Current History: A Monthly Magazine of the New York Times, May 1918 / Vol. VIII, Part I, No. 2

by Various

Historic Speech by Premier Lloyd George on the Picardy Battle and Its Fateful Consequences

The British Government introduced a bill April 9, 1918, to raise the military age up to 50, and in special cases to 55, and to provide for conscription in Ireland. Premier David Lloyd George, in introducing the measure in the House of Commons, delivered an important address, in which he reviewed the battle of Picardy up to that time and gave interesting details of the conduct of the war in the preceding months. The address opened a new phase in the world conflict as affected by the posture of affairs in Great Britain. The full speech was sent by special cable to The New York Times and is reproduced herewith as a historic document of the war:

We have now entered the most critical phase of this terrible war. There is a lull in the storm, but the hurricane is not over. Doubtless we must expect more fierce outbreaks, and ere it is finally exhausted there will be many more. The fate of the empire, the fate of Europe, and the fate of liberty throughout the world may depend on the success with which the very last of these attacks is resisted and countered.

The Government, therefore, propose to submit to Parliament today certain recommendations, in order to assist this country and the Allies to weather the storm. They will involve, I regret, extreme sacrifices on the part of large classes of the population, and nothing would justify them but the most extreme necessity and the fact that we are fighting for all that is essential and most sacred in our national life.

Before I come to the circumstances which led up to our submitting these proposals to Parliament, I ought to say one word as to why Parliament was not immediately summoned. Since the battle began the Government have been engaged almost every hour in concerting with the Allies the necessary measures to assist the armies to deal with the emergency.

The proposals which we intend submitting to Parliament required very close and careful examination, and I think there is this advantage in our meeting today, rather than immediately after the impact of the German attack, that we shall be considering these proposals under conditions which will be far removed from any suggestion of panic.

THE BATTLE OF PICARDY

I shall now come to the circumstances which have led to the present military position. It is very difficult at this time to present a clear, connected, and reliable narrative of what happened. There has been a great battle on a front of fifty miles—the greatest battle ever fought in the history of the world. Enormous forces have been engaged; there was a considerable retirement on the part of the British forces, and under these conditions it is not always easy for some time to ascertain what actually happened.

The House will recollect the difficulty we experienced with regard to Cambrai. It was difficult to piece together the story of the event for some time, and Cambrai was a very trivial event compared with this gigantic battle.

The Generals and their staffs are, naturally, engaged and have to concentrate their attention upon the operations of the enemy, and until the strain relaxes it would be very difficult to institute the necessary inquiries to find out exactly what happened, and to furnish an adequate explanation of the battle.

However, there are two or three facts which stand out, and in stating them I should like to call attention to two things which I think above all must be avoided. The first is that nothing should be said which could give information to the enemy; nothing should be said which would give encouragement to the enemy, and nothing should be said which would give discouragement to our own troops, who are fighting so gallantly at this very hour. And the second question is that all recrimination at this hour must be shut out.

GERMANS SLIGHTLY WEAKER

What was the position at the beginning of the battle? Notwithstanding the heavy casualties in 1917 the army in France was considerably stronger on Jan. 1, 1918, than on Jan. 1, 1917. Up to the end of 1917—up to, say, about October or November—the German combatant strength in France was as two to the Allies' three. Then came the military collapse of Russia, and the Germans hurried up their released divisions from the eastern front and brought them to the west. They had a certain measure of Austrian support, which had been accorded to them.

Owing to the growth of the strength of our armies in 1917 when this battle began the combatant strength of the whole of the German Army on the western front was only approximately, though not quite, equal to the total combatant strength of the Allies in infantry. They were slightly inferior in artillery. They were considerably inferior in cavalry, and, what is very important, they were undoubtedly inferior in aircraft.

The Germans, therefore, organized their troops so as to produce a larger number of divisions out of the slightly smaller number of infantry and slightly smaller number of guns. They had fewer battalions in a division and fewer men in a battalion. That is entirely a question of organization, and it yet remains to be seen that their organization is better than ours. It is necessary to explain that, in order that the House should realize why, with approximately the same number of men, the Germans have a larger number of divisions on that front.

