The European War
April, 1915
General Sir John French's Own Story
The Costly Victory of Neuve Chapelle
LONDON, April 14.—Field Marshal Sir John French, commander of the British expeditionary forces on the Continent, reports the British losses in the three days' fighting at Neuve Chapelle last month, as follows: Killed, 190 officers, 2,337 men; wounded, 359 officers, 8,174 other ranks; missing, 23 officers, 1,728 men; total casualties, 12,811. The report continues:
The enemy left several thousand dead on the field, and we have positive information that upward of 12,000 wounded were removed by trains. Thirty officers and 1,657 of other ranks were captured.
The British commander's dispatch concerning the battle is long, and says, among other things:
Considerable delay occurred after the capture of Neuve Chapelle, and the infantry was greatly disorganized. I am of the opinion that this delay would not have occurred had the clearly expressed order of the general officer commanding the First Army been more carefully observed.
Field Marshal Sir John French's report, which covers the battles of Neuve Chapelle and St. Eloi under date of April 5, was published in the official Gazette today. The Commander in Chief writes:
The event of chief interest and importance which has taken place is the victory achieved over the enemy in the battle of Neuve Chapelle, which was fought on March 10, 11, and 12.
The main attack was delivered by the troops of the First Army under command of General Sir Douglas Haig, supported by a large force of heavy artillery, a division of cavalry, and some infantry of the General Reserve. Secondary and holding attacks and demonstrations were made along the front of the Second Army, under direction of its commander, Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien.
While the success attained was due to the magnificent bearing and indomitable courage displayed by the troops of the Fourth and Indian Corps, I consider that the able and skillful dispositions which were made by the general officer commanding the First Army contributed largely to the defeat of the enemy and to the capture of his position. The energy and vigor with which General Sir Douglas Haig handled his command show him to be a leader of great ability and power.
Another action of considerable importance was brought about by a surprise attack made by the Germans on March 14 against the Twenty-seventh Division holding the trenches east of St. Eloi. A large force of artillery was concentrated in this area under the cover of a mist and a heavy volume of fire was suddenly brought to bear on the trenches.
At 5 o'clock in the afternoon this artillery attack was accompanied by two mine explosions, and in the confusion caused by these and by the suddenness of the attack the position of St. Eloi was captured and held for some hours by the enemy.
Well-directed and vigorous counter-attacks, in which the troops of the Fifth Army Corps showed great bravery and determination, restored the situation by the evening of the 15th.
The dispatch describes further operations, saying:
On Feb. 6 a brilliant action by the troops of the First Corps materially improved our position in the area south of La Bassée Canal. During the previous night parties of the Irish Guards and the Third Battalion of the Coldstream Guards had succeeded in gaining ground from which a converging fire could be directed on the flanks and rear of certain brick stacks occupied by the Germans, which had been for some time a source of considerable annoyance. At 2 P.M. the affair commenced with a severe bombardment of the brick stacks and the enemy's trenches.
A brisk attack by the Third Battalion of the Coldstream Guards and Irish Guards from our trenches west of the brick stacks followed and was supported by the fire from the flanking position which had been seized the previous night by the same regiments.
The attack succeeded, the brick stacks were occupied without difficulty, and a line was established north and south through a point about forty yards east of the brick stacks.
The casualties suffered by the Fifth Corps throughout the period under review, and particularly during the month of February, have been heavier than those on other parts of the line. I regret this, but do not think, taking all circumstances into consideration, that they were unduly numerous. The position then occupied by the Fifth Corps had always been a very vulnerable part of our line. The ground was marshy, and trenches were most difficult to construct and maintain. The Twenty-seventh and Twenty-eighth Divisions of the Fifth Corps had no previous experience in European warfare, and a number of the units composing the corps had only recently returned from service in tropical climates. In consequence, the hardships of a rigorous Winter campaign fell with greater weight upon these divisions than upon any other in the command.
Chiefly owing to these causes the Fifth Corps, up to the beginning of March, was constantly engaged in counter-attacks to retake trenches and ground which had been lost. In their difficult and arduous task, however, the troops displayed the utmost gallantry and devotion, and it is most creditable to the skill and energy of their leaders that I am able to report how well they have surmounted all their difficulties and that the ground first taken over by them is still intact and held with little greater loss than is incurred by the troops in all other parts of the line.
Describing an attack on the German trenches near St. Eloi on Feb. 28 by Princess Patricia's Regiment, of the Canadian contingent, under command of Lieut. C.E. Crabbe, the Commander in Chief says:
The services performed by this distinguished corps have continued to be very valuable since I had occasion to refer to them in my last dispatch. They have been most ably organized and trained and were commanded by Lieut. Colonel F.D. Farquhar, D.S.O., who I deeply regret to say was killed while superintending some trench work on March 20. His loss will be deeply felt.
