The part played by Verdun in the defence and by the Third Army in the battle.
After the battle of the Frontiers, the Third Army likewise beat a retreat. Having reached the left bank of the Meuse, the army pivoted on its right which rested on the fortress of Verdun, stopping frequently to delay the pursuit of the Crown Prince's army.
September 6th, 7th and 8th. While the Duke of Wurtemburg pressed heavily upon the right of the Fourth Army (under Langle de Cary), the Crown Prince vigorously set upon the left of Sarrail in an attempt to break completely through the pivot by Trouée de Revigny, valleys of Ornain and Saulx. He hoped to cut off Sarrail who, when attacked at the same time in rear on the Heights of the Meuse, would find himself surrounded and forced to surrender. But these ambitious plans were thwarted by the vigorous action of the left of the Fifth Corps and the Fifteenth which was withdrawn en masse from the Army of Lorraine (under Castelnau).
The Battle of the Marne.—The Third Army in front of Verdun.
September 9th. On its left the Third Army continued to engage the Germans on the flank, while the right wing, though vigorously holding its ground before frontal attacks, remained in a precarious position owing to the standing menace of the German forces in rear on the Hauts-de-Meuse. Sarrail received permission from the General-in-Chief to withdraw his right, if need be, and to leave the permanent garrison of Verdun to secure the defence of the Fortress. But the General of the Third Army held fast with heroic determination and would not give up his entrenched position as long as the Meuse was not liberated and while a ray of hope appeared.
September 10th. The forts of Troyon and Genicourt, on the Hauts-de-Meuse, continued to hold out against heavy artillery bombardment. The barrier of the Meuse was not cleared but, to guard against any eventuality, Sarrail transferred two divisions to the West of Saint-Mihiel.
September 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th. Coming from the German right, the advancing wave gradually overtook the armies of the Prince of Wurtemburg and the Crown Prince. The two latter, mad with rage, were forced to withdraw their forces in echelon, while Sarrail's army pivoting round Verdun harassed the enemy as far as Argonne. Thus the battle of the Marne was won by the same troops who had just undergone the repulse of the battle of the Frontiers and, when overwrought with fatigue, had successfully accomplished a retreat unprecedented in history. The undaunted spirit of Commander-in-Chief Joffre, the well-defined and masterful strategy which he planned and carried out in strict collaboration with his highly courageous army commanders, above all the superhuman bravery of the rank and file, to these factors is due what to-day we call "The Miracle of the Marne".
"The fate of the War was settled at its commencement, in 1914, on the Marne, where the French General indeed saved France against the fierce onslaught of a whole nation."
So wrote the Berliner Tageblatt after the War.
AFTER THE MARNE, THE BATTLE FOR VERDUN
October 1914-August 1915.—The enemy strove to cut off Verdun. On the East, the Salient of Saint-Mihiel. On the West, the battle of Argonne.
February 1916-August 1916.—In a terrific and desperate encounter the enemy threw themselves at Verdun. They were hurled back by a magnificent defence.
October 1916-August 1917.—Three French attacks drove the enemy back to their original attacking positions.
September-November 1918. The Salient of Saint-Mihiel was straightened during the great final offensive when Verdun was completely liberated by the French-American forces.
The line in front of Verdun, as it was in February 1916.
THE STABILISATION OF THE FRONT BEFORE VERDUN
(September-October 1914)
The formation of the Saint-Mihiel salient.
After the battle of the Marne, the Crown Prince established his lines of resistance north of the fortress, on the line Avocourt-Melancourt-Brabant-Ornes.
The formation of the Saint-Mihiel Salient (September 1914).
On September 20th, the third Bavarian Corps attacked the 75th reserve division, advanced rapidly on the 22nd as far as the line Combres-Vigneulles-Thiaucourt and bombarded the forts of the Hauts-de-Meuse. This line was defended by mobile troops outnumbered by two to one.
