FEW SENT TO THE EAST.
As a matter of fact, the numbers transported to the eastern front have been very moderate. Of the fifty-two army corps which faced us on the western front, Germany has only been able to take four and one-half corps for the eastern front. On the other hand, climatic conditions—the rain, mud, and mist—were such as to diminish the effectiveness of offensive operations and to add to the costliness of any undertaken, which was another reason for postponing them. Still another reason lies in the fact that from now on the allied forces can count upon a steadily expanding growth, equally in point of numbers and units as of material, while the German forces have attained the maximum of their power, and can only diminish now both in numbers and in value. These conditions explain the character of the siege warfare which the operations have assumed during the period under review.
Map illustrating the Battle of Flanders, the Battle of Ypres, and the terrain of the frustrated German efforts to reach Dunkirk and Calais.
Meanwhile, it is by no means the case that the siege warfare has had the same results for the Germans as for us. From Nov. 15 to Feb. 1, our opponents, in spite of very numerous attacks, did not succeed in taking anything from us, except a few hundred metres of ground to the north of Soissons. We, on the contrary, have obtained numerous and appreciable results.
[The French writer here proceeds to strike a balance of gains and losses between the allied and the German forces in France during the Winter campaign. The result he sums up as follows:]
1. A general progress of our troops; very marked at certain points.
2. A general falling back of the enemy, except to the northeast of Soissons.
To complete the balance it must be added that:
1. The German offensive in Poland was checked a month ago.
2. The Russian offensive continues in Galicia and the Carpathians.
3. A large part of the Turkish Caucasian army has been annihilated.
4. Germany has exhausted her resources of officers, (there are now on an average twelve officers to a regiment,) and henceforth will only be able to develop her resources in men to the detriment of the existing units.
5. The allied armies, on the contrary, possess the power of reinforcing themselves in a very considerable degree.
It may, therefore, be declared that in order to obtain complete success it is sufficient for France and her allies to know how to wait and to prepare victory with indefatigable patience.
The German offensive is broken.
The German defensive will be broken in its turn.
[It is evident from the report that the numbered German army corps are Prussian corps unless otherwise specified.]