Emphasizing the co-operation of the British and French forces and the new rôle in warfare assumed by the cavalry, the Commander in Chief writes:
During the month of February I arranged with General Foch to render the Ninth French Corps, holding the trenches to my left, some much-needed rest by sending the three divisions of the British Cavalry Corps to hold a portion of the French trenches, each division for a period of ten days alternately.
Map showing the field of the Battle of Neuve Chapelle and its position in the Allied line.
It was very gratifying to me to note once again in this campaign the eager readiness which the cavalry displayed to undertake a rôle which does not properly belong to them in order to support and assist their French comrades. In carrying out this work the leader, officers, and men displayed the same skill and energy which I have had reason to comment upon in former dispatches.
Referring to Neuve Chapelle and the considerations leading up to this, the Field Marshal says:
About the end of February many vital considerations induced me to believe that a vigorous offensive movement by the troops under my command should be planned and carried out at the earliest possible moment. Among the more important reasons which convinced me of this necessity were the general aspect of the allied situation throughout Europe, and particularly the marked success of the Russian Army in repelling the violent onslaughts of Marshal von Hindenburg; the apparent weakening of the enemy on my front, and the necessity for assisting our Russian allies to the utmost by holding as many hostile troops as possible in the western theatre; the efforts to this end which were being made by the French forces at Arras and in Champagne, and—perhaps the most weighty consideration of all—the need of fostering the offensive spirit in the troops under my command after the trying and possibly enervating experiences which they had gone through of a severe Winter in the trenches.
In a former dispatch I commented upon the difficulties and drawbacks which the Winter weather in this climate imposes upon a vigorous offensive. Early in March these difficulties became greatly lessened by the drying up of the country and by spells of brighter weather.
I do not propose in this dispatch to enter at length into the considerations which actuated me in deciding upon the plan, time, and place of my attack. As mentioned above, the main attack was carried out by units of the First Army, supported by troops of the Second Army and the general reserve. The object of the main attack was to be the capture of the village of Neuve Chapelle and the enemy's position at that point, and the establishment of our line as far forward as possible to the east of that place.
The object, nature, and scope of the attack and the instructions for the conduct of the operations were communicated by me to Sir Douglas Haig in a secret memorandum, dated Feb. 19.
After describing the main topographical features of the battlefield and showing how the Germans had established a strong post with numerous machine guns among the big houses, behind walls and in orchards which flanked the approaches to the village, Sir John proceeds:
The battle opened at 7:30 o'clock the morning of the 10th of March by a powerful bombardment of the enemy's position in Neuve Chapelle. The artillery bombardment had been well prepared and was most effective, except on the extreme northern portion of the front of attack.
At 8:05 o'clock the Twenty-third and Twenty-fifth Brigades of the Eighth Division assaulted the German trenches on the northwest of the village. At the same hour the Garhwal Brigade of the Meerut (British India) Division, which occupied a position to the south of Neuve Chapelle, assaulted the German trenches in its front. The Garhwal Brigade and the Twenty-fifth Brigade carried the enemy's lines of intrenchment, where the wire entanglements had been almost entirely swept away by our shrapnel fire.
The Twenty-third Brigade, however, on the northeast, was held up by wire entanglements which were not sufficiently cut. At 8:05 o'clock the artillery was turned on Neuve Chapelle, and at 8:35 o'clock the advance of the infantry was continued. The Twenty-fifth and the Garhwal Brigades pushed on eastward and northeastward, respectively, and succeeded in getting a foothold in the village. The Twenty-third Brigade was still held up in front of the enemy's wire entanglements, and could not progress. Heavy losses were suffered, especially in the Middlesex Regiment and the Scottish Rifles.
The progress, however, of the Twenty-fifth Brigade into Neuve Chapelle immediately to the south of the Twenty-third Brigade had the effect of turning the southern flank of the enemy's defenses in front of the Twenty-third Brigade. This fact, combined with powerful artillery support, enabled the Twenty-third Brigade to get forward between 10 and 11 A.M., and by 11 o'clock the whole of the village of Neuve Chapelle and the roads leading northward and southwestward from the eastern end of that village were in our hands.
During this time our artillery completely cut off the village and surrounding country from any German reinforcements which could be thrown into the fight to restore the situation, by means of a curtain of shrapnel fire. Prisoners subsequently reported that all attempts at reinforcing the front line were checked. Steps were at once taken to consolidate the positions won.
