THE REFORM BILLS OF 1852 AND 1854.
The postponement of the second reading of Lord John Russell’s new Reform Bill, until a later, and it may be a protracted period of the Session, is suggestive of some important considerations. It shows, in the first place, that even the author of the bill is by no means confident in his power of carrying it through the House of Commons, else we may be perfectly certain that no departure from the original arrangements would have taken place. It shows, moreover, that other members of the Cabinet—or, we should rather say, the members of the Cabinet collectively—do not consider the provisions of this measure of so much importance as to justify them in allowing it to interfere with the more immediate exigencies of the state. In one sense of the word, Lord Aberdeen and his colleagues are thoroughly conservative. They want to keep their places; and they have no idea whatever of sacrificing themselves through the impulse of Quixotic gallantry, or of allowing Lord John Russell’s pledges to imperil their tenure of office. But they have an obstinate and pragmatical man to deal with, and cannot afford to affront him. Without Lord John Russell, the Coalition could not stand, and therefore, in some matters, they are compelled to allow him more license than is agreeable to their own inclination, or in accordance with the interests of the country. Thus, they not only permitted him to prepare his measure during the recess, but they gave it real importance, by introducing it as a material part of the ministerial programme, as announced by her Majesty from the throne. At that time there was no more probability of a pacific settlement of the Eastern question than exists just now; so that every objection to the measure, founded on the impropriety of exciting internal agitation at such a crisis, must have been foreseen. There was still time before the development of the measure, and the publication of its intended details, to have postponed it without any loss of credit. No one would have blamed the Ministry had they done so—even the most ardent reformer could scarcely have maintained that they were bound to force it through Parliament, just as if no war were expected, or as if the country emphatically demanded it. But Lord John Russell would not consent to that. He was determined that the whole details of his project should be laid before the public; and he accordingly did so in a speech which fell flat on the ear alike of the House and of the country. He fixed a day for the second reading; but before that day arrived, postponed his bill until a later period of the Session, with a statement that, even then, it would depend upon circumstances whether he should proceed with it or not.
This is not such conduct as the country has a right to expect from the ministers of the Crown. They were entreated, both by friends and opponents, not to bring forward their measure in the midst of warlike preparations, and in the total absence of any demand on the part of the country for an immediate change in the representation. Those entreaties were met by silly, bombastical, and vapouring speeches about the sublime spectacle which Great Britain would afford to the world, if, while waging war abroad, she applied her energies to the remodelment of the constitution at home! We need not pause now to demolish that most pitiful pretext. It has virtually been given up by the Ministry; for they now acknowledge, that the time originally fixed for the second reading of the English bill was not seasonable; and they indicate, that if we should be actively engaged in war on the 27th of April, the bill will not be proceeded with; so that the notion of the “sublime spectacle” is thrown aside, whilst the cause of the irritation, made worse by the divulgence of the scheme in detail, is still continued.
No really united cabinet would have ventured to act in such a manner. It is in vain to tell us of concert and cordiality, when the public measures of one week belie the bragging language used in that which immediately preceded it—when bluster is followed by postponement, and extreme recklessness by an affectation of patriotic caution. The prevalent opinion is, that the bill will not be proceeded with; and if the Ministry had said even so much as that, there would have been no occasion for any further discussion; but they will not say it. Lord Aberdeen, on the 9th of March, when urged by Earl Grey to withdraw the bill altogether, is reported to have replied, that “the second reading of the bill had been postponed by Lord John Russell till the 27th of April, in sincerity and good faith. Whether it would then be proceeded with, depended upon the state of Europe; for no one could tell what a day or an hour would bring forth. Government, however, would act consistently with the interests of the country, and with a due regard to their own honour.”
We cannot predict what the Government may do hereafter, but we know what they have already done with respect to this matter; and it is our humble but deliberate opinion, that they have neither consulted the interests of the country nor their own collective credit. We should have been very glad, indeed, had they allowed the subject to drop; for we should then have been spared the necessity of criticising their conduct. But, threatened as we are, though by no means agitated or alarmed by the suspension of a most clumsy weapon over our heads, we must take the liberty of reviewing the proceedings of these Dionysians.
Let us assume, which we really believe and devoutly hope to be the case, that, notwithstanding the professions about sincerity and good faith, this bill has been absolutely sent to limbo. Let us look upon it in the light of a scheme abandoned. That, however, cannot acquit Ministers from the serious charge of having played fast and loose with the country, by embodying in the Queen’s speech, at the opening of Parliament, a distinct recommendation of internal organic change, when war was staring us in the face. They knew then perfectly well that there existed no probability of the settlement of the Eastern dispute without a direct appeal to arms; and it was their bounden duty to have interdicted the mooting of such a question at such a time. We maintain, that no cabinet has a right to countenance this species of deception. No specific measure should be announced by a Ministry, much less recommended by the Crown, unless it is seriously intended that it shall be carried through, not at some indefinite future period, but in the course of the existing session. This is not the first time that the country has been annoyed by this indecent and reprehensible practice, introduced, we believe, by Lord John Russell, of rash ministerial pledges. We do not think that even a premier is entitled, towards the close of one session, to announce distinctly the ministerial policy of the next, or to bind himself by a specific pledge; for even a premier is not allowed by our constitutional custom to act autocratically—he must carry along with him at least the majority of the Cabinet. He cannot accurately predict who may be his colleagues at the opening of the ensuing session—he cannot foresee what events may occur or causes arise to render a change of the intended policy not only expedient, but necessary. If a premier is not entitled to do this, still less is a subordinate like Lord John Russell; and yet we see him, session after session, blabbing about future schemes, and pledging himself unconditionally to their introduction. This is really intolerable, and it is full time that the nuisance should be abated. If the noble lord is of opinion that, notwithstanding all which we have heard and seen, he has still power and reputation enough to head an independent party—let him leave the Cabinet, and then, as a plain member of Parliament, he may pledge himself to his heart’s content. But while he remains a minister and servant of the Crown, he is bound to maintain the dignity of his position, and preserve a due decorum, instead of acting like a popularity-hunter and a partisan. Of late he has let himself down woefully. We are not accustomed, in this country, to see ministers, while in office, engaging in literary squabbles—and exposing themselves to damaging rejoinders by petulant paragraphs and absolutely deplorable sneers. Their duty is, not to write or edit gossip and scandal, but to devote themselves, heart and soul, to the affairs of the nation and the service of their sovereign; and, if they are not willing to abandon their favourite pursuits, they ought at once to withdraw. With less than this the nation will not be satisfied; and we really think we are acting a friendly part to Lord John Russell to tell him so, in as many words. If he doubts our sincerity, let him ask the opinion of his colleagues upon the point; and we are ready to stake our existence that they will be unanimous in their agreement with us. We believe also, that, if the question were fairly put them, they would be unanimous in recommending him, for the future, so long as he is a member of the Cabinet and acting along with them, to abstain from that system of specific pledging, the result of which, in the present instance, has by no means tended to raise them in the estimation of the country.
But it may be asked, why, when the Ministry have postponed for the present, and may abandon, the Reform Bill, we should harp upon a string not intended, for some time at least, to vibrate in the ear of the country? To that we reply that we have many good reasons for doing so. The vibration has already been made. If a man is told that it was intended, by virtue of a parliamentary act for which Ministers were to be responsible, to make some decided change in his property or condition, but that, in respect of certain external circumstances, it was deemed expedient to allow him a respite—surely he is entitled to use the interval in examining into the nature of the proposed change; and, if need be, in preparing his defence. It would perhaps be too strong a phrase to say that we know what is to come—for Lord John Russell is such an experimentalist, so entirely dependent upon suggestions from others, and so utterly devoid of any fixed principles to guide his own judgment, that no one can venture to predict what his views may be six months from the present moment. As a constitution-monger, the Abbé Sièyes was, in reality, less erratic. But we know this—that his lordship in 1852 brought forward a bill for amending the representation, which bill, owing to certain circumstances which we need not recapitulate, went to limbo; and that in 1854 he has brought forward another, bearing in no respect any likeness to the former one. Indeed the issue of Banquo and of Macbeth could not have been more dissimilar. No. 3, however, is a great deal more sweeping in its innovations than No. 2 (for we must recollect that more than twenty years ago the noble lord carried No. 1); and No. 4 may be still more progressive. Heaven only knows what we shall have proposed, when the number of his Reform Bills equals that of his Jew Bills, or the volumes of his Biography of Moore! He seems to think that the story of the Sybilline books was written expressly for his guidance and conduct, and that he is entitled, after each successive failure and rebuff, to charge the constitution with an additional per centage of radicalism by way of penalty. He becomes louder and broader in his demands whenever they are negatived or postponed, and seems in the fair way to adopt some of the views of the Chartists.
