FOOTNOTES:

[34] To a letter of confidence and congratulation, written to him at the time of his last Senatorial election, by a committee of the colored citizens of East Saginaw, Mich., Mr. Chandler replied (under date of Feb. 20, 1879): "I hope to be able to assist in the grand but unfinished work of securing equal political rights for every citizen of this country, black as well as white, South as well as North."

[35] The value of this class of documents will further appear from two quotations from the official "Digest of the Report of the Southern Claims Commission upon the Disallowed Claims," only two being taken where many might be. "Claim No. 193" was preferred before this Commission by W. R. Alexander of Dickson, Ala., for $13,443, for cotton and horses furnished to the Union army. Mr. Alexander produced evidence to show, and swore himself, that he had been a consistent Union man. The Digest (1 vol., p. 55) says: "Among the papers of the rebel government found at Richmond is a letter, now in the War Department, a copy of which Adjutant-General Townsend has furnished to us. It reads as follows:

"'Dickson, Ala., August 1, 1861.

"Sir: I have heard that the War Department was scarce of arms, and I have taken it upon myself to look up all the old muskets I can find and I now send them to you, and I hope they will kill many a Yankee. I have had one musket fixed to my notion, which I send with the others for a model. All here are delighted with our victory, both white and black. Yours, respectfully,

WM. R. ALEXANDER.

"P. S. I send these guns, ten in number, to the Ordnance Department, Richmond, Virginia.

W. R. A.

"The Hon. L. P. Walker."

"On October 11, 1872, the counsel for the claimant, John J. Key, Esq., appeared before the Commissioners and requested that the claim be withdrawn, admitting the disloyalty of the claimant. The claim is rejected."

"Claim 135" was preferred by J. P. Levy of Wilmington, N. C., for $10,000. After he had sworn to his own loyalty, he was called upon to face some letters found in the rebel archives. The Commission say (p. 33, 1 vol., Digest): "The original letters were furnished the Commission by the War Department from the captured rebel archives, and copies of several of them were filed with this report.... We have in them the claimant at the outbreak of the war calling upon the rebel government to punish the superintendent of his brother's plantation for insulting the rebel flag; and, again, asking the rebel Congress to pass a law granting him his brother's plantation on account of his signal service to the rebel cause; and, again, offering a ship, to be commanded by himself, for the rebel service; also, tendering for the benefit of the rebel army, patent fuse train and soda baking-powders, and boasting and complaining of the large amount due him from the rebel government for supplies for the rebel army. And now this shameless traitor, perjurer and swindler comes before us and swears, with brazen effrontery, that the government of the United States owes him, as a loyal adherent to the cause of the Union and the government throughout the war of the rebellion, for supplies furnished the army, the sum of $10,000. We reject this claim."

CHAPTER XVIII.
THE MAINTENANCE OF A SOUND CURRENCY AND THE PUBLIC FAITH.

In 1873 the bubble of an irredeemable currency, inflated prices, and wild speculation burst in the United States, and the era of universal shrinkage, commercial collapse, and industrial stagnation began. The financial condition of the government and the people at once became the absorbing topic of public discussion, and for five years the questions connected with the currency and the national credit were those which most completely absorbed popular attention. Mr. Chandler's share in the prolonged controversy over the financial problem was a conspicuous one; he came into it equipped with clear ideas and a consistent record; he contended for the causes of rational finance and public honesty without wavering in the face of the strongest opposition, and without any departure from sound doctrine; and he saw the courage and persistence of those with whom he acted finally rewarded by the enlightenment of the people, the restoration of a convertible currency, and the raising of the credit of the United States to the highest standard. For obvious reasons his record upon all the phases of "the financial question" can be most satisfactorily treated in a single chapter. That record will show that he began at a point to which many other public men were brought only by years of education, and it well illustrates the clearness of his conceptions of the principles underlying questions connected with what may be called the practical departments of statesmanship.

Not the least of the difficulties, which at the outset confronted the administration of Abraham Lincoln, was the fact that the public treasury was empty and the national credit impaired. In October, 1860, the government had contracted a five per cent. loan of $7,000,000 at a small premium; four months later, a six per cent. loan had been sold with difficulty at about ninety cents on the dollar. It was true, by way of offset, that the country was in a generally prosperous condition. The commercial wrecks of 1857 had disappeared, crops were abundant, and general business had become again remunerative. This was an element of national strength, but it was not a quickly available resource. War meant large immediate expenditure, for which the means must be promptly provided. There was no time to create and organize upon an extensive scale the machinery of direct taxation, and some doubts were then felt as to whether the people would not grow restive under any general imposition of new burdens. The entire stock of coin in the North was estimated at but about $121,000,000, while the paper money in existence was exclusively composed of the notes of state banks organized under diverse and often insecure systems, and much of it circulated only at a discount. This condition of the currency created the fear that the rapid negotiation of large government loans could not be accomplished without the serious derangement of the money market; the withdrawal of considerable sums from circulation, even temporarily, business men believed would be impossible without great injury to domestic enterprise and commerce. All these circumstances forced the government (which found itself facing absolutely without preparation organized rebellion) to resort at once to the issue of a national paper currency in the form of non-interest-bearing treasury notes of small denominations. Congress, at its extra session in July, 1861, passed the necessary act for this purpose, and $50,000,000 of these notes ($10,000,000 more were subsequently authorized) were placed in circulation; originally they were made redeemable in coin on demand at any United States sub-treasury, and thus violated none of the established principles of sound finance. This expedient facilitated the negotiation of loans, and provided "the sinews of war" for 1861. But, when Congress met in December of that year, it had become plain that the struggle would be of indefinite duration, and that past expenditures would be greatly exceeded in the months to come. To add to the embarrassments of the situation, at about this time the banks of the North suspended specie payments, and the Treasury Department was compelled as a matter of self-protection to also stop redeeming in coin its own notes then outstanding. It was as a means of escape from this emergency, that the first issue of greenbacks was authorized (by the act of Feb. 25, 1862). These notes were not redeemable on demand, but to secure their free circulation they were made a "legal tender" for all purposes except the payment of duties and of the interest on the public debt. The abandonment of the self-operating method of redemption and the resort to the compulsion of the "legal tender" enactment, as a means of keeping these notes in circulation, constituted a step which the Thirty-seventh Congress took with extreme reluctance. A small minority of its members resisted this measure to the last, but what seemed to be the overshadowing necessities of the situation and the earnest appeals of Secretary Chase finally forced the passage of the law. Mr. Chandler was one of those who, without approving of the principle of this legislation, still voted for it, on the ground that it was essential to the public safety at that moment and justified by the urgency of the situation. But he regarded it as a temporary expedient, a mere plan for an emergency, and not as a permanent policy. The first act authorized the issue of $150,000,000 of "greenbacks" and directed the retiring of the $60,000,000 of treasury notes previously paid out; this $150,000,000 Mr. Chandler believed it was possible to so control and use as to avoid the evils inseparable from inflation. But the proposition to double the amount of "greenbacks," which came in less than half a year from the Treasury officials, he strenuously opposed. On June 17, 1862, he offered this resolution in the Senate:

Be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives, That the amount of "legal tender" treasury notes authorized by law shall never be increased.

