Towards an enduring peace

by Unknown

PART I. PRINCIPLES OF THE SETTLEMENT: ECONOMIC

PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

Most international quarrels have economic origin. The present war produced by economic antagonisms.

The growing dependence of modern civilized and thickly populated countries for the necessaries of life and industry, for commercial profits, and for gainful investments of capital upon free access to other countries, especially to countries differing from themselves in climate, natural resources, and degree of economic development, is of necessity a consideration of increasing weight in the foreign policy of to-day. Every active industrial or commercial nation is therefore fain to watch and guard its existing opportunities for foreign trade and investment, and to plan ahead for enlarged opportunities to meet the anticipated future needs of an expanding trade and a growing population. It views with fear, suspicion, and jealousy every attempt of a foreign country to curtail its liberty of access to other countries and its equal opportunities for advantageous trade or exploitation. The chief substance of the treaties, conventions, and agreements between modern nations in recent times has consisted in arrangements about commercial and financial opportunities, mostly in countries outside the acknowledged control of the negotiating parties. The real origins of most quarrels between such nations have related to tariffs, railway, banking, commercial, and financial operations in lands belonging to one or other of the parties, or in lands where some sphere of special interest was claimed. Egypt, Morocco, Persia, Asia Minor, China, Congo, Mexico, are the most sensitive spots affecting international relations outside of Europe, testifying to the predominance of economic considerations in foreign policy. The stress laid upon such countries hinges in the last resort upon the need of “open doors” or upon the desire to close doors to other countries. These keenly felt desires to safeguard existing foreign markets for goods and capital, to obtain by diplomatic pressure or by force new markets, and in other cases to monopolize markets, have everywhere been the chief directing influences in foreign policy, the chief causes of competing armaments, and the permanent underlying menaces to peace. The present war, when regard is had to the real directing pressure behind all diplomatic acts and superficial political ferments, is in the main a product of these economic antagonisms. This point of view is concisely and effectively expressed in a striking memorandum presented by the Reform Club of New York to President Wilson:—

Consider the situation of the present belligerents.

Serbia wants a window on the sea, and is shut out by Austrian influence.

Austria wants an outlet in the East, Constantinople or Salonica.

Russia wants ice-free ports on the Baltic and Pacific, Constantinople, and a free outlet from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean.

Germany claims to be hemmed in by a ring of steel, and needs the facilities of Antwerp and Rotterdam for her Rhine Valley commerce, security against being shut out from the East by commercial restrictions on the overland route, and freedom of the seas for her foreign commerce.

England must receive uninterrupted supplies of food and raw materials, and her oversea communications must be maintained.

This is true also of France, Germany, Belgium, and other European countries.

Japan, like Germany, must have opportunity for her expanding population, industries, and commerce.

The foreign policies of the nations still at peace are also determined by trade relations. Our own country desires the open door in the East.

South and North American States and Scandinavia are already protesting against the war’s interference with their ocean trade.

All nations that are not in possession of satisfactory harbors on the sea demand outlets, and cannot and ought not to be contented till they get them.

Nations desiring to extend their colonial enterprises entertain those ambitions for commercial reasons, either to possess markets from which they cannot be excluded, or to develop such markets for themselves and be able to exclude others from them when they so determine.

Desire for commercial privilege is the primary cause of war.

The generalization from these statements of fact is expressed in the formula, “The desire for commercial privilege and for freedom from commercial restraint is the primary cause of war.”

Now, that the foreign policies of nations are, in fact, determined mainly by these commercial and financial considerations, and that the desire to secure economic privilege and to escape economic restraints is a chief cause of war, are indisputable propositions. So long as these motives are left free to work in the future as in the past there will be constant friction among the commercially developed nations, giving rise to dangerous quarrels that will strain, perhaps to the breaking-point, any arrangements for arbitration that may be made....

International trade is restricted.

Disputes arising from these economic causes are even deeper seated and more dangerous than those connected with the claims of nationality and autonomy. Indeed, political autonomy is shorn of most of its value unless it is accompanied by a large measure of economic liberty as regards commercial relations with the outside world. The case of Serbia, liable at any moment to be denied access to the sea, or to be cut off by Austria from her chief land markets, is a case in point. Or once again, would the autonomy of such a country as Hungary, Bohemia, or Poland, however valid its political guarantees, satisfy the legitimate aspirations of its population if high tariff-walls encompassed it on every frontier? Such instances make it evident that no settlement of “the map of Europe” on lines of nationality can suffice to establish peace. The effective liberty of every people demands freedom of commercial intercourse with other peoples. A refusal or a hindrance of such intercourse deprives a people of its fair share of the common fruits of the earth, and deprives the other peoples of the world of any special fruits which it is able to contribute to the common stock.

If any international Government existed, representing the commonwealth of nations, it would seek to remove all commercial restrictions which impair the freedom of economic intercourse between nations.

These restrictions are placed by the Reform Club Memorandum under the four following categories:—

First. There is the restriction of tariffs imposed by nations.

Second. There are restrictions upon the best uses of International commerce, of the terminal and land transfer facilities of the great trade routes and seaports of the world. A few such ports command entrance to and exit from vast continental hinterlands. It is vital to these interior regions that their natural communications with the outside world should be kept widely open, and this is equally vital to the rest of the world. Obstructive control of such ports and routes to the detriment of the world’s commerce cannot and should not be tolerated by states whose interests are adversely affected. But routes and ports are needed for use, not government; and port rivalries constantly tend towards offering the best and equal facilities to all. The swelling tides of commerce are clearing their own channels, and mutual interests will more and more prompt the states through which the principal trade routes pass to facilitate the movement of commerce.

Third. There are restrictions upon opportunities to trade with territories ruled as colonies or being exploited within spheres of influence. This is what now remains of the old mercantile system which flourished before our Revolutionary War, and which has been weakening ever since. Great Britain claims no preference for herself in her colonies. Other states have been less liberal. The fear of such restrictions being applied against them is to-day the main motive for a policy of colonial oversea possessions. If industrial states could be assured of the application of the open-door policy, no state would envy another its colonies. Colonies should be the world’s.

Fourth. There are restrictions in the free use of the sea. Unlike land routes, ocean routes are offered practically without cost to all, whithersoever the sea runs. Over these, however, until modern times commerce has been subject to pillage by regular warships as well as by pirates. The claims of commerce have been more slowly recognized on the sea than on the land; and, to an extent now unthinkable on land, warring states still feel free to interfere with neutral traders....