According to all the facts which have come to hand as to the losses of the battle, that roughly represents the relative strength of the combatants on both sides at this moment. The Germans had, however, one or two important advantages. The first, the initial advantage, which is always commanded by the offensive, is that they know where they mean to attack. They choose the ground, they choose the location, they know the width of the attack, they know the dimensions of the attack, they know the time of the attack, they know the method of the attack. All that invariably gives the initial advantage to the offensive.

Concentrated on the British

The defense has a general advantage, as, owing to air observation, concealment is difficult. At the same time, in spite of all that, owing to the power of moving troops at night, which the Germans exercised in a very large extent, there was a large margin for surprise, even in spite of air observation, and of this the enemy took full advantage.

I should like to say one word here as to the difficulty which the allied Generals were confronted with in this respect. Before the battle the greatest German concentration was in front of our troops. That was no proof that the full weight of the attack would fall on us. There was a very large concentration opposite the French lines. There was a very considerable concentration—I am referring now to the German reserves—on the northern part of our line.

After the battle began, or immediately before the battle, the Germans by night brought their divisions from the northern part to the point where the attack took place. They also took several divisions from opposite the French in the same way and brought them to our front. But it would have been equally easy for them, while concentrating troops opposite our front, to manoeuvre them in the same way opposite the French. I am only referring to that in order to show how exceedingly difficult it is for Generals on the defensive to decide exactly where, in their judgment, the attack is coming and where they ought to concentrate their reserves.

General Wilson's Forecast

I may just say a word here. This problem was considered very closely by the military staff at Versailles, and I think it right, in justice to them, to point out that after a very close study of the German position and of the probabilities of the case, they came to the conclusion, and they stated their conclusion to the military representatives and to the Ministers in the month of January, or the beginning of February, that the attack would come south of Arras; that it would be an attack on the widest front ever yet assailed; that the Germans would accumulate ninety-five divisions for the purpose of making that attack; that they would throw the whole of their resources and their strength into breaking the British line at that point, and that their objective would be the capture of Amiens and the severance of the British and French forces.

That was the conclusion which Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial Staff, came to, and which was submitted at that time, two or three months ago, and I think that it was one of the most remarkable forecasts of enemy intentions ever made.

As a matter of fact, the attack was made up, I think, by about ninety-seven divisions. It was an attack on the widest front that had ever been engaged. Its object undoubtedly was the capture of Amiens and the severance of the British and French forces. So that, almost in every detail, that very remarkable forecast has been verified in the event.

Another remarkable prediction was that it might probably succeed in penetrating the British line to the extent of half the distance of the front attacked. They came to the conclusion from a close examination of the offensives of the war.

Advantage of United Command

There was another advantage. There was, first of all, the advantage which the Germans had from having the initiative. There was a further advantage they had, and this undoubtedly was the greatest advantage, from having a united command opposed to a dual one. The Germans undoubtedly relied on this to a very large extent for their success. They owe much of the success of this attack to this.

It was reported to me on good authority that the Kaiser informed ex-King Constantine: "I shall beat them, for they have no united command." Which shows that that was what they were relying in the main upon; that, although their numbers were slightly inferior, they knew the importance that was to be attached to the fact that they had a perfectly united command.

And that is an obvious advantage, for if the risks in one particular part of the line are great, and in another part of the line are great, but substantially less than in the former, with one command there is no hesitation in the mind of the Commander in Chief as to which risk he will make the greatest provision against.

With two separate commands the problem is a different one. It is more difficult to adjust the balance of risk, and the General is always naturally inclined to give himself and his army the benefit of any doubt. That may be because if anything goes wrong there he alone is to be held responsible to his own countrymen for the safety of his army.

Weather Favored Germans

The enemy had another incidental but, as it turned out, very important advantage—that of the weather. Exceptional weather favored his designs. It was both dry and misty. The attack which succeeded was made on that part of the line where under ordinary Spring conditions the ground would have been almost impassable.

A wounded officer told a friend of mine today, a General, that under ordinary conditions no one could walk across the part which was traversed by the Germans at this time of the year. But it just happened to be absolutely dry and firm, and they walked across ground which no one had any right to expect at this time of the year would be in that condition.

Not only that, but the fact that it was warm increased the mist, and the Germans were actually in some parts within a few yards of our front line before any one knew of their approach. It was quite impossible to observe them. This was a special disadvantage to us, inasmuch as our scheme of organization in that particular part of the line depended largely upon the cross-line fire of machine guns and artillery. They had, therefore, a very special advantage, of which they made the fullest use.