On the following day he called up this resolution, and said:

The effect of the recommendation (to issue $300,000,000 of "legal tender" notes) has been most disastrous. The mere recommendation, without any action of Congress on the subject, has created such a panic, and has so convinced the moneyed centers of the world that we are to be flooded with this paper, that gold has risen in price from two and three-quarters to seven per cent. premium. National credit is precisely like individual credit. It is based, first, on the ability to pay; and, second, upon the high and honorable principle which would induce the payment of a liability. When the proposition to issue treasury notes was first made, it was received with great apprehension by Congress and by the nation.... There was at that time a vacuum for $50,000,000 that must be filled from some source.... I then believed that $100,000,000 was requisite, and that $100,000,000 was enough. I believe so now. When you issue $100,000,000 of currency you must either find a vacuum or you must create one for it. A hundred millions in addition to the existing circulation would at any time create great disturbance in the financial condition of this country.... The moment you authorize the issue of $300,000,000 your coin will rise to ten or twelve per cent., and your notes will full to 90 or 85. The result will be that the government will be paying just so much more for every article it purchases than it would if you kept your circulating notes at or about the value of coin.

Again, the moment you reduce the value of these notes, even to the point at which they now stand, even to seven per cent. discount, you drive out of circulation the coin of the country. The temptation is too strong to be resisted to use something else besides coin for change and for small circulation. Are we to be reduced to a shin-plaster circulation, as is the case to-day all through the South? That will be the result if you force upon the country an amount of circulating notes beyond its requirements.... I consider it a duty we owe to the country, a duty we owe to ourselves, to proclaim that under no circumstances shall a currency, irredeemable in coin, beyond the present issue of $150,000,000, be thrust upon the money markets of the country.

But the pressure toward a reckless currency expansion was irresistible, and the pending bill passed. Mr. Chandler's prophecies were promptly verified, for the gold premium rose and the "shin-plaster currency" made its appearance with but little delay. Moreover, these issues only stimulated the thirst they were intended to quench, and the general inflation of prices soon again produced an apparent scarcity of currency. Early in 1863 a demand came from Mr. Chase for authority to increase the "greenback" circulation to $400,000,000. Congress granted this application, but Mr. Chandler opposed it, saying in the Senate:

When the first proposition was made to issue $150,000,000 of treasury notes, I favored it; but when the proposition was made to increase that to $300,000,000, I opposed it.... I prophesied what the result of thus thrusting $300,000,000 of irredeemable paper upon an already overstocked market would be. I said it would carry up coin to an unlimited extent. The result has proved that my predictions were true. Now it is proposed to issue $400,000,000; we propose to thrust them upon an already over-supplied market.... It is our duty to protect the people, so far as in our power, from this great depreciation in the specie value of the circulating medium, and this we can only do by decreasing its volume.

The general positions which he stated thus early Mr. Chandler firmly held throughout every stage of the subsequent contest over the "currency question." He believed that irredeemable paper money, although issued by the government itself and made a "legal tender" by supreme authority, was an unmixed evil; that only the most imminent peril could justify an even temporary resort to its use; that it ought never to be employed except within narrow limits; that any excessive issues, if made, should be promptly called in; that it should be made redeemable on demand in coin, "the money of the world," at the earliest possible moment; and that ultimately it should be wholly withdrawn from circulation by the issuing power. Accordingly, he opposed the propositions to still further increase (to $450,000,000) the issue of "greenbacks," supported the principle (while objecting to some of the details) of the act of April 12, 1866, ordering their steady contraction, and was opposed to the act of Feb. 4, 1868, stopping such contraction. The reduction in the volume of the "greenbacks" he believed to be an indispensable preliminary to the resumption of specie payments, saying in the Senate: "The government will never resume so long as it has $400,000,000 of outstanding demand notes." As he opposed during the war excessive issues of the "greenbacks," so after it closed he steadily favored the reduction of their volume with the view to the early restoration of their convertibility and their final redemption and canceling. The hesitating and halting policy, which perpetuated all the unwholesome influences of inflation and added to the severity of the inevitable collapse, was followed against his protest and in the face of predictions, which were inspired by his intimate knowledge of natural commercial laws, and were verified by the event.

In the constant discussions of financial measures during the war, Mr. Chandler did not earnestly oppose the frequent resort to the issue of irredeemable paper without offering as a substitute policies which he believed would yield relief, equally adequate, much less costly, and far less unwholesome in tendency. He proposed to provide the means for meeting the enormous expenditures required of the government by more thorough direct taxation and by larger loans; and he believed that increased imposts, by strengthening the credit of the government, would greatly improve its standing as a borrower in the money markets of the world. Briefly, the policy which he favored, in lieu of the mass of temporary expedients which were adopted, was this: (1.) Declare that the issue of "legal tender" treasury notes should not exceed $150,000,000, and thus stop their depreciation by ending all fear of their inflation. (2.) Tax freely, and by this means convince the world that the United States could and would redeem its treasury notes and pay the interest and principal of its bonds. (3.) Use the credit thus created to borrow on the most advantageous terms, and avoid all measures that might in any way tend to impair the negotiable value of, or the general confidence in, the national securities. He developed these general ideas repeatedly in his speeches and votes, while questions relating to them were before Congress. On May 30, 1862, he said in the Senate:

We voted at an early day in the session that we would raise a tax of $150,000,000 from all sources.... What was the result of that vote? On the very day that that solemn pledge was given to the country and the world ... the six per cent. bonds of the United States stood at 90 cents on the dollar in the city of New York. To-day with an expenditure of more than a million dollars a day, ... under this simple pledge in advance, of what you would do, your bonds have gone up from 90 cents to above par, and are now sought for, not only at home but abroad. If you violate that solemn pledge given to your country and to the world, what will be the effect on your securities? Let Congress violate that pledge, and you will see your bonds not only not worth 104½ but you will see them below 85.... The world abroad does not believe your simple asseveration that you would impose a tax, but the people of this Union do and consequently they themselves have carried your bonds from 90 to 104½. But the world does not take them. Impose your tax; carry out your solemn pledges, and you will see your bonds eagerly sought for in the moneyed centers of the world.... I hope we shall not only carry out this pledge which we have given, but I care not if we exceed it.... Under this pledge ... you are now able to borrow money at six per cent. instead of seven and three-tenths, and you are to-day reaping the reward of your pledge of good faith.

All just tax measures Mr. Chandler vigorously supported, as furnishing the solid basis of national credit and public integrity, and time established the ability and the willingness of the people to sustain this war burden. Had the heavy taxation been accompanied by an adherence to sound principles in the management of the currency and a resort to borrowing when needed, it would have reduced the cost of conquering the rebellion by at least $1,000,000,000, probably by nearly one-half.

The maintenance of the public credit at a high standard was exceedingly important during the war, but it was of no less moment after the collapse of the rebellion, and is as great to-day as it has ever been. On no public question was Mr. Chandler more vigilant and outspoken than on this. Any attack on the integrity of the national promise represented by the bonds of the United States he denounced vigorously, whether it took on the form of the taxation of these securities, or of propositions to pay them in depreciated currency, or of bald repudiation. On May 20, 1862, he said, upon the proposition to tax the bonds:

I believe it to be for the best interest of the government—not for the benefit of moneyed men, not for the benefit of moneyed institutions, but for the benefit of this government—to proclaim in advance that we will never tax these bonds. I believe we shall receive the quid pro quo now, to-day, or whenever we negotiate. It is for our interest, not for the interest of moneyed institutions, to offer these bonds. Here is the best security in the world, and we proclaim to the world, if you take these bonds they shall never be taxed. I believe we shall realize more to-day, or to-morrow, or this year, or next year, for these bonds by that course, than if we were to impose a tax of one and a-half, or three, or five, or any other per cent. These bonds are negotiable. We are the negotiators. They are not in the hands of third parties. We are to borrow for our daily wants, ... and I believe it to be for the interest of the government to declare in advance that there shall never be a tax of any sort, kind or description upon these bonds which we are now offering to the world in such enormous quantities.