National financial groups control foreign policy. Economic oppositions determine foreign policy.

Another factor of increasing importance in the recent conflict of nations has been the competition between groups of financiers and concessionaires, organized upon a “national” basis, to obtain exclusive or preferential control in the undeveloped countries for the profitable use of exported capital. Closely related to commercial competition, this competition for lucrative investments has played an even greater part in producing dangerous international situations. For these financial and commercial interests have sought to use the political and the forcible resources of their respective Governments to enable them to obtain the concessions and other privileges they require for the security and profitable application of their capital. The control of foreign policy thus wielded has been fraught with two perils to world-peace. It has brought the Governments of the competing financial groups into constant friction, and it has been the most fruitful direct source of expeditionary forces and territorial aggressions in the coveted areas. As the struggle for lucrative overseas investments has come to occupy a more important part than the struggle for ordinary markets, the economic oppositions between European Governments have become more and more the determinant factors in foreign policy, and in the competition of armaments, upon which Governments rely to support and to achieve the aims their economic masters impose upon them.

John A. Hobson, “Towards International Government,” pp. 128-139.

TRADE AS A CAUSE OF WAR

Idealism hides real causes of war.

Decent men in the belligerent countries feel a natural repugnance in time of war to any discussion of the economic bearings of the struggle. If nations are to fight with clear consciences and single hearts, they must fight on in the belief that any objects which concern their statesmen beyond the objects of defense and national security are purely idealistic. We are all pragmatists in wartime; we believe what will conduce to victory. Cool observers see clearly the widening out of an immense range of colonial, imperial, and economic issues which will confront us at the settlement and after it. But these things are not debated as we debate the issues of nationality in this war. One might suppose from a study of our press that we are much more vitally interested in the fate of the Slovenes than we are in the trade of China.

This idealism is absolutely sincere, and a natural consequence of the exaltation of emotion which belongs to any war of nations. We can endure the thought that our young men are falling in many thousands for the liberties of little peoples. That brief statement of our aims would end in bathos if we were to add to it the subjection of China to Japanese suzerainty, the partition of Turkey into spheres of influence, the acquisition by the Allies of the German colonies, and the setting up of a Russian customs house at Constantinople. The mischief of this obsession is that the very field which stands most in need of illumination from critical yet idealistic thinking is left in a half light of semi-secrecy, and the will of democracies hardly dreams of intervening in the clash of the interests which divide it. Public opinion and the fortunes of war will govern the settlement of Belgium and Alsace, but in our present temper it is only too probable that all the colonial and economic issues involved in it will be left to the diplomatists with only the interests behind them.

Our need is organization to make international change without war.

The penetrating memorandum addressed by the New York Reform Club to President Wilson has sketched broadly but with sure insight the commercial and colonial questions which helped to lead up to this war. None of these issues appeared in the negotiations which preceded the war, but most of them were latent in the consciousness of the statesmen and even of the peoples. The curse of our unorganized Europe has been that fundamental change has rarely been possible save as a sequel of war. Diplomacy was always busied with a pathetic conservatism in bolstering up the status quo, or in arranging those little readjustments which might just avail to stave off war. We shall not banish war from Europe until we are civilized enough to create an organization that can make and impose fundamental changes without war. The best we can do in the meantime is to prepare to avail ourselves of the brief moment of settlement during which the structure of Europe will still be fluid under the shock of war, to bring our idealistic and democratic forces to bear upon these larger issues.

Free trade would remove incentive for colonies—and for concessions and monopolies.

The Reform Club’s memorandum deals with three of these questions: the abolition of capture at sea in wartime, the freedom of the world’s straits and highways in time of war, and the exploitation of colonies under a system of protection. The system of legalized piracy which permits navies to prey on commerce in wartime is undoubtedly the most potent incentive to swollen armaments at sea. So long as it survives, the opinion of the mercantile classes will never effectively back the demand for economy in armaments, for it is bound to regard navies as an insurance. The question of the ownership of straits stands high among the many competing causes of bloodshed. It explains the German struggle for Calais no less than the Allied expedition to the Dardanelles. One may doubt, however, whether a proposal to neutralize any of the more vital of these straits—the Straits of Dover or Gibraltar, for example—would stand a chance of calm consideration on the morrow of such a war as this. It will be feasible when war is no longer an ever-present terror; and when that day comes it will have lost its importance. Far more central in our problem is the general question of colonialism. It is a commonplace to say that modern industrial peoples desire colonies almost solely for economic reasons, and that one of the chief motives for this expansion would disappear with any approach to free trade. If the British colonies had not granted a preference to the mother country, and if French colonies were not hedged about with an impenetrable tariff wall, the feeling among German industrialists that their expansion was “hemmed in” would have been less acute, and the pressure for “places in the sun” would have been less powerful.

But it is doubtful whether the question of markets is as potent a cause of armaments and war as the competition to secure concessions, monopolies, and spheres of influence. The export of capital means much more for the modern politics of imperialism than the export of manufactured goods. The conquistador of to-day is the financier who acquires mining rights in Morocco, loan privileges in Turkey, or railway concessions in China. The foreign policy of Great Britain and our place in the European system has been governed for a generation by the occupation of Egypt, whither we went in the wake of the bond-holders. It explains our long bickerings with France; it helped to fling an isolated France into the arms of Russia; it brought us finally into the disastrous bargain over Morocco which underlay our feud with Germany. The competition of national financial groups for concessions in Turkey or China is not the competition of the market-place at home. Behind the financier stands the diplomatist, and behind the diplomatist is his navy. There is a clash of armor-plates when these competitors jostle. The struggle for a Balance of Power in Europe has often seemed little more than a race for the force and prestige which would enable the dominant Power or group of Powers to secure the concessions of the monopoly spheres which it coveted in the half-developed regions of the earth. No modern nation would openly make war to secure such ends as these, for no democracy would support it. Even the half-evolved democracy of Russia recoiled from the Manchurian War. But every nation, by pursuing these ends, makes the armed peace and the unstable equilibrium which prepares our wars.

Colonial free trade must be declared by international agreement, and the export of capital internationalized.

