FOOTNOTES:
[19] Mr. Clay (C. C. Clay, Jr., of Alabama), chairman of the Committee on Commerce, drew up in the room of that committee the original ordinance of secession for the State of Alabama, while he, a rebel traitor, was drawing the pay of this government. It was drawn upon government paper, written with government ink, and copied by a clerk drawing $6 a day from this government. I found it in that room and I have it now.—Zachariah Chandler in the Senate, April 12, 1864.
[20] This undoubtedly refers to Lewis Cass.
[21] Whatever credit there was in stopping the rout (at this point) is due wholly to Senators Chandler and Wade, and Representatives Blake, Riddle, and Morris. These gentlemen, armed with Maynard rifles and navy revolvers, sprang from their carriages some three miles this side of Centreville, and, presenting their weapons, in loud voices commanded the fugitives to halt and turn back. Their bold and determined manner brought most at that point to a stand-still. Many on horseback, who attempted to dash by them, had their horses seized by the bits. Some of the fugitives who were armed menaced these gentlemen. None, however, were permitted to pass until the arrival of the Second New Jersey Regiment, on its way to the battle-ground, turned back the flying soldiers and teamsters.—Washington Intelligencer, July 22, 1861.
CHAPTER XIII.
THE COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.
During the Congressional recess of the autumn of 1861 gross mismanagement led to the annihilation at Ball's Bluff of a brigade of Union troops, led by Senator Edward D. Baker of Oregon. They had been sent across the Potomac in flat-boats and skiffs, were left without adequate support, and, being surrounded by a vastly superior force of rebels, were driven to the edge of the river, and there either killed, wounded, captured, or driven into hiding places along the banks. Their commanding officer, who displayed throughout a high order of personal courage, was shot at the head of his line before the final rout. General Baker was a man of eloquence and many gallant qualities, and his death created a profound impression; that he was sacrificed by military incapacity cannot be doubted.
Congress met on Dec. 2, 1861, and on the first business day of the session Mr. Chandler offered a motion for the expulsion of John C. Breckenridge, who had at last joined the rebels, and it was unanimously adopted. On December 5 he introduced this resolution:
Resolved, That a committee of three be appointed to inquire into the disasters at Bull Run and Edward's Ferry (subsequently changed to Ball's Bluff), with power to send for persons and papers.
Mr. Chandler said, in explanation of his motion, that these reverses had been attributed to politicians, to civilians, to everything but the right cause, and that it was due to the Senate and to the country that they should be investigated and that the blame should rest where it belonged. After some discussion the Senate adopted the resolution with only three dissenting votes, first amending it by providing for a joint committee of both branches, and by enlarging the scope of its inquiries so as to include "the conduct of the war." The House concurred in the action, and the famous "Committee on the Conduct of the War" was thus created. On December 17, Mr. Chandler moved that the Vice-President should appoint the Senate members, adding: "I do not know what the parliamentary usage may be in a case of this kind. If that usage would give me the position of chairman, I wish to say that, under the circumstances, I do not wish to accept it." Mr. Chandler had also privately requested Mr. Hamlin to appoint Senator Wade to the chairmanship, saying it was important that a lawyer should be given that place, and his desires were followed in both respects. The first committee, as announced at that time, consisted of the following Congressmen: On the part of the Senate, Benjamin F. Wade, Zachariah Chandler and Andrew Johnson; on the part of the House, Daniel W. Gooch of Massachusetts, John Covode of Pennsylvania, George W. Julian of Indiana, and Moses F. Odell of New York. Of the original committee, George W. Julian is the only one who survived Mr. Chandler. When Andrew Johnson was appointed Military Governor of Tennessee, he resigned his position upon the committee, and Senator Joseph A. Wright of Indiana took his place. Mr. Wright served but a year, and after the expiration of his term the Senate branch of the committee in the Thirty-seventh Congress consisted of only Mr. Chandler and Mr. Wade. William Blair Lord, now one of the official reporters of the House of Representatives, was appointed its clerk and stenographer.
ZACHARIAH CHANDLER IN 1862.
The tone of the Congressional discussion upon Mr. Chandler's proposition shows that this was regarded as an exceedingly important step, for the resolution clothed the committee with powers of very unusual magnitude, which, if abused, must have seriously embarrassed the Administration. Mr. Lincoln and Secretary Cameron, as well as General Scott and General McClellan, opposed its appointment at the outset, but Mr. Chandler took prompt and successful measures to assure the President that, if the plans of its projectors were carried out, the committee would be used only to strengthen the hands of the Executive, and promised that it should be made a help and not a hindrance to the vigorous prosecution of the war. On this point the Hon. James M. Edmunds, who was thoroughly informed as to the secret history of that period, has said:
The writer knows that the Administration was not without fear that this was an unfriendly measure. A member of the Cabinet expressed such fears to him, and said that the President had not only expressed doubts as to the wisdom of the movement, but also fears that the committee might, by unfriendly action, greatly embarrass the Executive. On being told by the writer that the measure was not so intended, but, on the contrary, that it was the intention of the mover to bring the committee to the aid of the Administration, he expressed much gratification, and said it was of the utmost importance to bring such purpose to the knowledge of the President in some authoritative way, and at the earliest moment possible. This conversation was at once reported to Senator Chandler, whereupon both he and Senator Wade went immediately to the President and the Secretary of War, and assured them that it was their purpose to bring the whole power of the committee to the aid of the Executive. From this moment the most cordial relations existed between the committee and the Administration.[22]
President Lincoln and Secretaries Cameron and Stanton ultimately placed great reliance upon the committee, and constantly, throughout the war, it gave them the most valuable assistance. Mr. Wade and Mr. Chandler were deeper in the confidence of Secretary Stanton, from their connection with it, than were any other members of Congress, and differences of aim and opinion between them were exceedingly rare.
Upon organizing for work the committee found itself confronted with an enormous task, inquiries into every phase of the organization and management of the Union armies being referred to it for consideration. "Upon the conduct of the war," to quote from its own report, "depended the issue of the experiment inaugurated by our fathers, after the expenditure of so much blood and treasure—the establishment of a nation founded upon the capacity of man for self-government. The nation was engaged in a struggle for its existence; a rebellion, unparalleled in history, threatened the overthrow of our free institutions, and the most prompt and vigorous measures were demanded by every consideration of honor, patriotism, and a due regard for the prosperity and happiness of the people." And its sphere of duty was the constant watching of the details of movements, upon whose result depended such vast interests, as well as the safety of thousands of lives. The committee, in laying out its work, followed the suggestion of Mr. Chandler, which was, first, to obtain such information in respect to the conduct of the war as would best enable them to point out the mistakes which had been made in the past, and the course that promised to ensure the avoidance of their repetition; second, to collect such information as the many and laborious duties of the President and Secretary of War prevented them from obtaining, and to lay it before them with those recommendations and suggestions which the circumstances seemed to demand. Working in such a field, the committee soon became a second Cabinet council, and its proceedings were constantly at the President's hand. Its sessions were nearly perpetual, and almost daily its members were in consultation with the President or the Secretary of War. Many of its transactions were never committed to paper, and, as the members were sworn to the strictest secrecy, will never be revealed. Secretary Stanton was frequently present while the committee was in session, and its door was always open to him. There was never any lack of harmony between him and its chief members, but, on the contrary, the utmost confidence was exchanged, and this committee was the right arm of the War Department in the darkest days of the rebellion. Repeatedly, after the examination of some important witness, did Mr. Chandler or Mr. Wade go at once to the White House with the official stenographer, when Mr. Stanton would be sent for and the stenographic notes of the evidence would be read to the President and Secretary of War for their information and guidance. From such conferences there sprang many important decisions, and the files and records of the committee were constantly referred to and relied upon as sources of exceedingly useful knowledge and hints both at the White House and at the War Department.
