German Ambassador to Great Britain in 1914 Proves That His Country Forced the War
Prince Lichnowsky, who was the German Ambassador to Great Britain when the war began, is the author of an extremely interesting and important historical document which became public in March, 1918. It is in the form of a private memorandum written by the Prince, in which he frankly and definitely admits that the guilt for starting the world conflict rests upon his own country. The document, through some unrevealed agency, reached the Stockholm newspaper Politiken, the influential mouthpiece of the Swedish Socialists, and was printed in installments.
The publication created a profound sensation throughout Europe. It evoked passionate rebukes of the Prince in the Reichstag and drew forth an important utterance from the former German Foreign Minister, who failed to refute its supremely important revelations. It was reported early in April that the German Government had taken steps to institute proceedings against the Prince on the charges of revealing State secrets and of treason to the State.
The memorandum was written by Prince Lichnowsky about eighteen months ago for the purpose of explaining and justifying his position to his personal friends, and only half a dozen typewritten copies were made. One of these copies, through a betrayal, reached the Wilhelmstrasse, and caused a great scandal, and another was communicated to some members of the Minority Socialist Party. But how it happened that a copy got across the German frontier remains a mystery. Internal evidence, however, leaves no doubt in regard to the authenticity of the document. It is entitled "My London Mission, 1912-1914," and is dated "Kuchelna, (Prince Lichnowsky's country seat,) August, 1916."
Prince Lichnowsky begins with a recital of the circumstances which led to his being appointed to London after many years of retirement from diplomacy, and a description of the European position as he then found it. The moment, he believes,
was undoubtedly favorable for a new attempt to get on a better footing with England. Our enigmatical Moroccan policy had repeatedly shaken confidence in our peaceful disposition and aroused the suspicion that we were not quite sure what we wanted, or that our intention was to keep Europe in suspense, and, when occasion served, to humiliate the French. An Austrian colleague, who was long in Paris, said to me, "If the French begin to forget révanche, you regularly remind them of it by treading heavily on their toes."
After rejecting M. Delcassé's attempt to come to an agreement with us in regard to Morocco, and declaring that we had no political interests there, an attitude which was in full accordance with the traditions of the Bismarckian policy, we suddenly recognized in Abdul Aziz a Kruger No. 2. To him, also, like the Boers, we promised the powerful support of the German Empire—at the same cost and with the same result. For both affairs ended, as they had to end, unless we were already then resolved to undertake a world war—namely, in withdrawal.
Our attitude promoted the Russo-Japanese and the Russo-British rapprochements. In face of the German peril all other conflicts fell into the background. The possibility of a new Franco-German war had become evident.
THE BRITISH PROGRAM
After describing the futility of Germany's Moroccan policy, Prince Lichnowsky goes on:
When I arrived in London, in November, 1912, public opinion had calmed about the Morocco question. Mr. Haldane's mission had certainly failed, since we had demanded a promise of neutrality instead of satisfying ourselves with a compact which would secure us against a British attack or an attack with British support. Sir Edward Grey, however, had not given up the idea of reaching an agreement with us and, as a beginning, made an attempt in this direction in the economic and colonial spheres. With Herr von Kühlmann as expert intermediary, an exchange of views took place concerning the renewal of the Portuguese Colonial Agreement and the Bagdad Railway, the object of which was to divide the aforesaid colonies, as well as Asia Minor, into spheres of interest. The British statesman desired, since the old disputes with France and Russia were settled, to reach a corresponding agreement with us. His aim was not to isolate us, but to get us to take part in the already established concert. Having succeeded in throwing a bridge across the Franco-British and Russo-British divisions, he wished also, as far as possible, to remove the causes of friction between England and Germany, and, by a network of agreements—to which might well eventually have been added an agreement on the unfortunate naval question—to secure the peace of the world.
This was Sir Edward Grey's program. In his own words "Without prejudice to the existing friendly understandings with France and Russia, which pursued no aggressive aims, and involved in themselves for England no binding obligations, to reach a friendly rapprochement and understanding with Germany." In short, to bring the two groups nearer together.
In this connection two schools of opinion—the optimists, who believed in the possibility of an understanding; the pessimists, who considered that war was sooner or later unavoidable. To the former belonged Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Haldane, and most of the members of the Liberal Cabinet, as well as the leading Liberal organs, like The Westminster, The Chronicle, and The (Manchester) Guardian. To the pessimists belonged, primarily, Conservative politicians like Mr. Balfour, who on repeated occasions allowed me to know his opinion, and leading soldiers like Lord Roberts, who preached the necessity for the introduction of compulsory service; also the Northcliffe press, and the important English journalist, Mr. Garvin. During my time in office, however, this party refrained from all attacks, and maintained, both personally and politically, a friendly attitude. But our naval policy and our conduct in 1905, 1908, and 1911 had created among them the belief that some day it would come to war. The first school, exactly as among us in Germany, are now accused of foolishness and short-sightedness, while the second are regarded as true prophets.