Mr. Chandler said, in 1868, in a public address at Battle Creek, Mich., (on August 24):

The national debt is a sacred obligation upon this government, and it is to be paid, every dollar of it. But it is a Democratic debt, every dollar. If anybody should talk of repudiation it should be the Republican party, who had no instrumentality in creating it. But did you ever hear a Republican talk of repudiating it? It is a large debt. It is the price we pay for government. Is the government worth the cost? If it is, then the debt is not only an honest debt, but it has been worthily contracted. The Democrats propose to pay this debt in greenbacks, and they propose to pay the greenbacks by issuing more greenbacks. What do we gain by that? Issue $2,500,000,000 more greenbacks and they would not be worth the paper they are printed on, because the supply would flood the country and be greater than the demand.... It is a measure of fraudulent repudiation. In five or ten years the country might recover financially, but we would never wipe out the national disgrace that would follow that repudiation. It means the absolute annihilation of all values. These extra issues would be utterly worthless.

Mr. Chandler accordingly voted for the act of March 18, 1869, which formally declared that the United States would redeem its "greenbacks" and pay the interest and principal of its long term bonds in coin, and which was simply a new pledge that the government would do what it was already honorably bound to do both by fair construction of its own legislation and by the explicit and repeated promises of its agents. The full maintenance of the public faith, both as a matter of honor and of wise policy, he always upheld, and saw his arguments sustained and his prophecies made good in the steady improvement of the nation's credit and the refunding of its debt at greatly reduced rates of interest.

Of the national banking system Mr. Chandler was an original supporter. He regarded it as certain to become a lasting feature of the fiscal system of the United States, and as destined to ultimately furnish the paper money of the Union. The uniformity of its circulation, the security afforded to bill-holders, and the excellent results attending its method of governmental supervision, he considered as unanswerable arguments in favor of its permanent maintenance. It was his firm opinion that ultimately these banks would furnish all the national currency, and that their notes would supplant the "greenbacks." If national banking should be kept free, and redemption in coin required by law, he believed that the result would be a thoroughly-secured and readily-convertible paper currency, whose volume would be controlled by commercial demand and not by legislative caprice or political agitation, and which would lubricate and not obstruct the machinery of trade.

When the national bank bill first made its appearance in Congress, Mr. Chandler (in February, 1863) favored it as a measure of relief offering a quick market for $300,000,000 of government bonds, and as sure to supply "a better currency than the local banks now furnish." Holding the views he did, he supported the measures which promised to substitute bank notes for "greenbacks," although he opposed those which contemplated any expansion of the aggregate volume of both issues. For instance, in 1870, when the inflation element in Congress introduced a bill to add $52,000,000 to the national bank circulation (banking was not then free, it not being deemed prudent to leave the issue unlimited while all the paper money was irredeemable), he offered on January 31 an amendment to make the sum $100,000,000 and to withdraw "greenbacks" to an amount equal to the bank notes issued under this provision. He said:

The simple effect of my proposition, if adopted, will be to keep the circulation to a dollar where it is. If no new banks are started, no greenbacks are withdrawn, and if banks are started anywhere, then an amount of greenbacks must be withdrawn equal to the amount of national bank bills put in circulation. Should the whole $100,000,000 be taken we will be just $100,000,000 nearer to specie payments than we are to-day, ... and in the meantime the amount of national currency will not be changed in the slightest degree.

Mr. Sumner: There is salvation in that.

Mr. Chandler: Of course there is salvation in it; that is why I offer it.

All proposals made at the time to increase the aggregate paper circulation he resisted, saying:

That is a step in the wrong direction.... If you let it go out that this is to be the policy of Congress, you will see gold go up immediately, ... because it will show that the Congress of the United States is in favor of expansion instead of a reduction of the currency.

After the panic of 1873, when there was such a universal clamor for further inflation, and scores of propositions were introduced to add many millions to the existing volume of "greenbacks" and of bank notes, Mr. Chandler again insisted at all proper opportunities that resumption was the most essential step toward financial soundness, and that the substitution of bank notes for "greenbacks" would aid greatly both in reaching and in maintaining specie payment. On Feb. 18, 1874, he offered an amendment to a pending bill, directing "the Secretary of the Treasury to retire and destroy one dollar in 'legal tender' notes for each and every dollar of additional issue of bank notes," and spoke upon this proposition at length. He did not urge it as a complete remedy for the existing situation (contraction and resumption would alone furnish that), but he said:

This is a step in the right direction. In 1865 I advocated upon this floor the substitution of bank notes for greenbacks as a step toward the resumption of specie payments, and a rapid step toward that resumption. I am now simply advocating what I advocated then.

Mr. Chandler's wishes on this subject were not gratified at that time nor during his life, but before his death he saw the demand that the Treasury should cease to be a bank of issue approved by the soundest financial sentiment of the country. His belief, that the paper money of the Union should be furnished by commercial institutions operating under properly regulated governmental supervision, that is, by the national banking system perfected and enlarged, has been long held by the ablest and clearest students of monetary problems in the United States; it is to-day constantly growing in popular strength, and the result it aims at will form part of any durable settlement of "the currency question."

In 1873 the vacillating and halting financial policy of the nation—which had tried and abandoned contraction, and while looking toward the resumption of specie payments had, in fact, retreated from it—bore fruit in speculative collapses, followed by a panic in business circles and widespread commercial disaster. Congress met amid the crumbling of unsound enterprise, and was called upon to meet a terrified demand for a renewed inflation of the already excessive volume of irredeemable paper. To cure the fever, men demanded more miasma. To repair the ruin, which all history proved to be the natural result of an oversupply of currency, it was proposed to still further increase that supply. Measures to this end were introduced at once, and pushed with great vehemence. They were sustained by a misled but powerful public sentiment, which was especially strong in the West and influenced the great mass of that section's representatives at Washington. Mr. Chandler never served his country better than he did in that hour. Unmoved by the clamor about him, and refusing to listen to the cries of even his own people when they demanded false leadership, he firmly resisted every measure of inflation and every suggestion that added embarrassments to the business of the future, or increased the difficulties of preserving the public faith. The pressure in favor of the inflation bill which President Grant vetoed was unusually strong. The Western Congressmen were almost a unit for its passage, but no solicitations, no force of numbers, prevented Mr. Chandler from opposing and denouncing it. His speech in opposition to this bill (on Jan. 20, 1874) commenced with one of his terse sentences, which went straight to the marrow of the situation, and furnished a motto for the cause he championed. It was, "We need one thing besides more money, and that is better money." This phrase furnished the text for many addresses and editorials, and stood upon the title-page of the weekly circular issued by the friends of a sound currency in Boston during the controversy which preceded the passage of the Resumption act of 1875. In the same speech Mr. Chandler said:

To insure prosperity we ought to have something permanent, something substantial. Then the business of the country will conform itself to the facts and regulate itself accordingly. This panic (of 1873) was exceptional, as indeed all panics are. A panic among men is precisely like a panic among animals. I once saw 2,000 horses stampede, and they were just as the same number of thousands of men would be in a panic. It is the feeling of animal fear, and one encourages the other, and so it goes on until it becomes a perfect insane rush for something, nobody knows what. Prior to this late panic, as is well known, many of our capitalists had over-invested in wild railroad schemes; they had undertaken to do impossible things; when the panic struck them it ought not to have had the least effect outside of Wall street and operators in railroad stocks. But the panic swept like a tornado all over the land, affected values everywhere, values of all kinds. Whoever had money in bank sought to draw it out and hide it away. The panic was universal, and yet this nation was never more prosperous than it was the day before the panic struck. And to-day there is as much money in the Union as there was then. Every dollar that was here then is here now. Besides, the enormous borrowers, the men who would pay any price for money—one-half per cent. a day, one per cent. a day, or any other given price—have failed and gone out of the market. And now the money is seeking the legitimate channels of commerce for interest and use.... The best time for the resumption of specie payment that has occurred since the suspension was in 1865, at the close of the war, when gold had fallen from over 200 to 122. In a few days values had shrunk, and the people of the nation were comparatively out of debt, and were ready then for a resumption of specie payments, but the government was not. The government owed more than $1,000,000,000, that was maturing daily in the shape of compound interest notes, seven-thirties and other obligations that must be funded or disposed of. Hence the government was not prepared for specie payments at that time, although the people were.... From that day to this we have been drifting and floating further and further away every hour from the true path—the resumption of specie payments. I have advocated from the first the earliest possible payment in coin. I believe there is no other standard of value that will stand the test, and I believe the time has arrived, or very nearly arrived, for coming to it. I have not the same timidity in fixing a date that some of my friends on this floor have. I believe that if we were to resolve to-day that we would resume the payment of our greenbacks in coin on the 1st day of January, 1875, and authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to borrow $100,000,000 in coin to be used in the redemption of the greenbacks, and sell no more gold until the 1st of January, 1875, on that day we would have $200,000,000 of coin in the Treasury for the redemption of the greenbacks. I am not particular as to date. I merely suggest the 1st of January, 1875. But I would accept an earlier date than that if it were deemed more advisable, but certainly I would not extend it more than six months thereafter....

It is no part of the business of this government to issue an irredeemable currency. We cannot afford to place ourselves beside the worn-out governments of Europe—we cannot afford to place ourselves on a par with Hayti and Mexico. We are too rich a people to do it; and it is a disgrace to us as a nation that we have allowed it to continue one single hour beyond the hour when it was in our power to remedy the wrong.

The proposition to increase our paper currency is a step in the wrong direction, and I, for one, am utterly opposed to taking even one step in the wrong direction when I know what the right direction is.

As part of the same general discussion, Mr. Chandler made a carefully prepared financial speech in the Senate on Feb. 18, 1874, in which he first graphically sketched the history of "wild-cat banking" in Michigan, and then said:

After the failure of these banks the cry was still, "More money; and we must have more money; the country is suffering for more money." The cry was responded to, and more money was furnished. The Treasury of the State of Michigan, already owing $5,000,000, undertook to furnish more money, and the State issued treasury notes ad libitum, and the "more money" men got more money until the value of the state treasury notes, which have been paid to the last dollar at par, ran down to thirty-seventy cents on the dollar; and almost every city in the State, including the city of Detroit, responded to the cry of "more money," and issued shin-plasters; and individuals, realizing that "more money" was needed, issued shin-plasters. So the State of Michigan was flooded with more money.

Well, sir, you can see at a glance that the State of Michigan needed more money. We had as a people been speculating almost to a man. It was not confined to the merchant, the banker, the man of wealth; but the mechanic, the farmer, the laborer, every man who could buy a piece of property of any sort, kind, or description, bought it, ran in debt, laid out a town, sold the lots, gave a mortgage, and then wanted "more money" to pay that mortgage.

When the collapse came it was absolute; there was no mistake about it; the collapse was perfect. Then the people of Michigan had enough of "more money;" and when our constitutional convention met, as it did a few years later, they put into the constitution a clause prohibiting the Legislature forever from chartering a bank or affording the means of furnishing "more money;" and the people acquiesced in it. They had enough of the "more money" cry; and for twenty-five years there was no more cry in the State of Michigan for irredeemable money.... The losses to which I have referred did not fall upon the moneyed men of the State of Michigan, the men who were in sound condition. They fell upon the laboring man, the farmer, and the mechanic. They fell upon the men who could least afford to submit to the loss. So it is now. Why, sir, our values are fixed by a foreign market, and in coin. There is not a bushel of corn or a bushel of wheat raised in Indiana, or Illinois, or Michigan, the value of which is not fixed by the foreign value in coin of that particular article. When you enhance the cost of production by an inferior currency you put that loss upon the producer, and the loss falls not upon the wealthy man, but upon the laborer and producer. Money will take care of itself all over the world. If it is not safe in this country, it will find a country where it is safe, and it will go to that country, no matter where that may be. Hence, capital requires no protection whatever from this body; money will take care of itself; but the poor man, the laboring man, the man who submits to all the losses from this depreciated currency, is the man who suffers all the pain and all the injury that are inflicted by this false legislation....

Now, sir, we come to the crash of 1873. On the 15th day of September, 1873, this nation was in a more prosperous condition than perhaps it had been for the last twenty-five years. Every branch of industry was prosperous, every interest of the people was prosperous; but in a day, at the drop of the ball at twelve o'clock on the 16th of September, the panic struck. What produced this tremendous panic and crash in this great and prosperous country? It was over-speculating in railroad securities. It was by men undertaking to do what it was utterly impossible for them to do, to wit, for individuals to float untold millions by their own credit; and when the people became alarmed for fear the crash would come, the crash came, and there was no salvation from it. But, sir, on that very self-same day the nation was more prosperous than it had been for the last twenty years in all its interests—business, banking and every other. The crash ought not to have extended one yard beyond Wall street and the few producers of railroad iron who were manufacturing for these defunct railroads. But, sir, the panic was so great that it spread until it became universal, and values sank until there seemed to be no bottom, and everybody was affected throughout the length and breadth of this broad land.

But, Mr. President, that panic was of short duration. Many failures took place, and particularly among stock and railroad operators; but the main business of the country still went on with a few notable exceptions. Some manufacturers stopped for the want of money; others stopped for the want of credit. The men that had been issuing their paper without intending to pay it, issuing millions of dollars of paper which they knew they could not meet at maturity, trusting in luck to meet their obligations—those men cannot borrow money; their lines are full everywhere; nobody will loan them money; but, sir, upon undoubted security money is to-day cheaper than it has been at any time for the last twenty years. These great borrowers, without the expectation of paying at maturity, are to-day all out of the market. No man will loan money to a person who does not pay at maturity. Every man that desires to borrow money for legitimate business can borrow it to-day cheaper than he could borrow it at any time in the last twenty years. Sir, you may legislate for this class who have over-speculated, you may legislate for the benefit of the men who have built factories, built steamboats, built mills, bought mills, bought mines, bought everything for sale, and given their paper knowing they could not meet it unless they could borrow the money over again; you may legislate them $100,000,000 or $1,000,000,000, and you will not help them in the slightest degree....

Now, Mr. President, I will ask the attention of the Senate while I show the effect upon the purchasing value of money of issuing your greenback circulation from the day it was first issued to the present time. In 1862 we commenced the issue of greenbacks. In January, 1862, the premium on gold was 2.5 per cent.; in February it was 3.5; in March, 1.8; in April, 1.5; in May, 1.3; in June, 6.5; in July, 15.5; in August, 14.5; in September, 18.5; in October, 28.5, in November, 31.1; in December, 32.3. It will be remembered that the then circulating medium (which was at that time state bank notes) amounted to about $200,000,000. This circulation was increased during the year 1862 by the addition of $147,000,000 in greenbacks, and that increase of circulation carried the value of gold from 102.5 on the 1st of January to 132.3 on the 31st day of December following.