Many subjects presented themselves for investigation, any one of which would, in ordinary times, have required the exclusive attention of a separate committee, and to follow out every line of inquiry suggested was manifestly a practical impossibility. Therefore the committee decided not to undertake any investigations into what might be considered side issues, but to keep their attention directed entirely to the essential features of the war, so that they could ascertain and comprehend the necessities of the armies and the causes of disaster or complaint, and the methods of supplying the one and remedying the other. Attempts were made repeatedly to use its power to punish enemies or to avenge private grievances, but its members adhered resolutely to the straightforward course originally marked out as the path of its duty.
The first subject which the committee carefully inquired into was the defeat at Bull Run. Many witnesses were examined, chiefly officers who were engaged in the battle—Generals Scott, McDowell, Meigs, Heintzelman, Butterfield, Fitz-John Porter, and others. The testimony was very voluminous, but the committee reached an early and unanimous opinion as to the causes of the disaster. Their report, written by Mr. Wade, said: "That which now appears to have been the great error was the failure to occupy Centreville and Manassas at the time Alexandria was occupied, in May. The position at Manassas controlled the railroad connections in all that section of the country.... The next cause of disaster was the delay in proceeding against the enemy until the time of the three months' men was nearly expired. The enemy were allowed time to collect their forces and strengthen their position by defensive works.... There had been but little time devoted to disciplining the troops and instructing them, even in regiments; hardly any instruction had been given them in brigade movements, and none at all as divisions." General McDowell prepared a plan of campaign, which was approved by the Cabinet, and the 9th of July was fixed upon as the day for the advance; but the movement did not commence until a week later than the appointed time. Transportation was deficient, and there was much delay resulting from lack of discipline among the troops, and when the battle came the Union forces were fatigued and not in good fighting condition. "But," said the report, "the principal cause of the defeat was the failure of General Patterson to hold the troops of General Johnston in the valley of the Shenandoah." Patterson had 23,000 men, while Johnston had but 12,000. Still, Patterson disobeyed the orders of General Scott, which were to make offensive demonstrations against General Johnston so as to detain his army at Winchester, and if he retreated to follow him and keep up the fight. Those orders were repeated every day for more than a week in the telegraphic correspondence between Scott and Patterson. Finally, General Scott heard of a large force moving from Patterson's front, and telegraphed, "Has not the enemy stolen a march on you?" To this Patterson replied, "The enemy has stolen no march upon me," while at that very time his large army was watching an empty camp and Johnston was far on his way to reinforce the rebels at Manassas. Patterson did not discover that Johnston had gone until he was miles distant, and the consequence was that McDowell had both Beauregard and Johnston to fight, while Patterson, with 23,000 men, was lying idle in his camp. This is the substance of the report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War on the battle of Bull Run, and was the official announcement to the country of the inefficiency of the organization and generalship of the Army of the Potomac.
But before the committee was organized the men who were responsible for this failure had been displaced, and General McClellan had been made the commander-in-chief. He had taken the reins of authority amid national acclamations, and was then at the height of a remarkable popularity, which it is now known was adroitly stimulated for political purposes by the conservative press. But on the investigation into the second subject taken up by the committee (the disaster at Edward's Ferry or Ball's Bluff) facts came to the knowledge of its members which created the suspicion in their minds that General Stone, who was charged with the blame of that defeat, and who, as the scape-goat, was arrested and imprisoned in Fort Lafayette, was not alone responsible for the calamity, but that the real fault would be found higher up. This suspicion they were never able to substantiate by absolute proof, and it was not expressed in any of their reports.
The third topic taken up by the committee was the military management of the Western Department, under General Fremont. This was an inquiry of special importance, for the reason that that officer, upon taking command at St. Louis, issued a proclamation declaring free all slaves whose masters were engaged in rebellion against the United States. This order caused a great excitement throughout the country, and the Republican party was widely divided in opinion as to its legality and propriety. President Lincoln was conservative on the question, and revoked the Fremont order, much to the disappointment of Mr. Chandler and the other more "advanced" Republicans. Hence the committee approached the subject with unusual interest, and, after a thorough investigation, made an elaborate report. That part of this document which relates to General Fremont's order in regard to slaves was signed by Messrs. Wade, Chandler, Julian, and Covode, and showed the ground on which these gentlemen then stood with regard to emancipation; it was as follows:
But that feature of General Fremont's administration which attracted the most attention, and which will ever be most prominent among the many points of interest connected with the history of that department, is his proclamation of emancipation. Whatever opinion may be entertained with reference to the time when the policy of emancipation should be inaugurated, there can be no doubt that General Fremont at that early day rightly judged in regard to the most effective means of subduing this rebellion. In proof of that, it is only necessary to state that his successor, when transferred to another department, issued a proclamation embodying the same principle, and the President of the United States has since applied the same principle to all the rebellious States; and few will deny that it must be adhered to until the last vestige of treason and rebellion is destroyed.
The committee heartily endorsed General Fremont's administration, declaring it to have been "eminently characterized by earnestness, ability, and the most unquestionable loyalty." They also examined into various minor military matters and movements, including, particularly, rebel barbarities and the return of slaves to their masters by the army.
It was as a member of the Committee on the Conduct of the War in the Thirty-seventh Congress, and from the evidence taken in its inquiries, that Mr. Chandler obtained the mass of information which enabled him to make the most important of his war speeches, that of July 16, 1862, in which he exposed so conclusively General McClellan's utter incompetence. Ample as was the foundation of facts upon which rested this effective arraignment of conspicuous incapacity, the attack was one requiring genuine boldness, for it defiantly invited a storm of denunciation and, if it had failed of justification by the event, would have certainly ended its maker's political career. Notwithstanding his tardiness, his timidity, his inefficiency as a commander in the field, and his political sympathy with the more unpatriotic classes of the Northern people, General McClellan was still strong with the people and entrusted with great powers. The Democracy warmly commended his sentiments and methods, and labored incessantly to prevent any diminution of his hold upon the public confidence. The Army of the Potomac yet regarded him as "the young Napoleon," and its corps commanders were, with but few exceptions, his personal adherents. The long-suffering President was submitting with patience to his unjust complaints, after having labored incessantly to stimulate into activity his chronic sluggishness, fearful, with characteristic over-caution, lest his summary removal should divide the North and breed a dangerous disaffection in the face of the enemy among his troops. Many who did not believe in the sincerity or ability of the man also smothered their distrust, for fear that criticism would only weaken the common cause and with the hope that even in his nerveless hands the mighty weapon of the national resources would at last fall—even if by its own weight only—on the enemy with decisive force. At this juncture, and under these circumstances, Mr. Chandler, with characteristic vigor of statement and plainness of speech, placed before the Senate and the country the demonstration of McClellan's imbecility.
Originally Mr. Chandler believed that McClellan's selection as the practical successor of General Scott was a wise one, and hoped to see his organizing capacity in camp supplemented by enterprise and courage in the field. Distrust first sprang up with the persistent inaction of the Army of the Potomac throughout the last months of 1861, and it was strengthened by contact with the man himself and the study of his character and his plans. An illustration of how this change of opinion was brought about is given in an incident which occurred in the room of the Committee on the Conduct of the War. That committee sent for General McClellan as soon as they took up matters relating to his command, in order to consult with him informally as to the situation. This was in January, 1861, while he was in Washington "organizing" his army, and while there was no little impatience felt because he did not move. He was not formally summoned before the committee then, but simply called in for general consultation. After the regular business was finished, Mr. Chandler asked him bluntly why he did not attack the rebels. General McClellan replied that it was because there were not sufficient means of communication with Washington; he then called attention to the fact that there were only two bridges and no other means of transportation across the Potomac.
