At the close of the day the French still held the greater part of Herbebois and Wavrille, but La Ville Wood was in the hands of the enemy. The French line now ran by Hill 240, the Mormont Farm, and the intermediate position of Samogneux-Brabant. Their defensive works and trenches having been destroyed or made useless, the French had no cover. Fighting must now be carried on in the open. Often the French artillery fired at point-blank range regardless of their own sacrifices so long as they could mow down the enemy.
Fighting at Verdun up to March 1, 1916.
Brabant was evacuated by the French during the night of February 22, 1916. At Samogneux, owing to the intensity of the German fire, they remained on the defensive. Several counterattacks to the east were carried out which greatly improved the French positions.
In the Wavrille sector the French had succeeded during the night in connecting their new line with the Herbebois sector, though incessantly bombarded. Wavrille Wood and Hill 351 must be protected, for their capture would enable the Germans to sweep the Beaumont-Hill 344 line.
After repeated attacks the Germans captured Wavrille Wood, where they were kept hemmed in by the French barrage and unable to proceed. Fighting in the Herbebois sector had raged throughout the day, and during the night the French were forced to withdraw.
When February 24, 1916, dawned the French line ran by Beaumont, the northern edge of the Bois des Fosses, and covered La Chaume Wood. The Germans continued to bombard the Woevre front, but did not attempt to attack as the French artillery held them to their trenches.
During the day the Germans, who had been hemmed in at Samogneux, after repeated struggles to debouch from that place, succeeded when night came in capturing Hill 304.
From the southern edge of Caures Wood the Germans slowly advanced through the heavily timbered ravines up the slopes of Anglemont Hill. On the side of Fosses Wood they bombarded French positions all the morning of February 24, 1916. East of Rappe Wood and to the north of Wavrille Wood they assembled strong forces. Two French battalions succeeded in carrying part of the wood, and were then held up by machine-gun fire. Fosses Wood and Beaumont were deluged by German shells of every caliber. An infantry attack gave the Germans the southern edge of Wavrille Wood, where the French clung tenaciously. Fosses Wood, then Beaumont, were captured, then La Chaume Wood. The French situation had become serious. At 2.20 in the afternoon a large force of Germans advanced between Louvemont and Hill 347, and though the French made desperate efforts to stay the advancing waves, Les Chambrettes, Beaumont, and Fosses and Caures Woods were occupied by the enemy.[Back to Contents]
General Joffre conferring with General Pétain near Verdun, where General Pétain's forces meet the assaults of the armies of the Crown Prince in the battle for the fortress.
VERDUN
No one German success can affect France as would the taking of Verdun. It is the last of the great fortresses between the frontier and Paris, and Paris is distant in a direct line only 135 miles. Verdun is one of the most historic of French cities and in a manner is the cradle of France, for here in 843 Charles the Bold, Louis the German, and Lothaire, the sons of Louis I the "Debonair" or Pious, took over and divided the heritage of the Empire of the great Charlemagne, their grandfather. Verdun at that date passed into the hands of Louis the German and remained German territory until 1552 when it was taken by France; and later by the Treaty of Peace of Westphalia in 1648 was formally annexed to France.
Verdun's original fortresses were constructed by France's greatest military engineer, Vauban, in 1700. France has added to it chains of encircling forts and defenses.
THE BATTLES OF VERDUN
The German forces began the attack on February 21, 1916. At the moment of first contact the French forces were distributed as follows: The left wing's first position rested on the centers of Brabant, Consenvoye, Haumont, the Caures Wood, the second position being Samogneux, Cote 344 and the Mormont farm. The center held the line through Ornes, with a second position of Beaumont, Worville, the Fasses, Chaume, and teh Caurières Woods. The right wing helf Bezonvaux, Grand Chena and Dieppe. Behind these sections the line of forts was worked out by the villages of Bras and Douaumont, and the Vaux Fort.
- February 25—Continued German assaults resulted in an advance of from two to four miles over a front of twenty miles and in the capture of Fort Douaumont.
- March 7—The Germans occupied the village of Fresnes.
- March 10—From this date German attacks east of the Meuse center around the fort and town of Vaux. West of the Meuse key positions are Le Mort Homme and Hill 304.
