ADRIATIC PROBLEM.
From the Politika of Belgrade, March 30.
Italy is claiming not only Italian territories which are under Austro-Hungarian domination, but also a very considerable part of the most purely southern Slav regions. Italy will have to realize one simple fact. Until this war Serbia was closed in on all sides by Austria-Hungary. She therefore asked that Europe should secure for her from Austria-Hungary at least a free outlet to the Adriatic, the price of which she had already paid in blood.
The two Balkan wars were waged primarily for the same thing, since they were wars of liberation. Today it is no longer a question of the economic independence of Serbia, since Austria-Hungary is passing from the scene, but it is a matter of the liberation and of the union into a single State of our race as a whole. This is the idea which at this moment governs the masses of our people, and the numberless graves of our fallen heroes testify to the sacrifice which we have made for the sake of this idea. Whoever, therefore, opposes our national union is an enemy of our race.
Deeply as it would pain Serbia to uproot out of her heart the sympathy which she feels for Italy, she will none the less do so without fail if ever it should become manifest that Italy's present policy signifies that she desires not only to consolidate her legitimate interests, but also to encroach upon the Balkans by attacking Serbia.
From the Giornale d'Italia, April 4.
No one in Italy has ever said or thought that in the event of a bouleversement in the Adriatic and the Balkans there should be denied to Serbia or any Slav State which might arise from the ruins of Austria-Hungary a wide outlet to the Adriatic. But, on the other hand, no one in Italy could ever permit that the reversion of Austria's strategic maritime position should fall into any hands but ours.
There are political and military considerations which are above any question of nationality whatever. It should be enough to cite the example of an England which holds a Spanish Gibraltar and an Italian Malta, besides a Greek Cyprus and the Egyptian Suez Canal. It should be enough to recall the claim made by all the press of Petrograd to establish Russia at Constantinople and on the banks of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, in spite of all the principles of nationality, Balkan or Turk.
Let the Serbians, in case of an Adriatic and Balkan upset, have an ample outlet to the Adriatic, but do not let them aspire to conquer a predominance in that sea. The Italian people is not, and can not be at this moment, either phil or phobe regarding any other people. The existence, or at least the future, of all the nations is at stake today, and whoever desires the friendship of Italy must begin by loyally recognizing her rights and interests.
From the Giornale d'Italia of April 19.
We reject altogether the idea that Italy would be satisfied with the western portion of Istria, leaving the rest of the Eastern Adriatic shore to the Croatians and Serbians. While Italy would certainly gain by the possession of Trieste and Pola, the strategic position in the Adriatic would still be exceedingly disadvantageous, especially as the Slav claim advanced by certain Russian newspapers, (that Croatia become an autonomous State and divide Dalmatia with Serbia,) includes the right to maintain fortified naval bases on the eastern shore.
This would merely mean exchanging Austrian strategical predominance for Slavonic, and, consequently, Russian predominance nearly as threatening to Italian interests.
The principal objective of Italy in the Adriatic is the solution once for all of the politico-strategic question of a sea which is commanded in the military sense from the eastern shore, and such a problem can be solved only by one method—by eliminating from the Adriatic every other war fleet. Otherwise the existing most difficult situation in the Adriatic will be perpetuated and in time inevitably aggravated.
From the Messaggero of April 21.
We understand that an Italian-Russian accord has been practically concluded. This accord refers both to the war, on which Italy will shortly embark, as well as to the peace which will be finally signed. The French and British Governments have taken an active part in facilitating this accord, as it deals with other questions besides that of the Adriatic.
From Idea Nazionale, May 10.
Italy desires war:
1. In order to obtain Trent, Trieste, and Dalmatia. The country desires it. A nation which has the opportunity to free its land should do so as a matter of imperative necessity. If the Government and the institutions will not make war, they render themselves guilty of high treason toward the country.
2. We desire war in order to conquer for ourselves a good strategic frontier in the north and east in place of the treacherous one which we now have. When a nation can assure the protection of its domain it ought to do so, otherwise its future will have less. It is a necessary duty. There is no other alternative but this—either complete the work or betray what has already been done.
3. We desire war because today in the Adriatic, the Balkan Peninsula, the Mediterranean, and Asia Italy should have all the advantages it is possible for her to have and without which her political, economic, and moral power would diminish in proportion as that of others augmented. To this has the Hon. Salandra borne witness. If we should avoid war we desire less than his words most sacredly proclaimed to the nation in Parliament. If we would be a great power we must accept certain obligations; one of them is war in order to keep us a great power. If we do not want to be a great power any longer, we deliberately and vilely betray ourselves.
The foregoing are the three reasons for entering the war—reasons which are tangible, material, and comprehensive.
From the Giornale d'Italia, May 12.
Italy is determined to realize her national aspirations, cost what it may. For this reason the Government has hastened its preparations for war which, when completed, caused Austria to offer compensations, thus tacitly acknowledging the claims of Italy.
When the Austro-Italian negotiations were begun Signor Giolitti most unfortunately obstructed their successful issue by his inopportune letter declaring that war was unnecessary. Nevertheless, owing to the firmness of the Government and the determination to resort to war, the conversations were resumed. However, Austria, aside from offering insufficient concessions, assumed a waiting policy and sought secretly to conclude a secret peace with Russia. Thereupon the Italian Government opened negotiations with the Allies, which had the effect of increasing the offers of Austria.
During the ultimate, delicate phase of the conversations, when those who advocate neutrality are causing great injury to the interests of the country and also helping its enemies, the Government, reposing in the support of the people, is determined to expose the intrigues and conspiracies intended to favor the Austrians and Germans.
Hence the Government will, if necessary, make an appeal to Parliament. Meanwhile, it will conserve its power and righteously defend the interests of the country.