On the 25th, the Germans succeeded in getting a footing on the Hauts-de-Meuse in the region of Vigneulles. From there they pushed on to Saint-Mihiel and entered the town, without however being able to cross the Meuse. But on the following day, the river which was only defended at this point by a battalion of territorials was cleared, and the Germans started to climb again towards the valley of Aire, in the direction of Verdun. At this dangerous moment, the sixteenth corps which had left Nancy met the German forces, harassing them and forcing them to fall back on the suburbs of Saint-Mihiel. It did not, however, succeed in forcing them to withdraw on the right bank of the Meuse. On September 29th the line ran through Combres, Chauvoncourt, Apremont, Flirey, Le Bois le Prêtre.
The salient was made.
The enemy were attacked without cessation during the months of October, November and December. Towards Saint-Mihiel the enemy held their position on the left bank of the stream.
The crest of Les Éparges, after being held firmly by the enemy from September 1914, was strongly attacked on April 6th by the twelfth Infantry Division who struggled obstinately for over a month before they wrested from the Germans the observation posts which from this crest, gave near views towards the North. This brilliant action was followed by counter-attacks by the Fifth German Corps, which were particularly violent during the day-time of April 24th and May 5th. Starting from this moment, the struggle assumed a less stubborn character, but none the less keen and murderous. (See [page 129.])
The extremity of the Saint-Mihiel Salient seen from the Fort des Paroches.
The village of Forges in 1915.
A footbridge of wagons crossing the stream of Forges.
Les Éparges in 1915.
During a period of quiet, a plant for making rings has been installed at the entrance of a dug-out.
In April 1915, a 75 gun firing on the crest of Les Éparges.
Machine gun in position in a front line trench. Sector of Les Éparges, February 1915.
A ravine in the luxuriant forest of Argonne.
In the middle a company in Indian file is going up to the line.
THE STRUGGLE IN ARGONNE
The battle in the forest (October 1914-October 1915).
The stationary warfare assumed a special character in the Argonne. Lanes and footpaths formed the only breaks in the impenetrable thickets. There were no gentle slopes, no convenient firing positions for the infantry, no observation posts for the artillery—everything was concealed by the thick foliage.
Springs rose everywhere and rivulets ran over the clayey soil. Mud made the paths impassable, and filled up the trenches as soon as they were made. French and German trenches intersected. Firing was continuous, snipers perched here and there in trees taking careful aim, while at night rifle and machine gun fire at random continued uninterruptedly, sweeping the forest in order to prevent surprise and to make movement dangerous. But the rifle was merely an auxiliary weapon, as each army rained showers of grenades and bombs upon the other all day long.
Apart from actual battles, there were hundreds of casualties, killed and wounded, every day. In the attack or defence of a trench, the fighting immediately became a hand-to-hand struggle, with knives and revolvers. Underground there was a continuous digging of saps and mines; it was a contest of speed and skill between the opposing sappers. It was a case of blowing up the enemy first or being blown up by him. Over the wrecked trenches, destroyed by mines, through smoke and under a rain of earth thrown up by the explosions, the soldiers dashed forward to occupy the crater or to fight for it if the enemy had reached it first.
A fight with bombs.
French foot-soldiers throwing back at the enemy bombs which they have captured from them.
During the first three months of 1915, between Four-de-Paris and the valley of the Aire, the French sappers excavated over 3,000 metres of mine galleries and fired 52 mine chambers, using nearly 16,000 lbs of explosives.
Later on, the mine warfare developed considerably in other directions, and mine-chambers charged with more than 130,000 lbs of explosives were fired.
The German pushes towards Four-de-Paris
(October 1914-May 1915).
The enemy wanted to reach the valley of the Biesme across the wood of Grurie and Bolante.
In October, advancing to the sap, the Germans of von Mudra's army corps took Bagatelle and Saint-Hubert. At the end of November the Four-de-Paris—Varennes road was abandoned by the French.
The German pushes towards Four-de-Paris (October 1914-May 1915).
At the end of December, the Second French Corps cleared Four-de-Paris.
In January, the Garibaldians (Italian volunteers) attacked in the direction of Bolante.
On January 8th, the Germans hurled themselves upon the outskirts of Bolante. For three whole days the foot soldiers of the 31st, 46th, 76th and 89th regiments as well as the Garibaldians were at close grips with the Silesian and Hessian chasseurs, fierce struggles taking place.