- March 16—Violent but fruitless German assaults on the French positions on Le Mort Homme.
- April 12—Heavy German attack on a line between Le Mort Homme and Cumieres. Artillery bombardment between Douaumont and Vaux.
- May 8—The Germans reached the top of Hill 304.
- May 22—The French recaptured a part of Fort Douaumont.
- May 24—The Germans occupied Cumieres and recaptured Fort Douaumont.
- June 6—The Germans occupied Fort Vaux.
- June 23—The Germans took the Thiaumont Field Works. These fortifications were taken and retaken several times during the summer of 1916.
- October 24—The French, in a great offensive, recaptured Fort Douaumont and the Haudromont Quarries.
- October 28—Fort Vaux was taken by the French.
- December 15—North of Douaumont the French captured Vacherauville, Louvemont, Hardaumont, and Bezonvaux.
- December 28—The Germans advanced on Hill 304 and Le Mort Homme, west of the Meuse.
- During the spring of 1917 the Germans made some gains in this region. In August, 1917, the French opened a brilliant offensive west of the Meuse, driving the Germans back at Hill 304 and Le Mort Homme.
| Abaucourt, Upper Right | Forest Le Tremblais, Lower Right | Lempire, Lower Center |
| Amel, Upper Right | (Forest) Sartelles, Lower Left | Lissey, Upper Left |
| Ancemont, Lower Center | Forest of Souilly, Lower Center | Longwy, Upper Center |
| Beaumont, Upper Center | Forest of Tilly, Upper Right | Louvemont, Upper Center |
| Belleray, Lower Center | Forges, Upper Left | Marre, Upper Left |
| Belrupt, Lower Right | Ft. Belleville, Center | Mesnil, Lower Right |
| Bethelainville, Lower Left | Ft. Belrupt, Center | Meuse Canal, Lower Right, Center, Upper Left |
| Bethincourt, Upper Left | Ft. Bois Bourrus, Upper Left | Meuse River, Upper Left, Center, Lower Right |
| Bezonvaux, Upper Center | Ft. Chaume, Lower Left | Moirey, Upper Center |
| Blercourt, Lower Left | Ft. Choisel, Upper Left | Montgrignon, Center |
| Bourrus Forest, Upper Left | Ft. Douaumont, Upper Center | Montmedy, Upper Left |
| Brabant, Upper Left | Ft. Dugny, Lower Center | Montzeville, Upper Left |
| Bras, Upper Center | Ft. Genicourt, Lower Right | Moranville, Upper Right |
| Champneuville, Upper Left | Ft. Haudainville, Lower Right | Moulainville, Lower Right |
| Chatillon, Lower Right | Ft. Landrecourt, Lower Center | Nixeville, Lower Left |
| Consenvoye, Upper Left | Ft. Marre, Upper Left | Ornes, Upper Center |
| Côte du Poivre, Upper Center | Ft. Moulainville, Upper Right | Ornes River, Upper Right |
| Côte Talou, Upper Left | Ft. Regret, Center | Rau de la Diene, Lower Right |
| Cumieres, Upper Left | Ft. Rozellier, Lower Right | Regneville, Upper Left |
| Damloup, Upper Right | Ft. St. Michel, Center | Samogneux, Upper Left |
| Damvillers, Upper Left | Ft. Sartelles, Lower Left | Sartelles, Lower Left |
| Dieppe, Upper Right | Ft. Souville, Center | Senon, Upper Right |
| Dugny, Lower Center | Ft. Tavannes, Center | Senoncourt, Lower Center |
| Ecurey, Upper Left | Ft. Vaux, Upper Right | Sivry, Upper Left |
| Eix, Upper Right | Froid Terre, Upper Center | Souhesmes, Lower Left |
| Esnes, Upper Left | Gercourt, Upper Left | Spincourt, Upper Right |
| Etain, Upper Right | Germonville Battery, Lower Left | Thiaumont Field Work, Upper Center |
| Fleury, Upper Center | Gincrey, Upper Right | Thierville, Center |
| Forest of Amblonville, Lower Right | Gremilly, Upper Center | Vacherauville, Upper Left |
| Forest of Caures, Upper Left | Haudiomont, Lower Right | Vadelaincourt, Lower Left |
| Forest of Fresnes and Hermeville, Upper Right | Haumont, Upper Left | Vaux, Upper Center |
| Forest of Gremilly, Upper Center | Hermeville, Upper Right | Verdun, Center |
| Forest of Haumont, Upper Left | Hill 304, Upper Left | Warcq, Upper Right |
| (Forest) Jouy, Lower Left | Hill 320, Upper Center | Watronville, Lower Right |
| (Forest) La Vauche, Upper Center | Jouy, Lower Left | |
| (Forest) Le Mort Homme, Upper Left | La Belle Épine, Upper Left | |
| (Forest) Lempire, Lower Left | Lemmes, Lower Left |
PART IV—THE WAR AT SEA
CHAPTER XV