Closed Up Gap in Armies

With regard to the battle itself, as I have already stated, it will take some time to ascertain the whole facts. At one time it was undoubtedly very critical. The enemy broke through between our 3d and 5th Armies, and there was a serious gap, and the situation was retrieved owing to the magnificent conduct of our troops. They retired in perfectly good order, re-establishing the junction between the two armies and frustrating the enemy's purpose.

The House can hardly realize, and certainly cannot sufficiently thank—nor can the country—our troops for their superb valor and the grim tenacity with which they faced overwhelming hordes of the enemy and clung to their positions. They retired, but were never routed, and once more the cool pluck of the British soldier, that refuses to acknowledge defeat, saved Europe.

I am referring to the whole army, Generals, officers, and soldiers. I mean the whole army, and I draw no distinction. Their conduct has been one of incredible courage and great coolness under the most trying conditions. I do not think that any distinction can be drawn between officers and men. I am referring to the British Army, and that means all.

Praises General Carey's Feat

And I specially refer to what one Brigadier General did. Some reference has been made in the press already to it, where at one point there was a serious gap, which might have let the enemy into Calais.

[At this point the Prime Minister spoke of the critical situation which developed when the German attack began. He said the gap on the way to Amiens was held by Brig. Gen. Carey, who for six days stood off the enemy with engineers, laborers, signalers, and anybody who could hold a rifle. The Premier continued:]

Until the whole circumstances which led to the retirement of the 5th Army and its failure to hold the line of the Somme, at least till the Germans brought out their guns, and perhaps the failure adequately to destroy the bridges—until all these are explained it would be unfair to censure the General in command of the army, General Gough. But until those circumstances are cleared up it would be equally unfair to the British Army to retain his services in the field. It is necessary to recall him until the facts have been fully ascertained and laid before the Government by their military advisers.

After the retirement of the 5th Army the French reserves came up with remarkable rapidity, when their position before the battle is borne in mind. In fact, the speed with which, when the final decision was taken as to the real designs of the enemy, the French reserves were brought up is one of the most remarkable feats of organization in this war, and between the courage of our troops and the handling of the army—the way the 3d Army held, never giving way a hundred yards to the attack of the enemy—I think it right that it should be said about the army commanded by General Byng—that between the efforts of our soldiers and the loyal assistance given in true spirit of comradeship by the French Army, the position is for the moment stabilized. But it is clear that the Germans, having gained an initial success, are preparing another, and perhaps an even greater, attack on the allied armies.

Teutons Fail in Main Objects

Up to the present the enemy has undoubtedly obtained a great initial success. There is no good in not accepting the facts. It is from that basis we must begin to build. But he has failed so far in his main objects. He failed to capture Amiens. He failed to separate the French and British armies. But we should be guilty of great, it might be fatal, error if we were to underestimate the gravity of the prospect.

The enemy has captured valuable ground, which is too near Amiens for comfort or security, and he has succeeded for the time being in crippling one of our great armies.

I will now tell the House something of the measures adopted by the Cabinet to meet the emergency. I have already explained what was done about the French reserves. The Cabinet took every step to hurry up reinforcements in order to fill up the gap in our armies. No such large numbers of men ever passed across the Channel in so short a time.

As the emergency was great it was impossible to allow those who were summoned to France the usual leave to visit their relatives. It was with the greatest regret that we found it necessary to cancel this permission, and nothing but the gravity of the position would have justified so harsh a proceeding. But the troops accepted the position in a manner which is worthy of the fortitude, courage, and patriotism they have shown throughout.

There was an understanding that boys under 19 years would only be used in case of emergency. We felt that the emergency had arisen, and in so far as those who were over 18 were concerned, those who had already received six months' training, we felt it necessary that they should be sent to France.

As to the guns and machine guns which were lost, the numbers are grossly exaggerated by the enemy. I am assured that they have also exaggerated very considerably the number of prisoners they have taken. The Commander in Chief assured me last week that it was a gross exaggeration.

I am very glad to be able to say that the Ministry of Munitions were able not merely to replace those guns and machine guns, but that they still have got a very substantial reserve. The same thing applies to ammunition. There is an ample reserve of ammunition both in this country and in France.