In spite of all their furious attacks, the enemy could not get to the Biesme, but they succeeded in driving a deep and narrow wedge in the French lines in the direction of Four-de-Paris.
French attacks in the valley of the Aire.
While these obstinate encounters were going on in the forest of Argonne, the 9th and 10th French Divisions (5th Corps) attacked in the valley of the Aire and set out to storm Vauquois, a village perched on a mound commanding all the valley, which the enemy had constituted a defensive centre and a first class observation post.
From December to February, on ground that was transformed into a sea of mud, attacks on Boureuilles carried the French lines to 250 metres from the village.
From October 28th 1914 to March 1st 1915, four attacks were launched against Vauquois, the summit of which was reached by the French troops of the 10th Division. The struggle extended around the mine craters until 1916. (See [page 144.])
The big German attacks (June-July 1915).
In June and July 1915, the German commander gave up local attacks and had recourse to massed attacks of men and material on fronts of 3 to 4 kilometres.
The first attack (on June 20th) was on the North side and then (July 2nd) on the East side of the salient of Fontaine-Madame.
On June 20th in the morning, after a violent bombardment of gas shells, two Prussian and Wurtemburg divisions attacked in the wood of Grurie. The foot-soldiers of the 32nd Corps, though gassed and almost buried in their trenches, put up a fierce resistance. Their positions were subjected to a veritable siege. The enemy, however, captured Fontaine-aux-Charmes.
The big German Attacks (May-July 1915).
Up to June 28th, French counter-attacks succeeded in recapturing part of the lost ground.
On June 30th, the Germans extended their attack up to the north of Four-de-Paris. The enemy advanced to within 8 kilometres of their objective, the railway station of Les Islettes. The fire of the 75's, however, barred the road and the French reserves counter-attacked.
On July 2nd, there was an artillery bombardment of even greater violence.
The famous 42nd Division of Fère-Champenoise and the Yser withstood the attack with a heroism that won admiration even from the enemy.
The Germans could not capture the valley of the Biesme, in spite of their terrific efforts and heavy sacrifices.
In July 1915, the French front in the sectors of Bolante and Fille-Morte, followed the ridge which dominates the ravine of the Meurrissons, and passed over perpendicularly the Haute-Chevauchée road, comprising the dominating hills 285 and further to the East 263.
From this line which was provided with good observation posts, a French attack could take in rear the German lines that were established in front of Four-de-Paris.
The French Attacks in the valley of the Aire (October 1914-April 1915).
This attack after being fixed for July 11th was postponed to July 14th. The enemy, however, forestalled it by himself attacking on July 13th.
Sappers excavating a mine gallery.
After a bombardment of exceptional ferocity (nearly 50,000 shells) and the blowing up of several mines, 5 regiments of the Metz army attacked. They came out from saps which had been run up to within a short distance of shell-shattered French trenches.
The enemy crept in by small columns and surrounded the front lines. Under an avalanche of heavy shells, which annihilated a large number of men in their dug-outs, the French gave ground, to avoid being overwhelmed or outflanked. The enemy patrols then crossed the second French line.
The reserves of the 5th Corps, 131st, 82nd, 89th Infantry Regiments and the 66th battalion of chasseurs were brought up along ravines infested with gas, to the counter-attack. Without artillery preparation, they deployed under heavy rifle fire and then proceeded to clear the forest at the point of the bayonet and retook part of the first position.
From October 1915 to September 1918.
In October the Argonne front suddenly became as calm as it had previously been active. The Germans were content with a defensive policy. The struggle for the saps was renewed, trenches were blown up by mines and the mine craters were disputed by short bombing engagements.
In 1916, during the battle of Verdun, the Argonne was especially the scene of artillery duels and of mine warfare on the plateau of Bolante, at Hill 285 and at Vauquois.
The Mound of Vauquois hollowed out by mine craters.
(View from the air, May 1917).
E. Site of the church.—L. F. French lines.—L. A. German lines.
The German mine opposite the church had been charged with 60 tons of explosives. Notice on the German side, the entrances to the galleries excavated under the mound.