We do not say this lightly—by way of banter—or in regard of general political disagreement. We never, at any time, reposed much faith in the judgment or sagacity of Lord John Russell; and, of late years, our opinion of him, in these respects, has, we confess, materially declined. We have been, in our own sphere of action, engaged in most of the political struggles which have taken place within the memory of the present generation; and we trust that these have not passed by without some wholesome lessons. To change of opinion, where honestly induced and through conviction, every one is bound to be fair and lenient; because, undeniably, in our own day there has been a great unravelment of social questions, and mere party prejudice is no longer allowed to be paramount. Perhaps the only living statesman of eminence, who cleaves to the old system, and is inveterate in his addiction to party intrigue, and what he calls “tradition,” is Lord John Russell. Put him into Utopia, and his first thought would be how he might establish the exclusive supremacy of the Whigs. He is so much and so inveterately a party man, that he seems to care little what becomes of the country, provided only that he, and his, sit at the receipt of customs. He showed that long ago—not in the days of his hot youth, but in those of his pragmatic manhood. He—the Whig Constitutionalist—characterised the opinion of the Upper House as “the whisper of a faction;” and did not disdain the violent and frantic sympathy of mobs when such demonstrations tended to his own particular purpose, or aided the ascendancy of his party. Ever since he has pursued the same course. No man can tell when he is in thorough earnest, or when he is not. He invited, by word and deed, Papal aggression; and, when the aggression came, he started up at once, as an indignant Protestant champion, and flung down his diminutive gauntlet, in name of Great Britain, to the Pope! And yet, at the bidding of the Irish Roman Catholic phalanx, we find this second Luther a strenuous supporter of Maynooth, and of the nunneries! Had his ancestor John, the first Lord Russell—who in 1540, and 1550, obtained grants from the Crown of the possessions of the Abbey of Tavistock and the Monastery of Woburn—been equally zealous for the protection of convents, he probably would have remained, as he was born, an utterly unacred gentleman.
The proposed Reform Bill of 1852 did not attract a large share of the public attention, and that for two reasons. In the first place, the country was quite apathetic on the subject; and in the second place, it was introduced at a time when the Whigs were tottering to their fall. Nevertheless, it is a remarkable document, inasmuch as we may conclude it to embody the experiences and observation of Lord John Russell upon the working of our representative system during a period of exactly twenty years. That there should have been some defects in the machinery of the engine which he invented in 1832, is not wonderful; nor can we call him rash for essaying, after so long an interval, to remedy these defects according to the best of his judgment. His position in 1852 was this:—He told the House, that he, the mechanist of 1832, was now prepared, from the results of twenty years’ observation, to introduce certain improvements which would have the effect, for a long time coming, of preventing the necessity of any further change. The improvements he proposed were these:—The qualification in towns was to be reduced from £10 to £5; and in counties from £50 to £20. Every man paying 40s. a-year of direct taxes was to be entitled to vote. There was to be no disfranchisement of boroughs, but the smaller ones were to receive an infusion of fresh blood by the incorporation of adjoining villages. No property qualification was to be required for members, and the parliamentary oaths were to be modified, so as to allow the admission of Jews and other unbelievers in the Christian faith. Such were the chief features of the proposed measure of 1852, as laid before the House of Commons by Lord John Russell, then Prime Minister. Wise or unwise, they were the conclusions which he had formed as to the change necessary to be made in the English representative system; and we must assume that he had not formed them without due thought and matured investigation. That both the necessity for, and the nature of the change were seriously considered by him and his colleagues in the Cabinet, it would be unfair and irrational to doubt; and we must therefore hold that the provisions of the bill were regarded by them not only as wise and salutary, but as the very best which their collective wisdom could devise.
If, in 1852, this bill had been rejected by a majority of the House of Commons, Lord John might either have remodelled it, so as to meet the more obvious objections, or have again introduced it, without alteration, for the consideration of another parliament. But it was not rejected by the House, and its merits were never thoroughly discussed throughout the country. It was, as we have said, introduced at a time when the Whig ministry were obviously in the death throes, and in February of that year they tendered their resignation. The bill accordingly fell to the ground before judgment could be pronounced upon it. The public at large seemed to care nothing about it. There was no enthusiasm manifested at its introduction, and no disappointment expressed at its withdrawal.
The scheme, therefore, of 1852, was not only untried but uncondemned. Nothing had occurred that could reasonably shake the confidence of the deviser in its prudence, correctness, or aptitude for the necessities of the country; unless we are to suppose that he felt somewhat disappointed by the exceedingly cold and indifferent nature of its reception. That, however, could not be taken as any distinct criterion of its merits. We are not to suppose that Lord John Russell, in framing that bill, merely looked to the popularity which he and his party might attain thereby, or the future advantages which it might secure to them. We are bound, on the contrary, to assume that he, being then Premier, and in the very highest responsible position, was acting in perfectly good faith, and had embodied in the bill the results of his long experience and observation.
Now, mark what follows. In 1853, he again pledges himself to introduce a measure for the amendment of the Parliamentary representation; and redeems his pledge by bringing out, early in 1854, a measure totally different from that which he recommended in 1852! The great points of difference are these: By the one, the boroughs were to be preserved, and in some cases enlarged; by the other, they are to be disfranchised to the amount of sixty-six members. The bill of 1852 maintained the distinction between town and county qualification—that of 1854 abolishes such distinction. The first proceeded upon the plain principle that majorities alone were to be represented—the second, in special cases, assigns a member to minorities. In short, the two bills have no kind of family resemblance. They are not parallel, but entirely antagonistic schemes; and it is almost impossible, after perusing them both, to believe that they are the productions of the same statesman.
Nothing, it will be conceded on all hands, has occurred during the last two years, to justify such an extraordinary change of sentiment. We have had in the interim a general election, the result of which has been that a Coalition Ministry, numbering Lord John Russell among its members, is presently in power. Trade, we are told, is in the highest degree flourishing; and the prosperity of the country has been made a topic of distinct congratulation. Search as closely as you please, you will find no external reason to account for so prodigious a change of opinion. The potato-rot and famine were the visible reasons assigned for Sir Robert Peel’s change of opinion on the subject of protective duties—but what reasons can Lord John Russell propound for this prodigious wrench at the constitution? He cannot say that the proposals in both his bills are sound, safe, and judicious. The one belies and utterly condemns the other. If his last idea of disfranchising and reducing sixty-six English borough constituencies is a just one, he must have erred grievously in 1852 when he proposed to retain them. So with the other provisions. If he intends to maintain that he has now hit upon the true remedy, he must perforce admit that he has acquired more wisdom in 1853 than was vouchsafed him during the twenty previous years of his political career. He must admit that he was totally and egregiously wrong in 1852; and he has no loophole for apology on the ground of intervening circumstances. Really we do not believe that there is a parallel instance of a British minister having voluntarily placed himself in such a predicament. How is it possible that he can expect his friends, independent of the mere official staff, to support, in 1854, a measure diametrically opposite to that which was propounded in 1852? No wonder that Earl Grey and other influential Whigs are most desirous to have the measure withdrawn without provoking a regular discussion. Some of them may not have approved of the former bill; but those who did so, or who were at all events willing to have let it pass, can hardly, if they wish to be consistent, give their sanction to the present one. It is not Lord John Russell alone who is compromised; he is compromising the whole of his party. If they thought him right in 1852, they must think him wrong in 1854; for he cannot point to the smallest intervening fact to justify his change of principle. And if they think him wrong, how can they possibly support him? We do not believe that he can reckon on the support of the high-minded Whigs of England. They have principle and honour and character to maintain; and we think it exceedingly improbable that they will allow themselves to be swept into the howling Maëlstrom of Radicalism. Rather than that, we venture to predict that they will toss the rash little pilot, whose incapacity and want of knowledge are now self-confessed, overboard, and trust to the direction of an abler and more consistent member of the crew.