Our aircraft strength is greater now than before the battle, and we all know what brilliant service our airmen rendered in this battle. Until the whole story of the battle is told it will be almost impossible to estimate the services they rendered in retarding the advance of the enemy, in destroying his machinery, and in making it difficult for him to bring up his guns and ammunition. We feel confident that our armies, Generals, and soldiers will be quite equal to the next encounter whenever it comes.

America's Dramatic Assistance

The next step to which I should like to call the attention of the House is the material and dramatic assistance rendered by President Wilson in this emergency—one of the most important decisions in the war. In fact, the issue of the battle might very well be determined by this decision.

In America there is a very considerable number of men in the course of training, and the Allies looked forward to having a large American army in France in the Spring. It has taken longer than was anticipated to turn those soldiers into the necessary divisional organizations. If America waited to complete these divisional organizations it would not be possible for these fine troops in any large numbers to take part in this battle in this campaign, although it might be very well the decisive battle of the war.

This was, of course, one of the most serious disappointments from which the Allies had suffered. It is no use pretending it was not one of our chief causes of anxiety. We depend upon it largely to make up the defection of Russia.

For many reasons—reasons, perhaps of transport, reasons connected with the time it takes, not merely to train troops and their officers, but to complete the necessary organization—it was quite impossible to put into France the number of divisions every one had confidently expected would be there. Under the circumstances we, therefore, submitted to the President of the United States a definite proposal. We had the advantage of having the Secretary of State for War in this country within two or three days after the battle had commenced. Mr. Balfour and I had a long conversation with him upon the whole situation, and we submitted to him certain recommendations which we had been advised to make to Mr. Baker and the American Government.

Proposal of Earl of Reading

On the strength of the conversation we submitted proposals to President Wilson, with the strong support of Premier Clemenceau, to enable the combatant strength of the American Army to come into action during this battle, inasmuch as there was no hope of it coming in as a strong separate army. By this decision American battalions will be brigaded with those of the Allies.

This proposal was submitted by the Earl of Reading on behalf of the British Government to President Wilson, and President Wilson assented to the proposal without any hesitation, with the result that arrangements are now being made for the fighting strength of the American Army to be immediately brought to bear in this struggle—a struggle which is only now beginning—to this extent, and it is no mere small extent, that the German attack has been held up. It has stirred up the resolution and energy of America beyond anything which has yet occurred.

Another important decision taken by the allied Governments I must also call the attention of the House to. It became more obvious after the battle than ever before that the allied armies were suffering from the fact that they were fighting as two separate armies and had to negotiate support with each other. Valuable time was thus lost. Some of us had been deeply impressed by this peril for some time and had done our best to avert it.

But the inherent difficulties to be overcome are tremendous. There are national prejudices, national interests, professional prejudices and traditions. The inherent difficulties of getting two or three separate armies to fight as one are almost insurmountable, and it can only be done if public opinion in all these countries insists upon it as one condition of success.

The Versailles conference was an effort at a remedy. How were the Versailles decisions carried out, and the extent to which they were not carried out? This is not the time to inquire.

Foch Made Generalissimo

I respectfully suggest to the House that no good would come at this stage in discussing this question. But if any one needed conviction as to the wisdom of that policy, this battle must have supplied it. The peril we passed through, by establishing the conviction without challenge, may, I think, be worth the price we paid for it.

A few days after the battle commenced there were present not merely the Government, but the commanders in the field. We had not merely Field Marshals but army commanders present. We were so convinced—and the same thing applied to the French—of the importance of more complete strategic unity that they agreed to the appointment of General Foch to the supreme direction of the strategy of all the allied armies on the western front.

May I not say just one word about General Foch? It is not merely that he is one of the most brilliant soldiers in Europe, but there is this to be said about him: Foch is the man who, when we were attacked and were in a similar plight at the first battle of Ypres, rushed the French Army there by every conceivable expedient—buses, cabs, lorries, anything he could lay his hands upon. He crowded French divisions through, and undoubtedly helped to win the great battle.

There is no doubt about the loyalty and comradeship of General Foch. I have no doubt that this arrangement will be carried out not merely in the letter but in the spirit. But it is the most important decision that has been taken in reference to the coming battle. This strategic unity is, I submit to the House, the fundamental condition of victory. It can only be maintained by complete co-operation between the Governments and the Generals and by something more than that—the unmistakable public opinion behind it.