Mr. Chandler asked what the number of bridges had to do with an advance movement, and McClellan explained with much detail that it was one of the most important features of skillful strategy that a commander should have plenty of room to retreat before making an attack. To this Mr. Chandler's response was:
"General McClellan, if I understand you correctly, before you strike at the rebels you want to be sure of plenty of room so that you can run in case they strike back!"
"Or in case you get scared," added Senator Wade.
The commander of the Army of the Potomac manifested indignation at this blunt way of putting the case, and then proceeded at length to explain the art of war and the science of generalship, laying special stress upon the necessity of having lines of retreat, as well as lines of communication and supply, always open. He labored hard to make clear all the methods and counter-methods upon which campaigns are managed and battles fought, and, as he was an accomplished master of the theory of war, succeeded in rendering himself at least interesting. After he had concluded, Mr. Wade said:
"General, you have all the troops you have called for, and if you haven't enough, you shall have more. They are well organized and equipped, and the loyal people of this country expect that you will make a short and decisive campaign. Is it really necessary for you to have more bridges over the Potomac before you move?"
"Not that," was the answer, "not that exactly, but we must bear in mind the necessity of having everything ready in case of a defeat, and keep our lines of retreat open."
With this remark General McClellan left the room, whereupon Mr. Wade asked:
"Chandler, what do you think of the science of generalship?"
"I don't know much about war," was the reply, "but it seems to me that this is infernal, unmitigated cowardice."
The committee, after this interview, made a careful inquiry into the strength of the rebel forces confronting the elaborate intrenchments about Washington, and became convinced that the army at and about Manassas was a handful compared with the magnificent body of troops under McClellan's command. They submitted these facts to the President and his Cabinet at a special session held for that purpose, and urged the importance of an instant advance. With one single exception (a Cabinet officer) the heads of the departments and the committee agreed that an offensive movement from the line of the Potomac into Virginia was important and must be made. General McClellan promised that his army should start, but it did not. Toward the close of the winter the President ordered a general advance, but the Army of the Potomac still remained immobile. Finally, on March 10, under the peremptory orders of the President, it did advance to Centreville and found there deserted camps, wooden guns, weak intrenchments, and traces of the retreat of not more than a single full corps of rebel troops. It was during this most aggravating delay that members of the committee had another characteristic interview with General McClellan. On the 19th of February a sub-committee waited upon the Secretary of War[23] to ask why the army was idle, and why the city of Washington and the North side of the Potomac river were crowded with troops when the enemy was all in Virginia. Mr. Wade said that it was a disgrace to the nation that Washington was thus allowed to remain to all intents and purposes in a state of siege To this Secretary Stanton replied that the committee could not feel more keenly upon this subject than did he, that he did not go to bed at night without his cheek burning with shame at this disgrace, and that the subject had received his earnest attention, but he had not been able to change the situation as he wished. General McClellan was then sent for, and Secretary Stanton stated to him the object of the visit, and repeated the inquiries as to why an advance movement was not made into Virginia, the rebels driven away from Washington, and the soldiers who were idle in their camps in and around the city sent to active duty.
General McClellan answered that he was considering the matter, but that instant action was impossible, although he hoped that he would soon be able to decide what ought to be done. The committee asked what time he would require to reach a decision. He replied that it depended upon circumstances; that he would not give his consent to have the troops about Washington sent over to the Virginia side of the Potomac without having their rear protected more fully, and better lines of retreat open; that he designed throwing a temporary bridge across the river as soon as possible, and making a permanent structure of it at his leisure. That would make three bridges, and then the requisite precautions would be completed.
Mr. Wade replied, with great impatience, that with 150,000 of the best troops the world ever saw, there was no need of more bridges; that the rebels were inferior in numbers and condition, and that retreat would be treason. "These 150,000 men," Mr. Wade said, "could whip the whole Confederacy if they were given a chance; if I was their commander I would lead them across the Potomac, and they should not come back until they had won a victory and the war was ended, or they came in their coffins." Mr. Wade spoke strongly and plainly throughout the interview, and the Secretary of War endorsed every word he uttered. The committee had another conference with Secretary Stanton on the following day at his residence, at which it was decided that they should co-operate with him in an effort to persuade President Lincoln either to displace McClellan or to compel him to commence an active campaign at once. On the 25th of February this conference with the President was held, and it was followed by others, Senators Chandler and Wade finally threatening to make the laggardness of the commander of the Army of the Potomac a subject of debate in the Senate, and to offer a resolution directing the President to order an advance forthwith. The first result was what the committee were so anxious to accomplish. In March, the armies commenced to move, and McClellan, at last taking the field in person, pushed out to Centreville, and then followed up this delayed advance by his flank movement to the Peninsula, driving the rebels out of Yorktown by a month's work with the shovel, and following General Johnston up to Williamsburg, where a bloody victory was won, but its fruits were left ungathered. This campaign was short, bloody, and blundering, ending with the battle of Malvern Hill, which was also deprived of its proper importance by McClellan's failure to follow up his advantage with a prompt advance upon Richmond, and which thus in the end amounted to but little more than another Union reverse. Mr. Chandler always firmly believed that had McClellan moved toward the rebel capital and not toward his gunboats after Malvern Hill, the war would have been shortened by two years.
When it first became evident that General McClellan was, by sullenness and incapacity, throwing away advantages gained by the heroism of his troops on the Peninsula, Mr. Chandler determined to denounce him on the floor of the Senate, but was restrained by Mr. Stanton, who urged that, while the campaign was still in active progress, there was yet some hope of a change for the better, and that to destroy confidence in a commanding officer under such circumstances might injure the army in the field. After Malvern Hill these reasons ceased to have force, and Mr. Chandler commenced the careful preparation of his speech. This time the Secretary of War endorsed the timeliness as well as the truth of the expose, and the Committee on the Conduct of the War by formal vote authorized the use of the testimony taken before it and not yet made public. After he had gathered and grouped the facts which formed the basis of his arraignment, Mr. Chandler submitted them to a friend upon whose good judgment and sincerity he greatly relied, and asked:
"Knowing all these facts, as I do, what is my duty?"
The answer was: "Beyond all question, these facts ought to be laid before the country, for the knowledge of them is essential to its safety. But they will create a storm that will sweep either you or McClellan from public life, and it is more than probable that you will be the victim."
Mr. Chandler said: "I did not ask your opinion of the consequences, but of my duty."
To this it was replied: "The speech ought to be made, and no one else will make it."
Mr. Chandler simply said: "It will be made to-day; come and hear it." And he did make it, in the midst of a running discussion on a bill "to provide for the discharge of state prisoners and others," which was the special order in the Senate for that day (July 16, 1862).
Mr. Chandler commenced by briefly reciting the history of the appointment of the committee, and then gave from the evidence taken at its sessions a compact summary of the causes of the Bull Run disaster, fortifying each point with citations from the testimony. After closing this part of his speech he proceeded to review the Ball's Bluff catastrophe, saying:
Were the people discouraged, depressed? Not at all. Untold thousands rushed into the shattered ranks, eager to wipe out the stain and stigma of that defeat (Bull Run). From the East, the West, the North, and the Middle States, thousands and tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands came pouring in, until the government said, "Hold, enough." The Army of the Potomac, denuded in August of three-months' men and scarcely numbering 50,000 efficient men, swelled in September to over 100,000, in October to 150,000, in November to 175,000 and upward, until, on the 10th day of December, the morning rolls showed 195,400 men, and thirteen regiments not reported, chiefly intended for the Burnside expedition, but all under the command of General McClellan. During the months of October, November, and December, the weather was delightful and the roads fine. The question began to be asked in October, when will the advance take place? All had the most unbounded confidence in the army and its young general, and were anxiously waiting for a Napoleonic stroke. It came, but such a stroke! That a general movement was being prepared the whole country had known for weeks; but when the terrific blow was to be struck no one knew save the commander of the Army of the Potomac. The nation believed in its young commander; the President relied upon him, and all, myself included, had the most unbounded confidence in the result of the intended movement. It came! On the 21st of October, McCall's division, 12,000 strong, was ordered to Drainesville upon a reconnoissance. Smith's division, 12,000 strong, was ordered to support him. McCall's reconnoissance extended four miles beyond Drainesville, and to within nine miles of Leesburg. Stone, on Sunday, was informed of McCall's and Smith's advance, and directed to make a slight demonstration upon Leesburg. How? He could do it in but one way, and that was by crossing the river and moving upon it. [Mr. Chandler here introduced a mass of testimony and official orders to show that Col. E. D. Baker, whom General Stone sent across the Potomac at Ball's Bluff, had ample reasons to believe that he would be sustained in that advance, and reinforced if necessary. He proceeded:] Thus it is shown that Colonel Baker had reason to expect reinforcements, for the enemy were to be pushed upon their flank by General Gorman.