NAVAL SITUATION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND YEAR—SUBMARINE EXPLOITS
Naval events such as the world had never known were believed to be impending at the beginning of the war's second year. With the land forces of the belligerents in a fierce deadlock, it seemed that a decision must come upon the sea. Assuredly the Allies were willing, and Germany had accomplished things in her shipyards that for sheer determination and efficiency developed to the last degree, were comparable to her finest deeds of arms. None doubted that she longed with a grim hope for such a meeting. Helgoland and the newly enlarged Kiel Canal were hives where an intensive industry kept every man and vessel fit. And the navy grew while it waited.
It was not the work of a day, though, nor of a generation, to match the sea power that Great Britain had spent centuries in building. Try as she would, strain men, ordnance plants, and shipyards to the breaking point, Germany could not catch up with her great rival. The first half of the new year saw no matching of the grand fleets. It did produce a few gallant combats, and was marked by a melancholy succession of German submarine attacks on defenseless craft. The sacrifice of lives among neutrals and the Allies cast a pall upon the world.
Naval losses up to August 1, 1915, had been considerable on both sides without crippling any one of the belligerents. No sooner was a warship sunk than there were two to replace it. Every country engaged took effective steps to preserve such maritime power as it had, and Great Britain worked harder than any of the others, for her existence depended upon it.
The first year of the conflict cost England thirty-two fighting craft, great and small. France lost thirteen, Russia five, Japan three, a total of fifty-three. The combined tonnage was 297,178. To counterbalance this Germany lost sixty-seven war vessels, Turkey five and Austria four, the seventy-six ships having an aggregate tonnage of 206,100. The difference of 91,078 gross tons in favor of Germany and her partners in war was offset by the number of fast German cruisers which fell victims to the Allies, and by the numerical inferiority of the Central Powers' combined fleets.
On August 1, 1915, the naval situation was identical with that of August 1, 1914. Great Britain, aided materially by France, and her other allies, in a lesser degree, stood ready to do battle with the Teuton sea forces whenever opportunity offered. She had won every important engagement with the exception of the clash off the coast of Chile, and could look calmly forward, despite the gnawing of German submarines at her commerce. With every gun and man primed for the fight, with the greatest collection of armed vessels ever known lying at ports, merely awaiting the word, she felt supremely ready.
The lives of 1,550 persons were lost during the first year of the war through the sinking of merchant ships, nearly all of which were torpedoed. This applied to vessels of the Allies alone, twenty-two persons having been lost with neutral ships. The total of tonnage destroyed between February 18, 1915, when the German edict against commercial vessels went into effect, and August 1, 1915, was 450,000 tons, including 152 steamships of more than 500 tons each. This was the heaviest loss ever inflicted on the shipping of the world by any war. But it did not seriously cripple the commerce of either France or England, Germany's two major opponents. Their vessels continued to sail the seven seas, bringing the products of every land to their aid, while Germany and her allies were effectually cut off from practically all resources except their own. Switzerland and Sweden were the main dependence of Germany for contraband, and the activities of the former were considerably restricted when the Entente Allies really settled down to a blockade of Germany. Austria and impoverished Turkey had no friends to draw upon, but must fight their battles alone except for such assistance as Germany could lend, which did not extend beyond the actual material of war—guns, shells and bullets.
