CAUSES OF ITALY'S NEUTRALITY.
From the Corriere della Sera, Aug. 2, 1914:
Italy's decision to remain neutral is based on three causes:
1. The terms of the Triple Alliance call for Italy's participation in war only if Germany or Austria-Hungary is attacked by another power. The present war is not a defensive war, but one brought on by Austria-Hungary and Germany.
2. The spirit of the alliance demands that no warlike action be taken involving the three countries without full mutual discussion and agreement. Italy was not even consulted by Austria-Hungary and the course of events was brought to her knowledge only by news agency reports.
3. When Italy went to war with Turkey, Austria prevented her from acting with a free hand in the Adriatic and the Aegean, thereby prolonging the war at an enormous cost in men and money to Italy. Italy would be justified in acting in precisely the same manner now toward Austria-Hungary.
From Secolo, Sept. 3, 1914:
During the last few days we have assisted at a deplorable example of our Latin impressionability. The first German victories have made Italians waver, and Germany is taking advantage of the popular nervousness, and is working on public opinion in countless ways. Italy is invaded by Germans, who assert that Germany will issue victorious, and that her commercial and industrial activity will not be arrested. We are inundated with German letters, telegrams, newspapers, and private communications from German commercial houses, all asserting that Germany will win, and that Italy should keep neutral, to be on the winning side.
We are not of that opinion. We cannot lose sight of England. Germany knows that England represents her great final danger, hence the bitterness with which she speaks of England in all the above communications. England is not playing a game of bluff. She is not impotent by land, as Germany says, and may give Germany a mortal blow by sea. The war may possibly end in a titanic duel between England and Germany. In this case England will go through with the struggle calmly and grimly, smiling at difficulties and disregarding losses.
From the Corriere d'Italia, Sept. 17, 1914:
We do not know what Italy will do tomorrow, but we are of opinion that, in face of all eventualities, it is the elementary duty of patriotism not to trouble the calm expectancy of public opinion and not to mar the task of the Government, already difficult enough.
From the Messaggero, Sept. 18, 1914:
The Italian Nation is beginning to ask itself whether it ought to remain until the conclusion of peace in an attitude of resignation. It is necessary for us with clear vision to take our place in the fighting line. While the destinies of a new Europe are being decided on the battlefields of Champagne, Belgium, Galicia, and Hungary the Government is assuming a grave responsibility before the country in deciding to be disinterested in the struggle. The keen popular awakening which is manifested in demonstrations, meetings, and public discussions shows that growing preoccupation and varied uneasiness will not cease so long as the fate of the country is not decided at the right time by men who by temperament are best fitted to be interpreters of the soul and the interests of the nation.
From the Corriere della Sera, Oct. 4, 1914:
Many who now invoke a war of liberation complained at the beginning of August that Italy had not helped her allies. The declaration of neutrality then seemed the greatest act of wisdom performed by Italy for many years. Now, however, we must think of the future. Let us remember that the powers will only support our wishes when they have need of us. Gratitude and sympathy are mere phrases when the map of Europe is being redrawn. If Italy desire to safeguard her interests in the Adriatic she cannot postpone her decision till the last moment. Italy is isolated; the Triple Alliance treaty cannot defend her even if it be still in force. Italy and Austria, as Count Nigra and Prince Bülow said, must be allies or enemies. Can they remain allies after what has happened?