Prince Lichnowsky goes on to describe the situation during the Balkan war. There were two policies, he says, open to Germany—to act as an impartial mediator and seek a stable settlement in accordance with the wishes of the Balkan peoples, or to conduct a strict Triple Alliance policy. He himself recommended the former, but the Wilhelmstrasse determined on the latter. Austria wished to keep Serbia from the Adriatic; Italy wished to prevent the Greeks from reaching Avlona; Russia supported the Serbs, France supported the Greeks. Germany had no motive whatever for supporting her allies, and thus bringing about a bad settlement, except the desire to consolidate what, in Prince Lichnowsky's opinion, was a palpably worthless alliance—worthless because it was obvious that Italy would break from the alliance in the event of war, while Austria was absolutely dependent on Germany in peace and war without an alliance.
The best way to increase Austria's dependence was to cultivate friendly relations between Germany and Russia. The Kaiser, for dynastic reasons, was in favor of the division of Albania between Greece and Serbia, but "when I, in a letter to him, urged this solution, I received from the Chancellor a severe reprimand to the effect that I was supporting Austria's enemies, and should refrain from direct correspondence with the Emperor."
Thus Germany decided to take her stand on the side of the Turkish and Magyar oppressors for the sake of the Triple Alliance—a fatal blunder, which Prince Lichnowsky describes as "all the more striking since a sudden Franco-Russian assault—the only hypothesis which could justify the Triple Alliance policy—could, in fact, be ruled out of our calculations."
DANGEROUS BALKAN POLICY
It was not only unnecessary, he declares, but dangerous, to pay attention to Austria's wishes, since to look at the Eastern question through Austrian spectacles must lead to a collision with Russia and a world war.
Such a policy, moreover, was bound to alienate sympathy among the young, strong, and aspiring communities of the Balkan Peninsula, who were ready to turn to us and to open their markets to us. The opposition between courts and peoples, between the dynastic and the democratic idea of the State, was clearly defined, and, as usual, we stood on the wrong side. * * * In Serbia, against our own economic interests, we supported the Austrian policy of strangulation. We have always ridden horses whose collapse could be foreseen—Kruger, Abdul Aziz, Abdul Hamid, and William of Wied—and finally we came to grief in Berchtold's stable.
Prince Lichnowsky proceeds to describe the Conference of Ambassadors in London in 1913, and the influential and conciliatory part played there by Sir Edward Grey, who always, he says, found a way out of every apparent deadlock.
But we, instead of taking up a position analogous to that of England, invariably espoused the standpoint of Vienna. Count Mensdorff led the Triple Alliance in London; I was his second. My task consisted in supporting his proposals. In Berlin the prudent and experienced Count Szögyény was in control. "Here the casus foederis arises," was his constant refrain, and when I once ventured to question the correctness of this conclusion I was seriously warned for Austrophobia. At all points we accepted and supported the views of Austria and Italy. Sir Edward Grey, on the other hand, practically never sided with Russia or France. Usually, indeed, he took the side of our group, so as not to provide any pretext for conflict. That pretext was supplied later by a dead Archduke.
THE GUILT ESTABLISHED
Lichnowsky states that a few days after the Serajevo murder of June 28, 1914, he was in Berlin, and from interviews with Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg he found that the latter did not share the Prince's belief that peace might be maintained, and complained of Russian armaments. The memorandum continues:
I then went to Dr. Zimmermann, who was representing Herr von Jagow, [Foreign Secretary,] and from him learned that Russia was about to raise 900,000 fresh troops. His words showed an unmistakable animosity toward Russia, which, he said, was everywhere in our way. Of course, I was not told that General von Moltke was pressing for war. I learned, however, that Herr von Tschereschky [the German Ambassador in Vienna] had received a rebuke because he reported that he had advised moderation in Vienna toward Serbia.
Subsequently I learned that at a decisive conversation in Potsdam July 5 an inquiry addressed to us by Vienna found positive assent among all personages in authority. Indeed, they added that there would be no harm if war with Russia were to result. I received instruction that I was to induce the English press to take up a friendly attitude if Austria gave the deathblow to the Great Serbian movement, and as far as possible I was, by my influence, to prevent public opinion opposing Austria.
I gave warning against the whole project, which I described as adventurous and dangerous, and I advised that moderation be recommended to the Austrians because I did not believe in localization of conflict.