At two o'clock on Monday morning Colonel Devens crossed the river upon a reconnoissance with 400 men at Ball's Bluff, opposite Harrison's Island, as directed by General Stone. At daylight Colonel Baker was ordered to cross to the support of Colonel Devens. I have read his orders. One scow and two small boats were their only means of transportation. At eight o'clock on Monday morning the fight commenced by Colonel Devens, and Colonel Baker was placed in command, as is alleged, with discretionary orders. Colonel Baker knew that Smith and McCall were at Drainesville, or within striking distance, that our troops were crossing at Edward's Ferry, or, in other words, that 40,000 effective men were within twelve miles of him, and that at least 30,000 were upon the Virginia side of the Potomac, and that, in the nature of things, he must be reinforced. He did not know that at half-past ten A.M., of Monday, or two and one-half hours after Colonel Devens commenced the fight, the divisions of Smith and McCall commenced their retreat by the express orders of General McClellan. He knew that Colonel Devens was contending with greatly superior forces, and, like a gallant soldier as he was, he hastened to his relief with all the force he could cross with his inadequate means of transportation.
Colonel Baker has been charged with imprudence and rashness; but neither the facts nor the testimony support the charge. Instead of rashly or imprudently advancing into the enemy's lines, as was alleged, he did not move ten rods from the Bluff, and the only sustaining witness to this charge was one officer, who swore that he thought Colonel Baker imprudently exposed himself to the enemy's bullets. This kind of rashness is usually pardoned after the death of the perpetrator. At two o'clock P. M. Colonel Baker found himself in command of about 1,800 men upon Ball's Bluff, including Devens's men and three guns, and the fighting commenced. The alternatives were fight and conquer, surrender, or be captured. That noble band of heroes and their gallant commander understood these terrible alternatives as well upon that bloody field as we do now, and nobly did they vindicate their manhood. During all those long hours, from two o'clock P. M. until the early dusk of evening, the gallant Baker continued the unequal contest, when he fell pierced by three bullets and instantly expired. A council of war was called (after the frightful death-struggle over his lifeless remains and for them), and it was decided that the only chance of an escape was by cutting through the enemy and reaching Edward's Ferry, which was at once decided upon; but, while forming for the desperate encounter, the enemy rushed upon our little band of heroes in overpowering numbers, and the rout was perfect.... How many were killed in battle, how many drowned in the relentless river, will never be correctly known; suffice it to say, our little force was destroyed. Why was this little band permitted to be destroyed by a force little more than double its numbers in presence of 40,000 splendid troops? Why were McCall and Smith ordered back at the very moment that Baker was ordered to cross? If we wanted Leesburg, McCall could have taken it without the loss of a man, as his movement in mass had already caused its evacuation, and the enemy did not return in force until after McCall had retreated. If we did not wish to capture Leesburg, why did we cross at all? Of what use is "a slight demonstration" even, without results? These are questions which the people will ask, and no man can satisfactorily answer. Why were not reinforcements sent from Edward's Ferry to Colonel Baker? The distance was only three-and-a-half miles. We had 1,500 men across at two o'clock on Monday, and the universal concurrent testimony of officers and men is that a reinforcement of even 1,000 men—some say 500, and one gallant captain swears that with 100 men he could have struck them upon the flank,—would have changed the result of the day. Why were not reinforcements sent? Stone swears, as I have already shown, that there were batteries between Edward's Ferry and Ball's Bluff which would have utterly destroyed any force he could have sent to Baker's relief, and that Baker knew it. But Stone was not sustained by a single witness; on the contrary, all swear that there were not, to their knowledge, and that they did not believe there were any, and a civilian living upon the spot, and in the habit of passing over the ground frequently, swears there were none; and again, Stone, when questioned as to the erection of forts under the range of his guns upon his second examination, swears positively that there is not a gun now between Edward's Ferry and Ball's Bluff, and never has been. Why, then, were not reinforcements sent from Edward's Ferry? Let the men who executed and planned this horrible slaughter answer to God and an outraged country. General Banks swears that his orders were such from General McClellan, that, upon his arrival at Edward's Ferry, although his judgment was against crossing, he did not feel himself at liberty to decline crossing, and he remained upon the Virginia side until Thursday.... So much for the wholesale murder at Ball's Bluff.
Mr. Chandler next attacked General McClellan's disastrous procrastination. Describing the lapse of an army of 150,000 men into a state of chronic inaction in its intrenchments about Washington after the Ball's Bluff disaster, he laid before the Senate and the country documents which proved these facts: In October, 1861, the Navy Department requested that 4,000 men might be detailed to hold Matthias Point on the lower Potomac, after the gunboats should have shelled out the rebels, who were then in possession, and thus in control of the navigation of that important river. General McClellan agreed to furnish the infantry; twice the Navy Department prepared its vessels for the expedition, but the troops did not report for duty, so that, finally, the gunboats were necessarily detailed for other service, and the unnecessary, expensive and humiliating blockade of the Potomac continued for months. Mr. Chandler then proceeded:
Why was this disgrace so long submitted to? No man knows or attempts to explain. Month after month one of the most splendid armies the world had ever seen, of 200,000 men, permitted itself and the national capital to be besieged by a force never exceeding one-half its own number.
During the month of December, the nation became impatient. The time had arrived and passed when we were promised a forward movement. The roads were good, the weather splendid, the army in high condition, and eager for the fray. How long the roads and weather would permit the movement, no man could predict; still there was no movement. The generals, with great unanimity, declared that the army had reached its maximum of proficiency as volunteers, but still there was no movement. Under these circumstances, the Committee on the Conduct of the War asked an interview with the President and Cabinet, and urged that the winter should not be permitted to pass without action, as it would lead to an incalculable loss of life and treasure by forcing our brave troops into a summer campaign, in a hot and to them inhospitable climate. The President and Cabinet were united in the desire that an immediate advance should be made, but it was not made, although we were assured by General McClellan that it would be very soon, that he had no intention of going into winter quarters, and he did not! While the enemy erected comfortable huts at Centreville and Manassas for their winter quarters, our brave and eager troops spent the most uncomfortable winter ever known in this climate under canvas, as thousands and tens of thousands of invalid soldiers throughout the length and breadth of the land will attest. Why did not the army move in all December, or why did it not go into winter quarters? No man knows, nor is any reason assigned.