In 1863 the necessities of the government compelled us to increase the greenback circulation to a yet larger extent. We issued during that year $263,500,000 additional, carrying up our greenback circulation to $411,200,000, in addition, of course, to our bank circulation, whatever it may have been. During the month of January of that year the premium on gold was 45.1 per cent.; during February, 60.5; March, 54.5; April, 51.5; May, 48.9; June, 44.5; July, 30.6; August, 25.8; September, 34.2; October, 47.7; November, 48; December, 51.1. In other words, the average rate of premium upon gold during that whole year was 45.2 per cent. I hold in my hand a paper showing the cash value of this emission for 1863. The emission of greenbacks at that time was $411,200,000. The average premium on gold was 45.2 per cent. The actual cash purchasing value of that $411,000,000, during the year 1863, was $283,195,000, and that was the whole purchasing value of that money during that year.

Then we come to the next year, 1864. That year, we increased our circulating medium by the addition of $237,900,000, making the whole amount $649,100,000. In 1864 the price of gold was, in January, 155.5; February, 158.6; March, 162.6; April, 172.7; May, 176.3; June, 219.7; July, 258.1, or less than 40 cents on the dollar in coin for your greenbacks after you had carried the amount up to $649,000,000. In August the price was 254.1; in September, 222.5; in October, 207.2; in November, 233.5; in December, 227.5. There is not a man here who does not remember, nor is there a farmer or mechanic throughout the length and breadth of the land who does not remember, that he then paid 60 cents for cotton goods that he had been in the habit of buying for 12½ cents, and that he paid for everything else in the same ratio. The merchant took care that he met with no loss; but the laboring man, the farmer, the man of muscle, was the man who submitted to this great loss, while the merchant and while every man with money took care of himself.

During that year the average price of gold was 203.3 per cent., or your money was a fraction less than 48½ cents on the dollar during the whole year. You had out that year $649,100,000, and the value of gold was 203.3, and the purchasing value of your $649,100,000 was $319,281,000, and that was the whole of it.

In 1865 you again increased the volume of your circulating medium by the amount of $49,800,000; making the whole amount of your circulation $698,900,000. During the month of January, 1865, the price of gold was 216.2; during February, 205.5; in March, 173.8; in April, 148.5; and after that it stood at 135.6, 140.1, 142.1, 143.5, 143.9, 145.5, 147, 146.2. The average of the year 1865 was 157.3; and what was the purchasing value of your greenbacks that year? Every man here will remark that that year we were disposing of our bonds at the rate of hundreds of millions of dollars a month; money was passing through the Treasury almost without limit. We had $1,000,000,000 that must be negotiated, and negotiated at once—seven-thirties and compound-interest notes and other floating liabilities that must be funded; and during that year the war had closed, and while we were negotiating at this enormous rate, the price of gold fell to 153.3, and during that year the purchasing value of our circulation attained a higher rate than during any other year. That year, although our circulation of greenbacks was $698,900,000, and the premium on gold 57.3, the actual purchasing value of that $698,900,000 was $444,310,000.

In 1866 we retired $90,000,000, leaving $608,900,000, and the average premium on gold that year was 40.9 per cent. The purchasing value of the $608,900,000, with the premium on gold at 40.9, was $432,150,000.

The next year, 1867, we retired $72,300,000, and premium on gold fell to 38.2. So we went on reducing until we got down to $400,000,000, and then we struck 14.9, 11.7, 12.4 and 14.7 as the premium on gold. There the matter has stood, and I have here from year to year, the purchasing value for each year....

Mr. President, what we want is purchasing value, because the intrinsic value is measured by the purchasing value. There is not a bushel of wheat that goes from your State or from mine the purchasing value of which is not fixed by the gold value on the other side of the Atlantic. We are shipping millions and tens of millions and hundreds of millions of our agricultural products every year, and the value of these products is fixed in gold on the other side of the Atlantic; and yet by this increase of circulation we enhance the value of everything that the producer raises, but when the product comes to the market its value must be fixed by its price in gold across the Atlantic....

Mr. President, I know of no way to substitute the Treasury of the United States for the banking experience of the last ten centuries. We have the experience of the past, we have the experience of our own nation, we have the experience of the world. Now, do we propose to throw aside this experience, and to launch our boat upon a wild and uncertain sea, an ocean of expansion and no payments?

Sir, there are very few persons within the range of my acquaintance who desire expansion of an irredeemable currency. Certainly the people of Michigan have had abundance of experience of that kind. But wherever you go you will find two classes of men who are making a great noise about "more money." One is the speculator, the impecunious speculator, who has, perhaps, bought real estate and given a mortgage, and thinks that his only chance is to reduce the value of your currency until it falls so low that the people would rather take his land than hold your money; and the other is the man who has issued his paper without intending to pay when it matures, and who can borrow no more money upon any terms until he pays what he already owes.

On the 14th of January, 1875, the act for the resumption of specie payments became a law. Mr. Chandler was a member of the Senate when this bill passed. He had but one objection to it; the time fixed for resumption was unnecessarily remote. Neither present exigency nor needed preparation required the delay, and he believed it to be opposed alike to economy, patriotism, and public honor. But it was the best that could be secured; insistence upon an earlier date would have divided the friends of resumption, prevented the passage of any bill at that time, and postponed the day of specie payments. For these reasons Mr. Chandler favored the measure, and a few weeks later, when he retired from the Senate, it was with the consciousness that he had only voted for an irredeemable and inconvertible currency to meet the imperious exigencies of civil war, that he had opposed its undue expansion, that he had sustained every measure of contraction calculated to lessen the difficulties of the return to a sound basis, and that he finally had crowned his Senatorial career by support of a measure which insured the return of the government to the constitutional standard of values.

CHAPTER XIX.
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR IN THE CABINET OF PRESIDENT GRANT.

Eighteen Hundred and Seventy-four was a year of unusual political disaster. The prevalent commercial depression both naturally and seriously injured the party in power, and this and other causes combined to produce a general relaxation of Republican vigor, which bore its inevitable fruit in a series of damaging reverses in the fall elections throughout the Union. The contest in Michigan was complicated by an organized movement on the part of the opponents of Prohibition to secure a repeal of that State's stringent law against the liquor traffic, and to more surely reach that end its License League formed an alliance with the Democracy, by which the latter was greatly aided. The result was that the Republican plurality upon the State ticket was reduced to 5,969 in a total vote of 221,006, that three of the nine Congressional districts were carried by the Opposition, and that a Legislature was chosen in which the Republican majority upon joint ballot was but ten. Upon this body, so closely divided, devolved the choice of an United States Senator. To a man of Mr. Chandler's positive qualities and aggressive methods an active public life was impossible without creating strong enmities, and the attention which, had he been more subtle, he would have given to conciliating hostility his direct nature preferred to devote to showing appreciation of friendship. The equality of parties in the Legislature, and the passing disposition among Republicans to look with disfavor upon what has been since termed "stalwart leadership," supplied the local opposition to Mr. Chandler with the looked-for opportunity for successfully resisting his re-election. Michigan Republicanism as a whole gave him its usual hearty support, and, so far as the contest was waged within the recognized lines of partisan warfare, his personal triumph was flattering and signal. In the regular caucus he received fifty-two votes against five ballots cast for three other candidates, and his nomination was made unanimous with but one dissenting voice. A small Republican minority refused to participate in the caucus, and after a prolonged and exciting struggle a combination was formed between six of these men and the solid Democratic and Liberal Opposition, which (on the second ballot in the legislative joint convention) gave precisely the necessary majority of all the votes cast to Isaac P. Christiancy, then one of the Justices of the Supreme Court of Michigan. Mr. Christiancy was an original Republican, but had in some instances in the past so far satisfied the Democrats by his public course that he had been once re-elected to the Supreme Bench without opposition, his name having been placed at the head of the Democratic State ticket after his nomination by his own party. This fact materially facilitated the coalition which secured Mr. Chandler's defeat. Like results in pending Senatorial contests in Wisconsin, Minnesota and Nebraska showed that more than merely local influences had contributed to bring about this event.