The submarine was Germany's best weapon. She outmatched the Allies on land, but in such a small degree that her most brilliant effort could not win a decisive victory. Meanwhile her opponents grew stronger in an economic way, while the situation in Germany became more strained. By issuing a constantly increasing volume of bank notes against an almost stationary gold reserve she depreciated the value of her mark at home and abroad. In the face of this tangled situation her submarines rendered incalculable aid, destroying and menacing allied commerce. Without them Germany would have been helpless upon the sea, would have ceased to exist as a maritime power. Her first-line ships lay securely in their harbors, unable to venture forth and match the longer-ranged, heavier-gunned vessels of the British, ably supplemented by the French fleet.
Just how many submarines Germany possessed at the beginning of the war cannot be stated. The number probably was in the neighborhood of fifty. That she has lost many of these vessels and built even a larger number is certain. As the conflict grew older Great Britain in particular learned a method of combating them. It was estimated that on August 1, 1915, she had 2,300 small craft specially fitted for running down submarines. Private yachts, trawlers, power boats, destroyers, and torpedo boats hunted night and day for the elusive undersea boats of her enemy. The pleasure and fishing craft which had been impressed into service were equipped with all sorts of guns, some of them very old ones, but thoroughly capable of sinking a submarine. These vessels patrolled the British coast with a zeal that cost Germany dear. Some authorities believed that up to August 1, 1915, upward of fifty German submarines had been sunk and more than a dozen captured. The numbers probably are excessive, but if they had disposed of even twenty-five undersea boats the effort was a distinct success.
In addition to this means of defense Great Britain embarked upon another undertaking that truly was gigantic in its extent and the difficulties imposed. She stretched wire nets for many miles under the surface of the waters washing her shores. The regular channel routes were thus guarded. Once within such a net there was no escape for the submarine. The wire meshes fouled their propellers or became entwined around the vessels in a way that rendered them helpless. The commander must either come to the surface and surrender or end the career of himself and crew beneath the waves. A number of submarines were brought to the surface with their crews dead by their own hands. Others were captured, and it is said that about twenty of these vessels have been commissioned in the British navy.
The hazardous character of the work in which the submarine engaged and the success of British defensive measures undoubtedly made it difficult for Germany to man her new undersea craft. Special training is essential for both crew and officers, and men of particularly robust constitution are required. There have been reports that men assigned to the German submarines regarded their selection as a practical death warrant. Despite the fine courage of German sailors as evidenced in this war, word filtered through the censorship that it was becoming difficult for Germany to secure men for her submarines.
But the venturesome spirit of many German submarine commanders knew no bounds. Previous to the period under consideration at least one submarine had made its way from a German base to the Dardanelles, establishing a record for craft of this sort that had seemed impossible up to that time. During August other submarines made the same trip without any untoward event. The Allies knew full well that reenforcements were being sent to the Mediterranean, but seemed unable to prevent the plan's success. This inability was to result in serious losses to both the allied navies and their merchant shipping.
The first event during the month of August, 1915, that bore any naval significance was the sinking of the British destroyer Lynx on August 9, 1915, in the North Sea. She struck a mine and foundered within a few minutes. Four officers and twenty-two men out of a complement in the neighborhood of 100 were saved. The vicinity had been swept only a day or two before for mines and it was believed that a German undersea boat had strewn new mines which caused the loss.
Another British war vessel was sunk the next day. The auxiliary cruiser India fell prey to a submarine while entering the roads at Restfjord, Sweden, on the steamship lane between England and Archangel, Russia's northernmost port. Eighty of the crew, estimated at more than 300 men, were saved by Swedish craft. The attack came without warning and furnished another illustration of the submarine's deadly effectiveness under certain conditions. The India, a Peninsular and Oriental liner before the war, was well known to many travelers. Built in 1896, she had a registry of 7,900 tons, and was in the eastern service for a number of years.
After many months of idleness a clash came in the North Sea on August 12, 1915. The Ramsay, a small patrol vessel, met and engaged the German auxiliary Meteor. Although outmatched, the British ship closed with her foe and kept up the fight for an hour. The cannonade attracted a flotilla of cruisers, which came up too late to save the Ramsay, but which did succeed in cutting off the Meteor.
Four officers and thirty-nine members of the crew were picked up by the Germans when their antagonist went down and these, together with the crew of the Meteor, took to the German's boats when her commander saw that escape was impossible. He blew up his ship and by a combination of pluck, good seamanship, and a favorable fortune managed to elude the cordon of British cruisers, reaching the German shore with his prisoners. The total crew of the Ramsay was slightly more than 100 men.