Asks Support for Foch

Why do I say that? For this reason: A Generalissimo in the ordinary and full sense of the term may be impracticable. There are three functions which a General wields—strategical, tactical, and administrative. What does administrative mean? It means control of organization, the appointment and dismissal of officers and Generals, and that is a power which it is difficult or almost impossible to give to Generals of another country with a national army.

Therefore, in spite of all the arrangements made, unless there be not merely good-will, but the knowledge that the public of France, Great Britain, and America will assist in co-ordination and in supporting the authority in the supreme strategical plans chosen by the Governments, and in supporting the Governments in any action they may take to assert their authority, any arrangements made will be futile and mischievous. I make no apology for dwelling at some length upon this point. I have always felt that we were losing value and efficiency in the allied armies through lack of co-ordination and concentration.

We have sustained many disasters already through this, and we shall encounter more unless this defect in our machinery is put right. Hitherto, I regret, every effort at amendment led to rather prolonged and very bitter controversy, and these great inherent difficulties were themselves accentuated and aggravated. There were difficulties of carrying out plans and other obstacles, and, what is worse, valuable time is lost.

I entreat the nation as a whole to stand united for the united control of the strategical operations of our armies at the front. We know how much depends upon unity of concentration. We are fighting a very powerful foe, who, in so far as he has triumphed, has triumphed mainly because of superior unity and the concentration of his strategic plans.

BRITISH FORCES IN ASIA

There is another matter to which I should like to refer, and it is the suggestion that our forces have been dissipated on a subsidiary enterprise. Not a single division was sent from France to the East. With regard to Italy, had it not been for the fact that there are battalions of French and British divisions there, the Austrian Army would have been free to throw the whole of its strength on the western front. If there were not some there now the Austrian Army would be more powerfully represented than it is on the western front.

With regard to Saloniki, the only thing the present Government did was to reduce the forces there by two divisions. In Mesopotamia there is only one white division in all, and in Egypt and Palestine together there are only two white divisions, and the rest are either Indians or mixed with a very small proportion of British troops. I am referring to infantry divisions.

I want the House really to consider what that means. There is a menace to our Eastern empire through Persia, because through Persia you approach Afghanistan, and through Afghanistan you menace the whole of India. Had it not been for the blows inflicted upon the Turks, what would have happened? Before these attacks there were Turkish divisions helping the Germans in Russia. They would have been there helping the Germans on the west, exactly as they helped them on the east.

Germans Sent to Help Turks

But what has happened? They were attacked in Palestine and Mesopotamia and two Turkish armies were destroyed. If we had remained in Egypt and defended Egypt by remaining there on the canal and allowing the Turks to hold us with a small force while they were putting the whole of their force in Mesopotamia and menacing our position in India by that means, the Turks could now have been assisting the Germans in the west as they did in the east.

What is happening now? German battalions at this moment have been sent to assist the Turks instead of the Turks sending divisions to help the Germans. The Germans now have sent battalions to help the Turks in Palestine. After all, if you have a great empire you must defend it.

There was a great empire which withdrew its legions from the outlying provinces of the empire to defend its heart against the Goths and those legions never went back. The British Empire has not been reduced to that plight yet. We can defend ourselves successfully in France, and we can also hold our empire against any one who assails it in any part of the world at the same time.

May I, before I leave this topic, say how much gratitude we owe to India for the magnificent way in which she has come to the aid of the empire in this emergency?

It is not the fact that we have got three British divisions in Egypt and Palestine and one in Mesopotamia that has enabled us to hold our own, but it is the fact that we have had these splendid troops from India. Many of them volunteered since the war, and they have been more than a match for their Turkish adversaries on many a stricken field.

Great Losses in France

It is too early to state yet with accuracy our losses, because in the case of a battle over such a wide front, fought with such intensity for over a fortnight, with vast numbers of men engaged, the losses sustained must be considerable. The claims of the enemy as to prisoners have been grossly exaggerated, and Field Marshal Haig has assured me that they were quite impossible from the figures at his disposal, and which he showed me, and the enemy's claims seem quite preposterous from the statement he made to me.

But still our losses are very great and our reserves have been called upon to a considerable extent to make up the wastage and refit the units, and if the drain continues on this scale, a drain on the resources of reserves and of man power, it must cause the deepest anxiety, unless we take immediate steps to replenish it.