Considerable delay occurred after the capture of the Neuve Chapelle position. The infantry was greatly disorganized by the violent nature of the attack and by its passage through the enemy's trenches and the buildings of the village. It was necessary to get the units to some extent together before pushing on. The telephonic communication being cut by the enemy's fire rendered communication between the front and the rear most difficult. The fact of the left of the Twenty-third Brigade having been held up had kept back the Eighth Division and had involved a portion of the Twenty-fifth Brigade in fighting to the north, out of its proper direction of advance. All this required adjustment. An orchard held by the enemy north of Neuve Chapelle also threatened the flank of an advance toward the Aubers Bridge.
I am of the opinion that this delay would not have occurred had the clearly expressed order of the general officer commanding the First Army been carefully observed.
The difficulties above enumerated might have been overcome earlier in the day if the general officer commanding the Fourth Corps had been able to bring his reserve brigades more speedily into action. As it was, a further advance did not commence before 3:30 o'clock. The Twenty-first Brigade was able to form up in the open on the left without a shot being fired at it, thus showing that, at the time, the enemy's resistance had been paralyzed.
The brigade pushed forward in the direction of Moulin-du-Pietre. At first it made good progress, but was subsequently held up by machine gun fire from houses and from a defended work in the line of the German intrenchments opposite the right of the Twenty-second Brigade.
Further to the south the Twenty-fourth Brigade, which had been directed on Pietre, was similarly held up by machine guns in houses and trenches. At the road junction, 600 yards to the northwest of Pietre, the Twenty-fifth Brigade, on the right of the Twenty-fourth, was also held up by machine guns from a bridge held by the Germans over the River Les Layes, which is situated to the northwest of the Bois du Biez.
While two brigades of the Meerut Division were establishing themselves on a new line the Dehra Dun Brigade, supported by the Jullunder Brigade of the Lahore Division, moved to the attack of the Bois du Biez, but were held up on the line of the River Les Layes by a German post at the bridge, which enfiladed them and brought them to a standstill.
The defended bridge over the Les Layes and its neighborhood immediately assumed considerable importance. While the artillery fire was brought to bear, as far as circumstances would permit, on this point, General Sir Douglas Haig directed the First Corps to dispatch one or more battalions of the First Brigade in support of the troops attacking the bridge. Three battalions were thus sent to Richebourg St. Vaast.
Darkness coming on and the enemy having brought up reinforcements, no further progress could be made, and the Indian Corps and the Fourth Corps proceeded to consolidate the position they had gained.
While the operations, which I have thus briefly reported, were going on, the First Corps, in accordance with orders, delivered an attack in the morning from Givenchy simultaneously with that against Neuve Chapelle, but as the enemy's wire was insufficiently cut very little progress could be made, and the troops at this point did little more than hold fast to the Germans in front of them.
On the following day, March 11, the attack was renewed by the Fourth and Indian Corps, but it was soon seen that further advance would be impossible until the artillery had dealt effectively with the various houses and defended localities which had held the troops up along the entire front.
Efforts were made to direct the artillery fire accordingly, but, owing to the weather conditions, which did not permit of aerial observations, and the fact that nearly all the telephone communications between the artillery observers and their batteries had been cut, it was impossible to do so with sufficient accuracy. When our troops, who were pressing forward, occupied a house there, it was not possible to stop our artillery fire, and the infantry had to be withdrawn.
As most of the objects for which the operations had been undertaken had been attained, and as there were reasons why I considered it inadvisable to continue the attack at that time, I directed General Sir Douglas Haig on the night of the 12th to hold and consolidate the ground which had been gained by the Fourth and Indian Corps, and suspend further offensive operations for the present.
The losses during these three days' fighting were, I regret to say, very severe, numbering 190 officers and 2,337 of other ranks killed, 359 officers and 8,174 of other ranks wounded, and 23 officers and 1,720 of other ranks missing. But the results attained were, in my opinion, wide and far-reaching.
Referring to the severity of the casualties in action, the Commander in Chief writes:
I can well understand how deeply these casualties are felt by the nation at large, but each daily report shows clearly that they are endured on at least an equal scale by all the combatants engaged throughout Europe, friends and foe alike.
In war as it is today, between civilized nations armed to the teeth with the present deadly rifle and machine gun, heavy casualties are absolutely unavoidable. For the slightest undue exposure the heaviest toll is exacted. The power of defense conferred by modern weapons is the main cause for the long duration of the battles of the present day, and it is this fact which mainly accounts for such loss and waste of life. Both one and the other can, however, be shortened and lessened if attacks can be supported by a most efficient and powerful force of artillery available; but an almost unlimited supply of ammunition is necessary, and a most liberal discretionary power as to its use must be given to artillery commanders. I am confident that this is the only means by which great results can be obtained with a minimum of loss.