Be that as it may, we must try if possible to ascertain what cause has operated to produce this singular and rapid change in the opinions, or rather convictions, of Lord John Russell on the subject of Parliamentary Reform. As we have said already, there are no external circumstances, either apparent or alleged, to account for it. The boroughs have done nothing to subject them to the penalty of disfranchisement; the counties have done nothing to entitle them to a considerable addition of members. To use diplomatic language, the status quo has been rigidly observed. Well, then, in the absence of any such tangible reason, we must necessarily fall back upon motives, the first of which is the advice and representation of confederates.
We at once acquit Lord Aberdeen and the majority of the Cabinet of any real participation in the scheme of Lord John Russell. What may be the mind of Sir James Graham and Sir William Molesworth on the subject, we cannot tell, but we are tolerably sure that no other minister regards the bill with favour. Even the members of the Manchester party do not seem to consider it as an especial boon. Mr Bright knows well enough that a new reform bill, if carried, cannot be disturbed for a number of years to come; and as this one does not come up to his expectations, he is ready to oppose it. Indeed, it seems to satisfy none of the extreme party beyond old Joseph Hume, who, for some reason or other to us unknown, has of late years been in the habit of spreading his ægis from the back seats of the Treasury bench over the head of the noble Lord, the member for London. The voice of the ten-pounders, as a body, was not favourable in 1852 to the lowering of the franchise; and we have heard no counter-clamour from the class who were and are proposed to be admitted to that privilege. The Whig aristocracy, naturally enough, regard this bill with peculiar bitterness. Therefore we do not think that the astonishing change of opinion, or rather of principle exhibited by Lord John Russell, is to be traced either to the advice of colleagues, or the influence of more matured democrats. Our own theory is this—that he never had, as regarded improvements on the form of the constitution or the representation, anything like a fixed principle—that he was striking just as much at random in 1852 as in 1854; and that, so far from having any settled or original ideas of his own, he grasps at any which may be presented to him with extreme recklessness and avidity.
We are quite aware that it would be, to say the least of it, gross impertinence to make any such statement, or to express any such opinion, without reasonable and rational grounds. We should be very sorry to do so at any time, but more especially at the present, when we wish to see Ministers disembarrassed of all perplexing questions at home. But it is their fault, not ours, if we are forced to make the disclosure; and to show that, in reality, the grand mechanist of 1832 had so forgotten his craft, if he ever had a due knowledge of it, that after his last abortive effort, in 1852, he was fain to derive new notions from the pages of the Edinburgh Review. In saying this, we intend anything but an insinuation against the talents of the author of the articles to which we refer. We can admire the ingenuity of his arguments, even while we question their soundness. We have no right to be curious as to what section of politicians he belongs. He may represent the philosophic Liberals, or he may be the champion of Manchester in disguise. All we know is, that he has written three plausible articles, after the manner of Ignatius Loyola, the result of which has been that poor Lord John Russell has plunged into the marsh, misled by the ignis fatuus, and is at the present moment very deep in a quagmire.
Some of our readers will doubtless remember that, during the autumn of 1851, various pompous paragraphs appeared in the Whig newspapers, announcing that Lord John Russell had withdrawn himself to country retirement, for the purpose of maturing a grand and comprehensive scheme of Parliamentary Reform. The task was entirely gratuitous and self-imposed; for although the venerable Joseph Hume, Sir Joshua Walmsley, and a few other Saint Bernards of the like calibre, had attempted to preach up an itinerant crusade, their efforts met with no response, and their harangues excited no enthusiasm. Nobody wanted a new Reform Bill. The class which, of all others, was most opposed to innovation, embraced the bulk of the shopkeepers in towns, who, having attained considerable political and municipal influence, were very unwilling to share it with others, and regarded the lowering of the franchise not only with a jealous but with an absolutely hostile eye. It was upon the shoulders of that class that the Whigs had been carried into power; and it really seemed but a paltry return for their support and devotion, that a Prime Minister, upon whom they had lavished all their honours, should attempt to swamp their influence without any adequate reason. It would be absurd or unfair to charge them with selfishness. The first Reform Bill, acceded to and hailed by the great mass of the people, had established a certain property qualification for voters; and no one could allege that popular opinion was not sufficiently represented in the House of Commons. Nay, many of the Whigs began to think that popular opinion was too exclusively represented therein, and did not scruple to say so. Anyhow, the Bill had so worked that there, in 1851, was Lord John Russell, its parent and promoter, in the office of Premier of Great Britain, and in the command of a parliamentary majority. Small marvel if the ten-pounders asked themselves the question, what, in the name of gluttony, he could covet more?
They were quite entitled to ask that question, not only of themselves, but of the singular statesman whom they had been content to follow. Could he state that there was any measure, not revolutionary, but such as they and other well-disposed subjects of the realm desired, which he was prevented from introducing by the aristocratic character of the House of Commons? Certainly not. The triumph of the Free-trade policy was a distinct proof to the contrary. Was there any discontent in the country at the present distribution of the franchise? Nothing of the kind. The apathy was so great that even those entitled to enrolment would hardly prefer their claims. Even the enrolled cared little about voting—so little, indeed, that it was sometimes difficult to persuade one-half of a large constituency to come to the poll. All attempts at public meetings, for the purpose of agitating a reduction of the franchise, had been failures. The people were quite contented with things as they stood, and grumbled at the idea of a change. And yet this was the time, selected by a Prime Minister who had everything his own way, for getting up a fresh agitation!
Every one, beyond himself, saw the exceeding absurdity of his conduct. The leading Whigs became positively angry; and from that period we may date his rapid decadence in their estimation. The real nature of his scheme, consisting of an arbitrary lowering of the franchise, was quite well known; and as that could not, by any possibility, be carried even through the House of Commons, his own friends thought it advisable to put the noble Lord upon another scent.
There appeared, accordingly, in the Edinburgh Review for January 1852, an article on “The Expected Reform Bill,” which took most people by surprise on account of its apparently moderate, philosophic, and even Conservative tone. It would be difficult to analyse it—it is difficult, even after reading it, to draw any distinct conclusion from its propositions and argument. But this, at all events, was admitted, that “clearly there is no call for Parliamentary Reform on the part of any large or influential class. There is no zeal about it, one way or the other. An extension of the franchise is wished for by some, and thought proper and desirable by many; but it is not an actual want largely felt, nor is the deprivation of the franchise a practical grievance, clear enough, tangible enough, generally recognised enough, to have given rise to a genuine, spontaneous, exclusive demand for redress. There is a general languor and want of interest on the subject, manifested nowhere more plainly than in the tone and character of the meetings got up by the Reform Association for the sake of arousing public feeling. The nation, as a whole, is undeniably indifferent; the agitation is clearly artificial.” Then, again, we are told that “Quieta non movere is, in political matters, as often a maxim of wisdom as of laziness;” and a great deal more to the same effect, which could not have had a very exhilarating effect on the mind of Lord John Russell, supposing, as we do, that he was in total ignorance of the article in question before it was given to the public. Certainly, on this occasion, he had but a poor backing from his friends.
The view of the writer in question seemed to be this—that instead of arbitrarily lowering the franchise on the footing of a property qualification, it is important to discover some criterion by means of which persons morally and educationally qualified, who have not the franchise at present, may be admitted to that privilege. We are not reviewing or discussing the article—we are simply pointing out the sources from which Lord John Russell has derived most of his new ideas. Therefore we shall simply quote one passage from this article.
Source of Lord John Russell’s new idea of the Savings’ Bank Deposit qualification.—“Our present system is defective and unjust in this—that it selects two kinds or forms of property only as conferring the franchise. Let us continue to maintain a property qualification; but let us not insist that the property, so favourably and honourably distinguished, must be invested in one special mode. If a man has accumulated by diligence or frugality £50 or £100, and spends it either in the purchase of a freehold, or in removing his residence from an £8 to a £10 house, his realised property confers upon him the distinction of a vote. But if he invests the same sum, earned by similar qualities, in the savings’ bank, or in railway shares or debentures, or in the purchase of a deferred annuity—which would probably be much wiser modes of disposing of it—it carries with it no such privilege. This seems neither equitable nor wise. It might easily be rectified, and such rectification would be at once one of the safest, simplest, justest, and most desirable extensions of the franchise that could be suggested. Let the production before the registration courts of a savings’ bank book, showing a credit of £50, of at least six months’ standing, or of a bona fide certificate of shares to the same value in a valid railway, or of coupons to the same amount, be held to entitle a man to be inscribed upon the list of voters for that year.”—Edinburgh Review, Jan. 1852, p. 265.