The immediate necessity is relieved by the splendid and generous way and promptitude with which America has come to our aid, but they are simply lent to receive their training, with a view to their incorporation at the first suitable moment in the American Army in France, and even if they remain with the British right through the battle, the time will come when we shall need large reinforcements, if this battle continues.

I want the House to consider for a moment what the plans of the enemy may be as they are now revealed. It was never certain he would take this plunge, because he knows what it means if it fails. But he has taken it. The battle proves that the enemy has definitely decided to seek a military decision this year, whatever the consequences to himself.

Reasons for German Effort

There is no doubt he has overwhelming reasons. There is the economic condition of his country and the critical economic condition of his allies. He is now at the height of his power, and Russia is at the least, while America has not yet come in in its strength. So this year the enemy may put forth something which approaches his full strength. But soon he will grow feebler and weaker in comparison with the allied forces.

Everything, therefore, points to the definite determination of Germany to put the whole of her resources into seeking a military decision this year, and this means a prolonged battle from the North Sea to the Adriatic, with Germany and Austria throwing in the whole of their strength.

There are still seven or eight months within which the fighting can continue, and everything depends upon keeping our strength right to the end, whatever the strain upon our resources may be.

With American aid we can do it. But, even with American help, we cannot feel secure unless we are prepared ourselves to make even greater sacrifices than we have hitherto made. I know what the Government wish. I know also what will happen if the demand which the Government is putting forward is not responded to.

It is idle to imagine, as some people very lightheartedly seem to think, that you have got an unlimited reservoir of man power in this or in any belligerent country. We have already raised in this country for military and naval purposes very nearly six million men. We cannot raise here the same proportion of men per population as you can in other belligerent countries. I have repeatedly emphasized that in the House of Commons.

We have the greatest navy in the world, the command of the seas depends not merely for ourselves, but for our allies, upon the efforts we put forward. That is not only a question of manning the fleet: it is also a question of building, of adding to the numbers of ships, and of repairing the ships. Then you have got a mercantile marine, without which the Allies could not continue the struggle for a single month.

Navy and Shipping First

All that must be borne in mind, and whatever happens and whatever proposals we put forward today, it would be folly to do anything which would interfere with the one fundamental condition of success to the Allies—that the navy and shipping must be first.

We have also got to supply coal largely to our allies, as well as steel. But, owing largely to improved organizations in the various industries, to the way they are adapting themselves from day to day to new conditions, and to the increased numbers and greatly increased efficiency of woman labor, there is a reserve of men which, consistent with the discharge of these obligations, may yet be withdrawn in great emergency for our battle line; not without damage to industry—I do not forget that—and not without, to a certain extent, weakening the economic strength of the country, and not without imposing restrictions and perhaps privations, but without impairment to the striking power of the country for war. Nothing could justify such drastic action except an overwhelming emergency precipitated by a great military crisis.

I want to point out especially why the steps taken now are steps which will be useful in this battle. First of all, it is a battle which may last for months. The decision may be taken not now or next month, but may be months hence. But, beyond that, the Allies at the present moment have the same reserves of man power to reinforce their armies as Germany has, without taking into account those great reserves in America.

The German Age Limit

The Germans, however, are calling up another class, which will produce 550,000 efficient young men. These will be prepared to be thrown into the battle line. This is the 1920 class, aged 18½. These can be thrown into the battle line before this fight is over, and we must be prepared for their advent in this struggle this year.

Therefore, I have to submit to Parliament the totals for increasing, and increasing very materially, the reserves which will be available for reinforcing our armies in the field during this prolonged battle, upon which we are only just entering. I will now give roughly some of the proposals we intend to make in order to increase the number of men available.

We already have raised for armed forces during the first quarter of the year more than the quarter's proportion of the original number of men which it was estimated was the minimum required for the present year. We are also effecting a very strict comb-out of some of the essential industries. Very large levies have been taken from munition works. They will amount, I think, to something like 100,000 grade 1 men.

New Call on the Miners

That has been done already this year, and it will, of course, involve the utilization of other labor to a very large extent in munition works. A call for 500,000 has been made already on the coal industry, and these men have been rapidly recruited. I regret to say that military needs will necessitate the calling up of another 150,000 men from this industry. These men can be spared, we are convinced, after entering into the matter very carefully, without endangering the essential output of coal for national industries.