—1916—
THE BATTLE OF VERDUN
The fortress of Verdun, the basin of Briey, the fortress of Metz.
During 1915, Germany was particularly on the defensive, in Artois (May-June) and in Champagne (September-October). Her successes in Serbia and Russia had not brought the final victory which could only be won on the Western front.
Germany feared an allied offensive and was anxious over the continual increase of their forces in men and material. To forestall this offensive would cause it to miscarry and keep the initiative in her own hands.
The Germans wanted too, to make an impression on the world at large which began to have doubts about her ultimate victory. Finally they were influenced by political considerations at home. The rationing of the population had lowered the general morale, and the prestige of the Crown Prince had slumped heavily on account of his failure in Argonne. A grand victory was necessary to strengthen the German morale, to appease dissension and to rehabilitate the prestige of the Imperial family. The German High Command chose Verdun. Was this choice of ground as paradoxical as it has been said?
"Verdun in all the war is the hinge of the door which swings open sometimes on France, sometimes on Germany". (L. Gillet.)
The only communication between Verdun and the rear was by the Meusian railway and the "Sacred Way". The Verdun-Commercy railway was cut by the Saint-Mihiel salient and the Verdun-Sainte-Menehould railway would be cut by shell fire at the very outset of the battle.
To capture Verdun was to threaten the whole French right wing, to gain an important stake, a stronghold fronting the rich basin of Briey, and to get the benefit of a great moral effect.
The Verdun salient lent itself to converging enemy attacks and concentrated fire. On the right bank the defenders of Verdun would be fighting with their backs to the Meuse. The neighbourhood of Verdun with its valleys and woods, facilitated the moving of troops and the concentration of artillery screened from view.
The enemy too had fourteen railways at his disposal and Metz close at hand from which to bring up troops and supplies.
On the French side, there was only one broad gauge railway connecting Verdun, via Saint-Menehould, with the rest of France. This railway, too, was always liable to be cut off by shell-fire. ([See illustration opposite]).
Geographical Sketch.
The table-lands of Verdun where the battle was to be fought are the last of the series of heights which form the top of the basin in which Paris lies. The Meuse which often overflows in winter divides them from North to South.
The terrace of the table-lands of the right bank, for some ten kilometres in width, separates the valley of the Meuse from the marshy plain of the Woëvre.
Numerous streams flow at a depth of more than a hundred metres for a very short distance, thus hollowing out deep ravines which give to the hills of the Meuse a contour "jagged, cut in festoons, as though it was hand-modelled in a clay substance". The summit line, where not indented, contains the highest points (388 m.), keys to the battle field.
"All this country with its partitions and compartments seemed built like a natural fortress. The sheltered ways and ravines provided covered approaches and first-rate artillery positions. Every wood and copse could be converted into a redoubt.
"If the branching off of the valleys and their innumerable ramifications added to the dangers of movement or manœuvre or facilitated surprise attacks, the ridges, on the other hand, made marvellous observation posts. On all sides were the very slopes, banks and flank protection which engineers could desire." (L. Gillet: La Bataille de Verdun).
German plans for a decisive attack.
Following the lesson of the offensives in Artois (May 1915) and Champagne (September 1915), the German commander intended to put into practice the French offensive methods but to add, by means of artillery fire, an unparalleled ferocity. To concentrate masses of artillery, to cut by shell fire the only broad-gauge railway that connected Verdun with France ([see plan p. 18]), to flatten out the French defences, to isolate the occupants by barrages of heavy shells, then to rush headlong on the town and crush the last resistance, at the same time sending forward overwhelming masses of troops, without regard to losses: such was the plan which the Germans carried out on February 21st, 1916.
Troops in position on February 21st, 1916.
The enemy concentration round the fortress of Verdun.
The battered fort of Douaumont (August 1916).