Mr. Chandler, with that strong faith in his own position which was so useful a characteristic of the man, did not believe that his defeat was possible until it was accomplished. His disappointment was keen, but he bore it manfully, and, assuring his friends that he should be "a candidate for that seat when Judge Christiancy's term ended," he started for Washington to close up his eighteen years of continuous Senatorial service. Many and sincere were the expressions of grief among earnest Republicans everywhere at what seemed to be the abrupt termination of the public career of so influential a man. Mr. Chandler himself was as strongly affected by his fear that Republicanism might have received a severe blow from the method by which his re-election had been prevented as by any sense of mere personal failure. In a letter written in the following March, in response to an invitation from the great majority of the Republican legislators of Michigan to address them on political topics, he said:

Thanking you cordially for your continued confidence, I assure you most sincerely that when I enlisted in the Republican ranks it was for the whole war, which, I trust, is to be continued until the complete and final triumph of Republican principles, the pacification of the whole people, and the establishment of equal and exact justice for all men in every section of our common country. It will be my pride to prove to my friends, and to my enemies, if there are such, that I can be useful as a private soldier. In all the future contests of the Republican party with its opponents you may order me into the ranks with full confidence that I will respond with all my time, if need be, and with such ability as I can command.... We shall not yield in the forum the great principles which have triumphed in the field, nor shall we further waste in internal strife the strength which should be organized against our opponents. I have faith in the future of our country, because of my confidence in the continued success of the Republican party.

Ultimately it became evident that his defeat in 1875 was not a personal calamity, he himself afterward saw that it had opened the way for him to broader fields of public usefulness, and that in what then seemed to be a fall he had in fact only "stumbled up stairs."

After the termination of Mr. Chandler's third Senatorial term (on March 3, 1875), his name was connected, both in current rumor and in the deliberations of influential men, with several prominent positions. It was at one time predicted that he would be nominated for the St. Petersburg embassy, and at another that he would succeed Mr. Bristow as Secretary of the Treasury. Ground was not lacking for both reports, but the appointment which was actually made involved a far more complete test of his faculty of administration than would have attended either of the others. The Interior Department is the most complex division of the executive branch of the government. A great diversity of interests are under its charge, and its duties are dissimilar, widely ramified, and encumbered with a perplexing multiplicity of details. During President Grant's second term this Department, notwithstanding the personal honesty of Secretary Columbus Delano, had fallen into bad repute. It sheltered abuses and frauds which tainted the atmosphere, but were not hunted down and removed by its chiefs. From the scandals which this state of affairs created, Mr. Delano finally sought escape by a resignation, which took effect on Oct. 1, 1875. General Grant, who was determined to appoint to the place a man whose integrity, sagacity and vigor should make it certain that he would not tolerate incompetence and rascality among his subordinates, tendered the position to Mr. Chandler. After some hesitation, and no little urging by his friends, that gentleman accepted, and on Oct. 19, 1875, his commission as Secretary of the Interior was executed and sent to him. (His nomination was, on the meeting of Congress in December, promptly confirmed by the Senate, all of the Republican and three of the Democratic Senators voting affirmatively, with only six Democrats recorded in the negative). Mr. Chandler entered at once upon the discharge of his new and difficult duties. No man could have had less of the professional "reformer" about him—in fact he was not chary of expressing the most contemptuous skepticism concerning much that paraded itself as "reform"—but the exemplification which he gave of practical reform was at once thorough and brilliant. Without ostentation, without the faintest savor of cant, he went at his work in unpretentious, business-like, manful, and clear-sighted fashion. A firm believer himself that "corruption wins not more than honesty," he gave durable lessons on that theme in every bureau of the Interior Department.

THE INTERIOR DEPARTMENT.[36]

The first step of Mr. Chandler's administration was the infusion of new blood. He applied to James M. Edmunds for aid in the selection of a Chief Clerk, and was by him advised to tender that important position to Alonzo Bell, then holding a place in the Treasury. What followed illustrates some of Mr. Chandler's methods of transacting business:

Mr. Bell, at his desk in the Winder Building, received a dispatch on the afternoon of Nov. 8, 1875, which read: "The Secretary of the Interior desires to see you." On the next morning at nine o'clock he was in waiting in the ante-chamber of Secretary Chandler's office, and shortly thereafter that gentleman entered. In a few moments Mr. Bell was summoned into his room, and Mr. Chandler said, "Good morning, Mr. Bell. I suppose General Cowen (the then Assistant Secretary) has told you what the business with you is?" Mr. Bell answered, "I have had a very pleasant talk with him, but there has been no business alluded to by us." Mr. Chandler then said, "I have concluded to appoint you Chief Clerk of the Interior Department; will you accept?" "Yes, sir," was the reply. "Very well," said Mr. Chandler, "go ahead." Mr. Bell went at once to the Treasury, filed his resignation, and within an hour returned to the office of the Secretary of the Interior. He found him in conference with two Senators, and this conversation followed: "Mr. Secretary, I have taken the oath and I am ready to go to work." "Very well, do you know where to find the Chief Clerk's room?" "No, sir." "Well, sir, it won't take long to look it up." Mr. Bell started on the search for it, and within a few moments had relieved the gentleman temporarily in charge, taken possession of its desk, and commenced business. Mr. Chandler, also on recommendation of Mr. Edmunds, promoted John Stiles from a minor place to the Appointment Clerkship. The Assistant Secretaryship of the Department he requested the President to tender to Charles T. Gorham of Michigan, who had lately relinquished the embassy of the United States at The Hague. He believed that Mr. Gorham's business training, practical ability and personal attachment to himself would greatly aid in the reorganization of the Department, and only felt doubtful as to whether that gentleman would accept the position. In the end, Mr. Gorham was induced to take it, and the Assistant Attorney-Generalship was given to Augustus S. Gaylord of Saginaw, well-known to Mr. Chandler as a good lawyer and a vigilant and trustworthy man. These changes in his executive staff the new Secretary of the Interior regarded as an essential part of the work of investigation and purification which was to be accomplished.[37]

Within less than one month after the commencement of Mr. Chandler's term, all the clerks in one of the important rooms in the Patent Office were summarily removed. Examination had supplied satisfactory proof of dishonesty in the transaction of the business under their care, and the Secretary concluded that all of them were either sharers in the corruption or lacked the vigilance necessary for their positions, and he declared every desk vacant. To the Hon. Jay A. Hubbell, whom he met on the evening of the day upon which he had taken this vigorous step, he said, "I have been 'reforming' to-day. I have emptied one large room and have left it in charge of a colored porter, who has the key, who cannot read and write, and who is instructed to let no one enter it without my orders. I think the public interests are safe so far as that room is concerned until I can find some better men to put into it." To the remonstrances which followed this action he was resolutely deaf, and to some influential friends of one of the men thus displaced he said significantly, "That man is competent enough; if he thinks that the cause of his removal should be made public, he can be accommodated; I don't advise him to press it." Later in Mr. Chandler's term, and without warning, the monthly pay-rolls of the Patent Office employes were placed in the custody of a new officer, and the full name and city address of every one who signed them was taken. The result was that for upward of a score of names no owners appeared, and it was thus found that money had been dishonestly drawn in the past by some one through the device of fictitious clerkships. It was also ascertained that in a few cases work requiring expert skill had been given to unqualified persons who had "farmed it out" to others at reduced rates, and were thus receiving pay without rendering service. These disclosures led to further prompt removals of those implicated in the frauds, and to the eradication of the abuses thus exposed. In this bureau some change of methods was also made which simplified the transaction of business, and increased the facilities for procuring patents while lessening their cost to the public.