No one is likely to forget the fine response made by the miners at the beginning of the war, or the splendid part they have taken in hundreds of battles since then. They have been loyal in meeting the present demand of 50,000 men, and I am confident they would meet a further call upon them in the same spirit, in view of this great national emergency under which we are making it. The transport services also have been called upon to release the greatest possible number of fit men.

Combing Out Civil Service Under 25

Further calls are to be made upon the civil service. I do not think it is realized how much the civil service has done already. On one hand, it has had to release a large number of men for the army, and, on the other, it has to meet and is meeting the increased strain of work. But even at the risk of some dislocation we must call upon it to do more, and a clean cut of young, fit men must be made.

It is proposed that no fit men below the age of 25 should be retained. That is the clean-out. We comb out beyond that. I shall explain it later. It is proposed that it should be applied to other industries as well.

When we are adding to the age and when we are extending the military age, it should not be said that there are fit young men of 25 who are employed in the various industries of the country. This will bring the civil service into line, and on a general level, so far as a clean-out is concerned, with the munitions industries.

Under an act passed in January of this year, we are issuing orders canceling all occupational exemptions by age blocks in specified occupations. That is the clean-out. The first of these orders is being laid on the table in the House today and other orders of the same power will follow.

I know that the House will appreciate that it is not merely necessary to have men, but to have them quickly. It is no use raising them unless they are raised in time to take part in the struggle this year, when we shall be short of drafts, if the battle is a prolonged one.

The Government, therefore, has shortened the length of the calling up notice from fourteen days to seven and have authorized the sending of notice by whatever method is the most expeditious and convenient. It may be necessary even to curtail the rights of appeal on medical grounds, but for the moment it is not proposed to do so. We have had a good many frivolous appeals, which have wasted a good deal of time, and if that goes on, it will be absolutely necessary, in the interest of the security of the country, that the rights of appeal should be curtailed in this respect.

Military Age Raised to 50

There is another consideration. The strain upon the medical profession has been great already. We are very short of medical men, and we may be driven to do it by the hard necessities of the case.

I now turn to the new proposal embodied in the bill, which I beg leave to introduce today. Our first proposal is to raise the military age up to 50, and in certain specified cases we ask for powers to raise it to 55, but that only when a man with special qualifications is needed.

For instance, it may be necessary to do it, in the case of medical men, in order to secure their services. It may be necessary in certain special classes, with special training and special experience, to secure their services for the army. When you come to the question of raising the age to 50, it does not mean that men between 42 and 50 are necessarily to be taken in order to put them into the fighting line. It may be that there are men of that age who are just as fit as men of 25, but I am sorry to say that that is the exception, and we cannot, therefore, depend upon men of that age altogether to make the finest fighting material.

There are a good many services in the army which do not require the very best physical material, and it would be very helpful to get men of this age to fill those services, in order to release younger and fitter men to enter the fighting line. There is also to be borne in mind the fact that we have to prepare for our home defense, so as to be able to release men from this country and fill their places by men between 42 and 50, who, I have no doubt, would fight very tenaciously for their own homes if there were an invasion.

The proportion of men from 42 to 50 years of age whom we expect to be available is not very high—something like 7 per cent. That is only 7 per cent. of men from 42 to 50 will be available for the army.

I only want to reassure people between 42 and 50 that all the men of that age are not going to be called up to the fighting line. I gave a sort of rough estimate that it would be only a small percentage of men of this age who would be likely to come under the provisions of the bill.

[The Premier then took up the system of exemptions, which is revised in the bill. He explained that the King, under the provisions of the bill, could cancel former exemptions, and that men would be exempted on medical grounds only, with provisions also for speeding up the procedure of appeal tribunals. He continued:]

We have to choose between either submitting to defeat or taking the necessary measures to avert it. We will never submit to accepting defeat.

I need hardly say that this provision will not be used to set aside the pledges given to discharged soldiers. They will be carefully observed.

CONSCRIPTION IN IRELAND

I now come to the question of Ireland. When an emergency has arisen which makes it necessary to put men of 50 and boys of 18 into the army in the fight for liberty and independence—[Joseph Devlin here interrupted]—"and small nationalities," the Premier resumed: Especially as I am reminded, to fight for liberty and independence and small nationalities, I am perfectly certain it is not possible to justify any longer the exclusion of Ireland.