Adhering to our original intention of not discussing the merits of the different proposals of this and the other articles in the Edinburgh Review, we shall not comment upon the unblushing impudence of such a project as this, which would place the representation of the country principally in the hands of millionaires and railway directors. It is unparalleledly impudent. But we notice it now simply as the germ of Lord John Russell’s £50 savings’ bank qualification.
By the time this article appeared, Lord John Russell’s Bill was prepared; though no one expected that it would be carried. The Whig party were conscious that the hour of their doom was approaching, but they wished to bear with them into opposition a weapon which might be available for future warfare. Lord John’s ideas had not then penetrated beyond a lowering of the franchise and the admission to the register of parties who paid 40s. a-year of direct taxes. These were his deliberate impressions before the schoolmaster of the Edinburgh Review appeared abroad.
After this, Lord John Russell went out of office; but the Review kept harping on Reform. The writer had already stated, “that a new measure of Parliamentary Reform was demanded, rather in the name of theoretical propriety than of practical advantage.” It seems to us that such an admission was nearly tantamount to an argument against the policy of making any change at all; more especially when we were told, nearly in the same page, that “there was no call for Parliamentary Reform on the part of any large or influential class.” If that were true, we should like to know who “demanded” the new measure? But we must not be too critical regarding the advances of the new Lycurgus.
In October 1852, a second article appeared, the preamble of which was very moderate—indeed, rather calculated to impress the casual reader with the idea that the author would have much preferred if “the vexed question of the franchise” could have been left alone. Nevertheless it appeared to him that there were “many reasons which make it impossible either entirely to shelve or long to postpone the question of Parliamentary Reform;” and, having stated these, he dashes again into his subject. He is, however, a great deal too knowing to commence with the proposal of innovations. He treats us to several pages of high Conservativism, condemnatory of universal suffrage; and having thus established a kind of confidence—acting on Quintilian’s advice, to frame the introduction so as “reddere auditores benevolos, attentos, dociles”—he begins to propound his new ideas. In this article we have:—
Source of Lord John Russell’s new proposal to swamp the Counties by the admission of £10 occupants.—“The other plan is to extend the £10 qualification to counties, by which means every householder (to the requisite value) throughout the land would possess a vote; if he resided in a small town or a village, or an isolated dwelling, he would be upon the county register. The only objection we can hear of to this plan is, that in the country districts and in hamlets a £10 occupancy generally includes some land, and would not, therefore, indicate the same social station as the living in a £10 house in town, and that it might lead to the creation, for the sake of augmenting landlord influence, of a numerous and dependent class of tenant voters. But in the first place, the occupier of a £10 house in villages and small towns belongs to a decidedly higher social grade than the occupier of a £10 house in cities; and, in the second place, it would not be difficult to meet the objection, by requiring that the qualifying occupancy shall be, in the county register, a house, and not a house and land, or by fixing a sum which shall, as nearly as can be ascertained, be generally an equivalent to the £10 occupancy contemplated by the present law.”—Edinburgh Review, Oct. 1852, p. 472.
That is the second instance of appropriation on the part of the wise, ripe, deliberate statesman, who for twenty years had been watching the progress of his own handiwork with the view to introducing repairs. Before this article in the Edinburgh Review appeared, it had never occurred to him how convenient it might be to swamp the counties, and how very simple were the means of doing so! Now for appropriation third:—
Source of Lord John Russell’s proposal to admit all Graduates of Universities to Town and County franchise. “It is, of course, desirable, and is admitted to be so by every party, that all educated men shall be voters; the difficulty is to name any ostensible qualifications which shall include them, and them alone. But though we cannot frame a criterion which shall include all, there is no reason why we should not accept one which will include a considerable number of whose fitness to possess the franchise there can be no question. We would propose, therefore, that the franchise be granted to all graduates of Universities,” &c.—Edinburgh Review, Oct. 1852, p. 473.
Another hint adopted by Sir Fretful Plagiary! Next we come to a more serious matter:—
Source of Lord John Russell’s proposal for disfranchising the lesser English boroughs.—“The great majority of them are notoriously undeserving of the franchise, and those who know them best are least disposed to undertake their defence. The plan of combining a number of them into one constituency would be futile or beneficial according to the details of each individual case. If a close or a rotten borough were amalgamated with an open or a manufacturing town, much advantage might possibly result; if two or three corrupt or manageable constituencies merely united their iniquities, the evil of the existing things would only be spread farther and rooted faster. We should propose, therefore, at once to reduce the 61 boroughs with fewer than 500 electors, and now returning 91 members, to one representative each.”—Edinburgh Review, Oct. 1852, p. 496.
We shall see presently that this proposal was amended, as not being sufficiently sweeping. Only thirty seats are here proscribed; but it was afterwards found expedient to increase the black list to the number of sixty-six. Pass we to the next instance of palpable cribbage.
Source of Lord John Russell’s proposal that Members accepting office shall not be obliged to vacate their seats.—“The most desirable man cannot be appointed Colonial Minister, because his seat, if vacated, might be irrecoverable. Administrations cannot strengthen themselves by the alliance of colleagues who possess the confidence of the general public, because the place for which they sit has been offended by some unpopular vote or speech. We need add no more on this head: the peculiarity of the case is, that we have no adverse arguments to meet.”—Edinburgh Review, Oct. 1852, p. 501.
The writer is decidedly wrong about the non-existence of adverse arguments; and we shall be happy to convince him of the fact if he will be kind enough to accord us a meeting. In the mean time, however, he has humbugged Lord John, which was evidently his special purpose. Even while we deprecate the morality of his proceeding, we can hardly forbear expressing our admiration of his skill. We know not his earthly name or habitation; but he is a clever fellow, for he has led, with equal audacity and success, the ex-Premier of Great Britain, and the father of Reform, by the nose!
But we have not yet done. The article last referred to was penned and published before the new Parliament met, towards the close of 1852, and before the balance and state of parties could be ascertained. The result of the election showed that parties were in effect almost equally balanced—so much so, that, but for the junction of the Peelites with the Liberals, Lord Derby would have obtained a majority. The election, it will be remembered, took place under circumstances peculiarly unfavourable to the Government; and never perhaps was misrepresentation of every kind more unscrupulously employed than by the Liberal press on that occasion. Still it became evident that Conservatism was gaining ground in the country; and it was a natural inference that, after the question of Protection was finally set at rest, its progress would be still more rapid. This was not exactly what the writer in the Edinburgh Review had calculated on. He now saw that it would be necessary, if the Liberal party was to be maintained in power, to go a good deal further than he at first proposed; and accordingly, when he appears again before us in October 1853, we find him armed this time, not with a pruning-hook, but with a formidable axe. We hear no more about “theoretical propriety”—he is evidently determined upon mischief. Now, then, for his developed views, as adopted by his docile pupil.
Source of Lord John Russell’s proposal that freemen shall have no votes.—“There is no doubt in the mind of any man, we imagine, that incomparably the most openly and universally venal portion of borough constituencies are the old freemen, so unhappily and weakly retained by the Reform Act of 1832.... The disfranchisement of the freemen is, perhaps, of all steps which will be urged upon Parliament, the most clearly and indisputably right and necessary, and, added to the plan already suggested for pursuing individual cases of venality, will probably sweep away the most incurably corrupt class of electors.”—Edinburgh Review, Oct. 1853, p. 596.
