FRENCH HEAVY GUNS SUPERIOR.
Our heavy artillery was in process of reorganization when the war broke out, with the result that we were indisputably in a position of inferiority in respect of this arm during the first battles. But today the rôles have been changed and our adversaries themselves acknowledge the superiority of our heavy artillery.
The change has been brought about in various ways, partly by the intense activity of the cannon foundries in new production, partly by the employment at the front of the enormous reserves of artillery preserved in the fortresses. The very large number of heavy guns at the front represents only a part of the total number available for use. There is an abundant stock of projectiles for the heavy artillery, which, as in the case of the field gun ammunition, is daily growing in importance. The same is true of the reserves of powder and other explosives and of all materials needed for the manufacture of shells.
With regard to small arms, hand grenades, bombs, and all the devices for lifetaking which the trench warfare at short distance has brought into use, the position of the French troops is in every way favorable.
There follows a passage on the development of the machine gun in this kind of warfare.
Owing to the extended use of this weapon, the number supplied to the various units has been appreciably increased, says the review. Not only is each unit in possession of its full regulation complement of machine guns, but the number of these guns attached to each unit has been increased since Feb. 1 by one-third.
The report next passes to the transport service, which, it says, has worked with remarkable precision since the beginning of the war. This section of the review closes by referring to food supplies for the army, which are described as abundant.
LONDON, March 27, (Correspondence of The Associated Press.)—The eighth installment of the French official review of the war, previous chapters of which have been published, takes up the German losses of officers, the wastage of guns and projectiles, and "the moral wastage of the German Army."
The chapter on losses of officers begins with the statement that the condition of the cadres, or basic organizations, in the German Army is bad. The proportion of officers, and notably of officers by profession, has been enormously reduced, it says; and a report made in December showed that in a total of 124 companies, active or reserve, there were only 49 officers of the active army. The active regiments have at the present time, according to the review, an average of 12 professional officers; the reserve regiments, 9 to 10; the reserve regiments of new formation, 6 to 7; and it is to be remembered that these officers have to be drawn upon afresh for the creation of new units.
"If Germany creates new army corps, and if the war lasts ten months," it continues, "she will reduce almost to nothing the number of professional officers in each regiment, a number which already is very insufficient."