The Bureau of Indian Affairs Mr. Chandler found to be more utterly unsavory in reputation than any other division of his Department. Besides securing a new Commissioner and Chief Clerk, he instituted a series of quiet inquiries into the methods of doing business there, and soon determined upon removing a number of subordinates, whose records were unsatisfactory and whose surroundings were suspicious. He then sent for the Commissioner and notified him of this decision, but that officer replied that they were the most valuable men he had, and that it would be almost impossible to conduct the business of the bureau without them. The urgency of his protest finally induced Mr. Chandler to delay action for a few days. While matters were in this state of suspense, President Grant, who was watching with keen interest the examination into the Interior Department offices, said to its Secretary, "Mr. Chandler, have you removed those clerks in the Indian Bureau whom we were talking about?" Mr. Chandler replied, "No, sir; the Commissioner said it would be almost impossible to run the office without them." The President answered, "Well, Mr. Secretary, you can shut up the bureau, can't you?" The answer was, "Yes, sir." "Well then," said General Grant, "have those men dismissed before three o'clock this afternoon, or shut up the bureau." Mr. Chandler went over to the Department, sent for the Commissioner, told him that the suspected clerks must go that afternoon if the bureau was closed as the result, and gave the necessary orders of removal which were promptly executed. In regard to the dismissal of these men, he said, "I haven't evidence that would be regarded in a court as sufficient to convict them of fraud or dishonesty, but to my mind the proof of their crookedness is strong as Holy Writ." This was only one of many instances in which President Grant actively interested himself in the work of hunting out fraud, and there was no step which Mr. Chandler took in the direction of honest and cheaper administration in which he was not cordially and powerfully sustained at the White House.

The "Indian Attorneys" also came under and felt the weight of the new Secretary's just displeasure. One of the glaring impositions practiced upon the ignorant aborigines was that of inducing them, winter after winter, to send "agents" to Washington to look after their interests, upon representations made to them that the government would otherwise deprive them of some of their rights. Many of these men were paid eight dollars a day and their expenses, while others contracted for certain sums secured on the property of the Indians. In fact, these "attorneys" rendered no needed service and preyed upon the ignorance of their clients. These men Mr. Chandler banished from his Department; he also declined to allow the payment of claims preferred by representatives of the Indians for "expenses incurred in procuring legislation," on the ground that such outlay was illegal and immoral. His decision on these points was embodied in this order (addressed on Dec. 6, 1875, to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and still governing the proceedings of that bureau), which saved large sums of money to the Indians:

Hereafter no payment shall be made and no claim shall be approved for services rendered for or in behalf of any tribe or band of Indians in the procurement of legislation from Congress or from any State Legislature, or for the transaction of any other business for or in behalf of such Indians before this Department or any bureau thereof, or before any other Department of the government, and no contract for the performance of such services will hereafter be recognized or approved by the Indian Office or the Department. Should legal advice or assistance be needed in the prosecution or defense of any suit involving the rights of any Indian or Indians, before any court or other tribunal, it can be procured through the Department of Justice.

This regulation will govern the Indian Office, and application for compensation for such services must not be forwarded to the Department for action hereafter, it being understood that the regularly-appointed Indian Agent, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior are competent to protect and defend the rights of Indians in all respects, without the intervention of other parties, and without other compensation than the usual salaries of their respective offices.

Mr. Chandler's experience as Secretary of the Interior made him a firm believer in President Grant's policy of seeking to civilize the American savages by dealing with them through the agency of the Christian churches. Originally he favored turning the management of Indian affairs over to the military arm of the government, but actual contact with this knotty problem convinced him that the so-called "peace policy" was, with all its conceded imperfections, the true one. He held that, if firmly adhered to and improved as experience should dictate, it would ultimately yield the largest and best returns. To make any policy successful he knew that honest and competent service was indispensable, and that he spared no efforts to secure.

PRESIDENT GRANT'S CABINET—1876-'77.

[From a Sketch by Mrs. C. Adele Fassett.]

In the Pension Bureau there was also some wholesome investigation, and the efficiency of its administration and the vigilance of its scrutiny into fraudulent claims upon the government were materially increased, with the result of saving to the Treasury hundreds of thousands of dollars annually. In the Land Office a series of extensive frauds in what was known as "Chippewa half-breed scrip" were discovered during the first six months of Mr. Chandler's term. The matter was one that had been brought to the attention of the Department under other Secretaries, but no detection of rascality had followed. Mr. Chandler ordered a thorough investigation, which was pushed vigorously by Mr. Gorham and Mr. Gaylord. The end was the breaking up of a strong and corrupt combination, the prompt removal of all officers connected with its past operations, and the reporting of the facts to the proper Congressional committees for further action. The Secretary also ordered a consolidation of the seven stationery divisions of the Department into one central office, securing thereby a lessened cost of management which was and is worth $20,000 annually to the Treasury.

The result of this exhibition of executive vigor need not be described in detail. Under the impetus of shrewd insight, disciplined business habits, and firm purpose, the morale of the various bureaux improved rapidly. Abuses withered up, inefficiency became industry, and fraud took flight.[38] The Interior Department became a strongly-officered and well-administered branch of the government. Men saw that it had at last a head who meant that his subordinates should be honest and should render efficient service, and who could push his intentions into acts. Mr. Chandler, who had originally doubted as to whether he could still command his old mercantile faculty of mastering and managing a host of details, convinced both himself and others that this was still one of his powers. His administration made evident the benefits of the supervision of the public business by a practical man of affairs, and no member of President Grant's Cabinets made a record more enviable for unostentatious and efficient discharge of duty.

The anecdotes of Mr. Chandler's Cabinet service are many and entertaining. He commenced by arming himself for the chronic battle of all heads of departments with the claimants of patronage. One of his first orders prohibited clerks from recommending applicants for position, and another provided him with a statement of the number of employes in the Department from each Congressional district. A memorandum book, containing this information, was constantly by his side, and was used almost daily. A Congressman would apply for the appointment to a clerkship of some constituent whom he was anxious to oblige or assist. The record would be produced, and something like this conversation would follow: "You see your quota is full, but that don't matter; pick out any man you want me to remove and I'll put your man in his place at once." "But," the Congressman would reply, "I can't do that. If I ask you to turn out any of these men I shall get myself into hot water." "You don't mean to say that you're asking me to get myself into hot water for you?" the Secretary would answer, and with this weapon, thus used half banteringly but still effectively, he, with perfect good-nature, turned aside the Congressional pressure for positions.

He also carefully kept memoranda of the official records of his subordinates, and charges against any one of them coming from responsible sources were certain to be thoroughly investigated. But no man could be more wrathful at mere backbiting or at efforts for the secret undermining of reputation. His repugnance to injustice was no less keen than his sense of justice. One afternoon a man of clerical aspect and garb called at his office, and said, after introducing himself, "Mr. Chandler, I presume it is your intention to have none but correct people in your Department."