Two successful attacks in four days on British war vessels, and the loss of a third by a mine, stirred official circles, and demand was made in the papers that redoubled precautions be taken. It was believed that the adventure of the Meteor into hostile waters heralded further activity by the German fleet, but the days passed without incident, and the British naval forces settled down to the old routine of watching and waiting.
While these events were transpiring in the North Sea the British had not been idle elsewhere. From the beginning of operations in the Dardanelles attempts had been made to penetrate the Bosphorus and sink one of the Turk's capital ships. A number of sailing vessels and one or two transports had been sunk by British submarines in that sea, but efforts to locate the larger warships of the enemy failed until August 9, 1915. On that day the Kheyr-ed Din Barbarossa, a battleship of 9,900 tons and a complement of 600 men, was sent to the bottom. The attack took place within the Golden Horn, at Constantinople, and the event spread consternation in the Turkish capital. It was the first time on record that a hostile warship had penetrated the land-locked waters of the Ottoman city, so favored by nature that attack had seemed impossible there.
The Barbarossa, although an ancient ship as war vessels are rated, carried four 12-inch guns and was a formidable fighting craft, having been overhauled by German engineers about a year before the war started. Along with the Goeben and Breslau, which took refuge at Constantinople on the outbreak of hostilities, and were "sold" to Turkey, she constituted the Turk's chief naval arm.
News of the feat was received with enthusiasm in England, coming as the initial achievement of the sort by a British submarine. It helped salve the wounds to British pride, made by repeated disasters through the medium of German undersea boats. The event was one of the few bright episodes from an Ally standpoint in the campaign to capture Constantinople, and was taken to mean that a new tide had set in for the attackers. It did serve to clear the Sea of Marmora of Turkish shipping, and supplies for the beleaguered forces at the tip of Gallipoli Peninsula were henceforth carried by a single track railway or transport. It also inspired a healthy respect among the Turks for enemy submarines.
A few days later, August 16, 1915, another German submarine was to set a new record. Early in the morning of that day the towns of Whitehaven, Parton, and Harrington, on the western coast of England, were aroused in succession by the boom of guns and the falling of shells in their streets. It was believed for a few frenzied moments that the German fleet had come. But merely one lone submarine had made the attack. This was enough to cause considerable alarm, particularly when it was seen that a gas plant at Whitehaven had caught fire. There were other fires in the same town and at Harrington, none of which did much damage.
Once more the undersea boat of the enemy had scored. Not since 1778 had the towns smelled hostile powder. In that year John Paul Jones surprised the guards at Whitehaven during the night, spiked the guns of its defenses, and prepared to burn a number of ships at anchor there. The arrival of reenforcements frustrated this plan and the American seamen were recalled to their vessels. Whitehaven never forgot, and now it has a new chapter in its martial record.
The Turks were soon to have their revenge for the loss of the Barbarossa through the medium of a German submarine which, after more than a year of war, accomplished one of the cherished plans of the Germans—the sinking of a British troop ship. On August 17, 1915, the Royal Edward, registering 11,117 tons, was hit and sunk in the Ægean Sea. There were thirty-two officers and 1,350 troops aboard, in addition to 220 officers and men of the ship's company. One thousand were lost.
The blow was a hard one, coming after the efforts of the British navy to protect the country's fighting men. It emphasized the new activity by German submarines in the Mediterranean. No one believed for a moment that Austria had ventured upon such an extensive campaign as recent events pointed to. In addition to the one German submarine known to have reached the Dardanelles via Gibraltar, it had been reported that others were being brought overland to Pola and the parts assembled there.
A good deal of mystery surrounds an engagement off the west coast of Jutland on this same August 17th. Berlin announced that a fight began at 2 o'clock in the afternoon between five German torpedo boats and a light British cruiser and eight destroyers. It was alleged that the cruiser and one destroyer foundered, without any loss to the German force.
The British Admiralty was vague in its report of the encounter, saying that the British ships were mine-sweepers, of which one failed to return. Like many other incidents of the war at sea, the real facts cannot now be established. But there is no doubt that a clash did take place, and the German report was the more circumstantial.[Back to Contents]