Herr von Jagow answered me that Russia was not ready, that there doubtless would be a certain amount of bluster, but that the more firmly we stood by Austria the more would Russia draw back. He said Austria already was accusing us of want of spirit and we must not squeeze her; and that, on the other hand, feeling in Russia was becoming ever more anti-German and so we must simply risk it.
I knew that Sir Edward Grey's influence in Petrograd could be turned to use in favor of peace, so I used my friendly relations with Sir Edward, [British Foreign Secretary,] and in confidence begged him to advise moderation in Russia if Austria demanded satisfaction from Serbia.
At first the attitude of the English press was calm and friendly to the Austrians because the murder was condemned, but gradually more and more voices were heard to insist that, however necessary it was to punish the crime, exploitation of crime for political purposes could not be justified. Austria was strongly urged to show moderation.
When the ultimatum appeared, all the papers, except The Standard, which was always like slow water and apparently was paid by the Austrians, were as one in their condemnation. The whole world, except in Berlin and Vienna, understood that it meant war, and indeed a world war.
The British fleet, which chanced to be assembled for review, was not demobilized.
England and Russia for Peace
At first I pressed for a conciliatory answer as far as possible on the part of Serbia, since the attitude of the Russian Government left no further doubt of the seriousness of the situation. The Serbian reply was in accordance with the British efforts, and everything actually had been accepted except two points, about which a readiness to negotiate had been expressed.
If Russia and England had wanted war in order to fall upon us a hint to Belgrade would have been sufficient, and the unheard of [Austrian] note would have remained unanswered. Sir Edward Grey went through the Serbian reply with me and pointed to the conciliatory attitude of the Government at Belgrade. We then discussed his mediation proposal, which was to arrange an interpretation of the two points acceptable to both parties.
Cambon, [French Ambassador in London,] Marquis Imperiali, [Italian Ambassador in London,] and I should have met under Sir Edward Grey's presidency, and it would have been easy to find an acceptable form for the disputed points which, in the main, concerned the participation of Austrian officials in the investigation at Belgrade.
Given good will, everything could have been settled in one or two sittings, and mere acceptance of the British proposal would have relieved the tension and would further have improved our relations to England. I urgently recommended the proposal, saying that otherwise a world war was imminent, in which we had everything to lose and nothing to gain.
In vain! I was told that it was against the dignity of Austria and that we did not want to interfere in the Serbian business but left it to our ally. I was told to work for localization of conflict. Of course, it would only have needed a hint from Berlin to make Count Berchtold, Austrian Foreign Minister, satisfy himself with a diplomatic success and put up with the Serbian reply, but this hint was not given.
Germany Forced the War
On the contrary, we pressed for war. What a fine success it would have been! After our refusal Sir Edward asked us to come forward with a proposal of our own. We insisted upon war. I could get no other answer from Berlin than that it was enormous conciliation on the part of Austria to contemplate no annexation of territory.
Thereupon Sir Edward justly pointed out that even without annexations of territory a country can be humiliated and subjected, and that Russia would regard this as a humiliation which she would not stand. The impression became ever stronger that we desired war in all circumstances, otherwise our attitude on the question, which after all did not directly concern us, was unintelligible.
The urgent appeals and definite declarations of Sazonoff [Russian Foreign Minister] later on the positively humble telegrams of the Czar, the repeated proposals of Sir Edward, the warnings of San Giuliano, [Italian Foreign Minister,] my own urgent advice—all were of no use, for Berlin went on insisting that Serbia must be massacred. The more I pressed the less willing they were to alter their course, if only because I was not to have the success of saving peace in company with Sir Edward Grey.
So Grey on July 29 resolved upon his well-known warning. I replied I had always reported that we should have to reckon upon English hostility if it came to war with France. The Minister said to me repeatedly, "If war breaks out it will be the greatest catastrophe the world has ever seen." After that events moved rapidly.
When Count Berchtold, who hitherto had played strong man on instructions from Berlin, at last decided to change his course, we answered Russian mobilization—after Russia had waited and negotiated in vain for a whole week—with our ultimatum and declaration of war.
Up to the last moment I had hoped for a waiting attitude on the part of England. As late as August the King of England replied evasively to the French President, but in a telegram from Berlin, which announced the threatening danger of war, England already was mentioned as an opponent. In Berlin, therefore, one already reckoned upon war with England.
Before my departure Sir Edward Grey received me on Aug. 5 at his house. I went there at his desire. He was deeply moved. He said to me that he would always be ready to mediate, and "We do not want to crush Germany." Unfortunately this confidential conversation was published, and thereby von Bethmann Hollweg destroyed the last possibility of reaching a peace via England.