Character of the battle of Verdun
The battle of Verdun was a battle of annihilation, mutual annihilation. The method was to concentrate the fire of all the guns, not over a line but on a zone, and not only on the position to be captured but also as far as possible in rear on everything that could support the position. The simile that best expresses it is no longer that of a battering ram striking against a wall, but that of a rammer falling perpendicularly and hammering an encircled zone. The encircled zone was the part where the old territorials who were screening from observation a road behind the lines, ran almost as great a danger as men in other battles did in an attacking wave. Here, while the shells continued to fall, no fatigue party of men or munitions could go three hundred metres without being wiped out entirely. Here the wounded in deep-dug aid-posts went mad from lack of air. Here often a mug of water meant life or death to a man. This encircled zone was bounded by a narrow stretch of ground which the opposing artilleries tried to spare because the infantry were fighting there hand to hand, with bombs, machine guns, and flame-throwers; every square yard of ground being hotly disputed.
"In front of Verdun, one day, the O. C. of a new force asks the officer of the chasseurs whom he has just relieved: "Where does our line run here?—I'll show you. There where you will find on the ground my dead chasseurs, lying side by side, that is where our line runs".
"In front of Verdun, one day, a battalion commander being completely cut off sends twenty runners one after another, to the Colonel's headquarters. These runners are bound to follow a certain track to go and another to return. Not one comes back and on the next day he finds the bodies of all twenty, ten lying on the path there and ten on the path back.
"In front of Verdun, one day, at nightfall, a battalion commander goes up towards the front line to see his men and cheer them on. The front line is a string of shell holes and in these holes, one by one, the men are crouched. He leans over one of these pits of darkness, for the night was pitch black, and in a low voice so that the enemy may not hear asks: "How goes it?". There is no movement but a voice replies in muffled tones as though telling a secret: "All well, Colonel, they shall not pass". He goes on his way continuing his rounds "How goes it?" and from each dark shell-hole rises the same secret whisper.
At the aid post of the fort or Tavannes, two wounded men and a runner leaving the "furnace".
Their privations and sufferings are written on their wan faces.
"Where was that? At Mort-Homme or Froideterre? At Haudromont farm or Chapelle Sainte-Fine? It makes no difference! It was "in front of Verdun, one day" any day you like in this battle, in which so many days were alike, and these innumerable stories, so magnificent that no poet could have had the genius to invent one of them, these stories—each one so immortal—are all as alike in their essentials as were the countless actions in this "battle of annihilation" (Joseph Bédier: L'Effort français).
In the wood of Les Fosses. A runner on a track.
THE IMPORTANT PHASES OF THE BATTLE OF VERDUN
February 21st-25th 1916.—The central attack.
March-April 1916.—The attack on the flanks.
May-September 1916.—The battle of attrition.
The central attack (February 21st-25th) endangered the position of Verdun but the arrival of the first French reinforcements saved the place.
The enemy widened his attacking front, but his effort to outflank the position was a failure.
The defence was reorganised, road and rail taking their part in the battle. The enemy's attempts at attrition on the spot were a failure.
On July 1st the allied offensive was launched on the Somme.
October 24th 1916.—The Battle of Douaumont-Vaux.
December 15th 1916.—The Battle of Louvemont-Bezonvaux.
August 20th 1917.—The Battle of Hill 304 and Mort-Homme.
As soon as this new engagement allowed him, the French Commander intended to turn the enemy's failure before Verdun into defeat.
Three operations were prepared with the greatest skill and most energetically carried out, by which the enemy were driven out of the positions they had captured. These were the three victories of October 24th 1916 (Douaumont-Vaux), December 15th 1916 (Louvemont-Bezonvaux) and finally August 20th, 1917 (Samogneux-Mort-Homme, Hill 304).
The central attack (February 21st-26th 1916).
This attack was carried on from February 21st to 26th on the right bank of the Meuse and narrowed its front as it advanced, finally stopping on the sixth day at Poivre Hill and Douaumont.
THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE
(February-August 1916).
1. The central attack.
On February 21st 1916, at 7.15 a.m., the enemy opened fire on the two banks of the Meuse, over a front of 40 kilometres. Simultaneously Verdun was systematically bombarded, the last residents being evacuated by the military authority at midday on the 25th.
For nine hours, all the enemy guns and trench mortars kept up a running fire without intermission. In all the woods adjoining the front it was a regular fire-work display. A feature of this overwhelming bombardment was the enormous proportion of heavy calibre shells, 150's and 210's coming over like hailstones.