The remedy is so simple that only a very clever man could sophisticate himself into missing it, and it is as old as Cobden. It is not necessary to establish universal free trade to stop the rivalry to monopolize colonial markets; it would suffice to declare free trade in the colonies, or even in those which are not self-governing. To deal with the evil of “concessions” all that is required is a general understanding that financiers must win their own way, by merit or push or bribes, and that the doors of the embassies will be banged in their faces when they seek support. These sentences are easily written, but they would involve the democratization of diplomacy everywhere, the overthrow of the colonial group in France, and the confounding of the national economists in Germany. The force which might work such miracles is nowhere mobilized, for, with all their will to peace, the democracies nowhere understand the bearings of these colonial and commercial issues on war and armaments. It requires some imagination to understand that when two embassies compete in Peking for a railway concession, the issue may be determined by the balance of naval power in the North Sea. It requires some habit of observation to realize that because this may happen in Peking, the investing and governing classes are bound to keep up the balance in the North Sea. The nexus is none the less simple and clear, and it will hold as long as diplomacy continues to engage in this disguised imperial trading, so long as capital possesses nationality and regards the flag as an asset.

There are none the less ways of escape which are neither Utopian nor heroic. It ought not to be utterly beyond the statesmanship of Europe to decree some limited form of colonial free trade by general agreement—to apply it, for example, to Africa. France would oppose it, but what if Alsace were to be restored on this condition? To open a great colonial market to Hamburg, while ending the dream of revanche, would be to remove the two chief causes of war in western Europe. American statesmanship may ere long have the power to propose such a bargain as this. For the plague of concession-hunting the best expedient would probably be to impose on all the competing national groups in each area the duty of amalgamating in a permanently international syndicate. If one such syndicate controlled all the railways and another all the mines of China and Turkey, a vast cause of national rivalry would be removed. The interests of China and Turkey might be secured by interposing a disinterested council or arbitrator between them and the syndicate to adjust their respective interests. Short of creating a world state or a European federation, the chief constructive work for peace is to establish colonial free trade and internationalize the export of capital.

H. N. Brailsford, “Trade as a Cause of War,” The New Republic, May 8, 1915.

ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

Evil of “spheres of influence.” “Spheres” become “dependencies.”

The evils of an unrestricted competition for concessions and monopolies between rival financial groups backed by their Governments, are so notorious that diplomacy has found several typical formulæ for bringing them to an end. The obvious method of resolving such conflicts is the demarcation of spheres of “influences,” “interest” or “penetration” within which each of the competing Powers enjoys a monopoly respected by the others. This method is open to two grave objections. In the first place, it is rarely adopted before a ruinous conflict has exhausted the competitors. For years or decades they carry on a trial of strength which affects not merely their local relationship, but their attitude to one another in Europe, and is measured year by year in their military and naval estimates. If we were to take the sum by which British and German armaments have increased in the present century, it would be possible to allocate the increase, roughly, somewhat as follows: 50 per cent. or less for the settlement of the question, Who shall exploit Morocco?; 25 per cent. or more for the privilege of building a railway to Bagdad and beyond it; 25 per cent. or more for the future eventualities which remain unsettled—the fate of the Portuguese colonies in Africa, and the destinies of China. In the second place, the delimitation of spheres of interest is almost inevitably fatal to the national existence of the country partitioned, and as inevitably adds a vast burden to the commitments of the Imperial Power. Persia furnishes the obvious illustration. Sir Edward Grey is clearly resolved that he will not allow himself by the march of events to be drawn into the assumption of any direct responsibility for the administration of the British sphere. It is a laudable resolve, but Russia may at any moment frustrate it. She deals with her own sphere on the opposite principle, and her sphere happens to include the seat of the central government. That government is already a puppet of Russian policy, enjoying only a simulacrum of independence. How much longer can a government which is not a government continue to rule the southern sphere? Sooner or later a choice must be made. Either Russia must withdraw, or some separate government under British protection must be created for the south. Turkey is drifting rapidly towards a dissolution in which the spheres which the Great Powers already claim will be formally delimited. It is easy to predict what that will mean. There will be first provincial loans, then provincial advisers, and finally a military control, under which each of these “spheres” will become what Egypt already is, a dependency of a European Power.

How to avoid the evil. Must preserve peace without destroying victim nationality.

The method of avoiding financial competition by marking off zones of monopoly, is clearly the worst which can be pursued. There are alternatives. Let us consider what methods might be followed if the Powers were sage enough to shrink from the terrific conflict which may one day overtake them for the partition of China. China is so thickly peopled that crude conquest presents few attractions. Even Japan could not settle her surplus population in a country where every hill is terraced and every field subjected to intensive cultivation. But there is here a field which capital is already eager to exploit, and every year diminishes the resistance of prejudice and inertia to its ambitions. The attempts to mark out spheres of influence have so far been tentative and unsuccessful. Our own claim to the lion’s share, the Yangtse Valley, is admitted by no other Power, and it is doubtful whether the Foreign Office still maintains it. There are several principles which might be adopted if the Powers desired to avoid the jealous and dangerous struggle for concessions. In the first place, the simplest plan and the best would be the adoption of a self-denying ordinance by all the chief competitors. Let it be understood that British, French, and German banks may compete among themselves for railways and loans, but that none of them shall receive any aid or countenance whatever from the embassies or consulates of their respective countries. If that could be decided, the allotment of concessions would be settled either by the merits of the competitors or more probably by their skill and audacity in bribing Chinese officials. One may doubt, however, whether any of the Powers has sufficient faith in the honor of its competitors to enter on such an undertaking. A second and more hopeful plan might be borrowed from the undertaking negotiated by France and Germany over Morocco. They agreed to promote cooperation among their subjects, who were to share in agreed percentages in the coveted opportunities for public works. A vast “pool” or syndicate in which all the rival financial groups were represented, might be left to internationalize all the opportunities of monopoly in China on a plan which would give to each its allotted share in the risks and profits. The scheme worked badly in Morocco, and indeed created the friction which led to the Agadir incident. Something of the kind existed in China while the alliance of the banks of the Six Powers subsisted, and it eventually broke down. By this method friction may be avoided among the Great Powers, but China would be subjected to an intolerable financial dictation, which would be none the less oppressive because it was cosmopolitan. There exists, however, in the Ottoman Public Debt, a model which might be followed elsewhere. Its council represents all the bondholders of every nationality, and usually maintains good relations with the Porte. If the railways of Turkey, China, and Persia could be amalgamated, each in a single system under a cosmopolitan administration, the risk of partition and all the danger to peace, which this risk entails, might be removed. The obvious step is to confer on these syndicates of capitalists an international legal personality, which would enable them to sue or be sued before the Hague Tribunal. Some disinterested council nominated by The Hague should be interposed between the syndicate and the State in which it operates, so that the intervention of diplomacy may be as far as possible eliminated.