Questions of Guilt
As it appears from all official publications without the facts being controverted by our own White Book, which, owing to its poverty and gaps, constitutes a grave self-accusation:
1. We encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, although no German interest was involved and the danger of a world war must have been known to us; whether we knew the text of the ultimatum is a question of complete indifference.
2. In the days between July 23 and 30, 1914, when Sazonoff emphatically declared that Russia could not tolerate an attack on Serbia, we rejected the British proposals of mediation, although Serbia, under Russian and British pressure, had accepted almost the whole ultimatum, and although an agreement about the two points in question could easily have been reached and Berchtold was even ready to satisfy himself with the Serbian reply.
3. On July 30, when Berchtold wanted to give way, we, without Austria having been attacked, replied to Russia's mere mobilization by sending an ultimatum to St. Petersburg, and on July 31 we declared war on the Russians, although the Czar had pledged his word that as long as negotiations continued not a man should march—so that we deliberately destroyed the possibility of a peaceful settlement.
In view of these indisputable facts, it is not surprising that the whole world outside of Germany attributes to us sole guilt for the world war.
THE BAGDAD RAILWAY
Anglo-German negotiations concerning the Berlin-Bagdad Railway and German naval and commercial jealousy of Great Britain are touched upon in further sections of the personal memorandum.
Prince Lichnowsky says that the Bagdad Railway treaty aimed in fact at a division of Asia Minor into spheres of interest, although this expression was carefully avoided in consideration of the rights of the Sultan of Turkey. Sir Edward Grey asserted repeatedly that there was no agreement between England and France aiming at a division of Asia Minor. The greatest concession that Sir Edward made to Prince Lichnowsky personally was for the continuation of the railway line to Basra.
By this treaty the whole of Mesopotamia up to Basra became a German zone of interest by which all British rights and the question of shipping on the Tigris were left untouched. The British economic territories, the Prince adds, included the coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Smyrna-Aden Railway, the French territory was Syria, and the Russian Armenia. Had the treaty been concluded and published, he continues, an agreement would have been reached with Great Britain which would have finally ended all doubt of the possibility of Anglo-German co-operation.
GERMANY'S NAVAL THREAT
Referring to the difficult question of German naval activity, Prince Lichnowsky says that the creation of a mighty fleet on the other shore of the North Sea and the simultaneous development of the Continent's most important military power into a most important naval power had at least to be recognized by Great Britain as uncomfortable. To preserve the supremacy of the seas which Great Britain must have in order not to go down, the Prince adds, she had to undertake preparations and expenses which weighed heavily on the taxpayers. Nevertheless, the powers become reconciled to the German fleet in its definite strength. Obviously it was not welcome to Great Britain and, the Prince says, constituted one of the motives, but neither the only nor the most important motive, for England to join hands with Russia and France.
On account of the German fleet alone, Prince Lichnowsky says, Great Britain would have drawn the sword as little as on account of German trade, "which, it is pretended, called forth her jealousy and finally brought about war."
"NAVAL HOLIDAY"
During Prince Lichnowsky's term of office Winston Spencer Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, raised the question of the so-called naval holiday, proposing it for financial reasons as much as on account of the pacifist inclinations of his party. Churchill wanted a pause of one year in building ships. Prince Lichnowsky maintains it would have been difficult to support this plan on account of the workmen employed and the technical personnel. The German naval program was settled, and it would have been difficult to alter it. The Prince asserts that it was possible, in spite of the German fleet and without a naval holiday, to come to an understanding. In that spirit he had carried out his mission and had almost succeeded in realizing his program when the war broke out and destroyed everything.
Discussing the question of trade jealousy, Prince Lichnowsky says it rested on a faulty judgment of circumstances. In British commercial circles, he says, he found the greatest good-will and the desire for further economic interests in common. In order to get in touch with the most important business circles he accepted invitations from the Chambers of Commerce in London, Bradford, Newcastle, and Liverpool, and he had a hearty reception everywhere.
In conclusion Prince Lichnowsky gives his impressions of English society. King George he describes as very amiable and well-meaning, with sound understanding and common sense, and invariably well disposed toward the German Ambassador.