Under this deluge of projectiles all trenches were levelled, the woods became a twisted mass of trunks and branches, and villages collapsed and were blotted out.
The infantry attack was launched at 4.15 p.m. just before dusk, from the Haumont-Ornes wood.
Three army corps, the 7th, 18th and 3rd advanced. They thought that they had only to march, with their rifles slung, over ground like a ploughed field.
The 51st (Boulengé) and 72nd Divisions (Bapst) of the 30th Corps (Chrétien) sustained the first shock and for three days covered the arrival of French reinforcements.
A heroic combat followed the most formidable artillery preparation hitherto known. The chasseurs of Colonel Driant resisted the attack, inch by inch, in the wood of Caures. By nightfall the advance of the enemy was insignificant compared with their losses. They succeeded, however, in capturing the wood of Haumont.
On the 22nd, with snow falling, the bombardment was resumed with, if possible, greater intensity. Colonel Driant in the wood of Caures was outflanked on both sides and died fighting, after first evacuating his chasseurs to Beaumont.
Meanwhile the sectors of Woëvre and the left bank of the Meuse were subjected to violent bombardment.
The fighting on the 23rd was even more furious. Brabant fell into the hands of the enemy after a fierce resistance by the 351st Infantry Regiment, which clung desperately to the ruins of Samogneux until nightfall. Further east the battle raged fiercely. The French counter-attacked unsuccessfully at Caures Wood and were attacked at Herbebois. The 51st Infantry Division, fell back, making the enemy pay dearly for his progress towards Fosses Wood. In the evening, the front extended along the Samogneux-Beaumont-Ornes line. Samogneux was captured by the enemy during the night. The situation was very critical.
On the 24th, the enemy brought up fresh storm troops and, although harassed by the French artillery on the left bank of the Meuse, they succeeded in taking Hill 344 to the East of Samogneux, Fosses Wood and the village of Ornes. But on the same day French reinforcements arrived, namely the 37th Infantry Division of the 7th Corps, the 31st and 306th Brigades of the 20th Corps under General Balfourier who provisionally took charge from the Meuse to the Woëvre. At the same time also General Pétain took over the command of the army of Verdun from General de Castelnau.
On the 25th, the 37th Infantry Division, with orders to defend Talou Hill and Louvemont village, resisted for a long time against incredibly furious attacks, but on their right the enemy succeeded in capturing Vauche Wood and, advancing towards Douaumont, carried the fort by surprise (see [page 88]). However, their efforts to take the village failed before the heroic tenacity of the 31st Brigade, while the 94th Infantry Division, covered itself with glory. The enemy advance from this side had the effect of compelling the 31st Infantry Division to abandon Talou Hill.
During this time, in Woëvre, the front which was a dangerous salient and only very lightly held, was withdrawn to the foot of the Meuse Hills. This falling back was carefully cloaked and under cover of a rearguard action a new front was organised.
Taking over the command on the night of the 25th, General Pétain at once divided the battle-line into four sectors, officered as follows: General Bazelaire, on the left bank, from Avocourt to the river; General Guillaumat, from the Meuse to Douaumont; General Balfourier, from this point to the Woëvre; General Duchesne, on the Meuse Heights.
There were no trenches, but he ordered that the forts should at least be connected by a continuous line of entrenchments to be made while the battle was at its height and which the "poilus", in their disdain for the shovel and pick, called the "Panic Line". The entire 59th Division was told off to build the earthworks on the second and third lines. Thirteen battalions kept in repair the road from Bar-le-Duc to Verdun, via Souilly (the Sacred Way), which became the main artery for re-victualling the place in men and munitions, and along which 1,700 motor lorries passed each way daily. Lastly, General Pétain managed to imbue all ranks with his energy and faith, and the enemy's drive was stopped.
Indeed, during the day of the 26th, the 39th Division (Nourisson), which had relieved the 37th, repulsed all attacks on Poivre Hill, while the 31st Brigade continued to hold Douaumont until relieved in the evening by the 2nd Division (Guignabaudet).