The Drago Doctrine.

The problems raised by the export of capital have been considered in this chapter mainly from the standpoint of the creditor State, which sees its diplomacy involved in the process. We have found, so far, no solution which is satisfactory from the standpoint of the debtor nation. The inroad of foreign capital always means for it some loss of independence, and it has nothing to gain by agreements among competing Empires. It may, indeed, keep its independence by playing on their rivalries. Its shadowy autonomy vanishes when they come to terms. The pacifist and the nationalist are here divided in their sympathies. The former, thinking only of European peace, rejoices when Russia and Britain end their differences by the partition of Persia. The latter, seeing only that a nation has been destroyed, regards the agreement as a peculiarly evil development of Imperialism. Both are right, and both are wrong. The ideal expedient would preserve European peace without destroying the victim nationality. To propose that expedient requires an excursion into the realms of Utopian construction. We can propose nothing which seems feasible to-day, but a solution is conceivable which requires only an easy step in the organization of the civilized world for peace. The motives for the partition of Persia were rather political than financial. The object-lesson of Egypt, where the occupation had its origin in debt, is a more typical instance of modern processes. It happens that the Hague Conference has laid down a principle which is capable of fruitful extension for dealing with such cases as these. The Drago Doctrine, put forward by Señor Drago, a jurist and statesman of the Argentine Republic, supported by the United States and eventually adopted by all the Powers, provides that no creditor State may use arms to enforce a liability upon a debtor State, unless a decision of the Hague Tribunal has recognized the liability and prescribed the method of payment. This doctrine, even as it stands, is of immense value to minor but civilized States like the South American republics, Portugal and Greece, which may find themselves obliged to defer payment of an external debt. The Hague Tribunal would in such a case, if it realized its opportunities, act as a good County Court Judge would do at home—refuse to admit a merely usurious claim, and lay down terms and dates of payment which would admit of the debtor’s recovery from any temporary difficulty.

Permanent Credit Bureau.

But to defeat the more unscrupulous methods of the international usurer, this idea requires some amplification. It may be necessary for a debtor State, some grades below the level of Portugal and Greece in civilization, to mortgage some part of its revenues, and to accept, at least over part of them, some degree of foreign control. That means, if the creditor country has also political ambitions, the almost certain loss of its independence. There are also States like Turkey which stand in need of expert advice for the reorganization of their finances, but dread the consequences of admitting any foreigner, who may perhaps think more of the interests of European finance and of his own motherland, than of those of the country which employs him. To draw the full advantage from the international machinery at The Hague, there ought to be evolved a permanent Credit Bureau to which weak and timid States might apply. It might conduct enquiries into their solvency, lend them experts to reorganize their finances, help them to negotiate loans in neutral markets on fair terms, and in case of need provide the commissioners who would control their mortgaged revenues. It would act as a trustee or as a Court of Chancery towards its wards. It could have no political ambitions to further, and the country which applied to it need not tremble for its independence. Persia or Egypt, had this Bureau existed, might have turned to The Hague for help. If, in the end, owing to civil war, or the hopeless incapacity of native statesmen, forcible intervention became inevitable, it would lie not with any interested Power, but with The Hague itself, to take the initiative of summoning a European Conference to prescribe the nature and limits of the interference. It is even possible that the Bureau might be used as an arbitrator at the request of a State like China, hard pressed by the rivalry of Empires competing for concessions, to decide between them in its name, and to appoint a neutral adviser or board of advisers, who would stand between it and the greedy Powers in the allotment of its financial patronage.

Export of capital must be made servant of humane diplomacy.

A Europe which has organized itself for peace will be at no loss for expedients wherewith to reconcile the appetites of capital with the rights of nationality. A spectator of the moving cosmopolitan drama which is played, the world over, around this central motive of the export of capital, can readily invent attractive schemes for the regulation of the process. But such exercises tempt one to ignore the dynamics of the problem. The same primitive forces of greed which in earlier centuries inspired conquests and migrations are still strong enough to grip diplomacy and build navies. Our first task is to win at home the power to control this export of capital, to check it where it disregards the current ethical standards, to rebuff it where it would lead us into international rivalry, and at last to use it as the potent servant of a humane diplomacy. It can be forbidden to carry the devastations of slavery into distant continents. It can be checked in its usurer’s practises upon simple States. It can be used, if it be firmly mastered, to starve into submission a semi-civilized Empire which meditates aggressive war, or draws from Western stores the funds to finance its own oppressions.

H. N. Brailsford, “The War of Steel and Gold,” pp. 241-253.

THE PROBLEM OF DIPLOMACY

The chief problem of diplomacy is the weak State.

This whole business of jockeying for position is at first glance so incredibly silly that many liberals regard diplomacy as a cross between sinister conspiracy and a meaningless etiquette. It would be all of that if the stakes of diplomacy were not real. Those stakes have to be understood, for without such an understanding diplomacy is incomprehensible and any scheme of world peace an idle fancy.

The chief, the overwhelming problem of diplomacy seems to be the weak state—the Balkans, the African sultanates, Turkey, China, and Latin America, with the possible exception of the Argentine, Chile, and Brazil. These states are “weak” because they are industrially backward and at present politically incompetent. They are rich in resources and cheap labor, poor in capital, poor in political experience, poor in the power of defense. The government of these states is the supreme problem of diplomacy. Just as the chief task of American politics to the Civil War was the organization of the unexploited West, so the chief task of world diplomacy to-day is the organization of virgin territory and backward peoples. I use backward in the conventional sense to mean a people unaccustomed to modern commerce and modern political administration.

This solicitude about backward peoples seems to many good democrats a combination of superciliousness and greed....

And yet the plain fact is that the interrelation of peoples has gone so far that to advocate international laissez-faire now is to speak a counsel of despair. Commercial cunning, lust of conquest, rum, bibles, rifles, missionaries, traders, concessionaires have brought the two civilizations into contact, and the problem created must be solved, not evaded.

Economic imperialism and the weak State.