On the 1st day of January, 1862, and for months previous to that date, the armies of the republic were occupying a purely defensive position upon the whole line from Missouri to the Atlantic, until on or about the 27th of January the President and Secretary of War issued the order forward. Then the brave Foote took the initiative, soliciting 2,000 men from Halleck to hold Fort Henry after he had captured it with his gunboats. They were promptly furnished, and Henry fell; then Donelson, with its 15,000 prisoners; then Newbern, and the country was electrified. Credit was given where credit was due. Do-nothing strategy gave way to an "immediate advance upon the enemy's works," and the days of spades and pickaxes seemed to be ended. On the 22d of February a forward movement upon our whole line was ordered, but did not take place. The Army of the Potomac was not ready; but on the 10th of March it moved, against the protest of the commanding general and eight out of twelve of the commanders of divisions; but the President was inexorable, and the movement must be made. It proceeded to Centreville, and there found deserted huts, wooden artillery, and intrenchments which could and can be successfully charged by cavalry. It proceeded to Manassas, and found no fortifications worthy of the name, a deserted, abandoned camp, and dead horses for trophies. The enemy, less than 40,000 men, had leisurely escaped, carrying away all their artillery, baggage, arms, and stores. Our Army of the Potomac, on that 10th day of March, showed by its muster-roll a force of 230,000 men. Comment is needless! The Grand Army of the Potomac proceeded toward Gordonsville, found no enemy, repaired the railroad, and then marched back again.
Why this Grand Army of the Potomac did not march upon Richmond has never been satisfactorily explained, and probably never will be. One reason assigned was lack of transportation; but there were two railroads, one by way of Acquia Creek and Fredericksburg, the other via Manassas and Gordonsville, which could have been repaired at the rate of ten miles per day, and our army was ample to guard it. Had this overwhelming force proceeded directly to Richmond by these lines, it would have spent the 1st day of May in Richmond, and ere this the rebellion would have been ended. This grand army, ably commanded, was superior to any army the world has seen for five hundred years. Napoleon I. never fought 130,000 men upon one battle-field. Yet this noble army was divided and virtually sacrificed by some one. Who is the culprit?
Before the advance upon Manassas, General McClellan changed his plans, and demanded to be permitted to leave the enemy intrenched at Centreville and Manassas; to leave the Potomac blockaded, and to take his army to Annapolis by land, and there embark them for the rear of the enemy to surprise him. In the council of war called upon this proposition, the commanding general and eight out of twelve of the commanders of divisions (and here permit me to say that I am informed that seven out of the eight generals were appointed upon the recommendation of General McClellan) voted that it was not safe to advance upon the wooden guns of Centreville, and to adopt the new plan of campaign. The President and the Secretary of War overruled this pusillanimous decision, and compelled McClellan to "move immediately upon the enemy's works." He marched, and the trophies of that memorable campaign are known to the Senate and the country.
At Fairfax, General McClellan changed his plan and decided not to advance upon the rebels with his whole force, but to return to Alexandria, divide his army, and embark for Fortress Monroe and Yorktown. It was decided that 45,000 men should be left for the defense of the capital, and he was permitted to embark. After much delay (unavoidable in the movement of so vast a force, with its enormous material) the general-in-chief himself embarked. Soon after he sailed it came to the knowledge of the Committee on the Conduct of the War that the capital, with its vast accumulation of material of war, had been left by General McClellan virtually without defense, and the enemy's whole force, large or small, was untouched in front. [Mr. Chandler here introduced the official testimony to prove that General McClellan had so denuded Washington as to compel the President to interpose and detain General McDowell's corps for its adequate defense. He then said:] The country has been deceived. It has been led to believe that the Secretary of War or somebody else has interfered with General McClellan's plans, when he had an army that could have crushed any other army on the face of the earth. One hundred and fifty-eight thousand of the best troops that ever stood on God's footstool were sent down to the Peninsula and placed under command of General McClellan; and yet the whole treasonable press of the country has been howling after the Secretary of War because of his alleged refusal to send reinforcements to General McClellan. As I said the other day, he has sent every man, every sabre, every bayonet, every horse, that could be spared from any source whatever to increase that grand army under General McClellan in front of Richmond. Why did he not enter Richmond? We shall see.... It is not for me, sir, to state the strength of McClellan's army at this time; but I know it is 158,000 men, less the number lost by sickness and casualties. Does any man doubt that this army, ably handled, was sufficiently strong to have captured Richmond and crushed the rebel army? I think not, if promptly led against the enemy; but instead of that, it sat down in malarious swamps and awaited the drafting, arming, drilling, and making soldiers of an army to fight it, and in the meantime our own army was rapidly wasting away. Unwholesome water, inadequate food, overwork, and sleeping in marshes, were rapidly filling the hospitals, and overloading the return boats with the sick. Sir, we have lost more men by the spade than the bullet, five to one, since the army started from Yorktown under McClellan. Had the soldiers been relieved from digging and menial labor by the substitution of negro laborers, the Army of the Potomac would to-day, in my estimation, contain 30,000 more brave and efficient soldiers than it does. Had it been relieved from guarding the property of rebels in arms, many valuable lives would have been saved. Yorktown was evacuated after a sacrifice of more men by sickness than the enemy had in their works when our army landed at Fortress Monroe. The battle of Williamsburg was fought by a small fraction of our army, and the enemy routed. During the battle, General McClellan wrote a dispatch, miles from the field of battle, saying he should try to "hold them in check" there.... He would try to "hold them in check!" He could not hold them. He could not stop his eager troops from chasing them. After a small fraction of his army had whipped their entire force and had been chasing them for hours, he penned that dispatch and sent it to the Secretary of War, and, if I remember aright, it was read in one of the two houses of Congress. As you may suppose from that dispatch, there was no great eagerness in following up that victory. Three Michigan regiments were not only decimated, they were divided in twain, in that bloody battle at Williamsburg. They fought there all day without reinforcements. One Michigan regiment went into the trenches and left sixty-three dead rebels, killed by the bayonet, weltering in their blood. But who has ever heard, by any official communication from the head of the army, that a Michigan regiment was in the fight at Williamsburg? I do not blame him for not giving credit where credit is due, for I do not believe he knew anything more of that fight than you or I.
When that battle was fought and won, all the enemy's works were cleared away, and we had an open road to Richmond. There was not a single fortification between Richmond and Williamsburg. All we had to do was to get through those infernal swamps, march up, and take possession of Richmond. What did we do? We found the worst swamp there was between Richmond and Williamsburg, and sat right down in the center of it and went to digging. We sacrificed thousands and tens of thousands of the bravest troops that ever stood on the face of God's earth, digging in front of no intrenchments, and before a whipped army of the enemy. We waited for them to recruit; we waited for them to get another army. They had a levy en masse. They were taking all the men and boys between the ages of fifteen and fifty-five, and magnanimously we waited weeks and weeks and weeks for them to bring these forced levies into some sort of consistency as an army. The battle of Fair Oaks was fought. There the enemy found again a little fraction of our army, very much less than half, and they brought out their entire force. I have it from the best authority that they had not a solitary regiment in or about Richmond that was fit to put in front of an enemy that they did not bring to Fair Oaks and hurl upon our decimated army. Again the indomitable bravery of our troops (of the men, of private soldiers, the indomitable energy of Michigan men and New Jersey men—but I will not particularize, for all the troops fought like lions), and the fighting capacity of our army not only saved it from being utterly destroyed by an overwhelming force, but gave us a triumphant victory. The enemy went back to Richmond pell-mell. I have been informed by a man who was there at the time, that two brigades of fresh troops could have chased the whole Confederate army through the city of Richmond and into the James river, so utter was their rout and confusion.
And what did we do then? We found another big swamp, and we sat down in the center of it and went to digging. We began to throw up intrenchments when there were no intrenchments in our front, no enemy that was not utterly broken. We never took advantage of the battle of Fair Oaks. Again Michigan soldiers were cut to pieces by hundreds. Go into the Judiciary square hospital in this city, and you will find more than half the occupants are Michigan men who were shot at Fair Oaks and Williamsburg, men who stood until a regiment of 1,000 men was reduced to 105, and even then did not run. Sir, these men have been sacrificed, uselessly sacrificed. They have been put to hard digging, and hard fare, and hard sleeping, and if there was any hard fighting to do they have been put to that; and, besides all this, at night they have had to guard the property of rebels in arms. They have been so sacrificed that two or three of the Michigan regiments to-day cannot bring into the field 250 men each out of 1,000 with whom they started.