On the following days the fighting continued about and in the streets of Douaumont, which the enemy finally captured on March 4th. The Germans now began to show signs of weakening. Their effort on the right bank had failed. Checked at Douaumont, they were taken in the rear by the French positions on the left bank, and were obliged to modify their plans. From that time they operated simultaneously or successively on both banks.
General Pétain among the soldiers.
In Caures Wood a company of chasseurs manning a trench.—Colonel Driant.
West of Douaumont, starting out on a counter-attack (March 1916).
The Crown Prince reviewing his men at Charleville.
On the "Sacred Way" (March 1916).
Reinforcements arriving on the "Sacred Way" (March 1916).
2.—The battle on the flanks (March-April 1916).
The German offensive was unable on the right bank of the Meuse to yield the expected results. The enemy intended to combine operations on both banks.
On March 6th, two German divisions attacked from Bethincourt to Forges, where the French front was held by the 67th Division (Aimé) and succeeded in taking Forges and Regnéville, but were checked by the positions on Oie Hill.
Continuing their advance, on the 7th, they succeeded in capturing these positions, as well as Corbeaux Wood. The village of Cumières was the scene of terrible fighting, but remained in the hands of the French, while further to the west the enemy's attacks broke down at Mort-Homme (See [page 112]).
On March 8th, while on the left bank French troops retook Corbeaux, on the right bank the Germans brought into line units of five army corps and began a general attack, which failed with very heavy losses, their only gain being the capture of part of Vaux village.
On the 9th, they succeeded in getting a footing on the slopes of Mort-Homme, but at the other end of the battle-line their attack on Vaux Fort failed. Their radiograms announcing the capture of the fort were untrue (See [page 68]).
On the 10th, Corbeaux Wood was taken by the Germans and the French withdrew to the line Bethincourt-Mort-Homme, south of the Corbeaux and Cumières Woods. The battle continued in the village and in front of Vaux Fort, strongly held by the French. The enemy temporarily ceased his massed attacks. In reality his offensive had failed.
On March 10th, Joffre was able to say to the soldiers of Verdun:
"For three weeks you have withstood the most formidable attack which the enemy has yet made. Germany counted on the success of this effort, which she believed would prove irresistible, and for which she used her best troops and most powerful artillery. She hoped by the capture of Verdun to strengthen the courage of her Allies and convince neutrals of German superiority. But she reckoned without you! The eyes of the country are on you. You belong to those of whom it will be said: "They barred the road to Verdun!"
From March 11th to April 9th the aspect of the battle changed. Wide front attacks gave place to local actions, short, violent and limited in scope. On March 14th the enemy captured, from the 75th Brigade, Hill 265 forming the Western portion of Mort-Homme, but they failed to take the Eastern portion. On the 20th, Avocourt and Malancourt Woods fell into the hands of the Bavarians, and after a fierce struggle the village of Malancourt was lost, and then Bethincourt on April 8th. On the right bank, after powerful attacks near Vaux, the enemy reached Caillette Wood and the Vaux-Fleury railway, only to be driven back by the 5th Division (Mangin).
A furious attack was made along both banks by the Germans at noon on April 9th; on the left bank, five divisions were engaged, failing everywhere except at the Mort-Homme, where, despite the heroic resistance of the 42nd Division (Deville), they gained a footing on the N. E. slopes; on the right bank, Poivre Hill was attacked but remained in French hands.
On the following day in his order of the day, General Pétain promulgated his famous message "Courage ... we shall beat them!" (Reproduction [page 30]).
On April 30th, General Nivelle superseded in supreme command of the Verdun forces General Pétain who had been appointed to the command of the central army group.
"April 9th was a glorious day for our armies", General Pétain declared in his order of the day dated the 10th, "the furious attacks of the soldiers of the Crown Prince broke down everywhere. The infantry, artillery, sappers and aviators of the 2nd Army vied with one another in valour.
"Honour to all.
"No doubt the Germans will attack again. Let all work and watch, that yesterday's success be continued.
"Courage! We shall beat them!"
Ch. Pétain
General Joffre and General Pétain at the 2nd Army Headquarters at Souilly.