We have already seen that, in Oct. 1852, the reviewer proposed to abstract thirty members from the smaller English boroughs. It became evident, however, that so paltry a massacre of the innocents would not suffice, more especially as it had become part of the scheme to swamp the English counties. Accordingly we are told, in an off-hand and easy manner: “To all that we said on a former occasion as to the theoretical propriety and justice of the small borough representation, we unreservedly adhere. But, unfortunately, it is too notorious that these boroughs are generally in a condition which, for the sake of electoral purity, imperatively demands their disfranchisement, partial or entire. Here again it is true that parliamentary statistics do not altogether bear out our conclusion. Of the seventy-two boroughs convicted of bribery between 1833 and 1853, only twenty-one can properly be called small—as having fewer than five hundred electors—while some of the more constantly and flagrantly impure places number their votes by thousands.” So, according to the admission of even this writer, there is no case established, on the ground of corruption, for the wholesale disfranchisement of the small boroughs. Nevertheless we are to assume them to be impure, because he says it is notorious that they are so; and by this short and summary process of assertion he gets rid of the trouble of investigation. The boroughs are not put upon their trial, for there is no specific charge against them; but they are condemned at once because the writer has a low opinion of their morality. This is worse than Jeddart justice, where the trial took place after the execution. In the case of the boroughs there is to be no trial at all. The following conclusion is therefore easily arrived at: “There can be no doubt in the mind of any reformer that, in some way or other, these small boroughs ought to be suppressed; that we must have, if possible, no more constituencies under one thousand electors.” So much for the disfranchisement; now for the redistribution.
Final scheme suggested to Lord John Russell for disfranchising the small boroughs and swamping the counties.—“The third method proposed is to merge all these small boroughs into the county constituencies, by depriving them of their members, and reducing the county franchise to a £10 occupancy. In this way the class would still be represented, and the individuals would still retain their votes, and the electoral lists of counties would be considerably modified and greatly enriched. This plan would, we think, be far the fairest and most desirable, inasmuch as it would give us constituencies large in number and varied in character, and, therefore, to a great extent secure against illicit and undue influences.”—Edinburgh Review, Oct. 1853, p. 602.
The next and last point which we shall notice is the representation of minorities. We do not know to whom the credit of having invented this notable scheme is really due. There are various claimants in the field. Mr G. L. Craik, of Queen’s College, Belfast, asserts that he was the original discoverer, having propounded a plan of this nature so early as 1836. Ingenious as the idea may be, it will hardly rank in importance with the discovery of the steam-engine, nor do we think that its originator is entitled to any exorbitant share of public gratitude or applause. We shall give it as we find it in the Review.
Source of Lord John Russell’s proposal to give members in certain cases to minorities.—“The mode by which we propose to insure the constituent minorities their fair share in the representation—i. e. to make the majorities and minorities in the House of Commons correspond as nearly as may be to majorities and minorities in the country, or in the electoral bodies—is, to give (as now) to each elector as many votes as there are members to be chosen, and to allow him to divide these votes as he pleases among the candidates, or to give them all to one. But as at present most places return two members, it is obvious that, under the proposed arrangement, wherever the minority exceeded one-third of the total number of the electors, they would be able to return one member, or to obtain one-half the representation, which would be more than their fair share, and would place them on an equality with the majority, which would never do; while, if they fell short of one-third, they would be, as now, virtually unrepresented and ignored. To obviate this, it will be necessary so to arrange our electoral divisions, that as many constituencies as possible should return three members: one of these a minority, if at all respectable, could always manage to secure.”—Edin. Review, Oct. 1853, p. 622.
Here, at all events, is the notion about the representation of majorities, and the establishment of as many constituencies as possible, returning three members. Lord John Russell’s method of working this, is to restrict each elector to two votes.
Thus we see that all the leading features and peculiarities of Lord John Russell’s new Reform Bill—the disfranchisement of the boroughs, the swamping of the counties, the ten-pound occupancy clause, the qualification by deposit in the savings’ bank, the voting of graduates, the retention of their seats by members accepting office, and the representation of minorities—are contained in the articles published in the Edinburgh Review, in 1852 and 1853. This is, to say the least of it, a very singular coincidence. Of course we do not mean to maintain that Lord John Russell was debarred from availing himself of any useful hints which might be offered him, or from adopting the notions of any political sage, or harum-scarum cobbler of constitutions; we entirely admit his right to gather wisdom, or its counterfeit, from any source whatever. What we wish to impress upon the public is this, that, down to 1852, not one of these notions had occurred to our grand constitutional reformer, who for twenty years had been sedulously watching the operation of his original measure! Nay, more than that: two years ago, his ideas on the subject of Parliamentary Reform were diametrically opposite to those which he has now promulgated; and that not only in detail, but in absolute essence and form! Had he come before us this year with a scheme based upon the principle of 1852, which was a lowering of the franchise, without any farther disturbance of the constitution of the electoral bodies, it would have been but a poor criticism to have taunted him with a minor change in the details. He might have used his discretion in elevating or lowering the point where the franchise was to begin, without subjecting himself to any sneer on account of change of principle. But, wonderful as are the changes which we have seen of late years in the views of public men, this is the most astounding of them all. Never before, perhaps, did a statesman pass such a decided censure on his own judgment, or make such an admission of former recklessness and error. If he is right now, he must have been utterly wrong before. The constitution of 1852, as he would have made it, must have been a bad one. One-tenth of the members of the House of Commons would still have been returned by constituencies which he now regards as unfit to be constituencies any more. If the maintenance of the small boroughs is a blot on the constitution, how was it that Lord John Russell did not discover that blot until 1853, after the articles we have referred to were published? Did he take his ideas from those articles? If so, was there ever a more humiliating confession of entire poverty of mind? If he did not take his ideas from those articles, what was it that produced so entire a change of opinion?—what eminent political oculist has removed the film which impeded his vision but two short years ago? This is, in reality, a very grave matter. We are accustomed in this country to associate measures with men, and sometimes to accept the former on account of our belief and confidence in the sagacity of those who propose them. But what faith can we repose in a man who thus plays fast and loose upon a question with which he has been occupied all his life? This is not a case of expediency arising out of unforeseen circumstances. That the question is of the deepest import no one in his senses can deny. We know how the constitution, as framed at present, works; but we do not know how it may work if very materially altered. And yet we find the same mechanist proposing, within two years, two separate kinds of alteration! The first was simple enough, and had at least this much in its favour, that it did not require any violent displacement of the machinery. The second is so complex that the whole machinery must be re-arranged. It was our sincere hope that the country had seen the last of sudden conversions of parties—at no time edifying events, and sometimes attended by disastrous consequences—but we must, it seems, prepare ourselves for another conversion on the part of the Whigs, if this bill is to be carried through. They must, supposing them inclined to support Lord John Russell, either unsay what they said, or were prepared to have said, in 1852, or be ready to maintain that they were then greatly in advance of their leader. The dilemma, we admit, is an unpleasant and an odious one; but there is no escape from it, if the Whigs are determined, at all hazards, to follow their erratic leader.
That there is room for certain changes in the national representation we are by no means disposed to deny. It is impossible to devise any system so perfect as to preclude the idea of amendment; indeed, we suppose that there never was a constitution, or phase of a constitution, in the world, which gave entire and perfect satisfaction to all who lived under its operation. We may be told that the present system is theoretically wrong, that its principle is to exalt property and to exclude intelligence, and that in some parts it is incongruous, inconsistent, and contradictory. Possibly there may be some truth in such allegations; but then we must never lose sight of this, that the real test of a constitution is its practical working. It is undeniable that under the present system the middle classes have gained, not only power, but preponderance in the state; and accordingly we find that they are not favourable to a change which would certainly operate to their disadvantage. The ulterior aims of the men of Manchester may prompt them to desire a still further infusion of the democratic element, but neither the members nor the doctrines of that school have found favour with the British public. If public opinion generally, and the great interests of the nation, are well and effectively represented in the House of Commons, it does seem to us a very perilous experiment to disturb that state of matters. We should like very much to hear from Lord John Russell a distinct exposition of the results which he anticipates, should this scheme of his be carried. Is there any real point of interest to the nation which he is at present debarred from bringing forward by the exclusive constitution of the House of Commons? What are the existing grievances which call for so radical an alteration?
“What is there now amiss
That Cæsar and his senate must redress?”
We apprehend that the noble lord would be greatly puzzled to frame an intelligible answer to such queries. Well then, we are, perforce, compelled to fall back upon theory, and to assume that he vindicates his proposal, not because future measures will be of a better kind, or better discussed than heretofore, but because it is desirable, for symmetry’s sake, that the representation should be readjusted.
Be it so. We are content to take that view, albeit a low one, and to examine his scheme without any partial leaning to the present constitution of the House of Commons. And first, let us see what regard he has paid to the principle of equal representation.