The great African empires, for example, were not created deliberately by theoretical imperialists. Explorers, missionaries, and traders penetrated these countries. They found rubber, oil, cocoa, tin; they could sell cotton goods, rifles, liquor. The native rulers bartered away enormous riches at trivial prices. But the trading-posts and the concessions were insecure. There were raids and massacres. No public works existed, no administrative machinery. The Europeans exploited the natives cruelly, and the natives retaliated. Concession hunters and merchants from other nations began to come in. They bribed and bullied the chiefs, and created still greater insecurity. An appeal would be made to the home government for help, which generally meant declaring a protectorate of the country. Armed forces were sent in to pacify, and civil servants to administer the country. These protectorates were generally sanctioned by the other European governments on the proviso that trade should be free to all....

It is essential to remember that what turns a territory into a diplomatic “problem” is the combination of natural resources, cheap labor, markets, defenselessness, corrupt and inefficient government. The desert of Sahara is no “problem,” except where there are oases and trade routes. Switzerland is no “problem,” for Switzerland is a highly organized modern state. But Mexico is a problem, and Haiti, and Turkey, and Persia. They have the pretension of political independence which they do not fulfil. They are seething with corruption, eaten up with “foreign” concessions, and unable to control the adventurers they attract or safeguard the rights which these adventurers claim. More foreign capital is invested in the United States than in Mexico, but the United States is not a “problem” and Mexico is. The difference was hinted at in President Wilson’s speech at Mobile. Foreigners invest in the United States, and they are assured that life will be reasonably safe and that titles to property are secured by orderly legal means. But in Mexico they are given “concessions,” which means that they secure extra privileges and run greater risks, and they count upon the support of European governments or of the United States to protect them and their property.

Economic penetration into weak States is protected only through order and political control.

The weak states, in other words, are those which lack the political development that modern commerce requires. To take an extreme case which brings out the real nature of the “problem,” suppose that the United States was organized politically as England was in the time of William the Conqueror. Would it not be impossible to do business in the United States? There would be an everlasting clash between an impossible legal system and a growing commercial development. And the internal affairs of the United States would constitute a diplomatic “problem.”

This, it seems to me, is the reason behind the outburst of modern imperialism among the Great Powers. It is not enough to say that they are “expanding” or “seeking markets” or “grabbing resources.” They are doing all these things, of course. But if the world into which they are expanding were not politically archaic, the growth of foreign trade would not be accompanied by political imperialism. Germany has “expanded” wonderfully in the British Empire, in Russia, in the United States, but no German is silly enough to insist on planting his flag wherever he sells his dyestuffs or stoves. It is only when his expansion is into weak states—into China, Morocco, Turkey, or elsewhere that foreign trade is imperialistic. This imperialism is actuated by many motives—by a feeling that political control insures special privileges, by a desire to play a large part in the world, by national vanity, by a passion for “ownership,” but none of these motives would come into play if countries like China or Turkey were not politically backward.

Imperialism in our day begins generally as an attempt to police and pacify. This attempt stimulates national pride, it creates bureaucrats with a vested interest in imperialism, it sucks in and receives added strength from concessionaires and traders who are looking for economic privileges. There is no doubt that certain classes in a nation gain by imperialism, though to the people as a whole the adventure may mean nothing more than an increased burden of taxes.

Some pacifists have attempted to deny that a nation could ever gain anything by political control of weak states. They have not defined the “nation.” What they overlook is that even the most advanced nations are governed, not by the “people,” but by groups with special interests. These groups do gain, just as the railroad men who controlled American legislatures gained. A knot of traders closely in league with the colonial office of a great Power can make a good deal of money out of its friendships. Every government has contracts to be let, franchises to give; it establishes tariffs, fixes railroad rates, apportions taxes, creates public works, builds roads. To be favored by that power is to be favored indeed. The favoritism may cost the motherland and the colony dear, but the colonial merchant is not a philanthropist....

The backward States are the arenas of international friction.

The whole situation might be summed up by saying that the commercial development of the world will not wait until each territory has created for itself a stable and fairly modern political system. By some means or other the weak states have to be brought within the framework of commercial administration. Their independence and integrity, so-called, are dependent upon their creating conditions under which world-wide business can be conducted. The pressure to organize the globe is enormous....

Out of this complexity of motive there is created a union of various groups on the imperial program: the diplomatic group is interested primarily in prestige; the military group in an opportunity to act; the bureaucratic in the creation of new positions; the financial groups in safeguarding investments; traders in securing protection and privileges, religious groups in civilizing the heathen, the “intellectuals,” in realizing theories of expansion and carrying out “manifest destinies,” the people generally in adventure and glory and the sense of being great. These interested groups severally control public opinion, and under modern methods of publicity public opinion is easily “educated.”

Who should intervene in backward states, what the intervention shall mean, how the protectorate shall be conducted—this is the bone and sinew of modern diplomacy. The weak spots of the world are the arenas of friction. This friction is increased and made popular by frontier disputes over Alsace-Lorraine or Italia Irredenta, but in my judgment the boundary lines of Europe are not the grand causes of diplomatic struggle. Signor Ferrero confessed recently that the present generation of Italians had all but forgotten Italia Irredenta, and the Revanche has been a decadent French dream until the Entente and the Dual Alliance began to clash in Morocco, in Turkey, in China. Alsace-Lorraine has no doubt kept alive suspicion of Germany, and predisposed French opinion to inflicting diplomatic defeats in Morocco. But the arena where the European Powers really measure their strength against each other is in the Balkans, in Africa, and in Asia....

War is for sake of prestige in undeveloped countries.

This war is fought not for specific possessions, but for that diplomatic prestige and leadership which are required to solve all the different problems. It is like a great election to decide who shall have the supreme power in the Concert of Europe. Austria began the contest to secure her position as a great Power in the Balkans; Russia entered it to thwart this ambition; France was engaged because German diplomatic supremacy would reduce France to a “second-class power,” which means a power that holds world power on sufferance; England could not afford to see France “crushed” or Belgium annexed because British imperialism cannot alone cope with the vigor of Germany; Germany felt herself “encircled,” which meant that wherever she went—to Morocco, Asia Minor, or China—there a coalition was ready to thwart her. The ultimate question involved was this: whenever in the future diplomats meet to settle a problem in the backward countries, which European nation shall be listened to most earnestly? What shall be the relative prestige of Germans and Englishmen and Frenchmen and Russians; what sense of their power, what historical halo, what threat of force, what stimulus to admiration shall they possess? To lose this war will be like being a Republican politician in the solid South when the Democrats are in power at Washington. It will mean political, social, and economic inferiority.