Mort-Homme.—Hills 286 and 295.
In the background, the valley of the Forges stream, Bethincourt on the left, Forges wood on the right.
Between Douaumont and Vaux, the ravine of Fausse-Côte.
Third Phase.—The Battle of Attrition (May-September 1916).
The struggle continued obstinately and without interruption on the two banks of the Meuse. The attempt of the enemy to wear down the French forces was in vain, the latter re-organising their defences. Division succeeded division in the defence of Verdun but then were relieved before they were exhausted, so that they came out of the furnace better able to stand its hardships.
3. The battle of attrition (May-August 1916).
In May the enemy attacked on the left bank of the Meuse with an assault upon Mort-Homme. Then, widening their attacking front in a Westerly direction, they turned upon Hill 304, a strong key position and valuable observation post. The French lost this Hill on May 23rd but retook it the following day. A further month's bitter fighting only gained for the enemy the crest of Mort-Homme and the north slopes of Hill 304.
On May 22nd, with the object of clearing the left bank of the Meuse where the enemy were pressing, the 5th Division (Mangin) attacked on the right bank, in the direction of Douaumont. The central attack alone was successful, the enemy holding their ground inside the fort; their numerous reserves, among them the 1st Bavarian Corps, succeeded in dislodging the attackers on May 24th (See [page 90]).
Even though Douaumont remained in the enemy's hands, this attack was successful in freeing the left bank by drawing upon the German reserves. The struggle continued without respite or quarter. The Germans, alarmed by the preparations for the Franco-British offensive on the Somme, wished to be finished with Verdun. They, therefore, launched attack after attack but every time they were met by the irresistible will of the French.
The enemy, who in April had captured the village of Vaux, next furiously attacked the fort, and though on June 2nd they occupied the superstructure, it took them five days to subdue the garrison (See [page 71]).
At the same time they advanced from Douaumont towards Froideterre. On June 9th, Thiaumont Farm was captured, but the redoubt still held out. On the left bank, the enemy resumed their attacks. On May 31st, they outflanked Mort-Homme by the Meuse valley and reached Chattancourt station, but were driven back by a counter attack as far as Cumières. Even if they captured the summit of Hill 304, they could not conquer the South slopes, and they were still far from the fortified barrier of Bois Bourrus.
On the right bank, on the other hand, by holding Douaumont and Vaux the enemy were at hand to break through the barrier of Souville and had within view the basin of Verdun. Here it was that the enemy were going to work for the supreme decision.
On June 23rd, 70,000 men attacked on the front Thiaumont-Fleury-Vaux. Thiaumont redoubt was captured, waves of attackers being hurled upon the Froideterre redoubt. A counter-attack, however, cleared the plain as far as Thiaumont. In the centre, the enemy by outflanking Fleury on both sides gained a footing there, but in front of Souville they failed utterly (See [page 77]).
On July 11th, the enemy narrowed their attacking front, from Fleury to Damloup. Putting 40,000 men into the attack, they went through Fleury and crept round by the ravine to the west of the village. They gained a temporary footing in Souville fort from which they were almost immediately ejected (See [page 80]).
In spite of partial successes, the enemy had failed in their main objectives. Their losses had been enormous and the Franco-British offensive, launched on the Somme on July 1st, took up their reinforcements.
After nearly five month's siege, Verdun was safe. Still bitter fighting raged right on until the middle of August, centreing chiefly round Thiaumont redoubt which changed hands 16 times, Fleury village, recaptured on August 18th after many attempts, and in the woods south of Vaux where the enemy endeavoured to outflank Souville.
In rear of the battlefield.
Echelons of artillery on the slope of Houdainville.
A pinnace, used as a rest billet, hit by a 380.
Mass being celebrated in the church of Vaubecourt which had been burnt by bombs from aeroplanes.
In the Vaux sector.
A fatigue party coming from Tavannes tunnel.—Trenches of the Laufée redoubt (June 1916).—Soldiers going to fetch water from shell-holes in the ravine of Tavannes.
Clearing Verdun on the right bank of the Meuse.
The French offensives of October 24th and December 15th 1916.