It will not, we presume, be denied by any one that the three kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland, ought to be put upon an equitable footing as regards one another in this matter of representation. If imperial measures were all that the House of Commons had to discuss, this relative equality might be of less importance; but with separate laws and separate institutions guaranteed to and existing in the three kingdoms, it is proper that each should be fairly represented in the grand council of the nation. At present that is not the case. If we take the test of population, Scotland ought to have 18 more members than are now allotted to her; if we take the test of taxation and revenue, she ought to have 25 more. Combining the two, there is a deficit of more than 20 members to Scotland in her share of the national representation. Now, that is a matter which ought, in the very first instance, to have occupied the attention of the noble lord, and would have so occupied it, had he laid down for himself any fixed principles of action. It is nonsense to talk of inequalities between one borough and another, or between town and country qualification, before the first grand inequality is remedied. Apply the double test of population and revenue, and you will find that Ireland is upon an equality in point of representation with England, but that Scotland is not; and no reason has been, or can be, assigned for this anomaly. The quota for Scotland was fixed by the Act of Union at 45 members. It was increased by the Reform Act of 1832 to 53, but the number is still insufficient. Lord John Russell proposes, out of the 66 disfranchised seats, to give three to Scotland, but he has assigned no reason for doing so. The people of Scotland are not in the position of men supplicating for a boon. They are demanding that, when such a change as this is made, their political rights shall be respected and allowed; and they will not be satisfied with less than a measure of perfect justice. We think it right to put forward this point prominently, because it lies at the foundation of the whole question of the readjustment of the representation.
The question of the disfranchisement of the boroughs is one which should be approached with very great caution. In 1852, as we have already seen, Lord John Russell did not propose to touch them—now he has made up his mind to lop away 66 members from this branch of the representation. This is, in our opinion, by far too reckless a proceeding. We can see no good ground or principle for the entire disfranchisement of any of the boroughs, a step which we think ought never to be taken, except in case of absolute and proved corruption. When constituencies are too small, the proper and natural plan is, to annex and unite, not to abolish; and we believe that this could be effected with very little difficulty. The new Schedule A contains a list of 19 boroughs, returning at present 29 members, which are to be wholly disfranchised, on the ground either that the number of the electors is under 300, or that of the inhabitants under 5000. Therefore the privilege is to be taken from them, and the voters are to be thrown into the counties. We agree with Lord John Russell, that some constituencies are too small, but we do not agree with him in his scheme of disfranchisement, and we utterly object to his proposal of quartering the electors on the counties. They are borough voters, and so they ought to remain; and it is a very poor pretext, indeed, to make this disfranchisement the excuse for altering the county qualification. Let a union of the boroughs, by all means, take place; let the number of their members, if necessary, be considerably reduced; but let us have no disfranchisement, or assimilation between the town and county qualification, which would quite upset the whole system throughout the kingdom.
We do not profess to be conversant with local details, so that we cannot speak with perfect confidence; but it appears to us that some such arrangement as the following, which would unite the smaller boroughs, and at the same time diminish the number of members, might be adopted with advantage:—
| County. | Borough. | Present Electors. | Combined Electors. | Present Members. | Future Members. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Devonshire, | Ashburton, | 211 | 520 | 1 | 1 |
| „ | Dartmouth, | 309 | 1 | ||
| „ | Honiton, | 335 | 649 | 2 | 1 |
| „ | Totness, | 314 | 2 | ||
| Dorsetshire, | Lyme Regis, | 297 | 665 | 1 | 1 |
| Somersetshire, | Wells, | 368 | 2 | ||
| Sussex, | Arundel, | 208 | 493 | 1 | 1 |
| „ | Midhurst, | 285 | 1 | ||
| Wiltshire, | Calne, | 151 | 641 | 1 | 1 |
| „ | Marlborough, | 254 | 2 | ||
| „ | Wilton, | 236 | 1 | 1 | |
| Yorkshire, | Richmond, | 342 | 642 | 2 | |
| „ | Northallerton, | 303 | 1 | ||
| Essex, | Harwich, | 299 | 506 | 2 | 1 |
| Norfolk, | Thetford, | 217 | 2 | ||
| 22 | 7 |
Thus, without any disfranchisement, or violent displacement, fifteen boroughs, at present returning twenty-two members, might be formed into seven respectable constituencies, returning one member each to Parliament. There are, however, four others—Knaresborough, Evesham, Reigate, and Andover—which cannot be so easily thrown together. We would proceed with these on the same principle, by adding them to boroughs at present returning two members, but which Lord John Russell proposes to restrict to one member each. The following is our view:—
| County. | Borough. | Present Electors. | Combined Electors. | Present Members. | Future Members. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Yorkshire, | Knaresborough, | 226 | 583 | 2 | 1 |
| „ | Ripon, | 357 | 2 | ||
| Worcester, | Evesham, | 396 | 755 | 2 | 2 |
| „ | Tewkesbury, | 359 | 2 | ||
| Surrey, | Reigate, | 297 | 1124 | 1 | 2 |
| „ | Guildford, | 595 | 2 | ||
| Hampshire, | Andover, | 232 | 2 | ||
| 13 | 5 |
Here there are twenty-three seats set at liberty, without disfranchisement in any one instance. In justice to ourselves, we must state that we have implicitly followed the schedule attached to Lord John Russell’s bill, and not indulged in speculations of our own. Had the latter been the case, we might have been tempted to ask why Westbury, with an electorate of 289, is to be spared, while Wells, with 368, is to be blotted from the list of boroughs?
Besides these, Lord John Russell proposes that thirty other seats shall be made vacant, by restricting boroughs now returning two members to one. (His number is thirty-three, but we have already noticed Ripon, Tewkesbury, and Guildford.) If it could be shown that there is a really clamant case for representation elsewhere, the reduction might be allowed, but only to the extent required. It seems to us perfect madness to proceed with wholesale disfranchisement, until the necessity of transferring seats to other places is satisfactorily established. We can very well understand why some of the smaller boroughs which have now two members should be restricted to one, in order to satisfy the just requirements of some rising township which has hitherto been unrepresented. We have no doubt that Lord John Russell is quite right in his proposals to give members to Birkenhead, Burnley, and Staleybridge, and to erect Chelsea and Kensington into a Parliamentary borough to return two members. We think that two additional members each might be granted to the West Riding of Yorkshire and to the county of Lancaster—that Salford should return two members instead of one—and that the London University should be represented. We think that these are rational demands, and such as might be accorded; and the necessary number for these purposes, and for putting Scotland on a fair footing of equality with England and Ireland, would amount to the vacation of about thirty or thirty-two existing seats. We have already shown how, without entirely disfranchising any borough, twenty-three seats may be obtained; and if nine others are required, it would be no hardship to take from each of the following boroughs one out of the two members which they presently return:—
| County. | Borough. | Constituency. |
|---|---|---|
| Hampshire, | Lymington, | 328 |
| Cumberland, | Cockermouth, | 330 |
| Buckinghamshire, | Marlow (Great), | 335 |
| Wiltshire, | Chippenham, | 345 |
| Buckinghamshire, | Buckingham, | 349 |
| Devonshire, | Tavistock, | 352 |
| Cornwall, | Bodmin, | 360 |
| Wiltshire, | Devizes, | 363 |
| Buckinghamshire, | Wycombe (Chipping), | 365 |
This would take out of Schedule B no less than twenty-one seats which are now included in it; and it would be obviously unwise to exhaust, all at once, the only source from which new rising constituencies can be endowed. Lord John Russell seems to think—and we agree with him—that the present number of the House of Commons (654) is quite large enough; and although there is no principle to fix numbers, it may be as well to maintain them as they are. It is but natural to expect that, in future years, some places will decrease, and others increase, and that partial changes will be required. For that very reason we deprecate too hasty a reduction of the boroughs, and an apportionment of their seats to places and constituencies which do not require them. Suppose that in ten years after this, new seats of commerce and manufacture, like Birkenhead, Burnley, and Staleybridge, start into existence—that places like Salford increase immensely—and that new Chelseas require to be conjoined with new Kensingtons—where are we to find members for them, without unduly swelling the bulk of the House of Commons, if all the smaller borough seats are to be disposed of at the present time? The Legislature may say just now, with perfect propriety, to the men of Lymington—“Your borough is the smallest in the country which returns two members to Parliament. Birkenhead is a place of such importance that it requires a member; and therefore, as it is not expedient to increase the aggregate number of the national representatives, we shall take a member from you, and give one to Birkenhead.” That is quite intelligible; but why disfranchise boroughs when you do not know what to do with the vacancies? It is true that Lord John Russell tells us what he means to do with them; but we entirely demur to every proposal of his beyond those which we have already noticed. He proposes, we observe, to give three members instead of two to the following cities and boroughs whose constituencies we have noted:—
| Towns. | Constituencies. |
|---|---|
| Birmingham, | 8,780 |
| Bristol, | 10,958 |
| Bradford, | 2,723 |
| Leeds, | 6,400 |
| Liverpool, | 15,382 |
| Manchester, | 17,826 |
| Sheffield, | 5,612 |
| Wolverhampton, | 3,499 |
It must strike every one that there can be no principle in this. The constituencies both of Manchester and Liverpool are more than five times larger than that of Bradford, and yet all of them are to have three members; whereas the Tower Hamlets with 25,366, Marylebone with 20,377, and Lambeth with 18,522 electors, are but to have two each as heretofore. Even the sage of the Edinburgh Review has borne testimony to the impropriety and injustice of adding to the number of representatives returned for large towns. In his article of October 1852, he says:—
“It would appear that the large towns have their full share of the representation; since, if we add the small boroughs to the counties, on the supposition of their returning a somewhat similar class of members, and containing a somewhat similar constituency, the comparison would stand thus:—
| Population. | Members. | |
|---|---|---|
| Counties and small boroughs, | 10,250,000 | 259 |
| Large towns and cities, | 6,660,000 | 206 |
—whereas the proper arithmetical proportion for the cities would be 169, instead of 206.”