John Dillon—You will not get any men from Ireland by compulsion, not a man.

The Premier—What is the position? No home rule proposal ever submitted in this House proposed to deprive the Imperial Parliament of the power of dealing with all questions in relation to the army and navy. These invariably are in every home rule bill I have ever seen and are purely questions for the Imperial Parliament, so that I am claiming no more as a national right than was ever claimed in the House. The Defense of the Realm act also was extended to Ireland.

The character of the quarrel in which we are engaged is just as much Irish as English. May I say it is more so? It is more Irish, Scotch, and Welsh than it is even English. Ireland, through its representatives at the beginning of the war, assented to it.

Mr. Devlin—Because it was a war for small nationalities.

The Prime Minister—Ireland, through its representatives, assented to the war, voted for the war, supported the war. Irish representatives and Ireland, through its representatives, without a dissenting voice committed the empire to this war. They are as responsible for it as any part of the United Kingdom. May I just read the declaration issued by the Irish Party on Dec. 17, 1914, shortly after the war began?

Mr. Byrne—We have had a revolution since then.

The Prime Minister—This is the Declaration of the Irish Party:

A test to search men's souls has arisen. The empire is engaged in the most serious war in history. It is a just war, provoked by the intolerable military despotism of Germany. It is a war for the defense of the sacred rights and liberties of small nations and the respect and enlargement of the great principles of nationality. Involved in it is the fate of France, our kindred country and the chief nation of that powerful Celtic race to which we belong; the fate of Belgium, to whom we are attached by the same great ties of race and by the common desire of small nations to assert their freedom, and the fate of Poland, whose sufferings and struggles bear so marked a resemblance to our own.

It is a war for the high ideals of human government and international relations, and Ireland would be false to her history and to every consideration of honor, good faith, and self-interest did she not willingly bear her share in its burdens and its sacrifices.

It is not merely illogical that Ireland should not help, it is unjust. If it were merely England's battle, the young men of Ireland might regard that fact with indifference, but it is not. They are just as much concerned as the young men of England. Therefore, it is proposed to extend conscription on the same conditions as in Great Britain.

As there is no machinery in existence and no register has as yet been completed in Ireland, it may take some weeks before active enrollments begin. As soon as arrangements are complete the Government will put the act into immediate operation.

Irish Members Raise Uproar

[When Mr. Lloyd George referred to Ireland, Alfred Byrne, Nationalist member from Dublin, shouted: "We won't have conscription in Ireland!" An uproar followed. The Premier said the report of the Irish Convention was adopted by a majority only, and therefore the Government would take the responsibility for such proposals for self-government as were just and could be carried out without violent controversy. It would be some weeks before enrollment in Ireland began, the Premier continued. One Nationalist cried out: "It will never begin." Michael Flavin, Nationalist member from Kerry, said: "You come across and try to take us." Another Nationalist exclaimed: "It is a declaration of war against Ireland.">[

When the Premier was referring to Ireland, John Dillon, the successor of the late John Redmond as leader of the Irish Nationalists in Parliament, said: "If Irish liberty were at stake I would not hesitate to support that policy. I never challenged the justice of war. I don't challenge it now."

Mr. Lloyd George began: "I don't want to cause trouble—"

"You will get plenty," interrupted an Irish member.

Resuming, Lloyd George said "While we have one ship afloat we should not accept a German peace. The men being taken now may be the means of a decisive issue."

Mr. Asquith said he would suspend judgment until he saw the bill in print. He invited every one to keep his mind and ears accessible to reasonable argument. At the conclusion of Mr. Asquith's speech, Joseph Devlin moved an adjournment and warned the Government that it was entering upon a course of madness if it endeavored to inforce conscription on Ireland. His motion was defeated later by a vote of 323 to 80.

Mr. Dillon said he hoped for the sake of the war and for the sake of the empire that the methods of the War Cabinet in dealing with the war were different from its methods in dealing with Ireland. A bill applying conscription to Ireland, Mr. Dillon continued, would plunge the country into bloodshed and confusion and would open a new war front in addition to the western front. He urged the War Cabinet to inform itself as to the state of Irish feeling before proposing conscription to Ireland.

Leave to introduce the Government's Man-Power bill was carried after further hot debate by 299 to 80.

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