Fair Oaks was lost; that is to say, we won a brilliant victory, but it did us no good; we did not take advantage of it. Of course it would have been very unfair to take advantage of a routed army [laughter]; it would not have been according to our "strategy." We magnanimously stopped, and commenced digging. There was no army in our front, there were no intrenchments in our front; but we did not know what else to do, and so we began to dig and ditch, and we kept digging and ditching until the rebels had impressed and drilled and armed and made soldiers of their entire population. But that was not enough; they sent Jackson up on his raid to Winchester, and we waited for him to come back with his twenty or thirty thousand men. We heard that Corinth was being evacuated, and of course it would have been very unfair to commence an attack until they brought their troops from Corinth, and so we waited for the army at Corinth to get to Richmond. After the rebels had got all the troops they ever hoped to raise from any source, we did not attack them, but they attacked us, as we had reason to suppose they would. They attacked our right wing, and, as I am informed upon what I must deem reliable authority, they hurled the majority of their entire force upon our right wing of 30,000 men, and during the whole of that Thursday our right wing of 30,000 men held their ground, and repulsed that vast horde of the enemy over and over again, and held their ground at night. Of course you will say a reinforcement of twenty or thirty thousand men was sent to these brave troops that they might not only hold their ground the next day, but send this dastardly army into Richmond a second time, as at Fair Oaks. No, sir, nothing of the sort was done.
At night, instead of sending them reinforcements, they were ordered to retreat. That was "strategy!" The moment they commenced their retreat, as is said in the dispatches, the enemy fought like demons. Of course they would. Who ever heard of a retreating army that was not pursued by the victors like demons, except in the case of rebel retreats? No other nation but ours was ever guilty of stopping immediately after a victory. Other armies fight like demons after a victory, and annihilate the enemy, but we do not. Our left wing and center remained intact. A feint was made upon the left and center, and I have here, not the sworn testimony, but the statement of one of the bravest men in the whole Army of the Potomac—I will not give his name, but a more highly honorable man lives not—that when his regiment was ordered under arms, he had no doubt that he was going to march into Richmond. He believed the whole force of the enemy had attacked our right wing; he believed there was nothing but a screen of pickets in front; and he thought that now our great triumph was to come off. His men sprang into line with avidity, prepared to rush into Richmond and take it at the point of the bayonet. He never discovered his error until he saw a million and a half dollars' worth of property burned in front of his regiment, and then he began to think that an advance upon Richmond was not intended. And it was not! We had been at work there and had lost 10,000 men in digging intrenchments; we had spent months in bringing up siege guns, and we abandoned those intrenchments without firing one gun. Our army was ordered to advance on the gunboats instead of on Richmond. This colonel told me that his regiment fought three days and whipped the enemy each day, and retreated each night. The left wing and center were untouched until they were ordered to retreat. No portion of our vast force had been fought except the right wing under Porter, and they whipped the enemy the first day.
This is called strategy! Again, sir, I ask, Why was this great Army of the Potomac of 230,000 men divided? Human ingenuity could not have devised any other way to defeat that army; Divine wisdom could scarcely have devised any other way to defeat it than that which was adopted. There is no army in Europe to-day that could meet the Army of the Potomac when it was 230,000 strong, the best fighting material ever put into an army on the face of the earth. Why was that grand army divided? I simply charge that grave and serious errors have been committed, and, as I have said, no other way could have been devised to defeat that army. If the 158,000 men that were sent to General McClellan had been marched upon the enemy, they could have whipped all the armies the Confederates have, and all they are likely to have for six months. One hundred and fifty-eight thousand men are about as many as can be fought on any one battle-field. One hundred and fifty-eight thousand men are a vast army, a great deal larger army than that with which Napoleon destroyed 600,000 of the Austrians in a single year. One hundred and fifty-eight thousand men ably handled can defeat any force the Confederates can raise; and that is the force that went down to the Peninsula. But, sir, it lay in ditches, digging, drinking rotten water, and eating bad food, and sleeping in the mud, until it became greatly reduced in numbers, and of those that were left very many were injured in health. Still they fought; still they conquered in every fight, and still they retreated, because they were ordered to retreat.
Sir, I have deemed it my duty to present this statement of facts to the Senate and the country. I know that I am to be denounced for so doing, and I tell you who will denounce me. There are two classes of men who are sure to denounce me, and no one else, and they are traitors and fools. The traitors have been denouncing every man who did not sing pæans to "strategy," when it led to defeat every time. The traitors North are worse than the traitors South, and sometimes I think we have as many of them in the aggregate. They are meaner men; they are men who will come behind you and cut your throat in the dark. I have great respect for Southern traitors who shoulder their muskets and come out and take the chances of the bullets and the halter; but I have the most superlative contempt for the Northern traitors, who, under the pretended guise of patriotism, are stabbing their country in the dark.
The effect of this speech was profound. It enraged McClellan's friends to the highest pitch; it was not supported at the time by any like utterance in Congress, and at first many who believed it to be true condemned, or at least deprecated, the fierceness of the attack; but those who knew that "the young Napoleon" at heart preferred a pro-slavery compromise to the conquest of a durable and honorable peace, and who had marked with righteous indignation the attempt of his claquers to make the Secretary of War the scape-goat for his own blunders, greeted with enthusiasm the signal courage of the man who, in the face of abuse, prejudice, and popular blindness, dared to tell with words of rugged force this story of disastrous imbecility. Mr. Chandler disregarded the remonstrances of weak friends, and met without quailing the storm of vituperation he had invited. Events made themselves his justifiers and within four months[24] President Lincoln, with the full approval of the patriotic masses of the North, relieved General McClellan from all command and abruptly terminated his military career. Nothing contributed more to this salutary change than Mr. Chandler's arraignment, of which it has been well said, that "with words resembling battles he told the American people that they were leaning upon a broken reed, that 'the idol of the soldiers' was as incapable of helping them as the idols of the heathen, and that McClellan was only digging graves for the brave men who followed him and a last ditch for the cause he defended; he shocked by his language the mass of the people into a right comprehension of the death's dance this military Jack-o'-lantern was leading them through the swamps of Virginia."
Mr. Chandler, who took this step after full deliberation and not from any passing impulse, rated the McClellan speech as his most important public service, alike in its necessity, its timeliness, and its results. He also felt that it involved more real hazard, and made larger demands upon his courage, than any other act of his Senatorial career, for such relentless invective could scarcely fail to mortally wound either its object or its maker. Had time shown that he had uttered calumnies and not the sober truth, he would have been inevitably driven from public life; and even when he spoke, the men who thoroughly doubted McClellan were still a small minority. History has shown that his indictment was as true in substance as it was unsparing in terms and bold in spirit.