The fact is, that Lord John Russell has assigned an additional number to each of these towns, not because they require one, but in order to make the extraordinary experiment, to which we have already alluded, of the representation of minorities in Parliament. For that reason, also, he proposes to give thirty-six additional members to so many counties and their divisions, making each up to the number of three, so that minorities may be represented on rather an extensive scale. We shall have occasion presently to say a word or two on that subject. The notion seems to us not only impracticable, but positively silly; and such as no man of ordinary sense could entertain for a moment. Even were it more feasible than it appears, that would not justify an unnecessary disfranchisement of the boroughs. We can see no reason for parting with them so abruptly—many for retaining them; because, undoubtedly, they keep the balance even between town and country, and so perform a very valuable function in the Legislature. We do not dispute the propriety of their remodelment or curtailment. Our views, in that respect, are, we submit, sufficiently liberal; for we think it just that from them, as small constituencies, any palpable defect or positive need in the national representation should be supplied. But we will not consent to their sacrifice merely for theoretical experiment; or in order to give colour to the proposal for assimilating the town and county franchise—in other words, for swamping the latter representation. We are greatly surprised that Lord John Russell should, in his mature years, have thus been led astray. In the popular ferment of 1831–2—the particulars of which are better known to his lordship than to us—almost any proposal might have gone down; but now reason instead of passion must be appealed to and satisfied, before any one can be allowed to make a material inroad on the Constitution. Lord John is singularly unfortunate. Mr Bright is quite as much opposed to the notion of the representation of minorities as we are; and we venture to say that the collective voice of the counties, to which he proposes to give an additional member, will be raised against him. We need not press the point that the borough electors will be especially unwilling to lose their existing privileges. And if it should so happen—as we know, and as every man who knows the political feeling of the country, must be the case—that both the disfranchised parties, and those whose franchise is thereby nominally increased, hold the scheme in detestation and contempt, how is it possible that he can hope to carry it even through the House of Commons? He has no enthusiasm to back him. He is not attempting to give voice to the opinion of any large section of the public—he is simply repeating, parrot-like and without examination, in opposition to all he has heretofore said, the opinions enunciated by another. He is theorising, contrary to his own experience; and sacrificing, for a mere crotchet, his own arrangements, which, for twenty years, and until 1852, he deemed to be mathematically correct.
We now come to the question of qualification. This is a very serious one, and cannot be properly treated without reference to our existing fiscal arrangements. Indirect taxation has been reduced to the lowest possible limit; and, in order to make up the deficiency in the revenue occasioned by numerous relaxations, we are forced to submit to an income-tax which amounted last year to more than five and a half millions, levied from those persons only who are in receipt of more than £100 yearly. From Mr Gladstone’s financial statement, it appears that the Government does not intend to increase the amount of the national debt by contracting fresh loans, but that the inevitable expenses of the war, however large, are to be defrayed by additional yearly taxation. Further, we are told that it is not proposed to raise any portion of this by again resorting to indirect taxation, but that the whole of it is to be charged upon those persons who are already rated to the income-tax. We subscribe in theory to the opinion, that it is not advisable for the interests of posterity to increase the amount of the national debt; which might, however, have been cleared off during the years of peace but for the insane system pursued by successive Ministries, of abandoning indirect taxation for the sake of immediate popularity. In practice, it may be found impossible to avoid the contraction of fresh loans. It is not likely, for some time at least, that any Ministry will be bold enough to resort to the customs and excise duties for the supply of the yearly deficiency, so that there really seems no other available course than that of taxing property and income still farther. The effect of this is, that a certain limited class is made to pay for the others, and that the great bulk of the population are exempted. How long this can be endured we shall not venture to predict. We have demonstrated over and over again, in the pages of the Magazine, the extreme impolicy and ultimate danger of continuing a war tax in time of peace, and the result shows the soundness of our warning. The day will arrive when this burden will become so great as to be intolerable; and then, perhaps, it may be discovered that, in abandoning easy and evident sources of revenue, our commercial legislators have committed a most grievous error. At present, however, we can only look to the fiscal arrangements which have been proposed. It is obvious, at least to us, that it would be highly inexpedient, and even dangerous, to lodge political power in the hands of those who are not called upon to contribute directly to the necessities of the State. If you are to select a certain class as peculiar rate-payers, and to compel them, year after year, to make up the deficiency of the national income, whatever that may be, you are bound also to give them peculiar privileges. We care not how low you make the assessment. Indeed, we are of opinion that it should be brought down to the lowest possible limit, which, probably, would be fixed, as regards income, at £60 per annum. But whatever that limit may be, this principle ought to be established, that no man, not rated to the property and income tax, shall hereafter be capable of voting, or of being enrolled. This is the only good security we can have against confiscation. It is said that the idea of a war is peculiarly popular in the country. No wonder that it should be so. The artisan is informed that no additional tax will be laid in consequence upon any article of his consumpt; that the price of his beer, spirits, tea, coffee, sugar, and tobacco, will not be raised; and that others will defray the cost of equipping those fine fleets, and maintaining those splendid troops, which he cheers as they leave our shores. Very different are the feelings of the unfortunate individual who, by dint of industry, has worked his way to an income of £150 a-year, and has a wife and family to support. Last year he had to pay £4, 7s. 6d., directly to the Exchequer, and was consoling himself with the vision that, after April 1855, his contribution would be lowered to £3, 15s. Down upon him, like a vulture, swoops the tax-gatherer, with a demand for £7, 11s. 3d., to be increased if the war goes on. You cannot expect that man to be quite as enthusiastic as the artisan, whose voice, like that of Sempronius, is still for war, so long as he escapes untaxed. It is easy to be patriotic when there is nothing whatever to pay. What we advocate, therefore, is, an extension of the property and income tax to the lowest available limit, and an exclusion from the franchise of all those who do not contribute to it. It is a proposition not only fair and reasonable, but imperatively necessary under the circumstances in which we are placed; and no one can complain of injustice in being excluded from a privilege for which he does not pay, either from want of means, or because he fraudulently evades the tax.