World problem is due to competition for unorganized territory.

Americans have every reason to understand the dangers of unorganized territory, to realize clearly why it is a “problem.” Our Civil War was preceded by thirty or forty years of diplomatic struggle for a balance of power in the West. Should the West be slave or free, that is, should it be the scene of homesteads and free labor, or of plantations and slaves? Should it be formed into States which sent senators and representatives to support the South or the North? We were virtually two nations, each trying to upset the balance of power in its own favor. And when the South saw that it was beaten, that is to say “encircled,” when its place in the Western sun was denied, the South seceded and fought. Until the problem or organizing the West had been settled, peace and federal union were impossible.

The world’s problem is the same problem tremendously magnified and complicated.

The point I have been making will, I fear, seem a paradox to many readers,—that the anarchy of the world is due to the backwardness of weak states; that the modern nations have lived in an armed peace and collapsed into hideous warfare because in Asia, Africa, the Balkans, Central and South America there are rich territories in which weakness invites exploitation, in which inefficiency and corruption invite imperial expansion, in which the prizes are so great that the competition for them is to the knife.

This is the world problem upon which all schemes for arbitration, leagues of peace, reduction of armaments must prove themselves. The diplomats have in general recognized this. It was commonly said for a generation that Europe would be lucky if it escaped a general war over the breakup of Turkey in Europe. The Sick Man has infected the Continent. Our own “preparedness” campaign is based on the fear that the defenselessness of Latin America will invite European aggression, that the defenselessness of China will bring on a struggle in the Pacific. Few informed people imagine for a moment that any nation of the world contemplates seizing or holding our own territory. That would be an adventure so ridiculous that no statesman would think of it. If we get into trouble it will be over some place like Mexico, or Haiti, or the Philippines, or the Panama Canal, or Manchuria, or Hawaii....

Need of European legislatures to deal with problem.

Europe has also recognized that some kind of world government must be created. The phrase world government, of course, arouses immediate opposition; the idea of a European legislature would be pronounced utopian. Yet there have been a number of European legislatures. The Berlin Conference of 1885 was called to discuss “freedom of commerce in the basin and mouths of the Congo; application to the Congo and Niger of the principles adopted at the Congress of Vienna with a view to preserve freedom of navigation on certain international rivers ... and a definition of formalities to be observed so that new occupations on the African coasts shall be deemed effective.” The Powers represented made all sorts of reservations, but they managed to pass a “General Act of the West African Conference.” The Congo Free State was recognized. As Mr. Harris says: “Bismarck saw in this a means of preventing armed conflict over the Congo Basin, of restricting the Portuguese advance, and of preserving the region to free trade.” What was it that Bismarck saw? He saw that the great wealth of the Congo and its political weakness might make trouble in Europe unless the Congo was organized into the legal structure of the world.

Example of Algeciras.

The Conference at Algeciras was an international legislature in which even the United States was represented; the London Conference after the Balkan wars was a gathering of ambassadors trying to legislate out of existence the sources of European trouble in the Balkans. But all these legislatures have had one great fault. They met, they passed laws, they adjourned, and left the enforcement of their mandate to the conscience of the individual Powers. The legislature was international, but the executive was merely national. The legislature moreover had no way of checking up or controlling the executive. The representatives of all the nations would pass laws for the government of weak territories, but the translation of those laws into practise was left to the colonial bureaucrats of some one nation.

If the law was not carried out, to whom would an appeal be made? Not to the Conference, for it had ceased to exist. There was no way in which a European legislature could recall the officials who did not obey its will. Those officials were responsible to their home government, although they were supposed to be executing a European mandate. Those who were injured had also to appeal to their home government, and the only way to remedy an abuse or even sift out the truth of an allegation was by negotiation between the Powers. This raised the question of their sovereignty, called forth patriotic feeling, revived a thousand memories, and made any satisfactory interpretation of the European Act or any criticism of its administration a highly explosive adventure.

Suppose, for example, that Congress had power to pass laws, but that the execution of them was left to the States. Suppose New York had its own notions of tariff administration. How would the other States compel the New York customs officials to execute the spirit and letter of the Federal law? Suppose every criticism by Pennsylvania of a New York Collector was regarded as an infringement of New York’s sovereignty, as a blow at New York’s pride, what kind of chaos would we suffer from? Yet that is the plight of our world society.

An international Senate for each arena of friction.

The beginnings of a remedy would seem to lie in not disbanding these European conferences when they have passed a law. They ought to continue in existence as a kind of senate, meeting from time to time. They ought to regard themselves as watchers over the legislation which they have passed. To them could be brought grievances, by them amendments could be passed when needed. The colonial officials should at least be made to report to this senate, and all important matters of policy should be laid open to its criticism and suggestion. In this way a problem like that of Morocco, for example, might be kept localized to a permanent European Conference on Morocco. Europe would never lose its grip on the situation, because it would have representatives on the spot watching the details of administration, in a position to learn the facts, and with a real opportunity for stating grievances.

The development of such a senate would probably be towards an increasing control of colonial officials. At first it would have no power of appointment or removal. It would be limited to criticism. But it is surely not fantastic to suppose that the colonial civil service would in time be internationalized; that is to say, opened to men of different nationalities. The senate, if it developed any traditions, would begin to supervise the budget, would fight for control of salaries, and might well take over the appointing power altogether. It would become an upper house for the government of the protected territory, not essentially different perhaps from the American Philippine Commission. The lower house would be native, and there would probably be a minority of natives in the senate....

An organization of this kind would meet all the difficulties that our Continental Congress or that any other primitive legislature has had to deal with. There would be conflicts of jurisdiction, puzzling questions of interpretation, and some place of final appeal would have to be provided. It might be the Senate of European representatives; but if the Senate deadlocked, an appeal might be taken to The Hague. The details of all this are obviously speculative at the moment.

Prevention of war by international commissions for unorganized regions.

The important point is that there should be in existence permanent international commissions to deal with those spots of the earth where world crises originate. How many there should be need not be suggested here. There should have been one for Morocco, for the Congo, for the Balkan Peninsula, perhaps for Manchuria; there may have to be one for Constantinople, for certain countries facing the Caribbean Sea. Such international governing bodies are needed wherever the prizes are great, the territory unorganized, and the competition active.