Two other matters naturally group themselves with this speech: Mr. Chandler distrusted McClellanism in the Army of the Potomac as thoroughly as he did McClellan. The investigations of this committee convinced him that General Pope's campaign was so unfortunate because of the insubordination of General McClellan's friends among the corps commanders, and led him to believe that the same cause crippled the movements of both Burnside and Hooker, who, if faithfully supported, would have won decisive victories. So strong were his convictions on these points, that when General Grant became commander-in-chief he called upon the Secretary of War and requested him to make out a list of the incompetent, suspected and insubordinate generals of the Army of the Potomac, to be furnished to that officer so that he would be able to place them where they could do the least harm in the service. This Secretary Stanton promised to do. A few days afterward Mr. Chandler called again at the War Department, and, learning that this had not yet been done, said, "I will make out the list myself and send it to Grant;" and he did so, Major-Gen. C. C. Washburn being its bearer. Mr. Chandler carefully studied and vigilantly watched the Fitz-John Porter case, and approved of the findings of the court-martial, except the failure to inflict the death penalty, which he believed that the character and consequences of Porter's action fully merited. The attempt to secure the reversal of this verdict and the re-instatement in the army of the dismissed officer aroused his sternest indignation, and he fought it resolutely at every stage—and successfully, while he remained in the Senate. He spoke at length on this subject in that body on Feb. 21, 1870, declaring that he did so in fulfillment of a voluntary pledge given some years before in the same chamber to General Pope, "that justice should be done to him and to his campaign in the valley of Virginia, even although I were called upon to vindicate him from my seat in the Senate." After rehearsing the facts connected with Pope's movement, which was planned to create a diversion of Lee's army for the extrication of McClellan's forces from the Peninsula, in conformity with the suggestion of Gen. James S. Wadsworth, and showing that Pope had frequently requested to be relieved from the hazardous work laid out for him and that he had only a force of 42,000 men scattered between Harper's Ferry and Acquia Creek, Mr. Chandler said:
I asked him in the presence of the committee: "What is to prevent you from being struck by a superior force of the enemy and overwhelmed?" Said he: "Nothing on earth is more probable than that I shall be struck by a superior force and shall be whipped; but I will keep my troops near the mountains, and there are no ten miles where there is not a gulch up which I can take my men and small-arms, and, by abandoning my artillery and baggage, save my men; I shall probably be whipped, but it must be done." Any military man can see and appreciate the difficulties and responsibilities of so desperate a campaign. "Yet," said he, "it must be done."
Well, sir, General Pope started on that campaign. Had he announced to the newspaper press of Washington, or of the North, the number of his men or his object, the object itself would have been defeated. General Pope did what I believe is allowable in war: he perpetrated a ruse de guerre. He sent his scouts all through the mountains of Virginia proclaiming that he had an army of 120,000 men. And, sir, he fooled the newspaper correspondents of the city of Washington and of the whole North. General Pope, when he started on that campaign, had no more idea of going to Richmond than he had of following Elijah to Heaven in a chariot of fire without seeing death. He started with one single object, and that was to save the army of McClellan, or to do all that was in his power to save it. He massed his troops, and that terrible battle of Cedar Mountain was fought; and by that battle he not only fooled the people of this country, but he fooled the rebels. The rebels believed that he had 120,000 men, and that, unless they fought him and crushed him before he could unite with the Army of the Potomac, their cause was lost; and he drew upon his shoulders with that little force the whole rebel army, so that, when McClellan started for Yorktown, there was not even a popgun fired at his troops. The ruse was a perfect success, and, as I told General Pope then, "I consider that your campaign has been one of the most brilliant that has been fought up to this time"—which was February, 1863—"you saved two armies; you first saved the Army of the Potomac, and then you saved your own."
Sir, General Pope fought for eleven days, fought night and day, fought the whole rebel army with his little force, his force never having exceeded 70,000 men,—comprising not simply his own army, but also General Burnside's forces, and the 20,000 men who had in thirty days been brought up from the Army of the Potomac, and of whom Porter's corps was part. The force which he had met with these was that originally in his front, but overwhelmingly augmented by that rebel force from which McClellan, with his 90,000 men, had to be delivered by a demonstration in their rear. He fought for time. He defended every brook, every barn, every piece of woods, every ravine. He fought for time for the Army of the Potomac to reach him and unite with him, so as to crush the advancing and overwhelming force of the rebels.
Mr. Chandler then reviewed at length (and with copious citations from the testimony of eye-witnesses and the official orders) the facts as to Fitz-John Porter's course in Pope's campaign, adding extracts from the reports of rebel officers which had come into the possession of the government since the war, and closed as follows:
Mr. President, if I had more time I should like to go more fully into this subject; but I cannot. The court, after forty-five days spent in careful investigation, brought in unanimously the verdict against Porter. Many of the members of that court were in favor of sentencing him to suffer death. It is rumored, and many believe, that the only reason the death-penalty was not inflicted was the fear that Mr. Lincoln, whose kindness of heart was so well-known, would not execute the sentence; and, hence, they unanimously brought in the verdict they did. It was first carefully examined seriatim by the then Secretary of War and the President. No more just tribunal ever investigated a case, I presume to assert, than this tribunal, and there its finding stands.
It may be asked, How came it that a misunderstanding, almost as universal as complete, was suffered to be put upon the country? General Pope himself says: "The next day it (my report) was delivered to General Halleck; but by that time influences of questionable character, and transactions of most unquestionable impropriety, which were well known at the time, had entirely changed the purposes of the authorities. It is not necessary, and, perhaps, would scarcely be in place, for me to recount these things."
It is as well known to others present as to me that, during that gloomy, eventful Sunday which succeeded the last battle on Saturday, the 30th of August, the President and Mr. Stanton were overrun and overcome with statements that, unless McClellan was restored to command "the army would not fight." These statements came from men who did not mean it should fight, who could not in the exigency of the moment be displaced. The President was able afterward to relieve McClellan and court-martial Porter. Had he lived, he would have seen justice to General Pope awarded also. It remains for me, while I live, to do my portion of that duty.
There is one other point to which I wish to allude. During this very trial—during the very pendency of the trial—Fitz-John Porter said, in the presence of my informant, who is a man whom most of you know, and who is to-day in the employment of Congress, and whose word I would take as soon as I would most men's—though I told him I would not use his name, but I will give his sworn testimony, taken down within two minutes after the utterance was made—Fitz-John Porter said in his presence: "I was not true to Pope, and there is no use in denying it." Mr. President, what was "not true to Pope"? If he was not true to Pope, whom was he true to? Being true to Pope was being true to the country; "not true to Pope" was being a traitor to the country. Sir, "not true to Pope" meant the terrible fight of the 30th of August, with all the blood and all the horrors of that bitter day; "not true to Pope" meant the battle of Antietam, with its thousands of slain and its other thousands maimed; "not true to Pope" meant the first battle of Fredericksburg, with its 20,000 slain and maimed; "not true to Pope" covered the battles of the Wilderness and Cold Harbor, and all the dreadful battles that followed. Had Fitz-John Porter been true to his government, Jackson would have been destroyed on the 29th of August, and on the 30th the rebels could scarcely have offered any resistance to our victorious army. "Not true to Pope" meant 300,000 slain and 2,000,000,000 of additional dollars expended.
Sir, I wish to put this on the record for all time, that it may remain. Let Fitz-John Porter thank God that he yet lives, and that he was not living at that time under a military government. I told General Pope, in the first interview I had with him, that I had but one fault to find in the whole conduct of the campaign. He asked, "What is that?" Said I, "That you ever allowed Fitz-John Porter to leave the battle-field alive!"
In 1877 Porter at last succeeded, by the most persistent effort, in obtaining the order for the re-examination of his case, and when Mr. Chandler re-entered the Senate in 1879, he found himself confronting an organized movement to secure that officer's restoration to his old rank with full pay since the date of his dishonorable dismissal from the army. To this contemplated action he proposed to offer the most strenuous resistance, and the last volumes he drew from the Congressional Library were authorities he wished to consult in the preparation of his argument against the reversal of the Porter finding.
