10. Cornwallis Tries to Escape
Finding his enemies closing in for the kill, Cornwallis determined on a desperate measure. This was to transport his army across the river to Gloucester, break through the allied troops guarding that point, and march overland to New York.
A few hours cannonade from the new batteries upon York town, where the fraizings were already destroyed, the guns dismounted, many breaches effected, and the shells nearly expended, would be productive either of a capitulation, or an assault. A retreat by Gloucester was the only expedient that now presented itself to avert the mortification of a surrender, or the destruction of a storm. Though this plan appeared less practicable than when first proposed, and was adopted at this crisis, as the last resource, it yet afforded some hopes of success. In the evening, Earl Cornwallis sent Lord Chewton to Gloucester, with explicit directions for Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton to prepare some artillery and other requisites from his garrison to accompany the British troops with which his lordship designed to attack Brigadier de Choisy before daybreak, and afterwards retreat through the country. The guards of cavalry and infantry at Tarleton’s post were immediately augmented, and many officers were advanced as sentries, to prevent any intelligence being conveyed to the enemy. All the commanding officers of regiments were afterwards acquainted with the intended project, that their corps might be completely assembled and equipped. The spare horses of the garrison were ordered to parade for the benefit of the infantry, and the necessary artillery and waggons were prepared.
A number of sailors and soldiers were dispatched with boats from Gloucester, to assist the troops in passing the river. Earl Cornwallis sent off the first embarkation before eleven o’clock that night, consisting of the light infantry, great part of the brigade of guards, and the 23d regiment, and purposed himself to pass with the second, when he had finished a letter to General Washington, calculated to excite the humanity of that officer towards the sick, the wounded, and the detachment that would be left to capitulate. Much of the small craft had been damaged during the siege; yet it was computed, that three trips would be sufficient to convey over all the troops that were necessary for the expedition. The whole of the first division arrived before midnight, and part of the second had embarked, when a squall, attended with rain, scattered the boats, and impeded their return to Gloucester. About two o’clock in the morning the weather began to moderate, when orders were brought to the commanding officers of the corps that had passed, to re-cross the water. As the boats were all on the York side the river, in order to bring over the troops, it required some time to row them to Gloucester, to carry back the infantry of the first embarkation; but soon after daybreak they returned under the fire of the enemy’s batteries to Earl Cornwallis, at Yorktown. Thus expired the last hope of the British army.
Lieutenant-Colonel Tarleton,
A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781.
THE LAST DAY OF THE SIEGE
Reproduced from a picture by Van Blarenberghe, based on an action sketch. The foreground shows allied staff officers in consultation over a map. Nearby, French troops are moving up to the front. In the background the batteries of the second parallel are in full play against Yorktown.