The idea is not over-ambitious. It seems to me the necessary development of schemes which European diplomacy has been playing with for some time. It represents an advance along the line that governments, driven by necessity, have been taking of their own accord. What makes it especially plausible is that it grasps the real problems of diplomacy, that it provides not a panacea but a method and the beginnings of a technique. It is internationalism, not spread thin as a Parliament of Man, but sharply limited to those areas of friction where internationalism is most obviously needed.

Walter Lippmann, “The Stakes of Diplomacy,” pp. 87-135.

SOCIALISTS AND IMPERIALISM

Peace impossible without solution of economic conflicts.

Possibly we shall learn nothing from the war; at the present moment it looks that way. For all the world, including Socialists, seem to be divided between militarists and pacifists. By pacifism I mean of course the movement Socialists have attacked for fifty years—up to the present war—under the name of “bourgeois pacifism,” the idea that disarmament, the Hague Tribunal, and similar devices could put an end to militarism and war.

In one sense of course every internationalist, whether Socialist or Democrat, is a pacifist. Every internationalist is opposed to war. But from the days of Marx and before, up to the present time, all Socialists have been prepared for certain war-producing contingencies which can be abolished neither by calling them “illusions,” as Norman Angell has done, nor by any other phrases or exorcisms. Nor can the economic causes of national conflict be avoided by disarmament, Hague tribunals, international police, or abolition of secret diplomacy, as proposed by the Women’s Peace Party, the British Union of Democratic Control, the Independent Labor Party, etc. In a word, no measure dealing with military affairs or with mere political forms can in the long run have any effect whatever—as long as the present conflict of economic interests between the nations remains. The whole effort of the bourgeois pacifist from the Socialist standpoint is to attempt—in spite of the horrible and tremendous lessons of the present war—to close our eyes resolutely to the great task that lies before us, namely, to find a way either in the near future or ultimately to bring the conflict of national economic interests to an end.

Interests of nations do conflict.

There are two economic forces in the world which can not be conjured away either by words, by mere political rearrangements, or by any action whatever with regard to arms—whether making for more armament or less armament. There is no power at present which can prevent a great independent nation like Russia or Japan, Germany or Austria, where the political conditions are in whole or in part those of the eighteenth century, from declaring wars of conquest either against helpless, backward or small countries, or against the economically more advanced and more democratic countries like England, France, or the United States. It is true that industrial capitalism now preponderates in Germany, but no German publicist has ever denied the tremendous influence of the landlord nobility, both over the government and over the economic and political structure of German society. It is true also that these great agricultural estates are partially operated under capitalistic conditions, but the position of agricultural labor throughout enormous districts of Prussia is certainly semi-feudal. This is equally true of Austria, and the landlord nobility is perhaps even more predominant in Hungary than in Prussia.

The second fact which can not be conjured away by phrases or mere political rearrangements is that—under the present system of society—there is a direct conflict of interests between all nations, even the most civilized. This is why Norman Angell, in his new book (“Arms and Industry”), is at such great pains to deny that nations are economic units and “competing business firms.” His denial is futile.

Even workers gain from successful imperialism.

Even under individualistic capitalism all elements of the capitalist class have a greater or less interest in the business of the nation to which they belong; under the State Socialist policy, which is spreading everywhere, this community of interests is still closer. Moreover, under State Socialism even the working classes gain a share (of course, a small one) of whatever profits accrue from the successful competition of one’s own nation with other nations, and especially from such competition in its aggressive form, “imperialism.”

Socialists have sometimes denied that the economic interests of the working people of the various nations conflict.

Otto Bauer, of Austria, the world’s leading Socialist authority on Imperialism—who was to report on the subject for the International Socialist Congress to have been held in Vienna last summer—is of the contrary opinion. He believes that one of the worst features of the present system is that, under capitalism, the immediate economic interests of the working people of the various nations do conflict.

Only in so far as the working people attach greater importance to attaining Socialism than to anything they can gain under the present society, are their interests in all nations the same. In so far as the working people aim at an improvement of their condition this side of Socialism their economic interests are often in conflict.

Moreover, State Socialism, political democracy, and social reform, since they tend to give the working people a slightly greater share in the prosperity of each nation, intensify the workers’ nationalism and aggravate the conflict of immediate economic interests. This is why all the labor union parties of the world are tending in the same direction as that in which the German Party has been so clearly headed since the war—a tendency very clearly formulated by Vorwaerts when it recently asked whether the German Party was not becoming a “nationalistic social reform labor party.”

The bourgeois pacifists consider war to be the “great illusion.” In favoring war, under any conditions, they say, the capitalists, the middle classes, and the working classes are all mistaken. The only people that gain are the officers of armies and navies, and armament manufacturers. It is needless for Socialists—believers in the economic interpretation of politics—to point out that such a conclusion can only be reached by an abandonment of the economic point of view.

Only solution is industrial and financial internationalization.

In the opinion of internationalists, war can be abolished neither by armament or disarmament, nor by any measures leading in either direction. War can be abolished only by abolishing the causes of war, which every practical man admits are economic. By strengthening already existing and natural economic tendencies which are slowly bringing the nations together, the causes of war may be gradually done away with.

The outlook therefore is very hopeful—provided the intelligent (if selfish) ruling classes of the great capitalistic nations (England, France, America) decide once and for all to place no hopes either on militarism or pacifism. These natural economic tendencies indeed would already have made war impossible if they had not been impeded by artificial obstacles, such as tariff walls, immigration restriction, financial concessions to favored nations, etc.

And the modernization of undemocratic countries.

Socialists relied upon natural economic forces to abolish competition, establish the trusts, bring about government ownership, and prepare the way for democratic ownership. They rely upon similar economic forces to bring the nations together; reciprocal lowering of tariffs, the common development of the backward countries by the leading nations, the neutralization of canals—and last but not least, the modernization of Russia, Japan, Prussia, and Austria, that is, the full establishment in these countries of industrial capitalism and the semi-democratic political institutions that accompany it—as we see them in Great Britain, France, and America.

William English Walling, “The Great Illusions,” The New Review, June 1, 1915.

THE HIGHER IMPERIALISM

Cause of all wars found in economic motives:—that is, in competition of nationalist capitalistic groups.