Mr. Chandler's positive opinions in the McClellan and Porter cases were shared by his colleagues of the Committee on the Conduct of the War of the Thirty-seventh Congress, and are justified by their elaborate reports covering the history of the Army of the Potomac from the battle of Ball's Bluff to the close of the Fredericksburg campaign. The Thirty-eighth Senate adopted a resolution continuing the existence of this committee, and, the House concurring, the old members, so far as they were in Congress, were re-appointed. Senator Harding of Oregon took the place of Mr. Wright, and afterward Mr. Buckalew of Pennsylvania succeeded Mr. Harding. From the House, Mr. B. F. Loan of Missouri was appointed as the successor of Mr. Covode. Wm. Blair Lord was re-elected clerk and stenographer. This committee also devoted much of its time to the troubles of the Army of the Potomac. General Burnside had resigned the command because of a misunderstanding with the President, brought about by the interference of Gens. John Cochrane and John Newton, and General Hooker was appointed in his place, with General Halleck as commander-in-chief. But Halleck disliked Hooker, and forced his resignation by overruling his plans and countermanding his orders, General Meade succeeding. The committee examined closely into this matter, reaching the conclusion that Hooker had not been fairly dealt with, and incidentally disposing of the false statement then current that that officer was intoxicated at the battle of Chancellorsville, and was defeated from that cause. The committee condemned Hooker's removal, and Mr. Chandler firmly believed in his courage, patriotism and ability, and regarded him as the victim of circumstances. These facts make it an interesting coincidence that these two men—both bold, frank and positive in their respective spheres of public activity—should have died sudden and painless deaths within the same week.
The committee did not believe that the selection of General Meade for the command of the Army of the Potomac was a fortunate one, and doubted his ability to properly control his subordinates. While there is no reference to the matter in their report on this subject, it is a fact that they recommended the removal of General Meade from command, and the re-instatement of Hooker. On the 4th of March, 1864, Mr. Chandler and Mr. Wade called upon the President, and told him that they believed it to be their duty, impressed as they were with the testimony the committee had taken, to lay a copy of it before him, and in behalf of the army and the country demand the removal of General Meade, and the appointment of some one more competent to command. The President asked what general they could recommend; they said that for themselves they would be content with General Hooker, believing him to be competent, but not being advocates of any particular officer, they would say that if there was any one whom the President considered more competent, then let him be appointed. They added that "Congress had appointed the committee to watch the conduct of the war; and unless this state of things should be soon changed it would become their duty to make the testimony public which they had taken, with such comments as the circumstances of the case seemed to require." General Meade was not removed, but General Grant was, within a week, given command as general-in-chief, and assumed personal direction of the movements of the Army of the Potomac.
During 1864 and 1865 the committee (besides considering many minor matters) also investigated, with care:
1. The disastrous assault upon Petersburg on July 30, 1864; their report exonerated General Burnside from the responsibility for the repulse, and held that the disaster was attributable to the interference with his plans of General Meade, whose course in the matter was severely censured.
2. The unsuccessful expedition of 1864 up the Red river in Louisiana, which the committee (Mr. Gooch dissenting) emphatically condemned.
3. The first Fort Fisher expedition, the committee, in its report, approving of General Butler's course in withdrawing from the projected assault.
During the inquiry into the Petersburg fiasco, the sub-committee were in session at General Grant's headquarters, and Mr. Chandler was his guest, renewing there an early acquaintance and laying the foundations of their future close friendship. Some incidents of their intercourse were characteristic.
General Sherman had just reached Savannah, and the mystery of the objective point of his great "march to the sea" had thus been solved for the public. This memorable exploit was discussed at length between General Grant and Mr. Chandler. The former said that the suggestion was Sherman's, and so was the entire plan of the campaign. Sherman had urged it for a long time before he (Grant) would consent, but finally the conditions were ripe, and the order was given. General Grant added that Sherman was the only man in the army whom he would have entrusted this campaign to, as he was especially adapted for such a command, and said: "Congress ought to do something for Sherman. He deserves a great deal more credit and honor than he has ever received." "What can we do for him?" asked Mr. Chandler. "Increase his rank," was the reply. "We have made you lieutenant general," responded Mr. Chandler, laughingly, "and I suppose we could make him a general, and thus put him over you." "Do it," said Grant, promptly. "If he carries this campaign through successfully, do it. I would rather serve under Sherman than any man I know." General Grant also said that when he received a dispatch that Thomas had attacked Hood, he felt that a great victory was already won. He added: "I did not have any anxiety about the result; when Thomas attacks, a victory is sure. He is a slow man, but he is the surest man I know. Once in motion, he is the hardest man to fight in this army. He never precipitates a battle unless he is all ready, and knows his points, and you may rest easy when he attacks, for the next news will be the enemy's rout. When Thomas once gets in motion the rebels have not force enough to stop him."
Upon the final adjournment of the Thirty-eighth Congress (on March 4, 1865) it continued the existence of the Committee on the Conduct of the War for ninety days, in order to afford it time to finish its work. During this period it closed up some pending inquiries and prepared its final reports. Its last action was an examination into General Sherman's unauthorized and unfortunate negotiations with General Johnston, which the committee disapproved and that officer's superiors promptly repudiated. The final report of the committee bears the date of the 22d of May, 1865, and its closing passages are as follows:
Your committee, at the close of the labors in which the most of them have been engaged for nearly four years past, take occasion to submit a few general observations in regard to their investigations. They commenced them at a time when the government was still engaged in organizing its first great armies, and before any important victory had given token of its ability to crush out the rebellion by the strong hand of physical power. They have continued them until the rebellion has been overthrown, the so-called Confederate government been made a thing of the past, and the chief of that treasonable organization is a proclaimed felon in the hands of our authorities. And soon the military and naval forces, whose deeds have been the subjects of our inquiry, will return to the ways of peace and the pursuits of civil life, from which they have been called for a time by the danger which threatened their country. Yet while we welcome those brave veterans on their return from fields made historical by their gallant achievements, our joy is saddened as we view their thinned ranks and reflect that tens of thousands, as brave as they, have fallen victims to that savage and infernal spirit which actuated those who spared not the prisoners at their mercy, who sought by midnight arson to destroy hundreds of defenseless women and children, and who hesitated not to resort to means and to commit acts so horrible that the nations of the earth stand aghast as they are told what has been done. It is a matter for congratulation that, notwithstanding the greatest provocations to pursue a different course, our authorities have ever treated their prisoners humanely and generously, and have in all respects conducted this contest according to the rules of the most civilized warfare....
Your committee would refer to the record of their labors to show the spirit and purpose by which they have been governed in their investigations. They have not sought to accomplish any purpose other than to elicit the truth; to that end have all their labors been directed. If they have failed at any time to accomplish that purpose, it has been from causes beyond their control. Their work is before the people, and by it they are willing to be judged.
The volumes which contain the official record of the proceedings of the Committee on the Conduct of the War are and always must be regarded as the most valuable single magazine of historical material relating to the Great Rebellion. They have been liberally used in the preparation of every important account of our civil strife yet published, and the men, who shall in the light of another century estimate the greatness and significance of that "throe of progress," will inevitably look in their pages to the graphic narratives of those who were parts of memorable movements and actors in famous battles as a means of information, and to the conclusions of those who prosecuted inquiries so zealously when the events were yet fresh in the memory as a source of guidance. Infallibility is not a human attribute, and the work of this committee was not free from misapprehension and mistake. Time, which has shown some of its errors and will correct others, has also sustained the essential justice of its most important conclusions, which will stand unreversed on the pages of impartial history.
But the chief value of the labors of this committee is not to be found in its collection of rich materials for the future chronicler. To its unrecorded but potent influence upon the conduct of the war, adequate justice has not yet been done. Its unwearied investigations constantly exposed corruption, incompetence, and insubordination, and placed in the hands of the authorities the means of discovering and punishing the knavish, the weak, and the disloyal. Its activity was a perpetual prompter to energy, and a vigilant detective by the side of inefficiency and disaffection. As the result of its labors, the unsuccessful, the half-hearted, and the traitorous gave way to the able and the patriotic; because of the knowledge of its relentless questioning, indolent men were vigilant, and laxity was transformed into vigor. Its unremitting labors stayed up the hands of the War Secretary in the heaviest hours of his great task, and usefully informed the counsels and shaped the decisions of the White House. If its every session had been permanently secret, and not a line of its proceedings existed as a public record, there would still remain an ineffaceable transcript of the results of its action in the correcting of mistakes of organization and that crushing of sham generalship which alone made final victory possible.