LICHNOWSKY EXPLAINS
The German Vice Chancellor, Friedrich von Payer, announced in the Reichstag late in March that on account of the disclosures Prince Lichnowsky had resigned his rank and expressed regrets. Herr von Payer stated that Prince Lichnowsky himself, on March 15, made a statement to the Imperial Chancellor in which he said:
Your Excellency knows that the purely private notes which I wrote down in the Summer of 1916 found their way into wider circles by an unprecedented breach of confidence. It was mainly a question of subjective considerations about our entire foreign policy since the Berlin Congress. I perceived in the policy hitherto pursued of repelling Russia and in the extension of the policy of alliances to Oriental questions the real roots of the world war. I then submitted our Morocco naval policy to a brief examination. My London mission could at the same time not remain out of consideration, especially as I felt need in regard to the future and with a view to my own justification of noting the details of my experiences and impressions there before they vanished from my memory.
Prince Lichnowsky then described how the memorandum, which he had shown to a few political friends, got into wider circulation owing to an indiscretion, and finally expressed lively regret at such an extremely vexatious incident.
VICE CHANCELLOR'S REPLY
Herr von Payer said that Prince Lichnowsky had meanwhile tendered his resignation of his present rank, which had been accepted, and, as he had doubtless no bad intention, but had simply been guilty of imprudence, no further steps would be taken against him. The Vice Chancellor proceeded:
Some assertions in his document must, however, be contradicted, especially his assertions about political events in the last months preceding the war. Prince Lichnowsky was not of his own knowledge acquainted with these events, but he apparently received from a third and wrongly informed quarter inaccurate information. The key to mistakes and false conclusions may also be the Prince's overestimation of his own services, which are accompanied by hatred against those who do not recognize his achievements as he expected. The entire memorandum is penetrated by a striking veneration for foreign diplomats, especially the British, who are described in a truly affectionate manner, and on the other hand by an equally striking irritation against almost all German statesmen. The result was that the Prince frequently regarded Germany's most zealous enemies as her best friends because they were personally on good terms with him. The fact that, as he admits, he attached at first no great importance to the assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne, and was displeased that the situation was judged otherwise in Berlin, makes it plain that the Prince had no clear judgment for the events that followed and their import.
VON PAYER'S DENIALS
The Vice Chancellor then characterized as false all Prince Lichnowsky's assertions about General von Moltke's urging war at the Potsdam Crown Council of July 5, 1914, and the dispatch of the Austrian protocol by "this alleged Crown Council" to Count Mensdorff with the postscript that it would be no great harm even if war with Russia arose out of it.
Herr von Payer also denied the statement that the then Foreign Secretary was in Vienna in 1914, as well as the statement that Count von Pourtalès, the German Ambassador in Petrograd, had reported that Russia would in no circumstances move. The Sukhomlinoff trial had shown how unfounded were Prince Lichnowsky's reproaches against Germany for replying to the Russian mobilization by an ultimatum and a declaration of war. It was also false to assert that the German Government rejected all Great Britain's mediation proposals. Lord Grey's last mediation proposal was very urgently supported in Vienna by Berlin. The aim of the memorandum was obvious. It was to show the reader how much better and more intelligent Prince Lichnowsky's policy was and how he could have assured the peace of the empire if his advice had been followed. The Vice Chancellor added: "The memorandum will cause enough harm among malevolent and superficial people; it has no historical value whatever."
Dr. Payer then discussed the revelations of Dr. Mühlon, at present in Switzerland. Dr. Mühlon, an ex-Director of Krupps, had made a statement according to which he had a conference with two exalted personages in the latter half of July, 1914, from which it appeared that it was not the intention of the German Government to maintain peace. The Vice Chancellor alleged that Dr. Mühlon was suffering from neurasthenia at the time, and that no importance could be attached to his revelations, since the two gentlemen referred to had denied making the statements attributed to them.
VON STUMM'S STATEMENT
Herr von Stumm, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, said that while in London the Prince devoted himself zealously to his task. His views had frequently not agreed with those of the German Foreign Office, especially regarding his strong optimism in reference to Anglo-German relations. When his hopes, aiming at an Anglo-German understanding, were destroyed by the war, the Prince returned to Germany "greatly excited," and even then did not restrain his criticism of German policy. His excitement increased owing to attacks against him in the German press. All these circumstances, said von Stumm, must be taken into consideration when gauging the value of the memorandum.
In the subsequent discussion disapproval of Prince Lichnowsky's attitude was expressed, but some speakers urged the need for the reorganization of Germany's diplomatic service.
According to the report of the debate published by the Neues Wiener Journal, Herr von Payer himself acknowledged that prior to the war German diplomacy had made some bad blunders, and that reform was urgently needed. Herr Müller (Progressive) sharply criticised Herr von Flotow, who was German Ambassador in Rome at the beginning of the war, and charged him with having declared to the Marquis di San Giuliano, then Italian Foreign Minister, that there existed for Italy no casus foederis. Prince Bülow also came in for severe criticism.