When the Socialists in the belligerent countries voted for the war budgets and took their seats in the war cabinets, their whole attitude towards war underwent a fundamental change. It is true that in Germany and elsewhere the Socialists berated the capitalists and militarists for bringing on the conflict, but having made this protest, they acted exactly as did every one else. They excused themselves on the ground that the war was defensive. But the Kaiser and the Czar and the President of the French Republic all made the same excuse. It was not that the Socialists did not have power to put obstacles in the way of their governments. They did not have the will. They were forced into a painful position, where their love of country struggled against their adherence to the proletariat of the world. Despite themselves they were moved by idealistic considerations, which according to their theory should have had no weight.

For according to socialist doctrine the great events of the world are determined by economic factors. The idealists may speak of national honor and national duty, of the inviolability of treaties and the sacred rights of small nations, but the cause of all wars is really to be traced to the clash of economic motives. If we are to establish peace, we must found it on the customary reactions of selfish men, who want things and are willing to fight for them. Peace must be a peace between men as they are. It will not come by preaching, nor by nations surrendering their ambitions. It will not come through non-resistance, through the submission of the meek to the overbearing. It will not come through the nations joyously disarming as the light of reason breaks through the clouds. Reason is not so simple nor so unrelated a thing, for the material things that each nation wants, and the means by which the nation gets them, seem to the nation preeminently just and reasonable. However pompous the superstructure of ethics and ideals, the solid foundation of war, as of other social developments, is economic. So long as nations, or at all events their ruling groups, have conflicting economic interests, war is inevitable.

According to the Socialist, therefore, war and capitalism were inseparable. War must continue so long as the wage-system continued. The argument was simple. The great owners of capital, earning more than they could consume or profitably invest in home industries, were compelled to send their surplus to colonies and dependencies, where a new profit could be made. With the rapid increase of capital, however, the competition between the industrial nations for the possession of these agricultural dependencies became keener. Such competition meant war. As capitalism approached its climax wars were bound to become more frequent, destructive, and violent.

But now competitive imperialism makes way for imperialism by combination.

If this theory had been true it would have followed that the interests of capital would make for war and the interests of labor would make for peace. The day laborer, with no money in the bank, would not be interested in capital investments in Morocco, Manchuria, or Asia Minor. He would have no national interests whatever. But, as we may read in the admirable book on “Socialists and the War,” by William English Walling, a few Socialists have for some time begun to recognize that wage-earners do have special national interests and that these interests may be directly opposed to the interests of wage-earners in an adjoining country. If Serbia is completely shut off from the sea, her wage-earners suffer as acutely as do her peasants. If Switzerland is surrounded by a wall of hostile tariffs, if Holland and England are deprived of their colonies, the loss is felt not only by great capitalists but by the man who works with a trowel or a lathe. The ultimate interests of German and British wage-earners are identical, but if their immediate interests conflict, there will grow up a spirit of nationalism in both countries, and wage-earners will clamor for a national policy which may lead to war.

This seems to shut a door that leads to peace. But in shutting this door the newer Socialist thought has opened another. It assumes that the capitalists themselves are increasingly likely to profit by peace, to desire peace, and to achieve peace. According to the German Socialist, Karl Kautsky, we are approaching a new stage in the industrial development of the world. At first capitalists exploited the resources of their own country. Then they competed nationally for the exploitation of colonies and dependencies, and this policy led to imperialism and war. Now they are beginning to unite for the joint exploitation of all backward lands. Competitive imperialism is making way for imperialism by combination, just as competitive industry gave way to the trust. English, French, German, and Belgian capitalists will unite to exploit dependencies, will have joint spheres of influence, and the result will be peace with profits. Imperialism in the old sense will die out, and its place will be taken by a pacific super-imperialism, a higher imperialism.

This higher imperialism fraught with dangers.

What this theory actually means is that the normal development of industry and finance will automatically bring about international peace, and that socialism and even democracy are quite unessential to that end. Socialists may cry for peace, but they might as well cry for free air. But the theory concedes too much and goes too far. It is tainted with the same ultra-rationalistic spirit as is the earlier socialist theory, from which it is a reaction. War is not fought for economic motives alone, although these are important. Serbia would have been less vindictive had Austria conceded her an outlet for her trade, but in any case Serbia would not willingly be ruled by Austria, nor Bulgaria by Greece. Racial pride, religious prejudice, ancient traditions of all sorts still divide nations irrespective of economic interest. You cannot reduce a nation to a single unit thinking only in economic terms.

Moreover, even on the purely economic side there are infinite chances for war in the distribution of the profits of joint enterprises among the capitalists of the various nations. We all know how “gentlemen’s agreements” are broken as soon as it is profitable for the gentlemen to break them, and we cannot wholly trust irresponsible magnates, whether industrial or political, to be even intelligently selfish. Moreover, in the present state of the world the higher imperialism is a policy fraught with the very dangers and difficulties which it seeks to evade. If the capitalists of Europe were determined to exploit South America under a joint European control, the decision might directly lead to war. There are too many vested national interests in colonies, dependencies and spheres of influence to make internationalization of investment an immediate specific against war.

Internationalization of investment is only one step towards peace.

But in this matter of the higher imperialism we are less concerned to know how false than how true it is. It is a thing to be desired if it circumscribes war, even though it does not end war, if it tends towards peace, even though it does not by itself alone assure peace. We believe that this present war is not unlikely to end in a combination of great nations with enormous capital, willing to enter upon foreign investments jointly. The great capitalists, who influence if they do not rule our modern industrial nations, will often discover that it is cheaper to divide than to fight. It will be better to have twenty per cent. of a Chinese loan without going to war than thirty per cent.—or nothing at all—after a war. They will strive for the peace of “understanding”—the peace of give and take.

If the big speculators can thus merge their interests and deal across national boundaries, the little investors who have less to gain and more to lose by war will be even more pacific. Farmers and wage-earners have a still more attenuated interest in war, and a still more obvious interest in peace. Once great liens of peace are established, moreover, many of the incitements to war will of themselves disappear....

In the end, however, any internationalization of investment will be only a single step in the direction of peace. There are many other steps to be taken. Education, commerce, the development of an international morality, the creation of machinery for dealing with international disputes, are all essential to the evolution of peace. Industrial and political democracy are above all necessary. Men must be given a full life and a real stake in the wealth that peace provides, and they who bear the burdens of war must actually determine the national policies which make for war or peace.

The New Republic, June 5, 1915.