Of course, this is tantamount to a rejection of Lord John Russell’s proposal, that persons having £50 for a certain period of time deposited in a savings’ bank, shall be entitled to the franchise. This is a proposal which really will not bear examination. In the first place, it would lead to a prodigious deal of fictitious registration and wholesale manufacture of votes; in the second place, it is a most invidious and senseless preference given to one species of property beyond another. Why a savings’ bank? Are chartered, joint-stock, or private banks not as good? And why give a vote for £50 in the shape of a deposit only? Money is only equivalent to money’s worth. The man who expends £50 in the furnishing of his house, or in purchasing a share in some small business, or in fifty other ways of investment, is as good or better than his neighbour, who lets his money lie in the savings’ bank. It is utterly absurd to select one only kind of deposit for the franchise, practically excluding hundreds of thousands, who have more money invested in a different way. Then, again, what means are to be devised for ascertaining the right of parties so registered to continue on the roll? The tenure is obviously of the most precarious kind. An election takes place to-day, and a depositor votes in virtue of his £50; to-morrow he withdraws it from the bank. How is that to be ascertained? We presume it is not contemplated that the savings’-bank books shall be open to the inspection of the public; and if not, where are the means of ascertaining the continued qualification of parties? In like manner, we object to the qualification of £10 of yearly dividend from the Funds, or from bank stock. It is reasonable enough, perhaps, on account of their educational attainments, that graduates of universities should be admitted to vote either in town or county, provided that they are assessed to the property and income tax, but not otherwise; and the receipt of £100 a-year of salary, as it implies direct rating, may be taken as a sufficient qualification for borough or town voting.
But we are not at all prepared to agree to the proposed assimilation of the town and county franchise. It is a direct and dangerous innovation on the principle of the British constitution, which is, that the county representation shall be kept apart from that of the towns and boroughs. The Act of 1832 admitted the proprietor of a £10 house, not situated within the boundaries of a borough, to a county vote; and the result of that, in some localities, has been, that the voters in villages and small towns which were not boroughs, have been numerous enough to swamp and overpower the proper county constituency. That was bad enough; but it is now proposed that occupiers shall have the franchise; and, as we remarked last month, it is not by any means necessary that the house which the voter occupies should be of the yearly value of £10. We must again quote the words of Lord John Russell: “We propose, with respect to the county right of voting, that—with the exception of a dwelling-house, which may be of any value, provided the voter lives in it—in all other cases the building must be of the value of £5 a-year. Supposing there is a house and land, the house may be rated at £1 or £2 a-year, provided the voter resides in it; but if the qualification is made out by any other building—a cattle-shed, or any other building of that kind—then we propose this check, that such building shall be of the value of £5 a-year. This, then, is the franchise we propose to give in counties for the future.” Thus the English counties are to be inundated, 1st, By £10 occupiers, not resident within borough boundaries; and, 2dly, By the voters of sixty-six disfranchised boroughs, who are to be thrown loose upon them! We are confident that, in any case, such a proposal as this will be rejected. The counties do not want additional members at the expense of the boroughs; and we think it is, on principle, most important that the two kinds of representation should be preserved distinct. Indeed, but for the crotchet of giving representation to minorities, by assigning to as many constituencies as possible three members each, we should probably have heard nothing of this transfer of borough representation. That the county franchise may be advantageously lowered as regards tenants, we are ready to admit. Let them be enrolled from £20 upwards, provided they pay property and income tax, which, according to our view, ought to be made an indispensable condition to the franchise.
But we shall be asked, what is to become of £10 occupants residing beyond borough boundaries, who are really rated to the income-tax? Are they to remain unrepresented? Our reply is, that they ought to be represented, and can be represented, without sending them to the county-roll. The true, sound, and equitable method is to enlarge the parliamentary boundaries of boroughs, so that persons of this class may be enrolled in the nearest borough to their residence. Such enlargement may be made irrespective of other persons who are entitled to the county franchise, and who would still claim to be placed upon that roll. In this way, no one really entitled to vote would be excluded: both counties and boroughs would be preserved; and the latter would receive a very considerable augmentation of numbers from a class of men who at present do not enjoy the franchise.
There is but one point more to which we shall specially refer, and that is the proposed representation of minorities. We have shown, in a former article, that this is perfectly unworkable, and moreover greatly to be deprecated, as entirely changing the relations of the electors and their representatives. It can only, according to Lord John Russell’s admission, be attempted in constituencies which are to be allowed three representatives; and the simple fact of its being the exception, and not the rule, seems to us sufficient to condemn it. We have already put the case of the death or resignation of one of these minority members, and we cannot see how his place can be supplied, unless it is enacted that the candidate lowest on the poll is to be returned. It is neither sensible nor equitable to challenge the authority of majorities. If you leave a question, whether it relate to men or measures, to be decided by a certain number of people, you must perforce adopt and acquiesce in the verdict of the majority. But it is within our power to render the majorities less oppressive, by multiplying as much as possible the number of the tribunals of appeal.
This brings us to the consideration of a topic which we broached in the last number of the Magazine, and which, we venture to say, is well worthy of the attention of our statesmen. It cannot be denied that in many places, especially large towns, there is an immense degree of apathy on the part of those who are entitled to the franchise. Men who are in the possession or occupation of property far more than sufficient to entitle them to vote, do not even take the pains to place themselves on the roll; and many of those who are on the roll will not give themselves the trouble to vote. It is remarkable also that these are generally men of wealth, station, and intelligence—belonging, in short, to the class most likely to use the franchise with discretion and independence. The reason of this apparent apathy is, that they know quite well that they will be outvoted. In urban constituencies of four thousand or upwards, returning two members each, every one knows beforehand how the election will go, and consequently no effort is made by a desponding minority. We grant that such ought not to be the case; because an elector, though he may not be able to find a candidate of his own way of thinking, can always exercise a wholesome control, by voting for the man who, in his judgment, is the best in the field—but there can be no doubt that the case is as we represent it. For example, at last election, there voted, in round numbers, at London, only 7,500 out of 20,000 electors—at Finsbury, 9,000 out of 20,000—at Lambeth, 8,000 out of 18,000—at Manchester, 9,000 out of 13,000—at Westminster, 800 out of 14,800—at Sheffield, 3,500 out of 5,300—at York, 2,500 out of 4,100—at Edinburgh, 3,500 out of 6,900—at Glasgow, 5,000 out of 16,500. These represent the actual numbers on the register, but not the number of those entitled to be enrolled, but who have not lodged claims. In short, the activity in voting and enrolling seems to decline in proportion to the size of the constituency.
There is but one way of remedying this, and that is by recurring to the simple principle that no man shall be entitled, in one place, to vote for more than a single member. We do not mean by this that large populations should be restricted to a single member—that would be unfair, and even preposterous. We mean that each county, division of a county, city, town, or borough, which has more than one member allotted to it, should be subdivided into parishes, districts, or wards, each to return a member, according to the votes of the majority of the qualified electors within it. Thus London would be divided into four electoral districts; Liverpool, Manchester, Edinburgh, and others into two; and the counties would, in the same way, be partitioned into so many districts as there were members to be returned. This system is at present in partial operation in the counties of England, which are split into divisions, and there undoubtedly the system has worked well and satisfactorily. No man in his senses would propose that each county elector of Yorkshire should have six votes; and we really cannot see why one man, because he happens to live in a large town, should have double the personal political influence of another who resides in a small borough. It does not necessarily follow, by any means, that the members to be returned under the operation of the system which we propose should be antagonistic to one another. It would, we are convinced, materially tend to improve the representation, by infusing fresh energy into the constituencies; it is already recognised, and partially in effect; and it is not liable to any of the objections which it requires no ingenuity to rear against Lord John Russell’s absurd scheme for giving members to minorities.
We might say a great deal more on the subject of the present bill, but we think that further comment is needless. We have shown, by absolute demonstration, that it is not the result of Lord John Russell’s own Parliamentary experience—that, for twenty years of his public life, dating from 1832, he had failed to see the proper method of amending the representation of the people—and that he was at last enlightened by a series of articles, which display as little consistency as wisdom. We have shown also that he has not probed the great question of the relative proportional representation of the three united kingdoms—that he proposes to demolish borough representation, without any necessity for doing so—and that he wishes entirely to change, or rather to abrogate, the ancient distinction between town and county franchise. We have shown that he has not taken at all into consideration the recent fiscal changes, and that he proposes to place those who are heavily and directly taxed on the same footing with those who are allowed to escape that burden. We have shown that other parts of his scheme are either merely fantastical, or dictated by party motives; and having said so much, we are content to abide by the decision of the country.
If this bill is again brought forward on the 27th of April, or a later day in the session, we do not believe that it will ever pass into the statute-book. If it is withdrawn, on the score of inconvenience or otherwise, we are perfectly certain that it will not again appear in its present shape; for, many as are the legislative proposals which we have had occasion to consider, this is, beyond comparison, the worst digested, most incoherent and most rambling measure of them all.