"That is my intention."

"Well, do you know, sir, that you have a woman in one of the bureaux of your Department who is of bad character."

"No, sir, I do not know that I have any such persons in my Department."

"I thought you didn't know it, Mr. Chandler, and so I decided to come and inform you."

The name of the clerk in question was then given and the charges against her made still more explicit. Mr. Chandler listened quietly, and finally picked up a pen and handed it to his caller, saying, "Just put that down in writing, sir, and I will dismiss the woman." The accuser hesitated and said, "Now, I hope, Mr. Chandler, you will not connect my name with this matter. I don't want to be known." The Secretary thereupon leaned back in his chair and said, "You know all about this woman and I know nothing about her, except what you state to me; but you want me to put a stain on her reputation upon charges you are unwilling to even substantiate with your name. Never! Leave the office." Upon the abrupt departure of the visitor so dismissed, Mr. Chandler turned to one of his clerks and said, "He belongs to that class of informers who are always willing to stand behind and ruin a person, but who don't want to be known. I don't propose to be a party to any such transaction."

A contractor, whose rascality had been conclusively exposed and whose contract had been unceremoniously annulled, came to him one day to remonstrate. The conversation ran in this wise.

"Mr. Secretary, I have been badly used——"

"I'm glad of it," interrupted Mr. Chandler; "you're a scoundrel, and it's time you were getting your deserts."

The man attempted explanation, but Mr. Chandler was too impatient to listen, and finally sent him away with orders to write a letter setting forth his grievances, which should be investigated. "Although," added he, as the contractor retired, "it's my opinion that the worst treatment you could get would be too good for you."

In the few cases where genuine hardship followed his quick decisions and their enforcement, he was ready to make good the injury he had not intended to inflict. One morning a prominent officer of the army entered Mr. Chandler's office with a small pamphlet in his hand and said, "What kind of a fool is it, Mr. Secretary, that you have at your door distributing tracts?" Upon Mr. Chandler's denying all knowledge of this variety of colportage, he said, "Here is a tract a fellow out there gave me, and told me to read it, and said it might be good for my soul." Mr. Chandler was nettled at this violation of discipline, and made inquiries which showed that one of the clerks was distributing tracts about the Department under circumstances that implied neglect of his official duties, and thereupon he was dismissed. In a short time an earnest letter came to the Secretary from the wife of the displaced man describing the distress that had been brought upon their home, whereupon Mr. Chandler directed his re-instatement, saying, as he issued the order, "I guess he won't circulate any more tracts. I don't object to their distribution, but when a man is doing the government business he should give that his attention." For a clerk discharged because of dishonesty, no amount of personal solicitation, even by close friends of Mr. Chandler, availed anything. At one time when he was most vehemently and persistently urged to restore a suspected and dismissed subordinate, he finally said to the Senator who was pressing the matter, "There is but one way by which you can have that man re-appointed, and that is to first have me turned out."

In the early part of his term a letter came to Mr. Chandler from a man in California, who had a case pending before the Department upon an appeal from the Commissioner of the Land Office. He wrote that if the Secretary would decide that case in favor of the appellant, he would remit $300 in gold. Mr. Chandler read it and said to his clerk, "Call the attention of the Attorney-General to that, cite the law that man has violated, and ask the Department of Justice to prosecute the fellow," and this course was taken. At about the same time, a dispatch came from the Pacific coast stating that a man was at San Francisco who claimed to be Mr. Chandler's brother, and was seeking to borrow money on that statement. To this Mr. Chandler's answer was this telegram: "I have no brother. Arrest the scoundrel."

By the clerks, whose official record satisfied him, he was universally liked. He was easily approached, ready to listen, quick to perceive, and prompt in decision. He scarcely ever gave reasons, but his rapid judgment was rarely found to require reversal or even revision. With those who did business with the Department on honest principles, and only asked for promptitude and efficiency in its service, his popularity was great and deserved. The fact that he was at its head was kept constantly fresh in the minds of all. Soon after the commencement of his term he exchanged offices with the Commissioner of Patents, thus obtaining an apartment much more desirable than the one previously occupied by the Secretaries. One of the Patent Office attaches, in replying to the comment of somebody who expressed surprise at the fact that this change had not been sooner made, said, "To tell the truth we have generally regarded the Secretary himself as an interloper in the Department. Mr. Chandler has started a new order of things."

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR'S OFFICE.

While the investigating mania was at its height, the House Committee on the Expenditures of the Interior Department determined to look into his books and business system. He accordingly received from them a formal letter asking what time would be convenient for the investigation. The Chief Clerk submitted this communication to Mr. Chandler, who said, "Tell them to come down any day, and I want you to put the best room we have at their disposal, and give them all the facilities you can to investigate the affairs of any bureau of the Department that they want to look into. If they can find anything wrong that I haven't found, I shall be very much obliged to them. They will be pumping a dry well. The work is done." The committee came, but only held a few brief sessions, and finally never concluded their labors and never made a report in relation thereto.

Active as were Mr. Chandler's party sympathies, and little disposed as he was to consult his political opponents as to his course, or to admit them to any share in the patronage at his disposal, he did not manage the Department upon merely partisan principles. He did not make removals of Democratic subordinates except for cause; he never appointed any Republican whom he did not believe to be thoroughly upright and competent. That to fill any vacancy he always sought to find the right kind of Republican was true. His civil service theories stopped with honesty and efficiency, and did not exclude pronounced political sympathy with the appointing power nor party activity. Still, he did not on any occasion enforce the payment of political assessments by his subordinates, and their work for the Republican cause was left voluntary in character. The nearest approach to mere partisanship in his use of the appointing power was the giving of places in the Department to crippled soldiers who had been discharged from the employment of the House of Representatives by the Democratic Door-keeper, and even in that it was far more the indignation of the patriot than of the Republican that stirred him. At the close of Mr. Chandler's Secretaryship, the clerks of the Department waited upon him in a body, and thanked him for the kindness they had received at his hands. While farewells were being exchanged Mr. Schurz, the new Secretary, came in and was introduced to his staff of subordinates. Mr. Chandler then said:

Mr. Secretary, I welcome you to this office. When I came here this Department was greatly tainted with corruption, especially in the Patent Office and the Indian Bureau. With the aid of the gentlemen you see around you, I have been able to cleanse it, and I believe, as far as I am able to ascertain, that no abuses exist in the bureaux I have named. I had to use the knife freely, and I believe this Department stands to-day the peer of any department of the government.

Mr. Chandler further commended the corps of employes as honest, faithful men, and Mr. Schurz replied:

I think I am expressing the general opinion of the country when I say you have succeeded in placing the Interior Department in far better condition than it had been in for years, and that the public is indebted to you for the very energetic and successful work you have performed. I enter upon the arduous duties with which I have been entrusted with an earnest desire to discharge them conscientiously, and I shall be happy when leaving the Department to have achieved as good a reputation for practical efficiency as you have won. I thank you, sir, for this cordial welcome, and I will say to the gentlemen to whom you have introduced me that they shall have my protection; and I ask from them the same faithful assistance they have given you.

The tribute which Secretary Schurz at the outset thus paid to the practical efficiency of his predecessor merely expressed the public verdict which greeted the close of Mr. Chandler's term. Examination did not compel any modifying of this praise, and after Mr. Chandler's death his successor in the Interior Department—a man very exacting in judgment and one with whom his political differences had been numerous—again said: "In the course of the last two years I have frequently discovered in the transaction of public business traces of his good judgment and his energetic determination to do what was right."